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MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON MORAL DUTIES (DE OFFICIIS) (44 BC)
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Cicero was a Roman lawyer and statesman
who was active during the late Republic in
resisting the rise of dictatorship. His polish
style of writing Latin greatly influenced later
generations.
ABOUT THE BOOK
Part of a collection of Cicero’s writings which
includes On Old Age, On Friendship, Officius,
and Scipio’s Dream.
THE EDITION USED
in Ethical Writings of Cicero: De Officiis (On
Moral Duties); De Senectute (On Old Age); De
Amicitia (On Friendship), and Scipio’s Dream,
trans. Andrew P. Peabody (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co., 1887).
COPYRIGHT INFORMATION
The text of this edition is in the public domain.
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educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. Unless
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_______________________________________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.
ENDNOTES
CICERO DE OFFICIIS.
ENDNOTES
_______________________________________________________
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON MORAL DUTIES (DE OFFICIIS) (44 BC)
INTRODUCTION.
TH E RE are two systems of ethical philosophy, which in every age divide speculative moralists,
and are recognized with a more or less distinct consciousness in the conduct of life by all in
whom the moral sense has attained mature development. They are, indeed, in different ages
and by different writers stated more or less explicitly, in widely varying terminology, and with
modifications from culture, religion, national character, and individual proclivities. They are,
also, sometimes blended by an eclecticism which cannot wholly transcend the lower, yet feels
the intense attraction of the higher sphere. One system is that which makes virtue a means;
the other, that which makes it an end. According to the one, we are to practise virtue for the
good that will come of it to ourselves or our fellow-beings; according to the other, we are to
practise virtue for its own sake, for its intrinsic fitness and excellence, without reference to
ulterior consequences, save when, and so far as, those consequences are essential factors in
determining the intrinsic quality of the action.
Of course, this general division admits of obvious subdivisions. The former system includes the
selfish and the utilitarian theory of morals, — the selfish making the pursuit of our own
happiness our duty, and adaptation to that end the sole standard of right; the utilitarian
identifying virtue with benevolence, accounting the greatest good of the greatest number the
supreme aim, and beneficent utility the ultimate standard of duty. The alternative system,
according to which virtue is to be practised, not for what it does, but for what it is, includes,
also, various definitions of virtue, according as its standard is deemed to be intrinsic fitness,
accordance with the aesthetic nature, the verdict of the moral sense, or conformity to the will
of God. These latter theories, widely as they differ, agree in representing the right as having a
validity independent of circumstances and of human judgment, as unaffected by the time-and-
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validity independent of circumstances and of human judgment, as unaffected by the time-and-
place element, as possessed of characteristics connate, indelible, eternal; while the selfish and
utilitarian schools alike represent it as mutable, dependent on circumstances, varying with time
and place, and possessed of no attributes distinctively its own.
In Cicero’s time the left and the right wing in ethical philosophy were represented by the
Epicureans and the Stoics respectively, while the Peripatetics held a middle ground. The
Epicureans regarded happiness — or, according to their founder, painlessness — as the sole aim
and end of moral conduct, and thus resolved all virtue into prudence, or judicious self-love, — a
doctrine which with such a disciple as Pliny the Younger identified virtue with the highest self-
culture as alone conducive to the happiness of the entire selfhood, intellectual and spiritual as
well as bodily; but with Horace and his like, and with Rousseau, who professed adherence to
that school, afforded license and amnesty to the most debasing sensuality.
The Stoics regarded virtue as the sole aim and end of life, and virtue is, in their philosophy, the
conformity of the will and conduct to universal nature, — intrinsic fitness thus being the law
and the criterion of the right. Complete conformity, or perfect virtue, is, according to this
school, attainable only by the truly wise; and its earlier disciples, while by no means certain
that this ideal perfectness had ever been realized in human form even by Zeno, the great
master, yet admitted no moral distinction between those who fell but little short of perfection
and those who had made no progress toward it. The later Stoics, however, recognized degrees
of goodness, and were diligent expositors and teachers of the duties within the scope of those
not truly wise, by the practice of which there might be an ever nearer approach to perfection.
This philosophy was, from Cicero’s time till Christianity gained ascendency, the only antiseptic
that preserved Roman society from utter and remediless corruption.
The Peripatetic philosophy makes virtue to consist in moderation, or the avoidance of extremes,
and places each of the individual virtues midway between opposite vices, as temperance
between excess and asceticism; generosity between prodigality and avarice; meekness between
irascibility and pusillanimity. It admits the reality of the intrinsically right as distinguished from
the merely expedient or useful; but it maintains that happiness is the supreme object and end
of life, and that for this end, virtue, though essential, is not sufficient without external goods,
— so that the wisely virtuous man, while he will never violate the right, will pursue by all
legitimate means such outward advantages as may be within his reach.
The New Academy, whose philosophy was a blending of Platonism and Pyrrhonism, while it
denied the attainableness of objective truth, maintained that on all subjects of speculative
philosophy probability is attainable, and that wherever there is scope for action, the moral
agent is bound to act in accordance with probability, — of two courses to pursue that for which
the more and the better reasons can be given. The disciples of this school accepted
provisionally the Peripatetic ethics.
Cicero professed to belong to the New Academy, and its ethical position was in close
accordance with his nature. Opinion rather than belief was his mental habit, — strong opinion,
indeed, yet less than certainty. His instincts as an advocate — often induced by professional
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indeed, yet less than certainty. His instincts as an advocate — often induced by professional
exigencies, not only to cast doubt on what he had previously affirmed, but with the ardor of
one who threw himself with his whole soul into the case in hand to feel such doubt before he
gave it utterance — made the scepticism of this school congenial to him. At the same time, his
love of elegant ease and luxury and his lack of moral enterprise — though not of courage when
emergencies were forced upon him — were in closer affinity with the practical ethics of the
Peripatetics than with the more rigid system of the Stoics; while his pure moral taste and his
genuine reverence for the right brought him into sympathy with the Stoic school. Under no
culture short of that Christian regeneration which is less a culture than a power could he have
become heroically virtuous; under no conceivable influence could he, such as he was in his early
manhood, have become grossly vicious. He believed in virtue, admired it, loved it. His aesthetic
nature was pre-eminently true and pure. His private character indicates high-toned principle. In
an age when all things were venal, no charge of corruption was ever urged against him, even
by an enemy. He neither bought office, nor sold its functions. Associating familiarly with well-
known convivialists, who regarded a wine-debauch as always a welcome episode in the pursuits
whether of war or of peace, we have no vestige of a proof that he ever transgressed the
bounds of temperance, and there is not a word in his writings that indicates any sympathy with
excesses of the table. Living at a time when licentiousness in its foulest forms was professed
without shame and practised without rebuke, we have reason to believe that he led a chaste
life from his youth; and though as an advocate he was sometimes obliged to refer to subjects
and transactions offensive to purity, and in his letters there are passages which might seem out
of place in the correspondence of a Christian scholar of the nineteenth century, it may be
doubted whether in all his extant writings there is a single sentence inconsistent with what a
purist of his own age would have deemed a blameless moral character.
He has been, indeed, charged by some of his biographers with motives of the lowest order in
the divorce of the mother of his children after a union of thirty years, and his marriage with a
young heiress, his own ward. But by the best standard that he knew, though not by the
Christian standard so profligately ignored and outraged in our own section of Christendom, he
was more than justified. His wife was no little of a virago, had wasted a great deal of money
for him in his absence, and had willed property under her control in such a way as to give him
just displeasure; and it appears from his letters that he exercised the then unquestioned right
of divorce solely on these grounds, with no specific marriage in view, and that the alliance
which he actually made was preceded by overtures both to and from other candidates for that
honor. Moreover, the charge of mercenary views in this marriage is negatived by its speedy
dissolution on his part, with the sacrifice of the entire and large fortune which it brought to
him, on the sole ground that his bride had manifested unseemly satisfaction in the death of his
daughter Tullia, whom she regarded as her rival in her husband’s affection.
Yet there were heights of virtue beyond Cicero’s scope. He was wholly destitute of the martyr-
spirit. He was much of a Sybarite in his habits. His many villas, furnished with equal taste and
splendor, gave him the sumptuous surroundings and the aesthetic leisure without which he
could not regard even virtue as sufficient for his happiness, and times of enforced absence from
wonted pursuits and enjoyments were filled with unmanly complaint and self-commiseration. He
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wonted pursuits and enjoyments were filled with unmanly complaint and self-commiseration. He
loved applause, suffered keenly from unpopularity, and vacillated in his political allegiance,
sometimes with the breeze of public opinion, sometimes with his faith in the fortunes of an
eminent leader. He often worshipped with manifest sincerity the ascending star, and had little
sympathy with fallen greatness. He was thoroughly patriotic, would have sacrificed for his
country anything and everything except his own fame, and coveted nothing so much as
opportunities like that afforded by the Catilinian conspiracy for winning celebrity by signal
service to the republic. He had, too, large and profound wisdom as a statesman; but his best
judgment generally came too late for action, so that had he derived a surname from classic
fable, it would have been Epimetheus, not Prometheus. As an advocate he was supple and
many-sided, yet he always impresses his reader with his sincerity, and probably a prime
element of his pre-eminent success in the courts was the capacity of making a cause his own,
and throwing into it for the time genuine feeling and not its mere eloquent semblance.
His lot was cast in an age when only an iron will could have maintained, along with the
conscious integrity which, as I think, characterized Cicero’s whole life, the perfect self-
consistency which no stress could bend or warp. When we compare him with his most illustrious
contemporaries, it is impossible not to assign to him a preeminent place both as to private
virtues and as to public services. It is only when we try him by his own standard that we have
a vivid sense of his deficiencies and shortcomings.
Cicero’s only son, with the heritage of his name, Marcus Tullius, seems to have inherited few of
his father’s distinguishing characteristics, and not improbably may have borne, in some
respects, a close moral kindred to his high-spirited mother. He was impetuous, irascible,
headstrong, brave as a soldier, and though indolent except when roused to action, not without
ability and learning. At the age of sixteen he served with great credit in Pompey’s army. After
the defeat of Pharsalia he was sent to Athens to complete his education. He fell there into
habits of gross dissipation, being led astray by one of his teachers. He, however, yielded to his
father’s earnest remonstrances, expressed great grief and shame for his misconduct, and
entered upon a regular and studious course of life, winning high credit with Cratippus his
teacher, and receiving warm commendation from his father’s friends resident or sojourning in
Athens. He subsequently fought with distinction under Marcus Brutus, and after the battle of
Philippi joined Sextus Pompeius in Sicily. Returning to Rome when peace was concluded with
the Triumvirate, he was an object of special regard with Augustus, and after holding several
offices of lower grade, became his colleague in the consulship. He afterward went as proconsul
to Asia Minor, where his name drops from history, which but for his father might never have
found place for it.
When it appeared that Brutus and Cassius had effected nothing for the republic, and Antony
was becoming all-powerful in the state, in the spring of 44 B. C ., Cicero, deeming his life
insecure, left Rome, and spent the summer successively at several of his villas in Western Italy.
He beguiled his disappointment and sorrow at the issue of public affairs by philosophy and
ethics, and this summer seems to have been, at least for posterity, the most fruitful season of
his life, being the epoch of the completion of his Tusculan Disputations and his De Natura
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Deorum, and of the composition of several of his smaller treatises. In June of that year he says,
in a letter to Atticus, that he is writing for his son’s benefit an elaborate treatise on Morals. “On
what subject,” he asks, “can a father better write to a son?” In the latter part of the summer
he started on a journey to Athens to visit his son, but was recalled by the intelligence of a
probable understanding on amicable terms between Antony and the Senate. Deceived in this
hope, he repaired to Rome, and pronounced his first Philippic against Antony in the beginning
of September. In November he writes again about his ethical work, tells Atticus that he has
completed two books and is busy on the third, and announces and explains the title. The work
was completed before the end of the year.
Cicero’s time was a period of eclecticism in philosophy, especially so among the cultivated
Romans, with whom philosophy was not indigenous, but a comparatively recent importation.
Cicero himself was pre-eminently a lover of philosophical thought, study, and discussion, and
probably was more intimately conversant with the history of opinions and the contents of books
in that department than any man of his time; yet he seems to have lacked profound convictions
on the subjects at issue among the several schools. Thus in the De Officiis, while he repeatedly
professes his adherence to the New Academy and the Peripatetic doctrine of morals, he bases
his discussion on the Stoic theory, and intimates very clearly that he thought his son safer
under the rigid discipline of the Stoic school than under the more lax though wise tuition of his
Peripatetic preceptor. It is as if a Mohammedan, while recognizing the divine mission of the
Arab prophet, were to write for his son a treatise on the ethics of the New Testament as better
adapted than the moral system of the Koran for the training and confirming of a young man in
the practice of virtue.
This treatise, then, may be regarded as an exposition of the ethical system of the Stoics of
Cicero’s time, yet with a special limitation, purpose, and adaptation. It is not designed for the
ideally perfect philosopher, nor for a candidate for that exalted position, but for one on the
lower plane of common life. It therefore defines not the moral consciousness of the truly wise
man, but the specific duties by the practice of which one may grow into the semblance of true
wisdom. Nor does it purport to be a compendium even of these duties. It is simply a directory
for a young Roman of high rank and promise, who is going to enter upon public life, and to be
a candidate for office and honor in the state. It prescribes the self-training, the social relations,
and the habits of living, by which such a youth may both deserve and attain distinction and
eminence, and the respect and confidence of his fellow-citizens. Of course, many of the details
in this treatise were of merely local and transient import and value; but its underlying principles
are in such close harmony with the absolute and eternal right that they can never become
obsolete. At the same time, the division and arrangement of the treatise give it, so far as I
know, the precedence over all other ethical treatises ancient or modern. The division is
exhaustive. The arrangement is such as to leave an open space for the insertion and full
treatment of any topic within the scope of ethical philosophy.
The First Book treats of the Right. The right consists in accordance with nature, with the nature
of things, with the nature of man. Hence is derived its imperative obligation upon the human
conscience. Its duties are evolved from man’s own consciousness. Man by his very nature
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conscience. Its duties are evolved from man’s own consciousness. Man by his very nature
desires knowledge, and craves materials for the active exercise of his cognitive powers. He is
by his birth, by his instinctive cravings, by the necessity of his daily life, a gregarious being, a
member of a family, of society, of the state, and as such cannot but recognize justice, including
benevolence, as his imperative duty. He postulates distinction, eminence, a position from which
he can look down on earthly fortunes as beneath him, and can sacrifice all exterior good for the
service of mankind and the attainment of merited fame. He has also an innate sense of order,
proportion, harmony, which can satisfy itself only by practical reference to the due time, place,
manner, and measure of whatever is done or said. Hence the four virtues of Prudence or
Wisdom, Justice, Fortitude or Magnanimity, and Order, Temperance, or Moderation. These
virtues in their broadest significance include all human obligations,1 and form a series of
divisions, under one or another of which may be classed every specific duty. Under each of
these heads Cicero shows what was demanded by the highest sentiment of his time from a
youth of spotless fame and of honorable ambition.
The Second Book has Expediency, or Utility, for its subject. Outside of the province of duty or
of things required there is large room for choice among things permitted, — consistent with the
Right, yet forming no part of it. The question that underlies this Book is, By what honorable
methods, other than the discharge of express duty, can a young man secure for himself the
favor, gratitude, assistance, and — in case of need — the suffrages of his fellow-citizens? This
Book has its proper place in a treatise on morals, because it is the author’s aim throughout to
discriminate between the immoral and the legitimate modes of obtaining reputation and
popularity.
The Third Book deals with the alleged or seeming discrepancy between the Expedient and the
Right. Cicero denies the possibility of such mutual repugnance, and maintains that whatever is
expedient must of necessity be right, and that what is right cannot be otherwise than
expedient.
In this translation I have attempted to give, not a word-for-word version of the Latin text, but
a literal transcript in English of what I suppose that Cicero meant to write in his own tongue. I
have not used his moods and tenses in the instances in which our English idiom would employ
a different form of the verb. I have not infrequently omitted the connective and illative words
that bind sentence to sentence, in cases in which we should use no such words.1 In the few
obscure passages I have sought the aid of the best commentators, but have generally found
them hazy or ambiguous in their interpretation where there was any room for doubt. I may
have made mistakes in translating; but if so, it has not been for lack of close and careful study,
with the help of the best editions which I could procure for myself or find in the Harvard
College Library.
I have used Beier’s text as the basis for my translation, and have preferred not to deviate from
it even where a different reading seemed to me intrinsically probable; for in every such
instance Beier gives satisfactory reasons for his preferred reading, and destitute as I am of the
needed apparatus for textual criticism, I cannot but regard his judgment in such a case as
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needed apparatus for textual criticism, I cannot but regard his judgment in such a case as
much better than my own.
Endnotes
[1 ] See p. 10, note.
[1 ] I am strongly impressed with the belief that such words were largely employed as catch-
words for the eye, and that they served the purpose now effected by punctuation and by the
capital letters at the beginning of sentences. This opinion cannot of course be verified; yet could
we have phonographic reports of Cicero’s orations, I am inclined to think that we should miss
some of the conjunctions that are found in their written form. As to Greek particles I have no
right to an opinion; but I will hazard the conjecture that they would have been scattered with a
more sparing hand, had the art of punctuation been coeval with “the letters Cadmus gave.”
CICERO DE OFFICIIS.
BOOK I.
1. ALT H O U GH you, my son Marcus, having listened for a year to Cratippus, and that at Athens,
ought to be well versed in the maxims and principles of philosophy, on account of the
paramount authority both of the teacher and of the city, — the former being able to enrich you
with knowledge; the latter, with examples, — yet, as for my own benefit I have always
connected Latin with Greek, and have done so, not only in philosophy, but also in my self-
training as a public speaker, I think that you, too, ought to do the same, in order that you may
be equally capable of either style of discourse.1 To this end I have, as it seems to me, been of
no small service to my fellow-citizens, so that not only those ignorant of Greek literature, but
highly educated men also, think that they have gained somewhat from me, both as to public
speaking and as to philosophical discussion. Therefore, while you will be the pupil of the first
philosopher of our time, and will continue so as long as you please, — and that ought to be as
long as you can profit by his instruction, — yet by reading my writings, which dissent very little
from the Peripatetics (for both they and I regard ourselves as disciples both of Socrates and of
Plato), though on the subjects of discussion I would have you freely exercise your own
judgment, you will certainly acquire a fuller command of the Latin tongue. Nor in speaking thus
ought I to be regarded as presumptuous. For while in the science of philosophy I may have
many superiors, if I claim for myself what belongs properly to the orator, aptness, perspicuity,
and elegance of diction, since I have passed my life in this pursuit, it is not without a good
measure of right that I proffer the claim. Wherefore I earnestly exhort you, my Cicero, to read
carefully not only my orations, but these books of mine on philosophy, which already in bulk
are nearly equal to the orations. For while in oratory there is a greater force of expression, the
more even and moderate style of writing that belongs to philosophy ought also to be cultivated.
And indeed I do not see that it has fallen to any Greek author to exercise himself in both
styles, and to pursue at once forensic eloquence and unimpassioned philosophical discussion;
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styles, and to pursue at once forensic eloquence and unimpassioned philosophical discussion;
unless, perchance, this may be said of Demetrius Phalereus,1 — a keen disputant, and at the
same time an orator, though of no great power, yet with a winning grace by which one might
recognize him as a disciple of Theophrastus. But what proficiency I have made in either style let
others judge; I certainly have pursued both. Indeed, I think that Plato, too, if he had been
disposed to attempt forensic eloquence, would have spoken with equal fluency and power; and
that Demosthenes, if he had retained and had wished to put into writing what he had learned
from Plato, would have done so in a style both graceful and magnificent. I have the same
opinion of Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom, charmed with his own department, held the
other in low esteem.
2. But, having determined to write expressly for your benefit something at the present time,
much hereafter, I have thought it best to begin with what is most suitable both to your age and
to my parental authority. Now, among the many important and useful subjects in philosophy
that have been discussed by philosophers with precision and fulness of statement, their
traditions and precepts concerning the duties of life seem to have the widest scope. Indeed, no
part of life, whether in public or in private affairs, abroad or at home, in your personal conduct
or your social relations, can be free from the claims of duty; and it is in the observance of duty
that lies all the honor of life, in its neglect, all the shame. This, too, is a theme common to all
philosophers. For who would dare to call himself a philosopher, if he took no cognizance of
duty? Yet there are some schools of philosophy that utterly pervert duty by the view which
they propose as to the supreme good, and as to the opposite extreme of evil. For he who so
interprets the supreme good as to disjoin it from virtue, and measures it by his own
convenience, and not by the standard of right, — he, I say, if he be consistent with himself,
and be not sometimes overcome by natural goodness, can cultivate neither friendship, nor
justice, nor generosity; nor can he possibly be brave while he esteems pain as the greatest of
evils, or temperate while he regards pleasure as the supreme good. These things, though too
obvious to need discussion, I yet have discussed elsewhere.1 Those schools, therefore, can, if
self-consistent, say nothing about duty; nor can any precepts of duty, decisive, immutable, in
accordance with nature, be promulgated, except by those who maintain that the right is to be
sought solely,2 or chiefly,3 for its own sake. This prerogative belongs to the Stoics, the
Academics, and the Peripatetics; for the opinions of Ariston, Pyrrho, and Herillus1 were long
since exploded, though they might fittingly have discussed subjects pertaining to duty, if they
had left any ground for the preference of one thing over another, so that there might be a way
open for the ascertainment of duty. In this treatise I shall follow the Stoics, not as a translator,
but drawing from their fountains at my own discretion and judgment, as much, and in such
way, as may seem good.
I think it fit, however, since duty is to be my sole subject, to define duty at the outset.2 I am
surprised that Panaetius should not have done this; for the rational treatment of any subject
ought to take its start from definition, that readers may understand what the author is writing
about.
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3. The discussion of duty is twofold. One division relates to the supreme good in itself
considered; the other, to the rules by which the conduct of life may in all its parts be brought
into conformity with the supreme good. Under the first head belong such questions as these:
Whether all duties are of perfect obligation; whether any one duty is greater than another; and,
in general, inquiries of a similar kind. But the duties for which rules are laid down belong,
indeed, to the supreme good, as means to an end; yet this is the less obvious, because they
seem rather to have reference to the ordering of common life. It is of these that I am going to
treat in the present work. There is also another division of duty. Duty may be said to be either
contingent or perfect. We may, I think, give the name of perfect duty to the absolute right,
which the Greeks term κατόρθωμα;1 while contingent duty is what they call καθ κον.2
According to their definitions, what is right in itself is perfect duty; that for the doing of which a
satisfactory reason can be given is a contingent duty.
According to Panaetius, in determining what we ought to do there are three questions to be
considered. It is first to be determined whether the contemplated act is right or wrong, — a
matter as to which there often are opposite opinions. Then there is room for inquiry or
consultation whether the act under discussion is conducive to convenience and pleasure, to
affluence and free command of outward goods, to wealth, to power, in fine, to the means by
which one can benefit himself and those dependent on him; and here the question turns on
expediency. The third class of cases is when what appears to be expedient seems repugnant to
the right. For when expediency lays, as it were, violent hands upon us, and the right seems to
recall us to itself, the mind is distracted, and laden with two-fold anxiety as to the course of
action. In this distribution of the subject, while a division ought by all means to be exhaustive,
there are two omissions. Not only is the question of right or wrong as to an act wont to be
considered, but also the question, of two right things which is the more right; equally, of two
expedient things which is the more expedient. Thus we see that the division which Panaetius
thought should be threefold ought to be distributed under five heads. First, then, I am to treat
of the right, but under two heads; then, in the same way, of the expedient; lastly, of their
seeming conflict.
4. In the beginning, animals of every species were endowed with the instinct that prompts
them to take care of themselves as to life and bodily well-being, to shun whatever threatens to
do them harm, and to seek and provide whatever is necessary for subsistence, as food, shelter,
and other things of this sort. The appetite for sexual union for the production of offspring is,
also, common to all animals, together with a certain degree of care for their offspring.
But between man and beast there is this essential difference, that the latter, moved by sense
alone, adapts himself only to that which is present in place and time, having very little
cognizance of the past or the future. Man, on the other hand — because he is possessed of
reason, by which he discerns consequences, sees the causes of things, understands the rise and
progress of events, compares similar objects, and connects and associates the future with the
present — easily takes into view the whole course of life, and provides things necessary for it.
Nature too, by virtue of reason, brings man into relations of mutual intercourse and society with
his fellow-men; generates in him a special love for his children; prompts him to promote and
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his fellow-men; generates in him a special love for his children; prompts him to promote and
attend social gatherings and public assemblies; and awakens in him the desire to provide what
may suffice for the support and nourishment, not of himself alone, but of his wife, his children,
and others whom he holds dear and is bound to protect. This care rouses men’s minds, and
makes them more efficient in action. The research and investigation of truth, also, are a special
property of man. Thus, when we are free from necessary occupations, we want to see, or hear,
or learn something, and regard the knowledge of things either secret or wonderful as essential
to our living happily and well.1 To this desire for seeing the truth is annexed a certain craving
for precedence, insomuch that the man well endowed by nature is willing to render obedience
to no one, unless to a preceptor, or a teacher, or one who holds a just and legitimate sway for
the general good. Hence are derived greatness of mind and contempt for the vicissitudes of
human fortune. Nor does it indicate any feeble force of nature and of reason, that of all animals
man alone has a sense of order, and decency, and moderation in action and in speech. Thus no
other animal feels the beauty, elegance, symmetry, of the things that he sees; while by nature
and reason, man, transferring these qualities from the eyes to the mind, considers that much
more, even, are beauty, consistency, and order to be preserved in purposes and acts, and
takes heed that he do nothing indecorous or effeminate, and still more, that in all his thoughts
and deeds he neither do nor think anything lascivious. From these elements the right, which is
the object of our inquiry, is composed and created; and this, even if it be not ennobled in title,
yet is honorable, and even if no one praise it, we truly pronounce it in its very nature worthy of
all praise.
5. You behold, indeed, my son Marcus, the very form and, as it were, the countenance of the
right, which, were it seen by the eyes, as Plato says, would awaken the intensest love of
wisdom. But whatever is right springs from one of four sources. It consists either in the
perception and skilful treatment of the truth; or in maintaining good-fellowship with men, giving
to every one his due, and keeping faith in contracts and promises; or in the greatness and
strength of a lofty and unconquered mind; or in the order and measure that constitute
moderation and temperance.1 Although these four are connected and intertwined with one
another, yet duties of certain kinds proceed from each of them; as from the division first
named, including wisdom and prudence, proceed the investigation and discovery of truth, as
the peculiar office of that virtue. For in proportion as one sees clearly what is the inmost and
essential truth with regard to any subject, and can demonstrate it with equal acuteness and
promptness, he is wont to be regarded, and justly, as of transcendent discretion and wisdom.
Therefore truth is submitted to this virtue as the material of which it treats, and with which it is
conversant. The other three virtues have for their sphere the providing and preserving of those
things on which the conduct of life depends, so that the fellowship and union of society may be
maintained, and that superiority and greatness of mind may shine forth, not only in the
increase of resources and the acquisition of objects of desire for one’s self, and for those
dependent on him, but much more in a position from which one can look down on these very
things. But order, and consistency, and moderation, and similar qualities have their scope in
affairs that demand not merely the movement of the mind, but some outward action; for it is
by bringing to the concerns of daily life a certain method and order that we shall maintain
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by bringing to the concerns of daily life a certain method and order that we shall maintain
honor and propriety.
6. Of the four heads into which I have divided the nature and force of the right, the first, which
consists in the cognizance of truth, bears the closest relation to human nature. For we are all
attracted and drawn to the desire of knowledge and wisdom, in which we deem it admirable to
excel, but both an evil and a shame to fail, to be mistaken, to be ignorant, to be deceived. In
this quest of knowledge, both natural and right, there are two faults to be shunned, — one, the
taking of unknown things for known, and giving our assent to them too hastily, which fault he
who wishes to escape (and all ought so to wish) will give time and diligence to reflect on the
subjects proposed for his consideration. The other fault is that some bestow too great zeal and
too much labor on things obscure and difficult, and at the same time useless. These faults
being shunned, whatever labor and care may be bestowed on subjects becoming a virtuous
mind and worth knowing, will be justly commended. Thus we learn that Caius Sulpicius was
versed in astronomy,1 as I myself knew Sextius Pompeius to be in geometry,2 as many are in
logic, many in civil law, — all which sciences are concerned in the investigation of truth, but by
whose pursuit duty will not suffer one to be drawn away from the active management of
affairs. For the reputation of virtue consists wholly in active life, from which, however, there is
often a respite, and frequent opportunities are afforded for returning to the pursuit of
knowledge. At the same time mental activity, which never ceases, may retain us, without
conscious effort, in meditation on the subjects of our study. But all thought and mental action
ought to be occupied either in taking counsel as to the things that are right and that appertain
to a good and happy life, or in the pursuit of wisdom and knowledge. I have thus spoken of the
first source of duty.
7. Of the remaining three heads, the principle which constitutes the bond of human society and
of a virtual community of life has the widest scope. Of this there are two divisions, — justice, in
which consists the greatest lustre of virtue, and which those who possess are termed good; and
in close alliance with justice, beneficence, which may also be called benignity or liberality. The
first demand of justice is, that no one do harm to another, unless provoked by injury;1 the
next, that one use common possessions as common, private, as belonging to their owners.
Private possessions, indeed, are not so by nature, but by ancient occupancy, as in the case of
settlers in a previously uninhabited region; or by conquest, as in the territory acquired in war;
or by law, treaty, agreement, or lot.2 Thus it comes to pass that the territory of Arpinas is said
to belong to the Arpinates, that of Tusculum to the Tuscans, and a similar account is to be
given of the possessions of individual owners. Because each person thus has for his own a
portion of those things which were common by nature, let each hold undisturbed what has
fallen to his possession. If any one endeavors to obtain more for himself, he will violate the law
of human society. But since, as it has been well said by Plato, we are not born for ourselves
alone; since our country claims a part in us, our parents a part, our friends a part; and since,
according to the Stoics, whatever the earth bears is created for the use of men, while men
were brought into being for the sake of men, that they might do good to one another, — in this
matter we ought to follow nature as a guide, to contribute our part to the common good, and
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matter we ought to follow nature as a guide, to contribute our part to the common good, and
by the interchange of kind offices, both in giving and receiving, alike by skill, by labor, and by
the resources at our command, to strengthen the social union of men among men. But the
foundation of justice is good faith, that is, steadfastness and truth in promises and agreements.
Hence, though it may seem to some too far-fetched, I may venture to imitate the Stoics in
their painstaking inquiry into the origin of words, and to derive faith1 from the fact
corresponding to the promise.
Of injustice there are two kinds, — one, that of those who inflict injury; the other, that of those
who do not, if they can, repel injury from those on whom it is inflicted. Moreover, he who,
moved by anger or by some disturbance of mind, makes an unjust assault on any person, is as
one who lays violent hands on a casual companion; while he who does not, if he can, ward off
or resist the injury offered to another, is as much in fault as if he were to desert his parents,
or his friends, or his country. Indeed, those injuries which are purposely inflicted for the sake
of doing harm, often proceed from fear, he who meditates harm to another apprehending that,
if he refrains, he himself may suffer harm. But for the most part men are induced to injure
others in order to obtain what they covet; and here avarice is the most frequent motive.
8. Wealth is sought sometimes for the necessary uses of life, sometimes for indulgence in
luxury. In those possessed of a higher order of mind the desire for money is entertained with a
view to the increase of the means of influence and the power of generous giving. Thus, not
long ago, Marcus Crassus1 pronounced no property sufficient for one who meant to hold a
foremost place in the republic, unless its income would enable him to support an army. Others,
again, delight in magnificent furniture, and in an elegant and profuse style of living. In all these
ways there has come to be an unbounded desire for money. Nor, indeed, is the increase of
property, without harm to any one, to be blamed; but wrong-doing for the sake of gain is
never to be tolerated. Most of all, however, large numbers of persons are led to lose sight of
justice by the craving for military commands, civic honors, and fame. The saying of Ennius,
“Where kingship is concerned,
No social bond or covenant is sacred,”
has a much broader application; for, as to whatever is of such a nature that but few can be
foremost in it, there is generally so keen a rivalry that it is exceedingly difficult to keep social
duty inviolate. This was recently illustrated by the audacity of Caius Caesar, who overturned all
laws, human and divine, to obtain the sovereignty which he had shaped for himself in the
vagaries of his fancy. In this respect it is indeed unfortunate that it is, for the most part, in the
greatest minds and in men of transcendent genius that the desire for offices civil and military,
for power and for fame, is rife. The more heed, therefore, is to be taken against criminal
conduct in this matter.
But in every form of injustice it makes a very essential difference whether the wrong be
committed in some disturbance of mind, which is generally brief and temporary, or whether it
be done advisedly, and with premeditation. For those things which are done from some sudden
impulse are more venial than what is done with plan and forethought. Enough has now been
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impulse are more venial than what is done with plan and forethought. Enough has now been
said with regard to the infliction of injury.
9. For omitting to defend the injured, and thus abandoning duty, there are many reasons in
current force. Men are sometimes unwilling to incur the enmity, or the labor, or the cost
involved in such defence; or by mere carelessness, indolence, sloth, or engrossment in pursuits
or employments of their own, they are so retarded in their movements as to leave undefended
those whom they ought to protect. It will thus be seen that Plato is not entirely in the right
when he says of philosophers, that because they are engaged in the investigation of truth, and
because they despise and count as naught what most persons eagerly seek and are always
ready to fight with each other for, they are therefore just men.1 They indeed attain one part of
justice, in injuring no one: they fail as to the other part; for, kept inactive by their zeal for
learning, they forsake those whom they ought to defend. Plato thinks, too, that they will take
no part in public affairs, unless by compulsion. But it were more fitting that they should do this
of their own accord; for the very thing which it is right to do, can be termed virtuous only if it
be voluntary. There are, also, those who, either from the over-anxious care of their property or
from misanthropic feeling, profess to confine their attention to their own affairs, so as to avoid
even the appearance of doing injury to any one. They are free from one kind of injustice: they
fall into the other; for they forsake social duty, inasmuch as they bestow upon it neither care,
nor labor, nor cost. Since, then, we have assigned to each of the two kinds of injustice its
inducing causes, having previously determined the constituent elements of justice, we shall
easily ascertain the specific duty of any particular occasion, unless we be blinded by inordinate
self-love. However, the care of other men’s concerns is difficult. Although Chremes, in Terence’s
play, thinks nothing human indifferent to him, yet because we perceive and feel the things,
prosperous or adverse, which happen to ourselves more keenly than those that happen to
others, which we see, as it were, at a great distance, we decide concerning them otherwise
than we should concerning ourselves in like case. Therefore those give good counsel who forbid
our doing that as to the equity of which we have any doubt. For equity is self-evident; doubt
implies a suspicion of wrong.
10. But there are frequent occasions when those things which are generally regarded as worthy
of a just man, and one of good report, such as the restoring of a trust or the fulfilment of a
promise, are reversed, and become the opposite of right, and what belongs to truth and good
faith seems to change its bearing, so that justice demands its violation. Here reference is
fittingly made to what I have laid down as the fundamental principles of justice, first, that
injury should be done to no one, and in the next place, that service should be rendered to the
common good. When these principles are modified by circumstances, duty is also modified, and
is not always the same. There may perchance be some promise or agreement, the fulfilment of
which is harmful to him to whom the promise was made or to him who made it. Thus, to take
an instance from the popular mythology, if Neptune had not kept his promise to Theseus,1
Theseus would not have been bereft of his son, Hippolytus; for, of the three wishes which
Neptune had promised to grant him, the third, as the story runs, was his demand in anger for
the death of Hippolytus, the granting of which plunged him into the deepest sorrow. Promises,
then, are not to be kept, when by keeping them you do harm to those to whom they are
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then, are not to be kept, when by keeping them you do harm to those to whom they are
made; nor yet if they injure you more than they benefit him to whom you made them, is it
contrary to duty that the greater good should be preferred to the less.1 For instance, if you
engaged to appear as an advocate in an impending lawsuit, and meanwhile your child became
severely ill, you would not fail in your duty to your client by breaking your promise; on the
other hand, he to whom you made the promise would be false to his duty, if he complained of
your deserting him. Again, who does not perceive that promises extorted by fear,2 or obtained
by fraud, are not to be kept? Indeed, such promises are made void, in most cases by
praetorian edict,1 in some by express statutes.
There are, also, wrongs committed by a sort of chicanery, which consists in a too subtle, and
thus fraudulent, interpretation of the right. Hence comes the saying: The extreme of right is
the extreme of wrong. Under this head, there have been many violations of the right in the
administration of public affairs, as in the case of him who, during a thirty days’ truce with an
enemy, ravaged the enemy’s territory by night, on the pretext that the truce had been agreed
upon for so many days, not nights.2 Nor can we approve of our fellow-citizen, if the story is
true, that Quintus Fabius Labeo, or some one else, — I know of the matter only by hearsay, —
being appointed by the Senate as an umpire between the people of Nola and those of Neapolis
about their boundaries, when he came to the spot, argued with each party separately that they
should not be greedy or covetous, but should rather recede than advance in their demands of
each other. When they had both complied with his advice, there remained some territory
between these previously contiguous states; and so he fixed their bounds in accordance with
their respective claims, and adjudged the intermediate territory to the Roman people.1 This,
indeed, is swindling, not arbitration. Shrewdness like this is to be shunned in transactions of
every kind.
11. There are also certain duties to be observed toward those who may have injured you. For
there is a limit to revenge and punishment, — nay, I know not whether it may not be enough
for him who gave the provocation to repent of his wrong-doing, so that he may not do the like
again, and that others may be the less disposed to do as he has done. In the public
administration, also, the rights of war are to be held sacred. While there are two ways of
contending, one by discussion, the other by force, the former belonging properly to man, the
latter to beasts, recourse must be had to the latter if there be no opportunity for employing the
former. Wars, then, are to be waged in order to render it possible to live in peace without
injury; but, victory once gained, those are to be spared who have not been cruel and inhuman
in war, as our ancestors even admitted to citizenship the Tuscans, the Aequi, the Volsci, the
Sabines, the Hernici; while they utterly destroyed Carthage and Numantia. I could wish that
they had not destroyed Corinth; but I believe that they had some motive, especially the
convenience of the place for hostile movements, — the fear that the very situation might be an
inducement to rebellion.1 In my opinion, peace is always to be sought when it can be made on
perfectly fair and honest conditions. In this matter had my opinion been followed, we should
now have, not indeed the best republic possible, but a republic of some sort, which is no longer
ours. Still further, while those whom you conquer are to be kindly treated, those who, laying
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ours. Still further, while those whom you conquer are to be kindly treated, those who, laying
down their arms, take refuge in the good faith of the commander of the assailing army, ought
to be received to quarter, even though the battering-ram have already shaken their walls.2 In
this respect justice used to be so carefully observed by our people, that by the custom of our
ancestors those who received into allegiance states or nations subdued in war were their
patrons. Indeed, the rights of war are prescribed with the most sacred care by the fecial law3
of the Roman people, from which it may be understood that no war is just unless after a formal
demand of satisfaction for injury, or after an express declaration and proclamation of hostilities.
Popilius, as commander, held control of a province. A son of Cato served his first campaign in
his army. When Popilius saw fit to discharge one of the legions, he discharged also Cato’s son,
who served in that same legion. But when the youth remained in the army for love of military
service, Cato wrote to Popilius that if he permitted his son to stay, he must make him take a
second oath of military duty, else, the term of the first oath having expired, he could not
lawfully fight with the enemy. Thus there used to be the most scrupulous observance of the
right in the conduct of war. There is, indeed, extant a letter of Marcus Cato the elder to his son
Marcus, in which he writes that he has heard of his son’s discharge by the consul, after service
in Macedonia in the war with Perseus, and warns him not to go into battle, inasmuch as it is
not right for one who is no longer a soldier to fight with the enemy.1
12. In this connection it occurs to my mind that in the early time the name denoting an enemy
engaged in actual war was the word employed to denote a foreigner, the unpleasantness of the
fact being thus relieved by the mildness of the term; for he whom we call a foreigner bore with
our ancestors the appellation which we now give to an enemy. The laws of the Twelve Tables
show this, as, for instance, “A day assigned for trial with a foreigner,” “Perpetual right of
ownership as against a foreigner.”1 What can more truly indicate gentleness of spirit than
calling him with whom you are at war by so mild a name? Yet time has made that word
harsher; for it has ceased to denote a foreigner, and has retained, as properly belonging to it,
its application to an adversary in arms. Even when there is a contest for power, and fame is
sought in war, there ought still to underlie the conflict the same grounds that I have named
above as just causes for war. But the wars waged for superiority in honor or in dominion should
be conducted with less bitterness of feeling than where there are actual wrongs to be
redressed. For as we contend with a fellow-citizen in one way if he is an enemy, in a very
different way if he is a rival, — the contest with the latter being for honor and promotion, with
the former for life and reputation, — so our wars with the Celtiberi and the Cimbri were waged
as with enemies, to determine not which should come off conqueror, but which should survive;
while with the Latins, the Sabines, the Samnites, the Carthaginians, Pyrrhus, the contest was
for superiority. The Carthaginians, indeed, violated their treaties; Hannibal was cruel; the
others were more worthy of confidence. Indeed, what Pyrrhus said about restoring the captives
of war is admirable: —
“I ask that you should give no gold, no price;
In war I ply no trade but sword with sword;
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With steel, and not with gold, stake we our lives.
Wills queenly Fortune you or I should rule,
Try we by might. And bear this message with you, —
For those whose prowess Fortune spared in battle
Freedom is also spared by my decree.
Lead them away, — I grant, — the gods approve.”1
A sentiment truly royal, and worthy of the race of the Aeacidae.2
13. Still further, if any person, induced by stress of circumstances, makes a promise to a public
enemy, good faith must be observed in keeping such a promise. Thus Regulus, in the first Punic
war, taken captive by the Carthaginians, sent to Rome to negotiate an exchange of prisoners,
and bound by an oath to return, in the first place, on his arrival, gave his opinion in the Senate
that the prisoners should not be sent back, and then, when his kindred and friends tried to
retain him, preferred returning to punishment to breaking his faith with the enemy.
But in the second Punic war, after the battle of Cannae, the ten men whom Hannibal sent to
Rome bound by an oath that they would return unless they obtained the redemption of the
prisoners of war, were all disfranchised for life1 by the censors, because they had perjured
themselves. Nor did that one of the ten escape who had incurred guilt by the fraudulent
performance of his oath. He, having been suffered by Hannibal to leave the camp, returned
shortly afterward, saying that he had forgotten something. Then going out again from the
camp, he imagined himself acquitted of his oath, and he was so in words alone, not in fact. But
in a promise, what you mean, not what you say, is always to be taken into account. The most
illustrious example of justice toward an enemy was presented by our ancestors, when the
Senate and Caius Fabricius sent back to Pyrrhus a deserter who promised the Senate to kill the
king by poison. Thus they refused to sanction the murder of an enemy, and a powerful one,
and one who was making war on them without provocation.
Enough has now been said about duties connected with war.
We should also bear it in mind that justice is to be maintained even toward those of the lowest
condition. But the lowest condition and fortune is that of slaves, who, it has been well said,
ought to be treated as hired servants, to have their daily tasks assigned them, and to receive a
just compensation for their labor.1 In fine, while wrong may be done in two ways, either by
force or by fraud, the latter seems to belong, as it were, to the fox, the former to the lion, and
neither to be congenial with man. Yet of the two, fraud is the most detestable. But of all forms
of injustice, none is more heinous than that of the men who, while they practise fraud to the
utmost of their ability, do it in such a way that they appear to be good men. Enough has been
said about justice.
14. In the next place, as was proposed, let us speak of beneficence and liberality, than which,
indeed, nothing is more in harmony with human nature; yet at many points it demands
circumspection. In the first place, care must be taken lest our kindness be of disadvantage to
those whom we seem to benefit, or to others; in the next place, lest our generosity exceed our
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those whom we seem to benefit, or to others; in the next place, lest our generosity exceed our
means; still further, that our benefactions be apportioned to the merit of our beneficiaries, — a
fundamental principle of justice to which reference should be had in whatever we do for others.
Now, those who bestow on any person what is likely to be of disadvantage to him to whom
they seem to be kind, are to be regarded not as beneficent and liberal, but as harmful
flatterers; and those who injure some that they may be generous to others, are as much in the
wrong as if they directly converted what belongs to others into their own property. Yet there
are many, especially those greedy for show and fame, who take from some what they mean to
lavish on others, and these persons think that they shall seem beneficent toward their friends if
they enrich them, no matter how. But this is so remote from duty, that nothing can be more
contrary to duty. We must, then, take care that in our generosity, while we do good to our
friends, we injure no one. Therefore the transfer of property by Lucius Sulla and Caius Caesar1
from its rightful owners to those to whom it did not belong ought not to be deemed generous;
for nothing is generous that is not at the same time just. The second caution is that our
generosity should not exceed our means; for those who want to be more generous than their
property authorizes them to be, in the first place are blameworthy because they are unjust
toward their nearest kindred, giving to strangers what ought to be employed for the needs of
their own families or bequeathed for their future use. There is, too, connected with generosity
of this type, in almost every instance, a disposition to seize and appropriate wrongfully the
property of other men, in order to furnish means for prodigal giving. We can see, also, that a
large number of persons, less from a liberal nature than for the reputation of generosity, do
many things that evidently proceed from ostentation rather than from good will. It was said, in
the third place, that in beneficence regard should be had to merit, in which matter we should
take into consideration the character of the candidate for our favor, his disposition toward us,
the degree of his familiarity and intimacy with us, and the good offices which he may have
previously rendered for our benefit. That all these reasons for our kindness should be combined,
is desirable; if some of them are wanting, preponderant weight must be given to the more
numerous and more important reasons.
15. But since we pass our lives, not among perfect and faultlessly wise men,1 but among those
in whom it is well if there be found the semblance of virtue, it ought, as I think, to be our
purpose to leave none unbefriended in whom there is any trace of virtue; but at the same time
those have the highest claim to our kind offices who are most richly endowed with the gentler
virtues, moderation, self-control, and this very justice about which I have said so much. For in
a man not perfect or wise, a bold and ambitious mind is generally too impetuous; while the
virtues that I have just named seem to be more in accordance with the character of a truly
good man. Thus far I have spoken only of the character of those to whom our kind offices are
to be rendered. In the next place, as to the good will borne to us, our first duty is to bestow
the most on those who hold us in the dearest regard. We ought, however, to judge of their
good will not, as young people often do, by ardent expressions of love, but rather by the
firmness and constancy of their attachment. But if there are obligations on our part, so that
kindness is not to begin with us, but to be returned by us, there is all the greater responsibility
laid upon us; for there is no more essential duty than that of returning kindness received. If
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laid upon us; for there is no more essential duty than that of returning kindness received. If
Hesiod bids us to restore what we have borrowed for use in a greater measure, if we can, what
ought we to do when appealed to by unsolicited beneficence? Ought we not to imitate fertile
fields, which bring forth much more than they received? If we do not hesitate to confer favors
on those who, we hope, will be of service to us, what ought we to be toward those who have
already done us service? For while there are two kinds of generosity, one that of bestowing, the
other that of returning good offices, — whether we bestow or not, it is for us to choose; but to
omit the returning of kindness is impossible for a good man, if he can do so without wronging
any one. But there is room for discrimination as to the benefits received; nor can it be denied
that the greater the benefit, the greater is the obligation. In this matter the first thing to be
considered is, with what degree of earnestness, zeal, and true benevolence one has shown us
kindness. For many bestow benefits at haphazard, without judgment or method, or roused to
action by some sudden impulse of mind, as if by a blast of wind; and their kindnesses are not
to be esteemed so great as those which are conferred with judgment, deliberately and
continuously. But alike in bestowing benefit and in returning kindness, other things being equal,
it is in the highest degree incumbent upon us to do the most for those who need the most. The
contrary is the common habit. Him from whom men hope the most, even if he has no need,
they are the most ready to serve.
16. Still further, human society and fellowship will be best maintained, if where there is the
most intimate relation, the greatest amount of kindness be bestowed. Here it may be well to
trace back the social relations of men to their principles in nature. The first of these principles is
that which is seen in the social union of the entire race of man. Its bond is reason as expressed
in language,1 which by teaching, learning, imparting, discussing, deciding, conciliates mutual
regard, and unites men by a certain natural fellowship; nor in any respect are we farther
removed from the nature of beasts, in which, we often say, there is courage, as in the horse
and the lion, but not justice, equity, goodness, inasmuch as they have neither reason nor
language. Indeed, it is through this society, so broadly open to men with one another, to all
with all, that common possession is to be maintained as to whatever nature has produced for
the common use of men; so that while those things that are specially designated by the
statutes and the civil law are held as thus decreed, according to these very laws other things
may be regarded in the sense of the Greek proverb, “All things are common among friends.”
Indeed, all those things seem to be common among men, which are of the kind designated by
Ennius in a single example, but comprehending many others: —
“Who kindly shows a wanderer his way,
Lights, as it were, a torch from his own torch, —
In kindling others’ light, no less he shines.”
This one instance suffices to illustrate the rule, that whatever one can give without suffering
detriment should be given even to an entire stranger. Thus among common obligations we may
reckon, to prohibit no one from drinking at a stream of running water; to permit any one who
wishes to light fire from fire; to give faithful advice to one who is in doubt, — which things are
useful to the receiver, and do no harm to the giver. But since the resources of individuals are
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useful to the receiver, and do no harm to the giver. But since the resources of individuals are
small, while the multitude of those who need them is unbounded, this indiscriminate giving
should have the limit suggested by Ennius, “No less he shines,” so that we may have the
means of generosity to those peculiarly our own.
17. But there are several degrees of relationship among men. To take our departure from the
tie of common humanity, of which I have spoken, there is a nearer relation of race, nation, and
language, which brings men into very close community of feeling. It is a still more intimate
bond to belong to the same city; for the inhabitants of a city have in common among
themselves forum, temples, public walks, streets, laws, rights, courts, modes and places of
voting, beside companionships and intimacies, engagements and contracts, of many with many.
Closer still is the tie of kindred; for by this from the vast society of the human race one is shut
up into a small and narrow circle. Indeed, since the desire of producing offspring is common by
nature to all living creatures, the nearest association consists in the union of the sexes;1 the
next, in the relation with children; then, that of a common home and a community of such
goods as appertain to the home. Then the home is the germ of the city, and, so to speak, the
nursery of the state. The union of brothers comes next in order, then that of cousins less or
more remote, who, when one house can no longer hold them all, emigrate to other houses as if
to colonies. Then follow marriages1 and affinities by marriage, thus increasing the number of
kindred. From this propagation and fresh growth of successive generations states have their
beginning. But the union of blood, especially, binds men in mutual kindness and affection; for it
is a great thing to have the same statues of ancestors, the same rites of domestic worship, the
same sepulchres. But of all associations none is more excellent, none more enduring, than when
good men, of like character, are united in intimacy. For the moral rectitude of which I have so
often spoken, even if we see it in a stranger, yet moves us, and calls out our friendship for him
in whom it dwells. Moreover, while every virtue attracts us to itself, and makes us love those in
whom it seems to exist, this is emphatically true of justice and generosity. At the same time,
nothing is more lovable, and nothing brings men into more intimate relations, than the common
possession of these moral excellences; for those who have the same virtuous desires and
purposes love one another as they love themselves, and they realize what Pythagoras would
have in friendship, the unifying of plurality. That also is an intimate fellowship which is created
by benefits mutually bestowed and received, which, while they give pleasure on both sides,
produce a lasting attachment between those who thus live in reciprocal good offices. But when
you survey with reason and judgment the entire field of human society, of all associations none
is closer, none dearer, than that which unites each of us with our country. Parents are dear,
children are dear, so are kindred and friends; but the country alone takes into her embrace all
our loves for all, in whose behalf what good man would hesitate to encounter death, if he might
thus do her service? The more detestable is the savageness of those who by every form of guilt
have inflicted grievous wounds on their country, and are and have been employed in her utter
subversion. Now, if you make an estimate and comparison1 of the degree of service to be
rendered in each relation, the first place must be given to our country and our parents, bound
as we are to them by paramount benefits; next come our children, and the entire family which
looks to us alone, nor in stress of need can have any other refuge; then, afterward, the kindred
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looks to us alone, nor in stress of need can have any other refuge; then, afterward, the kindred
with whom we are on pleasant terms, and with whom, for the most part, we are in the same
condition of life. For the reasons indicated we owe chiefly to these that I have named the
necessary protection of daily life; but companionship, conviviality, counsel, conversation, advice,
consolation, sometimes reproof also, have their most fruitful soil in friendship, and that is the
most pleasant friendship which is cemented by resemblance in character.
18. In discharging all these duties, we ought to consider what is most needful for each person,
and what each person either can or cannot obtain without our aid. Thus the degrees of
relationship will not correspond with those of the occasions for our kind offices; and there are
duties which we owe to some rather than to others, on grounds independent of their connection
with us. Thus you would help a neighbor rather than a brother or an intimate friend in
harvesting his crops; while in a case in court you would appear as an advocate for your
kinsman or friend rather than for your neighbor. These and similar points are to be carefully
considered in every department of duty, and we should practise and exercise ourselves so that
we may be good calculators of duty, and by adding and subtracting may ascertain the
remainder, and thus know how much is due to each person. Indeed, as neither physicians, nor
commanders, nor orators, though they understand the rules of their art, can accomplish
anything worthy of high commendation without practice and exercise; so, though the precepts
for the faithful discharge of duty be delivered, as I am delivering them now, the very greatness
of the work which they prescribe demands practice and exercise. I have now shown, with nearly
sufficient fulness of detail, how the right, on which duty depends, is derived from the
constituent elements of human society.
It is to be observed that of the four sources from which right and duty flow, the greatest
admiration attends that consisting in a large and lofty mind which looks down on human
fortunes. Thus, when reproach is intended, nothing occurs more readily than utterances like
this, —
“Ye, youths, indeed show but a woman’s soul;
That heroine, a man’s;”—
or this, —
“Give, Salmacis,1 spoils without sweat and blood.”2
On the other hand, in panegyrics, our speech rolls on with a fuller flow when we praise deeds
that have been wrought with a large mind, bravely and grandly. Hence the field for eloquent
discourse about Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, Leuctrae; hence the fame of our own
fellow-countrymen, Cocles, the Decii, Cneius and Publius Scipio; hence the glory of Marcus
Marcellus, and of others more than can be numbered; and the Roman people, as a nation,
excels other nations chiefly in this very greatness of soul. In particular, the prevailing love for
glory in war is manifested in the almost uniform clothing of statues in military attire.1
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19. But this loftiness of spirit, manifested in peril and in toil, if devoid of justice, and
contending for selfish ends, not for the public good, is to be condemned; for not only does it
not appertain to virtue, — it belongs rather to a savageness that spurns all human feelings.2
Therefore courage is well defined by the Stoics as the virtue that contends for the right. No
one, then, who has sought a reputation for courage by treachery and fraud, has won the fame
he sought. Nothing that is devoid of justice can be honorable. It was well said by Plato: “Not
only is knowledge, when divorced from justice, to be termed subtlety rather than wisdom; but
also the soul prompt to encounter danger, if moved thereto by self-interest, and not by the
common good, should have the reputation of audacity rather than of courage.” Therefore I
would have brave and high-spirited men also good and simple, friends of truth, remote from
guile, — traits of character which belong to the very heart of justice. But the mischief is, that in
this exaltation and largeness of soul obstinacy and an excessive lust of power very easily have
birth. For as, according to Plato, the entire character of the Lacedaemonians was set on fire by
the desire for victory, so now, in proportion as one surpasses others in grandeur of soul, he is
ambitious to hold the foremost place among those in power, or rather, to rule alone. Now it is
hard, when you covet pre-eminence, to maintain the equity which is the most essential
property of justice. Hence it is that such men suffer themselves to be overcome neither in
debate nor by any legal or constitutional hindrance, and in the state they, for the most part,
employ bribery and intrigue that they may acquire the greatest influence possible, and may rise
by force, rather than maintain equality with their fellow-citizens by justice. But the greater the
difficulty, the greater the glory. Nor is there any occasion that ought to be devoid of justice.
Therefore not those who inflict, but those who repel, wrong ought to be deemed brave and
magnanimous. A soul truly and wisely great regards the right to which the nature of man
aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame; it chooses to be chief rather than to seem so. On
the other hand, he who depends on the waywardness of the undiscerning multitude does not
deserve to be reckoned among great men. But in proportion to a man’s towering ambition, he is
easily urged by the greed of fame to deeds averse from justice. His is a slippery standing-
ground;1 for we seldom find a man, who, for labors undertaken and dangers encountered, does
not demand fame as the price of his exploits.
20. A brave and great soul is, in fine, chiefly characterized by two things. One of these is the
contempt of outward circumstances in the persuasion that a man ought not to admire or wish
or seek aught that is not right and becoming, or to yield to human influence, or to passion, or
to calamity. The other is that, with this disposition of mind, one should undertake the conduct
of affairs great, indeed, and, especially, beneficial, but at the same time arduous in the highest
degree, demanding severe toil, and fraught with peril not only of the means of comfortable
living, but of life itself. Of these two things, all the lustre and renown, and the utility too,
belong to the latter: but their cause and the habit of mind that makes men great lie in the
former; for in this is inherent that which renders souls truly great, and lifts them above the
vicissitudes of human fortune. Moreover, this first constituent of greatness consists in two
things, in accounting the right alone as good, and in freedom from all disturbing passions: for
to hold in light esteem, and on fixed and firm principles to despise, objects which to most
persons seem excellent and splendid, is the token of a brave and great soul; and to bear those
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persons seem excellent and splendid, is the token of a brave and great soul; and to bear those
reputedly bitter experiences which are so many and various in human life and fortunes, in such
a way as to depart in no wise from the deportment that is natural to you, in no wise from the
dignity befitting a wise man, is the index of a strong mind and of great steadfastness of
character. But it is incongruous for one who is not broken down by fear to be broken down by
the love of gain, or for him who has shown himself unconquered by labor, to be conquered by
sensuality. These failures must be provided against, and the desire for money must especially
be shunned. For nothing shows so narrow and small a mind as the love of riches; nothing is
more honorable and magnificent than to despise money if you have it not, — if you have it, to
expend it for purposes of beneficence and generosity. The greed of fame, also, as I have
already said, must be shunned; for it deprives one of liberty, which every high-minded man will
strive to the utmost to maintain. Indeed, posts of command1 ought not to be eagerly sought,
nay, they should sometimes rather be refused, sometimes resigned. One should also be free
from all disturbing emotions, not only from desire and fear, but equally from solicitude, and
sensuality, and anger, that there may be serenity of mind, and that freedom from care which
brings with it both evenness of temper and dignity of character. But there are and have been
many who, in quest of the serenity of which I am speaking, have withdrawn from public affairs,
and taken refuge in a life of leisure. Among these are the most eminent philosophers, including
those of the very first rank, and also some stern and grave men, who could not endure the
conduct either of the people or of their rulers. Some, too, have taken up their abode in the
country, engrossed in the care of their own property. Their design is the same as that of kings,
to lack nothing, to obey no one, to enjoy liberty, the essence of which is to live as one pleases.
21. While the purpose of living as one pleases is common to those greedy of power and to the
men of leisure of whom I have spoken, the former think that they can realize it if they have
large resources; the latter, if they are content with what they have, and with little. Nor is either
opinion to be despised. But the life of the men of leisure is easier, and safer, and less liable to
give trouble or annoyance to others; while that of those who have fitted themselves for the
public service and for the management of large affairs, is more fruitful of benefit to mankind,
and more conducive to their own eminence and renown. All things considered, we ought,
perhaps, to excuse from bearing part in public affairs those who devote themselves to learning
with superior ability, and those who, from impaired health, or for some sufficiently weighty
reason, have sought retirement, abandoning to others the power and the praise of civic service.
But as for those who have no such reason, yet say that they despise what most persons
admire, places of trust and honor in the military or civil service,1 this, I think, is to be
reckoned to their discredit, not to their praise. They, indeed, deserve approval for despising
fame and thinking it of no account. But they seem to dread not only toil and trouble, but a
certain imagined shame and disgrace from the disappointments and repulses which they must
encounter. For there are those who in opposite circumstances fail to act consistently, — who
have the utmost contempt for pleasure, yet are unmanned by pain, — who scorn fame, yet are
broken down by unpopularity; and these are, indeed, manifest incongruities in a man’s
character. But those whom nature has endowed with qualities that fit them for the
management of public affairs ought, without needless delay, to become candidates for office
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management of public affairs ought, without needless delay, to become candidates for office
and to take the interests of the state in charge; for only thus can the state be well governed,
and only thus can commanding power of mind be made manifest. At the same time, for those
who undertake public trusts, perhaps even more than for philosophers, there is need of
elevation of mind, and contempt of the vicissitudes of human fortune, and that serene and
unruffled spirit of which I often speak, in order that they may be free from solicitude, and may
lead dignified and self-consistent lives. This is easier for philosophers, inasmuch as their
condition in life is less open to the assaults of fortune, their wants are fewer, and in case of
adverse events they encounter a less heavy fall. On the other hand, those who hold public
trusts are obviously liable to stronger mental excitement, and are more heavily burdened with
care than those who live in retirement; and they should therefore bring to their duty a
corresponding strength of mind, and independence of the ordinary causes of vexation. But let
him who meditates entering on any important undertaking, carefully consider, not only whether
the undertaking is right, but also whether he has the ability to carry it through; and here he
must beware, on the one hand, lest he too readily despair of success from mere want of spirit,
or, on the other hand, lest he be over-confident from excessive eagerness. In fine, in all
transactions, before you enter upon them, you should make diligent preparation.
22. Moreover, since military achievements are very commonly regarded as outranking civil
service, this opinion needs to be refuted; for wars have often been encouraged from the desire
of fame, especially by men of superior intellect and genius, when they have the requisite ability
for the service of arms, and are ambitious of the places of command which it offers. Yet if we
will only look at facts, there have been many civic transactions that have surpassed feats of
arms in importance and in renown.1 Thus, although Themistocles be rightly held in honor, and
his name be more illustrious than that of Solon, and Salamis be cited as witness of a most
splendid victory which may have a higher place in the popular esteem than Solon’s establishing
the Areopagus,2 yet this last must be regarded as no less glorious than the victory. For this
was once of benefit; that will always be of benefit to the state, as preserving inviolate the laws
of the Athenians and the institutions of their ancestors. And Themistocles could have named no
particular in which he could have given help to the Areopagus; while the Areopagus rendered
substantial aid3 to Themistocles, the war having been conducted by the counsel of that same
Senate established by Solon. The like may be said of Pausanias1 and Lysander.2 Although the
common idea is that the Lacedaemonian empire owed its enlargement to their prowess, yet
their achievements bear no comparison with the laws and discipline of Lycurgus. For was it not
these very institutions that made their armies both more obedient and more courageous? Nor,
indeed, when I was a boy, did I regard Marcus Scaurus3 as inferior to Caius Marius; nor, when
I was in public life, did I think Quintus Catulus4 inferior to Cneius Pompeius.
“Valor abroad is naught, unless at home be wisdom.”5
Nor yet did Africanus, of rare worth both as a man and as a commander, do greater service to
the republic in exterminating Numantia, than at the same time did Publius Nasica, a private
citizen, in killing Tiberius Gracchus. This last transaction, indeed, is not wholly of a civil
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citizen, in killing Tiberius Gracchus. This last transaction, indeed, is not wholly of a civil
character, — as it was performed by force and arms, it borders on the military; yet it was
effected by civic policy without military array. That verse of mine, against which, as I hear,
unprincipled and envious men are wont to rail, —
“Let arms yield to the robe, the laurel to the tongue,”1
is by no means devoid of excellence. Not to mention others, when I was at the helm of the
republic, did not arms yield to the gown? For there was never in the republic greater danger,
and never a more profound peace. Thus by my counsels and my assiduity their very weapons
fell speedily from the hands of the most audacious citizens. What equally great achievement
was ever performed in war? What triumph is to be compared with it? I may take the liberty of
boasting to you, my son Marcus, to whom belong both the heritage of this fame and the
imitation of my deeds. Forsooth, Cneius Pompeius, a man rich in military renown, in the
hearing of many did me the honor of saying that he would in vain have obtained his third
triumph, unless by my service to the state he would have had a place for the celebration of his
triumph. There are, then, cases of civic courage not inferior to those in war, nay, demanding
even a larger amount of labor and of zeal.
23. Of a certainty, the virtue which we demand of a lofty and large mind is generated by
strength of mind, not of body. Yet the body must be disciplined, and brought into a condition in
which it can obey counsel and reason in following out affairs to their issue, and in enduring toil.
But the virtue which we demand consists in mental care and thought, in which those who
preside over the state in the robe of peace, perform no less service than those who take the
lead in war. Indeed, by the counsel of the former, wars have been often prevented or
terminated, sometimes, also, begun, as the third Punic war, by the counsel of Marcus Cato,1
then dead, whose authority outlived him. Therefore skill in the settlement of controversies is
more desirable than courage in disputing them by arms; but care must be taken lest we resort
to peaceful measures rather to avoid fighting than for the public good.
But war should be undertaken in such a way that it may seem nothing else than a quest of
peace. Moreover, it belongs to a brave and firm man not to be disturbed in misfortune, nor to
be so thrown off his balance as to be, in the trite phrase, hustled down from his position, but to
take prompt thought and counsel, and not to be betrayed into unreason. While as much as this
belongs to a great mind, it is also the part of a man of transcendent ability to anticipate the
future in thought, and somewhat beforehand to consider what is liable to happen on either side,
and what is to be done in case of any possible event, so as not to be compelled at any time to
say, “I had not thought of this.” Such is the work of a mind large, and lofty, and trusting in
discretion and good counsel. But to make rash manoeuvres in battle, and to come to close
quarters with the enemy, is something savage and beastlike. Yet when occasion and need
demand, there must be hand-to-hand fighting, and death is to be preferred to slavery or
poltroonery.
24. As to the destruction and plundering of conquered cities, care must be taken that nothing
be done precipitately, nothing cruelly; and it is the part of a truly great man, in times of
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be done precipitately, nothing cruelly; and it is the part of a truly great man, in times of
disorder, to punish the guilty, to spare the many, and, whatever takes place, to keep rectitude
and honor inviolate. For as there are those, as I have already said, who prefer military to civil
service, so you may find many to whom perilous and hot-headed counsels seem more splendid
and imposing than calm and deliberate measures. Never, certainly, are we by shunning danger
to make ourselves seem tame and timid; but equally are we to avoid encountering needless
perils, than which nothing can be more foolish. Therefore, in impending danger, we should
imitate the custom of physicians, who employ mild treatment for those but slightly ill, but are
compelled to use dangerous and doubtful remedies for severer diseases. Thus it is the part of a
madman, in a calm sea to desire a storm with a head-wind; but that of a wise man, to
withstand the storm as best he may, especially if the benefits obtained by carrying the matter
through successfully are greater than the evil that may be incurred in the conflict. But public
transactions are perilous, sometimes to those who undertake them, sometimes to the state;
and, again, some run the risk of life, others of fame, and of the good-will of their fellow-
citizens. We ought to be more ready to encounter danger for ourselves than for the state, and
to contend more promptly for honor and fame than for anything else that concerns ourselves
personally.
Yet there have been found many who were ready to pour out not only their money, but even
their blood for their country, who would not make the least sacrifice of reputation, even when
the well-being of the state demanded it; as, for instance, Callicratidas, who, after having been
at the head of the Lacedaemonian forces in the Peloponnesian war, and having repeatedly
rendered excellent service, at last reversed everything by rejecting the advice of those who
thought it best to remove the fleet from the Arginusae and not to fight with the Athenians. He
answered them that the Lacedaemonians, if they lost that fleet, could equip another, while he
could not retreat without disgracing himself.1 This was, indeed, to the Lacedaemonians a blow
of moderate severity; that, a ruinous one, by which, when Cleombrotus,2 for fear of
unpopularity, fought rashly with Epaminondas, the power of the Lacedaemonians utterly
collapsed. What a contrast here to the advantage of Quintus Maximus,3 of whom Ennius
writes: —
“One man by slow delays restored our fortunes,
Preferring not the people’s praise to safety,
And thus his after-glory shines the more.”
This same kind of error is also to be shunned in civil affairs; for there are those who, for fear
of unpopularity, dare not say what they think, even if it be the very best that could be said.
25. In fine, let those who are to preside over the state obey two precepts of Plato, — one, that
they so watch for the well-being of their fellow-citizens that they have reference to it in
whatever they do, forgetting their own private interests; the other, that they care for the whole
body politic, and not, while they watch over a portion of it, neglect other portions. For, as the
guardianship of a minor, so the administration of the state is to be conducted for the benefit,
not of those to whom it is intrusted, but of those who are intrusted to their care. But those
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not of those to whom it is intrusted, but of those who are intrusted to their care. But those
who take counsel for a part of the citizens, and neglect a part, bring into the state an element
of the greatest mischief, and stir up sedition and discord, some siding with the people, some
with the aristocracy, and few being equally the friends of all. From this cause arose great
dissensions among the Athenians, and in our republic it has led not only to seditions, but also
to destructive civil wars. Partiality of this kind, a citizen who is substantial and brave, and
worthy of a chief place in the state, will shun and abhor, and will give himself wholly up to the
state, pursuing neither wealth nor power; and he will so watch over the entire state as to
consult the well-being of all its citizens. Nor will he expose any one to hatred or envy by false
accusation, and he will in every respect so adhere to justice and right as in their behalf to
submit to any loss however severe, and to face death itself rather than surrender the principles
which I have indicated. Most pitiful in every aspect is the canvassing and scrambling for
preferment, of which it is well said by the same Plato, that those who strive among themselves
which shall be foremost in the administration of the state, act like sailors who should quarrel for
a place at the helm. The same writer exhorts us to regard as enemies those who bear arms
against us, not those who desire to care for the interests of the state in accordance with their
own judgment, as in the case of the disagreement without bitterness between Publius Africanus
and Quintus Metellus.1
Nor are they to be listened to who think that anger is to be cherished toward those who are
unfriendly to us on political grounds, and imagine that this betokens a large-minded and brave
man; for nothing is more praiseworthy, nothing more befitting a great and eminent man, than
placability and clemency. Moreover, in free states and where all have equal rights, there is a
demand for courtesy, and for a soul superior to petty causes of vexation, lest if we suffer
ourselves to be angry with those who intrude upon us inopportunely, we fall into irritable habits
equally harmful and hateful. Yet an easy and accommodating temper is to be approved only so
far as may be consistent with the strictness demanded in public business, without which the
state cannot be administered. But all punishment and correction ought to be free from personal
insult, and should have reference, not to the pleasure of him who administers punishment or
reproof, but to the public good. Care also must be taken lest the punishment be greater than
the fault, and lest for the same cause some be made penally responsible, and others not even
called to account. Most of all is anger to be eliminated in punishment; for he who enters on the
office of punishment in anger will never preserve that mean between too much and too little, of
which the Peripatetics make so great account,1 and rightly too, if they only would not
commend anger, and say that it is implanted by nature for useful ends. On the other hand, it is
under all circumstances to be shunned, and it is desirable that those who preside over the state
should be like the laws, which are led to inflict punishment, not by anger, but by justice.
26. Again, in prosperity, and when affairs flow on as we would have them, we should with the
utmost care avoid pride, fastidiousness, and arrogance; for it is the token of a frivolous mind to
bear either prosperity or adversity otherwise than moderately, and pre-eminently praiseworthy
is an equable temperament in one’s whole life, the same countenance and the same mien
always, as we learn was the case with Socrates, and equally with Caius Laelius.1 I regard
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always, as we learn was the case with Socrates, and equally with Caius Laelius.1 I regard
Philip, king of the Macedonians, though surpassed by his son in achievements and in fame, as
having been his superior in affability and kindness. Thus the one was always great, the other
often very mean, — so as to give good ground for the rule of those who say that the higher
our position is, the more meekly we should carry ourselves. Panaetius, indeed, tells us that
Africanus, his pupil and friend, used to say, that as it is common to give horses that, from
having been often in battle, rear and prance dangerously, into the hands of professional
tamers, that they may be ridden more easily, so men, when at loose reins in prosperity, and
over self-confident, should be brought, as it were, to the ring2 of reason and instruction, that
they may fully see the frailty of man’s estate, and the fickleness of fortune. Still further, in the
extreme of prosperity, especially, resort is to be had to the counsel of friends, and even
greater authority to be given to them than under ordinary circumstances. In such a condition
we must also take heed lest we open our ears to flatterers, and suffer ourselves to be cajoled.
In yielding to sycophancy, we are always liable to be deceived, thinking that we deserve the
praise bestowed upon us, whence proceed numberless mistakes, men who are inflated by self-
conceit becoming the objects of coarse derision, and committing the most egregious
eccentricities in conduct. But enough on this point.
From what has been said, it is to be inferred that the most important affairs, and those
indicative of the highest tone of spirit, come under the direction of men in public life, their
official duty having the widest scope, and extending to the largest number of persons; but that
there are and have been many men of great mind in private life, engaged in important
investigations or enterprises, yet attending to no affairs but their own; while others, no less
great, midway between philosophers and statesmen, are occupied with the care of their
property, not, indeed, increasing it by every means in their power, nor yet depriving their
friends of the benefit of it, but rather, whenever there is need, giving freely to their friends and
to the state. Property thus held should, in the first place, have been fairly obtained, and not by
any mean or offensive calling; then it should show itself of service to as many as possible, if
they only be worthy; then, too, it should be increased by industry and frugality, and should not
lie open to the demands of sensuality and luxury rather than to those of generosity and
beneficence. He who observes these rules may live in splendor, dignity, and independence, and
at the same time with simplicity, with integrity, and in friendly relations with mankind.
27. I have now to speak of the only remaining division of the right, embracing modesty, which
gives a certain lustre to life, temperance, discretion, serenity of soul, and moderation in all
things. Under this head is included what we may fitly call decorum, or becomingness;1 the
Greeks call it πρέπον.2 The property of this is that it cannot be separated from the right; for whatever is becoming is right, and whatever is right is becoming. In what way the right and
the becoming differ is more easily felt than told; for whatever it is that constitutes
becomingness, it makes its appearance when the right has gone before; and thus the becoming
is not confined to the division of the right now under discussion, but is equally manifest in the
three other divisions. For it is becoming to employ both reason and speech with discretion, and
to do what you do deliberately, and on every subject to perceive and discern the truth; and, on
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to do what you do deliberately, and on every subject to perceive and discern the truth; and, on
the other hand, it is as unbecoming to be deceived, to misjudge, to commit grave mistakes, to
be deluded into unwise conduct, as it is to be delirious or insane. Then, too, whatever is just is
becoming; on the other hand, whatever is unjust, as it is base, is also unbecoming. The case is
the same with courage; for whatever is done manfully and high-spiritedly seems worthy of a
man, and becoming; whatever is the opposite of this, as it is base, is also unbecoming. Thus
this becomingness of which I speak belongs, indeed, to all virtue, and so belongs to it that it is
not discerned by any abstruse process of reasoning, but is perfectly obvious. For there is, in
truth, a certain something which is becoming — and it is understood to be contained in every
form of virtue — which can be separated from virtue in thought rather than in fact. As grace
and beauty of body cannot be separated from health, so this becomingness of which I am
speaking is entirely blended with virtue, yet is distinguished from it in conception and thought.
It has a twofold definition; for there is a certain general becomingness which has its place in
every kind of virtue; and another, subordinate to this and included within it, which belongs to
single departments of virtue. The former is usually defined somewhat in this way: That is
becoming which is in accordance with the superiority of man in those respects in which his
nature differs from that of other animals. The special type included under this general head may
be defined as designating that as becoming which is so in accordance with nature as to present
the aspect of moderation and self-restraint, together with the air and manner that befit
ingenuous breeding.
28. That these things are so understood, we may infer from that becomingness which is the
poet’s aim, about which I speak more at large in another treatise.1 We say that poets observe
what is becoming, when they represent that which befits each individual character as both done
and said. Thus were Aeacus or Minos2 to say, —
“No matter how they hate me while they fear me,”
or,
“The very father is his children’s tomb,”3
it would seem unbecoming; for the tradition is that they were just men. But when Atreus4 so
speaks, the audience applaud; for the speech befits the character. Now, the poets will
determine from the type of the character in hand, what befits each character. To us, however,
Nature has assigned a character endowed with great excellence and superiority over other
animals. The poets, on their part, in a great diversity of characters, will determine what is
suitable and becoming to each, even to the very worst. But since the parts of consistency,
moderation, self-restraint, modesty, are assigned to us by Nature, and since the same Nature
teaches us not to be indifferent as to the manner of our conduct toward men, we may thus see
how broad is the scope, both of that becomingness which belongs to all virtue, and of this
which is made manifest in each several kind of virtue. For as the beauty of the body attracts
notice by the symmetry of the limbs, and gives delight by the very fact that all its parts
harmonize with a certain graceful effect, so this becomingness which shines in the life calls
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harmonize with a certain graceful effect, so this becomingness which shines in the life calls
forth the esteem of society by the order, consistency, and moderation of all that is said and
done. A certain measure of respect should indeed be shown toward all men, whether in superior
position or on the common level; for indifference to the opinion of others is the token, not only
of self-sufficiency, but of utter recklessness. But in the treatment of men there is a difference
between justice and courtesy.1 It is the part of justice not to injure men; of courtesy, not to
give them offence, and it is in this last that the influence of becomingness is most clearly seen.
With this exposition, I think that the nature of what we term becoming may be sufficiently
understood.
The duty derived from it first leads to conformity with Nature and observance of her fitnesses,
whom if we follow as a leader, we shall never err, and shall attain equally that which is in its
essence keen and clear-sighted, that which is adapted to human society, and that which is
strong and brave.1 But the chief province of becomingness is in the division of virtue now
under discussion; for not only movements of the body fitted to nature, but much more those
movements of the mind which are in harmony with nature, claim approval. The natural
constitution of the human mind is twofold. One part consists in impulse, ρμ 2 in Greek, which hurries a man hither and thither; the other, in reason, which teaches and explains what is to be
done and what to be avoided. Thus it is that reason fitly presides, and impulse obeys.
29. Every purpose ought to be free alike from rashness and from negligence, nor ought
anything to be done for which a reason worthy of approval cannot be given. This, indeed, is
almost a complete definition of duty.3 Moreover, the impulses must be made obedient to
reason, and neither get the advance of it, nor yet from stupidity or indolence lag behind it, and
they must be quiet and free from all excitement, — a state of things which will show
consistency and moderation in their full lustre. For impulses which rove too far, prancing, as it
were, either in the pursuit or avoidance of objects within their scope, and not sufficiently held
in by reason, evidently transcend bound and measure; for they desert and repudiate obedience,
nor do they submit themselves to reason, to which they are subject by the law of nature. By
such impulses not only minds, but bodies are thrown into disturbance. You can discriminate at
sight the very countenances of the angry, of those who are excited by sensual passion or by
fear, or of those who are beside themselves through excess of pleasure, in all of whom face,
voice, gait, and posture are changed. Hence, — to return to the delineation of duty, — it is
inferred that all the appetites must be checked and calmed, and that watchfulness and care
must be on the alert to prevent us from doing anything rashly and at haphazard,
inconsiderately and carelessly. For we are not so constituted by nature as to seem made for
sport and jest, but rather for sobriety and for certain more weighty and important pursuits. It
is, indeed, right to indulge in sport and jest, but only as in sleep and other relaxations, when
we have done full justice to grave and serious concerns. Still further, the very style of jesting
ought not to be extravagant or immoderate, but in pure taste and with genuine humor. For as
we do not give boys the unlimited liberty of play, but only that degree of freedom which is
consistent with good conduct, so in jest itself there ought to shine forth something of the
radiance of a pure character. There are, in truth, two kinds of jokes, — the one vulgar,
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radiance of a pure character. There are, in truth, two kinds of jokes, — the one vulgar,
impertinent, vicious, obscene; the other, elegant, refined, witty, humorous. This last kind fills
not only our own Plautus and the old comedy of the Athenians, but also the books of the
Socratic philosophers; and many things of this sort have been wittily said by many persons, as,
for instance, those sayings collected by the elder Cato1 which they call πο θέγματα.2 The distinction between a refined and a vulgar joke is easily made. The one, if not untimely, is
worthy of any man at leisure; the other, unworthy of any man above the condition of a slave, if
polluted by vile images or filthy words. A certain limit is to be observed in sport, also, lest we
run into excess, and, carried away by pleasure, lapse into some kind of disgraceful conduct. Our
field1 for athletic exercises, and the amusement of the chase, furnish proper examples of sport.
30. It is appropriate to every discussion of duty, always to bear in mind how far the nature of
man excels that of cattle and other beasts. They feel nothing save sensual pleasure, and
toward that they are borne by every instinct; but the mind of man is nourished by learning and
reflection, is constantly thinking or doing something, and is led by the pleasure and profit
derived from what is seen and heard. And even if one is unduly inclined to sensual pleasure, if
he only be not on a level with brute beasts, — for there are some who are men, not in fact,
but in name, — if he be ever so little above them, although captivated with the mere delight of
the senses, he hides and dissembles the appetite for such pleasure from very shame. Hence it
is inferred that bodily pleasure is unworthy of man’s superior endowments, and ought to be
despised and spurned; and if there be any one who sets some value on sensual gratification, he
should carefully keep it within due limits. Thus food and the care of the body should be ordered
with reference to health and strength, not to sensual pleasure. Indeed, if we will only bear in
mind what excellence and dignity belong to human nature, we shall understand how base it is
to give one’s self up to luxury, and to live voluptuously and wantonly, and how honorable it is
to live frugally, chastely, circumspectly, soberly.
But it is to be borne in mind that we are endowed by nature as it were with two characters,
one of which is common to us with other men, inasmuch as we all partake of reason, and of
the traits which raise us above the brutes, from which all that is right and becoming is derived,
and from which we seek the method of ascertaining our duty; while the other is that which is
assigned to each of us individually. For as in bodies there are great dissimilarities, — we see
some excelling in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; also in personal
appearance, some have dignity, others grace, — so in minds there are even greater diversities.
Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a great deal of pleasantry; Caius Caesar, the son of
Lucius, even more and more elaborate; while in their contemporaries, Marcus Scaurus and
Marcus Drusus the younger, there was an unusual severity of manner; in Caius Laelius, much
mirthfulness; in his friend Scipio, greater ambition, a more austere type of character. Among
the Greeks, too, we have learned that Socrates was pleasant and facetious, and had a jocose
way of talking, and meant more than he said, one whom the Greeks call ε ρωνα;1 on the other hand, that Pythagoras and Pericles obtained the highest authority in their intercourse with men
without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We are informed that, of the Carthaginians, Hannibal
was crafty, and of our own commanders, that Quintus Maximus readily practised concealment,
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was crafty, and of our own commanders, that Quintus Maximus readily practised concealment,
kept silence, dissembled, laid snares, anticipated the plans of his enemies. In these traits the
Greeks assign the foremost place to Themistocles and Jason of Pherae, and accord pre-eminent
praise to the cunning and crafty procedure of Solon, who, for his own safety, and that he might
render additional service to the state, feigned insanity.2 There are others of very unlike
character, simple and open, who think that nothing should be done covertly or insidiously,
votaries of truth, enemies of fraud; others still, who will endure anything whatever, and will be
subservient to any one whomsoever, till they attain what they desire, as we saw in the case of
Sulla and of Marcus Crassus. Of this class of men we learn that Lysander, the Lacedaemonian,
was unsurpassed in crafty plotting and in his power of endurance, while Callicratidas, who
succeeded Lysander in the command of the fleet, was of the opposite character. Also in speech,
we sometimes see a man of surpassing ability contrive to appear like one of the multitude, as
we witnessed in Catulus, both father and son, and in Quintus Mucius Mancia. We have heard
from those of an earlier generation that this was the habit of Publius Scipio Nasica, and, on the
other hand, that his father, the man who avenged the nefarious enterprises of Tiberius
Gracchus, had nothing genial in his address. We learn, too, that Xenocrates, indeed the
sternest of philosophers, was on this very score eminent and renowned.1 There are other
innumerable diversities of nature and of manners, which yet give no good ground for obloquy.
31. Every one ought to hold fast, not his faults, but his peculiarities, so as to retain more easily
the becomingness which is the subject of our inquiry. We ought, indeed, to act in such a way
as shall be in no respect repugnant to our common human nature; yet, holding this sacred, let
us follow our individual nature, so that, if there are other pursuits in themselves more
important and excellent, we yet may measure our own pursuits by the standard of our own
nature. For it is of no avail to resist nature, or to pursue anything which we cannot reach. It is
the more apparent of what quality is the becomingness under discussion, when we consider
that nothing is becoming that is done, as the phrase is, without Minerva’s sanction, that is,
with the opposition and repugnancy of nature. In truth, if anything is becoming, nothing surely
is more so than uniform consistency in the whole course of life and in each separate action,
which you cannot preserve if, imitating the nature of others, you abandon your own. For as we
ought to use our native tongue, and not, like some who are perpetually foisting in Greek words,
incur well-deserved ridicule, so we ought not to introduce any discordance into our conduct and
our general way of living. This difference of natures, indeed, has so much force that sometimes
one person ought, and another under the same circumstances ought not, to commit suicide.1
For was the case of Marcus Cato different from that of the others who surrendered to Caesar in
Africa? Yet had they killed themselves, they might perhaps have been worthy of censure,
because their mode of life was less severe, and their characters were more pliant; while, since
Nature had given Cato an incredible massiveness of character, and he himself had strengthened
it by undeviating self-consistency, and had always been steadfast in the purpose once
conceived and the design once undertaken, it seemed fit for him to die rather than to look
upon the face of a tyrant. How many things did Ulysses endure in his long wandering, while he
submitted to the service of women, — if Circe and Calypso are to be called women, — and
while he strove to be affable and pleasant to all in his whole social intercourse! At home, also,
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while he strove to be affable and pleasant to all in his whole social intercourse! At home, also,
he bore the jeers of slaves and maidservants, that he might attain the object of his desire. But
Ajax, with the temper which he is said to have had, would have faced death a thousand times
rather than have borne such insults. In view of these things, it will be each man’s duty to weigh
well what are his own peculiar traits of character, and to keep them in serviceable condition,
and not to desire to try how far another man’s peculiarities may be becoming to him; for that
is most becoming to each man which is most peculiarly his own. Let each of us, then, know his
own capacities and proclivities, and show himself a discriminating judge of his own excellences
and defects, lest performers on the stage may evince more discretion than we do. For they
choose, not the best plays, but those the best adapted to their respective abilities, — those who
rely on voice, the Epigoni and Medus; those who depend on action, Menalippa or
Clytaemnestra; Rutilius, whom I remember, Antiopa always; Aesopus, not often Ajax.1 An
actor, then, will look to this fitness on the stage; shall not the wise man have equal regard to it
in life? Let us therefore bestow our diligence chiefly on those concerns for which we are the
best fitted. But if at any time necessity shall have forced us to undertake things outside of our
specialty, we must employ all possible care, thought, and diligence, that we may be able to
dispose of them, if not becomingly, yet with the least degree of unbecomingness; nor ought we
in that case to endeavor to attain capacities not our own, so much as to avoid mistake or
failure.
32. To the two characters which, as I have said, every man must sustain, is added a third,
imposed upon us by chance, or by circumstances beyond our power; a fourth, also, which we
assume at our own discretion. Posts of authority, military commands, high rank, honors, wealth,
and their opposites, at the disposal of chance, are controlled by circumstance. But it depends
on our own choice what character we will assume as to a favorite pursuit or profession. Thus
some apply themselves to philosophy; some, to the civil law; some, to oratory; and of the
several virtues some prefer to excel in one, some in another. Those, indeed, whose fathers or
ancestors have held any special distinction, generally aim at eminence in the same department,
as Quintus Mucius, the son of Publius, in the civil law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in military
service. But some add to the honors inherited from their fathers a special reputation of their
own, as this very Africanus crowned his military renown by eloquence. Timotheus, the son of
Conon, also did the like, being fully his father’s equal in military reputation, and adding to it
the praise of learning and genius. It is, however, now and then the case that young men,
forsaking the example of their ancestors, pursue some plan of their own; and this is the
course, almost always, of those who, of obscure origin, set before themselves large aims. All
these things ought to be taken into careful consideration when we inquire what is becoming.
At the outset, we should determine in what condition we wish to be, in what kind of pursuits,
and whether in private or public life, — a decision the most difficult of all; for it is in early
youth, when judgment is the weakest, that one chooses some mode of life with which he has
become enamored, and thus is involved in a fixed avocation and course before he is capable of
judging what is best for him. For as to what they say of the Hercules of Prodicus, as quoted by
Xenophon,1 that when he was just approaching maturity — the time given by nature to every
one to choose what course of life he will enter — he went into a solitary place, and sitting
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one to choose what course of life he will enter — he went into a solitary place, and sitting
there, hesitated long and seriously within himself, which of the two paths before him, one of
pleasure, the other of virtue, it was better for him to take, — this might perchance happen to
Hercules, the son of Jupiter, but not in like manner to us, who imitate whomsoever we see fit,
and feel impelled toward their pursuits and modes of life, yet still oftener, imbued with the
advice of our parents, are drawn into their manners and habits; while others, still, are carried
away by popular opinion, and make choice of those things that seem most charming to the
multitude. Yet some, whether by happy fortune, or by goodness of nature, or by parental
discipline, enter upon the right way of living.
33. But the rarest description is of those who, endowed either with the prestige of surpassing
genius, or with pre-eminent culture and learning, or with both, have time to deliberate what
course of life they would prefer to follow, — in which deliberation the issue should be made to
conform to one’s own natural bias. For while in the details of conduct we determine what is
becoming from a man’s native disposition, so in ordering the entire course of life much greater
care should be taken that we may be consistent with ourselves so long as we live, and may not
falter in the discharge of any one duty. But while in determining our course nature has the
greatest influence, fortune comes next in controlling power, and account must be taken of both
in choosing a mode of life, — yet most, of nature. For Nature is far the more stable and
consistent of the two, so that Fortune — herself mortal — sometimes seems to be in conflict
with Nature, the immortal. Let him, then, who refers his entire plan of life to his nature so far
as it is unvitiated, go on as he has begun (for this is in the highest degree becoming), unless he
be made aware that he was mistaken in his choice. If this take place (and it may), a change of
habits and of plans is requisite. If circumstances favor this change, we can make it with a good
measure of ease and convenience; otherwise, it must be made gradually and step by step, just
as it is more becoming, in the opinion of the wise, to unknit gradually friendships which no
longer please or satisfy us, than to cut1 them in sunder with a single stroke. But when our
mode of life is changed, we ought by all means to take heed that we present some show of
sufficient reason. To return to what I said awhile ago as to the fitness of imitating parents and
ancestors, an exception is to be made, in the first place, as to their faults, which we are not to
reproduce; and, in the next place, if nature will not permit this imitation in certain particulars,
— as the son of the elder Africanus1 (who adopted the younger Africanus, the son of Paulus)
on account of feeble health could not resemble his father as his father had resembled his
grandfather, — if, for instance, one cannot frequent the courts as an advocate, or hold the ear
of the people in their assemblies, or conduct military enterprises, he ought at least to exhibit
the qualities which are at his own command, justice, good faith, generosity, moderation,
temperance, so that public opinion may not require of him those things in which he is inevitably
deficient. But the best inheritance that fathers can give their children, more precious than any
patrimony however large, is reputation for virtue and for worthy deeds, which if the child
disgraces, his conduct should be branded as infamous and impious.
34. Since the same duties are not assigned to different periods of life, some belonging to the
young, others to those more advanced in years, this distinction needs to be spoken of. It is,
then, the part of the young man to revere his elders, and to choose from among them the best
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then, the part of the young man to revere his elders, and to choose from among them the best
and the most approved, on whose advice and authority he may rely; for the inexperience of
early life demands the wisdom of older men for its stability and its right direction. But most of
all is this early age to be guarded against sensuality, and to be trained in labor and endurance,
both of mind and of body, that the capacity of persistent diligence may be developed alike for
military service and for civic duty. Moreover, when the young wish to relax their minds and to
give themselves up to enjoyment, let them beware of excess, let them keep modesty in mind,
which they will do the more if their elders will interest themselves also in matters of this sort.
But for old men it would seem that bodily labor ought to be slackened, while mental efforts are
to be even increased. At the same time they should take pains to aid their friends, and the
young men, and, above all, the state, as much as possible by their counsel and experience. But
nothing is to be more shunned by old age than self-surrender to listlessness and indolence.
Luxurious living, too, unbecoming at any period of life, is most shameful for old age; and if to
this licentiousness be added, the evil is double; for thus old age at once disgraces itself, and
makes the excess of youth still more shameless.
Still further, it is not irrelevant to treat of the duties of magistrates and of those in private life,
of citizens1 and of foreigners. It is, then, the special function of the magistrate to regard
himself as representing the person of the state, and bound to maintain its dignity and honor, to
enforce the laws, to define conflicting rights, and to bear in mind whatever is committed to his
good faith. The private citizen ought to live on fair and equal terms with his fellow-citizens,
neither cringing and grovelling, nor yet assuming supercilious airs. Then too, in the state he
ought to choose those things which are peaceful and honorable; for we are wont to feel and to
say that such a man is a good citizen. It is the duty of a foreigner and a temporary resident to
do nothing beyond his own business, not to pry into the concerns of other people, and, least of
all, to be meddlesome in the affairs of the state in which he is an alien. Thus, for the most
part, duties can be ascertained, when the inquiry is raised what is becoming and what is fitting
for different persons, occasions, and ages. But there is nothing which is so becoming as to
maintain consistency in all that we do and undertake.
35. Since becomingness in all that is done and said has its place also in the movement and
attitude of the body, and consists in three things, beauty, order, and attire fitted for the work
in hand, difficult to express in words, — but it will be enough if they are felt, — and since in
these is included our care to win the approval of those among whom we live, a few things
ought to be said as to these particulars. In the beginning Nature seems to have made great
account of our bodies, having placed in plain sight our frame and such parts of our structure as
have a comely appearance, while she has covered and concealed those parts of the body
bestowed for the needs of nature, which might have an unshapely and ugly aspect. This so
careful construction of Nature the modesty of men has followed; for the very things which
Nature has hidden all persons of sound mind keep out of sight, and are at pains to obey the
necessities connected with them as secretly as possible. Moreover, as to these same parts of
the body, whose uses are necessary, they call neither them nor their uses by their proper
names, and what it is not disgraceful to do, if it be only in secret, it is obscene to name. Thus
the open doing of these things and the obscene mention of them are equally liable to the
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the open doing of these things and the obscene mention of them are equally liable to the
charge of immodesty. Nor is any heed to be given to the Cynics, or to those Stoics who are
almost Cynics,1 who make it a matter of reproach and ridicule that we deem things that are
not shameful in fact unfit to be called by their right names, while we apply their proper names
to things that are really shameful. Thus theft, fraud, and adultery are shameful in fact, but it is
not obscene to call them by their names; while to perpetuate one’s family is right in fact, yet
obscene in name. On this notion those same philosophers hold prolix arguments at the expense
of modesty. But let us follow Nature, and refrain from whatever lacks the approval of eye and
ear. Let attitude, gait, mode of sitting, posture at table, countenance, eyes, movement of the
hands, preserve the becomingness of which I speak. In these matters there are two extremes
to be especially shunned, — on the one hand, effeminacy or daintiness, on the other,
coarseness or rusticity. Nor ought it to be admitted that these rules, though proper for actors
and public speakers, are matters of indifference to us. The custom of actors, from ancient
tradition, carries modesty so far that no one is permitted to go upon the stage without drawers,
in the fear that in case of the accidental exposure of certain parts of the body they may
present an unbecoming spectacle. Our usage also forbids sons of ripe age from bathing with
their fathers, sons-in-law with their fathers-in-law. This kind of modesty is to be adhered to,
especially as Nature herself is mistress and guide.
36. While there are two kinds of beauty, in one of which grace, in the other dignity,
predominates, we ought to regard grace as belonging to woman, dignity to man. Let then every
species of apparel or adornment unworthy of a man be removed from his person, and let him
guard against similar faults in attitude and gesture. For the manners of the wrestling ground1
are apt to be somewhat disagreeable, and the affected attitudes of actors frequently give
offence; while in the entire carriage of the body whatever is direct and simple receives
commendation. Dignity of person is to be made sure by healthiness of complexion, and the
complexion is to be maintained by bodily exercise. There should be rendered, with reference to
neatness, a regard not offensively remiss, nor yet over-punctilious, just sufficient to avoid rustic
and ill-bred slovenliness. The same rule is to be observed in dress, in which, as in most things,
that which is becoming lies between the two extremes. Care must also be taken lest in our gait
we accustom ourselves to effeminate slowness, like the litters that carry in procession the
images of the gods, or when time presses attempt excessive speed, in consequence of which
panting ensues, the countenance is changed, the features are distorted, from all which the
obvious inference is that there is a lack of stead-fastness in the character. But much greater
pains should be taken lest the movements of the mind should transcend their natural equipoise;
and this we shall effect if we guard against violent emotions and fits of despondency, and if we
keep our minds intent on the observance of what is becoming. But the operations of the mind
are of two kinds, — the one of thought, the other of impulse. Thought is occupied chiefly in
seeking the truth; impulse urges to action. Care, then, is to be taken that we employ thought
on the best subjects possible, and that we make impulse obedient to reason.
37. To pass to another subject, the power of speech being great, and of two kinds, the one of
oratory, the other of conversation, let oratory find place in the arguments of courts, popular
assemblies, and the Senate; let conversation have its scope in smaller circles, in the discussion
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assemblies, and the Senate; let conversation have its scope in smaller circles, in the discussion
of ordinary affairs, in the gatherings of friends, — let it also follow1 convivial entertainments.
The rhetoricians give rules for oratory; there are none for conversation. Yet I know not but that
conversation might also have its rules. Masters are found when learners want them; but there
are none who make conversation a study, while the rhetoricians have crowds of pupils. Yet the
rules given about words and sentences apply to conversation no less than to oratory. And since
we have the voice as the organ of speech, let us at least attempt two things as to the voice, —
to have it distinct, and to have it pleasing to the ear. For both we must of course look to
nature; but the one may be improved by practice, the other by imitating those who pronounce
neither too broadly nor too rapidly. There was nothing in the Catuli1 that would make you think
them of exquisite taste in literature, — though they were men of letters, but only as others are,
— yet they were thought to speak the Latin language as perfectly as it could be spoken. Their
pronunciation was sweet to the ear; the separate letters were neither drawled nor clipped, so
as to avoid equally indistinctness and affectation; they spoke without effort, in a voice neither
languid nor shrill. Lucius Crassus1 had a more copious flow of language, with no less humor;
yet the reputation of the Catuli as good talkers was fully equal to his. Caesar, the brother2 of
the elder Catulus, surpassed them all in wit and humor, so that when he spoke in the courts in
his conversational way he was more efficient than other advocates with their set speeches. On
all these matters we must bestow labor, if we aim at what is becoming in every detail of
conduct.
Let then conversation, in which the followers of Socrates are pre-eminent, be easy, and by no
means prolix; let politeness be always observed, nor must one debar others from their part, as
if he had sole right to be heard; but, as in all things else, so in social intercouse, let him regard
alternation as not unfair. Then, too, let him at the outset consider on what sort of subjects he is
talking; if on serious things, let him show due gravity; on amusing, grace. Especially let him
take heed lest his conversation betray some defect in his moral character, which is most
frequently the case when the absent are expressly ridiculed or spoken of slanderously and
malignly, with the purpose of injuring their reputation. For the most part, conversation relates
to private affairs, or politics, or the theory and practice of the arts. Pains must then be taken
that, if the conversation begins to wander off to other subjects, it be recalled to these. Yet
reference must be had to the persons present; for we are not all interested in the same things,
at all times, and in a similar degree. We should always observe, also, the length of time to
which the pleasure of conversation extends, and as there was reason for beginning, so let there
be a limit at which there shall be an ending.
38. But as it is a most fitting rule for the entire life, that we shun passion, by which I mean
emotions that transcend the control of reason, so conversation ought to be free from emotions
of this kind, that thus no anger or inordinate desire may show itself, and that at the same time
there be no appearance of listlessness, or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also
take special care to preserve the bearing of respect and esteem for those with whom we
converse. There is sometimes occasion for administering reproof, in which we must perhaps use
a greater stress of voice and a keener severity of diction; indeed, this may need to be carried
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a greater stress of voice and a keener severity of diction; indeed, this may need to be carried
so far as to make us seem under the influence of anger. But we shall have recourse to this kind
of oral castigation, as to the cautery and the knife, rarely and reluctantly, nor ever, unless it be
necessary in the absence of any other remedy. And at all events let anger be kept far away; for
with anger nothing can be done rightly, nothing judiciously. But in most cases we can
administer mild reproof, yet combined with earnestness, so that at once due severity may be
employed and invective avoided. Moreover, the very bitterness which our reproof carries with it
should be made to appear as designed for the benefit of the person reproved. It is right, also,
even in our disputes with those the most hostile to us, and even though we receive from them
unmerited reproach, to maintain a serious bearing indeed, but to exclude irritation. For what is
done under some degree of excitement cannot be done with self-respect or with the approval of
bystanders. Still further, it is in bad taste to talk about one’s self, especially to lie about one’s
self, and with the derision of the audience to play the part of the Braggart Soldier.1
39. Since I want to make a thorough discussion of everything involving the question of duty, —
for such is my purpose, — I ought to say also what sort of a house, in my opinion, should
belong to a man in high office and conspicuous station. The ultimate end, of course, is
convenience, and to this the plan of the building should be adapted, while at the same time
care should be taken as regards stateliness of appearance and amplitude of accommodation. We
are told that it redounded to the honor of Cneius Octavius, the first of his family that was made
consul, that he had built a splendid house, one in all respects magnificent, on the Palatine Hill,1
which, being seen by the people at large, was thought to have procured for the owner,
belonging to a family that had before held no high office, the votes that raised him to the
consulship. This house Scaurus demolished, and built where it stood an addition to his own
house. And so the former of the two, first of his race, brought the consulship into his house;
the latter, the son of a man of distinguished eminence and renown, bore home to his enlarged
house on the same spot not only failure as a candidate for the consulship, but disgrace and
disaster.2 In truth, high standing in the community should be adorned by a house, not sought
wholly from a house; nor should the owner be honored by the house, but the house by the
owner. Moreover, as in matters of various kinds one must take account not of himself alone,
but of others also, so in the house of a distinguished man, into which many guests are to be
received, and a multitude of men of all kinds are to be admitted, care must be taken to have it
roomy. Under other circumstances a very large house is apt to bring discredit to its owner if it
have the air of loneliness, especially if under some former owner it used to be thronged. For it
is offensive to have it said by those who pass by, —
“O ancient house! Ah, how unlike a lord
Now lords it over thee!”1
which in these times may be said about many a house. But special care should be taken, if you
build yourself, not to go beyond reasonable limits in costliness and splendor. In such
extravagance great mischief is done by mere example; for very many are anxious, especially in
this direction, to follow the example of distinguished men. Thus who imitates the virtue of
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Lucius Lucullus, a man of the highest character? But how many have imitated the magnificence
of his villas!2 Here there certainly is need of a limit, and of a return to a moderate standard.
This same standard ought to be applied to the entire habit and style of living. But enough on
this head.
In whatever we do there are three things to be endeavored. The first is that impulse be
subservient to reason, than which there is no more fitting rule for the observance of duty. In
the next place, we should make ourselves acquainted with the magnitude of the object in hand,
so that we may take upon ourselves neither more nor less care and labor than the case
demands. The third rule is that the outlay for show and parade be brought within moderate
limits; and those limits are best kept when we maintain the becomingness of which I have
already spoken, and suffer ourselves not to go beyond it. Yet of these three the most excellent
is that impulse should be subservient to reason.
40. In the next place, I am to speak of the order of our doings and the fit arrangement of
time, which are comprehended in the science which the Greeks term ε ταξίαν, yet not in its sense of moderation (which involves the idea of measure or quantity), but in that sense of ε
ταξία1 which implies the observance of order in time and place. Yet in favor of our calling this moderation, we might cite the definition of the Stoics, who say that moderation is the art of
putting in the right place whatever is done or said. Thus the import of order and that of
collocation seem identical with it; for they define order to be the putting of things in fit and
suitable places, and say that the fit time is the place of an action, — the fit time for an action,
which we call occasion, being called in Greek ε καιρία.1 Thus it is that moderation, which I interpret as I have said, comes to denote skill in determining the fitness of times for specific
acts. But the same definition may be given of prudence, of which I treated in the earlier part of
this essay.2 Here, however, our subject is regularity, self-control, and virtues of that kind.
What belongs peculiarly to prudence has been spoken of in its proper place; but of the class of
virtues which has of late occupied our attention, it remains for me to speak of what may fall
under the head of modesty and of regard for the approval of those among whom we live.
Such, then, should be the order applied to whatever we do, that, as in a coherent speech, so in
the life, all things should be fitted to one another, and in harmony with one another. For it is
disgraceful and exceedingly blameworthy, on a serious subject to introduce the kind of talk that
belongs to a festive occasion, or any wanton strain of utterance. When Pericles had Sophocles
for a colleague in military command, and they had met on their common official duty, and, a
handsome boy happening to pass by, Sophocles said, “Oh, Pericles, what a beautiful boy!”
Pericles very fittingly answered, “It becomes a commander, Sophocles, to have his eyes as
abstinent1 as his hands.”2 Yet had Sophocles said the same at a trial of skill among athletes,
he would have incurred no just censure. So great is the significance of both place and time.
Thus, if one who is going to plead a cause should, on a journey or in walking, be self-absorbed
in meditation, or if at such a time he be wrapt in earnest thought on any other subject, he
cannot be blamed; but if he present this appearance on a festive occasion, he would be
regarded as ill-bred, because unmindful of the fitness of time. Such things, indeed, as are at a
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regarded as ill-bred, because unmindful of the fitness of time. Such things, indeed, as are at a
very great remove from propriety, like singing in the forum, or any other gross misconduct, are
readily perceived, nor do they stand in special need of admonition and direction. But one should
avoid with peculiar care offences that seem small, and cannot be appreciated by the many. As
in stringed instruments or flutes an expert detects discord, however slight, so we should in our
lives be on the watch for even the least discord, and all the more so, inasmuch as the harmony
of actions is greater and better than that of musical notes.
41. Therefore, as in stringed instruments the ears of musicians detect the slightest falsity of
tone, so shall we, if we are willing to be keen and careful observers of faults, often learn great
things from small. From the glance of the eyes, from the expansion or contraction of the
brows, from depression, from cheerfulness, from laughter, from the tone of the voice, from
silence, from a higher or lower key of utterance, and other similar tokens, we may easily
determine which of the greater things that they typify are fittingly done and which of them are
at variance with duty and nature. Nor is it unsuitable in matters of this sort to judge of the
character of our actions by looking at others, so that we may ourselves avoid whatever is
unbecoming in them; for it is the case — I know not how — that we perceive any delinquency
more readily in others than in ourselves. Therefore those pupils whose faults their masters
mimic in order to cure them are most easily corrected. Nor yet is it out of place, before forming
our judgment in doubtful cases, to consult men of superior natural intelligence or those who
have become wise by experience, and to ask them what they think as to any matters in which
the question of duty is involved. Indeed, most persons are wont to be drawn in nearly the
direction in which their nature leads them, and we want to learn of men, not merely what they
say, but what they think, and also why.1 As painters, and sculptors, and poets, too, like to
have their work pass under review by the people, that if any fault is found by a considerable
number of persons it may be corrected, and as they earnestly inquire both of themselves and
of others wherein the fault consists, so for us there are many things to be done and left
undone, and changed and corrected by the opinion of others. Concerning things done by
established custom or in order to obey the laws of the state, there are no rules to be given; for
custom and law are themselves rules. Nor ought any one to be led into the error of supposing
that, if Socrates or Aristippus2 did or said anything contrary to custom and to legal usage, he
may regard the like as lawful for himself. They obtained this liberty by superior and divine
endowments. The entire system of the Cynics also is to be shunned; for it is opposed to
modesty, without which there can be neither right nor honor. But we ought to respect and
revere those whose life has been passed in the transaction of honorable and important affairs,
who have a right feeling toward the state, and have rendered or are still rendering it service,
no less than those in civil office or military command; to pay great deference to old age; to
yield precedence to the magistrates; to make a distinction between citizens and foreigners, and
in the case of foreigners, between those who come in a private and those who come in a public
capacity. In short, not to treat of particulars, we ought to cherish, defend, preserve, the
common harmony and fellowship of the whole human race.
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42. Now as to the trades and modes of getting gain that are to be regarded as respectable,1
and those that are to be deemed mean and vulgar, the general opinion is as follows: In the
first place, those callings are held in disesteem that come into collision with the ill will of men,
as that of taxgatherers, as that of usurers. The callings of hired laborers, and of all who are
paid for their mere work and not for skill, are ungenteel1 and vulgar; for their wages are given
for menial service. Those who buy to sell again as soon as they can are to be accounted as
vulgar; for they can make no profit except by a certain amount of falsehood, and nothing is
meaner than falsehood. All mechanics are engaged in vulgar business; for a workshop can have
nothing respectable about it. Least of all can we speak well of the trades that minister to
sensual pleasures, —
“Fishmongers, butchers, cooks, poulterers, and fishermen,”
as Terence says. Add, if you please, to this list perfumers, ballet-dancers, and the whole tribe
of dice-players. The professions which require greater skill and are of no small benefit to the
community, such as medicine, architecture, the instruction of youth in liberal studies, are
respectable for those whose rank they suit.2 Commerce,3 if on a small scale, is to be regarded
as vulgar; but if large and rich, importing much from all quarters, and making extensive sales
without fraud, it is not so very discreditable. Nay, it may justly claim the highest regard, if the
merchant, satiated, or rather contented with his profits, instead of any longer leaving the sea
for a port,1 betakes himself from the port itself to an estate in the country. But of all means of
acquiring gain nothing is better than agriculture, nothing more productive, nothing more
pleasant, nothing more worthy of a man of liberal mind. Since I have said enough of this in my
Cato Major, you will find there what belongs to the subject.
43. I think that I have sufficiently expounded the way in which specific duties are derived under
the several divisions of the right. But as to the very things that are right there may be
sometimes a question as to alternatives,2 of two right things which is the more imperatively
right, — a subject omitted by Panaetius. Since all that is right is deduced from four divisions of
virtue, the first, knowledge; the second, social obligation; the third, elevation of mind; the
fourth, moderation, — these must of necessity be often brought into comparison with one
another in determining a specific duty.
In my opinion the duties derived from the relations of society have a closer adaptation to
nature1 than those which are derived from knowledge, as may be established by this argument,
— that should such a life fall to the lot of a wise man that in the full abundance of all things
and in entire leisure he could consider and contemplate within his own mind whatever is worth
knowing, yet, were his solitude such that he could never see a human face, he would rather
die. Then, too, the chief of all the virtues, that wisdom which the Greeks term σο ίαν2 (for
prudence, which the Greeks call ρόνησιν,3 has another, narrower meaning, namely, the knowledge of things to be sought and shunned), — the wisdom which I have designated as
chief of the virtues is the knowledge of things divine and human, which comprises the mutual
fellowship and communion of gods and men. But if wisdom is the greatest of the virtues, as it
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fellowship and communion of gods and men. But if wisdom is the greatest of the virtues, as it
undoubtedly is, it follows of necessity that the duty derived from this fellowship and communion
is the greatest of duties. Moreover, the knowledge and contemplation of nature are somehow
defective and imperfect, unless they lead to some result in action; and this appropriate action
is best recognized in care for the well-being of mankind. The virtue from which it springs
belongs, then, to the sodality of the human race, and is therefore to be preferred to
knowledge. That this is so, every excellently good man shows and indicates in very deed. For
who is there so deeply interested in penetrating and understanding the nature of things, that if,
while he is handling and contemplating subjects most worthy of being understood, there is
suddenly announced to him some danger and peril of his country in which he can render aid
and succor, will not abandon and fling away his learned pursuits, even though he imagines that
he can number the stars and find out the dimensions of the universe? And he would do the
same thing in the business or in the peril of a father or a friend. It is thus seen that the duties
of justice which concern the interests of our fellow-men, than which nothing ought to be more
sacred to man, are to have precedence over the pursuits and duties of knowledge.
44. Now those whose pursuits and whose entire life have been devoted to the acquisition of
knowledge, have nevertheless not withdrawn from the obligation of contributing to the
advantage and benefit of mankind; for they have so instructed many as to make them better
citizens and more useful to their respective states. Thus Lysis, the Pythagorean, taught
Epaminondas of Thebes, and Plato was the preceptor of Dion of Syracuse, and many others
have had numerous pupils. I myself, in whatever I have contributed to the well-being of the
state (if I have indeed contributed anything), entered upon the public service well furnished in
point of teachers and teaching. Nor is it only when these men are living and present that they
instruct and teach those desirous of learning; but they follow up this same work even after
death by the records of their knowledge and wisdom. For there is no topic omitted by them
that could relate to laws, to morals, to the government of the state; so that they seem to have
bestowed their leisure on our business.1 Thus the very men who are devoted to the pursuit of
learning and wisdom employ their intelligence and practical discretion chiefly for the benefit of
mankind. Therefore it is better to speak fluently, if wisely, than to think, no matter with what
acuteness of comprehension, if the power of expression be wanting; for thought begins and
ends in itself, while fluent speech extends its benefit to those with whom we are united in
fellowship. Moreover, as swarms of bees are not gathered for the purpose of making
honeycombs, but make honeycombs because they are gregarious by nature, so, and even much
more, men, sociable by nature, bring to their union skill in joint and associate action.
Therefore, unless the virtue which consists in caring for the well-being of men, that is, in the
maintenance of human society, accompany the knowledge of things, that knowledge must seem
isolated and meagre; and equally loftiness of mind, if divorced from human society and
fellowship, becomes mere brutality and savageness. Thus it is that the society and fellowship of
men transcend in importance the pursuit of knowledge. Nor is it true, as some say, that it is on
account of the necessities of life — because we could not obtain and accomplish what nature
demands without the aid of others — that fellowship and society were initiated among men, but
that if everything appertaining to subsistence and comfortable living were supplied for us, so to
speak, as by a magic wand, every person of excelling genius, giving up all other concerns,
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speak, as by a magic wand, every person of excelling genius, giving up all other concerns,
would occupy himself wholly in knowledge and science. It is not so; for man in that case would
shun solitude, and seek companionship in his pursuits, — would want now to teach, then to
learn; now to hear, then to speak. Therefore every form of duty which is of avail for the union
of men and the defence of society is to be regarded as of higher obligation than the duty which
is dependent on abstract study and science.
45. It may perchance be asked whether this human fellowship which is most closely allied to
nature is also always to have the precedence over modesty and decency. I think not. For there
are certain things, some so repulsive, some so scandalous, that a wise man would not do them
even to save his country. Posidonius1 has brought together a great many of these things, some
of them so foul, so indecent, that it would be offensive even to name them. These things, then,
one will not do for the sake of the state, nor yet will the state demand that they should be
done for its sake. But the question is the more easily settled, inasmuch as there cannot come
any crisis in which it can be for the interest of the state that a wise man should do any of these
things.
This, then, may be regarded as settled, that in choosing between conflicting duties preference
must be given to the class of duties essential to the maintenance of human society. Moreover,
considerate action is the result of knowledge and prudence. It therefore follows that to act
considerately is of more worth than to think wisely.2 But I have said enough on this point; for
this division of the subject has been so laid open that it cannot be difficult in an inquiry as to
duty to see in any particular case which duty is to be regarded as of prime and which of
secondary obligation.
But in society itself there are gradations of duties, from which it may be determined what one
owes in any individual relation. Thus we are bound in obligation, first to the immortal gods,
secondly to our country, thirdly to our parents, then by successive degrees to other persons
more or less nearly related to us.
From this brief discussion light may be thrown, not only on the question whether certain
specific acts are right or wrong, but also, when the choice lies between two right things, on the
question which of the two is of the highest obligation. This last head, as I said above, is
omitted by Panaetius. Let us go on now to what remains of the subject.
BOOK II.
1. I T H I N K, my son Marcus, that it has been sufficiently explained in my first book how duties
are to be derived from the right, and from each of the four virtues which I named as divisions
of the right. It comes next in order, to treat of those kinds of duties that belong to the
adornment of life and the command of its utilities, to influence and resources of every
description. Under this head I have said that the inquiry is, first, what is expedient and what
inexpedient, and then, of expedient things which is the more expedient, which the most
expedient. I shall proceed to the discussion of these things, after saying a few words concerning
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expedient. I shall proceed to the discussion of these things, after saying a few words concerning
my design and method in writing on philosophical subjects.
Although, indeed, my books have roused not a few to the desire not only of reading, but of
writing, still I sometimes fear that the mere name of philosophy may be offensive to certain
worthy men, and that they may marvel that I spend so much labor and time upon it. In truth,
so long as the state was administered by men of its own choice, I bestowed upon it all my care
and thought. But when all things were held under the absolute sway of one man, and there was
no longer room for advice or influence, while at the same time I had lost my associates in the
guardianship of the state, men of the highest eminence, I did not abandon myself to
melancholy, which would have consumed me had I not resisted it, nor yet, on the other hand,
to sensual pleasures unworthy of a philosopher. And oh that the state had continued in the
condition in which it recommenced its life,1 and had not fallen into the hands of men desirous
not so much of reforming as of revolutionizing its constitution! In that case, in the first place, as
I used to do when the state stood on a firm basis, I should expend more labor in pleading than
in writing; and in the next place, I should commit to writing not the subjects now in hand, but
my arguments before the courts, as I have often done. But when the state, on which all my
care, thought, labor, used to be expended, had utterly ceased to be, my forensic and senatorial
literature was of course silenced. Yet since my mind could not be unemployed, having been
conversant with these studies from my early days, I thought that my chagrin could be most
honorably laid aside if I betook myself to philosophy, to which I devoted a large part of my
youth as a learner, while after I began to hold important offices and gave myself wholly to the
service of the state, philosophy had as much of my time as was not taken up by the claims of
my friends and the public. Yet this time was all consumed in reading; I had no leisure for
writing.
2. I seem, then, in the severest calamities to have attained at least this good fortune, that I
am able to commit to writing subjects not sufficiently familiar to my fellow-countrymen, and yet
preeminently worthy of their cognizance. For what, in the name of the gods, is more desirable
than wisdom? What more to be prized? What better? What more worthy of man? It is the
seekers of this, then, who are called philosophers; nor is philosophy, if you undertake to
translate it, anything else than the love of wisdom. But wisdom, as defined by the ancients, is
the knowledge of things divine and human, and of the causes by which these things are kept in
harmony. I cannot well understand what he who blames the pursuit of this knowledge can
regard as commendable. For if gratification of the mind and repose from care be sought, what
pleasure can be compared with the pursuits of those who are always searching out what may
look and tend toward a good and happy life? Or if regard is paid to consistency of character
and to virtue, either this is the science1 by which we may attain them, or there is none at all.
To say that there is no science of these greatest of human interests when there are none of the
smallest concerns that have not their science, is the language of men who talk without thinking,
and who deceive themselves in matters of the highest moment. Then, too, if there is any
instruction in virtue, where should it be sought, when you turn away from this department of
learning? But these things are usually discussed with greater precision in urging readers to the
study of philosophy, as I have done in another treatise.1 My present purpose was simply to say
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study of philosophy, as I have done in another treatise.1 My present purpose was simply to say
why, deprived of opportunities for the service of the state, I chose this department of study
above all others.
It is objected to me, and that too by educated and learned men, that I seem not to act
consistently, when I say that nothing can be known with certainty, and yet am accustomed to
give my opinion on other subjects, and am now setting forth the rules of duty. I could wish
that these persons had an adequate understanding of my philosophical doctrine.2 For I am not
one of those whose minds drift about in uncertainty, and never have any definite aim. Indeed,
what sort of an intellect, or rather of a life, would remain, if fixed principles not only of
reasoning, but of conduct, were abolished? This is not my case; but while others say that some
things are certain, some doubtful, so I, differing from them, call some things probable, some
improbable. What is there, then, that can hinder me from pursuing those things that seem to
me probable, rejecting those things that seem improbable, and, while I shun the arrogance of
positive assertion, escaping the recklessness which is at the farthest remove from wisdom? All
opinions are controverted by our school, on the ground that this very probability cannot be
brought to light unless by a comparison of the arguments on both sides. These things,
however, are, as I think, expounded with sufficient care in my Academics. But though you, my
Cicero, are becoming versed in the most ancient1 and noble of philosophies, under the
guidance of Cratippus, who bears the closest resemblance to the illustrious founders of the
school, I am unwilling that these speculations of mine, nearly allied to those of your school,
should be unknown to you. But let us now take up the plan proposed for our discussion.
3. At the outset I proposed for the full discussion of duty five divisions, two relating to what is
becoming and right; two to the conveniences of life, resources, influence, wealth; the fifth to
the determination of our choice, whenever the right and the expedient might seem mutually
repugnant. The divisions relating to the right, which I would have you thoroughly understand,
are finished. This of which I am now going to treat is what is termed expediency, with
reference to which custom has turned out of the right way, and has been gradually brought to
the point of separating the right from the expedient, and of maintaining that what is not
expedient may be right, and what is not right, expedient, than which there could be no doctrine
more pernicious to human well-being. There are, indeed, philosophers of the very highest
authority who on strict and tenable grounds make a distinction in theory between three several
kinds of excellence, which yet, as they admit, are inseparable in their nature; for whatever is
just they regard as expedient, and likewise what is right as just. Hence it follows that whatever
is right is also expedient.1 Those who imagine that the distinction is not in mere theory, but in
fact, often admiring adroit and crafty men, take roguery for wisdom. Their mistake ought to be
eliminated, and the universal opinion brought over to the hope that men may learn to expect
the attainment of what they desire by right purposes and honest deeds, not by fraud and
roguery.
The means of sustaining human life are in part inanimate, as gold, silver, the products of the
earth, and other things of that sort; in part, living beings that have their own instincts and
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appetites. Of these last some are destitute of reason, others are rational. Those destitute of
reason are horses, oxen, other cattle, bees, by whose labor contribution is made to the service
and subsistence of men. Of the rational there are named two classes, — the one of gods, the
other of men. Reverence and purity will make the gods propitious. But next to and close after
the gods, men can be of the greatest service to men. The same division applies to those things
that cause injury and obstruction. But because it is thought that the gods do no injury, these
being out of the question, men are regarded as most of all interfering injuriously with men.
Indeed, the very things that I have called inanimate are produced for the most part by the
labor of men, nor could we have them unless handicraft and skill had given their aid, nor could
we utilize them except under the management of men. Nor without the labor of man could
there be any care of health, or cultivation of the soil, or harvesting and preservation of grain
and other products of the ground. Nor could there be the exportation of our superfluous
commodities, nor the importation of those in which we are lacking, unless men performed these
offices. By parity of reason the stones that we need for our use could not be quarried from the
earth,
“Nor iron, brass, silver, gold, be dug from their deep caverns,”1
without the labor and handicraft of men.
4. Whence, indeed, could houses, to dispel the severity of the cold and to allay the discomfort
of the heat, have been furnished for mankind in the beginning, or how could they have been
repaired, when made ruinous by storm, or earthquake, or age, unless society had learned to
seek aid in these things from men? Take into the account also aqueducts, canals, works for the
irrigation of fields, breakwaters, artificial harbors. Whence could we have these without the
labor of men? From these and many other things it is obvious that we could in no wise have
received the revenues and uses derived from inanimate objects without the skill and labor of
men. Then, again, what revenue or what convenience could be derived from beasts, unless by
the aid of men? For it was men certainly who were foremost in discovering what use we might
make of the several beasts in our service; nor could we now without the labor of men either
feed them, or tame them, or keep them, or receive returns from them in their season.1 By
men also those beasts that do harm are killed, and those that can be of use are captured. Why
should I enumerate the multitude of arts without which life could not have been at all? How
would the sick be cured, what would be the enjoyment of the healthy, what would be our food
or our mode of living, did not so many arts give us their ministries? It is by these things that
the civilized life of men is so far removed from the subsistence and mode of living of the
beasts. Cities, too, could not have been built and peopled but for the association of men, in
consequence of which laws and rules of moral conduct have been established, as also an
equitable distribution of rights, and a systematic training for the work of life. These things have
been followed by mildness of disposition and by modesty, and the consequence is that human
life is better furnished with what it needs, and that by giving, receiving, and interchanging
commodities and conveniences we may have all our wants supplied.
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5. I am dwelling on this subject longer than is necessary; for who is there to whom what
Panaetius says with no little prolixity is not perfectly obvious, that no one, either as a military
commander or as a civil magistrate, could ever have carried into effect important and
serviceable measures without the zealous co-operation of men? He names Themistocles,
Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, who, he says, could not have accomplished such great
things without the aid of men. He cites witnesses that are unnecessary in a matter beyond
doubt.
Still further, as we obtain great benefits by the sympathy and co-operation of men, so there is
no degree of evil, however execrable, which may not spring from man for man. There is extant
a book about the destruction of men,1 by Dicaearchus, a distinguished and eloquent Peripatetic,
who, after enumerating other causes, — such as inundation, pestilence, perils of the desert, the
sudden inrush of destructive beasts2 (by whose assaults, he says, whole races of men have
been consumed), — then shows by comparison how many more men have been exterminated
by the violence of men, that is, by wars or seditions, than by all other forms of calamity.
Since, then, there is no doubt on this point, that men transcend all other causes both of benefit
and of injury to men, I maintain that it is a special property of virtue to conciliate the minds of
men, and to make them availing for its own uses. Thus, while whatever in inanimate objects
and in the use and management of beasts redounds to human benefit is to be ascribed to the
mechanic arts, the good will of men, prompt and ready for the improvement of our condition, is
elicited only by the wisdom and virtue which belong to men of superior excellence.
Indeed, all virtue may be said to consist in three things,1 one of which lies in the clear
discernment of what is true and real in every subject, of the correspondences of things, of their
consequences, sources, and causes; the second, in the restraining of those troubled movements
of mind which the Greeks call πάθη,2 and in making the impulses which they call ρμάς3
obedient to reason; the third, in the considerate and wise treatment of those with whom we
are associated, by whose good will we may have in full and overflowing measure whatever
nature craves, and by whose agency we may ward off impending evil, may exact retribution of
those who attempt to do us harm, and visit them with such punishment as justice and humanity
will permit.
6. By what means we can attain this capacity of winning and holding men’s affections, I will
shortly expound; but there are a few things to be said first. Who does not know that Fortune
has great power on either side, whether toward prosperous or adverse events? For when we
sail under her propitious breath, we reach our desired port, and when she sends a contrary
wind, we founder. Fortune herself, then, occasions some calamities — though comparatively
rare — independently of human agency: in the first place, from inanimate things, as by gales,
tempests, shipwrecks, falling buildings, conflagrations; then from beasts, by stings, bites,
assaults. These, as I have said, are comparatively infrequent. But the destruction of armies, as
of three very recently,1 and of many others in former times; the murder of commanders, as
lately that of an eminent and remarkable man;2 the enmity, also, of the multitude, and by its
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lately that of an eminent and remarkable man;2 the enmity, also, of the multitude, and by its
means the exile,3 ruin, flight, often of well-deserving citizens; and, on the other hand,
prosperous events, civic honors, military commands, victories, — these, although they are
partly dependent on fortune, cannot be brought to pass on either side without the aid and
endeavor of men. This, then, being understood, I am to explain how we can elicit and call forth
the good will of men for our own benefit. If the discussion shall seem too long, let it be
compared with the advantage to be derived from it. It will then, perhaps, seem too brief.
Whatever, then, men bestow upon a man to enrich and ennoble him, they do it, either from
kind feeling to a person whom for some reason they hold dear; or from respect for one to
whose virtue they look up, and whom they think worthy of as ample good fortune as can accrue
to him; or for one in whom they have confidence, and whose counsel and aid for their own
benefit they hope in return; or for one whom they hold in dread for his capacity to injure them;
or, on the other hand, for those from whom they have expectations, as when kings and
demagogues distribute largesses; or, finally, when they are moved by price and bribe, which is
the meanest and vilest way, both for those whose favor is held by it and for those who
endeavor to resort to it; for it is a bad case when what ought to be effected by virtue is
attempted by money. Yet since subsidies of this kind are sometimes necessary,1 I will define
their proper use, when I shall have first spoken of things which bear a closer relation to virtue.
Moreover, men put themselves under the command and power of others for several reasons.
They are led to this either by kind feeling, or by the greatness of favors received, or by the
high social position of him to whom they yield deference, or by hope that such a course will be
of use to them, or by fear of being forcibly compelled to render obedience; or they are
attracted by the prospect of generous gifts and by promises; or, lastly, as we often see in our
state, they are hired for wages.
7. But of all things nothing tends so much to the guarding and keeping of resources as to be
the object of affection; nor is anything more foreign to that end than to be the object of fear.
Ennius says most fittingly: —
“Hate follows fear; and plotted ruin, hate.”
It has been lately demonstrated, if it was before unknown, that no resources can resist the
hatred of a numerous body. It is not merely the destruction of this tyrant, whom the state,
subdued by armed force, endured so long as he lived and obeys most implicitly now that he is
dead,1 that shows how far the hatred of men may prove fatal; but similar deaths of other
tyrants, hardly one of whom has escaped a like fate, teach this lesson. For fear is but a poor
guardian for permanent possession, and, on the other hand, good will is faithful so long as
there can be need of its loyalty. Those who hold under their command subjects forcibly kept
down must indeed resort to severity, as masters toward their slaves when they cannot
otherwise be restrained. But nothing can be more mad than the policy of those who in a free
state conduct themselves in such a way as to be feared. For though the laws be submerged by
some one man’s power, though liberty be panic-stricken, yet in time they rise to the surface,
either by opinions circulated, though unuttered, or by the quiet mustering of votes that shall
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either by opinions circulated, though unuttered, or by the quiet mustering of votes that shall
dispose of the high offices of state. Men indeed feel more keenly the suppression of liberty than
any evils incident to its preservation. Let us then embrace the policy which has the widest
scope, and is most conducive, not to safety alone, but to affluence and power, namely, that by
which fear may be suppressed, love retained. Thus shall we most easily obtain what we desire
both in private and in public life. For it is inevitable that those who wish to be feared should
themselves fear the very persons by whom they are feared. What, for instance, must have
been the case with the elder Dionysius?1 With what tormenting fear must he have been racked,
when, dreading the barber’s razor, he used to singe off his own beard with burning coals? What
are we to think of Alexander of Pherae?2 In what state of mind must we suppose him to have
lived, who, as we read the record, though somewhat fond of his wife Thebe, yet when he came
from supper to her chamber, ordered a barbarian attendant, and indeed one, as we are told,
branded with the marks of a Thracian,1 to precede him with a drawn sword, and sent in
advance some of his body-guards to search the woman’s boxes, and see whether there were
not some weapon concealed among the clothes? O wretch, to think a tattooed savage more to
be trusted than his own wife! Yet he was in the right; for he was slain by that very wife,2
because she suspected him of adultery. Nor indeed is there any ruling power strong enough to
be enduring, when it makes itself the object of dread. Of this we may find an example in
Phalaris3 whose cruelty was notorious beyond that of any other tyrant, who perished, not by
treachery, like that Alexander of whom I have just spoken, — not by the hands of a few, like
this tyrant of ours, but who was assailed by the whole mass of the people of Agrigentum.
What? Did not the Macedonians desert Demetrius,1 and in a body betake themselves to
Pyrrhus? What? When the Lacedaemonians usurped power that was not rightfully theirs, did not
almost all their allies leave them, and show themselves idle spectators of the disaster at
Leuctra?2
8. I prefer on such a subject to draw my examples from foreign states rather than from our
own. Yet so long as the sway of the Roman people was maintained by the bestowal of benefits,
not by injustice, wars were waged either in defence of our allies or of our own government; the
issues of our successful wars were either merciful or no more severe than necessity demanded;
our Senate was the harbor and refuge of kings, tribes, nations; while our magistrates and
military commanders sought to obtain the highest praise from this one thing, — the guarding of
the interests of our provinces and our allies by equity and good faith. Our sovereignty might
then have been termed the patronage, rather than the government, of the world. We previously
had encroached by degrees on this habit and policy; after Sulla’s victory we entirely departed
from it; for nothing any longer appeared inequitable toward our allies, after so much cruelty
had been exercised upon our own citizens. In his case a worthy cause1 was crowned by a
disgraceful victory; for he dared to say, when under the auctioneer’s spear2 he sold in the
market-place the property of good men and rich men who were undoubtedly citizens, that he
was selling his booty. He was succeeded by one who in an impious cause, after even a more
disgraceful victory, not merely offered for public sale the goods of individual citizens, but
embraced whole provinces and countries in one destructive ban. And so, foreign nations being
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embraced whole provinces and countries in one destructive ban. And so, foreign nations being
thus oppressed and ruined, in token of our forfeited empire, we saw Massilia borne in effigy in a
triumphal procession, and a triumph celebrated over that city without whose aid our
commanders never gained a Transalpine triumph.3 I might mention many other abominable
things done to our allies, if the sun had ever beheld anything more shameful than this very
transaction. We therefore are justly punished; for unless we had so often had impunity from
guilt, so great liberty of sinning would never have come into the hands of one man, whose
heritage of property falls to few, that of depraved desire to many bad men. Nor indeed will
there ever be wanting seed and pretext for civil wars, so long as abandoned men remember
and hope to see again that bloody spear which Publius Sulla1 brandished in the dictatorship of
his kinsman, not refusing to be salesman under a more atrociously guilty spear thirty-six years
afterward; while another Sulla,2 who in the former dictatorship was secretary, in this last was
city-quaestor. Hence it ought to be inferred that while such prizes are held in view, civil wars
will never cease to be. And so only the walls of the city stand and remain, and even they
already fear the extremity of crime; the state itself we have utterly lost. Moreover (for I must
return to the point under discussion), we have fallen into these calamities because we preferred
to be feared rather than to be loved and esteemed. If these things could befall the Roman
people exercising an unrighteous sway, what ought individuals to think as to their own conduct
and fortune? Since it is manifest that the power of good will is great, that of fear feeble, it
follows that we should inquire by what means we can most easily obtain, together with respect
and confidence, that love of others which we crave. We do not all, indeed, need this love in an
equal degree; for it must be determined by each person’s plan of life, whether he requires the
love of many, or whether it is enough for him to be held in dear regard by a few. This,
however, may be accounted as certain, that it is a prime and most essential requisite, to have
the enduring intimacy of friends who love us and hold us in high esteem. This one thing,
precious above all others, if attained, leaves but little difference between persons of the loftiest
rank and those in moderate condition, and it is almost equally attainable by those of either
class. All, perhaps, do not alike need promotion, and fame, and the good will of the citizens at
large; but yet, if one has these, they render some help, as to other ends, so to the obtaining of
friendships.
9. But I have treated of friendship in another book, under the title of Laelius. Let me now
speak of fame. Though on that subject also I have written two books,1 let me touch briefly
upon it here, since it is of the utmost service in the administration of important affairs.
The highest fame, and that to which there are no drawbacks, consists of these three things, —
the affection of the multitude, their confidence, and their regarding a person as worthy of
honor because they hold him in admiration.2 Moreover, these requisites to fame — to speak
plainly and concisely — are obtained from the multitude by nearly the same means by which
they are obtained from individuals. But there is also a certain other avenue to the popular
favor, by which we may, as it were, steal into the affections of all.
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Of the three things just named, let us consider, first, the rules for winning good will. It is,
indeed, best secured by conferring benefits. But, in the second place, favor is elicited by the will
to do good, even if the means of beneficence chance to be insufficient. The love of the
multitude, indeed, is strongly excited by the very report and reputation of liberality,
beneficence, honesty, good faith, and all those virtues which are included in gentleness of
manners and affability. For since that very style of character which we call right and becoming,
in itself, gives us pleasure, and by its nature and aspect captivates the minds of all, and shines
forth with the greatest lustre from the virtues that I have named, we are therefore compelled
by Nature herself to love the persons in whom we think that these virtues are found. These,
however, are only the most efficient causes of good will; for there may be some others, though
of less weight.
Of the confidence which may be reposed in us there are two efficient causes, our having a
reputation for discretion and, at the same time, for honesty. For we have confidence in those
whom we think our superiors in intelligence, who, as we believe, look into the future, and who,
when an affair is in agitation and a crisis is reached, can clear it of difficulty, and take counsel
according to circumstances (for this men regard as true and serviceable discretion); while the
confidence reposed in honest and faithful men, that is, in good men, is such that there can rest
upon them no suspicion of fraud and wrong. And so we think that our personal security, our
fortunes, our children, can be most fittingly intrusted to their care. Of these two qualities, then,
honesty has the greater power to create confidence; for while without discretion honesty has
sufficient prestige, discretion without honesty can be of no avail in inspiring confidence. For the
more skilful and adroit one is, for this very reason is he the more odious and the more open to
suspicion, if he has no reputation for honesty. Intelligence, then, combined with honesty, will
have all the power that it can desire in creating confidence; honesty without discretion will have
much influence toward that end; discretion without honesty will be of no avail whatever.
10. But if any one may have wondered, why, while all philosophers alike maintain, and I myself
have often asserted, that whoever has one virtue has all, I now separate them as if a man
could be honest without being wise also, my answer is that the nicety of expression employed
when the inmost truth is under discussion is one thing; the language used when what we say is
entirely adapted to popular opinion is another. Therefore, on this head I am speaking as people
in general do, when I call some men brave, others good, others wise; for I ought to employ
common and usual terms when I am speaking of public opinion, and Panaetius employed them
in the same way. But let us return to our subject.
Of the three requisites for fame, the third that I named was this, — that men should so hold us
in admiration as to regard us worthy of honor. Men generally admire all things that they see to
be great and beyond their expectation, and specially in individual objects such unexpected good
qualities as they discern. Therefore they admire and extol with the highest praise those men in
whom they think that they perceive certain rare and surpassing virtues; while they look down
with contempt on those in whom they imagine that there is no manliness, no spirit, no energy.
For they do not despise all of whom they think ill. They do not despise, indeed, those whom
they regard as villanous, malicious, fraudulent, capable of doing mischief, — by no means; of
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persons of this sort they think ill. But, as I have said, those are despised who, as the saying is,
are of no good to themselves or to any one else, in whom there is no work, no industry, no
forethought. On the other hand, those are regarded with a certain measure of admiration, who
are thought to excel others in virtue, and to be free not only from all disgrace, but also from
those vices which their fellow-men cannot easily resist. For sensual pleasures, the most alluring
of mistresses, turn away the minds of the greater part of mankind from virtue, and equally
when the fiery trial of affliction1 comes most persons are beyond measure terrified. Life, death,
riches, poverty, most violently agitate the great mass of mankind. When men with a lofty and
large soul look down on these experiences, whether prosperous or adverse, while any great and
honorable object of endeavor proposed to them converges and concentrates their whole being
in its pursuit, who can fail to admire in them the splendor and beauty of virtue?
11. This contempt of the mind for outward fortunes thus excites great admiration; and most of
all, justice, for which one virtue men are called good, seems to the multitude a quality of
marvellous excellence, — and not without good reason; for no one can be just, who dreads
death, pain, exile, or poverty, or who prefers their opposites to honesty. Men have, especially,
the highest admiration for one who is not influenced by money; for they think that the man in
whom this trait is made thoroughly manifest has been tested by fire.
Thus justice constitutes all three of the requisites to fame which I have named, — affection,
because it aims to do good to the greatest number, and for the same reason, confidence and
admiration, because it spurns and neglects those things to which most men are drawn with
burning greediness. Moreover, in my opinion, every mode and plan of life demands the aid of
men, and craves especially those with whom there may be friendly conversational intercourse,
which is not easy, unless you are looked upon as a good man. Therefore, even to a recluse, or
to one who passes his life in the country, the reputation of honesty is essential, and the more
so because, if he do not have it, in his defenceless condition, he will be assailed by many
wrongs. Those, too, who sell and buy, hire and lease, and are involved in business affairs, need
honesty for the management of their concerns. The force of this virtue is such that those who
obtain their subsistence by crime and guilt cannot live entirely without honesty. For he who
takes anything by stealth or force from a fellow-robber cannot maintain his place in a band of
robbers; and even the man who is called captain of a crew of pirates, if he were not impartial
in the division of their plunder, would be either killed or deserted by his crew. Indeed, it is said
that even among robbers there are laws which they obey, which they hold sacred. Thus by
fairness in the distribution of booty, Bardylis, an Illyrian robber, of whom Theopompus makes
mention, obtained great wealth, and Viriathus, the Lusitanian,1 much greater, to whom indeed
some of our armies and commanders gave way in battle, whom Caius Laelius, commonly called
the Wise, when he was praetor, crippled and reduced, and so subdued his ferocity that he
transmitted an easy conflict with him to his successors. Since, then, the force of justice is such
that it strengthens and augments the resources even of robbers, how great shall we account its
efficacy among laws and courts, and in a well ordered state?
12. I am inclined to think, indeed, that not only among the Medes, as Herodotus relates,2 but
also among our ancestors, men who had borne a high moral character were in early times
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also among our ancestors, men who had borne a high moral character were in early times
appointed kings, in order to the administration of justice; for when the poor commonalty were
oppressed by those of greater wealth, they had recourse to some one man pre-eminent in
virtue, who, while he defended the poorer classes from wrong, by establishing equitable
jurisdiction kept the highest under the same legal obligations with the lowest. There was like
reason for making laws as for choosing kings; for equality of right was always sought, nor
without equality can right exist. If this could be obtained through the ministry of one just and
good man, the people were contented under his rule. But when this ceased to be the case, laws
were invented which should speak with all, at all times, in one and the same voice. This, then,
is manifest, that those of whose justice the mass of the people had an exalted opinion used to
be chosen as rulers. If in addition these same persons were thought wise, there was nothing
that men did not expect to obtain under their administration. Justice is, therefore, by all means
to be cherished and held fast, at once for its own sake — else it would not be justice — and for
the increase of one’s honor and fame.
But as there is a method, not only of acquiring money, but also of investing it, so that it may
supply constant demands for generous giving no less than for necessary uses, so is fame to be
properly invested as well as sought. There is great truth, however, in the saying of Socrates,
that this is the nearest way, and, as it were, a short road to fame, — for one to endeavor to be
such as he would wish to be regarded. If there be those who think to obtain enduring fame by
dissembling and empty show, and by hypocrisy, not only of speech, but of countenance also,
they are utterly mistaken. True fame strikes its roots downward, and sends out fresh shoots;1
all figments fall speedily, like blossoms, nor can anything feigned be lasting. Very many cases
might be cited in attestation on either side; but for the sake of brevity I will name but a single
family. Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius, will be praised as long as the memory of Roman
affairs shall last; but his sons were not approved by good men while they were living, and in
death they have their position among those whose murder was justifiable.2
13. Let him, then, who would obtain genuine fame discharge the duties of justice. What these
are I have shown in the First Book.
But in order that we may be taken for what we really are, though there is the greatest efficacy
in our being what we would be taken for, yet some additional rules are to be given. If, indeed,
one from early youth finds himself in a position of celebrity and reputation, either inherited
from his father (as I think is the case with you, my Cicero,) or by some chance or happy
combination of circumstances, the eyes of all are turned to him; inquiry is made about him,
what he is doing, how he is living, and, as if he were moving in the clearest light, nothing that
he says or does can be concealed. But those whose first years, on account of their lowly and
obscure condition, are passed out of the knowledge of men, as soon as they emerge from
childhood, ought to hold great aims in view, and to strive after them with unswerving diligence,
which they will do with the greater confidence, since that age is not only exempt from envious
regard, but is even looked upon with favor.
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A youth, then, has the first title to fame, if he have the opportunity of obtaining it by military
service, in which many in the days of our ancestors won early distinction; for wars were almost
perpetual. But your time of service fell upon the epoch of that war in which one party was
exceedingly guilty, the other unsuccessful. Yet in this war, when Pompey had made you
commander of the left wing of his army,1 you won great praise both from that illustrious man
and from your fellow-soldiers for your horsemanship, your skill in the use of weapons, and your
endurance of all the hardships of the camp and the field. This reputation of yours sank, indeed,
simultaneously with the state. I have undertaken this discussion, however, not with reference
to you alone, but with reference to young men as a class. Let us then pass on to the remaining
subjects.
As in all other respects mental are much greater than bodily achievements, so those things
which we accomplish by intellect and reason win greater favor than those which we perform by
mere physical strength. The first claim that can be proffered for the general esteem proceeds
from regularity of conduct, with filial piety and kindness to those of one’s own family. Then,
too, young men become most favorably known when they seek the society of eminent, wise,
and patriotic citizens, with whom if they are intimate, they inspire the people with the
expectation that they are going to resemble those whom they have chosen as models for
imitation. His frequenting the house of Publius Mucius1 gave the youth of Publius Rutilius2 the
reputation both of moral purity and of legal knowledge. On the other hand, however, Lucius
Crassus, while yet a mere boy, sought no countenance from his elders, yet won for himself the
highest reputation from that splendid and famous accusation;3 and (as we learn was the case
with Demosthenes),1 at the very age when young men are wont to be applauded for their
exercises in declamation, Lucius Crassus showed that he could already do to perfection before
the judges what it would have been to his credit to have merely rehearsed by way of practice
at home.
14. But while there are two kinds of speech, to one of which conversation belongs, to the other
public debate,2 there is no doubt that the latter is most conducive to the acquisition of fame
(for it is that which we dignify by the name of eloquence); yet it is hard to say to what a
degree agreeableness and affability of conversation win favor. There are extant letters of Philip
to Alexander, of Antipater to Cassander, and of Antigonus to Philip, — all three, as we learn,
men of the greatest practical wisdom, — in which they advise their sons to allure the minds of
the multitude in their favor by kindliness of address, and to charm the soldiers by accosting
them in a genial way.
But the speech that is uttered with energy in a great assembly often awakens the enthusiasm
of the entire audience; for great is the admiration bestowed on him who speaks fluently and
wisely, and those who hear him think that he also has more intelligence and good sense than
other men. And if there is in the speech substantial merit united with moderation, there can be
nothing more worthy to be admired, especially if these properties are found in a young man.
But while there are many kinds of occasions that demand eloquence, and many young men in
our state have obtained praise by speaking both before judges and in the Senate, the highest
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our state have obtained praise by speaking both before judges and in the Senate, the highest
admiration attends the eloquence of the courts,1 before which there are two descriptions of
oratory, that of accusation, and that of defence, of which, although the latter is more worthy of
praise, yet the former is very frequently regarded with favor. I spoke just now of Crassus.
Marcus Antonius2 did the same when he was a young man. A public accusation also brought
into favorable notice the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius,1 when he arraigned for trial that
seditious and worthless citizen, Caius Norbanus. Yet this ought not to be done often, nor ever
except in the interest of the state, as in the cases that I have named, or to avenge wrongs, as
the two Luculli did,2 or for those under one’s special patronage, as when I appeared in behalf
of the Sicilians,3 and Julius4 in behalf of the Sardinians in the accusation of Albucius the
propraetor. The painstaking fidelity of Lucius Fufius in the accusation of Manius Aquillius5 is also
well known. One may, then, venture upon accusation once, or, at any rate, not often. Or if
there be reason for doing so more frequently, let it be done as a service to the state, whose
enemies one is not to be blamed for punishing repeatedly. But even then let there be a limit;
for it is the part of a hard man, or, I should rather say, scarcely of a man, to prefer a capital
charge against any considerable number of persons.1 While it is fraught with personal danger, it
is also damaging to one’s reputation, to allow himself to be called an accuser, which was the
fortune of Marcus Brutus,2 born of an illustrious race, the son of the Brutus who was eminent
for his skill in the civil law. Moreover, this maxim of duty is to be carefully observed, that you
never bring an innocent person to a capital trial; for this cannot possibly be done without guilt.
Nay, what is so inhuman as to pervert eloquence, bestowed by Nature for the security and
preservation of men, to the destruction and ruin of good citizens? On the other hand, we are
not to be so scrupulous as to decline defending on some occasions a guilty man, if he be not
utterly depraved and false to all human relations. This the people demand, custom permits,
even humanity endures. It belongs to the judge in the cases before him always to seek the
truth; to the advocate, sometimes to defend the probable, even if it be not absolutely true, —
which I should not dare to write, especially in a philosophical treatise, unless that strictest of
the Stoics, Panaetius, were of the same opinion. But fame and favor are best secured by the
defence of accused persons, especially if it so happens that this service is rendered in aid of one
who seems to be circumvented and put in peril by the influence of some man in power, — a
service which I have performed on many other occasions, and especially — when I was still a
young man — in defending Sextus Roscius1 against the power of Lucius Sulla, then playing the
tyrant, — a speech which, as you know, is published.
15. Having explained the ways in which, consistently with duty, young men may obtain fame, I
must speak, in the next place, of beneficence and liberality, of which there are two sorts,
kindness to those needing it being shown either by personal service or by money. The latter is
more easy, especially for one who is rich; but the former is more noble, more magnificent, and
more worthy of a strong and eminent man. For although in both modes there is the generous
desire of bestowing benefit, yet in the one case the kindness is drawn from the purse, in the
other from the giver’s own ability and worth. The bounty which proceeds from one’s property
drains the very source of liberality. Thus generosity is made impossible by generosity, which
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drains the very source of liberality. Thus generosity is made impossible by generosity, which
you can extend to the fewer in time to come, the more numerous its beneficiaries have been in
the time past. But those who will be beneficent and generous in personal service, that is, by
influence and effort, the more persons they have already benefited, will have the more helpers
in doing good. Then, too, by the habit of beneficent action, they will be better prepared, and, as
it were, better trained, to merit the gratitude of the larger number. Philip, in a certain letter of
his, very justly blames his son Alexander for seeking the good will of the Macedonians by
distributing gifts among them. “What, the mischief!” says he, “ever induced you to entertain a
hope like this, that those whom you had corrupted by money would be faithful to you? Are you
doing this that the Macedonians may hope to have you not for their king, but for their lackey
and caterer?” “Lackey and caterer” is well said, since such conduct is mean for a king; and still
better was it that he termed lavish giving “corruption.” For he who receives such gifts grows
worse, and more ready to expect the like in all time to come. He said this to his son; let us
regard his advice as given to all. It is, then, beyond doubt that the kindness which consists in
personal service and effort is more honorable, and extends farther, and can benefit a larger
number. Yet gifts must be sometimes bestowed, nor is this form of kindness to be wholly
repudiated; and aid should be often given to the deserving poor from one’s own property, but
thriftily and moderately. Many, indeed, have squandered their property in inconsiderate
generosity. But what is more foolish than to disable yourself from continuing to do what you
take pleasure in doing? Moreover, rapine follows extravagance in giving; for when men in
consequence of their lavish generosity have begun to be in want, they are constrained to lay
hands on the property of others. Thus, while they desire to be generous in order to win favor,
they obtain not so much the attachment of those to whom they have been liberal as the hatred
of those whom they have robbed. Therefore private property should neither be so shut up that
kindness cannot open it, nor so thrown wide as to lie open to all. Let a limit be observed, and
let this be determined by our means. We ought always to remember what has been so often
repeated by our people as to have come into use as a proverb, that prodigal giving has no
bottom.1 For what bound can there be to such giving, when those who have been accustomed
to receive, crave what they have been wont to get, and others also crave the same?
16. Of bountiful givers there are, in fine, two kinds, the one class prodigal, the other liberal, —
the prodigal, those who, in public banquets, distributions of flesh, gladiatorial shows, and the
preparation of games and wild-beast fights, pour out money on the kinds of things of which
they will leave but a brief remembrance, or none at all; the liberal, those who by their wealth
redeem persons captured by robbers, or take upon themselves the debts of their friends, or
render them aid in marriage-portions for their daughters, or help them in acquiring or
increasing property. I therefore wonder what came into the mind of Theophrastus in the book
that he wrote about Riches,1 in which he said many things admirably well, but that to which I
now refer, absurdly. For he is prolix in praise of the magnificence and elaborateness of popular
entertainments, and regards the means of meeting such expenses as the chief advantage of
wealth. But in my mind the advantage derived from the liberality of which I have given a few
examples seems much greater and more certain. How much more soberly and justly does Aristo
of Ceos2 reprove us for not being surprised at these outpourings of money which are made to
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of Ceos2 reprove us for not being surprised at these outpourings of money which are made to
propitiate the multitude! “If those besieged by an enemy,” he says, “are forced to pay a pound1
for a pint2 of water, at the first hearing it seems incredible and all are amazed; yet when they
consider the case they excuse it on the plea of necessity; but in this immense waste and these
boundless expenditures we feel no great astonishment, and that too, though neither is want
thus relieved nor respectability enhanced, and the very delight of the multitude is transient and
lasts but a little while, and, withal, is felt only by the most fickle, whose memory of the
enjoyment expires as soon as they are satiated.” He fittingly concludes that “these things are
gratifying to boys, and weak women, and slaves, and to free men who bear the nearest
resemblance to slaves; but that they cannot by any means be approved by a serious man and
one who weighs what is done by fixed principles.” Yet I am aware that in our city it is an old
tradition, and one that has come down from good times, that lavishness in the aedileship may
be expected even from the best men.1 Thus Publius Crassus, rich equally in his surname and in
his estate, gave the most costly public entertainments in his aedileship, and shortly afterward
Lucius Crassus, with Quintus Mucius, the most moderate of all men, for his colleague, served
through a most magnificent aedileship; and in like manner Caius Claudius, the son of Appius,
and many afterward, the Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus. Publius Lentulus, when I was consul,
surpassed all that went before him. Scaurus imitated him. But the entertainments given by my
friend Pompey in his second consulship were the most magnificent. With reference to all these
matters you see what my opinion is.
17. Yet the suspicion of penuriousness must be avoided. Mamercus, a very rich man, by
declining to be a candidate for the aedileship, lost his election as consul. If such expenditure,
then, is demanded by the people, and though not desired, at least approved by good citizens, it
is to be incurred, yet in proportion to one’s ability, as in my own case;1 and if at any time
some end of great importance and value can be gained by largesses to the people, they may
be bestowed, as in the recent instance in which Orestes gained great honor by a public dinner
in the streets under the name of a tithe-offering.2 Nor did any one find fault with Marcus Seius,
because in a time of dearth he gave the people corn for a penny3 a peck;4 for he thus freed
himself from great and inveterate odium by a lavishness not unbecoming inasmuch as he was
an aedile, and not very extravagant. But it was to the highest honor of my friend Milo when,
not so very long ago, by gladiators bought for the sake of the state which was dependent on
my safety, he suppressed all the plots and mad endeavors of Publius Clodius.5 There is,
therefore, sufficient reason for profuseness, if it is either necessary or useful. Yet in
expenditures of this sort the rule of moderation is the best. Lucius Philippus, indeed, the son of
Quintus, a man of great genius and of the highest eminence, used to boast that, without giving
any public entertainment, he had been elected to all the offices that were regarded as the most
honorable. Cotta said the same; so did Curio. I can also to a certain extent1 make the same
boast; for, as compared with the importance of the offices which I obtained without any
opposing votes2 in the years at which I became eligible3 to them respectively, — which was
not the case with either of those whom I have named, — the expense of my aedileship was
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not the case with either of those whom I have named, — the expense of my aedileship was
very small. At the same time, the more desirable expenditures in connection with public office
are for moles, docks, harbors, aqueducts, and whatever may be of service to the community.
Although what is given personally, as it were, into men’s hands, confers more immediate
gratification, the expense incurred in public works is more thankworthy. I blame the cost
bestowed on theatres, porticos, new temples, with diffidence on account of my regard for
Pompey’s memory;1 but the wisest authorities disapprove of such expenditures, as did this very
Panaetius whom in my present treatise I have followed, not translated; as did also Demetrius
Phalereus, who finds fault with Pericles for throwing away so much money on that famous
vestibule of the Parthenon.2 But this entire subject is carefully discussed in my book on the
Republic.3 The whole system of such extravagant largesses, in general worthy of censure, is
under certain circumstances necessary, — yet, when it becomes necessary, the expense must
be apportioned to one’s means, and kept within moderate limits.
18. In the other style of free expenditure which proceeds from liberality, we ought not to be
equally ready to give where the cases are unlike. The case of him who is laboring under
misfortune differs from that of him who, without any actual stress of adverse circumstances,
seeks to improve his condition. Generosity ought to be more readily bestowed on the
unfortunate, unless perchance they deserve what they suffer. Yet with regard to those who
desire assistance, not to be saved from utter ruin, but to reach a higher position, we ought to
be by no means niggardly, but to be judicious and careful in selecting suitable subjects for our
bounty. For Ennius says very fittingly: —
“Good done amiss I count as evil done.”
But what is given to a good and grateful man yields us in return a revenue both from him and
from others. For when one does not give at haphazard, generosity confers the highest pleasure,
and most persons bestow upon it the greater applause, because the kindheartedness of any
one who holds a conspicuous station is the common refuge for all. Care must be taken,
therefore, that we confer on as many as possible benefits of such a nature that their memory
may be transmitted to children and posterity, so that they too cannot be ungrateful. All, indeed,
hate him who is unmindful of a benefit received, and think themselves wronged when
generosity is thus discouraged; and he who is thus ungrateful becomes the common enemy of
persons of slender fortunes.1 Moreover, the liberality of which I now speak is of service also to
the state in redeeming captives from slavery, and in providing needy persons with the comforts
of life, which used to be very commonly done by men of senatorial rank,1 as we find written
out in full in the speech of Crassus.2 This habitual practice of charity I regard as far preferable
to the giving of public shows. The former is the part of substantial and prominent citizens; the
latter seems to belong to those who fawn on the people, and tickle, so to speak, the fickleness
of the multitude by low pleasure. But it will be becoming for one, while munificent in giving, to
be also not severe in exacting, and in all contracts, in selling and buying, in hiring and leasing,
in questions arising out of adjoining houses and estates,3 to be fair and accommodating, freely
making concessions from his own right, avoiding litigation as much as he can without excessive
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making concessions from his own right, avoiding litigation as much as he can without excessive
sacrifice, and perhaps even beyond what might seem the proper limit. For it is not only
generous, but sometimes profitable also, to abate a little from one’s rightful claims. Yet
reference must be had to one’s own estate, which cannot be suffered to go to ruin without
disgrace to the owner; but private property must be so cared for as to leave no suspicion of
penuriousness and avarice. Indeed, the ability of being generous without robbing one’s self of
his patrimony is the greatest revenue that money can yield. Theophrastus also rightly
commends hospitality; for it is, as it seems to me, very becoming that the houses of
distinguished men should be open to distinguished guests; and it is even for the honor of the
state that foreigners should not lack this kind of liberality in our city. It is also in the highest
degree expedient for those who desire to obtain great influence by honorable means to avail
themselves of help and favor among foreign nations through their guests. Theophrastus,
indeed, says that Cimon, at Athens, was hospitable not to strangers only, but to all of his own
district of Laciadae,1 making such arrangements and giving such orders to his farm-servants,
that every attention should be shown to any citizen of that district who might turn aside to his
country residence.
19. But the benefits which are bestowed, not by gift, but by personal service, are conferred,
sometimes on the whole state, sometimes on individual citizens. To protect the rights of others,
to aid them by legal advice, and by this sort of knowledge and skill to be of service to as many
as possible, tends very largely to the increase of one’s influence and popularity. Thus among
many things to be commended in the days of our ancestors, it is worthy of note that the
knowledge and the interpretation of our admirably constituted civil law were always held in the
highest honor. This science, until the present unsettled times, the leading men of the state
retained as one of their special prerogatives. Now, as is the case with civil offices and with all
grades of rank, its prestige is destroyed, and this the more shamefully, as it took place in the
lifetime of him who would have transcended in legal learning all his predecessors whom he
equalled in rank.1 This kind of service, then, is gratifying to many, and is adapted to bind men
by the ties of benefit. Closely allied to skill in interpreting the law is oratory, which even
surpasses it both as a grave pursuit and as a personal accomplishment. For what stands before
eloquence, whether in the admiration of its hearers, the hope of those who need its aid, or the
gratitude of those defended by it? To this, therefore, our ancestors assigned the first rank
among civil professions. There is, then, an extended range of beneficial services and of
patronage open to the eloquent man, who willingly appears in the courts, and, as was the
custom in the time of our fathers, without reluctance and without compensation1 defends the
causes of the many who seek his aid. The subject was reminding me to deplore here, as
elsewhere in my writings, the discontinuance, not to say the extinction, of eloquence, — only I
should dread the appearance of making complaint in my own behalf. But yet we see how many
orators have passed away, in how few is there good promise, in how much fewer ability, in how
many nothing save presumption. Yet while not all, indeed only a few can be either skilled in the
law or eloquent, still one may render service to many, by canvassing in their behalf for
appointments, by appearing in their interest before judges and magistrates, by watching the
progress of their cases in court, and soliciting for them the aid of legal counsellors and of
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progress of their cases in court, and soliciting for them the aid of legal counsellors and of
advocates. Those who do thus, obtain the largest amount of good will, and their labor has a
most widely extended influence. Nor need they here to be admonished (for it is obvious), that
they take heed lest while they desire to assist some, they disoblige others. For under such
circumstances they are liable to hurt the feelings of those whom it is either morally wrong or
inexpedient for them to wound. If they do this unwittingly, it is the result of carelessness; if
knowingly, of recklessness. You must even resort to apology wherever you can, to those to
whom you unwillingly give offence, showing them why what you did was necessary, so that you
could not have done otherwise, and promising them that the omission shall be compensated by
other services and kind offices.
20. But while in giving assistance to men reference is usually had either to character or to
condition, it is easy to say, and men commonly do say, that in conferring1 favors they are
influenced by the character, not by the outward condition of their beneficiaries. This mode of
speaking sounds well. Yet who is there, who in rendering his service does not prefer the cause
of a rich and influential man to that of a man without influence, though of signal excellence?
Our will, for the most part, inclines the more strongly toward him from whom we may expect
the more prompt and speedy remuneration. Yet we ought to look more carefully at the nature
of things. Undoubtedly that poor man, if he is a good man, even if he cannot return the favor,
can bear it faithfully in mind; and it is well said, whoever he be that first said it, “He who has
money has not repaid it; he who has repaid it has it not: but he who has returned kindness has
it, and he who has it has returned it.” Now those who think themselves rich, respectable,
fortunate, are unwilling to be placed under obligation by kindness rendered, nay, they even
think that they have bestowed a favor when they have received one however great, and they
imagine that something is also demanded or expected of them, — still more, it seems to them
as bad as death to have it said that they are indebted to any one’s patronage, or to be called
any one’s clients. On the other hand, the man of slender means just spoken of, thinking that
whatever is done for him is done from regard to himself, not to his outward condition,
endeavors to appear grateful, not only to him who has deserved his thanks, but also, — for he
needs many helpers, — to those from whom he expects similar favors. Nor, if perchance he can
render some good office in return, does he magnify it, but rather underrates it in what he says
about it. This also is to be observed, that if you defend a rich and successful man, the favor
does not extend further than to the man himself, or, peradventure, to his children; while if you
defend a poor, yet upright and self-respecting man, all men of humble condition who are not
bad — and there is a great proportion of these among the people — see in you a defence
prepared for their exigencies. Therefore I think a kindness better invested with good men than
with men of fortune. In fine, we should endeavor to meet the claims of those of every class;
but if it come to a competition between rival claimants for our service, Themistocles may be
well quoted as an authority, who, when asked whether he would marry his daughter to a good
poor man, or to a rich man of less respectable character, replied, “I, indeed, prefer the man
who lacks money to the money that lacks a man.” But the moral sense is corrupted and
depraved by the admiration of wealth. Yet of what concern to any one of us is another man’s
great fortune? Perhaps it is of benefit to him who has it, — not always, however. But suppose
it to be of benefit to him, — he may, indeed, have more to spend; but how is he made any
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it to be of benefit to him, — he may, indeed, have more to spend; but how is he made any
better? If, however, he be really a good man, let not his wealth be a hindrance, only let it not
be a motive for your serving him. The decisive question must be, not how rich one is, but what
sort of a man he is. But the ultimate rule in conferring favors and rendering service is, never to
make any effort against the right, or in behalf of the wrong; for the basis of enduring praise
and reputation is justice, without which there can be nothing worthy of commendation.
21. Having now spoken of the kinds of good offices that concern individuals, I must next
discuss those which have reference to a body of men and to the state. Of these a part are such
as accrue to the benefit of the whole community; a part, such as affect individuals, though in
the form of public service. Both interests ought certainly to be cared for, that of individuals no
less than of the community at large, yet in such a way that what is done may be of benefit, or
at all events, not of injury to the state. The distribution of corn by Caius Gracchus1 was
excessive, and tended to drain the public treasury; that of Marcus Octavius2 was moderate,
and both within the easy ability of the state and necessary to the people, — therefore a
beneficial measure both to the individual citizens who received the public bounty and to the
state. He who administers the affairs of the state must take special care that every man be
defended in the possession of what rightfully belongs to him, and that there be no
encroachment on private property by public authority. Philippus, during his tribunate, when he
proposed the agrarian law (which he readily suffered to be rejected, behaving in the matter
with great moderation), while in defending the measure he said many things adapted to cajole
the people, did mischief by the ill-meant statement that there were not in the city two
thousand men that had any property. It was a criminal utterance, tending to an equal division
of property, than which what more ruinous policy can there be? Indeed, states and
municipalities were established chiefly to insure the undisturbed possession of private property;
for though under the guidance of Nature men were brought together, still it was with the hope
of guardianship for their property that they sought the defence of cities. Pains should also be
taken that there may be no need of levying a tax on property,1 which in the time of our
ancestors was often done on account of the poverty of the treasury and the frequency of wars.
Against such a contingency provision should be made long beforehand. But in case such a tax
should be necessary for any state — for I would rather speak thus than forebode evil for our
own state, and I am treating not of our own, but of states in general — pains must be taken to
make all the citizens understand that in order to remain secure they must yield to this
necessity. Moreover, it will be the duty of those who govern the state to take care that there
be a full supply of everything requisite for the public service. How this provision is commonly
made and how it ought to be made, there is no need of discussing, — it is a perfectly plain
matter; the subject required to be merely alluded to.
But the chief thing in every department of public business and official administration is that
even the least suspicion of greediness for money be put at rest. Caius Pontius,1 the Samnite,
said, “Oh that Fortune had reserved me and delayed my birth till the time, should it ever come,
when the Romans had begun to take bribes! I would not then have suffered them to hold their
supremacy any longer.” Many generations must, indeed, have been waited for; for only of late
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supremacy any longer.” Many generations must, indeed, have been waited for; for only of late
this evil has invaded our state. Therefore I am glad that Pontius lived then rather than now, if
indeed he was so much of a man. It is not yet a hundred and twenty years2 since Lucius Piso’s
law about extortion was passed, whereas there had been no such law before. But there have
since been so many laws each more severe than the preceding, so many accused, so many
penally sentenced, so great an Italian war1 caused by fear of judicial proceedings, such a
pillaging and plundering of our allies2 when laws and courts were suspended, that we owe what
strength we have to the weakness of others, not to our own virtue.
22. Panaetius praises Africanus because he abstained from all illicit gain. Why should he not
praise him? There were in him other greater qualities; the merit of abstaining from illicit gain
belongs not only to the man, but to those times. Paulus obtained all the immense treasure of
Macedonia. He brought so much money into the public treasury, that the booty acquired by that
one commander put an end to the property-tax. But to his own house he brought nothing save
the eternal memory of his name. Africanus imitated his father, being none the richer for the
overthrow of Carthage. What think you? Was Lucius Mummius, his colleague in the censorship,
any the richer when he had destroyed to its foundations a city of vast wealth?1 He chose to
embellish Italy rather than his own house;2 though indeed in the embellishment of Italy his
house also seems to me more truly embellished. There is, then, — to return to the point
whence I made this digression, — no fouler vice than the greed of money, especially in the
case of the leading citizens who govern the state; for to turn the state into a source of profit is
not only vile, but even outrageous and execrable. Thus the oracle which the Pythian Apollo
pronounced,
“By naught but greed of gain will Sparta perish,”
he seems to have proclaimed not to the Lacedaemonians alone, but to all rich nations. But by
no means can those who preside over public affairs more readily conciliate the favor of the
multitude than by abstinence from the acquisition of wealth and the moderate use of what they
have.
Those, therefore, who desire to be popular, and with that view either attempt agrarian
measures,1 that the occupants of the public domains may be driven from their homes, or
advocate the remission of debts,2 are undermining the foundations of the state, — in the first
place, harmony, which cannot exist when money is taken from some and debts are cancelled
for others; in the next place, equity, which is utterly destroyed, if hindrances are laid in the
way of men’s keeping their own property. For, as I said above, this belongs to the very idea of
a state and a city, that the protection of every man’s property should be certain and not a
subject of solicitude. Moreover, by measures thus ruinous to the state men do not gain the
favor that they anticipate. He from whom property is taken becomes their enemy. He to whom
it is given conceals his desire to receive it, and especially in the case of debt cancelled, hides
his joy, lest he may be suspected of having been insolvent. On the other hand, he who is
wronged remembers it, and keeps his grievance in full sight.1 Nor if those to whom property is
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wronged remembers it, and keeps his grievance in full sight.1 Nor if those to whom property is
wrongfully given are more numerous than those from whom it has been unjustly taken, are
they therefore possessed of more influence; for these matters are determined, not by number,
but by weight. But what justice is there in a proceeding by which he who had no landed estate
obtains an estate that has been in the possession of the same family for many years, or even
generations, while he who has had the estate loses it?
23. It was for wrongs of this sort that the Spartans banished Lysander the ephor, and put to
death Agis the king,1 the first instance of the kind; and from that time such dissensions ensued
that tyrants sprang up, and men of high rank were expatriated, and that most admirably
constituted state fell to pieces. Nor did it fall alone, but overthrew also the remainder of Greece
by the contagion of evils which, starting from the Lacedaemonians, spread from state to state.
What more? Did not agrarian agitations destroy our citizens the Gracchi, sons of that most
eminent man Tiberius Gracchus, grandsons of Africanus? On the other hand, praise is most
justly bestowed on Aratus of Sicyon, who, when his state had been kept under oppression by
tyrants for fifty years,2 going from Argos to Sicyon, obtained possession of the city by entering
it secretly, and after suddenly crushing the tyrant Nicocles, restored six hundred exiles who had
been the richest men in the state, and freed the people by his advent. Then when he came to
reflect on the difficulty about property and its occupancy, thinking it very unjust that those
whom he had restored and whose estates were in the possession of others should remain poor,
and at the same time deeming it hardly fair that possessions of fifty years’ standing should be
disturbed, because after so long a time many estates were innocently held by inheritance,
many by purchase, many by dowry, he determined that neither ought the property to be taken
from those in possession, nor ought the former owners to be left without compensation. Having
come to the conclusion that there was need of money to set this matter right, he said that he
wanted to go to Alexandria, and ordered everything to remain as it was till his return. So he
hastened to Ptolemy, who had been his host, the second king after the building of Alexandria.
Having explained to him his purpose to restore freedom to his country, and informed him of
the posture of affairs, this man most worthy of celebrity easily obtained from the rich king the
aid of a large amount of money. Carrying this to Sicyon, he took into his counsel fifteen of the
principal men, with whom he considered carefully the cases both of those who held the property
of others, and of those who had lost their own property, and managed by a valuation of the
estates to persuade some of the present occupants to resign their estates and accept money
instead, and others to account it more to their advantage to have the value of their estates
paid to them than to recover possession of them. Thus it was brought about that all went their
ways perfectly satisfied, without any ground of mutual complaint. O truly great man, well
worthy to have been a native of our own commonwealth! Thus it is fitting to deal with citizens;
not, as we have twice seen, to plant the spear in the market-place, and to submit the property
of citizens to sale by the auctioneer. That Greek, indeed, as was to have been expected of a
wise and excellent man, thought that the welfare of all should be consulted; and this is the
consummate reason and wisdom of a good citizen, not to create separate interests among those
of the same state, but to hold all together by the same principles of equity. May men live
without compensation on the estates of others? Why so? That when I have bought, built, keep
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without compensation on the estates of others? Why so? That when I have bought, built, keep
the estate in good order, spend money upon it, you without my consent may have the use of
what is mine? What else is this but to take from some what is their own, and to give to others
what is not their own? Then too, what does the cancelling of debts mean, but that you may
buy an estate with my money, and keep it, while I go without the money?
24. Therefore the care should be to check such excessive indebtedness as will be of injury to
the state (which may be prevented in many ways),1 and not, if there are debts, to deprive the
rich of their money, and to let the debtors gain what is not theirs. For nothing holds the state
more firmly together than good faith, which cannot possibly exist unless the payment of debts
is obligatory. Never was there a more earnest endeavor against the payment of debts than in
my consulship. The attempt was made by arms and military operations, and by men of every
kind and order, which I resisted with such energy that so dire a calamity was averted from the
state. Never was there a larger amount of debt, nor was it ever discharged more fully or more
easily; for when the hope of successful fraud was removed, the necessity of paying was the
consequence. He indeed, of late conqueror, but at that time conquered,2 carried out what he
had then planned after he had ceased to have any personal interest in it.1 So great was his
appetite for evil-doing, that the very doing of evil gave him delight, even when there was no
special reason for it. From this kind of generosity, then, — the giving to some what is taken
from others, — those who mean to be guardians of the state will refrain, and will especially
bestow their efforts, that through the equity of the laws and of their administration every man
may have his own property made secure, and that neither the poorer may be defrauded on
account of their lowly condition, nor any odium may stand in the way of the rich in holding or
recovering what belongs to them; while they will also aid the growth of the state in power,
territory, and revenue, by whatever means, military or domestic, may be at their command.
Such are the aims of truly great men; these things were wont to be done in the times of our
ancestors; and those who perform faithfully duties of this class will with the greatest benefit to
the state secure for themselves distinguished favor and reputation.
Among these precepts relating to expediency, Antipater of Tyre, a Stoic, who recently died at
Athens, thinks that two subjects were omitted by Panaetius, — the care of health and that of
money, — which, I suppose, were passed over by that illustrious philosopher, because they
presented no difficulty. They certainly belong under the head of expediency. I would say, then,
that good health is maintained by the knowledge of one’s own constitution, by observing what
things are wont to be salutary or injurious, by self-restraint in the whole manner and habit of
living, by abstaining from sensual indulgences, and, lastly, by the skill of those to whose
profession these matters belong. Property ought to be obtained in ways not dishonorable, to be
preserved by diligence and frugality, to be increased also by the same means. These things
Xenophon, the disciple of Socrates, has thoroughly discussed in his book on Domestic
Economy,1 which, when I was about of your present age, I translated into Latin.
25. But the comparison of things that are expedient — this being the fourth division, omitted
by Panaetius — is often necessary. For bodily endowments are wont to be compared with
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outward advantages, and outward advantages with bodily endowments, bodily endowments
themselves, too, with one another, and outward advantages, some with others. Thus in
comparing bodily endowments with outward advantages, you would rather be in good health
than rich; in comparing outward advantages with bodily endowments, you would choose to be
rich rather than to possess extraordinary strength of body. In comparing bodily endowments
among themselves, good health would be preferred to sensual gratification, strength to
swiftness of foot; and of outward advantages, fame to wealth, city revenues1 to country
revenues.2 Of this last kind of comparisons is that quoted from the elder Cato, who, when
asked what was the most profitable thing to be done on an estate, replied, “To feed cattle
well.” “What second best?” “To feed cattle moderately well.” “What third best?” “To feed cattle,
though but poorly.” “What fourth best?” “To plough the land.” And when he who had made
these inquiries asked, “What is to be said of making profit by usury?” Cato replied, “What is to
be said of making profit by murder?”3 From this and from many things beside it may be
inferred that comparisons of things expedient are not infrequently made, and that this is rightly
added as a fourth head to our discussion of duty. But in everything appertaining to this last
topic, the acquisition and investment of money, — I could wish, as to its use, too, — the
discussions that might be held by certain very good men sitting among the bankers in the
Exchange1 are worth more than those by any philosophers of any school. Yet these matters
ought to be taken notice of; for they belong under the head of expediency, — the subject of
this book. Let us, in the next place, pass on to what remains of the proposed plan.
BOOK III.
1. MY son Marcus, Cato, who was nearly of the same age1 with Publius Scipio, the first of the
family that bore the name of Africanus, represents him as in the habit of saying that he was
never less at leisure than when he was at leisure, or less alone than when he was alone, — a
truly magnificent utterance and worthy of a great and wise man, indicating that in leisure he
was wont to think of business2 and in solitude to commune with himself,3 so that he was never
idle, and had no need betweenwhile4 of another person’s conversation. Thus the two things,
leisure and solitude, which with others occasion languor, quickened his energies. I could wish
that I were able to say the same; but if I cannot by imitation attain such transcendent
excellence of temperament, I at any rate in my inclination make as near an approach to it as I
can; for, debarred from political and forensic employments by sacrilegious arms and violence, I
am abandoning myself to leisure, and therefore, leaving the city and wandering from one place
in the country to another, I am often alone. But neither is this leisure of mine to be compared
with the leisure of Africanus, nor this solitude with his. He, indeed, reposing from the most
honorable public trusts, upon certain occasions snatched leisure for himself, and from the
company and concourse of men betweenwhile betook himself to solitude as to a harbor. But my
leisure proceeds from lack of employment, not from desire for repose. For, the Senate being
silenced1 and the courts suspended,2 what is there worthy of myself that I can do either in the
senate-house or in the forum? Thus, after having lived in the greatest publicity and in the
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presence of my fellow-citizens, I now hide myself to escape the sight of bad men who swarm
everywhere, and I am often alone. Yet since philosophers say that one ought not only of evils
to choose the least, but from even these least evils to extract whatever of good there may be
in them, I therefore am utilizing my leisure, though it be not that to which I was entitled after
having obtained leisure3 for the state, nor am I suffering this solitude — which necessity, not
choice, imposes upon me — to remain idle. Africanus, indeed, as I think, attained a higher
merit; for no monuments of his genius were committed to writing, there remains no work of his
leisure, no fruit of his solitude, — whence it should be inferred that it was in consequence of
mental activity and the investigation of those things to which he directed his thoughts, that he
was never at leisure or alone. But I who have not such strength of mind that I can abstract
myself from the weariness of solitude by silent meditation, am directing all my study and care
to this labor of writing, and thus in the short time that has elapsed since the overthrow of the
state, I have written more than in many years while it stood.1
2. But while all philosophy, my Cicero, is fertile and fruitful, nor is any part of it untilled or
unoccupied, there is no department within its pale more productive or more prolific than that
relating to the duties whence are derived rules for living consistently and virtuously. Therefore,
although I trust that you are diligently hearing and receiving instruction on this subject from
Cratippus, the foremost philosopher of the present age, yet I think that it will be for your
benefit that your ears should constantly ring with such themes, and, were it possible, should
hear nothing else. While this should be the case with all who mean to enter on a virtuous life, I
am inclined to think that there is no one for whom it is more fitting than for you, — liable as
you are to no small anticipation of imitating my diligence, to the confident expectation that you
will succeed me in public trusts, and to some hope, perhaps, of rivalling my reputation. You
have, beside, taken upon yourself the heavy responsibility of both Athens and Cratippus, to
which and to whom, after resorting as to a mart of good culture, it would be in the last degree
shameful for you to return empty-minded, thus disgracing the reputation of both the city and
the master. Look to it, then, that you accomplish as much as you can aim after in purpose, and
strive for by labor, — if learning be labor rather than pleasure, — nor suffer it so to be, that
when I have given you the most liberal supplies,1 you may appear to have been false to your
own interest. But enough of this; for I have written to you much and often by way of
exhortation. Let us now return to the remaining head of my proposed division.
Panaetius, then, who without doubt discussed the subject of duty with the utmost precision,
and whom I have thus far followed for the most part, with an occasional correction, having laid
down three heads under which men were wont to reason and deliberate concerning duty, —
one, the inquiry whether the act under discussion is right or wrong, the second, whether it is
expedient or inexpedient, the third, the mode of settling the discrepancy in case what has the
appearance of right is repugnant to what seems expedient, — treated of the first two heads in
three books, and said that he would speak of the third head in its turn, but failed to keep his
promise. I am the more surprised at this, because Posidonius, his pupil, says that he lived
thirty years after writing those first three books. I am surprised, too, to find this head but
slightly touched upon in certain essays of Posidonius, especially as he says that there is no
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slightly touched upon in certain essays of Posidonius, especially as he says that there is no
subject of so essential importance in all philosophy. I by no means agree with those who
maintain that this subject was not overlooked by Panaetius, but purposely omitted, and that it
ought not to have been written upon at all, inasmuch as expediency can never be in conflict
with the right. With regard to this assertion one thing admits of doubt, whether this third head
of Panaetius ought to have been taken into consideration or entirely omitted; the other thing
admits of no doubt, that it was undertaken by Panaetius, but left unwritten; for to him who has
finished two heads of a threefold division the third of necessity remains. Besides, at the close of
his third book he promises to treat of this division in its turn. We have further the testimony of
Posidonius, a credible witness, who also writes in one of his letters that Publius Rutilius Rufus, a
pupil of Panaetius, used to say that as no painter could be found who would finish the part of
the Venus of Cos1 which Apelles had left imperfect — the beauty of the countenance putting it
beyond hope that the rest of the body could be finished so as to bear comparison with it — so
no one had attempted what Panaetius had left incomplete, on account of the surpassing
excellence of the things that he had completed.
3. There can, then, be no doubt about the intention of Panaetius; but whether he was right or
not in annexing this third head to his discussion of duty may, perhaps, admit of doubt. For
whether the right is the sole good, as the Stoics think, or whether, as your Peripatetics
maintain, the right is the supreme good in such a sense that all things else placed in the
opposite scale are of insignificant moment, it is beyond question that expediency can never
clash with the right. Thus we learn that Socrates used to denounce as worthy of execration
those who regarded as separable the expedient and the right, which are conjoined by nature.
The Stoics have agreed with him in maintaining that whatever is right must be expedient, and
that nothing can be expedient which is not right. Now if Panaetius were the sort of man to say
that virtue ought to be cultivated because it is productive of utility, as those do who measure
the desirableness of objects by the pleasure or the freedom from pain that they may afford, he
might in that case have said that expediency is sometimes repugnant to the right. But since he
belongs to the class of men who regard what is right as alone good, and consider life as made
neither better by the acquisition nor worse by the loss of those things which with a certain
show of expediency are in conflict with the right, it does not seem as if he ought to have
introduced a discussion in which what appears to be expedient should be compared with what is
right. For what the Stoics term the supreme good, to live in conformity with nature, means, as
I think, to be always in harmony with virtue, yet to make free choice among things in general
that are in accordance with nature, only on condition of their not being repugnant to virtue.
Such being the case, some think that this comparison is not properly brought forward, and that
no practical lessons ought to have been given under this head. Indeed, that which is properly
and with literal truth called the right is found in the wise alone, nor can it ever be separated
from virtue; while in those not possessed of perfect wisdom, the perfect right itself cannot
possibly be, but only semblances of the right. For all these duties discussed in the present
treatise — contingent,1 as the Stoics call them — are common, and are largely practised, and
many attain to them by excellence of natural disposition and by advancement in knowledge. But
that duty which the Stoics term the right is perfect and absolute, and, in the phrase of those
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that duty which the Stoics term the right is perfect and absolute, and, in the phrase of those
same philosophers, has all the numbers,2 nor can it come into the possession of any one
except the wise man. But when anything is done in which contingent duties are manifest, it
seems to be abundantly perfect, because people in general do not understand what in it is
wanting to perfection, while so far as they do understand, they think nothing omitted. The like
is of ordinary occurrence in poems, pictures, and many other matters, namely, that the
unskilled view with delight and commendation things that do not deserve praise, because, I
suppose, there is in them something good of a kind to take the fancy of the ignorant, who are
incapable of determining what defect there may be in the several objects thus placed before
them; while after they have been taught by experts, they readily change their opinion.
4. These duties which I am discussing in the present treatise the Stoics call a sort of second-
grade duties, not belonging to the wise alone, but common to them with the whole human
race. Thus all in whom there is a virtuous disposition are favorably inclined to them. Nor,
indeed, when the two Decii or the two Scipios are commemorated as brave men, or when
Fabricius is called just, is the example of fortitude sought from them, or of justice from him, as
from men in the strict sense of the term “wise;” for neither of them was wise as we would
have the word “wise” understood. Nor yet were the men who were esteemed and surnamed
Wise, Marcus Cato and Caius Laelius, wise in this sense, nor yet those famous seven;1 but from
their constant practice of common duties they bore to a certain degree the semblance and
aspect of wise men.2 Therefore, while it is an error to compare the right properly so called with
expediency when repugnant to it, at the same time that which is commonly called right, and is
held sacred by those who want to be regarded as good men, should never be compared with
external goods; and it is as incumbent on us to defend and preserve that right which is on a
level with our apprehension, as it is on the wise to cherish the right properly and truly so
called. Otherwise, if any progress toward virtue has been made, it cannot be maintained.
Enough has now been said about those who are reputed as good men on account of the
discharge of common duties. But those who measure everything by the standard of gain and
personal convenience, nor are willing that these goods should be outweighed by virtue, are
accustomed, in their plans of life, to compare the right with what they deem expedient; good
men are not so accustomed. I therefore think that when Panaetius said that men are wont to
hesitate in this comparison, he meant precisely what he said; for he said only that they were
wont, not that they ought, to hesitate. And, indeed, it is in the utmost degree base not only to
prize what seems expedient above what is right, but even to compare them with each other
and to incline to doubt with regard to them. What is it, then, that is wont sometimes to
occasion doubt and may seem worthy of consideration? I believe that if doubt ever occurs, it is
as to the actual character of that which is under consideration; for it often happens, under
special circumstances, that what is wont for the most part to be accounted as wrong is found
not to be wrong. Let a case which admits of a wider application be taken by way of example.
What greater crime can there be than to kill not only a man, but an intimate friend? Has one,
then, involved himself in guilt by killing a tyrant, however intimate with him?1 This is not the
opinion of the Roman people, who of all deeds worthy of renown regard this as the most noble.
Has expediency, then, got the advantage over the right? Nay, but expediency has followed in
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Has expediency, then, got the advantage over the right? Nay, but expediency has followed in
the direction of the right.
Therefore, that we may be able to discriminate without mistake, if at any time what we call
expedient shall seem repugnant to what we conceive of as right, there must be established
some general rule,2 which if we recognize in the comparison of things, we shall never be false
to our duty. But this rule shall be in close accordance with the method and system of the
Stoics, whom I am following in this treatise, because though by the early Academics and by the
Peripatetics who were formerly identical with them those things that are right are preferred to
those that seem expedient, yet these themes are discussed in a loftier tone by those to whom
both whatever is right is also expedient, and there is nothing expedient that is not right, than
by those to whom anything right can be otherwise than expedient, or anything expedient
otherwise than right. Moreover, my sect of the Academy gives me broad liberty, so that I have
a right to defend whatever seems to me probable. But I return to the general rule.
5. For a man to take anything wrongfully from another, and to increase his own means of
comfort by his fellow-man’s discomfort, is more contrary to nature than death, than poverty,
than pain, than anything else that can happen to one’s body or his external condition.1 In the
first place, it destroys human intercourse and society; for if we are so disposed that every one
for his own gain is ready to rob or outrage another, that fellowship of the human race which is
in the closest accordance with nature must of necessity be broken in sunder. As if each member
of the body were so affected as to suppose itself capable of getting strength by appropriating
the strength of the adjacent member, the whole body must needs be enfeebled and destroyed,
so if each of us seizes for himself the goods of others, and takes what he can from every one
for his own emolument, the society and intercourse of men must necessarily be subverted. It
is, indeed, permitted, with no repugnancy of nature, that each person may prefer to acquire for
himself, rather than for another, whatever belongs to the means of living; this, however, nature
does not suffer, — that we should increase our means, resources, wealth, by the spoils of
others. Nor is this so merely by the law of nature and of nations; but also by those statutes of
particular communities on which the body politic in each state depends for its safety, it is in like
manner enacted that no one can be permitted to injure another for his own benefit. It is to this
that the laws look, it is this that they mean, that the union of citizens shall be secure; and
those who dissever it they restrain by death, exile, imprisonment, fine. Moreover, much more is
this end effected by the reason inherent in nature, which is the law of gods and of men, which
he who wills to obey — and all will obey it who desire to live according to nature — will never
so act as to seek what belongs to another and to appropriate to himself what he has taken
from another. For loftiness and largeness of soul, and therewith affability, justice, kindness, are
more in accordance with nature than pleasure, than life, than wealth, to despise which and to
count them as naught when compared with the common good is the token of a great and lofty
mind. To take aught from another for one’s own benefit is, then, more opposed to nature than
death, or pain, or any other adverse experience. At the same time, it is more in accordance
with nature to assume the greatest labors and discomforts for the preservation and succor of all
nations, were it possible, imitating that Hercules whom human gratitude, commemorative of his
services, exalted to a seat among the gods, than to live in isolation, not only free from all
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services, exalted to a seat among the gods, than to live in isolation, not only free from all
causes of disturbance, but even in the fulness of sensual gratification, abounding in resources
of every kind, nay, even surpassing all others in beauty and in strength. Therefore every man
endowed with a mind of superior excellence and brilliancy prefers the former to the latter mode
of life, whence it may be inferred that man, when obedient to nature, cannot injure man. Still
further, he who maltreats another that he himself may obtain some benefit, either is unaware
that he is acting contrary to nature, or else thinks that poverty, pain, loss of children, of
kindred, of friends, is to be avoided rather than wrong-doing to a fellow-man. If he is unaware
that he is acting contrary to nature in maltreating men, how are you to reason with one who
takes away from man all that makes him man? But if he thinks that wrong-doing ought indeed
to be shunned, but that death, poverty, or pain is much more to be shunned, he errs in
imagining any evil affecting the bodily condition or property to be of greater consequence than
moral evil.
6. This, then, above all, ought to be regarded by every one as an established principle, that the
interest of each individual and that of the entire body of citizens are identical, which interest if
any one appropriate to himself alone, he does it to the sundering of all human intercourse. And
further, if nature prescribes this, that man shall desire the promotion of man’s good for the
very reason that he is man, it follows in accordance with that same nature that there are
interests common to all. The antecedent is true; therefore the consequent is true. For this is
absurd indeed which some say, that they would take nothing from a parent or a brother for
their own benefit, but that it is quite another thing with persons outside of one’s own family.
These men disclaim all mutual right and partnership with their fellow-citizens for the common
benefit, — a state of feeling which dismembers the fellowship of the community. Those, too,
who say that account is to be taken of citizens, but not of foreigners, destroy the common
sodality of the human race, which abrogated, beneficence, liberality, kindness, justice, are
removed from their very foundations. And those who remove them are to be regarded as
impious toward the immortal gods; for they overturn the fellowship established among men by
the gods, the closest bond of which fellowship is the opinion that it is more contrary to nature
for man to take anything from man for his own benefit than to endure all forms of discomfort,
whether external, or bodily, or even mental, which leave room for the exercise of justice. For
this one virtue is mistress and queen of all the virtues. One may perhaps say, “Should not then
a wise man who is perishing with hunger take away food from another man who is good for
nothing?” No, indeed, by no means; for my life is not of greater service to me than is such a
disposition of mind as would preclude my injuring any one for my own benefit. What if a good
man, to save himself from perishing with the cold, should rob of his clothes the cruel and
savage tyrant Phalaris? May he do it? These matters are very easy of determination. If, indeed,
you were to take anything from a perfectly worthless man merely for your own benefit, you
would perform an inhuman act and one contrary to nature. If, however, you are a person
capable, by prolonging your life, of rendering great service to the state and to human society,
and for that reason you take something from another person, you would not be blameworthy.
But except in such a case, each man must bear his own privations rather than take what
belongs to another. Sickness, or poverty, or anything of this kind is not, indeed, more opposed
to nature than is the appropriation or coveting of what belongs to another. But at the same
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to nature than is the appropriation or coveting of what belongs to another. But at the same
time the dereliction of the common good is opposed to nature, for it is unjust; and therefore
the very law of nature, which preserves and maintains the good of man, undoubtedly prescribes
that the necessaries of life should be transferred from an inefficient and useless man to a wise,
good, brave man, whose death would make a large deduction from the common good, —
provided he effect the transfer in such a way that his self-esteem and self-love may not furnish
a pretext for wrong-doing. In this way he will perform his duty with reference to the good of
mankind and to the human fellowship of which I have so often spoken. Now as regards Phalaris
the decision is very easy; for we1 have no fellowship with tyrants, but rather the broadest
dissiliency from them, and this whole pestiferous and impious class of men ought to be
exterminated from human society. Indeed, as limbs are amputated when they are bloodless
and virtually lifeless, and injure the rest of the body, so this beastly savageness and cruelty in
human form ought to be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity. Of
this sort are all the questions in which duty is to be determined from circumstances.
7. Panaetius would, I think, have followed up topics of this kind, had not some accident or
some other occupation frustrated his intention. Toward these very inquiries there may be drawn
from his first three books many maxims, from which it can be clearly seen what is to be
avoided on account of its immorality, and what is not to be avoided because not absolutely
immoral.
But since I am, as it were, putting the topstone on a work incomplete, yet almost finished, as
mathematicians are wont, instead of demonstrating everything, to ask that some things be
admitted1 in order to explain more easily what they want to prove, so I ask of you, my Cicero,
to admit, if you can, that nothing except what is right is to be sought for its own sake. If,
however, you cannot grant this without hindrance from the teachings of Cratippus, you can
certainly admit that what is right is to be sought chiefly for its own sake. Either proposition is
sufficient for my purpose; and now this, now that, seems the more probable, while no other
proposition relating to this subject is in any degree probable. At the same time, Panaetius ought
in the first place to be defended on this point; inasmuch as he said, not that expediency could
ever be in conflict with the right, — for this he could not consistently say, — but that things
that seemed expedient might be thus in conflict. Indeed, he often affirms that nothing is
expedient which is not also right, and nothing right which is not also expedient; and he
maintains that no more prolific source of evil has ever found its way into human society than
the opinion of those who have divorced the expedient and the right. Therefore, it was not in
order that on certain occasions we should prefer expediency to the right, but that we might
discriminate without mistake between appearance and reality, if at any time there were a
seeming conflict, that he introduced into the plan of his work a seeming, not an actual, collision
between the expedient and the right. This division, then, which he left unwritten, I propose to
fill out, relying on no authority, from my own resources;1 for since the time of Panaetius there
has been nothing written on this head of a nature to satisfy me, among the works that have
come into my hands.
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8. When any specious appearance of expediency is presented, one cannot help being impressed
by it. But if, when you give it closer attention, you see that there is something morally wrong
connected with what thus seems expedient, in that case you are not to sacrifice expediency,
but you are to understand that where there is moral wrong expediency cannot be. For if
nothing is so contrary to nature as immorality (inasmuch as nature craves things right, and
fitting, and consistent), and nothing so in unison with nature as expediency, then it is certain
that expediency and immorality cannot exist in the same thing.2 Still further, if we were born
for virtue, and the right either is alone worthy to be sought (as Zeno maintained), or is
assuredly to be regarded as immeasurably outweighing all things else (as is Aristotle’s
doctrine), then, of necessity, what is right must be either the sole or the supreme good. But
what is good is certainly expedient. Consequently whatever is right is expedient.1 It is then the
misapprehension of bad men which, when it lays hold on anything that seems expedient,
considers it independently of the question of right. This is the origin of assassinations,
poisonings, forgeries of wills. Hence come thefts, embezzlements of public money, plunderings
and pillagings of allies and of citizens. Hence, too, proceed the intolerable usurpations of
excessive wealth, and, lastly, even in free states, the yearning for sovereign authority, than
which nothing can be imagined more foul or more offensive. Men, indeed, in their false
appreciation, see the profit of the wrong they do; they see not the punishment, I do not say, of
the laws which they often evade, but of the guilt itself, of which the punishment is intensely
bitter. Therefore let no quarter be given to this class of doubters, utterly wicked and impious,
who deliberate whether they shall pursue what they see to be right, or shall knowingly defile
themselves with guilt; for there is crime in the mere hesitation, even if they do not go so far as
the outward act. Therefore those things in which the very deliberation is criminal ought not to
be deliberated at all. Moreover, the hope and expectation of concealment, whether of the act or
of the actor, ought to be excluded from every deliberation on the conduct to be pursued. If we
have made even the least proficiency in philosophy, we ought to be thoroughly persuaded that,
even though we could escape the view of all gods and men, still nothing ought to be done by us
avariciously, nothing unjustly, nothing lustfully, nothing extravagantly.
9. For this reason Plato introduces the wellknown story of Gyges,1 who, when the ground had
caved away on account of heavy rains, passed down into the opening, and saw, as the story
goes, a brazen horse with doors in his sides. Opening these doors, he saw a man of unusual
size, with a gold ring on his finger, which drawing off, he put it on his own finger (he was a
shepherd in the king’s service), and then repaired to the company of the shepherds. There, as
often as he turned the part of the ring where the stone was set to the palm of his hand, he
became invisible, yet himself saw everything; and was again visible when he restored the ring
to its proper place. Then, availing himself of the advantage which the ring gave him, he
committed adultery with the queen, and by her assistance killed the king his master, and
removed by death those whom he thought in his way. Nor could any one see him in connection
with these crimes. By means of the ring he in a short time became king of Lydia. Now if a wise
man had this ring, he would not think himself any more at liberty to do wrong than if he had it
not; for it is right things, not hidden things, that are sought by good men. Here, however,
certain philosophers, by no means ill-disposed, yet somewhat deficient in acuteness, say that
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certain philosophers, by no means ill-disposed, yet somewhat deficient in acuteness, say that
this is only a fictitious and imaginary story that Plato has told, — as though, forsooth, he
asserted that such a thing took place or could have taken place. The meaning of this ring and
of this example is as follows: If no one would ever know, if no one would ever suspect, when
you performed some act for the sake of wealth, power, ascendency, lust, — if it would remain
forever unknown to gods and men, would you do it? They say that it is impossible. Yet it is not
utterly impossible. But I ask, If that were possible which they say is impossible, what would
they do? They persist, awkwardly indeed; they maintain that such a thing could not be, and
they stand firm in this assertion; they do not take in the meaning of the phrase, “If it were
possible.” For when we ask what they would do if they could conceal what they did, we do not
ask whether they can hide it; but we put them, as it were, on the rack, that if they answer that
they would do what seemed expedient if assured of impunity, they may confess themselves
atrociously guilty; and if they make the contrary answer, that they may grant that whatever is
wrong in itself ought to be shunned. Let us now return to the subject under discussion.
10. There occur many cases of a nature to perplex the mind under the aspect of expediency, —
cases in which the real question is not whether the right is to be sacrificed on account of the
greatness of the benefit to be gained (for that is unquestionably wrong), but whether that
which seems expedient can be done without guilt. When Brutus deposed his colleague Collatinus
from the consulship, he might seem to have done this unjustly; for Collatinus had been the
associate of Brutus, and his assistant in measures for the expulsion of the royal family. But
when the chief men of the state had come to the determination that the kindred of Superbus,
and the name of the Tarquins, and the remembrance of kingly government must be put out of
the way, what was expedient — that is, care for the well-being of the country — was so
entirely right that it ought to have satisfied Collatinus himself. Thus expediency became valid
on account of the right that was in it, without which, indeed, there could not have been any
expediency. Not so, however, in the case of the king who founded the city; for a bare show of
expediency struck his mind. When it seemed to him better to reign alone than with a colleague,
he killed his brother. He set aside both brotherly affection and humanity, in order to attain what
seemed expedient, yet was not so; and then offered in defence the pretext of the wall, — a
mere show of right, improbable in itself, and insufficient even if true. He was therefore entirely
in the wrong. With his leave I would say it, whether he be Quirinus or Romulus.1 Nevertheless,
advantages that are properly our own we are not to abandon, or to yield up to others, if we
ourselves need them; but each one must minister to his own advantage only so far as it may
be done without wrong to others. Chrysippus,2 who has written many sensible things, wisely
says: “He who is running a race ought to endeavor and strive to the utmost of his ability to
come off victor; but it is utterly wrong for him to trip up his competitor, or to push him aside.
So in life it is not unfair for one to seek for himself what may accrue to his benefit; but it is not
right to take it from another.”
But in the case of friendships there is the greatest perplexity as to duty, it being equally
opposed to duty to withhold what you can rightfully concede to a friend, and to concede what
is not right. Office, wealth, pleasure, other things of that sort, are certainly never to be
preferred to friendship. At the same time a good man will do nothing against the state, or in
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preferred to friendship. At the same time a good man will do nothing against the state, or in
violation of his oath or of good faith, for the sake of his friend, not even if he were a judge in
his friend’s case. For
“He drops the friend, when he puts on the judge.”1
He will yield so far to friendship as to wish his friend’s case to be worthy of succeeding, and to
accommodate him as to the time of trial within legal limits. But inasmuch as he must pass
sentence upon his oath, he will bear it in mind that he has God for a witness, that is, as I
think, his own conscience, than which God himself has given man nothing more divine. In this
view, it is an admirable custom derived from our ancestors — if we would only adhere to it —
that when a favor is asked of a judge, it is in the words, “So far as it can be done without a
breach of good faith.” A request proffered in such terms applies to things which, as I just said,
can be granted by a friend who is acting as a judge. On the other hand, were one to feel bound
to do all that friends might desire, such connections ought to be considered as not friendships,
but conspiracies. I am speaking of ordinary friendships; for in the case of wise and perfect men
there can be nothing of the kind. It is related that Damon and Phintias,2 Pythagoreans, were so
disposed toward each other, that when Dionysius the tyrant had fixed for one of them the day
of execution, and he that was condemned to death asked for a few days’ respite to make
arrangements for the care of his family, the other became surety for his appearance, to die in
his stead if he did not return. When he returned on the day appointed, the tyrant, admiring
their mutual good faith, begged them to admit him to their friendship as a third person. In fine,
whenever what seems expedient in friendship comes into competition with what is right, let the
apparent expediency be disregarded; let the right prevail. Moreover, when in friendship things
that are not right are demanded, religion and good faith are to take precedence of friendship.
Thus will the choice of duty, which is the subject of our inquiry, be determined.
11. But it is in affairs of state that wrong is the most frequently committed under the show of
expediency. Our own people were thus guilty with reference to the demolition of Corinth. The
Athenians acted with still greater severity in decreeing that the men of Aegina,1 who were able
seamen, should have their thumbs cut off. This seemed expedient; for Aegina was too
threatening on account of its proximity to the Piraeus. But nothing that is cruel is expedient;
for cruelty is in the utmost degree hostile to human nature, which ought to be our guide. Those
also are to be blamed who prohibit foreigners from living in their cities, and expel them, as
Fannius did in the time of our fathers, and Papius more recently.1 It is indeed right that one
who is not a citizen should lack the full privileges of citizenship, as is enacted by the law passed
under the consulship of those very wise men Crassus and Scaevola; but it is clearly inhumane
to prohibit foreigners from living in the city. On the other hand, a worthy renown rests upon
the instances in which the show of public benefit is despised in comparison with the right. Our
history is full of examples of this kind, while often at other times, especially in the second Punic
war, when, after the disaster of Cannae, the people manifested greater spirit than ever in
prosperity. There was no symptom of fear, no intimation of peace. Such is the power of the
right, that it eclipses the show of expediency. When the Athenians were utterly unable to
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sustain the assault of the Persians, and determined that, deserting the city and leaving their
wives and children at Troezen, they would go on board of their ships and defend the liberty of
Greece by their fleet, they stoned to death a certain Cyrsilus who pressed upon them the advice
to stay in the city and receive Xerxes. He, indeed, seemed to advocate expediency; but
expediency did not exist, when the right was on the other side. Themistocles, after the victory
in the Persian war, said in a popular assembly that he had a plan conducive to the public good,
but that it was not desirable that it should be generally known. He asked that the people should
name some one with whom he might confer. Aristides was named. Themistocles said to him
that the fleet of the Lacedaemonians, which was drawn ashore at Gytheum, could be burned
clandestinely, and if that were done, the power of the Lacedaemonians would be inevitably
broken. Aristides, having heard this, returned to the assembly amidst the anxious expectation
of all, and said that the measure proposed by Themistocles was very advantageous, but utterly
devoid of right. Thereupon the Athenians concluded that what was not right was not expedient,
and they repudiated the entire plan which they had not heard, on the authority of Aristides.
Better this than our conduct in holding pirates free from all exactions,1 our allies tributary.2
12. Let it be settled, then, that what is wrong is never expedient, not even when you obtain by
it what you think to be of advantage to you. Nay, the mere thinking that what is wrong is
expedient is in itself a misfortune. But, as I have already said, there often occur cases of such a
nature that expediency seems in conflict with the right, so that it must be ascertained by close
examination whether it is really thus in conflict, or whether it can be brought into harmony with
the right. Of this class are questions like the following: If, for example, a good man has
brought from Alexandria to Rhodes a large cargo of corn, when there is a great scarcity and
dearth at Rhodes and corn is at the highest price, — in case this man knows that a considerable
number of merchants have set sail from Alexandria, and on his passage he has seen ships
laden with corn bound for Rhodes, shall he give this information to the Rhodians, or shall he
keep silence and sell his cargo for the most that it will bring? We are imagining the case of a
wise and good man. We want to know about the thought and feeling of such a man as would
not leave the Rhodians uninformed if he thinks it wrong, but who doubts whether it is wrong or
not. In cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylon,1 an eminent Stoic of high authority, is wont to
express one opinion, Antipater1 his pupil, a man of superior acuteness, another. According to
Antipater, all things ought to be laid open, so that the buyer may be left in ignorance of
nothing at all that the seller knows. According to Diogenes, the seller is bound to disclose
defects in his goods so far as the law of the land requires, to transact the rest of the business
without fraud, and then, since he is the seller, to sell for as much as he can get. “I have
brought my cargo; I have offered it for sale; I am selling my corn for no more than others ask,
perhaps even for less than they would ask, since my arrival has increased the supply. Whom do
I wrong?” On the other side comes the reasoning of Antipater: “What say you? While you ought
to consult the welfare of mankind and to render service to human society, and by the very
condition of your being have such innate natural principles which you are bound to obey and
follow, that the common good should be your good, and reciprocally yours the common good,
will you conceal from men what comfort and plenty are nigh at hand for them?” Diogenes,
perhaps, will reply as follows: “It is one thing to conceal, another not to tell. Nor am I now
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perhaps, will reply as follows: “It is one thing to conceal, another not to tell. Nor am I now
concealing anything from you, by not telling you what is the nature of the gods, or what is the
supreme good, — things which it would profit you much more to know than to know the
cheapness of wheat. But am I under the necessity of telling you all that it would do you good to
hear?” “Yes, indeed, you are under that necessity, if you bear it in mind that nature establishes
a community of interest among men.” “I do bear this in mind. But is this community of interest
such that one can have nothing of his own? If it be so, everything ought, indeed, to be given,
not sold.”
13. You see that in this whole discussion it is not said, “Although this be wrong, yet, because it
is expedient I will do it;” but that it is expedient without being morally wrong, and, on the
other side, that because it is wrong it ought not to be done. A good man sells a house on
account of some defects, of which he himself is aware and others ignorant. Perhaps it is
unhealthy, and is supposed to be healthy, — it is not generally known that snakes make their
appearance in all the bedrooms, — it is built of bad materials, and is in a ruinous condition; but
nobody knows this except the owner. I ask, if the seller should have failed to tell these things
to the buyer, and should thus have sold his house for a higher price than he could have
reasonably expected, whether he would have acted unjustly or unfairly? “Yes, he would,” says
Antipater; “for what is meant by not putting into the right way one who has lost his way (which
at Athens exposed a man to public execration), if it does not include the case in which a buyer
is permitted to rush blindly on, and through his mistake to fall into a heavy loss by fraudulent
means? It is even worse than not showing the right way; it is knowingly leading another into
the wrong way.” Diogenes, on the other hand, says: “Did he who did not even advise you to
buy, force you to buy? He advertised for sale what he did not like; you bought what you did
like. Certainly, if those who advertise a good and well-built house are not regarded as
swindlers, even though it is neither good nor properly built, much less should those be so
regarded who have said nothing in praise of their house. For in a case in which the buyer can
exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there be on the part of the seller? And if all that is
said is not to be guaranteed, do you think that what is not said ought to be guaranteed? What
could be more foolish than for the seller to tell the defects of the article that he is selling? Nay,
what so absurd as for an auctioneer, by the owner’s direction, to proclaim, ‘I am selling an
unhealthy house’?” Thus, then, in certain doubtful cases the right is defended on the one side;
on the other, expediency is urged on the ground that it is not only right to do what seems
expedient, but even wrong not to do it. This is the discrepancy which seems often to exist
between the expedient and the right. But I must state my decision in these cases; for I
introduced them, not to raise the inquiry concerning them, but to give their solution. It seems
to me, then, that neither that Rhodian corn-merchant nor this seller of the house ought to have
practised concealment with the buyers. In truth, reticence with regard to any matter whatever
does not constitute concealment; but concealment consists in willingly hiding from others for
your own advantage something that you know. Who does not see what sort of an act such
concealment is, and what sort of a man he must be who practises it? Certainly this is not the
conduct of an open, frank, honest, good man, but rather of a wily, dark, crafty, deceitful, ill-
meaning, cunning man, an old rogue, a swindler. Is it not inexpedient to become liable to these
so numerous and to many more bad names?1
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so numerous and to many more bad names?1
14. But if those who keep silence deserve censure, what is to be thought of those who employ
absolute falsehood? Caius Canius, a Roman knight, a man not without wit and of respectable
literary culture, having gone to Syracuse, for rest, as he used to say, not for business, wanted
to buy a small estate, to which he could invite his friends, and where he could take his own
pleasure without intruders. When his wish had become generally known, a certain Pythius, who
was doing a banker’s business at Syracuse, told him that he had a country-seat, not, indeed,
for sale, but which Canius was at liberty to use as his own if he wished to do so; and at the
same time he invited the man to supper at the country-seat for the next day. He having
accepted the invitation, Pythius, who, as being a banker, was popular among all classes, called
the fishermen together, asked them to fish the next day in front of his villa, and told them
what he wanted them to do. Canius came to supper at the right time; a magnificent
entertainment was prepared by Pythius; a multitude of little boats were in full sight; every
fisherman brought what he had taken; the fish were laid down at the feet of Pythius. Then
Canius says, “Prithee, what does this mean? So many fish here? So many boats?” And he
answered, “What wonder? All the fish for the Syracuse market are here; they come here to be
in fresh water. The fishermen cannot dispense with this villa.” Canius, inflamed with longing,
begs Pythius to sell the place. He hesitates at first. To cut the story short, Canius over-
persuades him. The greedy and rich man buys the villa for as high a price as Pythius chooses
to ask, and buys the furniture too. He gives security; he finishes the business. Canius the next
day invites his friends. He comes early; he sees not a thole-pin. He asks his next neighbor
whether it is a fishermen’s holiday, as he sees none of them. “Not so far as I know,” was the
reply. “No fishermen are in the habit of fishing here. I therefore yesterday could not think what
had occurred to bring them.” Canius was enraged. But what was he to do? My colleague and
friend, Aquillius,1 had not then published his forms of legal procedure in the case of criminal
fraud, as to which when he was asked for a definition of criminal fraud, he replied, “When one
thing is pretended, another done.” This is perfectly clear, as might be expected from a man
skilled in defining. Pythius, then, and all who do one thing while they pretend another, are
treacherous, wicked, villanous. Therefore nothing that they do can be expedient, when defiled
by so many vices.
15. But if the definition of Aquillius is correct, pretence and concealment should be entirely
done away with. Thus a good man will neither pretend nor conceal anything for the sake of
buying or selling on better terms. Indeed, this offence of criminal fraud had been previously
punished both by the laws, as in the case of guardianship, by the Twelve Tables, and in the
defrauding of minors, by the Plaetorian law,2 and also, without express statute, by legal
decisions in which the phrase “As good faith requires” is employed.1 In other decisions the
following words hold a prominent place: — in the case of arbitration about a wife’s property,
“The better, the more equitable;”2 in the case of trust-property, “Fair dealing between good
men.”3 What then? Can there be any admixture of deceit in “The better, the more equitable?”
Or when “Fair dealing between good men” is specified, can anything be done craftily or
fraudulently? But, as Aquillius says, criminal fraud consists in misrepresentation. All falsehood,
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fraudulently? But, as Aquillius says, criminal fraud consists in misrepresentation. All falsehood,
then, must be removed from contracts. The seller must not employ a sham purchaser, nor the
buyer one to depreciate the article on sale by too low a bid. Let either party, if it comes to
naming the price, say once for all what he will give or take. Quintus Scaevola, the son of
Publius, when he asked to have the price of an estate that he was buying named once for all,
and the seller had complied with his request, said that he thought it worth more, and added a
hundred thousand sesterces.1 There is no one who would say that this was not the act of a
good man; but men in general would not regard it as the act of a wise man, any more than if
he had sold an estate for less than it would bring. This, then, is the mischievous doctrine, —
regarding some men as good, others as wise, according to which notion Ennius writes that the
wise man who cannot provide for his own advantage is wise in vain. I would readily account
this saying true, if I were agreed with Ennius as to what one’s advantage is. I see, indeed, that
Hecato of Rhodes, a disciple of Panaetius, says, in the books on Duties which he dedicated to
Quintus Tubero: “It is a wise man’s duty, while he does nothing contrary to morals, laws, and
customs, to have regard to his private fortune. For we desire to be rich, not for ourselves
alone, but for children, kindred, friends, and most of all for the state, — considering that the
means and resources of individual citizens are the wealth of the state.” The act of Scaevola just
named cannot, then, be in any way pleasing to Hecato. Nor is any great praise or favor to be
rendered to a man who merely says that he will not do for his own benefit what is unlawful.
But if pretence and concealment constitute criminal fraud, there are very few transactions
entirely free from criminal fraud; or if he is a good man who does good to those to whom he
can and injures no one, of a certainty we shall not easily find that good man. We conclude,
then, that it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong-doing is always disgraceful; and
because to be a good man is always right, it is always expedient.
16. As to landed property, the law of the state enacts that defects known to the seller must be
made known in selling it; and while by the law of the Twelve Tables it was enough for such
things as were guaranteed to be made good, and for the seller who made false statements with
regard to them to pay double damages, the jurisconsults have determined that the legal
penalty applies also to reticence.1 Their doctrine is, that whatever defect there may be in an
estate, if the seller knows it, he is bound to make it good. Thus when the augurs were going to
take an augury on the Capitol,2 and had ordered Tiberius Claudius Centumalus, who had a
house on the Coelian hill, to pull down those parts of it which were so high as to obstruct their
view of the heavens, Claudius advertised the detached house, and sold it. The purchaser was
Publius Calpurnius Lanarius. The same notice was given to him by the augurs. So when
Calpurnius had complied with the order, and had ascertained that Claudius advertised the
house for sale after being notified of the decree of the augurs, he procured the appearance of
Claudius before a legally appointed arbitrator, suing him for damages for his breach of good
faith. Marcus Cato pronounced the decision, the father of my friend Cato — for as other men
are named from their fathers, so is the father of that illustrious man to be named from his son
— he, I say, as judge, pronounced the decision: “Forasmuch as the seller knew of that decree
when he sold the house, and did not make it known, the damage ought to be made good to
the buyer.” He thus decided that in good faith a defect known by the seller ought to be known
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the buyer.” He thus decided that in good faith a defect known by the seller ought to be known
by the buyer. If this was a right decision, then neither that corn-merchant, nor the seller of the
unhealthy house, had a right to keep silence. But all such cases of reticence cannot be
comprised in the law of the land, though those which can be so comprised are carefully
repressed. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, my kinsman, had sold to Caius Sergius Orata the house
which he had bought from that same Orata a few years before. The estate was subject to
certain rights of way, which Marius had omitted to name in the contract of sale. The case was
brought into court. Crassus was advocate for Orata, Antonius for Gratidianus. Crassus laid
stress on the law that any defect known by the seller and not mentioned ought to be made
good. Antonius rested his plea on the equity of the case, that inasmuch as the defect was not
unknown to Sergius, who had previously sold the house, there was no need of its being
specified, nor had the purchaser been imposed upon, since he knew perfectly well to what the
estate purchased was liable. To what purpose do I name these things? That you may
understand that our ancestors did not approve of chicanery.1
17. But the laws remove chicanery in one way, philosophers in another, — the laws, so far as
they can lay hold on overt acts; philosophers, so far as they can reach such cases by reason
and understanding. Reason, then, demands that nothing be done ensnaringly, nothing under
false pretence, nothing deceitfully. Yet is it not ensnaring to spread nets, even if you do not
start and hunt your victims? For beasts themselves often fall into nets without being pursued.
Is it not thus that you advertise a house, — put up a notice of sale as a net; sell the house on
account of its defects; and some unwary person runs into the net? Yet such is the degenerate
state of feeling, that I find this neither accounted as morally wrong, nor yet forbidden by
statute or by the civil law, though it is forbidden by the law of nature. For there is — though I
have often said it, there is need of its being said still oftener — a fellowship of men with men,
which has, indeed, the broadest possible extent; a more intimate union, of those who belong to
the same race; one closer still, of those who belong to the same state. Therefore our ancestors
recognized a distinction between the law of nations and the law of the state. What is the law of
the state is not necessarily also the law of nations; but whatever is the law of nations ought
also to be the law of the state. But of true law and genuine justice we have no real and lifelike
representation; their shadow and semblances alone are ours. Yet would that we might follow
even these! For they are drawn from excellent models presented by nature and truth. How
precious are these words: “That I be not taken in and defrauded through you or on account of
my confidence in you!” What a golden formula is this: “As ought to be done between good men,
fairly and without fraud!”1 But the great question is, Who are the “good men,” and what is it to
be “fairly done”? Quintus Scaevola, the head of the pontifical college, said that there was the
greatest force in all decisions to which the phrase “in good faith” was annexed, and he thought
that as the term “good faith” had the broadest application as employed in guardianships,
partnerships, trusts, commissions, purchases, sales, hiring, leases, which make up the whole
system of social transactions, it required a judge of superior capacity to determine — especially
as there are often cross-suits — what each party is bound to render, and to whom, in the
satisfaction of just claims.
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There should, then, be an end of chicanery and of that cunning which means indeed to pass for
prudence, but is an entirely different thing and at the widest distance from it; for prudence has
its proper place in the choice between good and evil, while cunning — if whatever is immoral is
evil — prefers evil things to good.
Nor is it only with reference to landed estate that the civil law, derived from nature, punishes
cunning and fraud; but in the sale of slaves also all fraud on the part of the seller is prohibited.
By the edict of the aediles,1 the seller who may rightly be supposed to know about the health,
the truant habits, the dishonesty of the slave, is bound to guarantee the purchaser against
damage. The case of persons who sell slaves that have recently come to them by inheritance is
different.2 From these instances it is clear, since nature is the fountain of law, that it is in
accordance with nature that no one should act so as to prey upon another’s ignorance. Nor can
there be found any greater source of mischief to human society than the false show of
intelligence in the practice of cunning. Hence spring those countless cases in which expediency
seems to be in conflict with the right. For how few will be found who, if impunity and absolute
secrecy were offered, could refrain from wrong-doing!
18. Let us, if you please, try the principle that I have laid down, with reference to cases in
which the generality of mankind do not think that any wrong is committed. For I am not going
to speak here of assassins, poisoners, forgers of wills, thieves, peculators, who are to be
repressed, not by words and philosophical discussion, but by chains and imprisonment. Let us
consider the things that are done by those who are accounted as good men. Certain persons
brought from Greece to Rome a forged will of Lucius Minucius Basilus, a rich man. That they
might more easily maintain its validity, they made joint-heirs with themselves Marcus Crassus
and Quintus Hortensius, the most influential men of that time, who, while they suspected the
forgery, yet being conscious of no guilt of their own in the case, did not spurn the paltry
present that came to them through the crime of others. What then? Is their freedom from the
positive offence of forgery sufficient for their acquittal? I think not, though I loved one of them
while he lived,1 and am not an enemy of the other now that he is dead.1 But when Basilus
meant that his sister’s son, Marcus Satrius, should take his name, and had made him his heir,
— I mean this patron of the Picene and Sabine territory, to the disgrace of our time,2 — was it
right that those distinguished citizens should have the property, and that nothing save the
name should descend to Satrius? Forsooth, if he who does not, when he can, ward off or repel
wrong is guilty of injustice (as I showed in the First Book), what is to be thought of him who,
so far from repelling, abets the wrong? To me, indeed, genuine inheritances do not seem right,
if sought by knavish blandishments, — by attentions rendered not from sincere but simulated
kindness.3 In such affairs, one thing sometimes appears expedient, another right. But it is a
deceptive appearance; for the standard of expediency is the same as that of right. He who does
not clearly see this is capable of any kind of fraud, of any crime. For he who thinks, “That is
indeed right, but this is expedient,” will dare in his ignorance to divorce things united by
nature, — a state of feeling which is the source of all frauds, wrongs, crimes.
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19. Therefore, if a good man could by snapping his fingers make his name creep surreptitiously
into rich men’s wills, he would not use this power, no, not even though he were absolutely
certain that no one would ever have the least suspicion of it. But had you given this power to
Marcus Crassus, that by snapping his fingers he could get his name inserted in a will though he
were not really the heir, I warrant you he would have danced in the forum. A just man,
however, and one whom we feel to be a good man, will take nothing from any one to transfer
it to himself. Let him who marvels at this confess that he knows not what a good man is. But if
one would only develop the idea of a good man wrapped up in his own mind, he would then at
once tell himself that he is a good man who benefits all that he can, and does harm to no one
unless provoked by injury.1 What then? Must not he do harm, who, as if by enchantment,
displaces the true heirs, to put himself in their stead? “Is he not, then,” some one may say, “to
do what is serviceable, what is expedient?” Yes, but let him understand that nothing unjust can
be either expedient or serviceable. He who has not learned this cannot be a good man. In my
boyhood I heard from my father that Fimbria, who had been consul, was appointed judge in the
case of Marcus Lutatius Pinthias, a Roman knight, not otherwise than respectable, who had laid
a wager, to be forfeited if he did not prove himself to be a good man. Fimbria said that he
would never act as judge in the case, lest, if he decided against Pinthias, he might deprive a
worthy man of his reputation, or if he decided in his favor, he might seem to have pronounced
some ordinary person to be a good man, while such a character was made up of innumerable
duties and merits. To a good man, then, even in the conception of Fimbria, not to say of
Socrates,1 nothing can by any possibility seem expedient that is not right. Therefore such a
man will not dare, not only to do, but even to think anything which he may not venture to
proclaim publicly. Is it not shameful that philosophers should be in doubt about these matters
as to which even peasants have no doubt? From the peasants sprang the old saying that has
become proverbial. When they commend any one’s honesty and goodness, they say that you
might trust him to play odd and even2 with you in the dark. What does this mean, unless that
what is unbecoming is not expedient, even if you could obtain it without any one being able to
prove it against you? Do you not see that according to this proverb there could be no apology
either for that Gyges of whom I have spoken, or for this man whom I just now supposed by
way of illustration, who by snapping his fingers could convert the inheritances of a whole
community to his own use? For as what is immoral, though concealed, cannot be in any way
made right, so it cannot be brought about that, in spite of the opposition and repugnancy of
nature, what is not right should in any case be expedient.
20. Yet it may be said that when the gain is very great, there is justifying cause for wrong-
doing. When Caius Marius had no near prospect of the consulship, and still remained in
obscurity the seventh year after he had been praetor, nor gave any token that he was ever
going to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship, having been sent to Rome by his
commander Quintus Metellus, a man and citizen of the highest eminence, whose lieutenant he
was, he charged Metellus before the Roman people with needlessly protracting the war,
intimating that if they had made him consul, he would in a short time have given Jugurtha
either living or dead into the power of the Roman people. And so he was indeed made consul;
but in bringing into odium by a false accusation a citizen of the highest worth and eminence,
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but in bringing into odium by a false accusation a citizen of the highest worth and eminence,
whose lieutenant he was1 and by whom he had been sent home, he made a wide departure
from good faith and honesty. My kinsman Gratidianus2 did not play the part of a good man on
the occasion when he was praetor, and the tribunes of the people had called into counsel the
college of praetors, that the currency might have its standard fixed by a joint resolution; for
the value of money was then so fluctuating that no one could know how much or how little
property he had. The tribunes and praetors jointly framed a decree, specifying the penalty and
the judicial proceedings for its violation, and agreed to mount the rostrum together in the
afternoon. The others went their several ways; while Marius from the seats of the tribunes
directly mounted the rostrum, and alone announced the decree which had resulted from their
combined action. This affair, if you want to know, brought him great popularity. Statues were
erected in his honor in all the streets; incense and wax tapers were burned before them. To cut
the story short, no man was ever more cherished by the multitude. These are the cases which
sometimes perplex one in the discussion, — cases where the matter in which honesty is
transgressed is not so very great, while that which is obtained by means of it is of the very
highest value; as, for Marius, it was not so irredeemably shameful to forestall the popular favor
from his colleagues and the tribunes of the people, while by this means to become consul, the
end which he then had in view,1 seemed in the highest degree desirable. But there is one rule
for all cases, which I would have profoundly impressed on your mind, — either that what seems
expedient must not be wrong, or if it be wrong, that it must not seem to be expedient. Can we
deem either that Marius or this a good man? Unfold and examine2 your own consciousness,
that you may see what within it is the aspect, shape, and conception of a good man. Does it
fall in with the character of a good man to lie, to slander, to forestall, to deceive? Nothing
certainly can be less in harmony with it. Is there, then, any object of so much value, or any
advantage so worthy of your quest, that you should forfeit for it the glory and reputation of a
good man? What is there that so-called expediency can bring to you of equal worth with what it
takes from you, if it robs you of the reputation of a good man, and deprives you of truth and
honesty? For what difference does it make, whether one turns himself from a man into a beast,
or in the form of a man carries the moral obduracy of a beast?
21. What? Do not those who violate all that is right and virtuous if they can only obtain power,
do the same thing with him who chose to have even for a father-in-law the man by whose
audacity he himself might become powerful?1 It seemed expedient to him to avail himself of
the other’s unpopularity for his own great advancement. He did not perceive how unjust this
was to the country, how base, and how harmful. The father-in-law himself had always on his
lips the Greek verses from the Phoenissae, which I will render as I can, awkwardly it may be,
but still so as to be intelligible: —
“Transcend the right in quest of power alone;
In all things else hold fast the bond of kindred.”
It was criminal in Eteocles,2 or rather in Euripides, to except that one thing which was the
most wicked of all. Why, then, do we gather up crimes on a small scale, fraudulent heirships,
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most wicked of all. Why, then, do we gather up crimes on a small scale, fraudulent heirships,
bargains, sales? Here you have a man who desired to be king of the Roman people, and who
accomplished his purpose. Whoever says that this desire was right, is mad; for he approves of
the destruction of laws and of liberty, and deems their foul and detestable suppression glorious.
But as for him who acknowledges that it is not right to usurp sovereign power in a state which
was and which ought to be free, yet that it is expedient for him who can do so, by what
remonstrance, or rather by what reproach, can I strive to draw him back from so grave an
error? For (ye immortal gods!) can the basest and foulest parricide1 committed upon his
country be expedient for any man, even though he who has made himself thus guilty be called
parent by the citizens whom he has brought under the yoke? Expediency, then, ought to be
measured by the right, and so indeed, that the two, though expressed by different names, may
have to the ear the same sound. I do not accord with the opinion of the multitude who ask
what can be more expedient than the possession of sovereign power; on the other hand, I find
nothing more inexpedient for him who has obtained this power unjustly, when I begin to recall
reason to things as they really are. For can anxieties, solicitudes, terrors by day and by night, a
life crowded full of snares and of perils, be expedient for any one? Attius says,
“The throne has many faithless, loyal few.”
But of what throne does he say this? Of one that was held by right, transmitted from Tantalus
and Pelops. How much more, think you, must those words apply to that king who by the army
of the Roman people subdued that very Roman people, and forced to servile obedience a state
not only free, but ruling over whole races of men? What misgivings of conscience must he have
had on his mind, think you? What inward wounds? Whose life can be serviceable to himself if
he holds it on condition that whoever deprives him of it will rise to the summit of favor and
glory? But if these things which seem in the highest degree expedient are yet inexpedient
because full of disgrace and wickedness, we ought to be thoroughly convinced that there is
nothing expedient that is not right.
22. This, while often indeed at other times, was expressly decreed by Caius Fabricius in his
second consulate and by our Senate, in the war with Pyrrhus. For Pyrrhus having made war
with the Roman people without provocation, and there being a contest for supremacy with that
high-minded and powerful king, a deserter came from him to the camp of Fabricius, and
promised that, if he would give him his price, as he had come secretly, so he would return
secretly to the camp of Pyrrhus, and kill him by poison. Fabricius sent the man back to Pyrrhus,
and that act of his was commended by the Senate. Yet if we look to the appearance and the
popular opinion of expediency, a single deserter would have put an end to that great war and
to a dangerous enemy of the empire. But it would have been a great disgrace and scandal for
one with whom the contest was for glory to have been overcome by crime, not by valor. Which,
then, was the more expedient, for Fabricius, who was in this city what Aristides was in Athens,
or for the Senate, which never divorced expediency from honor, to contend with the enemy by
arms, or by poison? If empire is to be sought for the sake of glory, let crime, in which there
can be no glory, be excluded; but if power be sought by any means whatsoever, it can be of no
service conjoined with infamy. Therefore the proposal of Lucius Philippus, the son of Quintus,
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service conjoined with infamy. Therefore the proposal of Lucius Philippus, the son of Quintus,
was not expedient, namely, that the states which by a decree of the Senate Lucius Sulla, for
money received from them,1 had freed from tribute should be taxed again, without our
returning to them the money that they had paid for their exemption. The Senate assented to
the proposal, to the disgrace of the empire. Pirates keep better faith. But it may be said that
the revenues were increased, and it was therefore expedient. How long will men dare to call
anything expedient that is not right? Can odium and infamy be of service to any empire, which
ought to be supported by glory and by the good-will of its allies? I was often at variance even
with my friend Cato. He seemed to me to guard the treasury and the revenues too obstinately,
to refuse everything to the farmers of the revenue,1 and many things to our allies; while we
ought to be generous to our allies, and to deal with the farmers of the revenue as leniently as
we individually do with our own tenants, especially as the union of orders2 to which such a
course would conduce is for the well-being of the state. Curio, too, was entirely in the wrong,
when he said that the cause of the colonies north of the Po3 was just, but always added, “Let
expediency prevail.” He should have said that it was not just because it was not expedient for
the state, rather than have acknowledged it as just while saying that it was not expedient.
23. The Sixth Book of Hecato’s treatise on Duties is full of such questions as these. “Ought a
good man in a time of extreme dearth to continue to furnish food to his slaves?” He discusses
both sides of the question, yet at the last makes expediency rather than humanity the standard
of duty. He asks, “If in a storm at sea something must be thrown overboard, shall it be a
valuable horse, or a slave of no value?” In this case interest inclines in one direction, humanity
in the other. “If in case of shipwreck a fool gets possession of a plank, shall a wise man wrest it
from him if he can?” He answers in the negative, because it would be unjust. “What may the
master of the ship do in such a case? May he not take possession of the plank as his own
property?” Not by any means. He has no more right to do this than to throw a passenger from
the ship into the sea because the ship is his own. Until it arrives at the port to which passage
has been taken, the ship belongs not to the master, but to the passengers. “What if there be
but one plank for two shipwrecked passengers, both wise men? Shall they both try to get
possession of it, or shall one yield to the other?” One should give it up to the other; but let
that other be the one whose life is the more valuable, either for his own sake or for that of the
state. “What if their claims are equal?” There must be no quarrel between them, but one must
yield to the other, as if he had come off second-best in drawing lots or at odd and even. “What
if a father pillages temples, or makes an underground passage to the public treasury? Shall the
son give information to the magistrates?” That indeed would be wrong. Nay, he may even
defend his father if he should be publicly accused. “Does not then duty to the country take
precedence of all other duties?” Yes, indeed; but it is for the welfare of the country to have
citizens dutiful toward their parents. “What if the father should attempt to usurp supreme
authority, or to betray the country? Shall the son keep silence?” Yes, but he will implore his
father not to do so. If that is of no avail, he will take him earnestly to task; will even threaten
him; yet at the last, if there is danger of great harm to the country, he will prefer the country’s
safety to his father’s safety. He asks also, “If a wise man by an oversight takes counterfeit
coins for good, when he ascertains what they are, shall he pay them for good money to his
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coins for good, when he ascertains what they are, shall he pay them for good money to his
creditors?” Diogenes says, Yes; Antipater, No, and I agree with him. “Ought the seller of wine
that he knows will not keep, to tell his purchasers?” Diogenes says that there is no need of it;
Antipater thinks that a good man would tell. These questions are like mooted points of law,
among the Stoics. “In selling a slave, are his faults to be told? Not such faults as, if not
mentioned, would by the civil law throw the slave back upon the vender’s hands, but such as
his being a liar, a gambler, thievish, a drunkard?” Antipater says that they are to be told;
Diogenes, that they are not. “If any one selling gold thinks that it is brass that he is selling, will
a good man tell him that it is gold, or will he buy for a shilling1 what is worth a thousand
shillings?” It is plain enough by this time what I think of these things, and what a difference of
opinion there is among the philosophers that I have named.2
24. It is asked whether agreements and promises are always to be kept, if made — to borrow
the language of the praetorian edict — neither by force nor by criminal fraud. If one had given
to a person a remedy for the dropsy, and had stipulated that he should never afterward use the
medicine, — in case that person, having been cured by the medicine, were to contract the
same disease some years afterward, and could not obtain from him with whom he had made
the agreement leave to use the remedy again, what ought he to do? Since he who would refuse
such a request would be inhuman, and no harm can be done to him by using the remedy,
regard should be paid to life and health. What, if a wise man were asked by one who wants to
make him his heir to the amount of a million of sesterces,1 to promise that before taking
possession of his legacy he will dance in the forum publicly by daylight, and if without this
promise the testator would not have given the legacy? Shall he keep his promise, or not? I
should prefer that he had not made the promise, and this I think would have befitted his
dignity. But since he has made the promise, if he thinks it disgraceful to dance in the forum,
the least immoral falsehood of the two will be for him to break his promise and decline the
legacy, unless, perchance, he can expend that money for the state in some great emergency of
need, so that even dancing in the forum for the country’s benefit would not be disgraceful.
25. Nor yet are those promises to be kept which are not for the advantage of those to whom
you have made them. To go back to myths, Phoebus having promised his son Phaethon that he
would do whatever he wished, the son wished to be taken up into his father’s chariot. He was
taken up, and before he was fairly seated, he was consumed by a thunderbolt. How much
better would it have been if in this case the father’s promise had not been kept! What shall be
said of the promise that Theseus exacted of Neptune? Neptune having promised to grant him
three wishes, he asked for the death of his son Hippolytus, whom he suspected of intrigue with
his stepmother; but when Theseus had obtained his wish he was plunged into the deepest
sorrow.1 What shall we say of Agamemnon, who, having vowed to Diana the most beautiful
creature that should be born that year in his kingdom, immolated Iphigenia, because no
creature more beautiful was born that year in the kingdom? It would have been better not to
keep the promise than to commit so foul a crime. Therefore promises are sometimes not to be
kept, nor are deposits always to be returned. If one had deposited a sword with you when he
was of sound mind, and were to ask for it in a fit of insanity, to restore it would be wrong; not
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was of sound mind, and were to ask for it in a fit of insanity, to restore it would be wrong; not
to restore it, your duty. What if he who had deposited money with you were to levy war
against the country? Should you deliver up the trust? I think not; for you would act against the
state, which ought to be nearest to your affection. Thus many things which seem to be right by
nature become wrong by circumstances. To keep promises, to abide by agreements, to restore
trusts, by a change of expediency becomes wrong. I think that I have now said all that is
necessary about those things that seem to be expedient under the pretext of prudence, yet are
really opposed to justice.
But since in the First Book I derived duties from four sources of right, I will adopt the same
division in showing how hostile to virtue are those things that seem to be expedient, yet are
not so. I have already, indeed, treated of prudence which cunning would fain imitate, and of
justice which is always expedient. There remain two divisions of the right, one of which is
witnessed in the greatness and superiority of a lofty mind; the other, in the shaping and
government of the life by self-restraint and temperance.
26. It seemed expedient to Ulysses,1 — as the story has come to us through some of the
tragedians;2 Homer throws no such suspicion on him, but there are tragedies that charge him
with having purposed to escape service in the war by feigning insanity. The purpose was not
right. “Yet it was expedient,” some one perchance will say, “to reign in Ithaca, and to live at his
ease with his parents, with his wife, with his son. Do you think any honor won in daily labors
and perils to be compared with this quiet life?” I, indeed, think that this quiet life was to be
despised and spurned; for the repose which was not right I cannot regard as expedient. What,
think you, would Ulysses have heard, had he persevered in his pretended insanity? when, after
his greatest achievements in the war, he hears from Ajax: —
“He who first took the oath, and he alone,
As you all know, forswore his plighted faith.
Madness he feigned, the compact to evade,
And had not Palamedes, with keen vision
And wise device, unmasked his craft and cunning,
He still had been a perjured recreant.”1
It was, indeed, better for him to fight, not only with the enemy, but with the waves, as he did,
than to desert Greece confederated with one mind to carry war into the country of the
barbarians.2 But let us leave myths and foreign instances. Let us come to fact and to our own
history. Marcus Atilius Regulus, when in his second consulship3 he was captured by troops in
ambush under Xanthippus the Lacedaemonian, — Hamilcar, Hannibal’s father, being
commander-in-chief, — was sent to the Senate under oath that, unless certain prisoners of
high rank were restored to the Carthaginians, he would himself return to Carthage. He on his
arrival at Rome saw the semblance of expediency — but, as fact shows, regarded it as delusive
— to be in his own home, with his wife, with his children; to maintain unimpaired his consular
dignity, regarding the calamity which he had incurred in battle as but a common incident in the
fortunes of war. Who can deny that this was expedient? Who, think you? Magnanimity and
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fortunes of war. Who can deny that this was expedient? Who, think you? Magnanimity and
Fortitude deny this.
27. Do you ask for better authorities? It is the property of these virtues to fear nothing, to
despise all human vicissitudes, to think nothing that can happen to man intolerable. And so
what did he do? He came to the Senate; he stated his mission; he refused to give his own vote
in the case, because so long as he was bound by his oath to the enemy he was not a senator.
He, however, denied the expediency of sending back the prisoners of war (“O foolish man,”
some one may have said, “to contend against his own interest”); for the prisoners were young
men and good leaders, while his vigor was already impaired by age. By virtue of his influence
the prisoners were retained. He himself returned to Carthage, nor did his love for his country or
his kindred retain him. Yet he then well knew that he was returning to an implacably cruel
enemy and to excruciating punishment; but he considered his oath as binding. Thus when he
was killed by being deprived of sleep1 he was in a better condition than if he had remained at
home, a captive old man, a perjurer of consular dignity. “Yet he acted foolishly, in not only
declining to vote in favor of sending the prisoners back, but in also giving his advice against
their release.” How, foolishly? Did he act foolishly, if it was for the good of the state? Can what
is harmful to the state be expedient for any citizen?
28. Men subvert the very foundations of nature when they separate expediency from the right.
For we all seek what is expedient, and are drawn toward it, nor can we anyhow resist its
attraction. Forsooth, who is there that shuns the things that are expedient? Or rather, who is
there that does not pursue them with the utmost earnestness? But because we never can find
what is expedient, save in good report, honor, right, we therefore esteem these first and
highest; we regard expediency thus defined as not so much respectable as indispensable. “What
is there in an oath?” some one may say. “Do we fear the anger of Jupiter? It is indeed an
opinion common to all philosophers, not only to those who believe that the Deity neither does
anything nor makes manifestation of himself to any other being,1 but equally to those who
suppose him always active in the government and direction of events,2 that the Deity is never
angry and never does harm. But what more harm could an angry Jupiter have done than
Regulus did to himself? There was then no power of religion that could supersede expediency
so weighty. Was his motive to avoid acting basely? In the first place, the least of evils are to
be chosen. Was then the evil in the baseness of which you speak so great as that of the torture
which he had to bear? Then again, this sentiment from Attius, —
‘Faith hast thou broken?’
‘I neither gave nor give faith to the faithless,’3
although put into the mouth of an impious king, yet is admirably well said.” They add also that
as we say that some things seem expedient that are not so, in like manner they say that some
things seem right that are not so, — as, for instance, this very thing, returning to torture for
the sake of preserving an oath inviolate seems right, yet becomes wrong, because a promise
extorted by force ought not to be ratified. They still further say that whatever is highly
expedient becomes right, even if it did not seem so before.
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expedient becomes right, even if it did not seem so before.
29. This is the substance of the case against Regulus. Let us now examine the first count. “He
had no need to fear any harm from Jupiter’s anger; for Jupiter is not wont either to be angry
or to do harm.” This argument is of no more force against Regulus than against any oath. But
in an oath the point to be considered is not what it threatens, but what it means. For an oath
is a religious affirmation. Therefore what you positively promise as in the presence of God
ought to be performed. The question, then, no longer concerns the anger of the gods (for there
is no such thing), but it is a question of honesty and good faith. Ennius well says: —
“Oh genial, bright-winged Faith, and oath of Jove!”
He, then, who profanes an oath, profanes Faith, whom — as it is said in Cato’s speech — our
ancestors chose to have in the Capitol,1 hard by the shrine of Jupiter Best and Greatest. “Then,
too, Jupiter, if he had been angry, could not have done more harm to Regulus than Regulus did
to himself.” Undoubtedly, if pain were the only evil. But philosophers of the highest authority
affirm, not only that pain is not the greatest evil, but that it is not even an evil. For the truth
of this do not, I beg you, cast reproach on the testimony of Regulus, a witness not of
moderate, but, so far as I know, of the very highest credibility; for what more trustworthy
witness can you ask than the chief man of the Roman people, who of his own accord endured
torture that he might keep duty inviolate? Then, as to what they say about “the least of evils,”
— namely, that meanness is to be preferred to calamity, — is there any evil greater than
meanness? If such meanness as there is in the case of bodily deformity has in it something
offensive, in what vile esteem ought the depravation and foulness of soul to be held! Therefore
those who take the strongest ground on these matters dare to affirm that meanness of soul is
the only evil; those who speak with more laxity do not hesitate to call it the greatest of evils.
As to the saying,
“I neither gave nor give faith to the faithless,”
the poet had a right to say this; for in bringing Atreus upon the stage, he had to support the
character. But if those who are reasoning against Regulus assume that the faith pledged to a
faithless person is null, let them look to it lest there be found here a subterfuge for perjury.
Even belligerents have rights, and an oath is often to be kept sacred with an enemy. For what
was so sworn that the mind of him who took the oath at the time confessed the obligation,
ought to be fulfilled; what was not so sworn may be left unfulfilled without perjury.1 Thus you
would not pay robbers a price that you had agreed to pay for your life; it is no wrong if you fail
to do this after having promised with an oath. For a robber2 is not included in the list of
belligerents, but is the common enemy of all. Between him and other men there ought to be
neither mutual confidence nor binding oath. For it is not simply swearing what is false that
constitutes perjury; but it is perjury not to perform what you have sworn, as it is expressed in
our legal form, in the purpose of your own mind. Euripides makes a proper distinction when he
says: —
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“I swore in words; my mind I keep unsworn.”3
But Regulus was bound in duty not to violate conditions and agreements made in war and with
an enemy; for his concern was with a rightful and legitimate enemy, and as to such enemies
our whole fecial law and many mutual rights were valid between them and us. If it were not
so, the Senate would never have surrendered to enemies men of renown as prisoners.
30. This they did in the case of Titus Veturius and Spurius Postumius, who, in their second
consulship, after the defeat at Caudium when our soldiers passed under the yoke, having
concluded a peace with the Samnites without the consent of the people and the Senate,1 were
delivered up to the Samnites. At the same time Tiberius Numicius and Quintus Maelius, then
tribunes of the people, because the peace had been concluded by their authority, were also
surrendered, to consummate the repudiation of the treaty with the Samnites. Moreover,
Postumius himself, who was among those surrendered, advised and supported the measure.
Many years afterward the same thing was done by Caius Mancinus, who, having made a treaty
with the Numantians without authority from the Senate, was surrendered to them, he himself
advising the passage by the people of the decree to that effect, reported from the Senate by
Publius Furius and Sextus Atilius. He acted more honorably than Quintus Pompeius, who when
he was in the same case begged to be let off, and the decree of surrender was not passed.
Here what seemed expedient preponderated over the right; in the former instances the false
show of expediency was outweighed by the authority of the right. “But a promise exacted by
force ought not to be performed.” As if force could be brought to bear upon a brave man. “Still,
why did he go to the Senate for the special purpose of dissuading them from surrendering the
prisoners?” In asking this question, you cast reproach on what was greatest in Regulus. For he
did not make himself judge in his own case; he undertook the management of the case that
the Senate might decide upon it, and unless he had led the way to the decision by his
authority, the prisoners would have been returned. Thus Regulus would have remained safe in
his own country. Because he thought that this was not expedient for the country, he believed it
right for himself to express his opinion and to suffer. Still further, as to their saying that
whatever is highly expedient becomes right, the truth is that it is right, not that it becomes
right. For nothing is expedient which is not also right, nor is anything right because it is
expedient, but expedient because it is right. Therefore from many remarkable examples it
would be difficult to name one more praiseworthy or illustrious than this.
31. Of all that is thus praiseworthy in the conduct of Regulus the one thing specially worthy of
admiration is that he gave his advice in favor of retaining the prisoners. That, having thus
advised, he returned, now seems to us admirable; in those times he could not have done
otherwise. This merit therefore belongs to the times, not to the man; for our ancestors
considered no bond more stringent than an oath in securing good faith. This is declared by the
Sacred Laws;1 it is declared by treaties in which good faith even with an enemy is made
binding; it is declared by the examinations and sentences of the censors, who used to take no
more diligent cognizance of any other subject than they took of oaths. Marcus Pomponius,
tribune of the people, gave notice of an impeachment to Lucius Manlius, son of Aulus, after his
dictatorship, because he had illegally added a few days to the term of his dictatorship. He also
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dictatorship, because he had illegally added a few days to the term of his dictatorship. He also
reproached him with having banished his son Titus from society and ordered him to live in the
country. When the young man, the son of Manlius, heard that legal proceedings were instituted
against his father, he is said to have hastened to Rome, and to have come to the house of
Pomponius at early dawn. On his being announced, Pomponius, supposing that he had come in
anger to bring some charge against his father, rose from his bed, and suffering none others to
be present, gave orders for the young man to come to him. He, on entering, at once drew his
sword, and swore that he would kill Pomponius instantly unless he gave his oath to drop the
prosecution. Pomponius, constrained by imminent peril, took the oath; did not lay the
accusation before the people; told why he had been compelled to drop the case; discharged
Manlius. Such was the importance attached to an oath in those times. This Titus Manlius is the
one who obtained his surname1 near the Anio from a collar taken from a Gaul who had
challenged him and was killed by him, in whose third consulship the Latin army was scattered
and put to flight near the Veseris, — a very distinguished man, as bitterly severe toward his
son2 as he had been excessively kind to his father.
32. But as Regulus merits renown for keeping his oath inviolate, so are those ten whom, after
the battle of Cannae, Hannibal sent to the Senate under oath that they would return to the
camp that had fallen into the possession of the Carthaginians, unless they obtained the
redemption of the prisoners of war, to be held in the vilest esteem, if they really did not return.
As to these men accounts vary.1 Polybius, a fully trustworthy authority, says that of ten men of
the highest rank who were sent, nine returned, not having obtained from the Senate the
release of the prisoners, but that one who had gone back to the camp shortly after leaving it on
the pretence of having forgotten something, remained in Rome. By his return to the camp he
maintained that he was acquitted of his oath; but wrongly, for deceit aggravates perjury
instead of annulling it. This was, then, a foolish cunning perversely assuming the aspect of
prudence. The Senate, therefore, decreed that the rogue and cheat should be sent in chains to
Hannibal. But there was something still greater on the part of the Roman people. Hannibal held
as prisoners eight thousand men, who had not been taken in battle or escaped when in peril of
death, but who had been left in camp by Paulus and Varro. The Senate refused to have them
redeemed, though it might have been done for a small sum of money, that it might be ingrafted
in the minds of our soldiers that they must either conquer or die. Polybius writes that when
Hannibal heard this his spirit was broken, because the Senate and the Roman people had borne
their reverses with so lofty a mind. Thus does what seems expedient sink out of account when
brought into comparison with the right. I ought to add that Acilius, who wrote a history in
Greek, says that there were several who returned to the camp to free themselves from their
oath by the same equivocation, and that they were branded with every token of ignominy by
the censors. We may close this head; for it is perfectly clear that whatever is done with a timid,
sordid, abject mind — such as the action of Regulus would have been, had he either given his
opinion concerning the prisoners in his own interest and not in that of the state, or consented
to remain at home — is not expedient, because it is infamous, foul, base.
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33. There remains the fourth division, comprehending becomingness, moderation, discretion,
self-restraint, temperance. Can anything be expedient which is opposed to this choir1 of such
virtues? However, those of the Cyrenaic school2 and the disciples of Anniceris,3 philosophers
only in name, followed Aristippus in making all good to consist in pleasure, and regarded virtue
as commendable only in its pleasure-giving capacity. They having passed almost out of notice,
Epicurus holds his ground as an advocate and teacher of nearly the same doctrine. With these I
must contend, as the phrase is, with infantry and cavalry,4 if I mean to guard and maintain the
right. For if not only expediency but everything appertaining to a happy life consists in a strong
constitution of body and in a reasonable expectation of preserving that constitution, as
Metrodorus1 writes, certainly this expediency — the highest expediency in the opinion of those
who thus reason — will be in conflict with the right. For where, in the first place, shall room be
found for prudence? In raking together from every quarter objects to delight the senses? How
wretched this slavery of virtue in bondage to pleasure! What, then, is the function of prudence?
To choose pleasures intelligently? Grant that nothing can be more delightful than this, what can
be imagined meaner? Then, again, what room is there for fortitude, which is the contempt of
pain and labor, with him who calls pain the greatest of evils? For although Epicurus may in
many places, as he does, speak bravely enough about pain, we are to look, not at what he
says, but at what it is consistent for him to say, who acknowledged no good except pleasure,
no evil except pain. Thus also, if I listen to him about self-restraint and temperance, he says
indeed much in many places; but, as the phrase is, the water does not run.1 For how can he
commend temperance, who places the greatest good in pleasure? Temperance is inimical to the
sensual appetites; but those appetites are the handmaids of pleasure. Yet as to these three
virtues they shift and turn as they can, and with no little ingenuity. They bring in prudence as
knowledge employed to supply pleasures, to drive away pain. They also explain fortitude after
some fashion, calling it the method of taking no account of death and putting up with pain.
Temperance, too, they drag in, not very easily indeed, but as well as they can, saying that the
highest pleasure amounts to no more than the absence of pain. Justice totters, or rather lies
prostrate, and so do all those virtues which belong to social life and the fellowship of the
human race. Nor can there be goodness, or generosity, or courtesy, any more than friendship,
if they are not to be sought on their own account, but only with reference to pleasure. To sum
up the whole in brief, as I have maintained that there is no expediency which is opposed to the
right, so I affirm that all sensual pleasure is opposed to the right. All the more do I find fault
with Calliphon and Dinomachus,2 who thought that they were going to put an end to the
controversy by uniting pleasure with the right, as they might yoke a beast with a man. The
right does not accept this union, spurns it, repels it. Nor can the supreme good, which ought to
be simple, be mingled and compounded of widely unlike ingredients. But of this — for it is a
great theme — I treat more at length elsewhere.1 As to the subject now in hand, I have
sufficiently shown how the matter is to be decided, if at any time what seems to be expedient
is repugnant to the right. But if sensual pleasure shall be said even to have the appearance of
expediency, it cannot have any union with the right. To make such concession as we can in
favor of pleasure, the most that we can say of it is that it may perhaps give some seasoning to
life; it certainly is of no benefit.
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life; it certainly is of no benefit.
You have from your father, my son Marcus, a gift, in my opinion, great; but that will be
according to the use that you make of it. Although you are to take in these three books as
guests among the lectures of Cratippus, yet as if, in case I had come to Athens — which I
should indeed have done had not the country with a loud voice recalled me midway — you
would sometimes have listened to me as well as to Cratippus, so since my voice reaches you by
means of these volumes, you will give them as much time as you can, and you can give them
as much time as you please. When I shall have become fully aware that you take pleasure in
science of this type, while I shall, as I hope, at no great distance of time, talk with you face to
face, I shall none the less, while we are apart, converse with you though absent from you.
Farewell, then, my Cicero, and believe that you are very dear to me, and will be much more
dear if you shall find your happiness in writings like these and in such precepts as they contain.
Endnotes
[1 ] Either philosophical discussion or oratory.
[1 ] He was known chiefly as an orator; but the list of his numerous works comprises
philosophy, history, and poetry. Driven from Athens, he took refuge in Alexandria; and it was
owing to his influence that Ptolemy Lagi commenced the collection of books which grew into the
famous Alexandrian library. No probably genuine work of Demetrius Phalereus is now extant.
[1 ] In the De Finibus.
[2 ] As was the case with the Stoics.
[3 ] As was the case with the Peripatetics, and, hypothetically, with the Academics.
[1 ] Ariston, while he regarded virtue as the supreme good, maintained that among the
external conditions and objects with which duty is conversant, there is no ground for
preference, therefore no reason why one should be sought or pursued rather than another.
Pyrrho, the founder of the school of the Sceptics, in denying the possibility of attaining any
objective truth, denied the possibility of determining any condition, object, or action to be
better than any other. Herillus — like Ariston, a professed Stoic — regarded knowledge as the
supreme good, and external life, with all its doings and objects, though practically necessary, as
of no ethical value, because not contributing to the supreme good.
[2 ] Yet Cicero leaves duty (officium) undefined. Officium may be abbreviated from opificium, i.
e. work-doing; or it may be derived from ob and facio, in which case it denotes doing on
account of, or for a reason, and would include all acts for which a reason, i. e. a right reason,
can be given. I am inclined to think that it is in this latter sense that Cicero made choice and
use of the word.
[1 ] The direct, i. e. the intrinsically right.
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[2 ] The fitting, i. e. that which is rendered right by circumstances.
[1 ] It will be seen that, in the sequel, Cicero transposes the virtues springing from man’s
social nature and his desire for knowledge, placing wisdom or prudence first, and assigning the
second place to justice.
[1 ] These four virtues may be easily so enlarged in their scope as to cover the whole of life,
and to comprehend the entire duty of man. Thus, Prudence embraces all selfward obligations;
Justice (which includes benevolence, and is not exclusive of piety), all duties to fellow-beings;
Fortitude (including patience, submission, and courage), duty with reference to objects and
events beyond one’s control; Order (in time, place, and measure), duty with reference to
objects under one’s control.
[1 ] When serving in the Macedonian war, as military tribune under Aemilius Paulus, he
predicted an eclipse of the moon, and obtained liberty to announce his prediction to the
assembled army, thus precluding the else inevitable terror and foreboding which pervaded the
Macedonian army, and very probably turning the scale in favor of the Romans in the then
imminent battle in which Perseus, the Macedonian king, was utterly overthrown.
[2 ] Uncle of Cneius Pompeius Magnus, not in political life, but celebrated for his proficiency in
geometry, jurisprudence, and philosophy. He was a Stoic.
[1 ] This exception is one of the few points of discrepancy between the Ciceronian ethics and
the moral precepts of Christianity.
[2 ] The veterans who settled on the public lands (coloni) received their portions of land by lot,
and when a limited number from a particular corps were to be colonized, the persons to be
colonized were determined by lot.
[1 ] Fides, from fit quod dictum est, a derivation certainly very improbable, but hardly more so
than the derivation from πίστις, or, in the Aeolic dialect, πίττις, which most lexicographers assign to fides.
[1 ] Surnamed Dives. He inherited this cognomen, and belonged to the fifth generation of the
gens Licinius that had borne it. His prime ambition seems to have been to verify his name.
Pliny says that the estates which he owned outside of Rome amounted in value to two hundred
millions of sesterces, equivalent to little less than eight millions of dollars, no account being
taken of the much greater value of money then than now. He was a man of respectable ability,
of no mean reputation as an orator, and of considerable executive capacity; but it was probably
his wealth that gave him his place in the triumvirate with Caesar and Pompey, and that thus
procured for him the command in the Parthian war, in which he lost his army and his life.
[1 ] This is the substance of a discussion in the 6th Book of Plato’s Republic.
[1 ] Among the myths as to the parentage of Theseus, there is one which makes him the son
of Poseidon, or Neptune, who was said to have promised to grant him three wishes, two of
which had already been granted, when Phaedra, his wife, accused her step-son Hippolytus of an
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which had already been granted, when Phaedra, his wife, accused her step-son Hippolytus of an
attempted criminal intrigue with her. Theseus claimed of Poseidon his son’s destruction, and
Poseidon accordingly sent a bull from the water to frighten the horses of Hippolytus, as he was
driving in his chariot by the sea-shore. The horses upset the chariot, and dragged Hippolytus till
he died. Theseus too late ascertained that his son was innocent, and that his wife had falsely
accused him because he had repulsed her advances toward a criminal intimacy.
[1 ] The Hebrew conception of righteousness, “He that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth
not,” is certainly in closer accordance with the absolute right than this maxim of Cicero. Yet
Cicero’s example under this head really belongs to another category, that of circumstances so
altered as in the very nature of the case to make a promise void.
[2 ] A promise wrong in itself cannot be rightfully made, even under stress of fear; and if
made, should not be kept; for two wrongs cannot make a right. But a promise which one has a
right to make, as that of a ransom for one’s life, is sacred in the forum of conscience, if not
binding in law. If a man regards his life as worth a certain price, and offers that price, there is
no rightful reason why he should not pay it.
[1 ] The praetor urbanus was virtually the chief justice of Rome. On entering upon the duties
of his office he published a manifesto, or edictum, stating the principles to be recognized by
him in the interpretation and application of the laws. The principles laid down in these
successive edicts, and those involved in praetorian decisions under them, unless abrogated or
nullified by express legislation, were regarded as having the force of law, and corresponded to
what we familiarly term judge-made law.
[2 ] There are two transactions of this kind on record, — one of Cleomenes, the Spartan king,
in a war with Argos; the other, of the Thracians, when at war with the Boeotians.
[1 ] Quintus Fabius Labeo lived more than a century before Cicero. Valerius Maximus tells the
same story, but without expressing any doubt as to the name of the umpire. He adds that the
same Labeo, after a victory over Antiochus, King of Macedonia, having made peace on condition
of the surrender of half of the king’s fleet, cut all the vessels into halves, so as utterly to
destroy the fleet.
[1 ] Corinth had two ports, — one commanding the Ionian, the other the Aegean sea.
[2 ] It was the established custom of the Romans to admit to quarter enemies who
surrendered before the application of the battering-ram to their walls.
[3 ] So called from the fetiales, — priests whose duty it was, as heralds, to perform all the
ceremonies connected with the declaration of war, the ratifying of peace, and the making of
treaties. These forms were regarded as religious solemnities.
[1 ] Commentators in general see here two versions of the same story, and suppose one of
the two to be spurious. Yet there is no reason other than the internal evidence for rejecting
either, and they may both be true of the same Cato and the same son. The Ligurian war in
which Popilius was commander occurred four years before the war with Perseus. In the former,
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which Popilius was commander occurred four years before the war with Perseus. In the former,
Marcus Cato the younger may have made his first campaign, and in the latter, though no
longer a tiro or novice in the art of war, he may have been discharged as before, and his father
have repeated his legal objection to the son’s continuous service.
[1 ] This passage can be literally rendered only by retaining the Latin terms employed, as
thus: “He who by our present usage would be called perduellis was in former time called hostis,
the unpleasantness of the fact being thus relieved by the mildness of the term; for him whom
we now term peregrinus our ancestors called hostis. The laws of the Twelve Tables show this,
as, for instance, ‘A day assigned for trial cum hoste,’ ‘Perpetual right of ownership adversus
hostem.’ ”
In extant Latin literature the use of hostis in the sense of enemy seems to have been nearly, if
not quite, universal. There is, indeed, a passage in Plautus in which the word is evidently used
in the sense of foreigner; but this appears to be a reference to the title in the law of the
Twelve Tables cited above, status dies cum hoste. It seems by no means unlikely that the two
meanings of hostis may have co-existed in early use. Hostis probably is derived from the same
root with στία (whence comes Vesta), a hearth, or — what was the same thing as to the rites of domestic worship — an altar; and if so, hostis might mean either a stranger to be received
to the hospitality of the hearth, or an enemy to be made a victim at the altar. Hostia, an
animal sacrificed, and hostire, to strike, throw light upon this last meaning.
Some of the old lexicographers, including no less a man than Scaliger, derive hostis from the
pronoun στις, whoever, i. e. any person whatsoever outside of one’s own family, neighborhood, or nation, a stranger, and therefore, prima facie an enemy. With this derivation
— which I do not regard as valid — the two meanings of hostis might have been coeval and
concurrent.
[1 ] These verses are from the “Annales” of Ennius, and are supposed to be addressed to the
deputies sent with a large sum of money to treat with Pyrrhus for the release of prisoners after
the battle of Heraclea, B. C . 280.
[2 ] The kings of Epeirus claimed to be lineal descendants of Aeacus, the son of Zeus, who for
the righteousness of his rule on earth was made judge in the under-world.
[1 ] Literally, left among the aerarii, i. e. liable to taxation, but without the rights of
citizenship.
[1 ] The Stoics deduced the obligation to treat slaves humanely from their doctrine of human
equality, and the indifference of outward conditions to the truly philosophic mind. Seneca goes
in this direction to as great length as that of modern anti-slavery reformers. Cicero was an
eminently humane master.
[1 ] Reference is here made to the vast amount of property confiscated by Sulla from the
victims of his proscription, and bestowed with lavish prodigality on his partisans, and to the
rich spoils of the provinces which Caesar largely employed to purchase and reward adherents,
and to win the popular favor.
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[1 ] The Stoics maintained that the truly wise man lived only in theory, but had had no actual
being in this world.
[1 ] In the Latin, ratio et oratio, — a verbal assonance which our language affords us no
means of translating.
[1 ] Latin, conjugium, which is often employed to denote marriage without religious
ceremonies, and not necessarily permanent, and is used equally as to men and the lower
animals.
[1 ] Latin, connubia, which denotes legal marriages, deemed sacred and permanent as
compared with conjugia.
[1 ] Latin, contentio et comparatio, literally, a stretching of two or more objects side by side,
and measuring their equality or nonequality in length, — a figure which can hardly be
represented in translation.
[1 ] Salmacis was the name of a fountain in Caria, so called from a not very virtuous nymph of
that name. The waters of the fountain were said to enervate those who bathed in it, and it was
fabled to have been the resort of eager pleasure-seekers of both sexes. Trophies were, of
course, won there by wanton dalliance, and not by deeds of prowess.
[2 ] Some commentators say that these scraps of verse are from Ennius; others say that it is
not known whence they come. The latter are probably in the right.
[1 ] There were hardly any distinguished Romans that had not held some military command,
so that even for those best known as civilians a military costume might not have been
inappropriate.
[2 ] Latin, immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis, — one of those untranslatable
assonances in which Cicero delights, and which contribute largely to the euphony of his diction.
[1 ] On which it is hard to maintain one’s moral equipoise.
[1 ] Imperia, by which Cicero, oftener than not, denotes high military office.
[1 ] Latin, imperia et magistratus.
[1 ]
“Peace hath her victories
No less renowned than war.”
MI LTON, Sonnet XVI .
[2 ] Solon did not establish the Areopagus, which was of even prehistoric origin; but before his
time it was merely a criminal court, while he gave it censorial jurisdiction, advisory authority in
public affairs, and, in fine, functions that rendered it a council of state, and a strongly
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public affairs, and, in fine, functions that rendered it a council of state, and a strongly
conservative force against else unchecked democracy.
[3 ] The Areopagus, in a time of great dearth, furnished funds for the payment of the seamen
who were going to fight at Salamis.
[1 ] Pausanias overthrew the Persian general, Mardonius, in the battle of Plataea.
[2 ] Lysander took Athens, and destroyed the Long Walls.
[3 ] Marcus Aemilius Scaurus was a strong conservative and a zealous supporter of the
aristocratic party. His deportment, too, was remarkable for its gravity and its general
respectability. He may have been a better man than Marius; but he was charged with receiving
a heavy bribe from Jugurtha for securing a peace on terms favorable to the king, and he saved
himself from penal accountability only by procuring his own appointment as one of the judges
for the trial of his accomplices.
[4 ] Quintus Catulus supported Cicero at the time of the Catilinian conspiracy, and was the
first in the Senate to hail him as Father of the Country (pater patriae).
[5 ] A verse, quoted probably from some lost comedy, the measure being one employed by
the comic poets.
[1 ] This verse is from a poem of Cicero on his own times, and mainly to his own glory as
carried to its climax in his suppression of the Catilinian conspiracy. It was laughed at for the
patent self-conceit which it exhibited.
[1 ] As is well known, Cato never gave his vote in the Senate, no matter what the subject,
without repeating the words, Delenda est Carthago, Carthage must be destroyed. Its
destruction took place three years after his death.
[1 ] Callicratidas himself perished in the battle.
[2 ] Cleombrotus was taunted for excess of caution, and was thus induced to risk the battle
with the Thebans, against his own judgment. There seems to have been as much hesitation on
the Theban side, so that, prior to the battle, the scales would probably have seemed
equipoised.
[3 ] Quintus Fabius Maximus, who from his repeatedly avoiding direct conflict with Hannibal in
the determination to weary him out by delay, acquired the surname of Cunctator, and has
bequeathed the enduring epithet of Fabian to a policy like his own.
[1 ] They were often on opposite sides in the politics of the city, and sometimes on non-
friendly, if not unfriendly terms; but when Africanus was found dead in his bed, and supposed
to have been assassinated, Metellus exclaimed, “Come, citizens, to the rescue; the walls of our
city are thrown down;” and he ordered his sons to put their shoulders under the bier, saying
that they would never have the opportunity to perform that office for a greater man.
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[1 ] The Peripatetics, after Aristotle, defined virtue as always consisting of the mean between
two extremes. Thus, courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice. The New Academy,
to which Cicero belonged, accepted hypothetically the ethics of the Peripatetic school.
[1 ] Caius Laelius Sapiens, who died before Cicero was born, was a man of but moderate,
though not mean reputation as a general, a statesman, and an orator; but had a strong hold on
Cicero’s veneration as second to no man of his time in elegant culture, especially in Greek
literature and philosophy, and also as a stanch advocate of the aristocracy as opposed to the
plebs. Cicero makes him the chief interlocutor in the De Amicitia, and one of the speakers in
the De Senectute and the De Republica.
[2 ] Latin, gyrum, the ring or circle, round which horses are ridden to break or tame them.
[1 ] Literally, what may be called in Latin decorum. In what follows I have translated decorum
by the awkward, yet legitimate word, becomingness, which corresponds in sense very closely to
the Latin word, while in making decorum an English word we have dropped a part of its native
meaning.
[2 ] That which is becoming, or decorous.
[1 ] In the Orator.
[2 ] Sons of Jupiter, said to have led such righteous lives that they were made judges in the
underworld.
[3 ] These passages are probably from the lost tragedy of Atreus, by Attius.
[4 ] He, in Greek fable, killed the children of his brother Thyestes, and feasted him on their
flesh.
[1 ] Latin, verecundia, which commonly denotes modesty, but here evidently means that
courtesy which is a part or a consequence of modesty.
[1 ] The first three cardinal virtues are thus enumerated.
[2 ] Literally, impulse. The Latin word here is appetitus, which I have rendered impulse,
because anger and fear are included under it.
[3 ] Officium, from facere ob, to do on account of, or for a sufficient reason.
[1 ] Marcus Porcius Cato, the Censor. This collection is lost; but there are some specimens of
its contents in Cicero’s Orator. Collections of this kind, probably, were not unusual among the
ancients, though, so far as I know, but one has been preserved in either of the classic tongues,
namely, the στε α of Hierocles, the work, probably, of a compiler of whom no other vestige remains.
[2 ] Apophthegms, terse, pithy sayings, including jokes. Lord Bacon’s “Apophthegms New and
Old” are, all of them, anecdotes comprising smart, pointed sayings, and many of them jokes.
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Old” are, all of them, anecdotes comprising smart, pointed sayings, and many of them jokes.
[1 ] The Campus Martius, used by the Roman youth for riding, driving, swimming, and various
athletic sports.
[1 ] The accusative of ε ρων, which literally means a dissembler. Hence our word irony, which always involves the idea of a double meaning, and especially of a secondary meaning which
shall be latent to the person addressed or satirized, patent to every one else.
[2 ] When Athens had failed in a contest with Megara for the possession of Salamis, a law was
passed rendering it criminal to advocate the renewal of the contest. Solon evaded the law by
feigning insanity, and recited a poem of his own, calling upon the people to reconquer the
“lovely island.” The law was repealed, the war renewed, and the island won.
[1 ] Of the traits of personal character described in this section, some are known only on
Cicero’s authority; while others, attached to well-known names, are matters of history. I have
not thought it necessary to give, as I easily might, under the successive names, a series of
extracts from a dictionary of classical biography.
[1 ] It is well known that from Zeno, who committed suicide when he thought his life no longer
serviceable, down to Seneca, the Stoics maintained the right of suicide as a mode of relief from
irretrievable evil, whether bodily disease or untoward circumstances.
[1 ] None of the tragedies here named are extant. It would appear that on the Roman as on
the modern stage, actors not only had parts assigned them according to their peculiar types of
ability, but that the genius of a leading actor determined the choice of the play in which he
should appear.
[1 ] Xenophon, in the Memorabilia, gives this story by Prodicus, as cited by Socrates.
[1 ] Latin, dissuere — praecidere; to unsew — to cut.
[1 ] Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, bearing the same name with his father, the conqueror
of Hannibal, whose father was Publius Cornelius Scipio, alternately victor and vanquished in the
first Punic war. This second Africanus was regarded as superior in ability, no less than in
learning and elegant culture, to all the other members of the Scipio gens, but was too feeble in
health to take any part in public affairs, except in the peaceful offices of Augur and Flamen
Dialis. He had no children, but adopted a son of Lucius Aemilius Paulus, Publius Cornelius Scipio
Aemilianus Africanus, under whose generalship Carthage was finally subdued, and the city
destroyed.
[1 ] Latin, privatorum — civium, referring to the same persons, in contradistinction, first to
magistrates, and secondly to foreigners.
[1 ] The Cynics undoubtedly took their name from the κυνόσαργες, — one of the Athenian gymnasia in which their founder, Antisthenes, a pupil of Socrates, held his school; but some by
no means contemptible authorities derive the name from κύων, a dog, and ascribe it to the
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no means contemptible authorities derive the name from κύων, a dog, and ascribe it to the snarling habit of the early disciples of the school, who were wont to sneer and scoff at what the
rest of the world admired and prized. Diogenes of Sinope represented this type of character.
Stoicism, in the person of Zeno, sprang out of the bosom of Cynicism, and embodied in its
philosophy and ethics the fundamental principle of Antisthenes, that virtue is not the supreme,
but the sole good. The later Cynics were characterized mainly by insolence, gratuitous
indecency, and aimless asceticism.
[1 ] Palaestrici motus, literally, palaestric movements. The palaestra was the resort of the
young men of wealth and fashion, and thus a nursery of foppish manners no less than of bodily
vigor.
[1 ] Sequatur, which I have translated literally; for so far as I have been able to trace the
festal habits of the ancients, from Homer’s heroes downward, they ate in silence, and talked
afterward. This is implied in the uses of the term συμπόσιον, symposium, a drinking together after the more solid portions of the feast have been disposed of.
[1 ] Both of them men who held high places in the republic, and were worthy of its better
days. The father was distinguished as an orator, and both father and son were among the
foremost of their respective times in solid learning and in elegant culture.
[1 ] The greatest orator of his age. He was in his prime in Cicero’s boyhood.
[2 ] They had the same mother; their fathers were of different gentes, — Catulus being of a
plebeian, Caesar of a patrician gens.
[1 ] Militem gloriosum. Miles Gloriosus is the title of a comedy of Plautus, in which
Pyrgopolineces, a military braggadocio, is the principal personage. The character was a favorite
one with the Roman comedians and stage-lovers. Thraso, in Terence’s Eunuchus, plays this part
so well, as to have enriched the English language with the adjective thrasonical.
[1 ] In Palatio, — the Palatium was the most fashionable quarter on the Palatine Hill.
[2 ] Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, son of the Scaurus named in § 22, when candidate for the
consulship, was accused of extortion in the government of Sardinia, and though undoubtedly
guilty, was defended by Cicero, and was acquitted, but failed of election. Two years afterward
he was accused of bribery, condemned, and banished.
[1 ] From an unknown poet.
[2 ] Lucullus would have transmitted to coming time a great name as the conqueror of
Mithridates, had he not become still more famous by magnificence, ostentation, and
extravagance in his villas, gardens, fish-ponds, and entertainments. A single supper is said to
have cost him a sum equivalent in silver to about ten thousand dollars, in value to at least five
times as much. From him is derived the word lucullite, both French and English, denoting a
devotee of luxury.
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[1 ] This word is used by Xenophon in the sense of order; by Thucydides, in that of
moderation.
[1 ] Opportuneness.
[2 ] This passage, as it treats of the definition of words, can hardly be understood without the
use of the specific Latin words, both defining and defined. I therefore give here a more literal
translation: “I am to speak of the order of our doings and the fit arrangement of time, which
are comprehended in the science which the Greeks term ε ταξία, — not in that meaning of the word which we term modestia in which modus is implied, but in that sense which denotes the
order of time and place. Yet in favor of our translating the word (ε ταξία) modestia, it may be said that the Stoics define modestia as the art of putting whatever is done or said in the right
place. Thus ordo and collocatio seem to have the same import with it. For they define ordo as
the putting of things in fit and suitable places; but they say that the fit time is the place of an
action, — the fit time being called in Greek ε καιρία, in Latin, occasio. Thus it is that modestia, interpreted as I have said, comes to denote skill in determining the fitness of time for specific
acts. But the same definition may be given of prudentia, of which I treated in the early part of
this essay.”
[1 ] From lust.
[2 ] From bribes.
[1 ] Which we may learn by consulting men of sound discretion and practical experience.
[2 ] Aristippus maintained that the pleasure that lies nearest, whatever it be, is to be sought
and enjoyed, and that man has no other end of being. The records that remain of his life give
reason for believing that his personal morality was not so bad as his philosophy; yet he was
luxurious in his habits, boasted of his freedom from moral restraints, and boasted also of his
ability to forego without a sense of loss the indulgences which he had made habitual. He was a
hearer, not to say a pupil, of Socrates, whose eccentricities were abnormal in the direction of a
severer type of virtue.
[1 ] Liberales, worthy of a free man.
[1 ] Illiberales, unworthy of a free man.
[2 ] For men of senatorial, or even equestrian rank, these employments, if practised for gain,
were regarded as derogating from respectability.
[3 ] The Romans in general, till near the last days of the republic, despised commerce, and
though they depended for grain in great part on Sicily and remoter provinces, it was long
before they brought grain in their own ships. In Cicero’s time, however, it was the reproach of
the equestrian order that many members of it, tired of genteel poverty, were enriching
themselves by commerce; and Cicero, as a parvenu in the Senate, was weak enough to fall in
with this foolish prejudice.
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[1 ] Merchants, engaged in traffic from port to port, owned and commanded the ships that
carried their goods.
[2 ] Latin, contentio et comparatio, — stretching two objects side by side, and determining
their comparative length. See § 17.
[1 ] A Stoic idea. The Stoics derived all duty from nature, — the nature of things, the nature of
man. They therefore made nature the sole test of duty, and (if I may so express what in less
awkward phrase would be less clear) regarded the greater or less naturalness of a duty as the
criterion of its relative importance.
[2 ] Σο ία primarily meant sagacity, but is commonly employed to denote wisdom in its broadest sense.
[3 ] Φρόνησις means prudence, in the sense of practical wisdom.
[1 ] Otium, leisure; negotium = nec otium, business, — a favorite play upon words with Cicero,
which we have not the means of rendering into English.
[1 ] Posidonius was a Stoic, a disciple of Panaetius, a voluminous writer on an encyclopedic
range of subjects. Of his works only fragments are preserved, and happily the catalogue of
things not fit to be done has left no traces of itself. His works are known chiefly by copious
extracts made by Athenaeus.
[2 ] An inference so illogical as to seem an oversight.
[1 ] After the assassination of Caesar, when for a very little while there seemed some hope of
a return to republican institutions in fact as well as in name.
[1 ] Latin, ars; but art is here an inadequate rendering.
[1 ] In Hortensius.
[2 ] That of the New Academy.
[1 ] Cratippus was a Peripatetic, and thus regarded Aristotle as his master; but as Aristotle
derived much of his philosophy from Plato, and Plato, much or all of his from Socrates, Cicero,
with more rhetorical aptness than literal truth, antedates the school of which his son was the
pupil.
[1 ] A syllogism in Barbara.
[1 ] A verse from some lost poem, probably the Prometheus of Attius.
[1 ] For instance, wool, at the proper time of shearing.
[1 ] This work has entirely perished. Dicaearchus, a contemporary and follower of Aristotle,
was a copious writer in the departments of geography and history, as well as of philosophy.
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was a copious writer in the departments of geography and history, as well as of philosophy.
One of his books on “The Life of Greece,” if we may judge by the fragments of it that remain,
would have been worth more than all other extant records of Athenian life in his age.
[2 ] I do not know that there is any ancient record of the extensive destruction of human life
by wild beasts, except that in the Old Testament (2 Kings xvii. 25), of the slaughter of people
by lions in some of the Samaritan cities. But there are several traditions of instances in which
the inhabitants of cities or towns were compelled to change their abodes, and hardly without
some loss of life, by devastating, tormenting, or perilous incursions of mice, frogs, scorpions,
serpents, moles, rabbits, and locusts.
[1 ] We have here the first, fourth, and second of the cardinal virtues portrayed in Book I. The
third is omitted, as peculiarly non-utilitarian; the second has the third place, as a text to be
enlarged upon, — as the prime means of securing such utilities as men can bestow.
[2 ] Passions.
[3 ] Impulses.
[1 ] The army of Pompey the Great, in Pharsalia; that of his son, at Munda; and that of Scipio,
at Thapsus, — all defeated by Julius Caesar.
[2 ] The murder of Pompey the Great, in Egypt.
[3 ] Cicero undoubtedly has in mind, here, his own exile by the machinations of Clodius.
[1 ] Cicero here refers, not to bribery, but to such liberal uses of money as he designates with
approval in the sequel.
[1 ] The Senate were induced by Antony to pass sundry laws, the drafts of which he professed
— in part, no doubt, falsely — to have found among Caesar’s papers.
[1 ] Of Syracuse, — a sovereign of signal ability, energy, magnificence, and public spirit, a
liberal patron of literature and philosophy, but at the same time jealous, suspicious, arbitrary,
and cruel, — leaving at once vestiges of true greatness as a king, and records, undoubtedly in
large part authentic, of acts that disgrace humanity. The story is that while his daughters were
very young, he made them shave him and cut his hair; when they were old enough for him to
fear them, he used shoots of the walnut (juglans) to burn off his beard. He had a ditch round
his bed, with a drawbridge commanded by himself.
[2 ] He came to the throne by the murder of his uncle and predecessor.
[1 ] The Thracians, who were accounted as barbarians, were employed as body-guards by
some of the petty tyrants of the Grecian cities, as the Swiss have been employed in Paris and
in Rome, and as Scythians were employed in a similar capacity at Athens.
[2 ] Alexander’s chamber was at the top of a ladder, and a fierce dog was chained at the door.
His wife concealed her three brothers in the house during the day, removed the dog after
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His wife concealed her three brothers in the house during the day, removed the dog after
Alexander was asleep, covered the steps of the ladder with wool, and led the young men up to
murder her husband.
[3 ] Phalaris is almost a mythical personage. Different authorities assign dates nearly a century
apart for the beginning of his reign, the latest date being 570 B. C . There are also opposite
traditions as to his character, some authorities representing him as mild and humane.
[1 ] Demetrius Poliorcetes. Pyrrhus, King of Epeirus, had invaded Macedonia, and when
Demetrius marched to meet him, the Macedonian army en masse passed over to the invader.
Demetrius was a ruler of marvellous vigor, and though sometimes truculent and cruel, and
always grossly sensual, was not wholly devoid of humane and generous feeling.
[2 ] The campaign against Thebes, closed by the battle of Leuctra, was opposed to the wishes
of all the allies of Sparta, and their soldiers were accused by the Spartans of utter inefficiency
in the field, to be accounted for only by their reluctance to engage in the conflict.
[1 ] Sulla was the champion of the aristocracy, and thus far his position had Cicero’s approval
and sympathy.
[2 ] A spear stuck in the ground was in Rome, as a red flag is with us, the sign of a sale at
auction.
[3 ] Massilia (Marseilles), a city settled by Grecian colonists, and in Caesar’s time second to no
other city in the world as a seat of extensive commerce, was from the first a faithful ally of
Rome, and, when the region of Gaul in which it is situated became a Roman province, that city
was suffered to retain its independence. In the civil war the Massilians espoused the cause of
Pompey, and shut their gates against Caesar, who besieged and took the city, and had a model
of it borne in procession in his triumph.
[1 ] Publius Cornelius Sulla, the nephew of the dictator, and, about midway between his
dictatorship and Caesar’s, found guilty of bribery when a candidate for the consulship.
[2 ] Cornelius Sulla, a freedman of the dictator, who, as Sulla’s secretary, could secure large
profits from confiscated property, and as quaestor under Caesar had access to the city
treasury.
[1 ] They are both lost. Cicero mentions one of them in Letters to Atticus, xvi. 27. “Librum tibi
celerrime mittam de gloria.”
[2 ] This is evidently meant to exclude the meaner ways by which men insinuate themselves
into popular favor.
[1 ] Latin, dolorum faces, — the torches, or cautery, of sorrows.
[1 ] These men were hardly robbers in the ordinary sense of the word; but they carried on for
many years guerilla warfare, and, as is generally the case in such warfare, their forays were
fully as much predatory as murderous. They were called robbers because they were barbarians.
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fully as much predatory as murderous. They were called robbers because they were barbarians.
But Bardylis is termed by Diodorus king of the Illyrians, having Pyrrhus, king of Epeirus, for his
son-in-law; and Viriathus seems to have been a patriotic chieftain, whose prime aim was to
resist the Roman supremacy.
[2 ] According to Herodotus, Deioces, ambitious of sovereignty, commenced as arbitrator in his
own village, and on account of the reputation thus obtained for justice was chosen king. His
administration is represented as having been, though impartial, annoyingly inquisitorial and
relentlessly severe. But as his reign began more than seven centuries before the Christian era,
he may be regarded as a semi-mythical personage, and a like doubt may be thrown on the
origin of the Median sovereignty. The theory of the origin of kingly power here given seems to
have been a favorite notion with Cicero, and is found in other works of his. It perhaps defines
what ought to have been; but in fact the kingly office was probably at the outset but an
extension of patriarchal sovereignty.
[1 ] The allusion here seems to be to trees like the banyan, whose branches, as they bend to
the ground, take root, and send up fresh shoots.
[2 ] All the surviving records of the father’s life entirely justify Cicero’s encomium; it is an
open question whether the sons may not have fully inherited his high moral worth and devoted
patriotism. The family was plebeian, and it may not be otherwise than natural, that while the
father — allied by marriage to the patrician family of the Scipios — was identified with the
aristocracy, the sons should with honest and disinterested zeal have devoted themselves to the
relief, elevation, and well-being of the plebeians, who in their time might justly complain of
disabilities and oppression.
[1 ] Latin, alae alteri. Ala may mean either one of the wings of an army or one of the
squadrons of cavalry usually attached to every legion of foot-soldiers in service. Without the
alteri, as young Cicero was only sixteen years of age, alae should undoubtedly be rendered a
squadron, and many of the commentators suspect alteri to be a spurious interpolation. But as
Pompey was to the last degree solicitous to secure and retain the moral support of Cicero, he
may have sought to flatter the father by appointing the son to a nominal command, delegating
its more important duties to officers of maturer years and experience.
[1 ] Publius Mucius Scaevola, of the highest reputation as a jurist, and a copious writer on the
Roman law. While vehemently opposed to the Gracchi, and approving of the murder of Tiberius
Gracchus, he gave a legal opinion in favor of compensation from the public treasury for the
value of the effects constituting the dowry of the wife of Caius Gracchus, lost in the popular
disturbance caused by her husband.
[2 ] A man of rigid integrity and probity, and eminent for ability and learning as a jurisconsult
and a forensic orator.
[3 ] Lucius Licinius Crassus. He was undoubtedly the greatest orator of his time. Cicero may
have heard him, having been sixteen years of age at his death. When a mere stripling, —
Tacitus says, of nineteen years, — he accused Caius Papirius Carbo, of what crime we do not
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Tacitus says, of nineteen years, — he accused Caius Papirius Carbo, of what crime we do not
know, probably of bribery or extortion, and met with such signal success that Carbo committed
suicide to escape condemnation.
[1 ] Demosthenes, at the age of eighteen, brought a successful suit against his guardians, to
compel them to render account of his property in their hands.
[2 ] Latin, contentio. The only occasions for the practice of oratory in Rome were such as
might be designated by this term, which means contention. They were the advocacy of disputed
measures in the Senate or before the people and the pleading of cases in the courts of law.
[1 ] There was in Rome no profession corresponding to that of the modern advocate. There
were jurisconsults, men learned in the law, many of whom were also eloquent advocates, while
others were chamber-counsel, to whom advocates, as well as the immediate parties in a suit,
resorted for legal opinions and advice. But any man who had the will and the ability might take
charge of a case in court; and for young Romans who aspired to distinction, after military
ambition began to wane, the bar was the favorite avenue to the popular favor. There were no
public prosecutors; but any person who was ready to make and sustain a criminal charge had
only to present himself before the praetor urbanus, and to swear that he was acting not from
malicious motives, but in good faith, and in the interest of the state.
[2 ] Grandfather of the triumvir, — a contemporary of Crassus, and of nearly equal reputation
as an orator.
[1 ] He was twenty-eight years old when he accused Caius Norbanus of majestas, or treason,
for turbulent and seditious conduct as tribune of the people.
[2 ] The augur Servilius had prosecuted their father for bribery and malversation in Sicily, and
procured his condemnation and exile. Though the elder Lucullus was undoubtedly guilty, his
sons may have supposed him innocent, and at any rate they avenged themselves by the
unsuccessful impeachment of Servilius.
[3 ] In the impeachment of Verres.
[4 ] Caius Julius Caesar, who commenced public life by the accusation of Titus Albucius of
extortion as praetor in Sicily, and procured his condemnation.
[5 ] He was accused by Fufius of extortion in Sicily; but, notwithstanding strong proofs of guilt,
was acquitted on the ground of signal courage and ability in military command.
[1 ] Judicium capitis, or a capital trial, was a phrase used, not only where life was put in
jeopardy, but with reference to all cases in which one’s standing and privileges as a citizen were
imperilled, and the danger of degradation or exile was incurred.
[2 ] Marcus Junius Brutus. His father was eminent for his legal learning. Of the son we know
little except from Cicero, who may have been prejudiced against him as belonging to the
opposite political party.
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opposite political party.
[1 ] There is nothing in the entire record of Cicero’s life more honorable to him than his
conduct on this trial, in which he was for the first time engaged in a criminal cause. Sextus
Roscius was accused of the murder of his father, on no valid or probable evidence, and
undoubtedly with the view of securing permanent legality to the seizure of the father’s property
on the false pretence of unpaid debts. The principal in the fraud and the instigator of the
criminal pursuit was Chrysogonus, a freed man of Sulla. With every possible obstacle thrown in
his way, and with the whole influence of the dictator pressed into the opposite scale, Cicero
procured, by the masterly management of the case, no less than by his eloquent defence, the
acquittal of his client, but undoubtedly incurred imminent peril.
[1 ] The allusion here is, undoubtedly, to the cask with a perforated bottom which the
Danaides are eternally attempting to fill.
[1 ] A lost book.
[2 ] Latin (in many of the best editions), Aristo Ceus; (in all extant manuscripts and early
editions) Aristoteles. Aristotle not only has no sentiment like this in his extant writings, but can
hardly have had in his time the material for such a description of senseless extravagance. The
public entertainments of his age, especially in Athens, while redolent of superior culture, were
comparatively inexpensive. Aristo of Ceos wrote a treatise (now lost) on Vain Glory (περ κενοδοξίας), from which this passage may very probably have been quoted. But the reading which gives his name is at best an ingenious and not unlikely conjecture.
[1 ] Mina, in value a little more than four pounds sterling.
[2 ] Sextarius, about a pint.
[1 ] Of course, popularity in an aedileship contributed largely to one’s success as a candidate
for higher offices, and in the best days of the republic an aspirant for the popular favor may, as
aedile, have made for the entertainment of the public an expenditure fully level with his ability.
But before Cicero’s time it had become common for an aedile to incur in that office heavy
debts, to be liquidated, if ever, when as propraetor or proconsul he should be able to fill his
exchequer with provincial spoils. Debts thus contracted were regarded as an obligatory
mortgage on the popular suffrage, by which the debtor should have the opportunity of
reimbursing himself for his outlay to please the people.
[1 ] Cicero, as aedile, gave three public games.
[2 ] The Romans frequently offered to some god, generally to Hercules, a tithe of their
property on the eve of any great enterprise, or of their gains, in case of any signal success. But
a small part of such an offering was consumed in sacrifice, and the rest was commonly utilized
for a magnificent public festival. The words polluceo and polluctura as applied to such feasts
may authorize the supposition (though I know of no other ground for it) that Pollux may have
had in earlier time the honor which was subsequently paid to Hercules.
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[3 ] As, about half an English penny.
[4 ] Modius, a little less than a peck.
[5 ] Clodius was undoubtedly the greater ruffian and the worse man of the two; but it is only
by shutting out all testimony save that of Cicero’s magnificent defence of Milo, that we can
regard him as a pre-eminently law-abiding and patriotic citizen.
[1 ] Cicero never attained the censorship, to which, by custom tantamount to constitutional
law, and seldom departed from, ex-consuls alone were eligible.
[2 ] The vote was taken by centuries, so that a large opposing minority might be consistent
with a nominally unanimous suffrage.
[3 ] The normal age at which one was eligible to the quaestorship was thirty; to the aedileship,
thirty-seven; to the praetorship, forty; to the consulship, forty-three. These rules had
sometimes been disregarded, but were generally adhered to.
[1 ] Pompey erected the most splendid of the then existing theatres, and temples to Venus
and Victoria.
[2 ] The Propylaea, said to have cost a sum equivalent to two millions of our money.
[3 ] This discussion is not found in any of the portions of the De Re Publica that have been
recovered.
[1 ] Injustice is done to Cicero when these interested motives to beneficence are regarded as
standing alone. It must be remembered that in the First Book the duty of beneficence is urged
on grounds of intrinsic right; while expediency is the express and sole subject of the Second
Book, in which it is his aim to show that interest and duty point in the same direction, — that
the selfish man sins against himself no less than against his neighbor.
[1 ] So long as there was a wide distinction between the orders of the Roman state, the
patricians, in general, took a generous care of the interests of their respective clients and
dependents. Indeed, the very term patrician is an enduring record of kindly relations between
the higher and the lower orders.
[2 ] Lucius Licinius Crassus (§ 13). The reference is undoubtedly to his speech in favor of the
restoration of judicial functions from the equites to the Senate.
[3 ] There were subtleties in the Roman law as to the falling of water from the eaves of
houses (stillicidium), the preservation or obstruction of light, and various matters of dispute
that might arise and in all time do arise between owners of contiguous houses. Between estates
outside of the city there was legally a space of five or six feet in which each owner had a right
of way, and neither a right of occupancy for his own uses. Rights of way and other easements
were attached, also, to many private estates. Hence a fruitful field for litigation.
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[1 ] The territory of Attica (including Athens) was divided into one hundred and seventy-four δ μοι, or districts. The demos of Laciadae was outside of the city.
[1 ] Servius Sulpicius, after the death of Mucius Scaevola the most learned and celebrated
jurisconsult. He died but a year before this treatise was written, and Cicero pronounced a
eulogy on him in the Senate.
[1 ] The Roman law prohibited advocates from taking fee or reward. There is no proof that
Cicero was ever paid directly or indirectly for his services as an advocate, though undoubtedly
presents and legacies from those who had enjoyed the benefit of his services may have been
among the sources of his wealth.
[1 ] Latin, collocandis, investing, i. e. conferring favors with a view to the revenue in influence
and popularity which they may bring in return.
[1 ] Caius Gracchus, as tribune of the people, procured the passage of a law by which every
resident of the city who should personally appear at the Capitol might buy five modii (or pecks)
of corn each month, at less than half the average price, therefore at much less than cost. The
tendency, and of course a prime object, of this measure was to bring into the city, and under
the influence of the popular leaders, large numbers of the poorer population in the rural
districts.
[2 ] Tribune of the people not long after Caius Gracchus. He procured the passage of a law
raising the price of corn from the public granaries to a rate which arrested the depletion of the
treasury.
[1 ] For one hundred and four years, from the close of the Macedonian war (B. C . 147), which
brought an immense amount of treasure into the public coffers, till the very year succeeding
Cicero’s death, no property-tax was levied, the spoils of war and the tribute from the provinces
sufficing for the public expenditure.
[1 ] The Samnite general who defeated the Roman army at the Caudine Pass, and many years
later was himself defeated by Quintus Fabius Maximus, taken prisoner, led in triumph, and
beheaded.
[2 ] About a century and a half after the death of Pontius.
[1 ] Commonly called the Social War. Marcus Livius Drusus had, while tribune of the people,
procured the passage of a law providing for inquiry into the corrupt practices of the courts,
which had in many instances acquitted persons justly charged with bribery and extortion. He
had also procured the passage of laws conferring certain privileges — with a view to ultimate
citizenship — on the Italian allies. The Senate, under the influence of those who feared an
honest judiciary, annulled all the laws that had been enacted under the auspices of Drusus, on
the pretext that they had been carried against the auspices, and in defiance of certain
provisions by statute requiring a seventeen days’ promulgation of laws before they could be
passed, and forbidding the massing of several distinct clauses in the same vote. The allies
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passed, and forbidding the massing of several distinct clauses in the same vote. The allies
were, of course, thwarted of their expectations, and hence the Social War.
[2 ] During the dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar.
[1 ] Corinth.
[2 ] He flooded Rome with the richest spoils of Grecian art; but though by no means a man of
pure life, he rigidly abstained from participating in the booty or gain of his conquest. Pliny says
of him, that he filled the city with trophies of conquered Achaia, yet left not a dowry for his
daughter.
[1 ] The agrarian laws that have so large a place in Roman history are often misunderstood in
consequence of a misapprehension of the Latin terms possessor and possessio. These laws
proposed the eviction, in many instances, of possessors, but not of owners. Possessio means
not ownership, but occupancy. The lands obtained by conquest were for the most part leased
on what were understood to be and what we should call perpetual leases, on condition of the
payment of one tenth or one fifth of the annual revenue of the estate into the public treasury,
— a condition which after a time lapsed into disuse and oblivion, so that the lands thus
acquired were transmitted, bequeathed, and sold, as freeholds would have been, and with no
expectation that the possession would ever be disturbed. The possessors thus had the
consciousness of ownership, and the sympathy of the aristocracy and the rich men, on their
side; and though the state, having never ceded the fee of its domain, had, no doubt, a right to
take its lands from defaulting tenants and give them to the veterans or the landless plebeians,
still this could not be done without the commission of virtual wrong to a large extent, and
perhaps reducing to utter penury some who had felt as secure in the possession of their
property as if it had come down to them in an unbroken line of inheritance from the beginning
of time. We thus can reconcile the by no means delusive show of right and humanity on the
face of the agrarian laws with the virtuous detestation expressed for them by not a few law-
abiding Romans.
[2 ] Novae tabulae, or the general remission or scaling down of debts, was, in the latter days
of the Roman republic, a frequent demand of demagogues and of their followers and dupes.
[1 ] These words of Cicero describe with wonderful accuracy the result of an experiment with
novae tabulae in the United States of America. A profligacy at which Rome in her worst days
might have blushed found expression in a national bankrupt law passed by Congress in 1841,
repealed in 1843. By this law fraudulent insolvency had every possible facility and inducement.
There were in every community notorious instances in which men who had paid little or nothing
except the required legal fees showed openly and shamelessly the property of which they had
cheated their creditors. In fine, any man who chose to do so, whatever his pecuniary ability,
could repudiate his debts. The law resulted in the collapse and defeat of the very party that
had hoped by means of it to consolidate its power. Those who had taken the benefit of the law
were ashamed of it when they needed it no longer; while those whom it had wronged had no
tolerance for the authors of their wrong, — thus verifying to the letter what Cicero says about
the effect of such measures on the popularity of their authors and abettors.
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the effect of such measures on the popularity of their authors and abettors.
[1 ] Agis, the fourth Spartan king of the name, under whose government the Lysander here
referred to was ephor. Their endeavor was to procure the entire cancelling of debts, and the
re-distribution of the Spartan territory.
[2 ] With only a brief interval, during which the father of Aratus had served as one of two chief
magistrates chosen by the people. He probably was not in power long enough, or had not
sufficient authority, to right the wrongs committed by a series of tyrants. He was killed by a
usurper when Aratus was seven years old, and in the interval of thirteen years before the
successful expedition of Aratus, that usurper and his successor had been slain, so that Nicocles
was the third in this latter series of tyrants.
[1 ] Cicero would undoubtedly have said, by sumptuary laws, which were sanctioned by the
imperfect political economy of that day.
[2 ] Cicero undoubtedly suspected, and with good reason, that Caesar had covertly abetted the
Catilinian plot, and Caesar’s speech in the Senate, if its tone and spirit are fairly represented in
Sallust’s report of it, shows that he was solicitous to save the lives of the conspirators.
[1 ] At the time of Catiline’s conspiracy Caesar was very deeply in debt. He, in the first year of
his dictatorship, was the author of a law by which debts were liquidated by payment of seventy-
five per cent of their amount, the pretext being the increased value of money occasioned by
the expenditure and loss of treasure during the civil war. Caesar himself had by that time
become, not only free from debt, but absolutely rich, in great part, no doubt, from the
perquisites of his Gallic campaigns.
[1 ] Oeconomicus (Ο κονομικός), a work wholly devoted to the administration of the household and private property.
[1 ] From rents, and from the wages of slaves, — this last a very lucrative and therefore a
favorite source of income, though not deemed entirely respectable.
[2 ] Returns at a lower percentage than city investments, and more precarious, as contingent
on the character of the season and the abundance or scantiness of the crops. Agriculture,
though not the most gainful, was regarded as the most respectable source of income.
[3 ] Usury was held in abhorrence even more than in contempt.
[1 ] Latin, ad Janum medium. Janus was the name of a street in or near the forum, in which
were to be found almost all the brokers’ and bankers’ offices in the city; and Janus summus,
medius, and imus meant, respectively, the top, middle, and bottom of Janus Street.
[1 ] About ten years younger.
[2 ] Latin, otio de negotiis = nec-otiis.
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[3 ] Latin, in solitudine secum loqui solitum.
[4 ] Latin, interdum, literally, betweenwhile.
[1 ] Antony had surrounded the Senate in its sessions with armed followers of his, and of
course the purpose, as well as the effect of so doing, was to repress freedom of utterance.
[2 ] Brutus and Cassius, both praetors, could not safely remain in or return to the city, and as
they were legally at the head of the judiciary, the courts were suspended.
[3 ] Latin, otium. Repose would be a better rendering, were it not that we should lose Cicero’s
play upon otium, which is broad enough in its meaning to apply to the repose of the state from
the plots of conspirators no less than to the rest of a worker from his labor.
[1 ] Almost all Cicero’s philosophical and rhetorical works were written in the last three or four
years of his life.
[1 ] Young Cicero’s annual allowance would amount in our money to a little more than four
thousand dollars.
[1 ] The most admired of all the pictures of Apelles. He completed one picture of Venus
Anadyomene (or rising out of the sea) for the temple of Aesculapius at Cos, which was
afterward placed by Augustus in the temple which he built to Julius Caesar. This was injured,
and no one dared to repair it. The painter commenced another picture of Venus, for the Coans,
intending to surpass the previous one, but died before it was completed, and it remained
unfinished. It is probably to this that Cicero refers.
[1 ] Latin, media, which, literally translated, conveys no meaning. Contingent expresses,
perhaps, as well as any single word the Stoic conception of the ordinary duties performed by
persons not philosophers. The truly wise or ideal man (for the extreme Stoics denied that he
had ever existed) discerned the absolute right in its very essence, by direct intuition. Other men
performed duties, not because they were intrinsically right, but because each specific act of
duty had for them its rule or law in external circumstances.
[2 ] Most commentators say that the allusion here is to the rhythmical movements in dancing
and gymnastic exercises, in which he who was perfect was said to have or to keep all the
numbers. It seems to me more probable that Cicero refers to the Pythagorean doctrine of
numbers, specific numbers denoting perfection of specific kinds, and “all the numbers”
designating absolute perfection.
[1 ] The seven sages of Greece, — Bias, Chilo, Cleobulus, Pittacus, Periander, Solon, and
Thales.
[2 ] There is a striking analogy between the ideal man of the Stoics whom man never saw,
and the Christian ideal of humanity but once realized in human form, and with reference to
which as incarnate the best Christians hold the same position that was held by the warriors,
patriots, and sages here named with reference to the Stoic ideal.
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patriots, and sages here named with reference to the Stoic ideal.
[1 ] The reference here is, obviously, to the friendly relation in which Brutus stood to Caesar.
[2 ] Latin, formula.
[1 ] This is the general rule, or formula, referred to in § 4. It embraces all forms of wrong-
doing from man to man, and thus extends to all offences under the second and third of Cicero’s
divisions of duty, but would not include sins under the first and fourth.
[1 ] We, i. e. the Roman people. Cicero evidently has the death of Caesar in his mind.
[1 ] Axioms, which in their very nature do not admit of proof.
[1 ] Latin, sed, ut dicitur, Marte nostro, literally, “But, as the saying is, by my own Mars,” i. e.
fighting my own battle, depending on myself alone.
[2 ] This was undoubtedly intended as a syllogism, — a favorite mode of statement or
argument among the Stoics. It would admit of several logical forms, among others, of the
following: —
Expediency is in harmony with nature;
Immorality is not in harmony with nature;
Therefore, what is immoral is not expedient.
— A syllogism in Camestres.
[1 ] Another syllogism, in Barbara: —
Whatever is good is expedient;
Whatever is right is good (either the sole or the supreme good);
Therefore, whatever is right is expedient.
[1 ] Herodotus makes Gyges, not a shepherd, but the prime minister of Candaules, King of
Lydia, and writes that he killed Candaules and succeeded to the kingdom by the queen’s
connivance and aid. The story of the ring Plato quotes as a tradition, and makes the same use
of it in the Second Book of the Republic that Cicero makes of it here.
[1 ] Whether he be god or man. Romulus was deified and worshipped under the name of
Quirinus.
[2 ] A Stoic, and the most logical interpreter of the doctrines of the Stoic school.
[1 ] A verse from an unknown poet.
[2 ] Valerius Maximus writes this name Pythias.
[1 ] This, if authentic, must have taken place in the fifth century before the Christian era. It is
mentioned in no extant work of any Greek historian. It is related by Aelian, who, indeed, wrote
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mentioned in no extant work of any Greek historian. It is related by Aelian, who, indeed, wrote
in Greek, but was an Italian, lived as late as the reign of Hadrian, and embodied in his work
floating traditions with authentic history.
[1 ] Both of these men, in their respective tribunates, procured the passage of laws by which
foreigners, temporarily resident in Rome, were compelled to leave the city.
[1 ] After Pompey had suppressed piracy, the Cilician pirates whom he had subdued were
formed into a flourishing colony, and subsequently entered into friendly and helpful relations
with Antony.
[2 ] The people of Marseilles, king Deiotarus, and, in fine, all the allies that had adhered to the
Pompeian faction, were burdened with heavy tribute under Caesar’s government.
[1 ] Diogenes was one of the three philosophers sent on an embassy from Athens to Rome (B.
C . 155), to deprecate the payment of a heavy fine imposed on the Athenians. Aulus Gellius
characterizes his eloquence as moderate and sober (modesta et sobria).
[1 ] Little is known of Antipater, and of his works nothing remains; but from the incidental
notices of his character and opinions, and of the reverence in which he and his memory were
held, we have reason to believe that his opinions both in ethics and in theology were in
advance of his age. He was the teacher of Panaetius.
[1 ] Latin, vitiorum nomina, literally, names of vices.
[1 ] Caius Aquillius Gallus was Cicero’s colleague in the praetorship, and as the head of the
judiciary introduced into his official edict, and thus into the body of the Roman law, important
improvements in the legal remedies against criminal fraud (dolus malus).
[2 ] This law (B. C . 192) first discriminated between minors (minores) under twenty-five years
and those of age (majores). By this law fraud on minors was punished by a heavy fine and
public infamy. It provided also that contracts with minors should be voidable, unless made with
the consent of a guardian appointed by the praetor.
[1 ] The text is slightly ambiguous, at least to a modern translator. Some commentators
render the sentence as referring to decisions as to contracts in which the words ex fide bona
are used; others, as referring to decisions in which these words are employed.
[2 ] Melius aequius, prescribing, as I understand, a leaning in the wife’s favor in any questions
about the dowry to be restored in case of the wife’s death, or, in that age more frequently, in
case of her divorce.
[3 ] Inter bonos bene agier, in the case of property conveyed to a trustee on condition of its
being restored, — a condition sometimes to be inferred from the circumstances under which the
conveyance was made rather than from the express terms of the contract.
[1 ] Sestertii, or one hundred sestertia, equivalent to between four and five thousand dollars of
our money.
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our money.
[1 ] This statement refers not to praetorian edicts or to judicial decisions, but to the
interpretation of the statute by men learned in the law.
[2 ] The augurs faced the east in taking their observations, so that a high house on the
Coelian hill might obstruct their view, all the more so, if one of the augurs had any private
grudge against the owner of the house.
[1 ] Cicero here means to say: “Cases of this kind are comparatively recent. The records of
the earlier and better times contain no such instances of chicanery.”
[1 ] These were forms used in deeds of trust.
[1 ] The regulation of the markets was among the functions of the aediles.
[2 ] One who had just come into an inheritance of human chattels could not be expected to
know their characters and habits.
[1 ] Hortensius. As rival orators, cicero and Hortensius might have been on other than friendly
terms, had they not both been intimate friends of Atticus.
[1 ] Cicero charged Crassus with complicity in Catiline’s conspiracy, and Crassus was a friend of
Clodius, Cicero’s bitterest enemy. After Cicero’s return from exile, Crassus sought a formal
reconciliation with Cicero, and there was no subsequent manifestation of hostility on his part.
[2 ] It was shameful, as Cicero could not but think, that states whose citizens nominally
enjoyed the rights of Roman citizenship should need official patrons, and equally so, in his
esteem, that those patrons should be, like Satrius, selected from among Antony’s adherents
and satellites.
[3 ] It is a singular feature of Roman society in and after Cicero’s time that the legacy-hunters
(heredipetae) should have been numerous enough and should have found dupes enough to
form a distinct class, and almost a recognized profession.
[1 ] See Book I. § 7.
[1 ] Of a man of the world, not of a philosopher.
[2 ] Latin, mices. Micare, or micare digitis (to flash with the fingers), denotes the game of
mora, which is still a favorite recreation, or rather mode of gambling, with the Roman populace,
and may be often seen in the streets. Story, in his Roba di Roma, describes it as follows: “Two
persons place themselves opposite each other, holding their right hands closed before them.
They then simultaneously and with a sudden gesture throw out their hands, some of the fingers
being extended, and others shut up on the palm, — each calling out in a loud voice, at the
same moment, the number he guesses the fingers extended by himself and his adversary to
make. If neither cry out aright, or if both cry out aright, nothing is gained or lost; but if only
one guess the true number, he wins a point.”
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one guess the true number, he wins a point.”
[1 ] The relation of a legatus, or lieutenant, to his commander was, in Roman ethics, not
unlike that of a son to his father, so that Marius in his conduct toward Metellus might have
been pronounced impius.
[2 ] Marcus Marius Gratidianus, son of an adopted son of the brother of Caius Marius.
[1 ] He never obtained the consulship; but the very popularity won by his agency in settling
the fluctuating currency was in Sulla’s eyes a crime which made him one of the dictator’s
earliest victims.
[2 ] Latin, explica atque excute, literally, unfold and shake out.
[1 ] Pompey married Caesar’s daughter, and hoped to gain ascendency by throwing upon
Caesar the unpopularity of whatever was offensive in the measures of the triumvirate.
[2 ] Words put into the mouth of Eteocles when, having agreed to hold the sovereignty of
Thebes with his brother on alternate years, he refused to resign the throne at the end of the
first year.
[1 ] The term parricide (parricidium) was always employed with reference to heinous crimes
against the country (patria) as well as to the murder of a father.
[1 ] Probably some of the petty states that had been obtained by the conquest of Mithridates,
and to which Sulla had sold this exemption for the money needed to pay his army.
[1 ] They were sometimes in the position of rural tenants when the crops failed. There were
times when the under-farmers (portitores) could not make their collections of taxes in full and
in due season; but Cato was in favor of the most rigid treatment of the farmers-general
(publicani), however they might fare with their subordinates.
[2 ] The farmers of the revenue were of equestrian rank, and it was deemed desirable that the
equites should be on good terms with the Senate.
[3 ] They had claimed the full rights of citizenship in common with the colonies south of the
Po, — a claim which Caesar granted.
[1 ] Latin, denarius. The denarius was about equivalent to our New England shilling.
[2 ] Though Cicero seems to have thought rightly on these questions, the very fact that they
could be mooted among members of the school of philosophy most noted for its high ethical
standard, gives us a not very favorable impression of pre-Christian ethics; and the contrast
between these Stoics and certain of the post-Christian, though non-Christian moralists, gives
color to the belief that Christianity had somehow penetrated where it was not recognized.
[1 ] Nearly half a million of our money.
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[1 ] In Book I. § 10, this example is used to substantially the same purpose, — the object
there being to show, under the head of justice, that the literal keeping of a promise may, under
some peculiar stress of circumstances, be virtually wrong; while here the proposition is that the
intense stress of expediency may make that right which has the prima facie aspect of wrong.
[1 ] I leave the ellipsis as it stands in the original.
[2 ] Notably, Euripides and Sophocles, as also some of the Roman tragedians. The story is that
he, as one of Helen’s suitors, was the first to propose the oath by which they bound
themselves, in case the marital rights of the successful suitor should be invaded, to join in
defending or avenging him. But when he was called upon to fulfil his part of the covenant, he
feigned insanity, yoked an ox and an ass together, ploughed a field with them, and sowed it
with salt. Palamedes took Telemachus, and placed him where his father’s plough would go over
him, and Ulysses, by stopping his plough so as to avoid doing harm to the child, showed that
he was not demented, and was thus compelled to keep his agreement and to bear his
illustrious part in the Trojan war.
Palamedes, even a more decidedly mythical personage than Ulysses, is fabled to have been the
inventor of light-houses, measures, scales, the discus, dice, the alphabet, and the mode of
regulating sentries, — in fine, an impersonation of nearly all the practical wisdom of the old
world.
[1 ] These verses are from the Armorum Judicium of Pacuvius.
[2 ] The Greeks called all except themselves barbarians.
[3 ] He was proconsul in Africa, his second consulship having expired the previous year.
[1 ] Accounts as to the death of Regulus vary, — some saying that he was put into a chest
studded in the inside with nails; others, that his eyebrows were cut off, and his face then
exposed to the full glare of an African sun; while it would seem that Cicero had a still different
account, that he died from enforced wakefulness. Niebuhr sees no reason to suppose that he
was tortured or killed, indeed, has very little faith in any part of his story, and it is maintained
by some of the writers of his school that the report of his being so tortured was circulated in
Rome to excuse the cruelties perpetrated by the family of Regulus on Carthaginian captives
committed to their charge.
[1 ] The Epicureans.
[2 ] The Stoics.
[3 ] This is from the Atreus of Attius. Thyestes asks Atreus, Fregistin fidem? and Atreus
replies that he denies the obligation of keeping good faith with treacherous men.
[1 ] Numa was said to have built a temple to Fides on the Capitoline Hill.
[1 ] The most patent sophistry. If the sincerity with which an oath is taken be the sole ground
of its sacredness, free license is opened for unnumbered forms of perjury, — certainly for the
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of its sacredness, free license is opened for unnumbered forms of perjury, — certainly for the
proverbially untrustworthy custom-house oaths, than which the civilization of our time has had
no fouler opprobrium.
[2 ] Latin, pirata, which commonly means a robber by sea, yet is sometimes used, as here, in
the same sense with praedo, a robber by land.
[3 ] From the Hippolytus. Unfortunately for Cicero’s use of these words, which Euripides puts
into the mouth of Hippolytus, the oath is regarded as sacred. He had sworn that he would not
divulge Phaedra’s guilty secret to his father, and in the scene from which this verse is taken he
says that but for the oath into which he had been entrapped unawares, nothing could have
prevented him from telling his father the whole truth.
[1 ] The commanders, even were they the consuls, could not lawfully make a treaty. The most
that they had a right to do was to make a truce or an armistice, or to name terms of peace to
be ratified by the Senate and people. The principle thus recognized is so obvious that if war be
not, in Cicero’s phrase, “opposed to nature,” it might seem to belong to the law of nature no
less than to the law of nations.
[1 ] Latin, leges sacratae. They were, probably, laws for the violation of which the criminal and
his property were nominally consecrated to some god, i. e. he execrated and his property
confiscated, — laws which had in Cicero’s time become obsolete, as had the strict exercise of
the censorial animadversion in the case of perjury. Of this class were the laws passed on Mons
Sacer on the occasion of the first secession of the plebeians from Rome. Some commentators
say that these laws were the only ones known as leges sacratae. Yet another opinion is that the
leges sacratae corresponded to the canon law of Christendom, — that there were certain
offences, perjury among the nest, the legal eognizance of which belonged to the priests.
[1 ] Torquatus.
[2 ] Shortly before this very battle of Veseris the consuls gave orders that no Roman should
engage in single combat with any soldier of the opposing army. The son of Torquatus, driven
almost to madness by the taunts and insults of a Tuscan soldier, accepted his challenge, killed
him, and brought the trophies of the successful conflict to his father, who immediately ordered
the youth to be beheaded.
[1 ] This story, it will be remembered, is told in a slightly different form in Book I. § 13. The
passage in which that version of it occurs is wanting in some manuscripts, and omitted in some
editions; but the critical evidence is in its favor. It is appropriately told in each connection, and
Cicero is never unwilling to tell the same story twice, if it will in each instance serve the
purpose in hand. There seems to have been about the Punic wars, as about many passages of
Roman history, a strange mingling of authentic narrative and popular tradition, so that of
events that undoubtedly took place there are often several versions. The science of historical
criticism had not been even conceived of, and we find that writers, Plutarch included, always
select the version of a story that will best point a moral or illustrate a character.
Aulus Gellius says that of the ten Romans sent home by Hannibal eight returned, and two who
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Aulus Gellius says that of the ten Romans sent home by Hannibal eight returned, and two who
had evaded their oath by fraud remained in Rome, branded with ignominy by the censors, and
the objects of universal contempt and scorn.
[1 ] This figure is used in another instance by Cicero, in the Tusculanae Disputationes, Book V.
It is also used once in the New Testament, where our English version gives no intimation of it,
in 2 Peter i. 5. “With all diligence bring up and lead on in the choir [or dance] ([Editor: illegible
charachter]πιχορηγήσατε) on [or next to] faith, virtue,” &c.
[2 ] The Cyrenaic school was founded by Aristippus. See Book I. § 41, note.
[3 ] Anniceris is regarded as having been of the Cyrenaic school, and differed from Aristippus
chiefly in admitting that the social virtues are good in themselves, yet good because, though
they sometimes give trouble, their pleasure-yielding capacity transcends the labor,
inconvenience, and sorrow that may incidentally result from them.
[4 ] Latin, viris equisque, literally, with men and horses, i. e. in full military array, with all the
strength that I can muster, with might and main.
[1 ] The disciple, inseparable companion, and intimate friend of Epicurus, and his destined
successor, though Epicurus outlived him by seven years. He gave his master’s philosophy its
fullest development in the direction of sensuality, expressly and seriously maintaining that the
organs of digestion furnish the true test and measure for everything appertaining to a happy
life.
[1 ] A figure derived from a watercourse whose flow is obstructed. The idea is: What he says
about these virtues does not flow easily, as if he were sincere and thoroughly in earnest.
[2 ] Their doctrine was that for man pleasure and virtue are both ends of being, — pleasure by
nature and from the beginning, virtue after experience of the good that there is in it.
[1 ] In the Second Book of De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.
