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Chapter Two

American Foreign Policy

Glenn P. Hastedt

Dateline: The South China Sea

By definition, foreign policy is outward-looking and seeks to promote the national interest. Disagreement exists over how best to anticipate threats and recognize opportunities found beyond state borders. Do we look at the structure of the international system, changing relations between countries, or specific events? Each of these focal points presents itself as the United States formulates a foreign policy to respond to Chinese actions in the South China Sea.1

Some 648,000 square nautical miles, the South China Sea is one of the world’s largest semi-enclosed seas. Five countries (six if Taiwan is counted) with a combined population of about 270 million are found along its borders: China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia. All claim 28sovereignty over some or all of it. China argues that these islands have been Chinese territory “since antiquity.” At issue is control not only over the waters and the airspace above it, but also over some four hundred to six hundred rocks, reefs, atolls, and islands. The two largest groupings of land in the South China Sea are the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Both have been the focal point of military-political conflicts involving competing claims made by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The United States has taken no official position on these conflicting territorial claims, other than rejecting China’s claim to sovereignty over virtually all of it.

Three geostrategic factors come together to frame the South China Sea foreign policy problem facing the United States. First, the South China Sea is a critical passageway for global commercial shipping and naval operations linking the Middle East and Africa to Asia. The amount of oil passing through its waters is six times larger than that going through the Suez Canal. Second, evidence points to the presence of potentially significant natural energy reserves beneath the South China Sea that the Chinese media refer to as “the second Persian Gulf.” Third, the South China Sea is of great strategic importance to China. It is often spoken of in terms comparable to the United States’ traditional view of the Caribbean Sea. To a considerable degree it was in recognition of China’s growing economic and military power, along with the key role that the South China Sea played in China’s foreign policy thinking, that President Obama called for a “pivot” to Asia when he became president.

Tensions between the United States and China have grown noticeably over the past decade. As China’s military and economic power have increased, the U.S. has placed greater emphasis on Asia in its foreign policy. In November 2013, after China unilaterally claimed the right to police a contested portion of the airspace over the South China Sea, the United States sent two B-52 bombers into that zone without asking permission. In May 2014, without notice, China unilaterally placed a $1 billion deep water oil drilling rig on the shore of an island claimed by both China and Vietnam. The move was described in the press as a possible “game changer” because expansion of the Chinese navy would be required to protect its investment. Three months later, China rejected a U.S. call for a freeze on “provocative acts” in the South China Sea, stating that “as a responsible great power, China is ready to maintain restraint but for unreasonable provocative activities, China is bound to make a clear and firm reaction.”2

Matters escalated considerably in 2015, when China began to build a “Great Wall of Sand” in the South China Sea; this effort was defined by China as a “lawful and justified” land reclamation project within its own borders. The project involves the construction of coral reefs and rocks within the Spratly Islands, along with harbors, piers, helipads, and possibly an airstrip. State Department officials characterized it as an unprecedented attempt to “militarize outposts on disputed land features.” By early 2016, China had moved forward, placing surface-to-air missiles with a range of 125 miles on a disputed island. In a counter move, the United States. 

29announced that it was on track to reposition 60 percent of the navy to the Pacific by 2020. Later that year, the U.S. Navy sent a destroyer near a contested island. The government claimed that it was the first of what they defined as freedom of navigation patrols, intended to challenge China’s “excessive maritime claims” and demonstrate the U.S. commitment to free maritime passage through the South China Sea. China countered by carrying on military exercises in disputed waters. 2016 also saw the International Court of Justice reject China’s claims of historical rights to most of the South China Sea, a ruling that China has not accepted.

During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump openly criticized Obama for not responding forcefully enough to China’s expansionist South China Sea policies. However, it was only after nuclear talks with North Korea faltered, due to what he saw as China’s reluctance to bring pressure on North Korea, that Trump began to increase the U.S. presence in the South China Sea through B-52 bomber and surveillance flyovers and increased use of freedom of navigation patrols. The military effectiveness of these actions is unclear. In 2018 Admiral Philip Davidson, head of the US. Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress that “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.” Others note that the stepped-up U.S. naval presence also increases the risk of accidents, which could escalate into conflicts. For example, in 2018 a Chinese destroyer came within 45 yards of the USS Decatur, a guided missile destroyer.

This chapter lays the foundation for developing a deeper understanding of the foreign policy problems facing the United States today by presenting three broad international political perspectives used to study world politics and then identifying key structural features in world politics. Attention then turns to the contemporary international system, examining three important issues (terrorism, globalization, and American hegemony) and comparing American and non-American views of the world today.

President Obama’s “Asian Pivot” was not the first time that the United States had come to recognize the potential importance of Asia to its military and economic security. A first Asian Pivot occurred more than a century ago when Commodore Matthew Perry led four ships into Tokyo Bay on July 8, 1853 (see the Historical Lesson).

Historical Lesson

The First Asian Pivot: Commodore Perry’s Opening of Japan

For some two centuries, Japan had managed to severely limit the access by foreigners to its territory. Japanese leaders had expelled missionaries, whom they had come to consider as overly zealous, and foreign traders, whom they saw as taking advantage of their people, in 1639. By the mid-1800s this policy was becoming harder to maintain. In the 1830s, U.S. naval vessels stationed in China had already made several voyages to Japan in an effort to establish relations.

By the time Commodore Perry set sail to Japan, a combination of factors had made the opening of Japan a high-priority foreign policy issue. The annexation of California now provided the United States with Pacific Ocean ports, raising the possibility of expanding U.S. trade with China. Japan’s geographic location and rumors of its large coal reserves made access to Japanese ports an important part of any move to increase the U.S. economic presence in Asia. American missionaries also lobbied for access to Japan, convinced that Protestantism would be accepted by the Japanese, who had earlier rejected Catholicism. Stories of Japanese mistreatment of shipwrecked American sailors gave rise to even more calls for opening Japan.

Perry presented Japanese leaders with a letter from President Millard Fillmore outlining U.S. objectives. Before leaving, he informed them that he would return the following year. After his return, the Treaty of Kanagawa was signed on March 5, 1854; it was subsequently ratified unanimously by the Senate. The Treaty provided the United States with two coaling stations and protection for shipwrecked sailors but did not include commercial concessions or the guarantee of trading rights. In 1858, a follow-on treaty gave the United States two additional coaling stations and trading rights and established the principle of extraterritoriality (American citizens arrested in Japan would be tried by U.S. courts). Because this provision was common to treaties between Western powers and Asian states at the time, such agreements came to be known as unequal treaties.

Within a decade, Japan turned these agreements to their fullest advantage, using them to spur reforms to its feudal political and economic systems. The resulting Meiji Restoration transformed Japan into an industrial and military power, as testified to by its victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. The latter gave Japan control over Taiwan and much of Manchuria, as well as a dominant position in Korea. Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for helping bring about an end to the Russo-Japanese war.

Over the next several decades, Japan’s growing power also set the stage for a series of military and diplomatic interactions with the United States that would steadily deepen America’s involvement in Asian regional politics. One of the first points of dispute was the U.S. annexation of Hawaii in 1898. The Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905 was designed to prevent future disputes over areas of influence. In return for recognizing American control over the Philippines, the United States recognized Japan’s dominant role in Korea. This agreement was followed in short order by an American show of military strength and another agreement. In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt sent the entire American battle fleet of sixteen ships on an around-the-world tour, and Japan was one of its most important ports of call. At the time, the United States had the world’s second largest navy and Japan’s was the fifth largest. The next year both countries signed the Root-Takahira Agreement, promising to respect the political- military status quo in the Pacific, support the Open Door policy in China, and honor China’s political independence and integrity. This agreement failed to hold; during World War I Japan sought to extend its dominance over China by issuing the 21 Points and seizing control of Germany’s Asian colonial holdings.

Applying the Lesson

1. How do the foreign policy goals regarding Asia held by recent administrations compare with those that motivated Admiral Perry’s opening of Asia?

2. What lessons does Admiral Perry’s opening of Asia have for current U.S. foreign policy toward China and Japan?

3. How would realists, neoliberals, and constructivists evaluate U.S. foreign policy toward Japan as described here? How would this assessment compare to their views on President Trump’s Asia policy?

Thinking about the World

Disagreement about the causes and consequences of foreign policy decisions are an enduring feature of the commentary on American foreign policy. For example, some argue that Russia’s 2014 intervention into Ukraine was pushback provoked by Western military and economic expansion toward its borders. Others counter that full responsibility lies with Russia, and was a product of Russian domestic politics, most notably Putin’s declining popularity.3 A basic reason for disagreements over such an important foreign policy issue is different theoretical perspectives about the fundamental nature of world politics. Three perspectives are particularly important for understanding the larger debate over what American foreign policy should and can be: realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism.

Realism

The first theoretical perspective is realism.4 For realists, world politics involves a constant struggle for power carried out under conditions that border on anarchy. There is little room for embracing universal principles or taking on moral crusades. The acknowledged founding voice of American realism was Hans Morgenthau, who captured the essence of realism in stating that leaders “think and act in terms of interests defined as power.” For realists, peace—defined as the absence of war—is possible only when states follow their own narrowly defined national interests. Early realists stressed human nature as the central driving force in world politics, but later realists focused attention on the central role played by the structure of the international system. Once in place, the international system becomes a force that states cannot control; instead, it controls the states.

Neoliberalism

A second theoretical perspective is neoliberalism.5 While conceding that the international system is anarchic in many respects, neoliberalism rejects the pessimistic realist conclusion that world politics is essentially a conflictual process from which there is no escape. Instead, neoliberalism sees world politics as an arena in which all participants (states and nonstate actors) can advance their own interests peacefully without threatening others. This becomes possible by creating conditions that allow the inherent rationality of individuals to come to the forefront. Among the primary factors that promote peaceful intercourse are democracy, respect for international laws, participation in international organizations, restraints on weapons, and free trade. Although many of his views are closer to traditional liberalism, President Woodrow Wilson, who championed the League of Nations after World War I, is the American statesperson most associated today with neoliberalism. Long dismissed by realists as idealistic, Wilsonianism began to reassert itself as a powerful voice in American foreign policy after the Vietnam War.

Constructivism

The third theoretical perspective relevant to American foreign policy is constructivism.6 While realism and neoliberalism differ in their interpretations of the essential features of world politics, they both share the conviction that the nature of world politics is fixed and that objective rules for conducting foreign policy can be derived from it. Constructivists takes issue with this idea, asserting that international politics is not shaped by fixed underlying forces but by our perceptions. Ideas and cultural and historical experience give meaning to what we see. Free trade is not inherently a force for peace or a cause of war. How it is evaluated depends on personal and societal experiences with it.

Perceptions of the world change over time and as we interact with others. An entire generation of Americans has grown up after the end of the Cold War and sees American global dominance as natural. As a result, many in the United States have trouble understanding how revolutionary and unnatural such dominance can appear to others.7 One year after it was announced, a commentator noted that, from China’s perspective, Obama’s Asian Pivot “was pulled right out of the old Cold War playbook. . . . Washington is trying to inflame new tensions by isolating it and emboldening the countries China has territorial disputes with.”8 The administration soon quietly dropped the phrase “Asian Pivot” and begin speaking about the U.S. “rebalancing” to Asia.

International System: Structural Constants

This section and the following two present a survey of those forces in the international system most often seen as driving state behavior: structural constants, evolutionary trends, and the dominant features of today’s 33international system. While realists, neoliberals, and constructivists would disagree on how to rank their relative importance, all would agree that an effective U.S. foreign policy requires thinking critically about each of them. Structural constants include decentralization, the self-help nature of the international system, and stratification.

Decentralization

The first enduring feature of the international system is decentralization. From the realist perspective, no central political institutions exist to make laws or see to their enforcement in the international arena. There is no common political culture to anchor an agreed-on set of norms governing the behavior of states. The result is a highly competitive international system with a constant expectation of violence and very little expectation that international law or appeals to moral principles will greatly influence the resolution of an issue.

Decentralization does not mean anarchy. For realists, ordered anarchy would be a more apt characterization. Enforceable laws and common values may be absent, but there are rules limiting permissible behavior and directions to follow in settling disputes, lending a measure of predictability and certainty to international transactions. Rules are less permanent than laws, are more general in nature, and tend to be normative statements rather than commands. They grow out of the basic principles of self-help and decentralization and are rooted in the distribution of power in the international system. As power distribution changes, so will the rules.

Neoliberals hold a different interpretation. In their view, rules are negotiated, voluntarily entered into, and obeyed by states trying to advance their national interests. Once established, rules often demonstrate a remarkably long lifespan that outlasts the specific problem they were designed to address or the identity and power of those who negotiated them into existence.

Constructivism takes exception to both realism and liberalism, arguing that “anarchy is what states make of it.” To constructivists, anarchy lacks a fixed definition. States may see anarchy as requiring more power or requiring cooperation, depending on the values they hold and their past experiences.

Self-Help System

The second structural constant in the international system grows out of the first. According to realists the international system is a self-help system. A state must rely on itself to accomplish its foreign policy goals. To do otherwise runs the risk of manipulation or betrayal at the hands of another state. It is important to stress that Great Powers as well as smaller powers both need to avoid excessive dependence on others.

The self-help principle challenges policy makers to bring goals and power resources into balance. Pursuing more goals than the available resources allow or squandering resources on secondary objectives saps the vitality of the state and makes it unable to respond effectively to future challenges. Many argue that Vietnam is a classic example of the crippling consequences of an inability to balance goals and resources. American policy produced steady increases in the level of the U.S. commitment to the war, but it did not bring the United States any closer to victory. Instead, the reverse occurred: The longer the United States remained in Vietnam and the greater its commitment, the more elusive victory became.

Neoliberals reject the emphasis on self-help. From their perspective, the ability of states and individuals to recognize the costs and benefits of different strategies will allow them to pursue cooperative, mutually beneficial solutions to problems and avoid the use of force in settling disputes. Constructivism offers a cautionary perspective, suggesting that self-help can be interpreted as taking risks or acting cautiously to keep goals and resources in balance; it can mean acting alone or in cooperation with others. The perspective adopted reflects societal norms, values, and ideas; as those change, so will policy.

A Stratified System

The third structural constant in the international system is its stratified nature. The equality of states embedded in the concept of sovereignty is a legal myth. The principle of sovereignty dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia and the beginnings of the modern state system in 1648. It holds that no legal authority exists above the state, except that which the state voluntarily accepts. The reality of international politics is quite different; sovereignty is a matter of degree rather than an absolute. States are “born unequal.”9 The resources from which states draw their power are distributed unequally across the globe. As such, the ability of states to accomplish their foreign policy objectives (and their very choice of objectives) varies from state to state.

The principle of stratification leaves opens the question of how unevenly power is distributed. The three most commonly discussed forms of stratification are unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. In a unipolar system, one state possesses more power than any other. No other state or alliance of states can match it. In a bipolar system, two relatively equal states have more power than all others. Typically, permanent alliance systems form around the two states. A multipolar system is characterized by the presence of a core group of states that are relatively equal in power; floating coalitions—rather than permanent alliances—form as states join and leave to accomplish goals and protect their interests.

Neoliberals would argue that this picture is overdrawn. Rather than being organized around the global or regional distribution of power, the 35international system should be seen as organized around issue areas, or regimes, each of which is organized around its own set of rules and norms. Here again, enlightened self-interest is expected to produce regimes based on accommodation rather than domination. As a perspective for studying foreign policy and international politics, constructivism urges caution in creating fixed power hierarchies and classifying states and is reluctant to provide firm guidance on which policy to adopt or how to define the global context in which states act. This is seen by its advocates as a major contribution to American foreign policy and by its detractors as a major limitation.

International System: Evolutionary Trends

Although the basic structure of the international system has endured over time, the system itself is not unchanging. Four post–World War II trends are especially notable for their ability to influence the conduct of U.S. foreign policy: diffusion of power, issue proliferation, actor proliferation, and regional diversity.

Diffusion of Power

Power, the ability to achieve objectives, is typically viewed as something we possess—a commodity to be acquired, stored, and manipulated. However, it must also be viewed as a relational concept. Ultimately, it is not how much power a state has, but how much power it has on a specific issue compared to those with whom it is dealing.

The postwar era has seen a steady diffusion of power. The causes for this are many. After examining the decline of empires throughout history, Robert Gilpin asserts that a cycle of hegemonic decline can be identified.10 As the cycle progresses, the burdens of imperial leadership, increased emphasis on the consumption of goods and services, and the international diffusion of technology conspire to sap the strength of the imperial state and bring about its decline.

Foreign policy success and failures can contribute to the diffusion of power. The effect of foreign policy failures is relatively easy to anticipate. In the wake of defeat, the search for scapegoats, disillusionment with the task undertaken, and a desire to avoid similar situations can be followed. The Vietnam War is held by many to have been responsible for destroying the postwar domestic consensus on the purpose of American power. For example, economic sanctions directed against Fidel Castro in Cuba in the 1960s failed to bring down his regime and only made him more dependent on Soviet support.

American foreign policy successes have also hastened the decline of U.S. dominance. The reconstructions of the Japanese and Western European economies rank as two truly remarkable achievements. In a 36sense, U.S. foreign policy has been almost too successful. These economies are now major economic rivals of the U.S. economy and often outperform it. However, the Japanese case also illustrates that there is nothing inevitable about the process of power diffusion. In the 1960s, observers spoke of the Japanese economic miracle and the threat it presented to U.S. economic power. In the 1990s, reference was instead being made to Japan’s lost decade and the many economic problems it faced.

Issue Proliferation

The second area of evolutionary change in the international arena is issue proliferation. Not long ago, there was a relatively clear-cut foreign affairs issue hierarchy. At the top were a relatively small number of high-politics problems involving questions of national security, territorial integrity, and political independence. At the bottom were the numerically more prevalent low-politics issues of commerce, energy, environment, and so on. Although largely intuitive, the line between high and low politics was well established and the positions occupied by issues in this hierarchy were relatively fixed, allowing policy makers to become familiar with the issues before them and the options open to them. Today, this is no longer the case.

The high-politics category has become crowded. Natural resource scarcity moved from a low-politics to a high-politics foreign policy problem after the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. In 2014, the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review and other studies pointed to the growing national security threat posed by global climate change. Issues may also change position in the hierarchy for political reasons. Human rights, which was a major concern for the United States when Jimmy Carter was president, returned to a low-politics position when Reagan took office. Its importance has continued to fluctuate over time, most recently returning to a low-politics position under Trump.

Accompanying the high-low politics division is a long-standing distinction between foreign and domestic policy, which has become increasingly difficult to maintain. How, for example, do we classify attempts to fight international drug cartels? On one level this is a foreign policy problem. The United States is actively engaged with helping the Mexican government combat the drug cartels operating out of that country. These organizations realize more than $20 billion in profits from U.S. sales alone. Yet this is also a matter of domestic policy, as some states have legalized the recreational use of marijuana.

A term increasingly being used to characterize these and other issues with significant domestic and international dimensions is intermestic (inter from “international” and mestic from “domestic”).11 Other examples of emerging intermestic policy areas include food safety and the regulation of passenger airplanes. Traditionally, food safety has been treated as a domestic policy matter. This is no longer realistic, as food production has become 37globalized. Between 2000 and 2006, the value of U.S. food imports doubled, to $2.2 trillion; yet, traditionally, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspects less than 1 percent of the imported food products under its jurisdiction. Airline safety became front page news in 2019 when two Boeing 737 Max 8 planes on international flights crashed within months of each other. International airline safety regulations are largely left in the hands of national regulators such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). As a U.S. plane, the FAA had certified the safety of the Boeing 737 Max 8. The United States was virtually the last country to ground the plane after the crashes. Following the tragedies, serious doubts have arisen about its safety and FAA inspection policy.

Actor Proliferation

The third evolutionary feature of the international system is actor proliferation. On the one hand, actor proliferation has taken the form of an expansion in the number of states. Today, there are 190 countries, compared to fifty-eight states in 1930. The United States has diplomatic relations with all but three (four if Taiwan is counted). This expansion in the number of states has brought with it a corresponding expansion in the number of views that can be found on any given problem. Eighty-four states attended the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. In contrast, 185 countries attended the 2015 Paris Climate Summit conference; adding the European Union and others brought the total number of participants to 196. The vast number of states and the diversity of views expressed in these global meetings now present great obstacles to achieving an agreement.

Although the growth in the number of new states has slowed, continued growth is taking place in a second area: nonstate actors. While states have never been the only actors in world politics, it is only comparatively recently that nonstate actors have appeared in sufficient numbers and possessed control over enough resources to be significant actors in world politics. Three categories of nonstate actors may be identified: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations, NATO, and the Organization of American States; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as General Motors, the International Red Cross, the Catholic Church, and the Palestine Liberation Organization; and subnational actors, such as the U.S. Defense Department, New York City, and Texas.

Statistically, the growth in the number of nonstate actors has been explosive. On the eve of World War I, there were only 49 IGOs and 170 NGOs. By 1951 the numbers had grown to 123 IGOs and 832 NGOs. The 2015/2016 edition of the Yearbook of International Organizations identified 273 conventional IGOs and 3,189 conventional NGOs. Overall, the Yearbook lists almost 70,000 international organizations: 7,757 IGOs and 60,272 NGOs.12

Actor proliferation has altered the context in which American foreign policy decisions are made in three ways. First, it has changed the language used in thinking about foreign policy problems. The state-centric language of the Cold War now competes for the attention of policy makers with the imagery of interdependence and globalization. Second, nonstate actors often serve as potential instruments of foreign policy. By not being identified as part of a state, their actions may be better received by other actors. Third, nonstate actors often limit the options open to policy makers. Their ability to resist and frustrate state initiatives can necessitate consideration of courses of action that states otherwise would likely reject, including inaction. Two recent examples include the lack of a credible pro-Western rebel group in Syria to support and the inability to take quick action in Nigeria against the Boko Haram Islamic militant group.

Regional Diversity

As a superpower, the United States is concerned not only with the structure and operation of the international system as a whole, but also with the operation of its subsystems, three of which are especially important. Each presents different management problems and thus require different solutions.13 While the language used to describe them comes out of the Cold War era, the differences they highlight remain relevant to the way international politics is conducted and the foreign problems that are considered important.

The first subsystem, the Western system, is made up of the advanced industrial states of the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. The principal problem in the Western system is managing interdependence. At issue is the distribution of costs and benefits. U.S. leadership and initiative in the realm of national security policy, once so eagerly sought by its allies, is now often resisted. Even before Trump became president, many in the United States had begun to question the costs of leadership and sought to have its allies pick up a larger share of the defense burden. A similar situation holds for underwriting a free trade system or accepting economic discrimination in the name of alliance unity.

The second subsystem is the North-South system. Instead of expectations of sharing and mutual gain, the South views matters from a perspective rooted in the inequalities and exploitation of colonialism. When NATO and U.S. forces intervened in Libya and removed Muammar Qaddafi from power in the name of Responsibility to Protect, many in the South saw this humanitarian doctrine as nothing but a cover for another instance of Western imperialism. In contrast to solutions to the problems of interdependence, which lie in the fine-tuning of existing international organizations and practices, solutions to the problems of dependence and domination require constructing a new system that the South is willing to accept as legitimate and in which it is treated as an equal.

The third subsystem of concern to the United States is the remnants of the Cold War East-West system. Its fundamental management problem is reintegration. The Cold War divided the East and West into two largely self-contained, competing military and economic parts. In the 1970s, détente brought about a limited reintegration of the East and West through arms control and trade agreements. The opportunity for full-scale integration of these states into the international system came with the demise of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has to some extent been realized. Russia became a member of the Group of Eight (G8), and both China and Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Still, the task of reintegration is incomplete, as evidenced by Russia’s military intervention into Ukraine to reclaim the Crimea, China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and its aggressive overseas economic policies, and ongoing concerns about the status of human rights in both countries.

Dominant Features Today

In many ways, the contemporary international system lacks a defining identity. For some, it is the post–9/11 era. Others argue that not much has changed in world politics since 9/11.14 Still others see the current international system as being marked by the resurgence of Great Power politics with the rise of Russia and China. Regardless of how it is defined, it is clear that the structure of the international system has become more complex. It has become a three-dimensional chessboard, with different problems and dynamics on each board. There is a traditional hard-power-driven security chessboard, a soft-power-driven economic chessboard, and a third chessboard dominated by the activities of nonstate actors, where power is diffuse and hard to define. Not only does each chessboard to the United States, but disagreement exists over how to rank them in importance. Here, one challenge on each chessboard is identified: terrorism, globalization, and American hegemony.15

Terrorism

Terrorism dominates the third chessboard.  Box 2.1  presents a snapshot of the scope of the terrorism problem as it existed in 2017, a point in time when many were speaking of the end of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria, also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Using the term in its most value-free and politically neutral sense, terrorism is violence for the purpose of political intimidation.16 Terrorism is not a new phenomenon nor is it the exclusive tool of any political ideology or political agenda. It does not specify an organizational form. Governments as well as nonstate actors may engage in terrorism.

Box 2.1

Snapshot of Global Terrorism

Terrorism Trends  Over 99 percent of all deaths from terrorism have occurred in countries involved in a violent conflict or with high level of political terror.  Every region of the world recorded a higher impact of terrorism in 2017 than in 2002.  Right-wing terrorism is on the rise. The majority of the attacks were carried out by lone wolves. Seventeen of the sixty-six deaths were between 2013 and 2017, and 66 of the 113 attacks occurred in 2017.  Number of times since 2000 that a country has been ranked among the top ten countries affected by terrorism: 1. Afghanistan 16 2. India 16 3. Pakistan 16 4. Iraq 15 5. Somalia 11  The five most frequent types of terrorist attacks, 2002–2017: 1. Bombing/explosion 2. Armed assault 3. Hostage taking 4. Assassination 5. Facility/Infrastructure attacks  Emerging Hot Spots of Terrorism: 1. The Sahel and Maghreb 2. Southeast Asia 3. Nigeria

Terrorism in 2017  The total number of deaths from terrorism fell for the third consecutive year after peaking in 2014.  Sixty-seven countries experienced at least one death from terrorism in 2017. This is the second highest number since 2002.  The economic impact of terrorism in 2017 was $52 billion, 42 percent lower than in 2016.  Almost 20 percent of attempted terrorist attacks in 2017 failed.  Top 5 countries with regard to death by terrorism, 2017: 1. Afghanistan 2. Iraq 3. Nigeria 4. Somalia 5. Syria  Five largest increases in deaths from terrorism, 2016–2017: 1. Somalia 2. Egypt 3. Central African Republic 4. Myanmar 5. Mali  Four deadliest terrorist groups in 2017: 1. Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 2. Al-Shabaab 3. Taliban 4. Boko Haram

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index, 2018

Today’s brand of terrorism, which dates from 1979, is the fourth wave of terrorism that has arisen since the 1880s.17 The preceding three waves each lasted a generation. If this pattern holds, the current wave of terrorism will not lose its energy until around 2025. The first, anarchist wave of terrorism began in Russia and was set in motion by the political and economic reform efforts of the czars. The second, anticolonial wave of 41terrorism began in the 1920s and ended in the 1960s. The third, New Left wave of terrorism was set in motion by the Vietnam War. It was made up of Marxist groups such as the Weather Underground and separatist groups that sought self-determination for minority groups that felt trapped inside larger states, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The defining features of the current wave of terrorism are twofold. The first is its religious base. Islamic extremism is at its core. Its initial energy was drawn from three events in 1979: the start of a new Muslim century, the ouster of the shah in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The United States is the special target of this religious wave of terrorism. Iranian leaders have long referred to the United States as the “Great Satan,” and the common goal shared by Islamic terrorist groups has been to drive the United States out of the Middle East. Before 9/11, this wave had produced a steady flow of terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities. Marine barracks were attacked in Lebanon in 1983, the World Trade Center was first bombed in 1993, American embassies were attacked in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole was attacked in 2000. The second defining attribute is the specter of mass casualties. Earlier waves of terror focused on assassinating key individuals or the symbolic killing of relatively small numbers of individuals, but today we also see terrorist attacks resulting in large numbers of deaths.

As recently as 2015, U.S. officials struggled with the question of whether al-Qaeda or ISIS posed the greatest terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland. The FBI, the Justice Department, and the Department of Homeland Security rated ISIS as the higher threat, while the Defense Department, the National Counterterrorism Center, and intelligence agencies tended to place al-Qaeda ahead of it. At the heart of this debate were two questions: Which would be most able to strike U.S. targets? Which could cause the greatest damage? As one member of Congress put it before the 2015 Paris attacks, “ISIS is all about the quantity of attacks, Al Qaeda . . . is about the quality of the attack.”18

The ISIS caliphate ended in Syria in 2019, but that was not necessarily the end of ISIS, as proclaimed by President Trump, or the end of terrorism as a key feature of the contemporary international system. General Joseph Votel, head of the U.S. military central command, observed that “what we are seeing now is not the surrender of ISIS as an organization but . . . a calculated decision to preserve the safety of their families and preservation of their capabilities. The ISIS population being evacuated . . . largely remains unrepentant, unbroken, and radicalized.”19 Observers estimate that ISIS has a war chest of between $50 million and $300 million hidden away.

Looking at terrorism more broadly, what stands out is that terrorist groups are highly adaptive organizations. Early terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization were organized into small groups of individuals who had little contact with one another in order to protect their identities. Al-Qaeda embraced 42an organizational structure based on concentric circles. At its core was a central leadership group, surrounded by a ring of al-Qaeda affiliates in different countries. The outer ring contained al-Qaeda locals or lone wolves. ISIS operated as a pseudo-state, controlling oil-producing operations in Iraq and Syria, engaging in extortion, collecting taxes, and selling goods such as abandoned U.S. weapons and antiques on the black market. 20 Even before its defeat, ISIS began to decentralize its decision-making structure. It delegated power to mid-level military commanders in Iraq and Syria, sought out foreign affiliates, and actively recruited and trained disenchanted individuals and criminals to return to their home countries and engage in terrorist attacks. Of special concern to the United States has been the ability of ISIS and al-Qaeda to establish affiliates in North and Central Africa. In one notable encounter with ISIS in October 2018, fighters thought to be affiliated with ISIS ambushed U.S. troops in Niger, killing four and wounding two soldiers.

The question of how terrorist groups end is also important in determining the significance of terrorism in the present and future international system.21 Numerous possible endings include the capture or killing of leaders, the loss of popular support, the achievement of goals, the transition to legitimate political organizations, and transformation into criminal organizations.

Globalization

Globalization dominates the second chessboard. A central problem in formulating a foreign policy based on globalization is that it is a vaguely defined term often used interchangeably with internationalization, Westernization, and Americanization. Most commentators define globalization as an economic process centered on the speed of interactions among economies and the intense and all-encompassing nature of those interactions. Economies do not simply trade with one another; they are transformed by their interactions. Globalization’s supporters claim that this transformation will lead to economic benefits and prosperity.

Globalization, however, is much more than just an economic process. It is a dynamic mix of economic, political, social, and cultural forces that has the potential to bring about both positive and negative changes within and among states. Globalization may unleash the forces of democracy, but it may just as easily unleash a fundamentalist and defensive cultural backlash by those who feel threatened. Similarly, globalization accelerates the diffusion of technology and knowledge among people, which may help solve global health and environmental problems, but it also allows terrorist groups to communicate with one another, travel more efficiently, and gain access to weapons of mass destruction.

Globalization did not arrive on the scene suddenly. It emerged bit by bit over time. Although some commentators trace its foundations back to 43the eighteenth century, most identify its beginnings with the post–World War II era and the establishment of the Bretton Woods monetary system and its core institutions: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Together, these institutions laid the foundation for an international economic system that facilitated and encouraged an ever-expanding and accelerating cross-border flow of money, commodities, ideas, and people. This foundation set in motion a chain reaction, producing what Thomas Friedman refers to as the “flattening of the world.”22

The dominant perspective held that globalization was an irreversible process. It was a reality and not a choice.23 The problem facing the United States was not whether but how to participate in a globalized economy. In addition, as with all underlying structural aspects of the international system, globalization places limits on state behavior—rewarding states that embrace “correct” foreign and domestic policies and punishing those that adopt inappropriate ones.

Events over the past decade have called this view into question.24 References to the emergence of identity politics and the triumph of nationalism over globalization point to a weakening of globalization, if not a retreat from it.25 From this perspective, as globalization grew stronger it created a divide between groups at upper and lower socio-economic levels. Where the rich saw globalization as beneficial, others saw the accompanying job losses as threatening. The jobs that were once a key part of their identity were lost to foreign competition, and they came to feel that the political elites were not responding to their fears and needs. The result was a rise in populist sentiment and the reemergence of right-wing and authoritarian governments. Note that doubts about the future of globalization preceded the emergence of these trends. Writing in 2005, Niall Ferguson raised the possibility that at some point globalization may collapse and we may enter into a postglobalist era.26 He saw economic and political parallels between the current period of globalization and the one that existed prior to the outbreak of World War I and the Great Depression of the 1930s.

It is also possible that globalization will not end but enter a new phase. Ian Bremmer raises the possibility that globalization will come to be dominated by state capitalism,27 in which governments rather than private businesses are the driving force behind investment decisions. The goal here is to increase state power, not maximize profit. Prominent forms of state capitalism include government-owned or -controlled natural resource companies; national champions or firms that receive special tax incentives and other benefits from the state; and state-controlled sovereign wealth funds that invest in key firms and industries. Bremmer warns that state capitalist firms are inherently inefficient due to the role that politics plays in their operation, and that their investment decisions could harm global economic growth.

American Hegemony

American hegemony is the principal issue on the first chessboard, the traditional hard-power security-dominated chessboard. The term hegemony, which implies control, dominance, or preeminence, was used to describe the United States’ position after the end of the Cold War, when for all practical purposes it was the last superpower left standing on the chessboard. Part of the difficulty in making judgments about the present condition of this first chessboard lies in the terms commonly used to describe hegemonic power.

Some observers refer to the United States as an empire. Not surprisingly, this characterization is controversial.28 In its most neutral sense, an empire is a state with “a wide and supreme domain.” The political, economic, and military reach of the United States fits that criterion. However, the term also carries very negative connotations of a state that imposes its will on others and rules through force and domination. Military occupation and the arbitrary use of military power typify an empire’s foreign policies, charges that have frequently been leveled at American foreign policy. Critics of the empire label assert that the reach of American foreign policy, which is imperial in the sense that it is global, is being confused with the political ambition to control vast expanses of territory beyond U.S. borders, which does not exist.

A quite different view holds that America’s unchallenged dominance allows it to act as the functional equivalent of a world government. It provides services needed for the effective functioning of the international system, such as military security, stewardship of the global economy, and emergency humanitarian aid. If the United States did not carry out these and other crucial tasks, the international system might cease to function effectively, because no other state possesses the resources to do so, and a true world government would not likely come into existence. So American hegemony can be seen as beneficial rather than exploitive. As one supporter of this position noted, it is in the interests of both America and the world that American primacy last as long as possible.29

Between these contrasting views of American hegemony lies a third perspective that stresses the limits placed on U.S. hegemony by global politics. One variant of this perspective sees the United States has having sat atop a Unipolar Concert for most of the post–Cold War era.30 The United States did not dominate global politics singlehandedly; it did so with the acquiescence of the next two major powers in the international system (China and Russia). Both chose not to try and balance the United States because they benefitted greatly from the international system as it operated under U.S. leadership. Each of these three perspectives finds itself challenged by two questions: (1) How accurate a description is it today? and (2) How much longer will it hold true?

For those who adopt the American empire perspective, the historical reality is that empires come with expiration dates; they do not last 45forever. In addition, today’s empires tend to have much shorter life spans than ancient and early modern ones. The average Roman Empire lasted 829 years. The British Empire lasted 336 years. Twentieth-century empires on average lasted only 57 years.31 Even prior to Trump’s “America first” foreign policy agenda, the United States’ status as an empire was easily questioned due to the rise in Chinese economic and military power. Robert Kaplan asserts that we may have already entered the postimperial moment, in which world disorder and competition for power and space will grow. 32

For those who adopt the United-States-as-global-government perspective, the principal challenges facing the United States involve its ability to structure the “rules of the game” by which international politics is played.33 These challenges take two forms, both tied to the rising number and influence of authoritarian governments and their rejection of the liberal democratic values at the heart of the global system created by the United States. The first challenge is altering the policies of existing international organizations such as the United Nations to bring them more in line with U.S. values. The second is to create parallel international organizations to advance U.S. interests, like China did by establishing the Asian Development Bank and modeling its structure and functions on those of the World Bank.

For those who stress the continuing importance of power politics to U.S. dominance, the key longevity issue is the extent to which credible challengers to U.S. power exist or will surface. Some see the United States as being a remarkably secure country. There are many foreign policy problems, but individually and collectively they do not constitute security threats.34 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth argue that such challenges will not materialize soon.35 While China’s rise in power today is very real, they note that the distance that China must travel from great power to superpower is far bigger than successful challengers have faced in the past. Others take a more pessimistic view, arguing that power balancing by Russia and China is already under way to the point that the unipolar concert has unraveled, bringing with it a series of regional challenges to U.S. influence.36 See  box 2.2  for the May 2019 report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Congress on the military power of the Republic of China.

Box 2.2

Military Power Republic of China, 2019

Building a More Capable People’s Liberation Army

In support of the goal to establish a powerful and prosperous China, China’s leaders are committed to developing military power commensurate with that of a great power. Chinese military strategy documents highlight the requirement for a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) able to fight and win wars, deter potential adversaries, and secure Chinese national interests overseas, including a growing emphasis on the importance of the maritime and information domains, offensive air operations, long-distance mobility operations, and space and cyber operations.

In 2018, the PLA published a new Outline of Training and Evaluation that emphasized realistic and joint training across all warfare domains and included missions and tasks aimed at “strong military opponents.” Training focused on war preparedness and improving the PLA’s capability to win wars through realistic combat training, featuring multi-service exercises, long-distance maneuvers and mobility operations, and the increasing use of professional “blue force” opponents. The CCP also continued vigorous efforts to root out corruption in the armed forces.

The PLA also continues to implement the most comprehensive restructure in its history to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of fighting and winning “informatized local wars”—regional conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command and control (C2) and precision strike. PLA modernization includes command and force structure reforms to improve operational flexibility and readiness for future deployments. As China’s global footprint and international interests have grown, its military modernization progress has become more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operations.

China’s military modernization also targets capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. operational and technological advantages. China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies, including targeted foreign direct investment, cyber theft, and exploitation of private Chinese nationals’ access to these technologies, as well as harnessing its intelligence services, computer intrusions, and other illicit approaches. In 2018, Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive, dual-use or military-grade equipment from the United States included dynamic random-access memory, aviation technologies, and anti-submarine warfare technologies.

Reorganizing for Operations along China’s Periphery

China continues to implement reforms associated with the establishment of its five theater commands, each of which is responsible for developing command strategies and joint operational plans and capabilities relevant for specific threats, as well as responding to crises and safeguarding territorial sovereignty and stability. Taiwan persistently remains the PLA’s main “strategic direction,” one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as having strategic importance. Other strategic directions include the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and China’s borders with India and North Korea.

Source: “Executive Summary,” Military Power of the Republic of China, 2019, Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2019.

America and the World: Attitudes and Perceptions

As constructivists remind us, the global setting of American foreign policy involves more than just a series of contemporary problems and underlying structural features. It also consists of attitudes and perceptions about the world. As evidenced by responses to global public opinion polls conducted in the United States and other countries it is increasingly obvious that Americans and non-Americans do not always see the world the same way.37 In 2014, 70 percent of Americans polled said that the United States takes into account the interests of other countries in making foreign policy decisions. Little agreement on this point existed abroad. At one extreme, only 13 percent of Pakistanis indicated that the United States considers their country’s interest a great deal or a fair amount. At the other extreme, 85 percent of Filipinos felt that the United States considers their country’s interests.

Global public opinion polls also show differences in how Americans and citizens of other countries view policy problems. A 2018 survey showed that 59 percent of Americans identified climate change as the top international threat.38 Compare this to the global mean across twenty-three countries: 67 percent. The global mean for identifying cyberattacks as the top threat was 61 percent; in contrast, 74 percent of Americans identified it as the top threat.

Widely different views also exist on the exercise of American power. Of the individuals surveyed in these twenty-three countries in 2018, 45 percent viewed U.S. power and influence as a top threat, up from 25 percent in 2013. The polling data showed a strong connection between negative feelings about President Trump and concern regarding U.S. power and influence. In seventeen countries, citizens who had little or no confidence in Trump were most likely to see U.S. power as threatening. Thirty-six percent of global respondents identified Russian power and influence as a top threat, and 35 percent identified Chinese power and influence as a top threat. In 2013, a majority of people in twenty-three of thirty-nine countries felt that China had already replaced the United States as the dominant economic power or would soon do so.

Another politically significant indicator of differences in global outlook is reflected by the periodic anti-American protests that erupt around the world. In seeking to understand the motivations and logic of such anti-American demonstrations, observers have made distinctions among four different types of anti-Americanism:39

1. Liberal anti-Americanism. Commonly found in other advanced industrial societies, at its core is the charge that the United States repeatedly fails to live up to its own ideals in conducting its foreign policy.

2. Social anti-Americanism. Here, the complaint concerns the United States’ attempt to impose its version of democracy and its definition of rights on others while being insensitive to local societal values and norms.

3. 48Sovereign anti-Americanism. This version focuses on the threats the United States presents to the sovereignty and cultural and political identity of another country. A nationalistic backlash can occur regardless of whether the country is powerful or weak.

4. Radical anti-Americanism. This version defines American values as evil and subscribes to the notion that only by destroying them can the world be made safe.

The world is not solidly anti-American. Pro-American views tend to be most pronounced among those aged 60 and older, a factor many attributes to American foreign policy initiatives during the Cold War. Another group with solidly pro-American sentiments is made up of young people identified as aspirational (upwardly mobile or would like to be).40

Over the AHorizon: 2035

What, then, might the future hold? Periodically, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) addresses this question. Its peeks into the future are not meant to be taken as predications or forecasts but as attempts to help policy makers focus on trends and aspects of the international system that have the potential to shape U.S. foreign policy—for better or worse.

According to the NIC’s Global Trends 2035 report, which was produced in 2017, the coming years will test U.S. resilience and require it, as well as all other states, to adapt to the changing landscape of international politics.41 There will be a heightened risk of interstate conflict and an expanding terrorist threat as states, groups, and individuals will increase their ability to do harm. The net result will be creation of greater amounts of global disorder, raising questions about the rules, institutions, and distribution of power in the international system. In particular, the NIC expects U.S. competition with China and Russia to increase as these states seek to change the rules governing the international order and increase their influence over neighboring regions.

Meeting the challenge of increased global disorder and rising tensions will be difficult for three reasons. First, global technological, economic, environmental, and political trends will increase the number and complexity of issues that require global cooperation. Second, this expanded set of issues will lead to increased blurring of the line between peace and war. This will make it harder for states to employ traditional tools of foreign policy such as deterrence, economic coercion, and covert operations, but engagement in cyber operations and disinformation campaigns will become easier. Third, citizens have become increasingly fragmented and divided in their views of issues, making it difficult to facilitate global cooperation and unity based on democratic concepts that formerly united them. The bottom line is that traditional wars may become less frequent; they will be replaced by more remote stand-off military operations, which are more costly and less likely to produce decisive results.

Looking further into the future, the NIC is somewhat less pessimistic. Much hinges on government responses to economic changes and alterations in public attitudes; emerging patterns of cooperation and competition from the arena of international politics; and the types of short-term and long-term deals that countries are willing to make in addressing global issues. The central puzzle that states must solve is how to blend international, national, and community resources in a way that yields sustainability, security, prosperity, and hope.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Which of the three theoretical perspectives (realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism) is best suited for guiding thinking about U.S. foreign policy today, and why?

2. Which of the possible global futures is most likely? How should the United States prepare for it?

3. Which features of the international system are most influential in determining the success or failure of U.S. foreign policies, and why?

4.

Key Terms

· bipolar, 34

· constructivism, 32

· globalization, 42

· hegemony, 44

· intermestic, 36

· multipolar, 34

· neoliberalism, 32

· realism, 31

· sovereignty, 34

· terrorism, 39

· unipolar, 34

Further Reading

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security 40 (Winter 2015), 7–53.

This article examines the rise of China as a challenger to U.S. unipolarity. It concludes that while China’s rise in power is real, the United States will likely long remain the only superpower.

Chester Crocker, “The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift,” Survival 57 (February 2015), 7–30.

The author argues that the international system is in a rudderless transition. It is partially repolarized, creating a toxic mix of normative issues and power dynamics. With no one in charge of global order, the key question is how a player gains and uses strategic leverage.

John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations and Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

50

Authored by a leading diplomatic historian, this volume looks back to the end of the Cold War for insight into both why it ended and what that means for the future of American foreign policy.

Ted Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

This volume uses a social constructivist theoretical perspective to examine the Cold War period with an eye toward explaining the many abrupt changes in policy during its early years.

Anthony Richards, “Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37 (March 2014), 18–29.

This article presents a solid overview of the concept of terrorism, which it defines as a method of political violence. It then examines the implications of this definition for the debate over how to think about terrorism in world politics.

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Written by one of the founding scholars of the constructivist school of international relations theorizing, this book introduces readers to this approach and illustrates its utility through an examination of key concepts in the study of international relations and foreign policy.

Thomas Wright, All Measures Short of War (New Haven, CT: Yale University

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