

ON OLD AGE
ON FRIENDSHIP

CICERO, *Marcus Tullius*

TRANSLATED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES, BY
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MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO: 106-43 B.C.

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Introduction

Cicero's extremely active and many-sided career is the best documented of any Roman of antiquity. Even though some of his speeches and books and letters have been lost, what remains far exceeds in extent and importance the writings of any of his contemporaries. His activities in law and politics naturally produced the great number of legal and public speeches and volumes of letters. But one must look elsewhere to account for the long series of books and essays on philosophical and rhetorical subjects. Cicero, like everyone brought up in the educational system of the Hellenistic age, did not perceive any discontinuity between public life and philosophy. His career was founded on his oratorical abilities, and the study of perfection in oratory was equivalent to the study of rhetoric, embracing style, criticism, and logic. Active public life, furthermore, involved one in questions of morality and expediency, to which answers of conflicting kinds had been given by the great philosophical schools of Greece. It is no wonder that Cicero, with his vivid amateur interest in philosophy and profound training in literary theory, should have felt himself prepared to take up philosophic topics in writing.

Toward the end of his career, in particular, and especially during the six months following the assassination of Julius Caesar (March 15, 44 B.C.), Cicero wrote a series of books on varied but related subjects. These included the *Tusculan Disputations*, *On the Nature of the Gods*, *On Divination*, *On Fate* (lost), *On Glory* (lost), *Topics*, and *On Duties*. This series of books was not a sudden enthusiasm of Cicero's. It continued certain projects he had already begun as a young man. He felt justifiably that at the end of his life he had many

things to say of practical and tested wisdom about the great questions of ethics, religion, and public morality. And among the books produced at this time, two shorter ones have achieved a special popularity, *Cato Maior* and *Laelius*. They are named for the principal speaker in each book, Cato the Elder and Gaius Laelius, and are also known by the subtleties that indicate their contents, *De Senectute* and *De Amicitia*, *On Old Age* and *On Friendship*.

An amazing personal ambition colored most of Cicero's activities. His desire to be remembered as a great man led him constantly to magnify the importance of what he had accomplished, and to undertake late in his life¹ a writing project of enormous size. At the beginning of the second book of his treatise *On Divination* Cicero pauses to summarize the results of this project and to list his future efforts. He concludes, "This would be something marvelous and glorious for the men of Rome, that they should have no need of Greek writings on philosophy; I shall certainly attain this if I complete what I have projected."² Cicero's two dialogues *On Old Age* and *On Friendship* are only a small part of his philosophical writing, but their intent and success must be understood in terms of this chauvinistic, ambitious boast of their author.

Cicero hoped to free Romans from their dependence on Greek philosophical writings not by replacing Greek philosophy with another, but by reproducing it in a summary and attractive form. Thus the present works show little inventiveness in argument and their form, as we shall see, is adopted from a Greek invention. Only the intent is new: to present to Romans the results of Greek philosophy and by this means to

¹ Both dialogues were written in 44 B.C.; *On Old Age* preceded *On Friendship*. A more precise dating of *On Old Age* can be given from Cicero's letter to Atticus of May 11, 44 B.C. Cicero writes, "I must read *On Old Age*, which has been sent to you, more frequently; for old age makes me rather bitter" (*Ad Att.* XIV.21). Whether the essay was completed even earlier, before the assassination of Julius Caesar on March 15, as the opening section of the essay may lead us to believe, is a matter of debate.

² *De Div.* II.6.

render them independent of the source. This program is one of the curiosities of the history of philosophy, and Cicero has been judged harshly because of it. Yet it is somewhat useless to condemn Cicero for lack of originality when he professedly abdicates any pretense to it. Two observations seem more pertinent: first, that Cicero took on a task that was admirably suited to his talents (an amateur enthusiasm for philosophy, a grasp of the uniqueness of Rome as opposed to Greece, and most important a fluent, sophisticated, and mature prose style); secondly, that he was largely successful in Latinizing Hellenistic philosophy and in transmitting it to the "men of Rome," and to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Both of these works are cast in the dialogue form, one that was made a vehicle for philosophical material by Plato. Cicero does not rise to the rich resources that Plato found in dialogues, a richness that has been newly appreciated in recent years. For Plato a key element in philosophy was the *elenchus*, the critical examination of propositions or definitions; the *elenchus* was best carried on in a discussion between two or more people, and this is what is usually found in Plato's early and middle dialogues. The dialogue for Plato is also the means of portraying dramatically the proponents of ideas, so that in certain places in Plato's writings the opposition of intellectual positions is represented by the clash of personalities, one of which is usually Socrates, and the clash brings vividness to the writing. In his later dialogues, however, Plato modified his practice so that the *Timaeus* and *Laus* present a form closer to the one used by Cicero: a brief dramatic introduction followed by a long, more or less uninterrupted exposition by one speaker.³

Plato also excelled in providing for his dialogues historical context. It should be remembered that Plato was not the only Greek writer of Socratic dialogues. Xenophon's *Memorabilia* are exercises in this genre, and Xenophon—though not the *Memorabilia*—is frequently cited by Cicero in these two dialogues. See Index of Names. Aristotle's dialogues, now extant only in small fragments, would also undoubtedly have influenced Cicero.

settings that enhance the relevance of their subject matter. Man's relation to the law and to the city forms the subject of the *Crito*, a dialogue supposed to be held just when Socrates has refused an offer to evade his sentence. The speeches of the *Apology* follow the steps of Socrates' trial.

Although Cicero does not approach the subtlety or intensity of Plato's art, many features of *On Old Age* and *On Friendship* derive from the model of Plato. In each case Cicero selected a speaker who he felt embodied the quality under discussion in the dialogue. In *On Old Age* Cato appears rather than some mythological figure, "so the speech might have greater authority," as Cicero explains in section 3, and as he repeats in section 4 of *On Friendship*: "no character seemed more fitting to speak about that time of life than the one [Cato] who had both been an old man quite a long time and who had flourished more than others even in his old age." For analogous reasons Laelius' figure adds dignity to the discussion and, because he was "distinguished by the glory of his friendship, speaks on friendship." Besides having sought out a suitable speaker for each dialogue, Cicero has provided a historical setting. Not much is made of the setting in *On Old Age*, whose dramatic date is nevertheless clearly fixed at 150 B.C. The discussion *On Friendship* is supposed to take place in 129 B.C., a few days after the death of the younger Scipio. This lends color to much of the material of the work, particularly the eulogy of Scipio with which it closes.

There is one respect in which Cicero departs from Plato's example: he prefaces each dialogue with a brief dedicatory letter to his friend Atticus. These letters break the illusion of the dialogue, but they also explain the purpose of each one; in the case of *On Old Age*: "I want both you [Atticus] and myself to be lightened of this burden which I have in common with you" in the case of *On Friendship*, to fulfill a request of Atticus: "I have written it not unwillingly, at your request and so that I might benefit many."¹

For Cicero, then, the dialogue form was something of an anachronism. In the form there are several difficulties from

¹ *Persona*, the Latin word for a character in a play.

which he did not extricate himself with complete success. The comparative unimportance of some participants in the talk and their consequent lack of force is only a minor literary problem and one that even Plato, in his later pieces, did not bother to try to solve. Another convention of dialogue causes Cicero a certain amount of trouble: the fiction of spoken wisdom and the unwritten transmission of philosophy. Thus, for example, when Cato in *On Old Age* refers to Socrates' words about the immortality of the soul, words that Cicero paraphrases from Plato's *Phaedo*, Cicero takes pains to show not that Cato had read the *Phaedo*, but that, in some vague way, he had heard what Socrates said in prison: "... there were explained to me the things that Socrates spoke on about the immortality of the soul on the last day of his life" (section 78). The same process of recollection across generations occurs in *On Old Age* in the case of a speech of Archytas of Tarentum (sections 39-41); and in the case of the doctrines of Epicurus (section 43) and the teachings of the Pythagoreans (section 78). *On Friendship* presents the same fictitious roundabout recollection in the case of Empedocles' writings (section 24), and again with both Epicurus and the Pythagoreans (section 13). There are apparently two reasons for citing ancient philosophy in this strange manner. One reason is to maintain the characterization of Cato and Laelius. Cato, especially, was not well known as an enthusiastic student of Greek culture, so it would not do to have him appear more than vaguely familiar with Greek doctrines. Cicero, indeed, apologizes for this in the introductory letter to *On Old Age*: "If Cato appears to argue more learnedly than he used to in his books, you may attribute this to Greek literature, of which they say he was extremely studious in his later life" (section 3). The books with which Cicero represents Cato as being familiar are the *Cyropedia* and *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon, both of which are educative and unspeculative. A second reason that may help to account for the odd indirect citations is Cicero's desire to lend a Greek background to Roman intellectual life. In both dialogues he notes the presence of Pythagoreanism in Italy and other examples show an indirect influence of Greek thought

on early Republican culture. Cicero has exaggerated whatever direct contact there was in order to enhance the origins of Roman thought.

One last point on the dialogue form: in Plato there is never any hint that the words spoken by Socrates and others are not their own and historical, even though it is impossible for this to be true. Cicero, however, steps aside from the dialogue in the introductory epistles and himself raises the question of authenticity. For *On Old Age* there is the simple admission that Cato is merely Cicero's mouthpiece. In the case of *On Friendship* Cicero begins with a bit of autobiography, explaining his relationship to Scaevola the augur. He claims that he heard from Scaevola the speeches which Laelius makes in the dialogue. There is Platonic precedent for this distance in time between the original occurrence of a dialogue and later retelling of its speeches, notably the elaborate opening of Plato's *Symposium*.

* The plan of *On Old Age* is extremely clear. Its first fourteen sections contain the introductory letter to Atticus (1-3), the Cato's reply with its eulogy of Fabius Maximus. In section 15 Cato adduces four objections to old age which serve as the four topic headings under which the material of the main discussion is arranged: (1) old age reduces one's participation in public affairs, (2) it weakens the body, (3) it deprives one of all pleasure, and (4) it is close to death. Cato takes up each of these objections in turn and shows that it is badly made; frequently he cites anecdotes from the life of one or more historical Romans to disprove the force of the objection and he is occasionally made to draw upon his own experiences.

* The only remarkable break in this plan is a digression of ten sections (51-60) in which Cato praises the delights of farming. He claims that this is a pleasure to which old men are devoted, but talks about agriculture at far greater length than necessary. The digression may be intended to illustrate the garrulity of old men, or to extend the characterization of Cato, author of a handbook on the subject of agriculture.

How the dialogue *On Friendship* is put together is a question of somewhat less clarity than in the case of *On Old Age*. The introduction occupies the first five sections. Fannius opens the dialogue proper and Scaevola joins him in asking Laelius about his reaction to the recent death of Scipio. Laelius replies in sections 8 through 15 with a eulogy of Scipio that concludes with a hope that his friendship with Scipio will remain immortal. Thus the theme of the dialogue, friendship, is introduced. Fannius' following question gives the divisions under which the topic will be discussed: "What do you think about it; what do you think it is; what advice would you give?" This question leads the reader to expect three divisions in the dialogue, but commentators have had some difficulty in agreeing precisely what they are.

The first division seems quite clear. It extends from section 18 to section 24, answering the question, "What do you think about friendship?" The conclusion of this part is explicitly marked at the end of section 24: "By saying as much I think I have been able to say what I feel about friendship."

The third part—the answer to the question, "What advice would you give?"—extends quite clearly from section 56 to 100. Laelius begins by rejecting three current precepts about friendship (56-59), and proceeds to discuss the characteristics of old and new friendships, the attainment of stability in terms of old and new friendships, the discussion turns from the relationships. At section 76 the discussion turns from the relations between wise men to the friendships of ordinary people. Here the possibility of friendships turning to hatred is introduced, and how to prevent this is discussed. The abuses of friendship follow and the discussion widens to include false forms of friendship and how they may be distinguished from the true. This third division concludes (section 100) with praise of virtue as the essential condition for true friendship. It would seem that the intervening sections (25-55) should answer the second question—"What do you think it is?"—and form the second division of the dialogue. The search for a

definition of friendship begins by an examination of its beginnings; it does not begin in a need for dependence, or in a calculation of utilitarian ends; it is a natural inclination of kindred souls informed with good will; it is its own end, the greatest gift of the gods.

What has disturbed commentators about this middle section is the presence in it of repetitions of ideas. The refutation of the theory that friendships arise from a weakness of personality and from the consequent necessity to have friends occurs in both sections 26 and 46; the idea that friendship is something natural which may be observed even in lower orders of beings occurs in both sections 27 and 81; the idea that the greatness of men itself inspires friendships even if the men are removed in time occurs in both sections 28-30 and 51-52; the task of setting up limits to the claims of friendships is undertaken both in sections 36 and 56. Observation of these unnecessary repetitions and consideration of the transitional passages have led the commentators to assume that reworking has taken place.⁵ Sections 26-43 seem to be a separately written later passage and sections 44-56 are the original form and extent of the second division of the dialogue.

The philosophical content of the two dialogues does not represent one single school of ancient philosophy, but rather Cicero's selection either from his reading or from his memory of ideas from various schools that support or refute, as the case may be, the point under discussion. This does not mean to say that Cicero was completely eclectic. A somewhat scornful bias against Epicureanism is easily detectable in both dialogues; equally evident is a predilection for certain elements in Platonism, especially the doctrine of the soul's immortality. The Stoic self-sufficient wise man is frequently cited as an ideal. The Peripatetic element—the teachings of Aristotle and his successors—is more difficult to isolate in spite of an ancient notice that Cicero had read a work of Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus, *On Friendship*, which is no longer extant.

⁵ See the essay of Büchner cited in the Selected Bibliography.

The dialogues are not polemics, like much of Hellenistic philosophy, nor does Cicero attempt a thoughtful synthesis of various schools as a true eclectic would be committed to doing. The four objections of old age that Cato deals with are evidently not exhaustive, while the three rubrics under which Laelius discusses friendship are not so much defining categories as divisions of convenience. Although the word *amicitia* has been translated consistently as "friendship," the reader will soon realize that for Cicero it involved a complex of meanings and associations. The chief difficulty lies in the political implications of the word. Political "friendship" was an important and serious bond between men engaged in public affairs.⁶ Other notions that differ from this political meaning also appear: friendship as a close intimacy between older men of accomplishment, friendship as the inspiring relationship between older and younger men, friendship as a gracious disposition toward inferiors and slaves. But friendship as the basis of careers and public service is what arouses the deepest feelings of Laelius.

Perhaps the most authentic elements in these two essays are ultimately the portraits of Cato and Laelius. It was typical not merely of Cicero but of the Romans as a people, not to think of old age and friendship as concepts that might be understood by thorough verbal analysis, but as ideals of life and conduct that had once been embodied by great Romans in the past, ideals to the attainment of which philosophy might serve as a helpful guide, but ideals that could never be separated from life as it is lived.

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⁶ See the essay by P. A. Brunt cited in the Selected Bibliography.

On Friendship

Laelius

Quintus Mucius [Scaevola], the augur, used to tell with a

clear memory and pleasantly many things about his father-in-law, Gaius Laelius, and he never hesitated in any of his conversations to call him a wise man. Now when I put on the toga of a man,¹ I had been placed under the guidance of Scaevola by my father with the intent that as far as I was able and he should permit, I would never leave the old man's side. And in this way I committed to memory many wise arguments of his as well as many pithy and appropriate sayings, and I always strived to become more learned through his knowledge. When he died I attached myself to Scaevola the priest, the only man in our city whom I venture to call outstanding both for intellect and justice. But about him another time; now I come back to the augur.

Of the many things he said I especially remember that he,

² sitting at home in a recess² according to his custom, when both I and a very few intimates were present, took up the topic which at just about that time was on nearly everyone's lips; you surely remember, Atticus, even more because you were a close friend, how great was the amazement, or rather the outcry, of people when Publius Sulpicius, the plebeian tribune fell out in deadly hatred with Quintus Pompeius, who was then consul, the man with whom he had lived on most inti-

¹ Roman boys assumed the *toga virilis* at about the age of sixteen.

² Literally, a "hemicycle," a sort of summer-house or an unroofed bay in a larger house.

mate and friendly terms. And so then, when Scaevola chanced to bring up that very subject, he related to us a discussion of Laelius' on friendship held by Laelius with Scaevola and with his other son-in-law, Gaius Fannius, the son of Marcus, a few days after the death of Scipio Africanus.⁸ I committed to memory the main points of that dialogue, which I have set forth in this book at my discretion, for I have introduced them as if they spoke themselves, so that "I said" and "he said" would not be put in so often and so that the dialogue would seem to be held by those present, face to face. For since you were urging me repeatedly to write something on friendship, it seemed to me something worthy not only of everyone's knowledge, but especially of our friendship. Therefore, I have written it not unwillingly, at your request and so that I might benefit many.

But just as in the *Cato Maior*, which was addressed to you on old age, I introduced Cato the Elder leading the discussion because no character seemed more fitting to speak about that time of life than the one who had both been an old man quite a long time and who had flourished more than others even in his old age; just so, because we learned from our fathers that the intimacy of Gaius Laelius and Publius Scipio had been especially noteworthy, the figure of Laelius seemed suitable to me to express about friendship those same ideas which Scaevola had remembered as argued by him. Moreover, this type of discussion, held under the authority of men of old, and illustrious ones at that, seems somehow or other to have extra dignity. And as a result, when I myself read my own words, I am so stirred up at times that I think Cato is speaking, not myself. But as I then wrote as one old man to another old man about old age, so in this book I have written in the most friendly way to a friend on friendship. Then Cato spoke, than whom almost no one in those times was more ancient, no one wiser; now it is Laelius who, both a wise man—for so he is considered—and distinguished by the glory of his friendship,

⁸ This makes the dramatic date of the dialogue 129 B.C.

speaks on friendship. If you will please turn your attention from me a little, you will think Laelius himself is speaking. Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to their father-in-law after Africanus' death. They begin the discussion; Laelius answers and his whole argument is on friendship; reading it you will recognize yourself.

⁶ *Fannius*: Those things⁴ are true, Laelius; for there was no

man at all better than Africanus, nor anyone more famous. But you should keep in mind that everyone's eyes have been turned toward you; it is you alone they both name and think of as a wise man. This kind of tribute was paid to Marcus Cato and we know that Lucius Atilius was called a wise man in our fathers' time, but each for a somewhat different reason: Atilius because he was thought to be learned in civil law, Cato because he had experience in many areas. Many anecdotes about him both in the senate and in the forum were in circulation, either things wisely foreseen or consistently acted upon or cleverly answered; for these reasons in his old age he already had "the wise" almost as part of his name.⁵ We consider you a wise man for still another reason, not only for your nature and personality, but also for your study and learning, and not as the common people usually bestow the title "wise man," but as the learned do. In most of Greece no one fills our definition, for the so-called Seven Sages do not have among their number those who make truly subtle investigations. At Athens we think of only one,⁶ the very man whom even Apollo's oracle judged wisest. They think you have this wisdom because you consider that your entire fortune depends on yourself,⁷ because you think that the evil things that happen to men are less important than their virtue. And consequently they ask me—and also, I believe, Scaevola here—in what manner you bear the death of Africanus. And they ask espe-

⁴ Cicero writes as if the dialogue were already in progress.
⁵ *Sapientis*, "the wise," was his cognomen. See footnote 2, p. 3.
⁶ Socrates.

⁷ See footnote 5, p. 5.

cially because on the last nones⁸ when we had come to the gardens of Decimus Brutus, the augur, to rehearse as usual, you were not present, and you have been accustomed always to meet most faithfully that particular appointment and that obligation.

8 *Scaevola*: Many people have indeed asked, as Fannius says, Gaius Laelius, but I answer what I have seen, that you bore

with composure the sorrow you felt at the death of not only a great man but especially of a close friend; it was impossible for you not to be moved, and that is not one of your characteristics. In addition, I answer them that the cause of your absence from our college on the last nones was poor health and not grief.

Laelius: You answer correctly and truly, Scaevola. For I

ought not to have been distracted from that duty, which I always performed when I was well, by personal inconvenience and there is no case, I think, in which anything could happen to a man of character to cause any interruption of his duty.

9 You act very amiably, Fannius, when you claim that so very much is attributed to me that I neither admit nor lay claim to. But it seems to me that you misjudge Cato. Either there has never been a wise man, which I prefer to believe, or, if anyone has been, it was he. For let me only mention the death of his son: how bravely he bore it! I remember Paullus, I have seen Gaius; but their sons were children, while Cato's was a mature and popular man. Therefore, beware of preferring to Cato even the very one whom, as you mention, Apollonius judged most wise. For Cato's actions are praised, of Socrates only the sayings are. In my case, however, you two—since I now speak with both of you—consider thus: if I were to deny that I am moved by desire for Scipio, wise men would see how correctly I made the denial—but certainly I would be lying. For I am very moved by being deprived of such a friend, the kind of friend, I think, that no one else will ever be and the kind, as I can say positively, that no one else ever was. But I do not lack

8 The nones were the fifth or seventh of each month, when the college of augurs met to practice the rituals of their office.

remedies: I console myself, and especially with the consolation that I am free from the error by which most people are anguished at the death of friends. I believe that nothing evil has happened to Scipio; if anything evil happened, it happened to me. The person, you see, who loves himself is the one deeply upset by his own misfortunes, not the person who loves his friend.]

11 Who denies now that Scipio's life was outstanding? For unless he wished to aspire to immortality—something he hardly thought about—what did he not acquire of the things to which it is proper for a man to aspire? While he was still a

boy, his fellow citizens had the highest hopes for him; as soon as he became a young man, he surpassed that hope with his unbelievable virtue; he never sought the consulship but was made consul twice, the first time before he was eligible, the second at an age legal as far as he was concerned but almost too late for the state. He destroyed not only present but also future wars when he overthrew two cities especially hostile to Roman rule. What shall I say about his ease of manner, his piety toward his mother, his liberality toward his sisters, his generosity toward his family, his justice toward everyone? You know about those things. How beloved he was in the city was indicated by the mourning at his funeral. Therefore, how could the addition of a few years have been able to please him? I remember what Cato in the year previous to his death talked about with me and Scipio: for although old age may not be a burden, it nevertheless takes away the freshness in which Scipio lived even then. For that reason his life was such either in fortune or in glory that nothing could be added to it, and the swiftness of the end took away the pain of dying. It is hard to speak about how he died; you know what men suspect.⁹ However, it may be truly said that of the many days that were especially festive and happy for Publius Scipio while he lived, the most splendid day was the one on which he was escorted home at evening after a senate meeting by the senate.

9 Scipio's death was commonly supposed to be murder, although there is no certainty on the point.

tors, the Roman people, the allies, and Latins—the day before his death, so that he seems to have gone from such a high plane of dignity to the gods above, rather than to the ones below.

13 For I do not agree with those¹⁰ who have lately begun to

argue that souls die at the same time as bodies and that everything is destroyed in death; the authority of the ancients has more weight with me, the authority, in fact, of our own ancestors, who allotted rites of extreme reverence to the dead, a thing they surely would not have done if they thought the rites were of no use to the dead; or the authority of those¹¹

who once lived on this peninsula and who instructed Magna Graecia—which now, of course, has been destroyed, but which then flourished—with their societies and teaching; or the authority of the one who was judged wisest of all by the oracle of Apollo; he did not teach now one thing, now another, like

most people, but always taught the same: men's souls are divine, a return back to heaven is open for them when they depart from the body, and the return is especially swift to all the best and most just. The same concept met with Scipio's approval: only a few days before his death, when Philus, Manilius, and several others were present, and when you too, Scaevola, had come with me, he held forth, as if he were prophesying, for three days about the state;¹² almost the last

part of the argument was on the immortality of souls, which he said he had heard in his sleep in a vision from Africanus. If it is a fact that the souls of all good men fly forth very gently in death as if from the prison chains of the body, for whom shall we think the path to the gods was easier than for Scipio?

For this reason I am afraid that to feel sad at this happening

¹⁰ Epicureans.

¹¹ Pythagoreans.

¹² Cicero here and in section 25 alludes to his dialogue *De Re Publica* (*On the Republic*), a treatise on political science written in 54 B.C. The work has mostly been lost but was originally in six books and ended with the vision here attributed to Scipio (*Somnium Scipionis*), which has been preserved.

to him is more characteristic of an envious man than a friend. If, on the other hand, there is some truth in the view that souls and bodies suffer the same dissolution and no sensation remains, since there is nothing good in death, then certainly there is nothing bad, for when perception vanishes it is the same as if there had not been any birth at all. However, I shall rejoice that Scipio was born, and the city will be glad as long as it exists.

15 For this reason, as I said above, things certainly turned out best for him, but for me it was rather upsetting; because I

entered life before him, it would have been more just for me to leave before him. Nevertheless I so enjoy recalling our friendship that I seem to have lived blessedly merely because I have spent my life with Scipio. I shared with him a common care for public and private affairs, with him both my life at home and military service were in common and we had what sums up the strength of friendship, the highest agreement of desires, interests, and opinions. And so the reputation for wisdom, which Fannius mentioned just now, does not please me—it is surely a vanity—not as much as the hope that I have that the memory of our friendship will be everlasting. And it lies even closer to my heart because across the centuries hardly more than three or four pairs of friends¹⁸ are still mentioned by name. I dare to hope that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity in that class.

16 Fannius: Certainly, Laelius, your hope must come true. But

since you have mentioned friendship and we are at leisure, you would do something very pleasing to me, and I think to Scaevola also, if, in the same way you usually do on other topics when you are asked about them, you would also discuss on friendship: what you think about it, what you think it is, what advice you would give.

Scaevola: It will certainly be a pleasure to me; and when I was trying to make this very same request of you, Fannius¹⁸ Cicero has in mind such friends as Achilles and Patroclus, Theseus and Pirithous, Orestes and Pylades, Damon and Pythias.

anticipated me. Therefore, you would be doing something very pleasant for us both.

17 *Laelius*: I surely would not refuse if I trusted in myself, for the topic is an excellent one and we are also, as *Ramius* said, at our leisure. But who am I? What special ability do I have? This is a habit of the learned and of Greeks especially, to have a subject proposed to them for discussion, no matter how suddenly; it is a great task and needs no small practice. Therefore, the things that can be argued about friendship I advise you to seek out from those who profess such things. I myself can urge so much: that you place friendship before every other human concern, for nothing is so conformable to nature, so harmonious with either good or adverse circumstances.

18 *My first opinion is that friendship can exist only in good men, and I do not cut to the quick, like those*¹⁴ *who lecture on these things in an over-subtle way—perhaps with truth, but hardly in a way useful to most people. They deny, you see, that anyone is a good man except a wise man. I grant their point, but they define a wisdom to which no mortal has yet attained; we ought to be concerned with those things that are of use and concern in daily life, not those things that are imagined or hoped for. I will never say that Gaius Fabricius, Manius Curtius, or Tiberius Cornucanius, whom our ancestors called wise men, were wise men according to their norms. For this reason let them keep their snobbish and obscure word "wisdom," as long as they concede that these were good men. They will not do it, of course; they will deny that this can be conceded to anyone except a wise man. So let us act on our own resources,*¹⁵ *as they say. Those who so conduct themselves, who live in such a way that their faith, integrity, equality, and liberality are proved, and in whom there is no cupidity or lust or unscrupulousness, and who are men of great character, as were those whom I just mentioned—we shall consider that these must be called good men, just as they*

¹⁴ Probably Stoic logicians.

¹⁵ *pingui . . . Minerva: this literally means "with coarse wisdom," Minerva being the goddess of wisdom.*

are usually so considered, because they follow, as far as men can, nature, the best guide to good living.

For the following seems clear to me: that we are born in a condition where there is a degree of society between all people, and that it becomes greater as each one is more closely related. In this way citizens are closer than foreigners, relatives closer than strangers. Nature itself has created friendship among these; but that friendship has insufficient firmness. For friendship is superior to mere closeness because good will may be removed from closeness, but not from friendship; for when good will is removed, the name of friendship is taken away, that of closeness remains. How great the force of friendship is may be realized especially from the fact that out of the infinite relationships of the human race, which nature itself has formed, friendship is a quality so intimate and so restricted in a narrow space, that all feelings of affection are produced either between two people or among a few.

For friendship is nothing other than an agreement of all things human and divine, along with good will and love; indeed I do not suppose that, except for wisdom, anything better has been bestowed on man by the immortal gods. Some men prefer riches, some extol good health, some power, some honors—many even prefer pleasures. Surely this last is for beasts, and the former are transitory and uncertain, rooted not so much in our own abilities as in the accidents of luck. Those, however, who identify the greatest good with virtue do so with excellent intentions and yet this very virtue both engenders and subsumes friendships; and there is no way friendship can exist without virtue. Now let us understand virtue from the practice of our life and our language and let us not measure it by the magnificence of words as do some of our learned men, and let us number among the good men those who have the reputation: the *Pauli*, the *Catos*, the *Gaii*, the *Scipios*, the *Philii*. Everyday life is satisfied with these, and I propose we omit those who are never mentioned anywhere at all.

Among such men, therefore, friendship affords more advantage than I can really say. To begin with, what "life" can be

there is in friendship and concord: for what family is so stable, what city so unshakable, that it may not be completely overturned by hatreds and divisions?

From this it can be judged how much good there is in friendship. In fact they say that a certain learned man¹⁷ of

Agriacum sang forth in Greek verses that friendship draws

together and discord drives apart everything that is fixed in

the nature of things, and the whole universe, and whatever is

in motion. And indeed all mortals both understand this truth

and prove it by their actions. For instance, whenever there

stands forth some helpful action of a friend, either in under-

going or in sharing dangers, is there anyone who does not

praise it to the skies? What demonstrations there were in the

whole theater recently for the new play of my guest and friend

Marcus Pacuvius! When the king did not know whether it was

Orestes, Pylades said he was Orestes in order to be slain for

him; however, Orestes persisted in claiming that he was

Orestes, as in fact he was. They stood and applauded this

action. What can we imagine they would have done for the

real thing? Nature itself was easily exhibiting its own power,

since the audience judged something to be done rightly by

another man, although they could not do it themselves.

So far, I feel that I have been able to say what I think about

friendship. If there is anything more, and I believe there is a

great deal, ask about it, if you like, from those who lecture

about these things.

Fannius: We prefer however to ask you. Although I have

often asked them and have even heard them speak with some

pleasure, still in all there is some other different texture in

your argument.

Scaevola: You would say that even more emphatically, Fan-

ninus, if you had recently been in the gardens of Scipio when

there was the discussion about the state. What an advocate of

justice he was against the carefully argued speech of Philus!

Fannius: Surely it was easy for the most just of all men to

defend justice?

17 Empedocles.

"living," to use Ennius' phrase,¹⁸ that does not repose in good

will shared with a friend? What is sweeter than to have some-

one with whom you dare to say everything as if with yourself?

What would be the great fruit in prosperous affairs unless you

had someone who himself would rejoice in them as much as

you? It would be truly difficult to bear adversities without

someone who would bear them more grievously than yourself.

And then, other things that men pursue usually have only a

single application each: you make money to spend, you ac-

quire fortunes to arouse attention, honors to be praised, plea-

sure so you enjoy them, health so you lack pain and use the

gifts of the body. Friendship embraces manifold aspects.

Wherever you turn it may be observed; it is not shut out

from any place; it is never out of season; it is never harmful.

And so we do not use water, not fire, as they say, in more

places than friendship. At this point I am not speaking about

vulgar or mediocre friendship, which, however, is itself pleas-

ant and useful, but about true and perfect friendship, as was

that of those few who are known by name. For friendship

makes both good fortune more attractive and, by dividing and

sharing bad fortune, makes it easier to bear.

Although friendship includes the most and greatest advan-

tages, yet one of them undoubtedly exceeds the others: it holds

out a good hope for posterity and does not permit souls either

to fade or fall from view. For whoever gazes at a true friend

looks, as it were, at something like a pattern of himself. For

this reason those who are absent are present, and those who

are poor are rich and the weak are strong and, what is even

more difficult to explain, the dead are alive; so much honor,

memory, and desire from their friends accompany them in

the life of their living friends is praiseworthy. It follows that if

you removed the bond of good will from the nature of things,

no house or city at all would be able to stand, nor would

agriculture itself remain. If this is not very clear, it is possible

to understand from dissensions and discords how much power

¹⁸ It is not known from what work by Ennius this play on words comes.

Scævola: What about friendship? Is it not easy for the man to defend it who reaped extraordinary glory because his friendship was preserved with the maximum faith, steadfastness, and justice?

26 *Laelius*: This is certainly to apply force. For what difference does it make on what grounds you force me? You certainly are forcing me. It is not only hard to resist the eagerness of my sons-in-law, especially in a worthy undertaking, but it is not even just.

It has frequently seemed to me, therefore, while thinking about friendship, that a special consideration must be given to the problem of whether friendship has been desired because of weakness and poverty, so that by giving and receiving mutual benefits a person receives from another what he can do less well on his own and for this makes some kind of return, or whether, while this is an essential element of friendship, there is another cause further back, more noble, and having its origin closer to nature itself. For love, from which we derive the term friendship, is essential to establishing good will. For merely utilitarian ends are often obtained even from those who are cultivated with an appearance of friendship, who are held in respect for some occasion; in real friendship, however, there is nothing contrived, nothing simulated: whatever it is, it is true and springs from the will.

27 For these reasons friendship seems to me to arise more from nature than from need, more from an application of the soul with an inclination to love than from calculation of how much usefulness there would be in the relationship. In fact you can see what it is like even in certain animals, which are so devoted to their offspring up to a certain stage and are so loved by them that their inclination is easily apparent. This fact is much more clear in men, first, by the affection there is between children and parents, which cannot be broken except by an abominable crime. Secondly, when an equal inclination to love exists, if we discover someone whose character and nature fit in with ours, there is the fact that in him we seem to

181 i.e., amor, "love", amicitia, "friendship."

28 apprehend a sort of light of uprightness and strength. For nothing is more attractive than strength of character; there is nothing that draws one on more to love. Indeed in a certain way we come to love even those whom we have never seen because of their strength of character and uprightness. Is there anyone who does not contemplate the memory of Caius Fabricius or of Manius Curius with a certain loving good will, men whom one never saw? Who is there on the other hand, who does not hate Tarchanius Superbus, Cassius Vicellinus, or Spurius Maelius? Once there were two leaders fighting for rule in Italy, Pyrrhus and Hannibal. Toward Pyrrhus because of his uprightness we have a not completely hostile opinion; but this city will always hate Hannibal for his cruelty.

29 Indeed, if the power of upright character is so great that we love it either in those whom we have never seen, or what is more astounding, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if the souls of men are moved when they seem to perceive the strength and goodness of those with whom they can be linked by daily contact? Although love is reinforced by benefits received, by the observation of interests, and by a close familiarity, when these qualities are brought to bear on that first motion of the spirit and love, a certain amazing amount of good will blazes forth. If some people think this comes from weakness, that friendship's purpose is for there to be someone through whom each one may obtain what he desires, they permit the origin of friendship to be certainly despicable and hardly, I would say, high-born, this friendship which they wish to be born from poverty and need. In fact, if that were so, the closer each man came to thinking he was least worthwhile, the closer he would come to be perfectly suited to friendship, which is far from the truth. For insofar as each man has great confidence in himself, and insofar as each man is so greatly armed with virtue and wisdom that he lacks nothing and judges that all his own fortunes depend on himself alone, just so he excels the most in seeking out and maintaining friendships. Think of it! Did Africanus want anything from me? Hardly. And certainly I did not need anything from him. But

I loved him because of a certain amazement at his virtue, and he loved me in turn perhaps because he conceived some admiration for my personality, and familiarity increases good will.

But although many benefits followed, the motives for our devotion did not arise from the hope for them. For just as we are not men of good will and generosity in order to exact gratitude—for we do not put out our good deeds on loan but are by nature inclined to liberality—just so we think that friendship should be sought out, and we are not led to this conclusion by the hope of reward, but because all of friendship's profit is present in love alone.

Those who, like animals, refer everything back to pleasure disagree strongly with these assertions, and no wonder, for those who have lowered all their thoughts to a thing so debased and so contemptible are not able to apprehend anything profound or magnificent or divine. For this reason let us remove them from this argument and let us at least understand that our inclination to devotion and our generosity in good will arise from nature once the signs of uprightness have been displayed. Those who have longed for this apply themselves and move nearer in order to enjoy the company and character of the person whom they have begun to esteem, and in order to become equals, peers in devotion, are more ready to deserve well than to demand, and act so that this contest between them is noble. In this way the greatest benefits will be derived from the friendship and its source in nature will be more noble and more fruitful than a derivation from weakness. For if mere advantageousness solidifies friendships, when the advantage shifts, it dissolves the union. But since nature cannot be changed, true friendships, for that reason, are eternal. Now you understand the origin of friendship, unless perhaps you want something added to these things.

Fannius: No, please go on, Laelius. And I answer legally for this one here, who is younger!

Scævola: And you give the right answer. So let us listen.

Laelius: Well then, my good friends, listen to what Scipio and I used to say when we discussed friendship. In fact he used to say that nothing was more difficult than for friendship to last through to the last day of life. For he noted how often it happens either that the same thing is not advantageous or that there is not the same political opinion. He often said that even the habits of men change, sometimes in times of adversity, sometimes with the onset of old age. He took an illustration for these facts from comparing the early years: the warmest friendships between boys are often set aside along with the clothes of boyhood; and even if these friendships last up to adolescence, they are still broken up sometimes by contention over, say, a marriage contract or, it may be, over some other advantage that the friends cannot both acquire. If some men are carried along further in friendship, it is still often weakened if they fall into contention about a position, for there is no greater plague in friendships than the desire in most people for money, and in many of the best people the striving for honor and glory; from this, great feuds have often arisen between devoted friends.

Great fallings-out and frequently justifiable ones arise when something is demanded from friends which is not honorable, a demand that they become agents of vice or helpers in some violence. When they reject this demand, even though they reject it in good faith, they are still considered by those whom they did not wish to help to have rejected a claim of friendship. Besides, those people who dare demand anything they want from a friend imply by the very demand that they would do anything for the friend's sake. Their endless complaints not only usually destroy intimacies but even generate eternal hatreds. These are the many threats that hang over friendships like fates, so many that Scipio used to say that avoiding them all seemed not only an act of wisdom but also of sheer luck. For this reason let us look first at the question, if you like, of how far devotion in friendship ought to go. If Coriolanus, for instance, had friends, should they have carried weapons

against the fatherland with him? Should his friends have helped Vicellinus when he was seeking the kingship? Or Maecius? In fact we saw Tiberius Gracchus deserted by Quintus Tubero and other friends of his own age when he was disturbing the government. But when Gaius Blossius of Cumae, the friend of your family, Scaevola, came to me to ask pardon because I was an adviser to the consuls Laenas and Rupilius, he offered as a reason for me to forgive him the fact that he had esteemed Tiberius Gracchus so much that he thought he should do whatever Gracchus wanted. I asked him, "Even if he wanted you to set fire to the capitol?" "He never would have wanted that," replied Blossius, "but if he had, I would have obeyed." You see how horrible the statement is. And, by the gods, he did just that; in fact, he did even more than he said. He not only obeyed Gracchus' daring, he took charge of it and volunteered to be not merely the companion of Gracchus' madness but the leader of it. And so he eventually fled to Asia, terrified by this madness and the threat of a new trial; he went over to the enemy and paid heavy and just penalties to the state.

Therefore, it is no excuse for the crime if you commit it for a friend; for when the conciliator of friendship has been your reputation for virtue, it is hard for friendship to remain if you abandon your virtue. If we decided that it is right either to grant friends whatever they wish, or to demand from them whatever we wish, and if we were men of perfect wisdom, our decision would have no fault; but we are speaking about those friends who are before our eyes, whom we see or of whom we have some memory, those whom daily life knows. We must take our models from this kind of friend and especially from those who attain closest to wisdom. We know that Papus Aemilius was an intimate of Gaius Fabricius; we learn from our ancestors that they were consuls together twice and colleagues in the censorship; and it is a traditional memory that Manius Curtius and Tiberius Cornucanius were very close to them and with each other. Therefore we cannot even suspect that any one of those would have demanded from his

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friend anything contrary to their faith, contrary to their oath or against the state. What need is there to say in the case of such men that if one of them had asked something unworthy, it would not have been granted? For they were most pious men, and anyway it is as much an evil to perform an evil request as to make such a request. But Gaius Carbo and Gaius Cato were following Tiberius Gracchus; and Gaius Gracchus, his brother, followed him hesitantly at first and now extremely enthusiastically.

Therefore let this law be enacted in friendship: that we neither demand shameful actions nor do them if asked. It is a shameful, a completely unacceptable defense for crimes in general, and especially if anyone should say that he has acted against the state for the sake of a friend. We have arrived, Fannius and Scaevola, at such a juncture that we ought to survey from afar the coming crises of the state. Already the political customs of our ancestors have gotten a little bit out of the right course and track. Tiberius Gracchus tried to seize kingly power, in fact he did rule for a few months. What had the Roman people seen or heard like that? Even after his death his friends and relatives followed him and what they carried out against Publius Scipio I can not say without tears. We have tolerated Carbo the best way we could because of the recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus. It is not right to make a prediction of what I look forward to in the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus. Affairs are slipping each day, and once they have begun, they slide headlong to ruin. You know how in the case of the ballot law how much ruin was caused by the Gabinian Law first and two years later by the Cassian Law. It appears to me that the people are already separated from the senate and very momentous things are enacted at the whim of the multitude. Most people will learn how these things happen, rather than how they can be stopped.

Why have I brought up these topics? Because no one would attempt such things without companions. Good people must be instructed, therefore, that if in ignorance they happen into friendships of that sort by some accident, they should not

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think that they are so bound by friendship that they cannot part company with friends plotting against the state; for bad people, on the other hand, a penalty must be enacted. The punishment is no less in those who have followed another than for those who themselves are leaders of treason. Who was more famous in Greece than Themistocles, who was more powerful? When he was leader in the Persian War and had freed Greece from slavery and had been driven into exile because of envy, he did not bear the injustice of his ungrateful country as he should have: he did the same thing which twenty years before Coriolanus had done with us. They found no helper against their native countries, and so each took his own life. Therefore, such a conspiracy of shameful men should not be covered by the excuse of friendship, but should rather be avenged with all punishments possible so that no one may think it is permissible to follow a friend, especially one waging war on his native land. Yet the fact is, I am not sure that eventually things might not turn out the way they have begun to go. I am no less concerned about what the state will be like after my death than about what it is today.

43 Therefore, let this be passed as the first law of friendship: we should ask honorable things from friends and for friends we should do honorable things; we should not even wait until we are asked; eagerness should always be present, delay absent; we should be bold in giving advice freely. In friendship what has most power is the authority of friends who give good counsel, and this power should be brought to bear to warn not only openly but even sharply, if the situation demands, and the advice should be followed.

45 For I think that some incredible ideas have proved acceptable to certain men¹⁹ who I hear are considered philosophers in Greece, although there is nothing which they do not pursue in their quibblings. One of their ideas is that friendships in excess should be avoided so that it may not be necessary for one man to be concerned for many; one's affairs are more than sufficient to each man; it is annoying to be too much caught

19 The precise reference here has not been determined.

up in the affairs of others; it is best of all to hold the reins of friendship as loosely as possible, to tighten or slacken them as you wish; the chief condition of the good life, they say, is freedom from care, which the mind cannot enjoy if it alone is so to speak, in labor for several.

46 They say, moreover, that others²⁰ speak in an even more inhuman fashion, an argument that I touched on a little bit previously. They say that friendships should be sought out as a guard and refuge, not because of good will or love; consequently, in proportion as each one has less firmness and less strength, they say he seeks out friendship more; this fact explains why women seek out the shelter of friendship more than men, poor people rather than rich, and people prone to trouble rather than those who are considered happy. What wonderful wisdom this is! For it is like taking the sun from the universe when they remove friendship from life; we have nothing better from the immortal gods, nothing more pleasing. What is "freedom from care," after all? It is an attractive notion, to be sure, but on close examination there are many reasons for rejecting it. For it is not logical in any honorable affair or transaction to refuse to begin something or to drop something once you have begun it so that you will not be bothered. If we shun trouble, then we should give up the virtue that necessarily is put to some trouble to spurn and hate things contrary to itself, as goodness spurns evil, chastity spurns lust, and bravery spurns cowardice. You see that just persons grieve most at unjust events, the brave grieve at cowardly actions, and the peaceful at quarrelsome affairs. Therefore, this is essential to a well-rounded spirit: to rejoice at good actions and to be sad at the contrary. Therefore, if sadness of spirit is suitable to a wise man—and it surely is suitable, unless we are to think that humane feelings have been uprooted entirely from his soul—what reason is there that we should remove friendship altogether from life only to avoid taking on some troubles because of it? For once the impulses of the spirit have been taken away, what is the difference between—well, not so much between

20 Followers of Epicurus. The idea was referred to in section 26, p. 60.

tween beast and man, but between man and a log or a stone or anything of that sort? For we must not listen to those who want virtue to be harsh and almost like iron²¹ for surely in many aspects and especially in friendship it is gentle and tractable, so that in the good fortune of a friend it expands, so to speak, and draws together in times of bad luck. Consequently, that anguish which often must be undergone on behalf of a friend is not so powerful as to remove friendship from life, any more than the virtues should be repudiated because they involve many cares and troubles.

Now if any indication of virtue should shine forth, an indication to which a similar spirit may apply and attach itself—

since virtue draws together a friendship, as I said above²²—

when this happens, love arises necessarily. For what is so absurd as to be pleased with many empty things, like honor, glory, monuments, the clothing and ornamentation of the body, and not to take extreme pleasure in a being graced with virtue, in someone who can love and even, so to speak, love back? For there is nothing more pleasing than the repayment of good, will, ~~nothing~~ more attractive than the interchange of desires and services. Suppose we also add a point that can be properly added, namely, that there is nothing that draws and attracts anything to itself as much as likeness to friendship; it must surely be conceded to be true that good men love good men and attach others to themselves, joined almost by relationship and nature. For nothing is more eager for things like itself, nothing seizes on them more than nature. For this reason, Fannius and Scaevola, I think it is certainly agreed that good will is almost necessary for good men among the good; this source of friendship has been established by nature. But this same good will extends even to the multitude. For virtue is not inhuman, not proud and withdrawn; it is even accustomed to protect entire peoples and to take the best counsel for them; surely it would not do this if it shrank back from love for the crowd. Also it seems to me that those who stimulate

²¹ I.e., the Stoics.

²² In section 32, p. 60.

friendships for the sake of utility remove the finest knot of friendship. For it is not so much true that utility is engendered through a friend as that the love of the friend itself pleases. Also, what is obtained from a friend becomes pleasant if it is obtained with eagerness; it is far from true that friendships are cultivated because of need, for those who are endowed with riches and property, and especially virtue, which is the strongest guard, those, in short, who need another least, are the most liberal and loving. I am not sure that it is necessary that nothing ever be needed by friends. For how would my own projects have prospered if Scipio had never needed my advice or my aid at home or on the battlefield? I conclude that our friendship did not follow utility, but that utility came after friendship.

Therefore, we must not listen to men steeped in self-indulgence if they ever discuss friendship of which they have no knowledge, either practically or theoretically. Who is there, by the faith of the gods and men, who wishes to be rich in every resource and to live with all things abundantly overflowing so that he loves no one and is loved by no one himself? That, of course, is the life of tyrants, in which there cannot be any trust, any love, any stable faith in good will; everything is always suspicion and hatred, there is no place for friendship. For who either loves the person he fears or loves a man by whom he thinks he is feared? Tyrants, however, are played up to with dissimulation as long as convenient. But if by chance they are struck down, as happens to most, then it becomes clear how poor they were in friends. For instance, Tarkinus is quoted as having said when he went into exile that then he realized what faithful friends he had and what unfateful ones—at a time when he could not show gratitude to either kind. And yet I wonder that he could have any friends, with that pride and insolence. And just as the character of Tarkinus was not able to attract fast friends, in the same way the riches of many powerful persons exclude faithful friendships. For not merely is fortune herself blind, but she frequently makes blind the very persons she has embraced, and so they are almost

carried away with contempt and insolence; nothing could be more unbearable than a foolishly lucky man. The case may indeed be observed of people who, previously of ordinary character, were changed by command, power, and prosperous affairs; they spurn their old friendships and are addicted to new ones. Moreover, what is more absurd than the fact that when they are powerful through property, abilities, and resources, they obtain everything that money can buy—horses, slaves, fashionable clothes, precious works of art—but do not obtain friends—the best and, if I may say so, most lovely luxury of life? When they go after those other things they have no idea for whom they acquire them, or for whose sake they are taking such pains; any one of those things can belong to the person who wins out with force, but for each man his own personal, certain possession of friendships is an enduring one. Should even those things which are like gifts of fortune endure, a life unadorned by, and empty of, friends still cannot be pleasing. But enough of this topic.

We must, however, decide what are the limits of friendship, and the boundaries, as it were, of affection. I understand there are three points of view brought forward concerning them, none of which I approve. One is that we should be disposed toward our friend in the same way as toward ourselves; the second is that our good will toward our friends should match equally and on the same level theirs toward us; the third is that the value each man places upon himself should be the value placed upon him by his friends. I absolutely do not agree with any of these three ideas.

The first one is not true: that a man should think of his friend in the same way that he thinks of himself. Imagine how many things there are which we do for our friends but which we would never do for ourselves! Asking, even begging, a favor from someone we despise, or assailing someone sharply and berating someone bitterly, things like these which in our own affairs are not very honorable become very praiseworthy in the affairs of friends. There are many cases in which good men forego a great deal of their own convenience and allow them-

selves to be deprived of things so that friends may enjoy them rather than themselves.

The second idea is the one that defines friendship by equal exchange of services and attitudes. This surely is to calculate friendship too closely and miserly—to produce an equal rate of things given and received. True friendship seems to me to be richer and more generous and not to watch stingily that it does not return more than it receives. For there should be no fear that something might escape or that something might spill on the ground, or that something more than is due might be stocked up in friendship.

The third limitation is the worst, that a man should be esteemed as highly by his friends as he is by himself. For frequently in certain people the spirit is rather depressed or the hope of increasing their fortunes is rather broken. It is not the part of a friend for that reason to be the same toward him as he is toward himself, but rather it is to strive and try to strengthen his friends—dejected spirits and induce a better hope and outlook.

Another limit, therefore, to true friendship must be set up, only first I will repeat a favorite object of Scipio's criticism. He said there could be found no saying more harmful to friendship than the one of the man who said you should love a person as if he were going to hate you some day. Scipio said he really could not be brought to believe, no matter what most men believed, that this was spoken by Bias, who was considered one of the Seven Sages. He thought it was an idea of some decadent or scheming character or of the kind of person who considers everything only as it affects his own power. For how on earth will anyone be able to be a friend of the man of whom he thinks he can be the enemy? Why, it will even be necessary to desire, to hope, that the friend sins as frequently as possible so he will give himself more handles, so to speak, to be caught by. On the other hand it will be necessary to be anguished, to grieve, and to be angry at the good deeds and successes of your friends. For this reason this rule, whoever made it up, is only good for removing friendships.

NO REAL LIMITS

The rule should rather have been that we apply so much diligence in cultivating friendships that we do not begin to be friendly in the first place with anyone whom we might eventually hate. Indeed, even if we have not been very lucky in our attachments, Scipio thought they should be endured rather than be considered as an opportunity for enemies.

Therefore, I think these limits should be used: that when the characters of friends are faultless, then there should be a community, without exception between them, of all things, of advice, of wishes so that even if by some accident it happens that certain less than upright intentions of friends must be abetted, in which either their life or their reputation is involved, one may turn aside from the right path—as long as the excuse of friendship may be given.²³ Reputation must not be neglected nor should one think that the good will of the citizens is a weak weapon in conducting affairs, good will which it is nevertheless shameful to acquire by flatteries and fawning. Virtue, which love follows, is by no means to be rejected.

But he—for I often return to Scipio, whose every conversation was about friendship—was given to complain because in all other affairs men were more careful than in friendship; that they were able to say how many goats and sheep each man has, not how many friends he has; and even in acquiring livestock they showed carefulness, but that in selecting friends they were indifferent and did not have, as it were, common signs and pointers by which they might judge those who might be suitable to friendship. For this reason firm and stable and constant people should be chosen. There is a great scarcity of this type and it is hard indeed to judge unless you are an expert. What is more, you have to make the test in the friendship itself, so friendship runs ahead of judgment and removes the opportunity for testing. Therefore, a prudent man checks the rush of good will like that of a chariot and drives his friendship so that he puts the characters of his friends to the test. This would seem to be somewhat at variance with section 40, p. 59.

test, so to speak, as in the case of race horses. Some friends are seen to be frivolous in small money matters; others conversely, whom a small amount of money could not disturb, are recognized when large sums are involved. But even if some are found who might think it disgraceful to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not rate honors, magistracies, commands, powers, and possessions above friendship, so that when these things are offered from one direction, and the claims of friendship are advanced from the other, they do not much prefer the former? For human nature is weak in spurning power. And even if people attain power by neglecting a friendship, they think the fact is going to be cast in the shade, since the friendship is not being neglected without a very good reason. Consequently, in men who are involved in office and public business, true friendships are found only with the most difficulty. Where can you find someone who rates a friend's honor higher than his own? I will pass over that; but how heavy, how difficult to most people seem associations with those under a cloud, associations to which it is not easy to find people to descend. Ennius says rightly,

A firm friend is found in an uncertain affair.²⁴

However these two things convict most people of levity and weakness, either if they slight friends in prosperous times or if they desert them when things go bad. When a man appears who shows himself in both situations serious, constant, and stable in friendships, we should judge him to be from the most extremely rare class of men, from one which is nearly divine. The foundation of stability and constancy is characteristic of that fidelity that we seek in friendship, for nothing is stable that is unfaitiful. It is fitting that someone be chosen who is frank, sympathetic, and of like temperament, that is, who is moved by the same things; all these qualities are related to fidelity; for shifting and devious character cannot be faithful, and the man who is not moved by the same things and who is not naturally sympathetic cannot be faithful or constant. To

²⁴ Ennius, *Tragedies* 216.

tainous and forested places, in which we have passed some

length of time.

But the very greatest thing in friendship is to be equal to an

inferior. For there are often certain superiorities, such as the

one of Scipio in what I might call our "circle." But he never

put himself before Philus or Rupilius or Mummus, never

before friends of lower abilities. In fact Scipio treated his

brother Quintus Maximus as an outstanding man, to be sure,

but not really equal to him—as a superior because he was

older, and always wished all his friends to be able to be more

important because of himself. This should be done and imi-

tated by everyone so that if they ever accomplish anything

outstanding in bravery, genius, or fortune, they might give a

part and share it with their intimates. In the same way, if they

were born to lower-class parents, they would improve their

circumstances, or if they had relatives weak in spirit or re-

sources, they would be a source of honor and dignity to them.

The same thing in plays: characters who have been counted

for some time among the slaves because of ignorance of their

descent and family, when they have been recognized and

found to be the sons either of gods or of kings, they neverthe-

less retain warm feelings toward the shepherds whom they

have considered their parents for many years. I suppose that

this should be done much more in the case of true and un-

doubted parents. For the fruits of genius, of character, of suc-

cess of every sort are gathered most abundantly when they are

shared with whoever is close to you.

Just as those who are superior in the bond of friendship and

lower down, in the same way those lower down ought not to

complain that they are surpassed by their friends in intelli-

gence or fortune or dignity. Many of these less fortunate are

always complaining about something or even casting re-

proaches, especially if they think they have something which

they can allege they have done as a service either for friend-

ship or at some personal inconvenience. Certainly, this type of

person, always recasting his favors, is tiresome. The one who

I had same

in wine

this same man should be added that he does not take pleasure

in bringing criminal charges or believe in accusations—things

which all concern the constancy I have just been talking

about. And so the thing becomes true that I said at the begin-

ning: friendship cannot exist except between good men.

For it is the mark of a good man, who at the same time may

be called a wise man, to hold fast to these two principles in

friendship: first, that there is nothing at all artificial or simu-

lated; a frank man hates openly rather than conceals his feel-

ings with a false expression. Second, he not only rejects

criminal charges brought by another but is not even suspicious

himself, not always thinking that something has been committed

by his friend. To these qualities should be added a certain

ease of speech and manners, by no means an inconsiderable

seasoning to friendship. Gloom and seriousness in every con-

nection do indeed promote dignity, but friendship should be

more relaxed, more free, more gentle and more inclined to

every sort of companionship and ease of manner.

At this point, however, a certain rather difficult question

arises: whether sometimes new friends worthy of friendship

are to be preferred to old ones, in the same way that we

usually prefer younger horses to older ones. The doubt is not

worthy of mankind! For there should not be satellites of

friendships as there are of other things. All extremely old

things, like those wines which bear aging, ought to be very

flavorous. The proverb is true: many measures of salt must

be eaten before the obligation of friendship is fulfilled. And

yet if novelties bring hope, as from time to time fruit might

appear on a promising plant, they must not be cast aside; still,

age must be preserved in its place, for the power of age and

familiarity is very great. In the example of the horse I men-

tioned just now, there is no one who would not use one to

which he has become accustomed if nothing prevents him,

rather than an unbroken, new one. In the case of both animals

as well as for things that are inanimate, custom holds sway,

since we take pleasure especially in those places, even moun-

received the favors ought to remember them; the one who

reason, just as those who are superior in a friendship ought

to lower themselves, in the same way they ought somehow or

other to raise up those beneath them. There are certain people,

you see, who render friendships annoying when they themselves think they are despised; this hardly ever happens except

to people who go so far as to believe they should be despised.

They should be relieved of this belief not only by encouraging

words, but even by action. Moreover, only as much aid should

be rendered to each one, first, as you yourself are able to

perform, secondly, as much as the person whom you admire

and help is able to endure. For not even you are able to help

all your friends to the highest honors, even though you are a

leading figure. Scipio, for example, was able to make Publius

Rupilius consul, but not his brother Lucius. In fact, even if

you could do any favor at all for another, you still have to

consider what he might be able to tolerate.

In general terms friendships ought to be decided upon when

character and growth are already strong and mature. People

who as children were devoted to hunting or ball-playing

should not continue to have those people as intimates whom

they then cherished for their skill in those games; for by that

argument nurses and pedagogues²⁶ will demand most of one's

good will by right of long acquaintance, but, although they

hardly should be neglected, they should be esteemed in some

other fashion. Otherwise friendships are not able to remain

stable, for dissimilarities of character and different interests

follow, and those differences break up friendships; nor on ac-

count of any other cause are good people not able to be

friends with bad or bad with good, but only because the great-

est possible separation of habits and interests exists between

them.

It is also possible to prescribe for friendships that a certain

excessive good will should not, as too frequently happens,

²⁶ Not teachers, but slaves who escorted young children to and from

school.

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stand in the way of the great advantages of having friends. If I may cite more plays, Neoptolemus would not have been able to take Troy if he had consented to be persuaded by Lycomedes, with whom he had been brought up and who was trying with many tears to stop his departure. Often important affairs intervene, so that friends must make a separation; who-ever wants to prevent such a separation because his feelings cannot easily stand it is weak and sentimental by nature and therefore not very fair in friendship. In every affair you must consider what you will demand of a friend and what you will

allow him to demand from you.

For sometimes what might be almost called a disaster is necessary in breaking up friendships—for my discussion now descends from the intercourse of wise men to common friendships. Often the faults of friends break out, sometimes against friends themselves, sometimes against strangers, of which the evil reputation nonetheless besmirches friends. Friendships at this stage must therefore be cleared away by a slackening of contact, and, as I have heard that Cato said, they should be unravelled rather than torn apart—unless, of course, there has been an outbreak of a specific and absolutely intolerable wrongdoing, so that it is neither just nor honest nor avoidable that an unfriendliness and separation should not immediately come about. Or if a certain alteration either of habits or inter-

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ests comes about, as often happens, or a quarrel between factions of government intervenes—for I am now speaking, as I just said, not about the friendships of the wise, but about those of ordinary people—you will have to beware lest it appear that not merely have friendships been casually laid aside, but also that enmities have been engaged. For there is nothing more shameful than to wage a war with someone with whom you have gotten along familiarly. Scipio, as you know, had removed himself from the friendship of Quintus Pompeius on my account; also he was alienated from our colleague Metellus because of a party difference in the government. Both men he treated severely and yet with dignity and with

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no bitter feeling of offense. To sum up, your first task is to see

be; the things which they themselves do not grant to friends they desire from them. It is only proper, however, that one be a good man first and then seek out someone else like himself. In such cases that stability of friendship, which we have been now discussing at some length, can be established, when men joined by good will first will rule over the desires to which others are enslaved, and then will rejoice in equality and justice; when one man will undertake everything for another; when one man will never demand anything save what is decent and upright from another; when they will not only cultivate and love one another but will even show reverence. The man who removes reverence from friendship carries off its greatest ornament. Consequently, there is a destructive mistake in those who assume that a license for every just and sin stands open in friendship. Friendship has been granted by nature as an aid of virtues, not as the companion of vices, so that inasmuch as virtue alone is unable to achieve those things that are highest, it does achieve them jointly and in company with friendship. If this kind of association is, was, or will be best and most blessed for the highest good of nature, I say that this is the companionship in which everything is present that men think should be pursued: honor, glory, tranquillity, and happiness of spirit, so that when these things are present life is happy, without them life cannot be happy.

Since this is the best and greatest, if we want to attain it, we must pay attention to virtue, without which we cannot secure either friendship or anything that should be sought. When virtue is neglected, those who think they have friends discover, at the point when some difficulty forces friends to be tested, rather often, you ought to love after you have made a judgment; you should not form the judgment after you have loved. But we suffer in many things through negligence, especially in selecting and cultivating friends. For we make use of contradictory advice and we act too late, a thing we are forbidden by the old proverb. And so, when already entangled in all directions either by daily familiarity or even by favors, suddenly in

that ruptures between friends do not come about, but if something like that happens you have to see that they appeared to be smothered rather than strangled. You should also be cautious that friendships do not turn into serious enmities from which insults, curses, and quarrels arise; however, if they are not intolerable, you should accept them and you should do your old friendships the honor that only the person who incites the injury is in the wrong, not the one who suffers it.

In general, the one prevention for all these faults and embarrasments, the one safeguard, is for people not to begin to love too quickly and not to love unworthy people. Those individuals are worthy of friendship in whom there is some reason why they should be loved. They are a rare type: in fact anything outstanding is rare and the most difficult of all tasks is to find what is perfect of its kind in all respects. But many people do not recognize anything good even in personal relationships unless it is profitable; they choose only those people for friends from whom, like livestock, they hope they will get the greatest return. Consequently, they lack that most attractive and most natural friendship, the one that should be sought for, and because of itself; they do not furnish an example to themselves of the quality and extent of the power of friendship. Each man, you see, loves himself not in order to get some profit from himself of his own good will, but simply because he is dear to himself because of himself. Unless this same idea is applied to friendships, a true friend will never be found.

For a true friend is, so to speak, another self. If it appears in beasts, winged, swimming, land, domestic and wild, first, that they love themselves—for this sentiment is inborn equally in every animate being—and secondly, that they seek out and go after animate beings of the same genus to whom they can attach themselves, and if they do this with desire, even with a certain imitation of human love, then by how much more does this naturally happen in man, who loves himself and also seeks out someone else whose soul he can mix with his own in such a way that, out of the two, he makes one?

Most people out of perversity, I do not say impudence, wish to have the kind of friend that they themselves are not able to

mid-course we break off friendships when some offense or other has arisen.

86 For which reason so much lack of care for such an extremely necessary condition must be even more condemned. Friendship is the one thing in human affairs about whose utility everyone agrees with one voice. And yet virtue itself is condemned by many and is said to be a mere puffing up and ostentation. There are many who despise riches, those content with little, whom a small income and affluence delight; certain people are inflamed by longing for honors, and yet how many people there are who despise them so much that they think nothing is more empty, nothing more trivial. In the same way other things that seem admirable to certain people are considered by many others to be worthless. Everyone to a man feels the same thing about friendship, including those who have been involved in state affairs, those who take pleasure in knowledge and philosophizing, those who carry on their business at leisure and even those who have given themselves over wholly to pleasures: they all think that there is no life without friendship, as long as they want to live in any way like free men. For in some way or other, friendship winds its way through everyone's life, and it allows no mode of life to be devoid of itself.

87 Indeed, if anyone is by nature of such asperity and beastliness that he flees and hates the society of men—we have a certain Timon of Athens as an example—even so he cannot endure not to seek out someone to whom he can spit out the poison of his bitterness. And it is widely believed, if it could ever happen, that if some god or other picked us up out of this crowd of men and put us somewhere in a desert, supplying there an abundance of everything that nature requires, yet taking away entirely the opportunity of beholding another human being—who is stony-hearted enough to endure a life like that; from whom would the solitude not take away the fruit of all pleasures? Therefore, what I think used to be said by Archytas the Tarentine is true, something I heard our elders mention they heard from other old men: "If someone

went up to heaven and beheld the nature of the world and the loveliness of the stars, his admiration would be tasteless to him, however pleasing it would have been if he had someone to whom he could tell it." Thus nature loves nothing solitary and always leans to something as to a support, which is most pleasing in the most friendly.

Although nature itself declares by so many signs what it wishes, what it seeks out, what it desires, nevertheless we grow deaf somehow or other; we do not hear what nature's warning is. For the use of friendship is varied and multiple, and many occasions for suspicion and offense are given that the wise man must sometimes avoid, sometimes remove, sometimes endure. One principal difficulty must be put up with in order to retain the faith and usefulness of friendship: friends must often be warned and reprovved. These words must be received in a friendly way when they are spoken with good will. I cannot see how what my friend Terence says in the *Andria* is true:

Flattery produces friends; the truth breeds hatred.²⁷

89 It is an evil truth if hated, the poison of friendship, is indeed born from it. Yet flattery is much more evil, indulgent of transgression, allowing a friend to fall headlong to ruin; however, the greatest blame is his who at the same time rejects truth and is driven by flattery to cheating. Therefore, in this whole area reasonable care must be taken, first, that your warning is without bitterness and your reproof without anger; moreover, let there be pleasantness in flattery, since we are so freely using Terence's word, and let assent, the helper of vice, be removed far away. It is unworthy of a friend, even of a free man; there is one way to live with a tyrant, another with a friend. The safety of the person whose ears are closed to the truth, so that he cannot hear it from a friend, must be despised of. Cato's saying on this point is as well known as his others: "It is better in certain circumstances to merit bitter enemies than those friends who seem pleasant; the enemies often tell the truth, friends never do." The absurdity results

that those who are warned do not feel the annoyance they should feel, and receive the insult which they ought to overlook. They are not upset that they have done something wrong; they consider it insulting to be reproved. The fact is the reverse: they should be insulted at their transgression and be happy they are corrected.

Warning and being warned are essential to true friendship; the first should be done freely, without bitterness, the other should be received patiently, without recrimination. In the same way there is no greater bane in friendship than fawning, flattery, and yes-saying. Even though there are many words to name this vice, it is characteristic of untrustworthy, changing men, those who say everything for pleasure and nothing for truth. The simulation of anything is vicious because it blunts our judgment of the truth and weakens truth itself, but beyond this, simulation is especially harmful to friendship, for it destroys the truth, without which the concept of friendship cannot prevail. Since the power of friendship resides in the fact that one mind, so to speak, is created out of many, what will happen if there is not even one mind in the individual, not the same mind always, but, on the contrary, a variable, changing, and shifting mind? What can be so pliable, so dev-ous as the mind of the man who changes it to keep pace with someone else's thinking and intentions, and not merely these but even the other person's facial expression and slightest whim?

Someone says no; I say no. He says yes; I say yes. In the end I give myself orders to agree with everything.²⁸

as Terence says, but through the mask of Gnatho. To have any association with that kind of friend is complete foolishness; but there are many people like Gnatho, whose flattery, because they are eminent in office or in wealth or reputation, is harmful, since their influence reinforces their flattery. If diligence is applied, a fawning friend can be separated and distinguished from a true friend as easily as any smudged or faked

²⁸ Terence, *Eunuchus* 252.

object can be distinguished from a clean and genuine article. The assembly is made up of most unskilled people, and yet it can usually judge what is the difference between a popular—that is, a flattering and trivial—citizen, and one who is reliable, truthful, and serious. Papirius Carbo recently flooded the assembly's ears with such flatteries when he proposed the law about re-electing the tribunes. I spoke against him. But I will not talk about myself; I will speak more willingly about Scipio. Immortal gods! How much seriousness he had! How much majesty in his speech! You would easily admit that this was the leader of the Roman people, not their peer; but you were there and the speech is in your hands. And so the people's law was rejected by the people's votes.

Let me return to myself. You recall, in the consulship of Quintus Maximus, Scipio's brother, and Lucius Manlius, how the law of Gaius Licinius Crassus on priests appeared to be popular. The choosing of colleagues was being transferred to the will of the people. (Crassus, by the way, began the practice of turning toward the forum while addressing the people.) However, reverence for the immortal gods easily saved us in our defense against his meretricious oration. This bill was proposed when I was praetor, fifteen years before I was made consul; the case, you see, was defended more on its merits than because important powers were involved.

What are we to say if on the stage of public meetings, where there are many opportunities for imaginary and hinted fact,

the truth nevertheless prevails whenever it is made clear and brought to light—well, what should happen in friendship, which is judged entirely by truth? In friendship, as the phrase goes, unless you see an open heart and show your own, you have no faith, nothing examined and proved; there is no loving or being loved when you are in the dark as to how things really stand. Flattery, although it is pernicious, still cannot harm anyone except the one who receives it and takes pleasure in it. It so happens that a man who flatters himself and takes pleasure in himself most of all opens his ears as widely as possible to other flatterers.

Virtue is altogether loving of itself; for it knows itself best

wisdom which seems to be able to come to men—to frivolous relationships. So we should return to our first points and bring them to some sort of conclusion.

It is *Virtue*, I say, *Fannius* and *Scævola*, that both solidifies and preserves friendships. For in *Virtue* there is a harmony of affairs, a stability, a constancy; when she revealed herself and shone forth her light and when she has discerned and acknowledged the same in another, she gravitates toward this other and receives in turn that which is in the other; from this there takes fire either love or friendship. For both terms come from the same word, and to love is nothing more than to esteem the person whom you love, not because of some failing or because of any required usefulness, for usefulness flows by itself from friendship even if you should not have survived after it. It was this sense of esteem that we as young men had in our love for such older men as *Lucius Paulus*, *Marcus Cato*, *Gaius Calvus*, *Publius Nasica*, and *Tiberius Gracchus*, the father-in-law of our *Scipio*. Friendship shines forth even more among equals, as between *Scipio*, *Lucius Philus*, *Publius Rupilius*, *Spurius Mummius*, and myself. On the other hand, we old men repose in the affection of young men, as in yours and in that of *Quintus Tubero*; indeed I even take pleasure in familiarity with young *Publius Rutilius* and *Aulus Verginius*. Since the plan of our life and nature has been arranged so that one age arises out of a previous one, it is indeed greatly to be hoped that you can reach life's goal with the same contentment with whom you have been, so to speak, released from the starting gates. Yet, because human affairs are fragile and liable to failure, we must always seek out those whom we might love and by whom we may be held in affection. If love and good will are removed, all the attraction is taken from living. *Scipio*, in fact, still lives for me, although he was taken away suddenly, and he will always be alive, for I loved the man's virtue and that has not been destroyed. I am not the only one before whose eyes it hovers, I who always held it in my hands, but it will always be renowned, pointing the way for later generations. Never will anyone undertake anything considering

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and it knows how worthy it is of love; but I am not speaking now of abstract virtue, but of the reputation for virtue. There are not as many people endowed with true virtue as desire to seem so. Those people like flattery; when a speech composed of flatteries is made to their liking, they think empty phrases are a testimony in their own praise. That is no kind of friendship, when one man does not want to hear the truth, and the other is ready to lie. I think the flattery by parasites in our comedies would not appear funny if there were not bragging soldiers.

Did That's really thank me a lot? 29

It would have been enough to answer, "Yes, a lot"; but the parasite says, "Tremendously!" The flatterer always increases what the person whose will he is flattering wants to be large. Therefore, although that sweet hypocrisy has power over those who attract and invite it, more serious and level-headed people must be warned to take care, to watch out that they are not taken in by clever flattery. No one fails to detect an open flatterer unless he is a complete fool. What you must carefully watch for is that some clever, secretive flatterer does not creep in. They are not easy to recognize, especially the ones who flatter by frequently criticizing and who soften you up by pretending to quarrel until at the last minute they shake hands and allow themselves to be convinced so that the one they are deceiving seems to have been more clever. But what is worse than being deceived? You must always watch more closely that it does not happen:

Today in front of everyone, comics, blockheads, old men, you upset me and made a fool of me.³⁰

Even in plays the stupidest character is the poor credulous old man. But somehow or other my discourse has strayed from the friendships of mature men—I mean men of wisdom, that

²⁹ Terence, *Eunuchus* 391. The reference to bragging soldiers is probably to the braggart soldier in Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus*.
³⁰ A quotation from a play of Caecilius; see *On Old Age*, section 36, p. 18.

Index of Names

(The following index serves only to identify proper names in the dialogues and to supply whatever additional information may be pertinent. Following each entry are the numbers of the sections of each dialogue where the names occur or are referred to. OA = On, Old Age; Fr = On Friendship.)

Aetna. Volcanic mountain in Sicily under which the Giants were imprisoned after their defeat by the gods. OA 4.
Africanus. See Scipio Africanus. Agrirentum. Greek city in Sicily (Greek name, Acragas); birth-place of Empedocles. Fr 24.
Ajax. Homeric hero; the type of obstinate and slow-witted warrior. OA 31.
Albinus, Spurius Postumius. Consul in 186 B.C. OA 7.
Ambivius Turpio, Lucius. Actor and producer of the second century B.C. OA 48.
Andria (The Woman of Andros). Earliest known comedy of Terence (166 B.C.). Fr 89.
Andronicus, Livius (ca. 284-ca. 204 B.C.). One of the earliest Latin poets; wrote in various

Aelius, Lucius. Jurist in the third century B.C.; a successor of Cornucanius; named *Sapiens*, "The Wise," for his eminence in law. Fr 6.
Aelius Balbus, Manius. Consul in 150 B.C. OA 14.
Adelphi (The Brothers). Comedy of Terence, produced in 160 B.C.; involves two brothers raised separately by their father and uncle according to opposite principles of permissiveness. OA 65.
Aelius Paetus, Sextus. Consul in 198 B.C.; author of a famous commentary on the Twelve Tables. OA 27.
Aemilius Papus, Quintus. Colleague of Fabricius as consul in 282 and 278 B.C., and as censor in 275. Fr 39.

able, with soul or hope, who will not reflect that Scipio's memory and image should be an example. I dare say that of all the things that chance or nature has granted me, I have nothing that I could compare with the friendship of Scipio. There, in that friendship, I found an identity of opinion about the state, advice in private affairs, and relaxation full of delight. Never did I offend him, as far as I realized, in the least thing; I myself heard nothing from him that I would not have wished. Our households were one, the same style of living, and one that we shared. Not only were our military careers the same, but our travels and vacations were also shared in common. And what shall I say about the hours of study, always gaining some knowledge, always learning something, those hours removed from the public eye in which we spent all our leisure time? If the recollection and memory of those things had perished along with him, there is no way I could bear up under my longing for the man closest to me and most my friend; but those things are not extinct. On the contrary, reflection and memory nourish them and they increase; and if I were entirely deprived of them, my old age itself offers me a great solace in spite of that, for I cannot live much longer in this desire. In any case all short-lived evils ought to be tolerated, even if they weigh heavily.

This is what I had to say about friendship. I urge you, finally, to put virtue on such a plane, virtue, the one thing indispensable to friendship, that with the exception of it, nothing will seem more everlasting to you than friendship.