week 8 Discussion EDU500
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ChapterThirteenCognitiveDevelopmentinAdulthood.docxChapter Thirteen Cognitive Development in Adulthood
Andrew lives his life certain that for every situation there is a “right way” and a “wrong way” to view it. He sees the world in absolutes. According to Andrew, the taking of a human life for any reason is wrong. Hence, he is against such things as capital punishment, abortion, and assisted suicide. In contrast, for his sister Marie, everything is relative. Abortion, the death penalty, and assisted suicide may be appropriate in particular situations, according to Marie. Andrew and Marie represent different ways of thinking about the same issue. Scholars continue to be fascinated with the myriad of ways people think and whether adults’ thinking patterns change with age. If so, what might these changes in thinking patterns look like over the adult life span?
The study of pathways of adult cognitive development—that is, how thinking patterns change over time—is often linked to a combination of factors, primarily the interaction of maturational and environmental variables. As in other research traditions on learning, the major studies on cognitive development have been primarily carried out with children and adolescents. When this research is extended to adulthood, the underlying assumption has often been that adults move toward a final stage of cognitive development, however that is defined, or if that stage has been attained, work at maintaining that stage. Still other theorists have posited models of cognitive development that may be unique to adulthood.
Explored first in this chapter is the foundational work of Piaget (1972) and how scholars have used and extended this work. We then discuss alternative conceptualizations of cognitive development that are linear or categorical in nature (for example, Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986 ; Perry, 1999 ). This discussion is followed by an exploration of dialectical thinking and models that are representative of this form of thinking. Then, the contextual perspective on cognitive development and key theorists who represent this perspective are presented. Last, wisdom—the hallmark of adult thinking—is discussed. Representative conceptions of wisdom, including those of Holliday and Chandler, Sternberg, and Bassett, are reviewed.
Foundational Work on Cognitive Development
When we speak of cognitive development, Jean Piaget immediately comes to mind. Although Piaget's work is entirely focused on childhood cognitive development, his theory has provided the foundation for work with adults. Piaget proposed four invariant stages of cognitive development that are age related. These stages represent “qualitatively different ways of making sense, understanding, and constructing a knowledge of the world” ( Tennant, 1988 , p. 68). In Piaget's view, children's thought processes move from innate reflex actions (sensory-motor stage, birth to two years), to being able to represent concrete objects in symbols and words (preoperational stage, two to seven years), to an understanding of concepts and relationships of ideas (concrete operational stage, seven to eleven years), to an ability to reason hypothetically, logically, and systematically (formal operational stage, twelve-plus years). Piaget contended that normal children have the capacity to reach this final stage of formal operations between the ages of twelve and fifteen, which he later revised upward to ages fifteen to twenty ( Piaget, 1972 ). It is this final stage, characterized by the ability to think abstractly, that characterized the apex of mature adult thought for Piaget.
Piaget's model has its limitations in that it accepts “a mechanistic worldview that is caught up in a cause-effect, hypothetico-deductive system of reasoning. Unconcerned with questions of power relations and the way they structure our consciousness, formal operational thinkers accept an objectified, unpoliticized way of knowing that breaks a social or educational system down into its basic parts in order to understand how it works. … [F]ormal thought operates on the assumption that resolution must be found for all contradictions” ( Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1993 , p. 297).
Those who came after Piaget (neo-Piagetians) have challenged some aspects of Piaget's principles. First, they recognize that these qualitative changes (for example, moving from concrete operational thought to formal operational thought) may not occur for all aspects of thinking, but rather tend to be “local and domain specific in nature” ( Knight & Sutton, 2004 , p. 49). This explains why people can use concrete operations in one context and formal operations in another.
Second, several neo-Piagetian scholars have found evidence of postformal thought (see Arlin, 1975 ; Sinnott, 1998 ). Knight and Sutton (2004) note, “Whereas Piagetian formal operational thinking implies the ability to think systematically within a set of logical parameters, a more advanced level involves an individual's ability not only to think logically but also to reflect on this logical thinking” (p. 51). People who possess postformal thought believe the following: First, they know that all knowledge is incomplete and subjective. However, they recognize that they must act despite the limits of their knowledge. They understand that there is not one “Truth” but many “truths” and they commit to one set of beliefs knowing that there are many. Further, they understand that contradiction and subjectivity are inherent in all logical and objective observations ( Sinnott, 1998 ). They go beyond problem-solving behaviors, as is common in formal operations where they seek a solution to a problem, to problem-finding behaviors, characterized by “creative thought vis-à-vis ‘discovered’ problems” ( Arlin, 1975 , p. 603). In short, formal operational thought “presume[s] logical consistency within a single logical system” ( Sinnott, 1998 , p. 25). In contrast, postformal operations “presume somewhat necessarily subjective selection among logically contradictory formal operational systems, each of which is internally consistent and absolute” (p. 25).
In addition to recognizing the existence of postformal operational thought, neo-Piagetians focus on the importance of context in learning and development. In his later work, Piaget acknowledged that learning and development were more dependent on context than previously thought ( Knight & Sutton, 2004 ). However, neo-Piagetians concentrate on the specific context in which the learning occurs and assert that “new learning is most robust in the context in which it was constructed” (p. 51). The further away a person gets from the context in which the learning was constructed, the more difficult it is to access the learning that occurred.
So, how has Piaget's theory enhanced our understanding of cognitive development in adulthood? Tennant (1988, p. 77) noted Piaget's most salient contributions:
· • The emphasis on qualitative rather than quantitative developmental changes in cognition (and his related “structuralist” approach to cognitive development)
· • The importance attached to the active role of the person in constructing his or her knowledge (with the implication that learning through activity is more meaningful [than passive learning])
· • A conception of mature adult thought (that is, formal operations)
· With the discovery of postformal operational thought, neo-Piagetians have further expanded our understanding of cognitive development. They have helped us recognize that cognitive development occurs into adulthood ( Knight & Sutton, 2004 ). Further, the importance of contextual support such as “familiar materials, opportunities for practice, analysis [and] interaction with others” (p. 52) for adult learners cannot be underestimated. The more types of support adult learners have, the more likely they are to perform at high levels and to retain the learned information. Conversely, if they are not given the support or challenged to think at higher levels, the understanding and retention of material will be lower ( Knight & Sutton, 2004 ).
· Neo-Piagetian theories offer several implications for adult educators. First, students come to our classes at different cognitive levels and thus interpret our course material and activities in different ways. They operate at different levels during a class period. In addition, assert Knight and Sutton (2004) , older students have a higher level of functioning than younger students and can access their optimal levels more easily than younger students. They add, “Consequently, in the college classroom, the cognitive gap is even wider than a simple comparison of optimal levels would suggest. Therefore, we add even more complex challenges to the educator of adults” (p. 57).
· In sum, Jean Piaget's four stages of cognitive development provided the foundation for other models of cognitive development. Neo-Piagetians augmented Piaget's original theory in the following ways: First, they recognized that people could use formal operational thought in one context and concrete operational thought in another. Hence, cognitive change was not systemwide but localized. Second, they introduced the idea of postformal thought; that is, there is development past formal operations. These discoveries have implications for adult educators. Adult educators now know that cognitive development occurs in adulthood and that learning affects this development. In addition, the importance of context in adult learning is acknowledged.
· Linear and Categorical Models of Adult Cognitive Development
· There are other models of cognitive development that differ from Piaget's and yet are also linear or categorical in nature. These writers come from a variety of disciplines and interests (for example, college student development, women's development, psychology), but all have the same interest in exploring how adult thinking changes over time. A discussion of a number of these linear or categorical models of cognitive development follows.
Perry's Developmental Scheme
Perry's (1970, 1999) map of cognitive development is perhaps the best known and has been used the most often in the study of young adults, most of whom have been college students. Based on a study of the thinking patterns of Ivy League, White male college students, Perry proposed a model of cognitive development consisting of nine positions, each position representing a qualitatively different way of interpreting learning experiences. Perry purposely chose the word position over stage because “the notion of ‘position’ is happily appropriate to the image of ‘point of outlook’ or ‘position from which a person views his [sic] world’” ( Perry, 1999 , p. 54). As in Piaget's work, each position is conceptualized as hierarchical and sequential and moves from relatively simple thinking patterns to highly complex ways of perceiving and evaluating knowledge. People move from viewing knowledge in “dualistic” terms, as either right or wrong, to an acceptance of knowledge and values as “relativistic”—that is, the context of the knowledge is as important as the knowledge itself. Perry places as much emphasis on the transitions between each position as on the positions themselves and observes: “Perhaps development is all transitions and ‘stages’ [are] only resting points along the way” (1981, p. 78). Some examples of Perry's proposed positions and the transitions between them are outlined as follows (see Perry, 1970 , 1981 , 1999 for a complete description):
· Position 1: Authorities know, and if we work hard, read every word, and learn the Right answers, all will be well.
· Transition between Positions 1 and 2: But what about those Others I hear about? And different opinions? And uncertainties? Some of our own Authorities disagree with each other or don't seem to know, and some give us problems instead of answers.
· Position 2: True Authorities must be Right, the Others are frauds. We remain Right. Others must be different and wrong. …
· Transition between Positions 5 and 6: But if everything is relative, am I relative too? How can I know I'm making the Right Choice?
· Position 6: I see I'm going to have to make my own decisions in an uncertain world with no one to tell me I'm Right. …
· Transition between Positions 8 and 9: Things are getting contradictory. I can't make logical sense out of life's dilemmas.
· Position 9: This is how life will be. I must be wholehearted while tentative, fight for my values yet respect others, believe my deepest values are right yet be ready to learn. I see that I shall be retracing this whole journey over and over—but, I hope, more wisely. [ Perry, 1981 , p. 79]
Within this schema one can see shades of the conceptually complex notions of dialectical thinking, which is discussed later in this chapter, as well as the major theme of becoming more relativistic in one's thought patterns as one matures.
Each position is descriptive of individual cognitive growth, and in addition, Perry's positions have also been used to describe how people view instructors’ roles and their own roles as learners. Learners at the lowest positions, for example, tend to view instructors as authority figures; their job as learners is to filter out the right answers from the material presented. Those at the higher end of the continuum view knowledge in a contextual sense and search for relationships between ideas; they see instructors more as guides.
The increasing diversity of the college student population has prompted scholars to investigate the generalizability of Perry's scheme with various student populations. Zhang (1999, 2004) investigated the applicability of Perry's scheme to both American and Chinese college students. He conducted five studies between 1994 and 2000 using the Zhang Cognitive Development Inventory (ZCDI), which is based on Perry's schemes. In the five studies that he conducted, he found that Chinese college students’ cognitive development was opposite that of Perry's scheme. That is, students traversed from a more relativistic viewpoint toward a more dualistic viewpoint. In the two studies in which Americans were included, the dualistic-relativistic-commitment progression did not hold for American students in the second study, but it did in the first. Zhang (2004) hypothesized that changing American values may explain why Perry's order of cognitive development was not evident. He indicated that mainland China's approach to higher education, which limits students’ opportunities for making choices, may explain why students in the study moved toward more dualistic thinking. He cautioned, however, that these conclusions were not final and recommended that qualitative research procedures and longitudinal studies would give a richer picture of Chinese students’ cognitive development. Likewise Johnson (2000) noted that Perry's scale, normed on White, traditional-age college students, did not account for cultural differences between Whites and African Americans.
Most of the work using Perry's schema with older adults has produced contradictory results. Lavallee, Gourde, and Rodier (1990) and Wilson (1996) found that the majority of their respondents were at Positions 3 or 4 (multiplicity) on Perry's scheme, while Cameron's (1983) subjects were primarily at Position 2 (dualist). In a cross-sectional study, Hood and Deopere (2002) found that “as age increased, relativism scores tended to decrease” even when researchers controlled for intelligence and education (p. 233). This finding reinforces the stereotype that older people are more set in their ways and “less capable or willing to handle complexity in their thought processes” (p. 233). In addition, the findings of Wilson (1996) and Lavallee, Gourde, and Rodier (1990) differed on the importance of the level of education in terms of reaching higher levels of cognitive development. Wilson (1996) and Hood and Deopere (2002) found that those with a higher education scored higher on Perry's scale while Lavallee, Gourde, and Rodier (1990) concluded that level of education had little effect on the cognitive development of their subjects.
In sum, Perry's cognitive development model, based on the thinking patterns of White, Ivy League traditional-age college students, suggests that individuals move from dualistic (right-wrong) thinking toward dialectical thinking, where students are able to hold contradictory notions in their mind. Recent studies have indicated that the model may not account for cultural differences ( Johnson, 2000 ; Zhang, 2004 ). Further, some studies show that older adults may show more dualistic thinking than younger adults ( Hood & Deopere, 2002 ; Wilson, 1996 ).
The Reflective Judgment Model
King and Kitchener, like Perry, have also constructed a stage model. Influenced by the developmental traditions of Perry (1970) , Piaget (1972) , and Kohlberg (1981) , they examine the development of “epistemic assumptions” or “reflective thinking from late adolescence through adulthood” ( King & Kitchener, 2004 , pp. 5–6). The authors focus on how people make judgments about complex or “ill-structured” problems that “cannot be defined with a high degree of completeness, and … cannot be solved with a high degree of certainty” (p. 5). Examples include such controversial issues as “the accuracy of news reporting, the creation of human beings, and the safety of nuclear power” (pp. 10–11).
According to this complex stage model, people move through seven stages, with the final two stages encompassing the more mature thinking patterns of what King and Kitchener call reflective thinking (King & Kitchener, 1994 , 2004 ). In Stages 1, 2, and 3 (labeled prereflective thinking), people assume that knowledge comes from authority figures or is gained through personal experience. Individuals in these stages do not see problems as ill-structured, but rather view all problems as having complete and right answers. In Stages 4 and 5 (quasi-reflective reasoning), people define knowledge in terms of uncertainty and are more subjective in their thinking. Although they understand that ill-defined problems exist, they have trouble dealing with the ambiguity of those problems and tend to respond in very individualistic ways. In the final two stages of thinking (Stages 7 and 8), knowledge is no longer a given. Rather, knowledge, especially knowledge used to solve life's ill-structured problems, may have to be constructed by the person, and this knowledge must be understood in the context in which it was generated. Decisions and judgments people make, although they must be grounded in relevant data, should remain open to evaluation and reevaluation (King & Kitchener, 1994 , 2004 ). It is important to note that individuals do not fit neatly into one particular stage. People can use Stage 4 reasoning and can also evidence Stage 3 epistemic assumptions. King and Kitchener note that the development of reflective thinking is more like “waves across a mixture of stages, where the peak of the wave is the most commonly used set of assumptions” ( King, Kitchener, & Wood, 1994 , p. 140).
The sample for their original ten-year longitudinal study consisted of male and female students. The sample included twenty high school juniors, forty twenty-one-year-old college juniors, and twenty doctoral students whose average age was twenty-eight ( King & Kitchener, 2002 ). Subsequent studies have included nonstudent adults. As the result of thousands of interviews, King and Kitchener (2004) have come to the following conclusions: “(a) There are striking differences in people's underlying assumptions about knowledge or epistemic assumptions; (b) these differences in assumptions are related to the way people make and justify their own judgments about ill-structured problems; and (c) there is a developmental sequence in the patterns of responses and judgments about such problems” (p. 5).
A great deal of research has been completed using the reflective judgment model (see King & Kitchener, 1994 , 2002 ). Research has centered on validating whether the stages in the model form a developmental sequence. In addition, scholars have examined the impact of education, gender, and ethnicity on reflective judgment and the relationship of reflective judgment to other intellectual and personality constructs ( King & Kitchener, 2002 ). As previously noted, there appears to be a developmental sequence to the model. Further, there is a trend for older, more educated participants to score higher on the reflective judgment model than younger, less-educated individuals. Results on differences in reflective judgment by gender are mixed. King and Kitchener caution readers that “samples differ on many variables beyond gender (such as ability and educational level), and [we] suggest that these should be examined when interpreting gender differences” (p. 49).
There has been scant research on reflective judgment and ethnicity. Two studies that examined ethnicity (Latino-Latina and African American) revealed similar reflective judgment scores to Whites ( King & Kitchener, 2002 ). King and Kitchener report, “Prior studies have show that RJ [reflective judgment] is related to but not the same as academic aptitude, verbal ability, formal operations, or traditional measures of critical thinking” (2002, p. 50). There also appears to be some overlap with Belenky et al.'s (1986) Women's Ways of Knowing, but “only to the extent that the Belenky et al. interview asks epistemic questions and scores for that category” (p. 51). Regarding the relationship between reflective judgment and personality constructs, there seems to be moderate correlations between RJ and tolerance for diversity. Kozak (1996, as cited in King & Kitchener, 2002 ) found that people with higher reflective judgment scores “can access their feelings in the process of decision making, but aren't ruled by their feelings” (p. 53). The authors conclude that although personality variables may be related to reflective judgment, reflective judgment is a separate construct.
Recent research utilizing the reflective judgment model includes an investigation of the relationship between personality traits and reflective judgment among female undergraduates and graduates in teacher education programs ( Friedman, 2004 ), the epistemological development of Finnish adults ( Pirttilä-Backman & Kajanne, 2001 ), and the reflective judgment scores of seminarians over time ( Dale, 2005 ). In the study concerning the epistemological development of Finnish adults, fifty-nine adults were interviewed in the mid-1980s and again in the early 1990s using King and Kitchener's Reflective Judgment Interview. Participants ranged in age from twenty-four to fifty in the follow-up interviews. Their post–high school education included graduation from a vocational institute or university in the technical, medical-nursing, or social science fields. Formal education contributed to “epistemic development … through middle adulthood” ( Pirttilä-Backman & Kajanne, 2001 , p. 90). In addition, being exposed to a variety of information and diverse associations with others appeared to promote epistemic development in adulthood.
There seem to be similarities between the Perry scheme and the model developed by King and Kitchener. For example, both start with the assumption that people progress from a dualistic to a relativistic form of thinking. However, King and Kitchener incorporate the idea of knowledge construction in their model while Perry focuses on expanding his ideas of using relativistic thinking in a responsible way. Although a great deal of research has been completed using the reflective judgment model, few studies have been completed with adults outside the higher education setting. Attention to adult populations outside of the higher education setting would increase the generalizability of the reflective judgment model and would expand the understanding of people's personal epistemology.
Women's Ways of Knowing
In reaction to the early work of Perry (1970) , Kohlberg (1973) , and others in which primarily male samples were used, researchers became more interested in hearing the voices of women on developmental issues. The most prominent and often-quoted study on cognitive development using a sample of women is the work of Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule: Women's Ways of Knowing (1986). These researchers interviewed women from diverse social and ethnic backgrounds from two major settings: different types of academic institutions and parenting classes. From their in-depth interviews of 135 women of different ages, classes, and ethnic backgrounds, “based on the theoretical and empirical work of Perry, Kohlberg, and Gilligan” (p. 14), Belenky et al. grouped women's perspectives on knowing into five major categories:
· 1. Silence—a position in which women experience themselves as mindless and voiceless and subject to the whims of external authority. (They are passive, feel incompetent, and are defined by others.)
· 2. Received knowledge—a perspective from which women conceive of themselves as capable of receiving, even reproducing, knowledge from the all-knowing external authorities but not capable of creating knowledge on their own. (They listen to the voices of others; their world is literal and concrete, good or bad.)
· 3. Subjective knowledge—a perspective from which truth and knowledge are conceived of as personal, private, and subjectively known or intuited. (The locus of truth shifts to the self; intuition is valued over logic and abstraction; here women begin to gain a voice. Half the women in the study were in this category.)
· 4. Procedural knowledge—a position in which women are invested in learning and applying objective procedures for obtaining and communicating knowledge. (This position takes two forms: separate knowing—the self is separate from the object of discourse, making it possible to doubt and reason—and connected knowing—there is intimacy and equality between the self and the object of discourse, based on empathetic understanding.)
· 5. Constructed knowledge—a position in which women view all knowledge as contextual, experience themselves as creators of knowledge, and value both subjective and objective strategies for knowing. (This stage is characterized by the development of an authentic voice.)
These categories, which are not necessarily fixed or universal, move from the simple to the complex—from having no voice, to being able to value and create different ways of knowing that are contextual in nature. Although these authors do not assert that the categories constitute specific stages of cognitive development, they appear to present them as such, and some people continue to interpret them in this way ( Goldberger, 1996b ).
Reflecting on fifteen years of research, Clinchy (2002) lent some additional insight to a couple of positions. She realized the Silence position was much more common than previously realized, regardless of class. She also noted that the categorization of women into five broad categories did not allow for subtle distinctions between women in that category. For example, she indicated that most Received Knowers in their sample were young college students or older, poor women. Clinchy stated, “Received Knowing may take a different form among, say, a sample of prosperous middle-aged people. … Received Knowing cannot be quite the same for a first-year student in an elite college … and a fifty-year-old with minimal formal education” (pp. 68–69).
Scholars see similarities and differences between the Women's Ways of Knowing (WWK) positions and other epistemological models. Clinchy (2002) states that there are parallels between Perry's (1970) dualistic position and Women's Ways of Knowing position of received knowledge. In both cases, the knowers see “the world in terms of black and white, right and wrong” ( Clinchy, 2002 , p. 66). Likewise, subjective knowledge has similarities to Perry's (1970) multiplicity position, and WWK's constructed knowing is similar to Perry's Position 5—relativism ( Clinchy, 2002 ). However, Baron (2003) , who used “factor, correlational, and comparative analysis” to assess the relationships between Perry's scale and WWK, found that “the two theories are largely independent of each other” (p. x). Baron believes that Perry does not address “the concept of knowing in relationship and caring” while WWK explicitly acknowledges these factors (p. 55). Further, Perry presents his theory in a sequential fashion, whereas the WWK authors do not see cognitive development as a linear progression.
WWK's final category of constructed knowing seems comparable with the findings of King and Kitchener (1994, 2004) and Baxter Magolda (1992; Baxter Magolda's work is reviewed in the following section). For example, King and Kitchener (2004) speak to the importance of contextual knowing and constructing one's own knowledge as characteristic of their final two stages, and Baxter Magolda (1992) stresses the integration of relational (subjective) and impersonal (objective) knowing as key to what she terms contextual knowing. These apparent similarities add confirmation to the work of Belenky and her colleagues and are in line with their original interpretations of their research.
As with other epistemological models, scholars have several criticisms of the WWK theory. First, they argue that it is essentialist rather than constructivist. Clinchy refutes this criticism, saying, “We did not argue that the positions we described applied only to women, although we speculated that for various reasons, the positions might take somewhat different form in men” (2002, p. 79). Second, critics note that the theory does not take into consideration “the role of social positionality and oppression in the construction of knowledge” ( Goldberger, 1996b , p. 8). Goldberger agrees that this is a weakness of the theory, but says they have “listened to and learned from women of color and other culture theorists …, [and] have become much more alert to the situational and cultural determinants of knowing and to the relationship of power and knowledge” (p. 8). Cultural differences were also not explored in the WWK theory. However, the influence of culture on knowing has become of interest to the authors as the result of subsequent conversations. Last, the theory is thought to “endorse … the superiority of antirationalist, subjectivist epistemologies” (p. 9). Goldberger (1996b) replies that the authors value both connected and separate knowing and do not champion one above the other.
The WWK theory has generated much discussion around issues of gender and epistemological development. Clinchy (2002, p. 85) recommends that future research examine “development within rather than across domains” in the form of longitudinal case studies in order to get a better understanding of what factors promote epistemological development.
Epistemological Reflection Model
Marcia Baxter Magolda (1992) originally developed the epistemological reflection model to demonstrate the epistemological reasoning of college students. Later, she extended her work to young adults beyond their college experience. Like others who have studied cognitive development, Baxter Magolda's work is grounded in the assumption that ways of knowing are socially constructed and context bound.
Baxter Magolda (1992, p. 29) followed a group of seventy predominantly White male and female college students over five years, interviewing them yearly, and discovered “four qualitatively different ways of knowing, each characterized by a core set of epistemic assumptions”: absolute knowing, transitional knowing, independent knowing, and contextual knowing. Students told stories of moving from being certain about what they knew, to uncertainty, and finally to being able to integrate information from diverse points of view in order to apply that knowledge in a particular context. Baxter Magolda noted that only a small percentage of students used contextual knowing while in college. Like Perry's (1999) and King and Kitchener's (2004) work, Baxter Magolda provides excellent descriptions of what this work means for practice in higher education.
Unlike the work on the Perry (1981) and King and Kitchener (1994) schemes, Baxter Magolda found patterns of thinking within each of the ways of knowing that were gender related. Baxter Magolda (2004) explains, “I use the term gender related to convey that women or men in the project used one pattern more but the patterns were not exclusive to one gender” (p. 34). For example, in the absolute knowing category, two patterns emerged: listening-recording and mastery. Women focused on listening and recording information to learn from authorities while men were more likely to use the mastery pattern, which meant they participated in class and actively showed their mastery of material ( Baxter Magolda, 2004 ).
Baxter Magolda (2004) extended her original study and followed students for another two years after they graduated from college. She found that when her participants exhibited contextual knowing, their ways of knowing were no longer gender related. Rather, as they took on different adult roles, their patterns of thinking within this contextual framework became more integrated. More specifically, the patterns of relational and impersonal modes of knowing, which characterize contextual knowing, were used in an integrative fashion: “Contextual knowing required connecting to others and to the subject to be known, yet at the same time required standing back to analyze the situation” (pp. 37–38). (Her descriptions of contextual knowing echo somewhat the descriptions of “constructed knowledge” described by Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986 .) However, Baxter Magolda was puzzled at recent college graduates’ need to continue to “look to external sources for guidance” despite their advanced epistemological positions ( Baxter Magolda, 2004 , p. 38). She stated, “On leaving college, longitudinal participants did what they had been taught to do best—follow authorities’ leads to manage uncertainty” (p. 38). She continued to interview participants “for 12 years after their college graduation” (p. 39) and found that participants put external authority in perspective as they began to author their own lives. Baxter Magolda (2004) explained, “Becoming the author of one's life meant taking responsibility for one's beliefs, identity, and relationships. The internal voice became the coordinator of meaning-making in all three dimensions of development” (p. 40). As a result, people opened themselves to change and ambiguity and authored their own epistemologies.
From these longitudinal interviews with undergraduates, Baxter Magolda and King (2004) developed a learning partnerships model where they “identified conditions that promote self-authorship” (p. 41). The authors listed three assumptions and three key principles of educational practice. The assumptions were as follows: First, environments that promoted self-authorship conveyed “knowledge as complex and socially constructed” (p. 41). Individuals had to grapple with multiple interpretations and ambiguity. Second, these environments recognized that “self is central to knowledge construction” (p. 42). Third, “authority and expertise were shared in the mutual construction of knowledge” (p. 42). These assumptions were demonstrated by educators and employers in connection with the three principals of educational practice. The first principle was “validating learners’ capacity to know” (p. 42). Employers and teachers solicited students’ opinions and demonstrated that knowledge is constructed. Second, employers situated learners’ experiences. Employees’ knowledge was used as a “basis for continued learning and decision making” (p. 43). The last principle, “mutually constructing meaning” (p. 43), was shown when experts and learners constructed knowledge together to arrive at more complex understandings of the material.
The Transcendence View
A very different view of cognitive development has emerged from scholars writing from the perspective of transpersonal psychology. Washburn (2000) , among others (see Wilber, 1990 ), has extended models of cognitive development beyond the rational level by identifying deeper structures in the mind that undergird higher or transpersonal levels of consciousness. An important component of these theories is Consciousness of human beings, with a capital C, which denotes “the unlimited reservoir from which we draw personal, ego-centered awareness. Our individual Consciousness is an infinitesimal spark within the eternal flame of Universal Consciousness” ( Nuernberger, 1994 , p. 96). When we allow ourselves to move beyond our own individual limits of time and space—our individual Consciousness—a whole new world of expanded Consciousness with limitless boundaries, almost mystical in nature, is open to us.
Washburn (2000) cites several characteristics of transpersonal cognition. First, our consciousness goes beyond ourselves or our egos. We are more open to images. Second, transpersonal cognition is not only a cognitive occurrence but includes “feeling, instinct … a sense of being in the midst of or infused by an awesome energy” (p. 204). This energy amplifies our awareness. Third, transpersonal cognition is initially unstable and becomes more stable as it develops. In short, transpersonal cognition is a deep awakening. Washburn writes, “As Socrates put it, wisdom cannot be taught; we must awaken to it, and this awakening is not an isolated cognitive event but is, rather, a transformation of our whole being” (p. 207).
Wilber's (1986) model of transpersonal cognitive development has nine stages. The last two levels illustrate well the transpersonal nature of the theory. The subtle level, Level 7, is based on “a truly trans-rational structure … not emotionalism or merely felt meaning … or hunch” ( Wilber, 1982 , p. 30). Rather, phrases such as illumination of the spirit, intuition as an elemental sense, and mystical awareness characterize the thinking of this developmental level. The eighth level, the causal state, indisputably moves individuals beyond themselves. As described by Wilber (1983, p. 97), “This is total and utter transcendence and release into Formless Consciousness, Boundless Radiance. There is here no self, no God, no final-God, no subjects, no thingness, apart or other than consciousness as such.”
In reviewing these and other theoretical models of adult cognitive development, what becomes apparent is there are two themes that many of these theories address: first, higher stages of cognitive development in some models suggest the presence of dialectical thinking in adulthood—that is, the acceptance of inherent contradictions and alternative truths—and second, context, including the acceptance of cultural differences, is critical in determining what thinking patterns in adulthood really mean. The discussions of dialectical thinking have a long history in adult cognitive development, beginning with the work of Riegel (1973) and others. In contrast, viewing the contextual dimensions of development is more recent. Both of these themes, and representative work illustrating the themes, are discussed in the next two sections.
Dialectical Thinking
Our modern world is rife with contradictions and paradoxes. We have the capability to clone cells, with the possibility for great advances in medicine and many other areas, yet at the same time we fear what might be constructed with this technology. We eradicate one dreaded disease and other vicious diseases take its place. We can replace most body parts at will, but ethically cannot decide who should get the limited supply of these parts. And the list keeps expanding to the point where Kegan (1994) , among others, views us literally “in over our heads” in responding to a world of continuous change and disparities.
Conflict and contradictions in adult life are not new phenomena; rather, they may just be more apparent now because we can often see and hear them up close through television and other technological formats. In addition, what used to be intensely personal, such as the beginning and the end of life, has also become public knowledge. Should a woman be allowed to decide to abort an unwanted child? Who has the right to end someone's life? These are just a few of the questions debated in the public forum. In responding to life's inherent contradictions and complexities, a number of authors have posited that dialectical ways of thinking must become part of the way adults think. In essence, thinking in a dialectic sense allows for the acceptance of alternative truths or ways of thinking about similar phenomena that abound in everyday adult life. One might abhor killing, for example, and yet silently applaud the gentle person who switches off the life-support system of her spouse who is suffering beyond relief from a terminal illness.
One of the earliest and most thoughtful theorists to describe dialectical thinking was Riegel (1973, 1975, 1976). According to Riegel (1973, p. 350), “[D]ialectic conceptualization characterizes the origin of thought in the individual and in society [and] represents a necessary synthesis in the development of thought toward maturity.” In describing the dialectic thought process, Riegel (1973, 1975) proposed a corresponding mode of dialectic operations to stand beside Piaget's formal system. The key to this alternative system is the inclusion of the dialectic, or the acceptance of inherent contradictions and ambiguities in thought processes, at all developmental levels and not just as part of the more mature thought of adulthood. “The skills and competence in one area of concern, for instance in sciences, might be of the type of formal dialectic operations, while in everyday business transactions, might be of the type of concrete dialectic operations,” and so on ( Riegel, 1973 , p. 365). Riegel's basic assumptions are that people do not have to pass through any of the Piagetian levels to reach the higher levels of thinking within the dialectic framework and that people can operate simultaneously on all levels. In proposing this system, Riegel (1973, p. 366) argued that people are not only ready to live with life's inherent contradictions and ambiguities but will accept “these contradictions as a basic property of thought and creativity.”
Unlike Riegel, however, some writers view dialectical thought as evolving from the formal stages Piaget proposed. Benack and Basseches (1989, p. 98), for example, in exploring dialectical thinking as a postformal stage of thought, have developed a “dialectical schemata framework” consisting of twenty-four schemata representing different “moves in thought that dialectical thinkers tend to make.” These schemata were abstracted from “writings reflecting dialectic world-outlooks” ( Basseches, 1984 , p. 72) and interviews with college students and professors about the nature of education. Basseches claims that “some of the dialectical schemata describe ways of introducing dialectical perspectives on existence and knowledge into processes of inquiry. Others describe ways of maintaining dialectical movement within one's own thought” (p. 73). Based on his research, Basseches has suggested that there are actually four phases to the development of mature dialectical thinking. (See Basseches, 1984 , and Benack & Basseches, 1989 , for a full description of these phases.)
Kegan (1994) , framing his work from both a psychological and contextual approach, proposes a level-of-consciousness model that incorporates dialectical thinking as part of the highest level of consciousness. His assumption in proposing this model is that the “hidden curriculum” of modern life necessitates different ways of thinking and “a new conception of consciousness thresholds individuals may have to reach in order to satisfy contemporary expectations of love and work” (p. 11). Through examples of real-world demands on our private lives (parenting and partnering) and our public lives (work, dealing with differences, healing, and learning), Kegan (1994) explains how our thinking must continue to evolve through several levels of consciousness in order to navigate our complex lives. First, adults need to discern how to use their mental capacities in social situations. This form of thinking moves adults from the concrete world (having a point of view), to abstractions (being able to build inferences and hypotheses), to abstract systems (conceiving relations between abstractions), and finally to dialectical thinking (testing of paradoxical and contradictory formulations). Dialectical thinking thus becomes the hallmark of mature adult thinking.
Kegan argues that this pressing demand for dialectical thinking comes from our need as adults to respond to what he terms “culture's curriculum”—that is, the mental demands the postmodern world places on us. Kegan, like Riegel and Kramer, also views contradictions and paradoxes as inevitable and at the heart of the dialectical process. He then adds a new framework to this process: trans-systems thinking. What is key in this trans-systems way of thinking is that the parties or systems in conflict move beyond trying to “win” for their position, even the most desired of outcomes—the “win-win” position. Rather, what is needed is the recognition that “the other side will not go away, [and] probably should not. The conflict is potentially a reminder of our tendency to pretend to completeness when we are in fact incomplete” ( Kegan, 1994 , p. 319). Therefore, we must acknowledge and value the thought processes that brought about these conflictual relationships, knowing they are often based in fundamental ideological differences. We need to work within these relationships, miserable as that might be, to advance our ways of thinking and working.
In working together, the parties or systems in these conflictual relationships must then focus on transforming who they are versus trying to solve the conflict. As Kegan (1994, p. 345) goes on to observe:
This view does not mean that the challengers are co-opted into the status quo. It means that the old status quo is replaced by a new status quo. It does not mean that blacks can come into the office only if they act white. It does not mean that women's experience is included in the curriculum simply by changing pronouns and making a “Michael” example into a “Mary” example. It means that formerly marginalized people will come into the office, and they will have their own distinctive way of seeing things, setting the agenda, getting the goals accomplished; and it means that these ways will be recognized, acknowledged, and respected, provided that some common ground can be found where all contending “cultures” in their wholeness and distinctness can stand. This common ground becomes, in effect, a new status quo and a new ideology, but a much more wholesome one.
From his longitudinal work, Kegan (1994) has found that most people do not even enter the fourth level of consciousness until their forties. Kegan sees our expanded life span as a wonderful opportunity to develop our consciousness to this fifth level. From Kegan's perspective, “Highly evolved people do not mate and create highly evolved children. The evolution of human consciousness requires long preparation. We may gradually become ever more ready to engage the curriculum of the fifth order because we have found ways to increase the number of years we live” (p. 352).
Some studies on dialectical thought include the view that culture shapes the process. Peng and Nisbett (1999) describe differences between Western and Eastern thought. First, they delineate three principles to Chinese dialectical epistemology. First is the principle of change, which says that reality is a dynamic, flexible process. Existence does not consist of two categories: life and death. Instead, life is a “constant passing of one stage to another” (p. 743). Second is the principle of contradiction, which says that reality is full of contradictions. “Two sides of any contradiction exist in an active harmony, opposed but connected and mutually controlling” (p. 743). Third is the “principle of relationship or holism” (p. 743). Everything is connected and an entity is more than the sum of its parts. Next, Peng and Nisbett maintain that Western thought rests on laws of formal Aristotelian logic. The law of identity dictates that everything is what it is. A equals A. The law of noncontradiction says that “no statement can be both true and false” (p. 744).
Peng and Nisbett (1999) selected Chinese and American dialectical and nondialectical proverbs for American and Chinese undergraduates to read. A dialectical proverb, for example would be “Beware of your friends, not your enemies,” which contradicts the very definition of friendship (p. 744). A nondialectical proverb might be “One against all is certain to fall” (p. 744). Americans preferred nondialectical American proverbs, while the Chinese preferred dialectical Chinese proverbs. In a separate study, Chinese and American undergraduates were asked to read vignettes and suggest resolutions to the conflicts. Americans suggested nondialectical solutions more often than their Chinese counterparts, while Chinese proposed dialectical solutions more often than their American colleagues. Peng and Nisbitt determined that Westerners take a more analytic approach to problems, while Easterners have a more holistic approach.
Caroline Ho (2004) takes issue with these findings in her dissertation. She examined the dialectical reasoning of 196 Chinese Canadians and European Canadians. She found no difference between groups in dialectic reasoning ability, suggesting that “dialectical thinking skills may be more universal; however, the “tendency to display those skills may be more culture specific” (p. ii).
Nisbett's 2003 book, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently … and Why, explores these cultural differences in detail. He contends that that we do think quite differently, in part because of the Greek heritage of the West versus the Confucian-Chinese philosophy of the East:
The ancient Greeks were fond of categories and used them as the basis for discovery and application of rules. They also believed in stability and understood both the physical and social worlds in terms of fixed attributes or dispositions. These are not unrelated facts, nor is it a coincidence that the ancient Chinese were uninterested in categories, believed in change, and understood the behavior of both physical and social objects as being due to the interaction of the object with the surrounding field of forces. … [For example], there is the whiteness of the horse or the whiteness of the snow in ancient Chinese philosophy, but not whiteness as an abstract, detachable concept that can be applied to almost anything. [pp. 152–153]
Clearly, there are intriguing questions yet to be explored about the role of culture in cognitive development—and “if the nature of thought is not everywhere the same” ( Nisbett, 2003 , p. 211), then what are the implications for educators?
The Contextual Perspective
When we read through the many theories of cognitive development, some of us might resonate better than other people with these theories. We may wrestle with ideas presented in various theories and reflect later on how powerful being exposed to different ways of thinking has been. Acknowledging the contextual factors of cognitive development—that is, taking into account how social, cultural, economic, and political forces shape the development of adult thinking—completes the picture. Our theories and models need to be altered and perhaps totally revamped when these contextual aspects are seriously considered by scholars studying adult cognitive development. The work of Labouvie-Vief (1992) and the work of Goldberger (1996a) are used to illustrate how scholars consider context as central to cognitive development.
Labouvie-Vief (1980, 1984) was one of the earlier scholars to acknowledge the importance of contextual factors in cognitive development. Labouvie-Vief challenged the more accepted notion at that time that the perfection of formal logic was the ultimate goal of adult thinking. Rather, Labouvie-Vief contends that a different form of thinking must be integrated into one's model of adult cognitive development: “While the theme of youth is flexibility, the hallmark of adulthood is commitment and responsibility. Careers must be started, intimacy bonds formed, children raised. In short, in a world of a multitude of logical possibilities, one course of action must be adopted. This conscious commitment to one pathway and the deliberate disregard of other logical choices may mark the onset of adult maturity” (1980, p. 153). Therefore, what may have been conceived of as a regression in later life to Piaget's notion of concrete thought patterns is, rather, a positive adaptation to the realities of adult life. One key factor in being able to adapt to these new ways of thinking is the ability to accept and even thrive on contradiction. This in turns leads to acceptance of the notion of inherent relativity of knowledge and the ability to be self-regulating in choosing one's worldview.
Labouvie-Vief (1990, p. 256), expanding on her earlier work, postulates that “it may be variables related [more] to one's social context than to one's age that account for particular developmental gradients” in cognition. Therefore, if one wishes to discover changes and patterns in cognitive development, it might be more fruitful to examine groups of people who share pertinent life events and experiences versus people of a certain chronological age group. For example, age has been most often cited as the marker by which cognitive declines are measured. Labouvie-Vief (1990) instead asks the question of whether a major life event, such as retirement, “could be the cause of the ubiquitous decline in cognitive functioning” (p. 263). In posing this framework, Labouvie-Vief is echoing the sentiments of those studying personal and intellectual development from a sociocultural or contextual perspective.
In more recent work, Labouvie-Vief has examined the relationship between cognitive complexity and cognitive-affective integration ( Labouvie-Vief & Diehl, 2000 ). A person's cognitive complexity was shown by tests that measured crystallized intelligence (cultural knowledge), fluid intelligence (on-the-spot reasoning not dependent on experience but tied to how fast we can respond to stimuli), and reflective cognition (the complexity of thought demonstrated in thinking about oneself). Cognitive-affective integration was demonstrated by the level of a person's coping strategies and defense mechanisms as shown by answers to the California Psychological Inventory–based coping and defense scales. The study showed an interconnection between cognitive complexity and cognitive-affective integration. Those who were more “culturally advantaged and of higher cognitive complexity are more likely to show integrated coping” (p. 501). However, for those who “feel a sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis their family of origin, the two domains may be somewhat disconnected” (p. 501). In short, the study demonstrated the importance of environment on cognitive-affective integration.
Goldberger (1996a) , from interviews with approximately sixty bicultural individuals, primarily women, living in the United States, has added different dimensions of meanings to all of the original categories of knowing that she and Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986) had described. Goldberger found that the position of “not knowing,” that of silence, for example, is a much more complicated phenomenon than was described in Women's Ways of Knowing. Rather, how silence is defined can be culturally determined and is actually a positive way of knowing for some. In American Indian cultures, “silence is taught [as something to be respected] within their tribal groups. … Allaq [a member of the Inuit nation] remembers the ‘nice silence’ of many children in a room, listening as the elders told stories. Hard Rider [a member of the Canadian West Coast Dtidahy band], struggling to learn from his grandfather how to be a tribal leader, had already recognized the advantages of silent and respectful listening” ( Goldberger, 1996a , p. 343). Goldberger also highlights the importance of silence for others, such as African-American women, as a tactical strategy for “negotiating life in white communities or workplaces” (p. 345). This distinction of types of silence has led Goldberger to differentiate between those who are truly silenced “by oppressive and demeaning life conditions who feel powerless, mindless, and truly without words … from individuals who resort to strategic or culturally and ritually endorsed silence, but who may have other well-developed ways of acquiring, even constructing knowledge” (p. 346). In reframing the original categories from a contextual perspective, Goldberger views them more as strategies for knowing than as “person types” to which individuals are assigned based on their response patterns. In conceptualizing these categories as knowing strategies, one can then explore how contextual factors limit or expand our ways of knowing and allow us to speak of different uses or even meanings of each of the ways of knowing.
In this review of the work of Labouvie-Vief, Goldberger, and others on the contextual perspective of cognitive development, two important points become apparent.
First, the majority of the mainstream theory in adult cognitive development is “based largely on the findings from a mainly White, well-educated U.S. population” ( Hofer & Pintrich, 1997 , p. 89). There is a paucity of studies that incorporate people of color or different social classes or that examine cross-cultural differences. It appears from studies where the contextual aspect is acknowledged that people from varying backgrounds may define and value knowledge quite differently. Goldberger (1996a) , for example, shares three stories from bicultural women living in the United States: Kat, a South American–born woman of mestizo background who is a counselor; Allaq, a Native Alaskan of the Inuit people and a health worker; and Toshi, an African-American professor recently granted tenure:
Kat: My grandmother [who is a shaman] would teach me the difference between thinking that you know something and knowing it. She would take me out into the woods and have me sense becoming things. Not just looking and describing what I saw. I had to be the tree, I had to be the rock, I was the bird. Some of that [kind of knowing] is helped with the sacred medicine plants. They allow one to open up many different channels and get all the information possible. Whereas [simply] thinking about something feels like it is a very narrow band, a very narrow channel.
Allaq: As a child, I learned a lot just listening to the elders. They talked about the way of living of the Yupik people. … Knowledge is part of the soul. You have to learn it spiritually in every aspect of life—spiritually, mentally, emotionally, physically, socially, as a whole person. Yugarag is passed through generations. … In my world everything is interrelated. Everything interrelates.
Toshi: Black people have a different way of relating to the world. Even intellectually active black people. And that way is more experientially related than cognitively related. We think less about something but react more. I like being able to go from my experience, rather than having to think about it. As a Black person, I don't have to hold it in. I can express it. [pp. 336–337]
What is evident in these stories, and those from other writers (for example, Goldberger, Tarule, Clinchy, & Belenky, 1996 ; Reybold, 1997 ), is that culture and personal experience shape what and how people develop their distinctive ways of knowing.
The second point regarding the contextual perspective, as observed by Goodnow (1990, p. 82), is that social context is not, as it is often presented, “a relatively benign, neutral, or free market” commodity. Rather, the social world in which we live “takes an active and managing interest in the ideas people acquire” (p. 93). This active and managing interest manifests itself in two ways related to adult cognitive development. The first is that the dominant culture may subvert ways of knowing it does not value. Because these ways of knowing may not be valued by the dominant culture, they may be hidden or lost, and worse, viewed as illegitimate or not needed in our modern world. And second, scholars themselves may choose to study only the development of the ways of knowing that they are familiar with and value. This bias will continue to block the construction of alternative models and theories that acknowledge contextual factors as a critical aspect of adult cognitive development.
Wisdom: The Hallmark of Adult Thinking
Wisdom is often seen as the pinnacle or hallmark of adult thinking. It is something we all speak about and sometimes yearn for as we face the many challenges of adult life. Should we tell our teenage grandchildren they are making horrendous decisions? Should we make a major career change, especially if it means losing our financial security? What do we say to a very dear friend who is dying of cancer? Questions like these haunt many of us, and we wish we had the wisdom of the elders to make the “right” decisions. Yet this notion of wisdom continues to be a fluid and elusive idea that is most often characterized by the acceptance of ambiguity as one of its many virtues.
Wisdom is not a new concept; it has been discussed through the ages by great philosophers and theologians of all backgrounds and persuasions. Psychologists and educators have defined and studied wisdom from a variety of perspectives. Robinson (1990) noted that the definition of wisdom has changed over time, differing in ancient Greek, traditional Christian, and contemporary conceptions. Baltes and Smith (1990) define wisdom as expertise in everyday life, while Kramer and Baccelar (1994) link wisdom to being able to think in a dialectic way, while Becvar (2005) states that “being wise has to do with higher awareness,” one which allows us to acknowledge the “many possible paradigms, worldviews, reality tunnels and epistemologies, each of which is a plausible explanation of the way the world really is” (p. 29). Therefore, the problems we face as adults are value- and context-specific, and wisdom then becomes a process versus a state of being. And Sternberg (1996b, p. 276) has noted the importance of the social-interaction nature of wisdom, which stresses “that wisdom by definition will hardly ever be found in an individual, but rather in cultural or social interactive products.” These and other definitions point to the complexity of the concept. Most researchers do agree, however, that wisdom is the province of adulthood, although older is not always equated with wiser.
Researchers and writers on wisdom have attempted to delineate its major components and its relationship to the aging process. Holliday and Chandler (1986) , for example, have sought to provide empirical parameters for the term wisdom in three interlocking studies. They first collected general descriptions of wise people from which they formulated the basic description of wisdom in a second study. In the third phase of their research, they “examined the influence of the wise prototype on people's information processing strategies” (p. 44). The 458 subjects in their study represented all age cohorts of adults: young, middle-aged, and older. They concluded that wisdom is a multidimensional construct consisting of more than objective and context-free aspects of thought. In their view, “Wise people must be able to solve problems—but not in an abstract sense. The type of problems that wise people presumably deal with appear to have strong practical and emancipatory components. That is, wisdom problems are problems endemic to life and to the human condition. … Consequently, the problems typically involve or center on values” (p. 90).
In a somewhat different way, Sternberg (1986b, pp. 177–178) sought to discover people's conceptions or implicit theories of wisdom by exploring “the nature and the interrelationships of intelligence, wisdom, and creativity.” Through a series of studies with both laypersons (community volunteers and students) and specialists (college professors from a variety of disciplines), Sternberg found that people not only have implicit theories about intelligence, wisdom, and creativity but use them to evaluate others. Moreover, he found differences in the way laypersons and specialists perceived each of the three constructs, including the notion of wisdom.
Laypersons perceived the wise individual to have much the same analytic reasoning ability one finds in the intelligent person. “But the wise person has a certain sagacity that is not necessarily found in the intelligent person. He or she listens to others, knows how to weigh advice, and can deal with a variety of different kinds of people. … The wise individual is especially well able to make clear, sensible, and fair judgments and is perceived to profit from the experiences of others and … learn from others’ mistakes, as well as from his or her own” (p. 186). The specialists, in contrast, tend to emphasize certain aspects of wisdom as more critical than others. The art professors, for example, “emphasize insight, knowing how to balance logic and instinct … and sensitivity,” while the business professors emphasize such things as “maturity of judgment, understanding of the limitations of one's own actions … and appreciation of the ideologies of others” (pp. 186–187). Sternberg concludes that the three major constructs of intelligence, wisdom, and creativity are indeed distinct and yet interrelated, and moreover, that we must pay as much attention to wisdom and creativity as we do to intelligence.
Sternberg and associates, using the findings from this 1986b study, have expanded on this earlier work through an expansive research program over the last twenty years to further delineate the nature of wisdom ( Sternberg, 2000a ; Sternberg & Jordan, 2005 , Sternberg & Lubart, 2001 ; Sternberg et al., 2000 ). Sternberg has often linked this research, which is both theoretical and empirical, to his study of intelligence, and more specifically to his triarchic, successful, and practical theories of intelligence (see Chapter Four teen). Sternberg's current theory of wisdom “views successful intelligence and creativity as the basis for wisdom” (2003b, p. 152). Termed the balance theory of wisdom, Sternberg contends that wisdom is mediated by the values that underlie achieving the common good. Thus wisdom is “about balancing various self-interests (intrapersonal) with the interests of others (interpersonal) and of other aspects of the context in which one lives (extrapersonal). Wisdom also involves creativity, in that the wise solution to a problem may be far from the obvious” (p. 152).
In a recent handbook on wisdom, edited by Sternberg and Jordan (2005) , Sternberg (2005a) takes a different view of wisdom through his discussion of the absence of wisdom, or what he has characterized as foolishness. His message is very clear—“the costs of foolishness can be very high” (p. 349), especially from the actions of people who possess incredible power and wealth. Their foolishness has led us into wars, polarizations among those who could make a positive difference, and inconceivable hardships for people worldwide. It is Sternberg's contention, as echoed in his earlier work, that being bright does not necessary equate with being wise. Rather, based on his balance theory of wisdom, he not only views wisdom as a continuous balancing act among individuals, groups, and societal interests “but also of three possible courses of action in response to this balancing: adaptation of oneself and others to existing environments; shaping of environments to render them more compatible with oneself or others; and selection of new environments” (pp. 346–347). What is critical is taking action, as echoed earlier by Sternberg (2003b) and will be seen later in this chapter in the work of Bassett (2005) and Thorpe (2005) —in “wisdom, one seeks a common good, realizing this common good may be better for some than for others”( Sternberg, 2005a , p. 345).
Bassett (2005) also has developed a model of wisdom. This model, the Emergent Wisdom model, is based on in-depth interviews with twenty-four adults whom she describes as “thoughtful, insightful people of public distinction from many walks of life” (p. 6). Using a grounded theory approach, the model that emerged from these interviews comprises four major components: discerning, respecting, engaging, and transforming. Discerning includes the cognitive functions of wisdom, meaning that wise people have “the ability to distinguish often quite subtle variations in different qualities and characteristics of others” (p. 7). Or as one of her respondents observed: “Wise people are able to look at the ‘underlying forces and not be distracted by surface symptoms’” (p. 7). Respecting is an affective function that allows adults to express “a kind of caring for the other, even another we might not agree with, feel empathy for, or ‘love.’ Respect manifests gratitude and an expanded sphere of consideration” (p. 9) for both other people and the many interconnected parts of the environments where we live. Engaging means that we push ourselves to action, do things we never thought we could do and in some cases are afraid of doing. Engagement displays itself “in the wider world as committed action for the common good, what is good for many of us, not just me and the people like me” (p. 9). Transforming is a reflective process that allows us to think more deeply about “the fundamental patterns and relationships, expanded spheres of consideration, and actions” (p. 10) that are often associated with the common good. This domain allows us to live with ourselves, even with the “many possible, plausible, and competing worldviews and epistemologies” we are confronted with as we move through life. In essence, “the self becomes understood not as a unit seeking stability, but rather as a process where the sub-parts constantly shift, adjust, and change” (p. 11; italics in original). In addition, included in the model for each dimension are “proficiencies (skilled behaviors), a main manifestation and several learning prompts or developmental stimuli whose practice can lead to wisdom” (p. 7).
Bassett (2005) views this model or “map of wisdom” not as a single path to follow but as a “spiral, circling ever wider and deeper” (p. 10). Therefore, we can keep moving forward, survive, and perhaps even thrive again, through even the most perplexing and painful situations, like the loss of a child, or being left with nothing from nature's wrath of earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes. Do these types of challenges we all face as adults leave us wiser? Not necessarily so. However, by embracing the Emergent Wisdom model, we may find a deeper acceptance of paradox and recognition of the interdependence of all living systems—“in short, the whole mystery of the world and of wisdom” (p. 11).
Thorpe (2005) , in her essay on wisdom, asks different kinds of questions: “Does wisdom ever appear in the same place as violence and madness? What if madness came to town—and we had to deal with it?” (p. 34). Could we—or would we, especially those of us who are warm, well-fed, and relaxed—“have good sense, unusual discernment and judgment, in the face of firsthand violence or would we too be swept away in the hysteria?” (p. 34). Often we look for answers to these questions from great men and women throughout the ages, but she asks if the response to these questions really comes more from ordinary people, without aspiration, who find themselves in extraordinary situations. To answer these questions she followed the stories of three ordinary men who lived during the 1800s who found themselves embroiled in extraordinary times. What she discovered in their stories were numerous themes about wisdom that were a part of each of their stories. A sampling of these themes contains ideas that are both similar and different to what we have discussed previously in our discussion of wisdom.
· • Wisdom is not the same thing as peace, serenity, or personal insight. When madness is flying all about, no one is peaceful, serene, nor afforded the luxury of inner contemplation. …
· • Wisdom is neither moderation nor relativism. It is not about giving equal weight to all perspectives, nor about compromise. [Rather,] it is seeing beyond the immediate positions and knowing what is beyond them that is more fundamental—and more permanent. …
· • Wisdom cannot be identified through benchmarks of time and place. The standards of time and place do not predict or denote wisdom. However, the little streams of wisdom that people leave in other times and places grow into rivers that change the benchmark over time towards systems that work better. [ Thorpe, 2005 , pp. 41–42; italics in original]
Thorpe concludes “that wisdom appears when we most need it” (p. 43). If wisdom could not appear in times of war, madness, and polarization, those “tiny rivulets of sanity” that save us and society from exploding into oblivion would not be forthcoming.
Despite the different perspectives from which wisdom has been studied and the lack of consensus on its precise dimensions, several points of agreement have emerged. Wisdom is grounded in life's rich experiences and therefore can be developed throughout our adult lives. Although book learning may be a part of developing wisdom, it is not a requirement. Rather, being able to respond well to the pragmatics of life seems to form the core of being wise. Moreover, wisdom seems to consist of the ability to move away from absolute truths, to be reflective, and to make sound judgments for the common good related to our daily existence, whatever our circumstances.
Recently, Sternberg (2005b) published a comprehensive review of the literature on the relationship between wisdom and age. He presents a number of conclusions with respect to this question. First, there is no single position on the relationship between age and wisdom—studies have reported it decreasing with age, increasing with age, and remaining stable with age. He also concludes that “there are almost certainly widespread individual differences in the trajectory of wisdom”; wisdom appears to lie “in situational rather than personal variables” and research results depend on how wisdom is defined and measured (p. 20). Finally, he concludes that while research suggests that people have the ability to become more wise, “whether wisdom actually will develop depends not so much on age as upon cognitive variables, personality variables, and life experiences” (p. 21).
In reflecting on this study of wisdom and how it might enrich learning in adulthood, we are struck by observations made by Dychtwald and Flower (1989) about “the third age”—that part of life beyond age sixty, a time of life that more and more people are experiencing as healthy and vital individuals. Dychtwald and Flower contend that this third age allows for the “further development of the interior life of the intellect, memory, and imagination, of emotional maturity, and of one's personal sense of spiritual identity” (p. 53). It is a time for people to give back to society through their wisdom, power, and spirituality “the lessons, resources, and experiences accumulated over a lifetime” (p. 53). They then quote Monsignor Fahey, the director of Fordham University's Third Age Center: “People in the third age should be the glue of society, not its ashes” (p. 53). Their conclusion is clear and dramatic: “Think about it. We know even with the best care overall fitness will decline gradually over the years. While the strength of the senses is weakening, what if the powers of the mind, heart, and the spirit are rising? If life offers the ongoing opportunity for increased awareness and personal growth, think how far we could evolve, given the advantage of extra decades of life!” (p. 52). Their observations of using our later years to further develop our cognitive thinking abilities are similar to Kegan's (1994) , discussed earlier. In incorporating the concept of wisdom in our thinking about cognitive development, mature adult cognition is more than just abstract logic, complex reasoning, and dialectical thinking; it also encompasses the ability to think, feel, and act “wisely” in life.
Summary
Cognitive development refers to the change in thinking patterns that occurs as one grows older. Much of the earlier work on cognitive development in adulthood has been grounded primarily in the work of Piaget. One line of research has focused on how Piaget's stages play out in adulthood. A more fruitful research tradition, grounded in Piaget's work, has been the conceptualization of adult stages of cognition beyond that of formal operations, such as the work of Arlin (1975) . Other researchers have posited entirely new schemes of adult cognitive development. These alternative theories range from the traditional stage theories of development, such as the work of Perry (1970, 1999) and King and Kitchener (1994, 2004), to those theories that bring in new voices ( Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986 ; Goldberger, Tarule, Clinchy, & Belenky, 1996 ) and different ways of framing development, represented by Baxter Magolda (1992, 2004) and Labouvie-Vief (1980, 1990; Labouvie-Vief & Diehl, 2000 ).
In the review of the many theories of adult cognitive development, two major themes became apparent: dialectical thinking is important and contextual factors are critical in determining how we develop our thinking patterns as adults. Dialectical thinking, as represented by the work of Riegel (1973) and Kegan (1994) , allows for the acceptance of alternative truths or ways of thinking about the many contradictions and paradoxes that we face in everyday life. To be able to engage in dialectical thinking is viewed by some as the only way to navigate our postmodern world successfully. Bringing in the contextual perspective on adult cognitive development acknowledges that the world around the thinker makes a difference in how adults develop their thinking patterns. Social, cultural, economic, and political forces help shape both how we think and what kind of knowledge we value.
The chapter concluded with a discussion of wisdom, often regarded as the hallmark of mature adult thinking. Although it has been discussed over the ages by the great philosophers and theologians, this area of study has received little attention in the literature on cognitive development and learning in general. Representative conceptions of wisdom, including those of Holliday and Chandler (1986) , Sternberg (1996b, 2003b, 2005a), and Bassett (2005) , were reviewed. Despite the different perspectives from which wisdom is viewed, scholars seem to agree that wisdom involves special types of experience-based knowledge and is characterized by the ability to move away from absolute truth, to be reflective, to take action for the common good, and to make sound judgments related to everyday life.
