strategic planning

CHAPTER THREE Initiating and Agreeing on a Strategic Planning Process

The beginning is the most important part of the work.

—Plato, The Republic

The purpose of the first step in the Strategy Change Cycle is to develop an initial agreement about the overall strategic planning effort and main planning steps among key internal decision makers or opinion leaders (and, if their support is necessary for the success of the effort, key external leaders as well). This agreement represents a plan for planning—or specific process design—intended to point the way toward the ultimate end of creating significant and enduring public value. As Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon ( 1996 , p. 111) says, “Everyone designs who devises a course of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones.”

The support and commitment of key decision makers are vital if strategic planning and change in an organization are to succeed. But the importance of their early involvement goes beyond the need for their support and commitment. They supply information vital to the planning effort: who should be involved, when key decision points will occur, key requirements for a successful process, and what arguments are likely to be persuasive at various points in the process. They can provide critical resources: legitimacy, staff assignments, a budget, and meeting space.

Every strategic planning effort is in effect a drama that must have the correct setting; themes; plots and subplots; actors; scenes; beginning, middle, and conclusion; and interpretation (Mangham & Overington, 1987 ; Bryant, 2003 ). Only key decision makers will have access to enough information and resources to allow for the effective development and direction of such a drama. But unlike a normal play, the end is not known to anyone in advance. The end may well be as much “emergent” as it is intentional. Indeed, strategic planning and management at their best involve “real learning [that] takes place at the interface of thought and action, as actors reflect on what they have done; in other words, strategic learning must combine reflection with result… [They] involve crafting the subtle relationships between thought and action, control and learning, stability and change” (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2009 , pp. 205–217).

Planning Focus and Desired Immediate Outcomes

The initial agreement will outline the important design features of the planning process. Ideally, the step will produce agreement on several issues:

· 1.The purpose(s) and worth of the strategic planning effort

· 2.Project organization, including who the sponsors and champions are

· 3.The organizations, units, groups, or persons who should be engaged, and in what ways

· 4.The specific steps to be followed, how the Web and information and communication technologies will be used, and the way ongoing feedback and learning will occur

· 5.The form and timing of reports

· 6.Resource commitments to begin the effort

· 7.Key requirements for a successful effort

Finally, a strategic planning coordinating committee and a strategic planning team probably should be formed and given a charge statement or charter.

As a general rule, the strategic planning effort should focus on that part of the organization (or function, collaboration, or community) controlled, overseen, or strongly influenced by the key decision makers interested in engaging in strategic planning. In other words, only under unusual circumstances would it make sense to develop strategic plans for organizations or parts of organizations over which the key decision makers involved in the effort have no control, or for which they have no responsibility.

The exception to this rule is externally initiated reform programs designed to demonstrate how an organization might conduct itself if it took the reformers’ aims seriously. For example, candidates running for elective office often include in their campaign platforms proposed new strategies for the governments they wish to lead. Editorial and opinion pages of newspapers, public affairs books and magazines, and think tank reports also often include what are in effect reformers’ strategic plans for public or nonprofit organizations.

The agreement also should make clear what the “givens” are at the beginning of the process. In other words, what is it about the organization's history, arrangements, and practices that will be off-limits, at least for the time being, and what is open for revision? On the one hand, if everything is a candidate for far-reaching change, potential participants may be scared off and resistance to change within the organization may harden. On the other hand, if everything is sacred, then there is no reason for strategic planning. There should be enough tension to prompt change and make it worth the effort, but not so much that it paralyzes potential participants with fear and anxiety (Nutt, 2001 ; Fiol, 2002 ; Eden & Ackermann, 2010 ).

The process of reaching an initial agreement is straightforward in concept, but often rather circuitous in practice. It usually proceeds through the following stages:

· 1.Initiating the process

· 2.Introducing the concept of strategic planning

· 3.Developing an understanding of what it can mean in practice

· 4.Thinking through some of its more important implications in terms of necessary commitments and other requirements for success

· 5.Developing a commitment to strategic planning

· 6.Reaching an actual agreement

The more numerous the decision makers who must be involved and the less they know about strategic planning, the more time-consuming the process will be, and the more indirect the route to agreement. Indeed, typically a series of agreements must be reached before the strategic planning process can begin in earnest.

Desired Longer-Term Outcomes

A number of significant longer-term outcomes flow from a good initial agreement (Benveniste, 1989 ; Janis, 1989 ; Nutt, 2002 ). These longer-term outcomes involve laying the groundwork for what Innes and Booher ( 2010 , pp. 36–39) call “system adaptations,” meaning changes that help the organization or collaboration create a better fit with its environment, including the possibility of changing the environments in important ways. The first is simply that the purpose and worth of the strategic planning effort are likely to be widely recognized by the affected parties, leading to broad sponsorship and legitimacy. Broad sponsorship dispels any suspicion that the effort is a power play by a small group. And it ensures that the results of the efforts are likely to be seen as objective (that is, as not manipulated to serve narrow partisan interests). Broad sponsorship also is a source of psychological safety that can help people address what otherwise might be highly threatening, anxiety- or guilt-producing prospects for change (Heifetz, 1994 ; Fiol, 2002 ; Schein, 2010 ; Scharmer, 2009 ).

Legitimacy justifies the occasions, content, and timing of the discussions and ensuing actions in the next stages of the planning process (Suchman, 1995 ; Innes & Booher, 2010 ). Such discussions—particularly when they involve key decision makers across functions, levels, and organizational boundaries of various sorts—are unlikely to occur without prompting. And they are unlikely to be prompted without authorization. As Borins ( 1998 , p. 47) notes, “Collaboration across boundaries does not happen naturally, it must be made to happen.”

Authorization of such discussions is an enormous resource to the planners who organize them because they gain considerable control over the forums in which they occur, the agenda, the information provided, and how the issues to be discussed are framed. The planners gain control because the deliberations typically will be cross-functional rather than under the control of any unit or department. As facilitators of cross-functional deliberations, planners gain leverage. Control of this sort is not manipulative in a partisan sense; instead, it ensures that the organization as a whole is looked at and discussed, rather than only its separate parts (Bryson & Crosby, 1996 ; Crosby & Bryson, 2005 ).

The Loft case was the most straightforward of the three cases focused on in this book. As noted in Chapter One , there was general agreement that the time had come for the next strategic planning process. The time period of the existing plan was running out and most of the goals had been achieved. There was the prospect that the executive director, Linda Myers, might retire within the next five years. And there were some concerns about the emergence of a more challenging competitive, financial, and technological environment. Broader understanding of these issues was sharpened in the winter of 2006 when board member Steve Wilbers led a committee of Loft board and staff members to identify strategic issues affecting the Loft. This work resulted in a Spring 2006 conference exploring how technology might influence literary life in the future. The conference involved around 150 writers, teachers, librarians, parents, and students in discussions about digital access, changing forms of writing and reading, youth education, the role of libraries, and the work of the Loft. The conference helped set much of the context for the upcoming strategic planning process.

In the summer of 2006 a strategic planning team was charged by the board with leading an eighteen-month, participatory process, with regular reports back to the board. The group consisted of two members of the board of directors, Steve Wilbers and Jocelyn Hale, and the staff managing director, Nancy Gaschott. The group consulted with and received frequent guidance from executive director Linda Myers and the executive committee of the board (Hale, 2007 , p. 10).

The Park Board's process for establishing the initial agreement was organizationally more complicated, reflecting in part its much larger size, government status, and somewhat conflicted recent history. After an initial attempt at strategic planning in 2001, the process progressed slowly. The hiring of a new superintendent in 2003 resulted in some organizational and administrative restructuring that positioned the organization to launch an organization-wide, cross-functional, and community-involving strategic planning process in October 2005 that was sponsored by the elected board and new superintendent.

The MetroGIS case was by far the most complicated of the three because it involved creating a voluntary agreement among scores of individuals and organizations. First, in 1995 Rick Gelbmann, head of the Metropolitan Council (MC) GIS Unit, convinced Richard Johnson, the MC's deputy regional administrator, that they should convince the Council members (the formal MC policymakers) that the MC should do two things: (1) authorize an exploration of what the MC should do about fostering creation of a regional GIS system that included parcel data; and (2) hire someone to help with the exploration. Randall Johnson (no relation), a planner with suburban Shoreview who had experience with MC data and projections that did not effectively take into account carrying capacity of the land, was hired and became the process champion. Since the counties produced parcel data—which are a critical component to harmonizing projections with actual capacity—Johnson received permission from the MC to explore with the seven regional counties what incentives would be needed: (1) to establish a means by which the MC would have ongoing access to county-produced parcel data; and (2) to gain county approval to participate in the development and use of standards to normalize parcel data across the seven counties. These discussions lead to a substantially more ambitious concept: broadening the stakeholders to include all local and other governmental units that served the metropolitan area and collaborating to address a host of shared geospatial information needs beyond parcel data. The MC was willing to put $1.1 million on the table to gain access to data produced by others in a form it could readily use.

Randall Johnson took the lead on organizing a series of formal and informal discussions and two major forums of 75-plus stakeholders each to explore the issue of whether to pursue a regional GIS system and whether the MC should lead the initiative. Each forum involved creating or maintaining and reinforcing existing relationships among actors. A general consensus emerged from these discussions for the idea that there should be a regional GIS system and the MC should take the lead in this case—although tension continued to exist between the MC and local governments on other issues, which is partly a consequence of the way regional and local governments are organized constitutionally and legislatively in Minnesota.

The MC officially accepted responsibility for sponsoring a formal strategic planning effort. Randall Johnson was process champion and was assisted by a strategic planning team consisting of Johnson; MC GIS Unit Coordinator Rick Gelbmann; MC Learning and Development Director Shelly Bergh Gardner; and MC Learning and Development Assistant Director Marcy Syman. Part of their job was to use the process to figure out how to organize and govern a collaborative approach to accomplishing metrowide sharing of geospatial data. In other words, in new, large, and voluntary collaboration efforts, often the collaboration's governance structure is itself a strategic issue that must be resolved as part of the process, not settled at its beginning.

As part of the unfolding series of “initial agreements,” Richard Johnson, the MC's Deputy Regional Administrator, agreed to allow the Council to sponsor the December 14, 1995, Strategic Planning Forum. The forum planning team, together with the facilitators John Bryson and Charles Finn, decided on the critical stakeholder categories that needed to participate and candidates to invite to represent each critical stakeholder interest. The primary purpose of the forum was to reach agreement on strategic issues and statements of intent to guide the work of creating a metrowide mechanism to improve organizational effectiveness through collaborative use of geospatial technology. The resulting session achieved these purposes and set in motion a four-month process that yielded an agreed mission statement, five initial strategic design projects, an initial organizational structure, and a road map that guided MetroGIS's efforts for nearly a decade. The participants (with the exception of the NSDI Framework Coordinator, who deferred to the U.S. Geological Survey's Minnesota liaison) agreed to continue to serve in an advisory capacity that evolved into the MetroGIS Coordinating Committee. As noted in Chapter One , MetroGIS also engaged in a second major strategic planning effort in 2007. That process will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. For now it is important to note that the “initial” agreement in that process as well involved a number of agreements, including fending off a concerted challenge to the organization's existence and subsequent endorsement of its continued existence by the MC. In sum, those involved in multiorganizational collaborative strategic planning should expect that a rather lengthy series of such “initial agreements” will be involved as part of the process of initiating a strategic planning effort.

A well-articulated initial agreement also provides a clear definition of the network to be involved and the process by which it is to be maintained. A good network management process will provide involved or affected stakeholders with a sense of procedural justice—that is, with the sense that both the procedures used to reach decisions and the decisions themselves are fair (Eden & Ackermann, 1998 , pp. 53–55; Page, Eden, & Ackermann, 2010 ). For example, adopting a doctrine of no surprises can be a good idea when developing a network and moving toward major decisions. The doctrine means that major stakeholders are at least kept informed of progress, events, and impending decisions, and perhaps consulted or even involved in decision making. Nothing is dropped on them “out of the blue.” This would appear to be particularly necessary when the need for cooperation and the risks of failure are high (Janis, 1989 ; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007 ). The doctrine of no surprises may be the best in other situations as well—even when there seem to be good reasons for keeping certain stakeholders in the dark. In an era when a basic characteristic of information seems to be that it leaks (Cleveland, 1985 ), full and prompt disclosure may be advisable. As Ben Franklin used to say, “Three people can keep a secret if two of them are dead.”

A good initial agreement also will include an outline of the general sequence of steps in the strategic planning effort, the way the Web and information and communication technologies will be used to facilitate the process, and the way in which ongoing feedback and learning will be incorporated. Ongoing feedback and learning are crucial since they are indispensable means of keeping the process on track in pursuit of desired purposes. As management guru Ken Blanchard famously said, “Feedback is the breakfast of champions.” In a more academic vein, Herbert Simon ( 1996 , p. 172) asserts, “Feedback control shows how a system can work toward goals and adapt to a changing environment, thereby removing the mystery from teleology.”

The sequence should contribute to stakeholders’ sense that the process is procedurally rational. According to Eden and Ackermann ( 1998 , p. 55), procedural rationality means that “the procedures used for strategy making make sense in themselves—they are coherent, follow a series of steps where each step is itself understood (not opaque) and relates to prior and future steps.” They add that a procedurally rational process needs to be “sensible and reasonably thorough going, but neither too time-consuming nor too hurried,” and the process must allow for “cognitive and emotional commitment.” As a result, any decisions made are seen to be the outcome of appropriate deliberation. To be effective, the sequence of steps must ensure that the process is tied to key decision-making points in arenas such as, for example, budget decisions, elections, and the rhythm of the legislative cycle. Time in organizations is partly chronological, but key junctures also matter (Bryson & Roering, 1988 , 1989 ; Albert & Bell, 2002 ; Mulgan, 2009 ). And the most important junctions are decision points.

To return to our drama metaphor, a good initial agreement will name the actors and their roles, describe the general character of the story and themes to be followed, spell out as much of the plot as it is possible to know in advance, specify the way the drama will be broken into acts and scenes, state how interactions among the actors will be designed and governed, designate the stage on which it will be played, and clarify who the audience is. Thus, the initial agreement step is extremely important because what follows depends significantly on the specifics of the beginning. The opening epigraph captures the fatefulness embodied in this early work, particularly in systems prone to unpredictable or at least partly chaotic behavior (Kingdon, 2002 ; Innes & Booher, 2010 ). As Gleick ( 1988 , p. 23) notes, chaotic systems demonstrate a “sensitive dependence on initial conditions.”

Moreover—and this will dramatically affect the story that develops—the agreement should specify exactly what is to be taken as given—at least at the start. For example, an organization's existing legal commitments, mandates, personnel complements, organizational designs, mission statements, resource allocations, job descriptions, or crucial aspects of its culture may need to be taken as a given in order to gain agreement. It is very important to be clear from the start what is off-limits for the exercise; otherwise, several key decision makers are unlikely to participate. With too much up for grabs the process will be too threatening or dangerous, will result in unconstructive or downright damaging conflict, or will produce a strategic plan that is useless because it lacks adequate support. On the other hand, the more that must be taken as given, the less useful strategic planning is likely to be (Scharmer, 2009 ). It is important, therefore, to find the right tension between what is given and what is possible. A good agreement also provides mechanisms, such as a strategic planning task force or coordinating committee, for deliberation, buffering, consultation, negotiation, or problem solving among units, groups, or persons involved in or affected by the effort. Without these mechanisms, conflicts are likely to stymie or even destroy the effort (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988 ; Borins, 1998 ). These mechanisms also will allow errors to be detected and corrected as the process proceeds. A strategic planning task force or coordinating committee can make needed midcourse corrections. A task force also will be a valuable sounding board for ideas. An important function of such a group will be to keep attention focused on strategic concerns while referring operational matters to appropriate groups and individuals.

A good initial agreement guarantees the necessary resources. Money typically is not the most needed resource for strategic planning; the time and attention of key decision makers are more important. Staff time will also be needed to gather information and provide logistical and clerical support (probably one part-time staff person in a small organization, several people in a larger organization).

A good agreement should provide useful preparation for any major changes that may be forthcoming. For example, if initiators envision pursuing a big win of some sort—ultimately, if not initially—rather than a series of small wins, the groundwork will probably need to be laid in this phase. A big win may mean changing the conceptual frame underpinning current strategy, dramatically changing goals or guiding visions, changing basic technologies, altering dominant coalitions, or some other fundamental change. Needed groundwork may involve having people other than the “usual suspects” on the planning committee or planning team; highlighting or separating off the planning effort in such a way that its power and influence are increased; gaining authorization for a range of background studies, such as benchmarking analyses, reengineering studies, or system analyses; arranging for visits to, and interviews at, innovative organizations; and so forth. Such groundwork can lead to undesirable fear and rigidity among stakeholders, so how it is undertaken must be thought through carefully. Consider the words of novelist Amy Tan in The Bonesetter's Daughter ( 2001 , p. 153): “And Precious Auntie flapped her hands fast: ‘A person should consider how things begin. A particular beginning results in a particular end’” (italics in original).

Finally, a good initial agreement signifies the political support of key decision makers or opinion leaders at several levels in the organization, and it helps maintain that support at different points in the process. For strategic planning to work, a coalition must develop that is large enough and strong enough to formulate and implement strategies that deal effectively with key strategic issues. Such coalitions typically do not develop quickly (particularly in interorganizational or community planning efforts; see Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001 ; Huxham & Vangen, 2005 ; Innes & Booher, 2010 ). Instead, they coalesce around the important strategic ideas that emerge from the sequence of deliberations, consultations, mutual education, and reconceptualization that are at the heart of any strategic planning effort (Mintzberg & Westley, 1992 ; Sabatier & Weible, 2007 ; Crosby & Bryson, 2005 ; Innes & Booher, 2010 ).

Developing an Initial Agreement

So far we have covered the purpose and desired short- and longer-term outcomes of this first step in the strategic planning. Now we can go into greater depth on specific aspects of the process of developing an initial agreement.

Whose Process Is It, and Who Should Be Involved?

Important design considerations include deciding who owns the process and who should be involved. Obviously, some individual or some group must initiate and champion the process. This champion will need to make the initial decisions about what the process should focus on and who should be involved. If the strategic planning process is going to affect the entire organization, then the organization's key decision makers (and perhaps representatives of some of the external stakeholders) should be involved. For example, the Loft's strategic planning process included a multitiered system of involvement for its strategic planning effort. The first tier included the board and executive director. The second tier was the strategic planning team consisting of two board members and one senior staff member. The third tier consisted of the board and staff as a whole entity that engaged in a major strategy mapping session (discussed in Chapter Six ). The fourth included six task forces to look at six different strategic issue areas (programs for writers, education, new sources of financial support, constituents, technology, and leadership and succession). Finally, the 2,800 Loft members were informed of the process and asked for their ideas.

Those in the first two tiers obviously were the key decision makers, but they chose to involve the other groups—and especially staff—in a consultative role in order to get the necessary strategy-related ideas, other information, support, and commitment to make the strategic planning effort work for the organization as a whole. The group decided not to involve representatives of all key external stakeholder groups (for example, funders, publishers, or broadcasters) in major decision-making roles, although they did include representatives of teachers and students. As the official, legally responsible decision-making body for the organization, the board could not really share this responsibility. However, various outsiders were consulted or did serve on the advisory task forces created to make recommendations for addressing the strategic issue areas identified by the board and staff. Each task force had external stakeholders involved and some community topic experts who were not necessarily Loft stakeholders.

If the strategic planning focus is on an organizational subunit, collaboration, or community, then the key decision makers (and possibly other stakeholders) for those entities should be involved. For example, key decision makers or stakeholders for a community, such as the owners of major businesses, may not actually live in the community. The initial agreement for the Park Board strategic planning effort—which focused both on the organization and its connections within the community it served—included the Park Board Commissioners elected by that community, and Jon Gurban, the superintendent. Again, legally and politically the board and superintendent were the key formal decision makers, but particular staff members played vital roles in helping develop elements of the agreement and in carrying it out. Ultimately, more than a hundred staff members were involved in the process, especially through membership on one or more of nine different staff teams (infrastructure, demographics, programs and services, information management, sustainability, planning, community outreach and research, evaluation, and art and history). Some three thousand more people were involved at various points in the process via town meetings, a questionnaire mailed to all Minneapolis households, focus groups, community leader workshops, and a telephone survey.

For organizations, it may be advisable to involve insiders from three levels of the organization, as well as key outsiders. (Note that elected or appointed policy board members can be outsiders as well as insiders.) These include top policy and decision makers, middle management, and technical core or frontline personnel (Thompson, 1967 ; Nutt & Backoff, 1992 ). Top policy and decision makers should be involved for several reasons. First, they are formally charged with relating the organization to its domain. Second, because of their responsibilities they are often highly effective boundary spanners, with links to many organizations and people both inside and outside the organization. Third, they often are among the first to perceive mismatches between the organization and its environment, and therefore the most responsive to external threats and opportunities affecting the organization (Schein, 2010 ; Kettl & Fesler, 2008 ). Finally, they control the resources necessary to carry out the strategic planning effort and implement the recommendations that grow out of it. It is simply very difficult to plan around these people, so they should be included from the start, if at all possible (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006 ).

In governments and public agencies, this initial group is likely to include members of an elected or appointed board as well as high-level executives. In council-manager cities, for example, the initial agreement typically is negotiated among council members, the city manager, and key department heads. As noted earlier, the initial agreement that framed the Park Board's effort involved the elected board, the appointed superintendent, and key managers. In nonprofit organizations, the key decision-making group is likely to include the senior managers and board of directors. The initial agreement for the Loft's effort was negotiated among the organization's board, executive director, and senior managers.

Middle management personnel should be included because of their vital role in translating policies and decisions into operations. Further, middle management personnel are likely to bear the brunt of any managerial changes that result, and therefore should be involved to reduce unnecessary resistance and make transitions smoother (Block, 1987 ; Fernandez & Rainey, 2006 ).

Technical core or frontline personnel also may need to help fashion an initial agreement. Again, there are several reasons to consider involving them or their representatives (Benveniste, 1989 ; Cohen & Eimicke, 1998 ). First, they are in charge of the day-to-day use of the core technologies contributing to, or affected by, strategic change. As a result, they are likely to be the most knowledgeable about how the organization's basic technologies work in practice, and also are most likely to be immediately helped or hurt by change. Their early involvement may be necessary to ensure that needed changes can be understood, wise changes are implemented, and resistance to change can

can be minimized. Second, technical or frontline personnel are likely to be asked for their opinions by key decision makers anyway, so anything that can make them receptive to strategic change is a plus. Finally, because of their technical knowledge or their daily contact with customers, clients, or users, these personnel can severely hamper strategic changes they do not support. In extreme cases they might undermine or even sabotage change efforts. Co-opting these groups early on can be an important key to strategic planning success.

An important caveat is in order. If it is clear from the start that strategic planning will result in the elimination of certain positions, work groups, or departments—such as in major reengineering efforts—then it may be both unnecessary and downright harmful to involve people in those positions. The effective and humane approach may be to involve these people in planning for their transition to new jobs, including retraining, placement, and severance arrangements (Behn, 1983 ; Nutt, 2001 ; Holzer, Lee, & Newman, 2003 ; Nutt & Hogan, 2008 ).

Finding the Right People

Typically, some initial stakeholder analysis work will need to be done before the “right” group of people can be found to forge an effective initial agreement. The purpose of a stakeholder analysis at this point is to help process sponsors decide who should be involved in negotiating an initial agreement either because they have information that cannot be gained otherwise, or their support is necessary to assure successful implementation of initiatives built on the analyses (Thomas, 1993 , 1995 ).

But a prior strategic question involves first figuring out who should be involved in doing the stakeholder analyses, and how. Again, in general, people should be involved if they have information that cannot be gained otherwise, or if their participation is necessary to assure a successful strategic planning process. Fortunately, the choice actually can be approached as a sequence of choices, in which an individual or small planning group begins the effort and then others are added later as the advisability of doing so becomes apparent (Bryson, 2004b ).

One way to approach the task is as a five-step process in which a decision can be made to stop any time after the first step. Stopping might be advisable, for example, because enough information and support to proceed has been gained, time lines are short, the analyses are too sensitive, or for some other good reason. The steps are as follows:

· 1.Someone or some small planning group needs to initiate the process by doing a preliminary stakeholder analysis, for example, using the Basic Analysis Technique (discussed in more detail in Chapter Four ), Power Versus Interest Grid, Stakeholder Influence Diagram, Bases of Power—Directions of Interest Diagram, and Participation Planning Matrix (discussed in Resource A ). This step is useful in helping sponsors and champions of the change effort think strategically about how to create the ideas and coalitions needed for the effort to reach a successful conclusion. This step typically is “back room” work. Necessary informational inputs may be garnered through the use of interviews, questionnaires, focus groups, or other targeted information-gathering techniques in this and subsequent steps, or in conjunction with the other techniques outlined in Resource A .

· 2.After reviewing the results of this analysis, a larger group of stakeholders can be assembled. This meeting can be viewed as the more public beginning of the change effort. The assembled group should be asked to brainstorm the list of stakeholders who might need to be involved in the change effort. Again, the Basic Analysis Technique, Power versus Interest Grid, Stakeholder Influence Diagram, Bases of Power—Directions of Interest Diagram, and Participation Planning Matrix might be used as a starting point.

· 3.After this analysis has been completed, the group should be encouraged to think carefully about who is not at the meeting but should be at subsequent meetings. The group should consider actual or potential stakeholder power, legitimacy, and urgency (defined as a composite of the stakeholder's time sensitivity to an organizational response, and the importance of the claim or relationship to the stakeholder) (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997 ). The group should carefully think through the positive and negative consequences of involving—or not—other stakeholders or their representatives, and in what ways to do so.

· 4.After these conversations have been completed, the “full” group should be assembled—the group that includes everyone who should be involved in the stakeholder analyses. The previous analyses may need to be repeated, at least in part, with the full group present, in order to make any needed corrections or modifications to prior analyses and get everyone on board and committed to moving forward.

· 5.Finally, after the full group has met, it should be possible to finalize the various groups who will have some role to play in the change effort: sponsors and champions, coordinating group, planning team, and various advisory or support groups (Chrislip, 2002 ; Linden, 2002 ; Friend & Hickling, 2005 ). It probably makes sense to fill out a Participation Planning Matrix, found in Resource A .

Note that this staged process embodies a kind of technical, political, administrative, and ethical rationality. The process is designed to gain needed information, build political acceptance, make sure appropriate administrative concerns are taken into account, and address at least some concerns about legitimacy, representation, and credibility of the process. Stakeholders are included when there are good and prudent reasons to do so, but not when their involvement is impractical, unnecessary, or imprudent. A certain amount of collective wisdom is used to inform these choices. Clearly, the choices of whom to include, how, and when are freighted with questions of value, and are perhaps fraught as well, but there is no way of escaping the need for wise and ethical judgments if an organization's or collaboration's mission and the common good are to be advanced (Vickers, 1995 ; Frederickson, 1997 ; Forester, 2009 ; Innes & Booher, 2010 ).

An Opening Retreat

For an organization, often the best way to reach initial agreement is to hold a retreat (Weisman, 2003 ). Begin the retreat with an introduction to the nature, purpose, and process of the proposed strategic planning effort. Often key decision makers need such an introduction before they are willing fully to endorse a strategic planning effort. For organizations that have not done strategic planning before, or not for some time, or have new leadership with little strategic planning experience, orientation and training methods might include a lecture and discussion; presentations by representatives of organizations that have used strategic planning, followed by group discussion; analysis by key decision makers of written case studies, followed by group discussion; circulation of reading materials; strategy films; and so on. Because strategic planning means different things to different people, such an introduction can be useful even if many key decision makers have considerable experience with strategic planning. The discussions can help people reach a common agreement on what the process might mean in practice for the organization and a common language with which to discuss it.

A possible format for the first day of a strategic planning retreat is:

· Morning. Presentation and discussion about the nature, purpose, and process of the strategic planning effort.

· Lunch. Presentation from a representative of a similar organization that engages in strategic planning, highlighting the benefits and liabilities of the process.

· Afternoon. Analysis and discussion of a written case study, as well as instruction in any special techniques necessary for successful strategic planning, such as brainstorming, the snow card technique (see Chapter Five ; Spencer, 1996 ), or the use of the action-oriented strategy mapping process (see Resource D ).

By the end of the first day it should be clear whether or not the key decision makers wish to proceed. If so, the second day might be organized as follows:

· Morning. Basic stakeholder analysis, power versus interest grid, and stakeholder interest diagram (see Resource A ), review of mandates, review of the existing mission statement, or development of a draft mission statement.

· Lunch. A speaker presents another case example.

· Afternoon. SWOC/T analysis, preliminary identification of strategic issues, and next steps.

Organizations that lack experience with strategic planning, but are committed to it nonetheless, may skip the activities outlined above for the afternoon of the first day in order to begin the second day's activities earlier. Organizations that have used strategic planning before may spend much of the first morning identifying the strengths of their previous processes and modifications that would improve the processes. They would then begin the second day's activities in the afternoon of the first day.

The retreat may conclude at the end of the second day, after next steps have been consensually mapped out, or it may continue for a third day. The morning of the third day can be devoted to further identifying and discussing strategic issues, establishing priorities among them, and developing possible strategies for addressing them. The afternoon can carry this discussion further and outline possible next steps in the process. The retreat should not end until agreement is reached on what the next steps in the process will be and who will be responsible for what in each step. (Unfortunately, the regrettable fact is that it is increasingly hard to get any group of participants to commit two, let alone three, continuous days to any process. The difficulty seems to have two parts: people simply do not think they can delay the urgent to attend to the important; nor do they find it easy to justify the cost of retreats that are held off-site, no matter how important they know them to be.)

If a group can reach quick agreement at each point, fewer than three days might be sufficient. If quick agreement is not possible, more time may be necessary to complete the various tasks, and sessions may have to be spread out over several weeks. For one thing, it can take time to do needed analyses of the organization and its situation and what can be done about it. Beyond that, quick agreement is particularly unlikely if the strategic issues imply the need for a major change. It takes a group time to cope with the anxiety, fear, anger, and denial that may accompany profound change, particularly if it senses that its culture and basic beliefs about the world are being threatened (Fiol, 2002 ; Bryant, 2003 ; Scharmer, 2009 ; Schein, 2010 ).

A retreat also might be helpful for a network or community engaged in strategic planning to help decision makers reach agreement about the nature of the planning effort. Such a retreat, however, might be very difficult to organize. More groundwork will probably be necessary to build trust and to gain agreement from decision makers on the purposes, timing, and length of the retreat. The retreat itself probably would have to be less than three days, and post-retreat logistics, coordination, and follow-through would probably take more time and effort. Nonetheless, a retreat can provide an important signal and symbol that the network community is about to address its most important issues and concerns; can provoke desirable media attention and pressure to continue; and can prompt other stakeholders, who might have been more lukewarm about the process, to participate (Chrislip, 2002 ; Ray, 2002 ; Wheeland, 2004 ; Innes & Booher, 2010 ).

How Many “Initial” Agreements?

Sequential agreements among successively larger groups of key decision makers may be necessary before everyone is on board. For example, the Park Board initiated a strategic planning effort in 2001, when it contracted with a planning consultant to begin the process. The consultant conducted initial interviews with park board commissioners, but the process was delayed by budgetary and administrative changes. Then in 2003 the board decided not to renew the then-superintendent's contract. The ensuing hiring process was contentious. After a national search, the field was narrowed to two candidates, both of whom dropped out, possibly because of worries about troubled relations among the commissioners. The situation was only resolved when superintendent Jon Gurban was hired by a 5–4 vote in late 2003. The board chair had made the unusual move of nominating Gurban for the position—for which he had neither applied nor interviewed. Four of the commissioners knew nothing of him prior to the meeting. According to a local media story, “the vote and the chaotic meeting solidified the board's reputation for dysfunction and disregard for the usual measure of public notice and process” (Olson, 2003 ). But in hindsight, Gurban's hire can be viewed as a second agreement toward what ultimately became a formal, participative, and very effective strategic planning process.

Once hired, Gurban obviously had a difficult challenge trying to guide the organization toward a new beginning with a divided board, significant budget shortfall, and questions about the way he was hired. He knew strategic planning was needed, but also knew that significant reorganization and administrative improvements were needed before an organization-wide, cross-functional, and community-involving formal effort was likely to succeed. He proceeded in a very strategic manner to address long-standing management issues. He started by restructuring the organization into cross-functional teams and reorganized the park district into three newly delineated subdistricts with a district administrator for each. Work was streamlined and each of the three new subdistricts was assigned a planner, maintenance foreman, support specialist, and liaisons from the park police and forestry. Operating procedures were put in place to standardize management of the various divisions and functions (Enke, Nguy, Sullivan, & Zenk, 2009 , p. 8). The changes at the senior management level have already been noted. By August 2005, the stage was set for a highly participative and deliberative strategic planning effort that had a good chance of succeeding, and an agreement was outlined and approved by the board and senior management team (Enke et al., 2009 ). The strategic planning efforts of the Loft and MetroGIS also began with more than one “initial” agreement. In short, strategic planning in collaborative settings will almost certainly require a series of initial agreements (Chrislip, 2002 ; Linden, 2002 ; Innes & Booher, 2010 ).

Indeed, it is worth keeping in mind that forging agreements of various sorts will go on throughout the Strategy Change Cycle. Coalitions are built incrementally by agreement, and strategies and plans also are typically adopted and implemented incrementally, through various agreements. These agreements may be signaled by various means, including handshakes, letters or memoranda of agreement, contracts, formal votes, and celebrations.

It is important for sponsors and champions to keep in mind that throughout a Strategy Change Cycle there are a number of tangible and intangible, process- and content-oriented outcomes that are likely to be needed if the process is to succeed. Figure 3.1 classifies outcomes according to these dimensions. The process versus content dimension is probably quite familiar—at least in a negative way—as, for example, when people will complain that “process is getting in the way of substance.” Less obvious, because it is less frequently discussed, is the distinction between tangible versus intangible outcomes (Innes & Booher, 1999 ; Friend & Hickling, 2005 , p. 100). Here I have subcategorized the dimension according to my interpretation of Schein's three levels of culture ( 2010 ). The most obvious aspects of culture are what we can see; namely, artifacts, plans, documents, or other symbolic representations of the less visible values, beliefs, and interpretive schemes that shape them. Even less obvious, but in many ways the most important of all, are the basic assumptions and worldviews that underpin the values, beliefs, and interpretive schemes. They are most important because they serve as the (almost) invisible underpinnings of what is above them; they are the platform on which the rest is built. As Innes ( 1998 , p. 54) notes, “When information is most influential, it is also most invisible” (italics in original). Strategic planning and management grow out of organizational or community culture, and thus any outcomes produced must tap into that culture, even if the purpose—as it usually is—is to change the culture in some ways, including possibly some of its basic assumptions (Schein, 1997 ; Khademian, 2002 ; Scharmer, 2009 ).

Figure 3.1. Outcomes Likely to Be Needed if the Strategic Planning Process Is to Succeed.

Source: Bryson, 2004a .

The entries in Figure 3.1 show that the most obvious outcome—but in some ways the least important one—is the tangible, content-oriented outcome represented by a strategic plan. Recall that earlier I said the purpose of strategic planning was to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization is, what it does, and why it does it—and not to produce a strategic plan. Often a strategic plan can help, but strategic plans will sit on the shelf if they are not based on positive outcomes in the other three quadrants of the figure.

The initial agreement is primarily about developing tangible, process-oriented outcomes; specifically, a commitment—probably in the form of a written agreement—to project organization; process steps, procedures, and requirements; a general work program for carrying out those steps; stakeholder involvement processes; and requirements for success. The initial agreement will be meaningless, however, unless it is based on some intangible, process-oriented outcomes. These would include some appreciation of: stakeholders and stakeholder relationships, how to work together productively, effective approaches to conflict management, organizational culture, uncertainties surrounding the process and the organization, and requirements for perceived rationality and legitimacy. If these appreciations are not deepened and widened over the course of the process, the process will fail. If they are enriched and spread throughout relevant networks, then crucial intangible, content-oriented outcomes will be produced. These include a widespread appreciation of and commitment to—on the part of senior leadership, major employee groups, and other key stakeholders—the organization's mission, mandates, vision, philosophy, core values, goals, strategies, and other key elements of a successful change effort.

If these last outcomes are in place, then the strategic plan will basically implement itself when a small organization is involved; in the case of a larger organization, collaboration, or community, implementation will be far easier than it would be otherwise. The plan will simply record the changes that have already occurred in the hearts and minds of key stakeholders. Said differently, if the intangible elements are in place, then the tangible outcomes will follow. As Mintzberg ( 1994 , p. 252) observes, “Organizations function on the basis of commitment and mindset. In other words, it is determined and inspired people who get things done.” Commitment, mindset, determination, and inspiration are not directly visible. What matters most in strategic planning thus is what is not visible, so sponsors, champions, and facilitators must pay very careful attention to the production of those intangible but highly consequential outcomes; if they do not, the plan will be mostly worthless. It may satisfy certain mandates or reporting requirements, but it certainly will not be a living document.

What Should the Initial Agreement Contain?

The initial agreement should cover the immediate desired outcomes listed at the beginning of this chapter: agreement on the purpose of the effort (including by implication what it will not achieve) and its worth; project organization, including sponsors and champions; the organizations, units, groups, or persons who should be involved, and how; a shared understanding about the nature and sequence of the steps in the process and how the Web and information and communication technology will be used to facilitate the process; agreement on the form and timing of reports; commitment of necessary resources to begin; and articulation of key requirements for a successful process. Next, a committee or task force probably should be established to oversee the strategic planning effort. The committee should be headed by someone with enough standing and credibility in the organization to assure that the effort is given visibility and legitimacy. Ideally, this person will be trusted by all or most factions in the organization so that the effort will not be seen as a narrow partisan affair. The committee can be an existing group, such as a board of directors or city council, that adds strategic planning oversight to its responsibilities, or it can be a committee or task force established for the specific purpose. In the Loft case, the official overseers of the process were the board and the executive director, although the executive committee and a three-person board and staff strategic planning team also shared responsibility for the strategic planning effort. The Park Board's process was overseen officially by the board and superintendent; however, in addition, a team consisting of staff from multiple disciplines (planning to forestry) and levels within the organization (management to the front line) played a key role in guiding and managing the process. As the process proceeded, a subcommittee of the board was delegated the responsibility for overseeing and promoting the process, and communicating to all board members information about progress on the plan's development. And in the MetroGIS case, the MC and deputy regional administrator were the formal overseers, but day-to-day oversight and management of the process were the responsibility of Randall Johnson, MetroGIS staff coordinator, in regular consultation with Rick Gelbmann, Council GIS unit coordinator, and occasionally with Richard Johnson, deputy regional administrator, and Shelly Berg-Gardner and Marcy Syman, director and assistant director of the Council's Learning and Development Unit. The oversight committee probably will be the body with whom the initial agreement is formulated, although it may be necessary to work out agreements first with various groups and factions who then send representatives to sit on the oversight body.

Next, a team to carry out the staff work probably will be necessary. The team should include planners and change advocates, but also helpful critics, to make sure that difficulties arising over the course of the process are recognized and constructively addressed (Janis, 1989 ). The teams assisting with the Loft's, Park Board's, and MetroGIS's processes were mentioned above. In the MetroGIS case, some consultants, including myself, were de facto team members while preparing for and during the December 1995 forum, and for several weeks following the forum, when the newly formed MetroGIS Coordinating Committee was acting on the forum's products. In the Loft case, I was occasionally a de facto team member via consultations with Jocelyn Hale and Nancy Gaschott. In all three cases, task forces were assigned to look at specific issue areas and report back to the teams with recommendations.

The necessary resources to begin the endeavor must be committed. Obtaining needed financial resources may not be difficult as they will be relatively minor in comparison with an organization's overall budget. The more important—and typically scarce—resources needed for a successful effort are the attention and involvement of key decision makers (Light, 1998 ; Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkataraman, 1999 ; Mulgan, 2009 ). Depending on the scale of the effort, strategic planning may demand from five to twenty-five days of attention from an organization's key decision makers over the course of a year—in other words, up to 10 percent of ordinary work time. Is this too much? Not for what is truly important for the organization. If there is not enough time for everything, then something else—not strategic planning—should go. Recall the great German philosopher Goethe's admonition: “Things which matter most must never be at the mercy of things which matter least.”

Finally, there should be an understanding of the likely requirements for success. Start listing requirements by first asking: Who has to say yes to this process and the resulting plan? And who—as best we can know at present—has to say yes to implementing approved strategies? And what would it take for these persons, groups, or organizations to say yes? Beyond that, there are almost certainly additional administrative, financial, legal, ethical, and not least, political considerations to be taken into account. Being clear about likely requirements is not the same as accepting the list as rigid and nonnegotiable constraints. Instead, it is a way of helping to clarify what specific process design features and activities may be necessary as a response to requirements in order to ensure overall success.

The end of this first step typically is the first major decision point in the process if the organization (collaboration, community) is large, the situation is complex, or many people need to be involved. (If the organization is small, few people are involved, and the situation is simple, the first major decision point will come later, although precisely when will depend on the particular details.) If agreement is reached on the various content items, then it makes sense to go ahead with the process.

If agreement is not reached, then either the effort can go on anyway—with little likelihood of success—or else this step should be repeated until an effective agreement can be worked out. It usually makes sense to repeat the step, or to scale down the effort to focus on a smaller area where agreement is possible. Part of the scaled-down effort might be to develop effective strategies to involve the other parts later. Recall that in the Park Board case the first attempt at strategic planning in 2001 was slowed because of budgetary and administrative challenges. When the board decided not to renew the superintendent's contract, a targeted effort at hiring a replacement ensued. Once a new superintendent was hired, his initial focus was on reorganizing and streamlining the organization in such a way that it was prepared to undertake