WK5 CASE STUDY CJ453

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  • Chapter Five

The fundamental problem with coastline is that of permeability. The U.S. has the fifth longest coastline, behind Canada, Russia, Norway, and Indonesia.  The U.S. maintains land borders with Mexico and Canada totaling 7,477.6 miles (12,034 km).  The U.S.–Canada border is a combination of land, lake, and ocean boundaries that are mostly unguarded and open along their length to nearly free transit.  If the open land border with Canada is removed from this total, there are only 1,969 miles (3,169 km) of land border with Mexico that require focused protective efforts.  However, there are 12,380.2 miles (19,924 km) of U.S. coastline that require security.

For the record, "coastline" and "shoreline" are two different measures.  The “coast” is determined by a “smoothed” line running across inlets, bays, channels, harbors, etc.  The “shore” is an actual point where land meets ocean salt-water.  The difference is a fundamental matter of measurement. While the U.S. has 12,380.2 miles of “coastline” it has over 95,000 miles of “shoreline.”  Along the Texas coast, which is nearly 1000 miles (1,600 km) in total length, there are about 1,150 seaports. In addition to actual ports, small craft can make landings along virtually any stretch of beach to load or unload cargo of all types.

Comprehending the impact of maritime commerce and the accompanying need to provide security for the continued movement of merchant ships, is essential to understanding the process currently in place to secure the maritime realm.  Joint operations between the French, British and Americans were conducted off the North African coast in the early 1800s to put an end to pirate attacks on merchant shipping.  Two hundred years later, joint operations involving many different nations are ongoing along the West African Coast and in the Red Sea to protect merchant shipping from Somali pirates.  Today’s efforts are part of a concerted international effort to implement a maritime security strategy that involves defense in depth, the same concept that gave rise to the U.S. Navy in the late 1700s.

Recently moved to the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) carries out extensive functions with what has traditionally been a very limited capacity.  Dating back to 1790, today’s USCG came into being when the first Congress authorized the construction of ten vessels to enforce federal tariff and trade laws and to prevent smuggling.   The Coast Guard is one of the oldest organizations of the federal government and until Congress established the Navy Department in 1798 served as the nation’s only armed force afloat.  They have protected the nation throughout its long history and served proudly in every one of the nation’s conflicts.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States moved to consolidate and better organize the agencies associated with the defense of the U.S.  Part of the efforts was the move of the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security.  This was accomplished in law by a major revision to Title 14 of the U.S. Code and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.  The USCG is a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States.  It is a component of the Department of Homeland Security, except when operating as a service in the Navy.  Essentially, the USCG is the military arm of the Department of Homeland Security.  Unlike the U.S. Navy, the officers, warrant officers, and petty officers of the USCG are also Federal law enforcement Officers with the authority to carry out the duties and functions of any other Federal Law Enforcement Agency.  The primary duties of the USCG can be found in Chapter 1 paragraph 2 of Title 14 of the United States Code (95th Congress, 1995).

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United Stated recognized maritime security as an area of significant vulnerability.  Action was taken to address the issue with the issuance of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS).  The U.S. is “dependent” upon open oceans for its economic survival.  Economics implies a joint relationship between the corporate world and the government when it comes to Maritime Security. The NSMS identifies five threats to maritime security. They are:

Nation-State Threats: in the absence of inter-state conflict, individual state actions represent a significant challenge to global security.  In particular, those states providing safe havens for criminals and terrorists.

Terrorist Threats: successful attacks by non-state terrorist groups that exploit open borders provide opportunities to cause significant disruption to regional and global economies. Terrorists have also taken advantage of criminal smuggling networks to circumvent border security measures.  Terrorists can also develop effective attack capabilities relatively quickly using suicide boats and light aircraft; merchant and cruise ships as kinetic weapons; commercial vessels as launch platforms for missile attacks; underwater swimmers to infiltrate ports; and unmanned underwater explosive delivery vehicles.  Terrorists can also take advantage of a vessel’s legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied natural gas, as the explosive component of an attack.

Transnational Criminal and Piracy Threats: the smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband, as well as piracy and armed robbery against vessels, post a threat to maritime security.  Piracy and incidents of maritime crime tend to be concentrated in areas of heavy commercial maritime activity, especially where there is significant political and economic instability, or in regions with little or no maritime law enforcement capacity. Maritime drug trafficking generates vast amounts of money for international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations.  Those funds can then be used to bribe government officials, bypass established financial controls, and fund additional illegal activities, including arms trafficking, migrant smuggling, and terrorist operations.

Environmental Destruction: intentional and unintentional acts can have far-reaching, negative effects on the economic viability and political stability of a region.

Illegal Seaborne Immigration: this is a long-standing issue that remains a major challenge to regional stability because of the strain migrants and refugees place on fragile economies and political systems.  In some countries the collapse of political and social order prompts maritime mass migrations.  The potential for terrorists to take advantage of human smuggling networks in attempts to circumvent border security measures cannot be ignored.

The oceans offer all nations a network of sea-lanes that are of enormous importance to their security and prosperity.  They are likewise a source of food, mineral resources, and recreation and support of commerce among nations.  They also act as both a barrier to threats to the security of people everywhere.  Like all other countries, the United States is highly dependent on the oceans for its security and the welfare of its people and economy.  In today’s economy, the oceans have increased importance, allowing all countries to participate in the global marketplace.  More than 80 percent of the world’s trade travels by water and forges a global maritime link.  About half the world’s trade by value and 90 percent of the general cargo are transported in containers.  Shipping is the heart of the global economy, but it is vulnerable to attack in two key areas. Spread across Asia, North America, and Europe are 30 cities that constitute the world’s primary, interdependent trading web.  Through a handful of international straits and canals pass 75 percent of the world’s maritime trade and half its daily oil consumption.  International commerce is at risk in the major trading hubs as well as at a handful of strategic chokepoints.

Today’s transnational threats have the potential to inflict great harm on many nations, thus the security of the maritime domain requires comprehensive and cohesive efforts among the United States and many cooperating nations to protect the common interest in global maritime security. This strategy describes how the United States Government will promote an international maritime security effort that will effectively and efficiently enhance the security of the maritime domain while preserving the freedom of the domain for legitimate pursuits.  This approach does not negate the United States’ inherent right to self-defense or its right to act to protect its essential national security interests.  Defending against enemies is the first and most fundamental commitment of the United States Government.  Preeminent among our national security priorities is to take all necessary steps to prevent WMD from entering the country and to avert an attack on the homeland.  This course of action must be undertaken while respecting the constitutional principles upon which the United States was founded.

The U.S. adheres to three principles to provide overarching guidance to this strategy which include;

Preserving the freedom of the seasis a top national priority.

  • The United States must facilitate and defend commerce to ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping.
  • The United States must facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and material.  There need not be an inherent conflict between the demand for security and the need for facilitating the travel and trade essential to continued economic growth.

    • In keeping with these guiding principles, the deep-seated values enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, and applicable domestic and international law, the following objectives are a guide to the nation’s maritime security activities:

    • Prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts;
    • Protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures;
    • Minimize damage and expedite recovery;
    • Safeguard the ocean and its resources.

    To bring about security of the maritime domain it is necessary to employ all the instruments of national power in conjunction with other nation-states and consistent with international law.  To best achieve the national objectives, a partnership between public and private entities is necessary along with the development of scalable layers of security and implementation of strategic actions by all concerned.  These strategic actions are:

    • Enhance International Cooperation;
    • Maximize Domain Awareness;
    • Embed Security into Commercial Practices;
    • Deploy Layered Security;
    • Assure continuity of the Marine Transportation System.

    Perhaps the most important of these strategies is the idea of Layered Security.  This is the fundamental focus of the deployment of national assets.  In support of this concept the NSMS directs the development of eight other support plans of varying lengths that address the need for interoperability between the private and public sectors at Federal, State, and local levels as well as cooperation with other nations.  These supplemental plans are:

    National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness lays the foundation for an effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States, and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible.

    Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan uses existing capabilities to integrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the maritime domain.

    Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan aims for coordinated United States Government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain by establishing roles and responsibilities that enable the government to respond quickly and decisively.

    International Outreach and Coordination Strategy provides a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with foreign governments and international organizations, and solicits international support for enhanced maritime security.

    Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan recommends procedures and standards for the recovery of the maritime infrastructure following attack or similar disruption.

    Maritime Transportation System Security Plan responds to the President’s call for recommendations to improve the national and international regulatory framework regarding the maritime domain.

    Maritime Commerce Security Plan establishes a comprehensive plan to secure the maritime supply chain.

    Domestic Outreach Plan engages non-Federal input to assist with the development and implementation of maritime security policies resulting from NSPD-41/HSPD-13.

    The first major supporting document for the National Strategy for Maritime Security is the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, October 2005 is a cornerstone for successful execution of the security plans tasked in NSPD-41/HSPD-13.  This plan serves to unify United States Government and support international efforts to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).  It directs close coordination of a broad range of federal departments and agencies for this lasting endeavor.  Some key definitions of this plan include;

    • Maritime Domain is all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.
    • Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.
    • Global Maritime Community of Interest (GMCOI) includes, among other interests, the federal, state, and local departments and agencies with responsibilities in the maritime domain. Because certain risks and interests are common to government, business, and citizen alike, community membership also includes public, private and commercial stakeholders, as well as foreign governments and international stakeholders (DHS, 2005).

    MDA Goals support the core national defense and security priorities.  MDA serves to simplify our security environment by the following strategic goals:

    •        Enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter and defeat threats as early and distant from U.S. interests as possible;

    •        Enable accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the full spectrum of maritime threats; and

    •        Sustain the full application of the law to ensure freedom of navigation and the efficient flow of commerce.

    MDA Objectives-achieving MDA depends on the ability to monitor activities in such a way that trends can be identified and anomalies differentiated.  Data must be collected, fused, and analyzed to assist in handling data streams, so operational decision makers can anticipate threats and take the initiative to defeat them.  

    MDA Guiding Principles;

    • Unity of Effort. MDA requires a coordinated effort, including public and private sector organizations and international partners.  The need for security is a mutual interest requiring the cooperation of industry and government.
    • Information Sharing and Integration. MDA depends upon unparalleled information sharing. MDA must have protocols to protect private sector proprietary information.  
    • Safe and Efficient Flow of Commerce. Public safety and economic security are mutually reinforcing. All stakeholders recognize the efficient flow of commerce is enhanced by an effective understanding of the maritime domain.  

    The bottom line is MDA is the critical enabler that allows leaders at all levels to make effective decisions and act early against a vast array of threats to the security of the United States, its interests, allies, and friends.

    The second major supporting document for the National Strategy for Maritime Security is the National Strategy for Maritime Security is the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan.  The United States has more than 95,000 miles of shoreline and 3.4 million squares miles of water within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), so it is particularly open to attack from the Maritime Domain (FAS, 2005).

    Recognizing the maritime domain requires a robust layered security posture.   The NSMS assumes dependency on globally networked operations with information and maritime domain awareness developed from many intelligence sources.  The increasing maritime threat environment demands more integrated maritime intelligence enterprise that can identify and transfer maritime threat information to law enforcement responders at a maximum time and distance from the United States and its international partners. The gathering and dissemination of this intelligence is the function of the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan (GMIIP).  The guiding philosophy is community information access and integration rather than organizational consolidation of maritime intelligence activities.

    The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR) is the third component of supporting documents for the National Strategy for Maritime Security.  A classified document, the MOTR is available only to those with a secret security clearance and the associated “need to know”. Fundamentally, the MOTR coordinates agencies across the range of maritime response activities, including the deployment capabilities and use of force required to defeat maritime threats.  This strategy establishes the following goals:

    •        A coordinated policy for United States government maritime security activities with foreign governments, international and regional organizations and the private sector.

    •        Enhanced outreachto foreign governments, international and regional organizations, private sector partners and the public abroad to solicit support for improved global maritime security (Phelps, Dailey & Koenigsberg, 2014).  

    The fourth component of supporting documents for the National Strategy for Maritime Security is the need for international cooperation in this effort.  The Department of State leads the active international outreach to enhance global maritime security.  These efforts are aligned with domestic outreach efforts to ensure the development of a consistent message.  The strategic goals of this effort include;

    • Establish unified, consistent U.S. positions on maritime security programs for U.S. bilateral and multilateral exchanges.
    • Emphasize the importance of maritime security as a key priority in U.S. international policy.
    • Ensure the full integration of international law in the advancement of global maritime security at international meetings.
    • Optimize the use of meetings and other exchanges with countries and private sector groups to advance maritime security.

    The goals of this outreach to foreign governments, international organizations and private sector partners is to solicit support for improved global maritime security. The strategic goals of this effort include;

    • Build partnerships with the maritime community reach out to regional and international organizations in order to advance global maritime security.
    • Coordinate U.S. and international technical assistance to promote effective maritime security in critical regions.
    • Coordinate a unified message on maritime security for public diplomacy.
    • Provide U.S missions abroad with guidance to enable them to build support for U.S. maritime security initiatives with host governments, key private-sector partners, and the general public abroad.

    The fifth, sixth, and seventh component plans of the National Strategy for Maritime Security is the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan of April 2006 (DHS, 2006), the Maritime Transportation System Security Plan (DHS, 2005a) and the Maritime Commerce Security Plan, of October 2005 (DHS, 2005b).  These three supplementary plans are so interrelated it is necessary to discuss them as if they were a single composite plan.

    According to the American Association of Port Authorities, the Marine Transportation System (MTS) moved over $1.434 trillion in imports and exports through U.S. ports in 2010.  The MTS makes it possible for goods from other countries to be delivered to our front door step.  It enables the U.S. to project military presence across the globe, creates jobs that support local economies and provides a source of recreation for all Americans.  Fundamentally, the Nation’s economic and military security are closely linked to the health and functionality of the MTS (Phelps, Dailey & Koenigsberg, 2014).

    U.S. seaports are responsible for moving nearly all of the country’s overseas cargo volume.  Each of our 50 states relies on at least 15 seaports to handle its imports and exports, which total some $3.8 billion worth of goods moving in and out of U.S. seaports each day.  Seaports also support the employment of more than 13 million people in the U.S., which account for $650 billion in personal income.  Additionally, for every $1 billion in exports shipped though seaports, 15,000 U.S. jobs are created (Phelps, Dailey & Koenigsberg, 2014).  

    The MTS is geographically diverse and composed of many types of assets, operations, and infrastructure that are operated by a diverse set of stakeholders.  In addition, the MTS is an open system that enables many users to use it at minimal cost.  The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for overseeing the development and implementation of eight Maritime Transportation System Security recommendations which include;

    Risk Management—Improve security management through the consistent application of risk assessment methodologies to prioritize and track the outcomes of security improvement efforts.

    Security Information Management—Develop an interagency security data management plan to improve the quality and protection of critical security information among all appropriate MTS stakeholders.

    International & National Regulatory Framework—Continually improve the international and national regulatory framework established by the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) and Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 (MTSA 2002).

    Stakeholder Responsibility & Coordination—Manage a coordinated network of stakeholders who accept their responsibilities for ensuring maritime security and are actively engaged in collaborative efforts to reduce security risks in the maritime domain.

    Credentialing—Develop the ability for U.S. authorities to identify all individuals working aboard commercial vessels and operating recreational boats in the U.S. Maritime Domain and workers at land-based MTSA-regulated facilities and critical infrastructure components within the U.S.   

    Leverage Safety Frameworks—Examine transportation safety frameworks with respect to potential terrorist attack scenarios and determine if reasonable safety enhancements can significantly improve the inherent security of the MTS.

    Security Technology—Promote the development of technologies to address security gaps and improve the current Maritime Transportation System Security Network.  

    Security Training—Ensure port and maritime personnel are properly trained in maritime security in accordance with their function within the MTS.

    Implementing a five-part framework, the MTS proposes:

    • Accurate data in the form of advance electronic information to support the risk assessment of the cargo.  This assessment identifies cargo that may present a threat and may require some type of intervention.    
    • Secure cargo requires cargo to be loaded on the vessel conforms to the cargo information electronically transmitted to the authorities.  This process connects first-hand knowledge of the cargo with the validation of the cargo information.  This process also ensures safeguards are in place to prevent unlawful materials from being combined with the legitimate cargo.
    • Secure vessels and ports protect the security of the cargo while it is in the Maritime Domain. The MTS does not focus on this element of maritime commerce security.  
    • Secure transit is the procedure to ensure the secure cargo remains in that status as it enters and moves through the Maritime Domain.
    • Improvements to security within the first four parts of the framework are addressed in a way that ensures consistency and substantive improvements across the supply chain. An important way this goal is achieved is through engagement of appropriate international organizations in the development of standards.  Standards are the only meaningful way the government can ensure a certain level of security across the supply chain can be achieved.

    The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP) is fundamentally a FEMA document that addresses the process by which infrastructure is recovered following a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) that occurs under the jurisdiction of the United States.  If a TSI is of such a significance as to require the implementation of the National Response Framework and mobilization of personnel, then it becomes a “national TSI.”  This triggers the implementation of the MIRP which becomes guidance for the designees of the Secretary of Homeland Security in the decision making process to maintain the nation’s MTS operational capabilities and to restore transportation capabilities.

    The MIRP recognizes the MTS is a system and as such must be dealt with as if it were a living organism that will adapt to problems as they develop, provided there is sufficient information available to inform those controlling the overall movement of vessels in the Maritime Domain.  It also recognizes the majority of ocean traffic is commercial in nature and that cooperation with businesses is the best way to redirect the shipment of goods rather than a top-down government assumption of control in the event of a national TSI.

    The primary objective of the MIRP is to provide guidance for federal decision makers to use in restoring maritime transportation capabilities, specifically the restoration of cargo flow and passenger vessel activity after a national TSI.  To assist with the recovery/restoration of maritime transportation capabilities, the MIRP accomplishes the following:

    • Provides recovery management procedures for the Secretary of Homeland Security to make decisions affecting national maritime recovery efforts;
    • Provides recovery management procedures for those making decisions that provide support;
    • Recognizes based on the circumstances of the incident, a transition in focus from homeland defense operations to recovery management may occur between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security;
    • Takes into consideration initial post-incident decisions made by senior officials from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding short-term, targeted operational actions to help maintain flow of commerce through non-incident sites;
    • Lists responsibilities of federal, state, local, tribal governments and the private sector.  The listing is specific to the functional responsibilities related to recovery of maritime transportation capabilities;
    • To evaluate the effectiveness of the plan, the MIRP subscribes to an exercise program that includes periodic validation of the concepts of this recovery plan; and
    • Identifies next steps and makes recommendations to improve recovery management.

    The final components of the National Strategy for Maritime Security are three additional documents; The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, the joint U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard publications A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept, 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy. Of these three, the last is the most important.

    Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) describes when, where and how U.S. naval forces will contribute to enhancing security, preventing conflict and prevailing in war.  Readers will quickly discern several themes that collectively embody the essence of naval service to our Nation.  Implicit in these themes is Sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen should expect to be engaged in both preventing and winning wars.  

    NOC 10 articulates the ways naval forces are employed to achieve the strategy conveyed in CS-21. Published in 2007, CS-21 described a set of core capabilities that added maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) to the traditional forward presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection.  

    NOC 10 does not prescribe Naval Service tactics, nor is it doctrine.  Rather, it serves as a precursor to the development of both.  It describes how the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard operate together, and will be complemented by Service-specific concepts.

    Maritime security is a non-doctrinal term defined as those operations conducted to protect sovereignty and maritime resources, support open seaborne commerce and to counter maritime related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration.  Effective maritime security requires a comprehensive effort to promote global economic stability and protect legitimate ocean-borne activities from hostile or illegal acts in the maritime domain.

    Maritime security may be divided into individual or collective categories.  Individual maritime security operations involve actions taken by a single nation-state to provide for its security, consistent with its rights.  While the responsibility of individual nations to secure their territorial waters is the foundation upon which global maritime security is built, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21) notes unilateral action by a single nation cannot ensure the security of the global maritime commons; collective maritime security operations are required to unite actions of like-minded nation-states to promote mutual security at sea.

    The size and complexity of the maritime commons create unique security challenges for the international community as terrorists and criminals leverage the expanse of the maritime domain to facilitate their illicit activities.  Threats to security include piracy, narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, weapons proliferation, environmental destruction, and the pilfering of natural resources. Neutralizing these threats is essential to U.S. national security and the global economy.  Global maritime security can only be achieved through the integration of all maritime initiatives.  To this end, unprecedented coordination from everyone, domestic and international, is required.  

    The United States has numerous maritime law enforcement arrangements to address various maritime security challenges.  Each agreement is tailored to requirements, diplomatic and political relationships and the domestic laws of the participating nations.  These agreements expand U.S. maritime authority and eliminate border seams that are exploited by illicit actors.

    Maritime Security Force Assistance (MSFA)comprises efforts to strengthen security burden-sharing with foreign military and civilian maritime security forces and government institutions, as well as multinational and regional maritime security entities.  These activities assist partner naval forces to become more proficient at providing security to their populations.  In the context of the global maritime commons, MSFA promotes stability by developing partner nation capabilities to protect their maritime security interests.  Naval forces will often conduct MSFA concurrent with other forward operations.  For example, while conducting security patrols around the Iraqi off-shore oil platforms, Navy and Coast Guard maritime security forces integrated Iraqi military personnel into the operation to improve their proficiency.  Similarly, while maintaining port and waterway security, Coast Guard port security unit (PSU) and Navy maritime expeditionary security squadron members trained Iraqi naval forces on perimeter security defense.  Likewise, Coast Guard cutters and personnel employed on partner nation naval vessels in order to provide expanded law enforcement capability to carry out interdiction operations.  Cutter boarding teams instruct and assist with searches and evidence processing.  Multi-lateral exercises serve to increase the proficiency, interoperability and confidence of U.S. naval forces and those of its allies across the entire Range of Military Operations (ROMO).

    U.S. naval forces, often in concert with joint general purpose and special operations forces, other government agencies, and international partners, actively respond to conventional and irregular maritime threats.  Naval Service response operations include:

    • Increased Surveillance and Tracking . Vessels of interest are subject to increased surveillance and tracking, using a wide variety of military and commercial space-based systems, as well as air, surface, and underwater sensors.  These actions facilitate more efficient interdiction operations and are increasingly conducted by long-range unmanned platforms with multi-spectral sensors.
    • Combined Task Force (CTF) Operations. U.S. naval forces, in conjunction with allies, conduct combined operations to counter specific maritime security threats such as piracy, smuggling and weapons trafficking.
    • Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). MIO monitor and board merchant vessels to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolutions and prevent the transport of restricted goods. Boarding teams comprised of Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and other law enforcement personnel are trained in board and search and seizure techniques and conduct specific missions in accordance with relevant laws and capabilities.
    • Law Enforcement Operations. Law enforcement operations (LEO) are a form of interception operations distinct from MIO.  Coast Guard cutters frequently conduct independent LEO while exercising Title 14 authority in deep water environments.   
    • Expanded Maritime Interception Operations . Expanded MIO (EMIO) intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related materiel that pose an imminent threat to the United States and its allies.

    The 2010 Naval Operations Concept makes reference to the Automatic Identification System (AIS). This is an international tracking system installed on every commercial vessel, tracking in real time every ship’s current location and transmits that information to central data collection centers. Through the AIS system it is possible to follow every commercial ship anywhere in the world.

    AIS is a fusion of technologies that allows the layered overlay of different data on common platforms, such as Google Earth.  The data has been adapted to allow the real-time position of all AIS vessels to be displayed on a Google Earth background. By layering the data, it becomes possible to simply mouse over any given icon and get quick information on the particular vessel.  All of this allows for the maritime security apparatus to rapidly identify any particular vessel and helps to indicate which ships may require closer observation.

    The technological advances in port security are also significant. Most of the world’s goods are shipped in containers that are easily delivered to the end user.  This containerization allows for shippers to load a diverse selection of products into a single metal box and have that container moved to anyplace on the globe in a matter of days.  A container loading facility in Suez, Egypt, functions exactly the same as the one in Long Beach, California.  This allows a shipping company in Egypt to purchase marketable commodities and load them into a single container.  That locked metal box is identified by a serial number and with a breakable metal seal that is unique to that particular container.  It is loaded on a truck and delivered to Suez where it is loaded on a freighter bound for Singapore and then the U.S.  The invoice for the goods loaded in Egypt is electronically transmitted to the shipping company and to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, before the box ever leaves Egypt.  When the ship arrives in Long Beach and the containers are unloaded the Customs Inspector checks the container number to see if the lock and seal are intact.  Any indication the box has been tampered with in route triggers the need for a secondary inspection, which can be conducted in a variety of manners, including x-ray, and physical inventory.  The entire process is essentially seamless and provided there is no indication of tampering or contraband in the container, it will be delivered to the importer within a day or two—perhaps even transshipped across the U.S. by train in the process.  This is the ultimate benefit of a modern transportation system in a globalized economy when the maritime security system functions as intended.

    Throughout history a major concern of empires and countries with ocean borders has been the safety and security of their maritime commerce.  No security system is perfect.  As long as there are people involved in the supply chain, the potential for human compromise exists.  This opens the Maritime Domain to an unlimited number of potential threats.

    The complex nature of the Maritime Transportation System is apparent and the critical balance of security and commerce cannot be achieved without the cooperation of both domestic and international stakeholders involved in the operation of the system.  Recognition of the joint responsibility for Maritime Security held by the private sector and government entities is clearly stated in the National Strategy for Maritime Security.  

     

    References

    95th Congress (1995). Title 14 of the U.S. Code and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. Retrieved from: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1471.pdf

    Andreas, P. (1998). The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 113, no. 4, (Winter 1998 p. 595).

    Cato Journal (2012).  Volume 32, Number 1. Copywriter Cato Institute. Retrieved from:             http://www.cato.org/cato-journal/winter-2012

    Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) (2011). Office and Air and Marin (OAM). Retrieved from:             https://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/marine/air_marine.ctt/air_marine pdf

    Department of Homeland Security (2006). Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan of April 2006. Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSPD_MIRPPlan_0.pdf

    Department of Homeland Security (2005). National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, October 2005. Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSPD_MDAPlan_0.pdf

    Department of Homeland Security (2005a). Maritime Transportation System Security Plan . Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSPD_MTSSPlan_0.pdf

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    Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (2005). National Strategy for Maritime Security is the Global   Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan. Retrieved from: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/gmii-lan.pdf

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