US FORIEGN POLICY WEEK 1

profileCooper2021
ChoCollectiveActionLeadership.pdf

Disclaimer: This is a machine generated PDF of selected content from our products. This functionality is provided solely for your convenience and is in no way intended to replace original scanned PDF. Neither Cengage Learning nor its licensors make any representations or warranties with respect to the machine generated PDF. The PDF is automatically generated "AS IS" and "AS AVAILABLE" and are not retained in our systems. CENGAGE LEARNING AND ITS LICENSORS SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES FOR AVAILABILITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Your use of the machine generated PDF is subject to all use restrictions contained in The Cengage Learning Subscription and License Agreement and/or the Gale eBooks Terms and Conditions and by using the machine generated PDF functionality you agree to forgo any and all claims against Cengage Learning or its licensors for your use of the machine generated PDF functionality and any output derived therefrom.

Collective Action

Author: Kisuk Cho Editors: George R. Goethals , Georgia J. Sorenson , and James MacGregor Burns Date: 2004

From: Encyclopedia of Leadership(Vol. 1. ) Publisher: Sage Publications, Inc.

Document Type: Topic overview Length: 2,118 words

COLLECTIVE ACTION

THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

Tanya and Cinque have been arrested for robbing the Hibernia Savings Bank and placed in separate isolation cells. Both care much more about their personal freedom than about the welfare of their accomplice. A clever prosecutor makes the following offer to each. "You may choose to confess or remain silent. If you confess and your accomplice remains silent I will drop all charges against you and use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice does serious time. Likewise, if your accomplice confesses while you remain silent, they will go free while you do the time. If you both confess I get two convictions, but I'll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain silent, I'll have to settle for token sentences on firearms possession charges. If you wish to confess, you must leave a note with the jailer before my return tomorrow morning." (Kuhn 2003)

Collective action occurs through the decision of individuals, who are regarded as rational actors seeking to maximize self- interest, to participate in an activity with the purpose of achieving common or group interests. The study of collective action therefore provides valuable insight for understanding the dynamics of activities or movements generated and sustained by a group of cooperating individuals.

Collective action may be a one-time incident, such as the payment of contributions by members of a community to renovate their town hall, or a long-term process, such as participation in a decade-long struggle for the improvement of civil rights. Regardless of the duration of the action and the degree of commitment required for its sustenance, the main feature of collective action is that it rarely occurs in natural conditions. This problem is commonly explained through the logic of what is known as the Prisoners' Dilemma.

The Prisoners' Dilemma is based on the fundamental assumption that individuals are self-interested

Page 219

in the sense that they maximize utility. The following scenario provides an illustration of the concept:

To summarize, if Tanya and Cinque both choose to remain silent, they will both achieve the most positive outcomes. If both confess, they will face somewhat more negative results. But if one chooses to confess while the other remains silent, the one who remains silent will suffer the most negative consequences while the one who confesses will enjoy the most positive

THE NATURE OF PUBLIC GOODS

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COOPERATION

MOVING FROM INDIVIDUAL INACTION TO COLLECTIVE ACTION

outcome. Although remaining silent seems to be the best choice for both players, the individuals are likely to end up choosing confession for two reasons. First, confession is the strategy that offers a better outcome regardless of the other player's choice. Second, due to the lack of trust, individuals choose confession in order to avoid potential exploitation by the other player. In other words, confession will be the desirable strategy for the rational, self-interested individual. The important discovery here is that what is in the best interest of the group differs from that which is in the best interest of the individual.

When the Prisoners' Dilemma is applied to a group setting (this is called the N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma), individuals will be reluctant to cooperate for similar reasons. Each individual will have the choice to either contribute or not contribute for a collective (or public) good. The best outcome for the group as a whole will be produced when all members of the group decide to contribute. Everyone will have paid the same cost and will receive equal shares of the collective good in return. But the best outcome for the individual, on the other hand, will be to not contribute and exploit the contributions made by other members instead, since through this choice the individual will be able to reap benefits without paying the cost. This phenomenon is called the "free-rider problem," and it would be logical for self-interested individuals to become free-riders since their goal is to secure maximum gain. Consequently, individuals will be reluctant to engage in collective action for two reasons. First, the strategy of non-contribution offers a better outcome than the strategy of contribution. Second, individuals attempt to avoid possible exploitation by other players in the group.

It is necessary to look into the nature of public goods to better understand the reason why individuals find it difficult to participate in collective action. Public goods are beneficial resources that are shared by members of a group or community. Public goods have two characteristics: jointness of supply and the impossibility of exclusion. This means that public goods are made available through collective contribution, but noncontributing members cannot be excluded from enjoying the public good: contributors and non-contributors alike will become beneficiaries of the public good. Using the example of the town hall above, we can imagine a situation in which half of the members of the community have contributed for renovation but the other half have not. The town hall will have been renovated through the collective contribution of the cooperating members of the community only, but because the town hall is public property (a public good), even noncontributing members of the society will be able to enjoy and freely access the renovated facility. Some other examples of public goods are natural resources such as air and water, and different kinds of public property such as parks, playgrounds, and stadiums. The nonexclusive nature of these public goods has the effect of encouraging free riders, since individuals

Page 220

are able to harvest the fruits of the public good without having to sow any seeds.

As demonstrated above, the problem of collective action is that it is unlikely to occur because individuals have the incentive to act selfishly rather than serve the common interest. Yet, the more serious problem is that when individuals decide to pursue their self-interest, the collective outcome turns out to be disastrous. Non-cooperation and non-participation in collective action will result in either the absence of public goods (the problem of creation), or the exhaustion of already-existing public resources (the problem of depletion). Without active participation in a civil rights movement, there will be no equal and fair rights for the minority people to enjoy. Without contributions for renovation, the town hall will remain shabby, defunct, and may even end up collapsing over the night. Phenomena such as pollution, environmental degradation, and energy shortages also are examples of the negative consequences of non-cooperation.

In other words, without cooperation, every member will be worse off than he or she would have been if each had contributed a fair share and the public good been provided.

The unfavorable consequences of non-cooperation and inaction transform collective action from a choice into a necessity. The question then is how to induce self-interested individuals to participate in collective action, going against their natural inclinations.

Olson, in The Logic of Collective Action, named two catalysts for collective action: selective incentives and entrepreneurship. Collective action may occur when the payoff attached to choices made by the individual are altered through external intervention. An example would be the provision of selective incentives such as material rewards, monetary compensation, and the enhancement of one's social reputation. Real-world examples include health insurance benefits exclusively offered for the members of a labor union, consumer guidebooks for the members of consumer organizations, and the like. If one has a selective incentive to gain through his or her participation in collective action, he or she would be more willing to cooperate.

Olson also noted the importance of entrepreneurs in the production of public goods. Entrepreneurs play a facilitating role as the means of pursuing a personal ambition, such as running for office. This might explain how collective action occurs in the first

It is better to have one person working with you, than three working for you.

—Unknown

THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP

THE ROLE OF FOLLOWERSHIP

place, but it fails to give an appropriate account of how groups are maintained and collective goods are sustained.

Negative measures such as threats, punishment, fines, and sanctions also enforce collective action by significantly reducing the well-being of those who decide to not cooperate. These measures, however, are not welcome in democratic society, since they incur enormous sanctioning costs.

The most idealistic way of generating collective action is for members of a community or group to reach a voluntary agreement for sustaining or producing public goods, and utilizing the function of peer pressure to inhibit free-riders. This will work only in small and tightly knit groups where peer pressure has visible influence over other members, and large groups will find it difficult to overcome the free-rider problem.

The most effective driving force behind collective action may come from within, not outside of, a group. Historical examples of effective and long-running public-spirited movements—such as the Indian Independence Movement of the early 1920s, the American civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa, which

Page 221

lasted for three decades—shed light on the significant role of leadership in the mobilization of collective action. In most cases, leaders will initiate and involve themselves in collective action for a different reason. Unlike other members of the group who painstakingly calculate the pros and cons of each available option by conditioning their choices upon the possible response of the other, leaders will have an independent interest, one that lies in the achievement of the common good pursued by the movement he or she has authored or sponsored. Leaders will thus act autonomously when committing themselves to the collective action.

Such visionary and transformational leadership ("leading by example") becomes a contagious force over the other members of the group. Effective and committed leadership not only creates momentum in favor of a movement, but also sets forth a greater possibility of its success, to which followers will respond by jumping on the bandwagon. This, of course, increases the possibility for ultimate success (meaning the achievement of the common purpose). There is no doubt that the inspirational influence of leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela was crucial to the mobilization and success of the social movements mentioned above. In the American civil rights movement, for instance, Martin Luther King Jr.'s moral values stemming from his Christian faith and a firm commitment to nonviolence as a strategy for creating social change had the impact of encouraging numerous followers to participate voluntarily in important historical events such as the Montgomery bus boycott (1955–1956) and the March on Washington (1963). The fact that he held fast to the movement facing constant harassments and attempts at assassination targeted not only toward himself but also toward his family members and his most trusted colleagues, which ultimately resulted in his death, provides a fine illustration of "leading by example."

Leadership plays a powerful role in stimulating collective action, but it would not be complete without an active followership. On the outset, followers may not seem to be of much significance since they are belittled under the towering presence of leadership. But without the collaboration of followers no movement or action would be possible, even with the most committed and passionate leadership.

The Montgomery bus boycott could not have been successful had the whole African-American population in Montgomery failed to follow and wholeheartedly support the decisions made by the leadership. The leadership had expected about 60 percent of the black population to participate in the boycott, but were surprised to find that there was nearly a 100-percent rate of cooperation: this was an undeniable blow to the bus company, which relied on the African-American population, who accounted for 60 percent of the riders, for profit.

Such cases reveal that followers are not doomed to remain captives of self-interest, but are just as capable of realizing and pursuing the common interest as leaders are. Education and promotion of the purposes of the collective action by the

LEADERSHIP, FOLLOWERSHIP, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

leadership will encourage active followership. Experience may also teach lessons worth remembering: if a community continuously suffers the negative consequences of inaction, there will be a rising awareness among its members of the necessity of cooperation. Followership that goes hand-in-hand with leadership is essential for successful collective action.

Rational and self-interested individuals do not spontaneously engage in actions that aim to achieve a common interest. If interests are shared, individuals would prefer to become free-riders and leave it to other members of the group to pay the cost for the provision of public goods that would benefit all. This tendency of rational actors to act selfishly results in a worsened collective outcome, and in order to prevent such situations other measures should be employed to gear the desire of individuals toward cooperation. Incentives and disincentives prove to be useful in suiting this purpose, but academic research and social experience draw attention to the transformational power of leadership and the important supporting

Page 222

role of followership as the keys to effective and sustainable collective action.

—Kisuk Cho

See also Activism; Coalitions ; Community Development ; Teamwork

Further Reading

Chong, D. (1991). Collective action and the civil rights movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Crozier, M., Friedberg, E., & Goldhammer, A. (1980). Actors and systems: The politics of collective action. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Diani, M., & Eyerman, R. (Eds.). (1992). Studying collective action. London: Sage.

Diani, M., & McAdam, D. (2003). Social movements and networks: Relational approaches to collective action. London: Oxford University Press.

Hardin, R. (1971). Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma. Behavioral Science, 16, 472–481.

Hardin, R. (1982). Collective action. Baltimore: Resources for the Future, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kuhn, S. (2003, Fall). Prisoner's dilemma. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved October 16, 2003, from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/prisoner-dilemma

Miller, D. L. (2000). Introduction to collective behavior and collective action. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sandler, T. (1992). Collective action: Theory and applications. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Tarrow, S. G. (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collective action, and politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Traugott, M. (1995). Repertoires and cycles of collective action. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2004 SAGE Publications, Inc.

Source Citation Cho, Kisuk. "Collective Action." Encyclopedia of Leadership, edited by George R. Goethals, et al., vol. 1, SAGE Reference, 2004,

pp. 218-222. Gale eBooks, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CX3452500062/GVRL?u=mlin_w_umassamh&sid=GVRL&xid=0a4a7454. Accessed 23 May 2021.

Gale Document Number: GALE|CX3452500062