Week 11 Discussion
Pe0512
Cheung2011.pdf
‘Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast Asia: Implications from the Rohingya Experience’
S A M U E L C H E U N G
UNHCR 1
MS received November 2010; revised MS received March 2011
By examining the comparative experiences of Rohingya who fled in the early 1990s to Bangladesh and Malaysia, this paper discusses implications for refugee
protection in an Asian regional context characterized by generally applicable immigration measures and a reluctance to offer formal durable solutions. Somewhat secure from refoulement but undifferentiated or even deliberately invisible among larger irregular migrant populations, refugees in the region
develop certain protection strategies and livelihood mechanisms outside the boundaries of formal asylum, which suggest they possess significant capacities to carve out their own protection space and achieve a level of de facto integra-
tion. Given the migration-focused discourse among states and regional processes as well as the impasse on solutions in Asia, this paper makes the case for further recognition of available, intermediate solutions which capitalize on ambiguities
between migration management and refugee protection and empower refugee-driven solutions in all dimensions.
Keywords: refugee, asylum, migration, integration, Asia
Introduction
In the early 1990s, some 250,000 Rohingya from Northern Rakhine State in Myanmar (Burma) fled an intensified post-election clampdown called Pyi Thaya, and in the years that followed, have continued to flee repressive state policies and practices. While the vast majority of this group fled to neighbouring Bangladesh, a smaller group of some 15,000 fled further away to Malaysia. For some two decades, these Rohingya refugees have remained in a protracted situation of displacement in camps and semi-urban settings in Bangladesh, and in the urban centres of Malaysia, caught in an apparent impasse between migration control policies and dim prospects for solutions.
Journal of Refugee Studies � The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] doi:10.1093/jrs/fer048
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By examining the comparative experiences of these Rohingya who fled to and remained in Bangladesh and Malaysia, this paper discusses pos- sible implications for refugee protection in an Asian regional context where few countries are signatory to the 1951 Convention and there is a corres- ponding absence of domestic legal frameworks to deal with matters of asylum. Shaped not by official state policies but rather by ad hoc institu- tional practices which fluctuate along with domestic sentiments toward mi- gration, the protection environment for refugees and asylum seekers in many parts of South and Southeast Asia has often been characterized by generally applicable immigration measures, which at times tend toward being punitive, and a general reluctance to offer formal durable solutions for the resolution of certain longstanding refugee situations. Somewhat secure from refoulement but falling short of receiving a regularized right of stay, refugees have suffered from the lack of formal, consistent policies and, undifferentiated among larger populations of irregular migrants, have been subjected to arrest and detention, lack formal access to labour markets and have limited admission to certain public services such as education or health programmes.
In this regional context, the experience of the Rohingya in Bangladesh and Malaysia permits some useful observations regarding the protection strategies and livelihood mechanisms that refugee populations develop when they are unable to benefit from the legal provisions of the 1951 Convention and are instead compelled to carve out for themselves their own protection space. Their experience in adapting to migration control policies and enduring the solutions impasse to find an intermediate, available solution, is indicative of the refugee experience in much of South and Southeast Asia and has broader implications for the meaning of refugee protection outside the boundaries of formal asylum.
Rohingya Displacement to Bangladesh and Malaysia
The term ‘Rohingya’ commonly refers to Muslims from Northern Rakhine State (formerly Arakan) in Myanmar who form an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority and have been subjected to repeated waves of persecution and forced displacement. These cycles of historical displacement, beginning with the Burmese invasion of Arakan and deportation of Arakanese in 1784, and followed by returns and armed struggle in the British colonial era (1824– 1948) and further displacements after independence, formed a justification for the Myanmar government’s labelling of Rohingya as ‘illegal migrants’ and forcing them out again on several occasions.
2
In 1974, at the time of constituting Rakhine State from the former Arakan Division, the Emergency Immigration Act downgraded Rohingya to possess- ing only foreign registration cards rather than national registration certifi- cates. In 1978, the Myanmar military commenced the Nagamin (or Dragon King) operation to register all citizens prior to a national census and screen
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out foreigners from citizens, an operation which allegedly resulted in wide- spread violence (Human Rights Watch 1996). Some 200,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, which requested assistance from the United Nations and estab- lished 13 camps along the border to deal with the influx. However, later restrictions on food rations and the withdrawal of basic services from the camps caused nearly all of the Rohingya to return due to the difficult conditions.
In 1982, the revised Myanmar Citizenship Law excluded Rohingya from the list of 135 national ethnic groups and this, combined with onerous evi- dentiary requirements to apply for citizenship, caused Rohingya to become stateless and more vulnerable to arbitrary denial of rights. Then in 1991– 1992, after the disputed multi-party elections won by the National League for Democracy, the Myanmar military commenced another campaign called Pyi Thaya (or Prosperous Country), which began with a build up of military forces and formation of a border task force, called Nay-Sat Kut-kwey Ye (or Nasaka) which consisted of police, military intelligence and immigra- tion/customs and other officials. The intensified post-election clampdown led to a second exodus. Some 250,000 Rohingya crossed into Bangladesh while another 15,000 ultimately made their way to Malaysia. In the years that followed, a small but steady flow of Rohingya have continued to flee to both Bangladesh and Malaysia to escape persecution in Myanmar.
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In Bangladesh, the majority of the 250,000 Rohingya who fled in 1991–1992 were initially sheltered in some 20 government-administered refu- gee camps around Cox’s Bazaar District under the authority of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (renamed from the Ministry of Relief) which was entrusted with providing asylum, assistance and relief. By execu- tive order, the Rohingya were recognized as prima facie refugees by the gov- ernment on the single criterion of being Muslim. Not long after, Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a bilateral agreement to return those Rohingya who could establish a so-called bona fide residence in Myanmar. A controversial repatriation programme followed, in which almost all of the 250,000 were repatriated to Myanmar by 2000 (Human Rights Watch 2000). Today, only some 28,000 remain in two camps, Nayapura and Kutupalong, in the south- east district of Cox’s Bazaar, but there are an estimated 200,000 Rohingya residing in various villages and towns outside the camps, many of whom fled in 1991–1992, were repatriated and since then have returned to Bangladesh again.
According to Bangladesh policy, the prima facie recognition of Rohingya ended with a registration cut-off date in mid-1992; those estimated 200,000 who arrived or returned after the cut-off date are not refugees and are not permitted in the camps. At the same time, the porous border with Myanmar means there is a constant flow of persons who enter Bangladesh illegally, obtain daily or weekly passes to visit relatives or find day labour, or remain inter-mingled with the population. Consistent with the government’s policy, UNHCR has not registered those outside the camps nor does it actively
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engage with this self-settled population. Refugees in camps were initially provided with temporary ration cards which were then replaced by family books and finally individual refugee identification cards issued by UNHCR. Documentation is not provided to those refugees outside the camps.
Refugees in the camps live in generally poor, although improving, condi- tions with an alleged government position against improving facilities for fear of attracting more Rohingya (Hussain 2010). Refugees are not formally allowed to leave the camps without specified reason as the government per- ception is that access to the labour market would constitute local integration. However, many refugees, especially men, do leave through private arrange- ments with the authorities to work in nearby villages and towns and there is significant inter-mingling with the local community. Official local integration has not been considered an option for refugees in the camps and concerns over an influx of more Rohingya and the potential social and environmental problems in an already densely populated country have been often cited as reasons not to regularize the status of those outside the camps (Daily Star 2010). Nevertheless, even with little assistance, many of the 200,000 self-settled outside the camps have achieved a degree of de facto integration after years of stay in Bangladesh, aided by their cultural and linguistic simi- larities to the local Chittagonian people and shared Muslim faith (Human Rights Watch 2000).
The Rohingya’s irregular status, however, means that protection remains insecure, both for those inside the camps affected by corruption, exploitation and crime (Human Rights Watch 2000; Pittaway 2008) and those self-settled outside the camps, their attempts to assimilate notwithstanding. This was made clear in late 2009, when local authorities forcibly removed refugees who had self-settled on the periphery of Kutupalong camp, and in early 2010, after rising anti-Rohingya sentiment among the host population, to- gether with a campaign of violent arrests, detentions and forced repatriation by the local authorities, caused refugees outside the camps to flee inside Kutupalong camp for safety (MSF 2010; BBC 2010). Since then, the Rohingya in Bangladesh continue to live as a stateless population in exile, describing themselves as ‘caught between a crocodile and a snake’ (MSF 2002). Denied the right to return to Myanmar and, particularly for the self-settled population, unrecognized as refugees in their country of asylum, their statelessness and lack of recognition as citizens either in Myanmar or Bangladesh makes it all the more difficult to address their status and plight as refugees (Pittaway 2008).
While some 200,000 Rohingya were received in camps in Bangladesh, repa- triated and returned again to self-settle in Bangladesh, another group of some 15,000 Rohingya ultimately made their way to Malaysia. Those who arrived in the early 1990s were initially issued limited documentation in the form of protection and attestation letters by UNHCR, and were provided financial and material assistance through the Malaysian Red Crescent Society. For the first decade after their arrival in Malaysia, little is reported on the Rohingya
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as the population was apparently stable and well-tolerated in local society, having also achieved a level of unofficial, de facto integration in line with that of other migrant groups from countries such as Indonesia. While still margin- alized compared to local nationals due to lack of documentation, lower edu- cational levels and socio-economic status, they were able to access the informal labour market and had limited access to public services such as health programmes and, in some cases, education.
However, this period of general acceptance and de facto integration for Rohingya in Malaysia ended in 2002 when the Immigration Act was amended to impose stiffer penalties on undocumented persons and the formerly toler- ated Rohingya were now subjected to sometimes severe enforcement meas- ures. This also marked the beginning of a stricter migration control strategy embraced by the Malaysian government, to curb irregular migration through large-scale crackdowns on undocumented persons. These ‘blitzes’ typically involved intensified campaigns of immigration raids, sometimes preceded by amnesty periods to encourage irregular migrants to leave. Such crack- downs resulted in as many as 300,000 undocumented migrants reportedly leaving in 2002 and another 400,000 in 2005 (Aglionby 2002; Yeo 2005). In response to the increasing risk of arrest, detention and refoulement, UNHCR began to re-issue documentation to previously registered Rohingya as well as to new arrivals now being caught up in the enforcement of stricter immigration laws.
In 2004, the Rohingya in Malaysia came very close to an official local integration solution, due in part to a problem arising from the government’s immigration crackdown strategy whereby the deportation of some one mil- lion undocumented workers led to a severe labour shortage in the country. After negotiation with UNHCR, the government announced in parliament and in public that it had decided to grant temporary residence permits to 10,000 Rohingya residing in Malaysia, allowing the adults to work and their children to attend school. The Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister hailed it as ‘a way to resolve a human rights issue and resolve the labour crunch in the country’ (Agence France Press 2005; Bernama 2005). The Home Minister reaffirmed: ‘It is time they are absorbed into the labour force. They are already here and it would be a waste if we don’t recognize them or give them job opportunities’ (Inter Press Service 2005). However, the implementation exercise, which had been outsourced to local agencies and Rohingya volunteers, was halted by the government days after it began in August 2006 due to allegations of corruption in the process after many non-Rohingya were being issued application forms (Malaysiakini 2006). Despite the halt, the possibility of work permits reportedly sparked the travel of as many as 8,000 Rohingya who either departed or transited through Bangladesh by boat to Malaysia and Thailand in hopes of receiving a work permit (Lewa 2008a).
Since then, there have been no indications that Malaysia will resume im- plementation of the Rohingya programme. In March 2010, the Ministry of
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Home Affairs announced plans to issue government identification cards to refugees, including Rohingya and others, which would regularize their tem- porary stay but, this time, without the right to work (Amnesty International 2010). However, the plan was discarded not long after under distinctly different rhetoric from the Home Ministry spokesman who said: ‘no law allows us to issue a card to an illegal’ (Zappei 2010). Meanwhile, hoping to receive the promised permits, some Rohingya continue to arrive in Malaysia via a hazardous land or boat journey exposing them to the exploit- ation of brokers and traffickers (US Committee on Foreign Relations 2009) or government push-backs, as occurred off the shores of Thailand in 2009 and 2010 (Human Rights Watch 2011). With normal population growth and new arrivals, the Rohingya population in Malaysia has now reached an estimated 20,000 who today cope with the stricter immigration environment while struggling to retain the level of de facto integration they had earlier achieved.
Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse
The experience of the Rohingya in Bangladesh and Malaysia illustrates the situation faced by many refugees in parts of South and Southeast Asia. Given the absence of legal frameworks dealing with matters of asylum, and given the corresponding reliance on inconsistent ad hoc institutional practices, the protection environment for refugees and asylum seekers in Bangladesh, Malaysia and their regional neighbours in South and Southeast Asia has been strongly characterized by generally applicable migration control meas- ures and a reluctance to offer formal durable solutions.
Despite several refugee flows in the past century, most notably the large-scale displacement of Indochinese refugees during the 1970s and 1980s, South and Southeast Asia continue to hold to what Davies (2008) calls a ‘persistent rejection’ of international refugee law, and have some of the least developed refugee legislation and asylum institutions in the world. Among regional neighbours to Malaysia and Bangladesh, only Cambodia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste are signatories to the 1951 Convention relat- ing to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. In the Philippines, domes- tic legislation and permanent refugee institutions have been in place for some time, whereas Cambodia passed national laws and established a Refugee Office only in 2008. The fragility of this refugee framework in Cambodia was seen in acts of refoulement in late 2009, which highlights the fact that accession to the 1951 Convention is not in itself a cure-all. Among non-signatory countries such as Vietnam and Laos, there is no domestic refugee legislation and UNHCR remains a primary actor, where it works with governments toward the resolution of situations such as that of the Montagnard refugees and is involved in capacity-building of national immi- gration institutions; while in Indonesia, there were positive indications toward accession to the 1951 Convention but still no domestic legislation enacted to
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practically address a steady rise in new asylum seekers. Nevertheless, none of these countries host a population of refugees and asylum seekers comparable in size to that from Myanmar, which remains by far the largest source of refugees for countries in South and Southeast Asia.
The ongoing and protracted displacement from Myanmar exemplifies the unresolved nature of disputes in South and Southeast Asia, some of which are legacies of post-colonial power re-orderings and national integration ef- forts, which have made it difficult for states to reconcile contested body politics, regional cooperation initiatives and international human rights standards (Hedman 2006). Of the major countries of asylum for refugees from Myanmar, which include Thailand, Malaysia, India and Bangladesh, none is a signatory to the 1951 Convention. Other than certain prima facie determinations in response to mass influxes, refugee policies have rarely been based on formally-stated national policies, but rather have been formed through ad hoc practices adopted by primarily immigration or na- tional security authorities in response to prevailing domestic sentiments toward migration control and enforcement. With rapidly developing econo- mies and increasing globalization, these countries continue to witness spon- taneous regional migration to the extent that, in some instances, the number of undocumented foreign workers has been higher than the number of those documented (Weiss 2010). Mixed migration flows contribute to a blurred distinction between the relatively smaller refugee groups and the larger regular and irregular migrant population and this, combined with tenu- ous lines of ethnic balance and national identity, further reinforces states’ reliance on generally applicable, sometimes punitive, migration policies and a reluctance to offer formal durable solutions for even the most protracted refugee situations.
Following large-scale displacement which began with the Karens as early as 1984, Thailand hosts the largest number of refugees from Myanmar with some 140,000 camp-based refugees and some 200,000 more outside the camps of varying ethnicities and political profiles,
4 many of whom are un-
recognized and inter-mingled among a large population of migrants from Myanmar estimated at as many as 2 million persons (UNHCR 2011; USCRI 2009). The Immigration Act of 1979 (amended in 1992) provides the basis for immigration regulations and enforcement and is administered by the immigration bureau of the Thai police department, operating under the Ministry of Interior. Section 11 of the Act requires that entry into or exit from Thailand be in conformity with the channels specified by the Ministry of Interior, and Section 12 excludes entry of various persons. Penalties for those who enter without permission and for those aiding and abetting illegal migrants include arrest, prosecution, detention and deportation.
To these otherwise generally applicable enforcement measures, the Thai government has enacted some limited legislative exemptions for refugees and asylum seekers. These exemptions have been interpreted to be on the basis of Article 17 of the Immigration Act, which stipulates that ‘[u]nder
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special circumstance[s], the Minister [of Interior], by the consent of the Cabinet, may authorize an entry into the Kingdom subject to any condition or exempt any alien from compliance with this [Immigration] Act.’ Several cabinet resolutions and executive orders have been promulgated to this effect, regulating the admission into and stay of specific groups of refugees. Considering them under the rubric of national security, bodies such as the military, the National Security Council and the Ministry of Interior have played primary roles in dealing with refugees and asylum seekers. Their prac- tices have unsurprisingly been ad hoc, depending on the evolving security and political interests involved, with a variety of inconsistent terminologies having arisen for categories of displaced persons.
After establishing camps along the Myanmar border following the displace- ments which began in 1984, the Thai government convened provincial admis- sions boards in 1999 to regularize the status of those existing camp residents by screening them according to the term, ‘displaced persons fleeing fighting.’ Those who did not meet the criterion of ‘fleeing fighting’ and indeed all refugees and asylum seekers outside the camps were considered illegal mi- grants, subject to immigration regulations which include arrest, indefinite detention and deportation. Functions of the provincial admissions boards have been intermittently suspended since 2001 following two prominent se- curity incidents at the Myanmar Embassy and Ratchaburi Hospital, after which the Thai government chose to discourage new arrivals from Myanmar (Nation 2000). In 2003, after UNHCR-recognized refugees were discovered planning a demonstration, UNHCR was told to suspend refugee status determination for asylum seekers from Myanmar. UNHCR then began recognizing Myanmar asylum seekers as ‘persons of concern,’ or ‘POCs,’ further frustrating relations until the government announced in 2005 that all ‘POCs’ would be required to move to government camps. UNHCR ceased refugee status determination functions while the provincial admissions boards, this time with an additional category of those ‘fleeing political per- secution’ in an attempt to align the criteria more closely with the refugee definition, resumed functions until being suspended again in 2007 and since then functioning intermittently. For camp-based refugees, local integration was never considered and resettlement has been the preferred durable solu- tion. In 2009, Thailand was the largest resettlement operation globally with over 16,800 refugees resettled (UNHCR 2009b). Meanwhile, those outside the camps risk enforcement of generally applicable immigration measures, with consequences which range from referral to provincial admissions boards for relocation to camps or, for some new arrivals such as Rohingya boat people, potentially deadly push-backs to sea (Human Rights Watch 2011). Depending on the political climate and their ability to blend in with the migrant community in Bangkok or disappear into the Thailand– Myanmar borderlands, some have been able to evade immigration enforce- ment entirely. Lang (2002) observes how many refugees choose not to identify themselves as ‘persons of concern’ to UNHCR and other international actors
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and instead ‘negotiate their existence and face the hazards to which ordinary illegal immigrants are exposed as if the protection apparatus did not exist’ (p. 178).
Bangladesh hosts the second-largest number of refugees from Myanmar. None of the laws governing immigration, such as the Passport Act of 1920, the Foreigners Act of 1946 and the Control of Entry Act of 1952, make any reference to refugees or asylum seekers. Hence, by law all those without a visa or permit can be charged under the Foreigners Act for illegal entry or stay, under penalty of imprisonment up to five years and a fine or deport- ation. However, there exists an arguable tradition of providing asylum to populations fleeing persecution and human rights violations in neighbouring countries found in Article 31 of the constitution, which provides legal pro- tection for ‘every other person for the time being in Bangladesh, and in particular no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law.’ Article 25(1)(C) of the Fundamental Principles of State Policy also asserts that Bangladesh shall ‘support oppressed peoples throughout the world waging a just struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism.’ Bangladesh’s history of hosting Rohingya, with the earliest arrivals recorded in 1948, and its prima facie recognition of those residing in the camps has arguably been on this basis. As discussed above, local integration has not been considered for camp-based refugees and, despite years of de facto integration and inter-mingling for those self-settled outside the camps, the protection environment has remained precarious, subject to change depending on the political climate and attitudes of the host community.
While difficult to determine precisely, it is estimated that India hosts more than 60,000 persons from Myanmar, primarily ethnic Chin who settled in the Mizoram hills, with a much smaller number who travelled to Delhi to apply for refugee status (Alexander 2008; USCRI 2009). In India, the Foreigners Act of 1946 addresses the treatment of all foreigners, with persons violating their conditions of entry liable to face prosecution and deportation. However, the government of India has also introduced some measures for the protec- tion of certain categories of refugees and asylum seekers, particularly in in- stances of mass influx. These specific policies, which have included, at times, land allocation, access to social services and issuance of travel documents, depend greatly on India’s regional strategic or political considerations and the nationality of the asylum seeker, and have most notably been implemented for Tibetans and Sri Lankans.
Other refugees and asylum seekers in India, including those from Myanmar, do not benefit from government assistance and would technically fall under the generally applicable enforcement provisions of the Foreigners Act of 1946, but for the Indian court system’s reading in of international law. The Indian constitution states in Part IV, Article 51(c) that ‘the State shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another.’ On this basis, the Indian
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Supreme Court has also held that, subject to consistency with domestic jurisprudence, courts can ‘read in’ provisions of international conventions and norms into domestic law, including customary law principles of non-refoulement. Nevertheless, interventions depend on the individual inter- pretation of a particular judge or magistrate as well as the asylum seeker’s status with UNHCR. A significant population have not been registered with UNHCR and instead assimilate into the local population. Local integration has also not been considered for refugees from Myanmar, with resettlement being the preferred solution.
Malaysia hosts more than 80,000 refugees from Myanmar, including Rohingya as well as other ethnic groups; precise numbers may be much higher depending on estimates of the unregistered population (USCRI 2009; UNHCR 2009b; Amnesty International 2010). As in its Southeast Asian neighbours, the refugee population constitutes a small part of a larger migrant population, with foreign migrants comprising some 2 million out of Malaysia’s 12 million work force (Ng 2011) With no mention of asylum in the constitution nor any legislative provisions dealing with the right to seek asylum, refugees and asylum seekers are instead treated in ac- cordance with generally applicable immigration regulations as implemented by the immigration department, which operates under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The amended Immigration Act 1959/63 provides the basis for these immigration regulations, under which individuals are divided into two simple categories: legally documented persons and illegal undocumented persons.
As discussed above, the Immigration Act was amended in 2002 to impose stiffer penalties on undocumented persons. Penalties under the Act include arrest, detention, prosecution, imprisonment, deportation and even judicial caning (or whipping). The Act also provides significant enforcement powers to the police and immigration authorities for the arrest, detention and de- portation of any undocumented person, and permits, for example, detention for as long as is necessary to arrange for removal and deportation. The Act not only penalizes refugees, but makes any occupier of land liable to face similar fines, imprisonment or even judicial caning for ‘harbouring’ illegal immigrants. These ‘harbouring’ provisions have caused even charitable or- ganizations to fear that providing educational, health or other kinds of as- sistance to refugees and asylum seekers may be construed as ‘harbouring’ under the Act and be penalized accordingly. In the absence of domestic in- stitutions, UNHCR performs all functions of registration, status determin- ation and documentation, but without written agreement from the government, its interventions vary in effectiveness depending on the political climate. UNHCR documentation has not been formally recognized and af- fords a measure of protection only at the discretion of local enforcement authorities who may or may not choose to recognize it. Other than the aborted Rohingya permit programme in 2006 and withdrawn plans for government-issued refugee cards in 2010, measures towards formal local
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integration have never been seriously considered in Malaysia and resettlement remains the main, if not only, durable solution. In 2009, Malaysia represented one of the largest resettlement operations for UNHCR with over 7,500 people resettled from Malaysia (UNHCR 2009b).
Protection Space and Intermediate Solutions
In this regional context, the Rohingya have remained for almost two decades in a protracted situation and, without the benefit of the legal provisions of the 1951 Convention nor a domestic framework for refugee protection, have developed certain protection strategies and livelihood mechanisms to adapt to these circumstances and carve out for themselves their own protection space outside the boundaries of formal asylum. Adapting to migration control policies which fail to differentiate them from larger populations of irregular migrants, and sometimes subject to punitive immigration measures, they have endeavoured to find an intermediate, available solution, largely secure from refoulement but falling short of a regularized right to stay, with informal access to labour markets and certain available public services, yet still shy of the full realization of rights and entitlements which characterize local integration.
Several UNHCR-commissioned non-governmental as well as independent academic studies have examined the protection gaps and livelihoods of the estimated 200,000 refugees who have self-settled in various villages and towns outside the camps in the Cox’s Bazaar, Bandarban and Chittagong districts of Bangladesh as well as the 28,000 in the two government-administered camps of Nayapara and Kutupalong. In March 2007, UNHCR published summaries of consultations held with refugees in the two government-administered camps (UNHCR 2007a) and in May 2007, pub- lished an analysis of gaps in protection for camp-based Rohingya refugees based on statistical and sectoral reports by UNHCR, partner agencies and participatory assessments (UNHCR 2007b). In August 2008, a study com- missioned by the Netherlands examined the forced migration experiences, protection problems and livelihoods of self-settled Rohingya in Bangladesh through interviews conducted between June 2007 and February 2008 (Lewa 2008b). In May 2009, UNHCR and ILO commissioned a rapid appraisal of the livelihood capabilities of camp-based refugees in Bangladesh (UNHCR and ILO 2009). Other useful studies have also examined the situation of the now 20,000 Rohingya who settled in Malaysia. In 2005, a group of academics brought together by a local human rights organization interviewed Rohingya in Malaysia, examining the overall demographic profile, socio-economic status, livelihood, experiences and problems (Suaram 2005). Then in 2008– 2009, UNHCR conducted surveys of randomly selected heads of households having their documentation renewed between October 2008 and March 2009, as well as undertaking participatory assessments with focused groups of in- dividuals (UNHCR 2009a).
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A comparative analysis of these studies, while certainly not conclusive, permits some limited observations regarding the protection strategies and livelihood mechanisms developed by Rohingya who left Myanmar at the same time in the early 1990s but since then have remained in two separate countries, each with its own particular refugee policies and available protec- tion space. One observation is that, given the fluidity of borders in South and Southeast Asia, refugees often follow normal urbanization trends in search of greater economic opportunities, sometimes at the cost of personal security.
For example, the demographic profile of Rohingya in Malaysia reflects certain traditional patterns of urban migration, with a higher proportion of males, unmarried singles and smaller average household sizes in the relatively more urban cities of Malaysia than in Bangladesh. Selection of geographic location is also extremely urban in Malaysia with the vast majority centred in the three major cities of Penang, Selangor and Kuala Lumpur, compared to the more semi-urban coastal and hilly regions selected by refugees in Teknaf, Cox’s Bazaar and Ukhiya in Bangladesh. A major driver in this trend is likely the fact that wages in the informal labour market are several times higher in Malaysia, where the average labourer earns RM601 to RM800 per month (US$171–$228), compared to Bangladesh where a typical labourer earns BDT1,800 to 3,300 per month ($26–$50) (UNHCR 2009a; Lewa 2008b). Employment is more urban and service-oriented in Malaysia (construction, factories, restaurants and cleaning), compared to seasonal and day labour in agriculture and fishing in Bangladesh.
Given these economic parameters, Rohingya refugees remain in and con- tinue to be attracted to Malaysia, despite the more punitive migration control measures enforced there and potential exploitation or abuse by employers due to their irregular status. Arrest and deportation rates are extremely high in Malaysia, with almost half of all individuals having experienced arrest and multiple deportations, as well as a significant number reporting being whipped. In contrast, arrest and deportation were not significantly reported in Bangladesh until recent crackdowns in early 2010. Despite this, the migra- tory trend is that Rohingya travel from Bangladesh to Malaysia, and not vice versa. One local media account portrays Rohingya in Bangladesh who ‘toil in poverty and dream of better jobs in nearby Malaysia, which is viewed as a Muslim promised land of prosperity and opportunity’ (Rahman 2010), con- trasting strongly with human rights groups which describe Malaysia as an ‘unwelcome and dangerous place’ (Amnesty International 2010). Possession of documentation is not determinative, as while many Rohingya in Malaysia possess UNHCR documentation, this has not been formally recognized by the government as a substitute for national identification cards and may not prevent enforcement of immigration laws. By contrast, in Bangladesh, neither the Rohingya outside the camps nor most local nationals possess formal documentation. However, recently-listed voters have been issued with identity cards after it was discovered that some Rohingya had been registered to vote, in a development carrying negative effects for Rohingya no longer able to
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hide their identity (Lewa 2008b). Increasingly hostile popular attitudes and decreasing assimilation have contributed to a deteriorating protection envir- onment in Bangladesh since early 2010, which may persuade even more to migrate to Malaysia.
This interplay of urban migration, access to livelihoods and personal se- curity is one illustration of how refugees navigate their own protection space. While not a strictly defined term, UNHCR has most recently described ‘pro- tection space’ as ‘the extent to which a conducive environment exists for the internationally recognized rights of refugees to be respected and their needs to be met’ (UNHCR 2009c). Indicators include: absence of threats of refoule- ment, arrest or detention; freedom of movement, association and expression; access to livelihoods and the labour market; adequate shelter and living con- ditions; legal residency rights and documentation; access to public services; and harmonious relationships with other communities (ibid). Under this rubric, the Rohingya example illustrates that, while refugees have limited capacities to influence the legal and political factors of available protection space, such as documentation and residency rights and risks of arrest, they do demonstrate significant capacities in relation to livelihoods, access to public services and relationships with the host community. Moreover, migratory patterns indicate that their capacities in this respect, combined with available social and economic opportunities, may drive them over and above personal security concerns. With respect to urban refugees, Bruijn (2009) observes this dualism in urban settings, noting increased exposure to exploitation and in- security, on the one hand, and the particular resourcefulness of refugees and potentially better access to education, health, credit and communication facil- ities, on the other.
However, the superior economic opportunities available in Malaysia do not necessarily correspond to greater de facto integration. Local integration has been characterized as comprising three components, economic, social/cultural and political (UNHCR 2003). The economic component includes progressive self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods, the social and cultural component relates to interactions with host communities without discrimination or ex- ploitation, and the political component involves the progressive realization of rights and entitlements enjoyed by local citizens (ibid). Jacobsen (2001) and Banki (2004) have separately argued for the recognition of de facto or inter- mediate integration, particularly in relation to self-settled refugees who remain in an insecure and temporary legal status but who have achieved a level of unofficial integration. Distinct from local integration as an end result, they have set out some indicators of this sort of integration, including, among others: refugees living dispersed among the local population, social network- ing through, for example, intermarriage, and land ownership or unofficial or official access to it.
In the case of the Rohingya, inter-mixing with locals appears greater in Bangladesh, where many Rohingya were supported by locals upon arrival with easier interaction given their shared similar linguistic and cultural
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background. In Malaysia, however, few have friendships with locals and most live near other Rohingya. In Bangladesh, a significant proportion of Rohingya married locals and Rohingya men favour intermarriage with Bangladeshis as a protection tool, compared to Malaysia, where Rohingya rarely married locals and, if they did marry non-Rohingya, these were gen- erally other illegal foreigners, primarily Indonesians. Accommodation is strictly rental in Malaysia while options in Bangladesh include ownership, rental or housing free-of-charge or in exchange for work. Hence, while most Rohingya in Bangladesh have remained in the same place of residence since the early 1990s, those in Malaysia have been more transient and mobile. Access to education for children also appears higher in Bangladesh, where there are several non-government schools and in Cox’s Bazaar refugees’ access to government schools is comparable to locals, whereas in Malaysia, lack of documentation prevents almost all refugees from accessing public education and there are only a few community-run or religious schools for refugees. Access to education does not necessarily correspond with education levels, as significant numbers are able to speak, read and write Malay, Burmese and English in Malaysia where such skills are more necessary, com- pared to very high levels of illiteracy in Bangladesh.
Indicators such as social networking and intermarriage, access to land ownership and other access points to the local population suggest that su- perior economic opportunities in Malaysia alone do not necessarily corres- pond to greater de facto integration, particularly with respect to the social and cultural components. On the other hand, migratory patterns and the lure of greater earning potential in Malaysia, particularly where there is even the remote possibility of an official integration solution, may continue to outweigh the de facto social and cultural integration available in Bangladesh.
Implications for Refugee Protection
Given the scarcity of state signatories to the 1951 Convention and domestic legal frameworks, refugee policies in South and Southeast Asia will likely continue to be dictated by generally applicable, sometimes punitive, migration control policies rather than a formal legal framework for protection. Case-by-case exceptions to the rule may arise but national treatment of refu- gees and asylum seekers continues to be ad hoc, depending on the nationality of the asylum seeker, regional strategic and political considerations and otherwise based on a remote sense of international obligation or humanitar- ianism left to the discretion of field-level immigration officials or magistrate judges.
The predominance of this migration control-oriented approach, as well as the general reluctance to assume additional responsibility for finding durable solutions, have deep roots in Asia which arguably can be traced to the re- gion’s first major responsibility-sharing agreement, the Comprehensive Plan
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of Action for Indochinese Refugees (CPA), adopted in 1989. In this plan, recognized as a major multilateral achievement to address a continuing influx of Indochinese boat people, push-backs by countries of first asylum and decreasing third country resettlement opportunities, a local integration solu- tion was never offered and instead resettlement was the primary mechanism, entrenching in some Asian states a historical precedent for relying on Western-supported permanent solutions (Robinson 2004). Davies (2008) goes even further to suggest that Southeast Asian states learned from the CPA that refusal to provide even temporary asylum would reap more reset- tlement offers. Through the CPA, of the nearly 250,000 Vietnamese boat people given temporary asylum in Malaysia in eight camps, some 240,000 were resettled in Western countries, while some 9,000 returned to Vietnam (UNHCR 2001). Today, refugees from Myanmar represent the largest group benefiting from resettlement with 24,800 resettled, primarily from Thailand and Malaysia, in 2009 (UNHCR 2009b). Nevertheless, there remain constant references to the CPA and a perception that the international community is not doing enough to persuade third countries to resettle more refugees from ‘first’ asylum states. This persistent impasse on solutions is a major reason why Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh were identified in June 2008 among four other situations to be targeted under the Protracted Refugee Situation Initiative aimed to ameliorate conditions, ensure protection and identify ap- propriate solutions (UNHCR 2008a). Yet it is clear that this situation extends beyond the Rohingya in the camps to those self-settled outside the camps in Bangladesh, those in the cities of Malaysia as well as to other refugee groups throughout South and Southeast Asia. Of the 5.2 million of the world’s refugees identified as living in exile for more than five years, the largest proportion are in Asia (ibid.).
Built into the CPA were also migration management components, such as screening mechanisms and an orderly departure programme, devised on the basis that not all of the boat people were leaving their country for refugee-related reasons and that resettlement had created a pull factor, fuel- ling migratory pressures by providing incentives for people to leave Vietnam (UNHCR 1995). This recognition that the nature of the exodus had changed from prima facie refugees to mixed migration, including both refugees and economic migrants, similarly set a pattern for refugee protection overlapping heavily with migration control, which carries on until now. Today, regional and ministerial processes in South and Southeast Asia which deal with refu- gees and asylum seekers focus primarily on labour migration or linkages between security and migration. Refugees and asylum seekers are often men- tioned but without clear reference to or foundation in the rights-based frame- work of protection, in part out of a reluctance to encroach on regional principles of ‘non-interference’ and national sovereignty (Abrar 2001; Pearson 2009). When ASEAN states were confronted with the Rohingya boat people issue in 2009, rather than activating human rights mechanisms within the ASEAN charter, the issue was delegated to the Bali Process on
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People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crimes. Despite the Bali Process’s positive initiatives on trafficking, the handling of a protracted refugee situation within a process established to address border control, security, law enforcement and documentation fraud, typifies the re- gion’s preoccupation with notions of illegal migration and risks further se- curitization of migration and displacement-related issues (Matthieson 2009; Hedman 2009). Even processes such as the Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants struggle to gain traction when outnumbered by other predominantly migration-oriented bodies, where pro- gress is measured by the slow and gradual insertion of human rights language rather than a direct discussion of the root causes of displacement or pro- posals for comprehensive solutions.
Acknowledging the challenges for humanitarian actors and their limitations in attempting to ‘unlock’ protracted refugee situations, UNHCR laid out a targeted, staged, comprehensive and developmental approach which balances long-term solutions with current protection interventions (UNHCR 2008a). On protracted situations, Durieux (2009) has similarly acknowledged that responsibility-sharing often fails to deliver fairness and the protection frame- work ‘does not contain in itself either the normative or cooperative instru- ments which will deliver the sought-after permanent solutions.’ Hence, he advocates that protection and solutions be worked on creatively and dynam- ically all the time to move a regime toward these twin objectives (ibid.). This creative and dynamic approach is particularly relevant in the context of South and Southeast Asia as conceptualizations of protection and solutions become increasingly intertwined. Protection strategies which not only pro- mote enjoyment of legal and political rights, such as safety from detention and refoulement, but also incorporate many of the social and economic elem- ents that constitute a local integration solution, such as access to livelihoods and harmonious host community relations, are very relevant in the many urban spaces of South and Southeast Asia (UNHCR 2009b). At the same time, local integration is also increasingly being recognized not as a once and for all solution but instead involving a complex and gradual two-way process, both dynamic and multi-faceted (UNHCR 2005). Recognition of intermediate stages of integration, often falling outside the boundaries of formal asylum, independent of international assistance and, at times, in defiance of or delib- erately invisible to host government regulations, is all the more important to address the several protracted situations in the region and should be factored into any protection strategy.
While providing a good example of the impasse between migration control policies and durable solutions, the Rohingya displacement also illustrates certain ambiguities in the protection space available to refugees and migrants alike. In Bangladesh, government-recognized Rohingya refugees in camps live next to unrecognized self-settled Rohingya who come from the same original displacement group, with those within the camps awaiting a formal solution through potential resettlement or repatriation and those outside the camps
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achieving a level of de facto integration despite being precariously without status. In Malaysia, UNHCR-recognized Rohingya refugees also found a level of unofficial integration similar to other migrant groups until an immi- gration policy shift in 2002 exacerbated their undocumented status and the attempt to regularize their status, reconciling their long-term presence in the country with domestic labour needs and humanitarian considerations, was abandoned. While not absolving states of their own obligations, an acknowledgement of the solutions impasse in the context of South and Southeast Asia implies understanding that, whereas governments may be reluctant to assume additional formal responsibilities toward durable solu- tions, there may nevertheless be room for intermediate solutions, such as the de facto integration achieved by the Rohingya. Furthermore, the dis- course of mixed migration continues to resonate strongly among states in the region, reflected in Southeast Asia being a focal point for UNHCR’s 10-Point Plan of Action (UNHCR 2007c). With mixed migration likely to remain the norm and migration management the common language of states and regional processes in South and Southeast Asia, intermediate solutions most likely to find success will be those which capitalize on the ambiguities and overlaps between migration management and refugee pro- tection and can be framed in their migratory context with potential migra- tion benefits.
The protection strategies and livelihood mechanisms developed by popula- tions such as the Rohingya also raise certain worthwhile considerations re- garding the meaning of protection and possibilities for solutions. Most notably, these observations show that, without the benefit of the legal terms of the 1951 Convention, refugees have the capacity to carve out their own protection space and achieve a level of de facto integration, even in the face of punitive immigration enforcement measures and sometimes beyond what international actors or the formal refugee framework can offer. While their capacity to influence the legal and political circumstances may be limited, their ability and determination to navigate the economic, social and cultural aspects of available protection space should not be underestimated.
UNHCR’s Protracted Refugee Situation Initiative places particular focus on, among other things, self-reliance possibilities for sustainable livelihoods, rooted in the principle that exiled populations should be able to meet a progressively greater proportion of their own needs and enjoy a steadily growing level of prosperity and human security (UNHCR 2008a, 2008b). With fluid borders and high human mobility in South and Southeast Asia, refugees will likely continue to follow normal migratory patterns and urban- ization trends in search of greater economic opportunities, despite concerns over personal security, and have demonstrated significant capacities to do so. In light of this, protection and solutions strategies should factor in self- reliance and sustainable livelihoods by seeking to empower a refugee-driven solution through refugee-demonstrated capacities. For example, while
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UNHCR’s urban policy acknowledges that refugees have little alternative but
to join the informal economy, and recommends initiatives toward self-reliance
‘in an unobtrusive manner’ (UNHCR 2009c), more overt efforts may be
required to match the fluid labour situation in the region. At the same
time, it is important to note that economic opportunities alone do not ne-
cessarily equate to greater social and cultural inclusion. Hence, a comprehen-
sive approach toward solutions would need to incorporate holistic social,
cultural as well as economic inclusion by advocating for measures which
authorize refugees to engage with the host community in all dimensions of
life. Successful protection and solution strategies in South and Southeast Asia
will be those which embrace the ambiguities between migration management
and refugee protection, focus on states not obstructing the de facto integra-
tion available to refugees and migrants alike, and empower the local capa-
cities of refugees to carve out their own protection space and find an
intermediate solution.
1. The views expressed are the personal views of the author and may not necessarily
be shared by the United Nations or by UNHCR.
2. For a concise summary of the Rohingya’s historical displacement to Bangladesh,
see Human Rights Watch (2000).
3. For a recent overview of the situation of Rohingya in Myanmar, see Irish Centre
for Human Rights (2010).
4. For a detailed understanding of the nature and causes of displacement from
Myanmar to Thailand and the varying ethnic and political profiles of refugees,
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