Groups: A Love/Hate Relationship

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Chapter 9:

Groups

9.1 Group Ac�ons

What Is a Group?

Social Facilita�on

Social Loafing and the Köhler Effect

Deindividua�on

9.2 Group Cogni�on

9.3 Social Dilemmas

Commons Dilemma

Resource Dilemma

Prisoner's Dilemma

Dealing With Social Dilemmas

Chapter Summary

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Learning Objec�ves

By the end of the chapter you should be able to:

Define "group" and describe the various types of groups

Explain the posi�ve and nega�ve effects of social facilita�on

Differen�ate social loafing from the Köhler effect

Explain what deindividua�on is and when it occurs

Explain brainstorming techniques that increase or decrease the number of ideas developed

Describe the effect of group polariza�on on group decisions

Explain the antecedents, characteris�cs, and consequences of groupthink

Explain factors in group decision making

Differen�ate the following social dilemmas: tragedy of the commons, resource dilemma, prisoner's dilemma

Chapter Outline

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Brainstorming

Group Polariza�on

Groupthink

Group Decision Making

* * *

Jury trials were adopted by the United States in 1791, with the 14th Amendment to the Bill of Rights. Jury trials were seen as a way for ci�zens to be part of the decision-making process and to prevent poli�cal leaders or others who might be in power from unfairly or unjustly prosecu�ng ci�zens. About 154,000 jury trials take place every year in the United States (Graham, 2009). Almost 30% of Americans have served as a trial juror in their life�me, with about 32 million Americans being summoned each year to serve on a jury (Burne�, 2009; Read, 2009). Jury trials occur in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and many other countries around the world. They usually consist of a small group of people, typically, between 6 and 12 jurors. When juries make decisions, they take about 4 hours for delibera�on (Burne�, 2009).

Juries are just one example of a small group working together to make a decision or accomplish a goal. Every day, groups of people engage in ac�ons, large and small, that affect their own lives and the lives of others. A family may jointly decide what restaurant to eat at that night. A group of execu�ves may decide to engage in a hos�le takeover of a rival company. Ci�zens of a na�on may rise up together to overthrow their leaders, as occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in January and February of 2011. Understanding how groups think and act together is important to understanding their influence on us.

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This group of golfers enjoying each other's company would likely be an in�macy group.

Expand Your Knowledge: Triple�

You can read Triple�'s classic study of social facilita�on at h�p://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Triple�/index.htm (h�p://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Triple�/index.htm) . Triple� offers a number of possible explana�ons for his observa�ons, including theories like the suc�on theory, the brain worry theory, and the theory of hypno�c sugges�ons.

9.1 Group Ac�ons In life, we engage with groups in a variety of se�ngs. A child jumping rope may do so with an audience of other children. A basketball player shoo�ng a free throw may be affected by the presence of the crowd. A team on a factory floor may produce different amounts of product than would be expected based on each member's individual produc�on. A mob of angry protesters may act in ways uncharacteris�c of its individual members. Groups can affect individual behavior in posi�ve and nega�ve ways. In this sec�on, we inves�gate these types of situa�ons, focusing primarily on the way individuals act, think, and interact.

What Is a Group?

A jury is a fairly clear example of a group. Would a dozen people standing at the bus stop qualify as a group? What about three students studying at the same library table? A group can be defined as at least two people interac�ng and forming some kind of coherent unit (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Dasgupta, Banaji, & Ableson, 1999). According to this defini�on, those bus riders or the studying students might qualify as a group if they are doing something together. If the students are interac�ng and quizzing one another on class material, they would qualify as a group. If the bus riders are simply standing together as they wait for the bus, they are unlikely to qualify.

We can also differen�ate various types of groups. Rela�ves or friends—that is, groups of individuals who are related to one another or enjoy one another's company—are in�macy groups. In�macy groups help fulfill one's need for affilia�on. Groups that engage in tasks together, like juries or work groups, are task groups. Achievement needs are met by par�cipa�on in task groups. Social categoriza�on, like being a woman or a Japanese American, can be the basis of a group and provide us with a sense of iden�ty. Groups might also be described by loose associa�ons, like those who like hiphop music or football (Johnson et al., 2006; Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001). When people think about each of these types of groups, they think about them differently. In�macy groups are assumed to be small and long-lived, involve a lot of interac�on, and be rela�vely impermeable to outsiders. Social categories, on the other hand, are likely to be large and involve less interac�on, but, like in�macy groups, be long-lived and rela�vely closed to outsiders. Because task groups work together on tasks, we see them as having common goals and interac�ng to meet those goals, but they are less likely to be of long dura�on. Loose associa�ons are likely to be short-lived and open to outsiders, with li�le interac�on (Lickel et al., 2000).

Social Facilita�on

When people are together and interac�ng with one another, they may act differently than if they are alone. In the 1890s, Norman Triple� no�ced that bicycle riders clocked different �mes depending on whether they were bicycling alone or with others. He saw that when bicyclists competed against the clock and there were no other bicyclists cycling with them, they went slower than when other bicyclists were there. Triple� began by looking at the records of cyclists, but discovered that a large number of other variables, extraneous variables, might affect the findings. For example, when bicyclists race together they dra� one another, allowing the group to go at a faster pace than an individual might be able to achieve. To focus in on the impact of the group and to control extraneous variables, Triple� looked at the behavior of 40 children. He asked these children to wind up a modified fishing reel. Some�mes the children were alone and some�mes other children were present, winding up their own fishing reels. On average the children wound most quickly when other people were there. Triple�'s study is considered by many to be one of the first studies in social psychology.

Later researchers found results similar to Triple�'s. Par�cipants performed be�er when others were present. For example, when people engaged in tasks like doing easy mul�plica�on problems or crossing out all the vowels in a wri�en passage, they did be�er when others were present (Allport, 1920; 1924). But these findings were not consistent; some researchers found that the presence of others caused problems. In one study par�cipants did worse on a memory task when others were present than when they performed the task alone (Pessin, 1933). This le� researchers ques�oning what determined whether the presence of others actually helped performance or hindered it.

An explana�on for this difference was provided by Robert Zajonc ("Zajonc" rhymes with "science"). He proposed that the presence of others increases arousal. Increased arousal, he argued, increases the dominant response tendency, which is related to the nature of the task. For simple, easy, or well-learned tasks our most likely (dominant) ac�on (response tendency) is to do the task well. For difficult, new, or complex tasks, our most likely ac�on is to do the task poorly. If the presence of others increases our arousal, and arousal increases our dominant response tendency, then we should do simple or easy tasks par�cularly well in the presence of others. On the other hand, if the presence of others increases our arousal and arousal increases our dominant response tendency, then we should do difficult or new tasks poorly (see Figure 9.1). If you were a star basketball player in

high school and shoo�ng a free throw is a well-prac�ced response, you should be more likely to make the basket in a packed gym because your increased

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arousal due to the audience would drive your dominant response of free-throw shoo�ng behaviors. Alterna�vely, if you have played basketball rarely and making a basket is a rela�vely new and difficult task for you, an empty gym would provide you with the best chance to make that basket because your arousal would be lower.

Figure 9.1: Social facilita�on

The presence of others can affect a person's task performance. Photo credits: Hemera/Thinkstock; iStockphoto/Thinkstock

When the presence of others affects task performance, social facilita�on has occurred. Evidence of this can also be found in animal as well as human behavior. Zajonc and colleagues set up an experiment using cockroaches (Zajonc, Heingartner, & Herman, 1969). They created both complicated and simple mazes for the cockroaches, and provided �ny Plexiglas audience boxes for observer cockroaches. When other cockroaches were in the audience boxes, the cockroach in the maze completed the simple maze faster but completed the complicated maze more slowly. Similar effects have been found with rats and chickens (Tolman, 1967; Wheeler & Davis, 1967; Zentall & Levine, 1972). People show social facilita�on just like these insects and animals. Good pool players play be�er when watched, but poor players tend to do worse with an audience (Michaels, Bloommel, Brocato, Linkous, & Rowe, 1982).

Zajonc (1980) argued that social facilita�on could occur simply because others are there, what he called mere presence, not because of other factors. Other researchers suggested that the presence of others creates distrac�on or concern about being evaluated and it is this distrac�on or concern that is the true cause of the social facilita�on effects (Co�rell, 1972). There is some support for these alternate explana�ons. In one study par�cipants completed a task in a room where another person was present. The other person either quietly observed or was blindfolded, presumably because the person was wai�ng for a study of vision to begin soon and needed to have his or her eyes adapt to darkness. If social facilita�on occurs simply because of the presence of others, there should be no difference in how well the par�cipant completes the task because in both condi�ons the "mere presence" of another exists. This study, however, showed no social facilita�on effects when the other person was blindfolded (Co�rell, Wack, Sekerak, & Ri�le, 1968). Although this study suggests that social facilita�on requires more than the mere presence of others, later studies showed that mere presence is enough; the effect of apprehension about evalua�on remains a ques�on (Platania & Moran, 2001).

Some researchers have ques�oned whether arousal is the mechanism behind social facilita�on (Aiello & Douthi�, 2001). More recent ideas have proposed cogni�veneuropsychological mechanisms—the presence of others seems to put demands on the frontal lobes of the brain and the cogni�ve system that manages the other systems (execu�ve system), diminishing the capacity to process new or difficult tasks (Wagstaff et al., 2008). The frontal lobes of the brain are par�cularly important for planning for the future, a�en�on in the present, and ini�a�on of ac�ons, so such an explana�on makes logical sense.

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Of the types of groups discussed, which is most likely to be small, have a long life, and largely be closed to outsiders? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

In�macy groups are o�en small, have longevity, and are not very open to new members.

When learning how to perform tricks with a yo-yo for the first �me would you be be�er off with an audience or without? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

According to research on social facilita�on,when learning to do something new or doing a difficult task, people do be�er when others are not present, so you would likely do be�er without an audience.

How are the frontal lobes of the brain involved in the performance issues found with social facilita�on? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

The frontal lobes of the brain are important for our engagement in new or difficult tasks, and the presence of others also puts demands on our frontal lobes.

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Individuals tend to socially loaf when they do not expect their contribu�ons to lead to something they value.

Social Loafing and the Köhler Effect

In studies involving social facilita�on, the individual performing the ac�on was simply in the presence of others, with the others either doing an ac�on at the same �me or observing. What happens when the others are working with the individual doing the ac�on? When a group performs ac�ons together to accomplish a goal, do the members of the group act differently than if they were engaging in that ac�on alone? At about the same �me as Triple�, Max Ringelmann completed a set of early studies in social psychology to answer these ques�ons. Ringelmann, a French agricultural engineer, inves�gated the amount of work individuals versus groups put into tasks. He suggested that two or more individuals working together did not accomplish as much as one individual alone because of a difficulty in coordina�ng their efforts, termed coordina�on loss. Even though, he suspected there might be issues with the mo�va�on of the members of a group, he le� it to later researchers to inves�gate this possibility (Kravitz & Mar�n, 1986).

The tendency for individuals to produce less or not work as hard when working with others is called social loafing. Social loafing occurs when individuals are working together toward a shared goal and their efforts are pooled. When our work is combined we tend to have less mo�va�on or show less effort. In one study of this phenomenon, par�cipants were asked to pull a rope as hard as they could in a simulated tug-of-war exercise (Ingham, Levinger, Graves, & Peckham, 1974). The researchers measured how hard par�cipants pulled when they were pulling alone and knew it, as opposed to when they thought they were pulling with others. To separate coordina�on loss from issues involving mo�va�on, researchers had par�cipants do the work alone, although they believed they were working with others. In the tug-of-war, par�cipants completed the task blindfolded so they would not know they wethe only one pulling. When par�cipants thought a number of other people were pulling, they pulled with less force than if they thought the task was theirs alone.

If your efforts toward a group goal, like a class project, were pooled, but you knew that each person's piece could be clearly iden�fied, would you engage in social loafing? One key factor in social loafing is the iden�fiability of individual effort. When one's work is pooled with others but one's effort can be iden�fied individually, social loafing declines or disappears. To determine if iden�fiability was important, research par�cipants were asked to yell as loud as they could under three condi�ons: when

they were yelling alone and knew they were alone, when they thought they were yelling with one other person, and when they thought they were yelling with five other people (Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981). The par�cipants had headphones and blindfolds on so they could not actually see or hear what others were doing. The researchers found that when people thought they were yelling with one other person, they produced 69% as much sound as when they were yelling alone. When par�cipants thought they were part of a group of six, they produced 63% as much sound. The researchers were able to eliminate this reduc�on in sound produc�on by pu�ng individual microphones on par�cipants and telling them that when they were yelling with others their individual efforts were iden�fiable.

When individuals do not expect their contribu�ons to ma�er, they are most likely to socially loaf. This could occur either because they perceive that their contribu�ons are not going to be meaningful, or because they do not value the outcome of the group. In a tug-of-war, you might feel that your addi�onal effort is not going to add much to the group, so you would pull less when the group is pulling with you. You might also feel that any praise you would get would be quite small in the tug-of-war, because it would be divided amongst your group members. It follows, then, why individual iden�fiability is important. When your contribu�on can be recognized, it becomes meaningful and the outcome more valued. When people engage in social loafing while in a group, they are called free riders. Free riders do not put as much energy or work into a group task, gaining the rewards of the group's outcome without inves�ng.

Social loafing is partly determined by the nature of the group and the types of task. We engage in less social loafing when we know the other people in our group and we have a cohesive group. Perhaps knowing your friends are relying on you is different from having strangers rely on your contribu�ons. We loaf less when the outcome depends on us in some way (e.g., the project will not be completed without our contribu�on) or the task is meaningful, important, or enjoyable to us in some way (Hoigaard, Safvenbom, & Tonnessen, 2006; Karau & Hart, 1998; Karau & Williams, 1993; Shiue, Chiu, & Chang, 2010; Smith, Kerr, Markus, & Stasson, 2001). If you know your group cannot finish the class project without you or you simply enjoy inves�ga�ng the topic or pu�ng together a report, you may not loaf.

Social loafing varies depending on gender and culture. In general, men are more likely to socially loaf than women (Karau & Williams, 1993; Kugihara, 1999). Women tend to show more equal inputs whether working alone or with a group. Individuals from more interdependent cultures are also less likely to socially loaf than those from independent cultures (Gabrenya, Wang, & Latane, 1985; Klehe & Anderson, 2007). Within each culture, though, women are less likely to loaf than men (Kugihara, 1999). In men and women, social loafing is less likely in people who are high in the personality trait of conscien�ousness (Ferrari & Pychyl, 2012)

In some instances, groups can posi�vely affect performance by elici�ng mo�va�on to work harder (rather than engage in social loafing). Imagine you were recruited to be part of a basketball team. Though you know the rules and have played before, your background in basketball is limited. When you are playing with a team of great players, will you try as hard as you can or not as hard as you can? Most likely you would be mo�vated to work hard and would put a great deal of effort into your play, hoping you will not let your team down. The tendency for individuals to work harder when they are less capable than the other group members has been called the Köhler effect (Hertel, Kerr, & Messe, 2000; Kerr, Seok, Poulsen, Harris, & Messe, 2008). That increased mo�va�on may come

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from comparing oneself to other group members and realizing that one's performance is lacking. It could also come from a realiza�on that the group's outcome will only be as good as one's weaker performance allows (Kerr, Messe, Park, & Sambolec, 2005; Kerr et al., 2008; Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1996).

The weakest players on a team gain the most from the Köhler effect. For example, on a swim team, the members with the slowest �mes in individual trials show the greatest declines (and so, the greatest improvement) in their �mes when swimming with their team in the finals (Osborn, Irwin, Skogsberg, & Feltz, 2012). The effect is also strongest for tasks that are conjunc�ve, where the en�re team can only do as well as its weakest member, rather than addi�ve, where the weakest team member contributes less to team output than other members (Kerr & Hertel, 2011). Weaker group members tend to do be�er when a group is con�nually changing rather than when it remains stable, perhaps because the weaker member con�nues to compare his or herself to others and does not simply get used to being outperformed (Lount, Kerr, Messe, Seok, & Park, 2008).

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What factors make social loafing less likely to occur? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Social loafing is less likely when people are individually iden�fiable, when members of a group are cohesive and know one another, when members are women or from a more interdependent culture, and when members perceive the task as being meaningful, valuable, or interes�ng.

A�er joining a pub quiz team you discover you are the weakest member of the team. What is likely to happen to your performance as a result of this situa�on? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

According to the Köhler effect being the weakest member of a team provides people with the mo�va�on to try harder and work to live up to the level of the other members of the team.

Deindividua�on

Have you ever a�ended a spor�ng event and found yourself yelling at the top of your lungs in a way you would not ever do if you were alone? If you have ever been in a crowd and found yourself ac�ng in a way you would not act alone, you may have experienced deindividua�on. Deindividua�on is the tendency for awareness of one's individual iden�ty to decline in group se�ngs, o�en leading to engagement in behaviors with a group that one would not engage in alone. Yelling insults, throwing objects onto the field at a spor�ng event, or loo�ng have all been behaviors par�cipated in when people feel deindividuated.

Researchers have proposed a variety of factors that could lead to deindividua�on. A reduced sense of individual responsibility for ac�on, high physiological arousal, a lower awareness of personal values and beliefs, novel situa�ons, and a sense of anonymity have all been suggested as factors that increase deindividua�on (Pren�ce-Dunn & Rogers, 1982; Zimbardo, 1969). Imagine the types of situa�ons where such things are true. When a mob is involved in loo�ng, individuals know their own behavior is unlikely to be traced back to them. At a spor�ng event people are excited and may be distracted from awareness of their inner thoughts by the ac�on on the court/field/rink. At a rock concert, low ligh�ng and wearing a band t-shirt like many others may allow one to feel anonymous. Researchers further inves�gated the factors that may lead to deindividua�on using a technique called meta-analysis. Meta-analysis involves looking at as many studies as possible on a par�cular topic and using a sta�s�cal technique to summarize those findings. When researchers did this for factors that promote deindividua�on, they found that feelings of individual responsibility were most important (Postmes & Spears, 1998). This means that, while a novel situa�on or high physiological arousal might have a small impact on tendency to engage in deindividua�on, feeling like one is not accountable for one's ac�ons is essen�al.

Deindividua�on o�en leads to nega�ve behavior, such as stealing and chea�ng (Postmes & Spears, 1998). For example, one Halloween, trick-or-trea�ng children were told that they were supposed to take only one piece of candy. When the adult who had given the children these instruc�ons le�, researchers watched from a hidden loca�on to see how many pieces of candy the children actually took. Children who were more anonymous and were in a group were more likely to steal candy than those who were more iden�fiable or trick-or-trea�ng alone (Diener, Fraser, Beaman, & Kelem, 1976). In another study, Halloween masks that hid children's iden��es led to greater stealing of candy (Miller & Rowold, 1979).

Most examples you will find of deindividua�on evaluate behaviors such as yelling insults, stealing, or chea�ng, but this sort of behavior is not inevitable. In a study by Johnson and Downing (1979) par�cipants were placed either in a situa�on to induce deindividua�on or in a situa�on where their ac�ons were clearly iden�fied as their own. The par�cipants were asked to put on one of two costumes. For half of the par�cipants, a nurse's uniform was provided, with the explana�on that the costumes had been borrowed from the hospital for the study. The other half were asked to put on a robe that the researcher had supposedly made himself. He said "I'm not much of a seamstress so these ended up looking kind of Ku Klux Klannish" (Johnson & Downing, 1979, p. 1534). The idea was that the costumes might provide par�cipants with different cues toward behavior. The researchers believed the nurse's uniform would provide people with an environmental cue to be helpful, because we generally think of nurses as helpful. The robe could provide people with an environmental cue toward nega�ve, aggressive behavior, because the KKK is and has been a violent organiza�on.

Par�cipants were asked to select an electrical shock level when another par�cipant responded incorrectly. They had the op�on of either raising the shock level, up to a posi�ve 3, or reducing it, down to minus 3. By raising the shock level par�cipants were engaging in an ac�on that inflicted addi�onal harm on the other

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par�cipant. By lowering the shock level they were helping the other par�cipant by making the shock less painful. The other par�cipant, who was allegedly being shocked, did not really exist; no one received a shock in this study. The researchers wondered if deindividua�on could actually create helpful behavior, if the environmental cues were right, or if anonymity always leads to nega�ve behavior. Table 9.1 shows the results of the study.

Table 9.1: Average shock level increase or decrease of par�cipants in different groups in Johnson and Downing's (1979) study of deindividua�on

Individuated Deindividuated

Cue for helpfulness – 0.35 – 1.47

Cue for aggression 0.76 0.95

From Johnson, R. D. & Downing, L. L. (1979). Deindividua�on and valence of cues: Effects on prosocial and an�social behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(9), 1532-1538. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.37.9.1532 Copyright © 1979 by the American Psychological Associa�on.

As you can see from the table, deindividuated individuals with the aggressive cue showed more aggressive behavior: They increased the shock level. Those who had something in their environment that suggested helpfulness tended to do what they could to reduce the pain someone else would experience, par�cularly when they were deindividuated. Therefore, deindividua�on has the poten�al to create posi�ve behavior if the environment supports it.

Overall, deindividua�on increases the individual's responsiveness to the situa�on or the group norms (Postmes & Spears, 1998). The person will take on the norms of the group, the group iden�ty, and engage in behavior that goes along with those norms, good or bad. You can think of the impact individual iden�ty and group iden�ty has on our behavior as working like a teeter-to�er. When one side of a teeter-to�er goes down, the other goes up; when our reliance on our individual iden�ty goes down, the iden�ty of the group becomes more important. On the other hand, when we are very aware of our own individual iden�ty, the group is less of a determinant for our behavior. This is the idea behind the social iden�ty model of deindividua�on effects. As people lose a sense of their own iden�ty, they take on the iden�ty of the group around them.

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Does deindividua�on always lead to nega�ve behavior? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Deindividua�on tends to lead to nega�ve behavior but, given posi�ve cues in the environment, it is possible for deindividua�on to lead to prosocial behavior.

Because you are wearing your favorite team's colors and are in the stands with hundreds of others in that color, you lose some sense of your unique iden�ty. According to the social iden�ty model, what is likely to occur? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

According to the social iden�ty model, when you lose some of your own iden�ty you take on the iden�ty of the group.

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9.2 Group Cogni�on In the previous sec�on we explored how groups affect the ac�ons of individuals. When in groups, people do not simply act differently, they also think differently. Individuals in groups may think together to generate ideas or make decisions. The number and quality of ideas and the quality of the decisions may be influenced by the group. Group discussions can also affect individual a�tudes.

Brainstorming

When groups think together, coming up with ideas as a group, it is called brainstorming. Brainstorming has been proposed as a way to develop a wide variety of solu�ons or new and crea�ve ideas (Osborn, 1957). Common brainstorming prac�ces include trying to generate as many ideas as possible, with encouragement to combine, improve, or expand on previous ideas. Brainstorming seems, to many, to generate more ideas than the same individuals would generate working alone (Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes, & Camacho, 1993). In fact, overall, brainstorming actually provides fewer ideas per person than the same number of individuals would provide on their own. This may be because of issues related to produc�on within a group. Individuals might interrupt one another or spend �me in social conversa�ons unrelated to the task at hand (Diehl & Strobe, 1987). As groups get bigger and there are more people to interrupt or get off topic, groups show a greater loss of produc�vity (Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 1991). Brainstorming groups also tend to become fixated on par�cular realms of ideas, leading to lower diversity of ideas (Kohn & Smith, 2009).

Some people are anxious in social situa�ons and may put a damper on group brainstorming interac�ons. Researchers have found that people who find interac�ng with others a stressful and anxiety-provoking experience were not as helpful in brainstorming sessions because they were unwilling to par�cipate orally. When highly anxious people were in a group with those who were not anxious, the low-anxiety individuals tended to show poorer performance as well (Camacho & Paulus, 1995). Feeling anxious in interac�ons puts a damper on both those who feel the anxiety and those with whom they interact.

To maximize the poten�al of brainstorming, the standard technique of ge�ng all members of the group into a room and speaking their minds may not be most effec�ve. Combining individual ideas and group brainstorming can be helpful. Studies show that the greatest number of ideas are developed when the group brainstorms together, and then each person brainstorms alone (Brown & Paulus, 2002). The group may prompt individuals to think in direc�ons the individuals would not have thought about on their own. Following a group session with an individual session allows individuals to come up with a number of ideas without the loss of produc�vity due to interrup�ons by other members of the group, and without the social anxiety of the group context. Talking over other group members can also be avoided by having members write down their ideas and read rather than speak the ideas of others, or by using a computer to type up one's ideas and sending them electronically to other group members (Brown & Paulus, 2002).

Group Polariza�on

Do group discussions change the way people think? When the opinions of individuals are surveyed before and a�er a group discussion of opinion-related topics, opinions tend to shi� farther toward an extreme. If we think of opinions on a con�nuum, with strong agreement on one pole and strong disagreement on the other pole, people tend to polarize. Polariza�on involves a shi� closer to whichever pole people were ini�ally leaning toward.

There are a variety of possible reasons why this occurs. During a group discussion, individuals might hear arguments in favor of their own posi�on that they had not heard or thought of before (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977). People might also realize that their opinion is more common than they thought (Myers & Lamm, 1976). Such a realiza�on may lead us to make our own a�tude more extreme as we strive to be dis�nc�ve from the group. Thus, group discussion may provide us with more arguments bolstering an already held opinion and the mo�va�on to make that opinion stronger.

In general, people are more persuaded by their ingroups than by an outgroup, par�cularly when the ingroup and outgroup are in conflict, and are more persuaded by unanimous groups than by groups with a dissenter (Kunovich & Deitelbaum, 2004; Mackie & Cooper, 1984; Williams & Taormina, 1993). Greater polariza�on occurs during deindividua�on (Lee, 2007). According to the social iden�ty model of deindividua�on, people take on the iden�ty of the group when personal iden�ty is lowered, leading to greater iden�fica�on with the a�tudes of the group and therefore greater polariza�on.

Polariza�on can occur not only within group discussion, but also as a result of repeated exposure to an a�tude, or with dedicated �me spent thinking about the a�tude (Brickman, Redfield, Harrison, & Crandall, 1972; Downing, Judd, & Brauer, 1992; Tesser, 1978). Part of the effect of polariza�on may, therefore, come not because of the group but because the interac�on allows individuals to state their own opinion and �me to think about their a�tude (Van Boven, Judd, & Sherman, 2012). Polariza�on also occurs with juries. In general, individuals who ini�ally want to be lenient have a greater slant toward leniency a�er some jury delibera�on. Those whose ini�al leaning is toward a severe punishment have an even more severe stance a�er discussion (Bray & Noble, 1978). When juries deliberate, the first vote o�en predicts the outcome of the delibera�on, par�cularly when the ini�al vote favors acqui�al rather than convic�on (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995).

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Do group members come up with more ideas collec�vely in a group brainstorming session or individually? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Combining the efforts of many individuals outside of a group usually leads to more ideas being generated than a group brainstorming session.

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In the Challenger space shu�le incident, the push to launch overrode the warnings of concerned engineers.

A�er group discussion do people's a�tudes tend to remain the same, become less extreme, or become more extreme? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Individual a�tudes tend to become more extreme a�er group discussion than they had been before, a phenomenon called group polariza�on.

Groupthink

In 1961 a group of 1,600 U.S. funded and trained Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The mission was to lead a popular movement to overthrow Fidel Castro and his communist regime. The mission failed en�rely, and the exiles were captured or killed. The world was outraged that the United States invaded a sovereign country. Far from being overthrown, Castro remained in power for nearly 50 years, and only ceded power to his brother in 2008 because of ill health.

Groups are o�en involved in decision making. With the adage "two heads are be�er than one," many of us believe that a decision made with others is be�er than a decision made by an individual. President Kennedy and a small group of advisors made the decision to move forward with the invasion plan, hatched during the Eisenhower administra�on. Neither Kennedy nor his advisors seemed to have understood the hazards of invading with such a small force. The tac�cs, the numbers, the weapons, and even the intelligence from Cuba added up to a flawed plan doomed to failure (Sidey, 2001). Despite the characteriza�on of Kennedy's group of advisors as "the best and brightest" (Halberstam, 1972), Kennedy later described their ac�ons as stupid (Sorensen, 1966).

The Bay of Pigs Invasion shows that groups can and do make bad decisions. Similarly, disastrous decisions were made by various groups in the failure of the United States to prepare for the a�ack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the escala�on of the Viet Nam war, and even in the Challenger space shu�le disaster. Many of these group decisions share common characteris�cs. Researcher Irving Janis studied these types of group decisions, and developed a model to describe how groups could make such poor choices (Janis, 1972; 1982). Janis's model involves a process including the antecedents, characteris�cs, and consequences of this type of group decision making. He named it groupthink, a decision-making process that occurs when a desire for harmony and consensus within the group interferes with appropriate informa�on seeking, and leads to bad decision making.

According to this model, the antecedents are the condi�ons that must be in place for groupthink to occur. The group needs to

be highly cohesive,

be insulated from other viewpoints,

have a direc�ve leader,

have poor procedures for searching out and evalua�ng alterna�ves, and

be under high stress or feel threatened.

No�ce that these condi�ons revolve around an insular, cohesive group that follows a leader with a certain plan. The group does not seek outside input, but looks into itself for answers.

The antecedents lead to a group decision-making process with par�cular characteris�cs. These characteris�cs are the natural outgrowth of such an insular group, where the group

feels invulnerable;

assumes the moral correctness of its viewpoint;

stereotypes outsiders, par�cularly opponents;

engages in self-censorship, not sharing concerns, doubts, or disagreements;

pressures dissenters to conform to group opinion;

has an illusion of unanimity; and

has members who act as mindguards—individuals who protect leaders from hearing a viewpoint contrary to their own.

When a group is showing characteris�cs of groupthink, that group supports its own viewpoint and dismisses or ignores those of others. Even those within the group who disagree are silenced. Because of mindguards, the leader never hears about dissen�ng opinions. For example, had Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon appointed at least one person whose job it was to challenge proposed decisions, historical courses of ac�on may have been different.

The consequences of such a process can be devasta�ng, as the historic examples illustrate. The par�cular consequences of groupthink for the group are that the group does not

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fully consider its true objec�ves,

consider alterna�ves to the proposed course of ac�on,

fully examine risks of the proposed course of ac�on,

thoroughly search for informa�on, and

develop appropriate con�ngency plans.

Because the group does not consider alterna�ves, risks, or develop a con�ngency plan, when things go wrong the group is surprised and le� scrambling for answers.

Though we would expect to find groupthink when the antecedents for groupthink are present, this does not always happen. The antecedents set the stage, but a group might s�ll avoid groupthink. Not all antecedents are necessary for groupthink to occur. Cohesive groups that are insulated from other viewpoints and have direc�ve leaders are the most vulnerable (Ahlfinger & Esser, 2001; McCauley, 1989). Since the Bay of Pigs and Janis' work, these insulated cohesive groups have con�nued to make poor decisions in circumstances, such as in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq, the space shu�le Challenger accident, and a series of decisions a group of NBC execu�ves made regarding Jay Leno and The Tonight Show (Moorhead, Ference, & Neck, 1991; Neck, 1996; Post, 2011).

Although a decision-making process characterized by groupthink does not use the best decision-making strategies, decisions made this way are not always disastrous. It is possible for a groupthink decision to turn out well if the group happens to stumble on a good solu�on or gets lucky in the outcome of its ac�ons. Groups making decisions without groupthink do not always make the best decisions either (Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, & Feld, 1992). However, a decision made when groupthink is in play is more likely to turn out badly than one made by a group not involved in groupthink.

Social Psychology in Depth: The Wisdom of Crowds

Want to know what movie will be big at the box office this weekend?

Want to know the answer to that tough ques�on on the game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?

Want to know how many jelly beans are in the jar?

All these ques�ons are best answered by combining the answers of many rather than relying on the response of one person. The average es�mate for the group is usually closer to the real number of jelly beans in a jar than any individual es�mate. The studio audience picks the right answer 91% of the �me on Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? Friends give correct answers only 65% of the �me (Surowiecki, 2004).

Predic�on markets use the wisdom of the group to predict events. Within these markets, individuals use real or fake money to bet on the likelihood of an event (though other types of predic�ons are also used, see Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) and their collec�ve wager is o�en quite accurate. The Iowa Electronics Market (h�p://�ppie.uiowa.edu/iem/ (h�p://�ppie.uiowa.edu/iem/) ) correctly predicted Obama's presiden�al victory in 2008 with closer accuracy than any of the major polling companies (Rowe, 2010). This was not a fluke; such markets have been more accurate than polls for a variety of poli�cal races (Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, & Reitz, 2001).

According to James Surowieci, author of The Wisdom of Crowds, groups are helpful with three types of problems: cogni�ve, coordina�on, and coopera�on. Cogni�ve problems are those that require judgment. If you poll 100 people about the month and year humans first set foot on the moon, the group will get closer than almost all of the members of that group. This holds true for predic�on as well as facts. Want to know who will be awarded an Oscar? Take a look at the Hollywood Stock Exchange (h�p://www.hsx.com/ (h�p://www.hsx.com/) ) to find out (Pennock, Lawrence, Giles, & Nielsen, 2003).

Groups also show wisdom in their coordina�on. Walking down a sidewalk, you might find yourself dri�ing to the right side while the foot traffic coming toward you inhabits the le�. Because of this coordinated ac�on, you rarely crash into another pedestrian. Finally, crowds show coopera�on. At the beach, the group may collec�vely watch over one another's possessions and the small children playing the waves, all without talking about the task or knowing one another.

Not all crowds are wise. The key to good collec�ve decision making is independence (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001; Surowiecki, 2004). Each member of a group needs to make an independent judgment for the collec�ve response to be accurate. Solomon Asch, who performed his classic studies of conformity, would agree. In comments about Asch's work, Levine (1999) wrote,

[T]he bo�om line is that, because people are involved in coopera�ve efforts to understand the world, they have a responsibility both to assert their own viewpoint, which involves independence, and to pay a�en�on to others' viewpoints, which can lead to conformity. (p. 360)

Group Decision Making

Research on juries, as well as other groups, has revealed that a variety of factors can affect the process and the outcome of group decisions. Beyond the decision-making defects of groupthink, groups that make decisions together are affected by the informa�on individuals bring to the table and whether or not

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The U.S. Congress illustrates how group size and majority rules can affect decision making.

they share that informa�on, the size of the group, and if the group is required to make unanimous decisions.

Unique Knowledge

When a group comes together, each member brings a unique perspec�ve. For example, if your work group was making a decision and you were the only one who knew about a new product the rival company was developing, it would be useful to your group if you shared that informa�on. For many group decisions, each member could help the group most by clearly and concisely sharing his or her unique knowledge. Yet o�en �mes group members focus on what all of them know or hold in common, ignoring the unique, poten�ally useful, informa�on they possess as individuals (Stasser & Titus, 1985). For example, a commi�ee might primarily discuss the aspects of a situa�on they all best understand. Commi�ee members who have other exper�se or knowledge that could help the group are less likely to bring those up, at least ini�ally. Because they do not readily share unique informa�on, some groups fail to find a solu�on to the problem they face (Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012).

Unique informa�on is more likely to come up later in a group discussion, sugges�ng that longer discussions are more likely to yield diverse informa�on (Fraidin, 2004; Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbo�, 1998). People also tend to bring up informa�on when they know it is their task to do so. By giving different members of the group different tasks and asking them to report on those tasks, groups can amass a greater depth of informa�on (Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996; Stasser, 2000). Groups that are persuaded of the value of diverse opinions are also more likely to share diverse informa�on amongst themselves (Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007). When members of a group are in a good mood, they tend to broaden the focus of their informa�on search and share more unique informa�on (Bramesfeld & Gasper, 2008). Happy groups, therefore, are less likely to rely on shared informa�on to make decisions and are more likely to use the unique knowledge that various members bring to the group.

Unanimous Versus Nonunanimous Decision Rules

Groups that are required to come to a unanimous decision act differently than those who can quit delibera�on when a majority agrees. With majority rule, group members who hold alterna�ve opinions can be outvoted. Tradi�onally, unanimous decisions were required of juries. In research on juries, a nonunanimous verdict is associated with taking less �me to reach a verdict (Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975; Foss, 1981; Has�e, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). Given that longer group delibera�on is more likely to include discussion of informa�on unique to par�cular members, it is likely that these nonunanimous juries are making decisions having not fully explored the knowledge of all members. Nonunanimous juries are more likely to be able to come to a decision because they do not need to convince those final few people to agree with the majority (Nemeth, 1977; Padawer-Singer, Singer, & Singer, 1977).

Group Size and Diversity

Both small groups and large groups have their advantages. When groups get too big, unanimous decisions can be virtually impossible (Romme, 2004). In general, smaller groups tend to share more informa�on (Cruz, Boster, & Rodriguez, 1997; Waller, Hope, Burrowes, & Morrison, 2011). Small groups are also more efficient, and members may have more chance to par�cipate. However, larger groups offer more diversity of opinion and are more likely to include people with a diversity of backgrounds or ideas (Cummings, Huber, & Arendt, 1974). For example, larger juries are more likely to contain members of ethnic and racial minori�es (Saks & Mar�, 1997).

How does diversity affect decision making? Overall, diverse groups tend to have less group cohesiveness and lower morale (Jackson, 1991; O'Reilly, Cadwell, & Barne�, 1989). At �mes, diverse groups do not perform as well as less diverse groups (Ancona & Cadwell, 1992; Mullen & Copper, 1994). However, diverse groups tend to do be�er with complex decisions, or decisions that require crea�ve thinking as opposed to decisions that require se�ling on one answer or performing a simple task (Levine & Moreland, 1998). One important factor in this dis�nc�on is the ways individuals from different backgrounds share informa�on and in their willingness to share. When diverse groups are encouraged to share diverse informa�on, they can make good decisions (Kooij-de Bode, van Knippenberg, & van Ginkel, 2008). Going back to jury research, juries with minority members were found to spend more �me delibera�ng, discussed a wider range of informa�on, and made fewer errors in their discussion of the case. This was not solely due to the contribu�ons of the minority members of the groups. Majority members brought up more informa�on and made fewer errors in the diverse groups than similar members in homogeneous groups (Sommers, 2006).

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What are some characteris�cs of groups that make them vulnerable to groupthink? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Groups that are cohesive, insulated from outside influences, and have direc�ve leaders are par�cularly vulnerable to groupthink.

What characteris�cs of group discussions make it more likely that group members will bring up informa�on they know uniquely? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

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When groups meet for a longer �me, members are more likely to bring up unique informa�on. Groups in which individuals know it is their task to bring their unique knowledge and value diverse opinions are also more likely to have unique informa�on brought out in discussion.

What are one posi�ve and one nega�ve about the requirement that a group reach a unanimous decision? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Groups required to come to unanimity tend to talk longer and listen to all members to a greater degree but they are also more likely to encounter an inability to come to a final decision.

How is diversity within a group helpful to decision making? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Groups with diverse members spend more �me digging into complex ques�ons, discuss a wider range of informa�on, and make fewer errors in their discussions.

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Ocean pollu�on is one example of a commons dilemma. What other examples can you think of?

9.3 Social Dilemmas A�er emptying a can of soda, what do you do with the can? Throwing it in the trash might be easiest. The trash bin is right there, and you are taking out the trash soon anyway. But if you throw it in the trash, you know that the can will end up in a landfill. The recycling bin might be harder to get to and require a special trip; however, recycling is be�er for the environment, saves energy and landfill space, and reduces pollu�on. Do you do what is best or easiest for you, at least in the short term, or do what is best for the larger group? You are facing a social dilemma.

When individuals face decisions whose outcomes create a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the collec�ve (or group), they are facing a social dilemma. For these dilemmas, what is best for the individual is not what is best for the group. The individual would be best served by being selfish. But those individual behaviors are harmful to the collec�ve and may, in the end, come back to harm the individual.

Commons Dilemma

Imagine you live in a village with a common grazing field. Each person in your village could graze one cow on that common green space. As you evaluate the space, you realize that adding one more cow would harm the field only a small amount. You need the milk to get you through the winter, so you add one or two more cows. Your neighbor comes to the same conclusion, as do a number of other villagers. With the addi�on of many animals the common field becomes a field of mud and no cows are able to graze. In situa�ons like these, the individual can gain the best outcome by taking advantage of a collec�ve resource, but if too many in the group take advantage of the resource, it will not be sustainable and will no longer be available. This phenomenon is called the commons dilemma or tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).

Commons dilemmas are a part of a variety of social problems: overfishing, pollu�on, overpopula�on, forest deple�on, and overuse of energy. For each of these scenarios, what is best for the individual, at least in the short term, is to act in a self-interested way. A fisherman needs to make a living, so making a large catch is important. If only a few individuals took advantage of a collec�ve resource, the outcomes might not be as good for the collec�ve but the resource would be sustained. If only a few fishermen take large catches, there will s�ll be fish to reproduce and provide future fishing opportuni�es. The tragedy occurs when large numbers act in a self-interested way. This depletes the resource. For a commons dilemma, fairness means equal outcomes for all (van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). Even if a fishing resource could sustain some addi�onal catches by some fisherman, what we view as fair is for each fisherman to have equal access or take an equal amount of fish from that resource.

O�en �mes decisions can be win-lose situa�ons. For example, if you buy the house on the corner that I was looking at, you win and I lose because we cannot both have the house. Many of the games we play, everything from Monopoly to Jeopardy, are zero-sum games—games where the gains or losses of the one person are balanced out by the gains or losses of another. So if I win $100 dollars, you lose $100 dollars. Social dilemmas are of a different type. Social dilemmas like the commons dilemma are non-zero-sum games. Within a social dilemma, played as a game or lived out in real life, the outcome does not need to sum to zero. If everyone cooperates, everyone can win, but if everyone competes, everyone will lose.

Resource Dilemma

With the tragedy of the commons, individuals have the op�on of gaining from a collec�vely owned resource that will naturally renew itself. A related social dilemma is called the resource dilemma. With the resource dilemma, individuals contribute to a resource from which all may benefit. Public television and public radio in the United States are funded, to a large extent, by those who watch or listen, but everyone with a radio or television within range has access to PBS and public radio, regardless of their contribu�ons. The best individual strategy would be to not contribute and take advantage of the resource. Blood banks also encounter a resource dilemma. We all hope that blood is available when we need it, but what is best for us as individuals is to avoid the �me and discomfort associated with blood dona�on. The dilemma is that if no one were to contribute, the resource would not exist. For resource dilemmas, we view fairness in terms of equity. Those who benefit most from a resource should contribute the most and those who benefit li�le can contribute li�le and be seen as being fair in their contribu�ons (van Dijk & Wilke, 1995).

Prisoner's Dilemma

The commons dilemma and the resource dilemma involve groups of people, whereas the prisoner's dilemma only involves two people. The prisoner's dilemma is a scenario that demonstrates that two individuals might not cooperate, even when it is in their collec�ve best interest to do so (Axelrod, 1984). To understand how this dilemma works, imagine you are a thief. The police caught you and your partner engaging in a minor crime. The police take the two of you into separate interroga�on rooms and offer you this deal: If you confess to a major crime they suspect you of and implicate your partner, you will go free and your partner will spend 20 years in jail. The police tell you they are offering the same deal to your partner: If your partner confesses to the major crime, you will go to jail for 20 years and your partner will go free. If you both confess to the major crime, you will both spend 5 years in jail. If neither one of you confesses to the major crime, you will both be charged with the minor crime you were arrested for and spend a year in jail. (See Table 9.2.) What do you do?

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Table 9.2: Prisoner's dilemma matrix

Partner

Confess (does not cooperate with you)

Do not confess (cooperates with you)

You

Confess (do not cooperate with partner)

Partner 5 years You 5 years

Partner 20 years You 0 years

Do not confess (cooperate with partner)

Partner 0 years You 20 years

Partner 1 year You 1 year

It would be best for you if you confessed and your partner did not. Collec�vely, it would be best if the two of you cooperated and spent only a year in jail each. If you both try to get the good deal, both of your sentences will be appreciably longer than if you had cooperated with one another.

When the prisoner's dilemma is played by two players several �mes in a row, called the "iterated prisoner's dilemma," players can use a number of different strategies. One strategy would be to always cooperate with one's partner no ma�er what the partner did. If the partner always cooperates this is a good strategy. By always coopera�ng the two of you are able to, collec�vely, get the best outcome. The drawback comes if the partner realizes you always cooperate and is willing to take advantage of that. If so, you will get the worst outcome while your partner gets the best. Another strategy would be to always compete. Such a strategy would avoid the danger that you will be taken advantage of and may get you the best outcome (0 years) if your partner cooperates. If your partner is willing to cooperate consistently, compe��on prevents the best collec�ve outcome.

Another strategy for the prisoner's dilemma game is the �t-for-tat strategy. With �t-for-tat you would use whichever strategy your partner did on the previous turn. If your partner cooperated on turn 2 you would cooperate on turn 3. If your partner competed on turn 3 you would compete on turn 4. If your partner cooperated on every turn you would also cooperate on every turn. If your partner consistently competed you would also compete. A problem with the �t-for-tat- strategy is that if both members are using it and compe��on becomes the norm, each side reciproca�ng with compe��on, you have a nega�ve outcome, individually and collec�vely. Because �t-for-tat can result in this nega�ve cycle of responding, some have proposed a generous �t-for-tat strategy, where the individual cooperates more than would be strictly done in response to a partner's compe��on (Wedekind & Milinski, 1996).

Another strategy where you change depending on what your partner does is called the win-stay, lose-shi� strategy. With this strategy, you would con�nue with whatever strategy is providing you with the best outcome. If coopera�ng is ge�ng you the best outcome, you would con�nue to use it un�l it starts to be a problem, then you shi� to compe��on (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). Other strategies exist, but overall, the generous �t-for-tat and win-stay, lose-shi� strategies have consistently had the best outcomes (Axlerod, 1984; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996).

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What is the difference between a commons dilemma and a resource dilemma? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

A commons dilemma occurs when collec�vely owned resources are destroyed because everyone takes more than their fair share; whereas, a resource dilemma occurs when everyone must contribute for the resource to exist. One relies on the group's good stewardship of a pre- exis�ng resource to con�nue, the other relies on the group's collec�ve generosity for the resource to exist.

How is a zero-sum game different from a non-zero-sum game? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

With a zero-sum game one person wins in propor�on to what the other person loses, so the total sums to zero. With a non-zero-sum game it is possible for all par�es to win or for all par�es to lose.

If you were to play the prisoner's dilemma game what would be the danger of coopera�ng with your partner? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Coopera�ng with your partner is a good idea if your partner cooperates with you, but if your partner competes you will end up with a much worse outcome than if you had also competed.

Dealing With Social Dilemmas

Pi�ng self-interest against collec�ve interest, social dilemmas are difficult to solve. There are some factors, however, that make coopera�on more likely. One factor that increases coopera�on most of the �me is communica�on (van de Kragt, Dawes, Orbell, Braver, & Wilson, 1986). Individuals playing the prisoner's dilemma game or engaging in a laboratory simula�on of the tragedy of the commons are more likely to cooperate with one another if they can communicate with one another. There is some evidence that communica�on does not even need to take place for coopera�on to be increased. When people simply thought about the kinds of things that might be said concerning a social dilemma during a group discussion, they showed more coopera�on than without the imagined discussion (Meleady, Hopthrow, & Crisp, 2012).

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Coopera�ve behavior is more likely when payoffs make coopera�on more a�rac�ve, either through punishment for selfish behavior or through rewards for coopera�ve behavior (Dawes, 1980; Shaw, 1976; van de Kragt et al., 1986). Changing payoffs to punish self-interested behavior or reward coopera�on may involve oversight by a government or other organiza�on. For example, most states issue a limited number of hun�ng and fishing licenses to make certain overhun�ng and overfishing do not occur. The problem with oversight is that it can cost resources to implement, police, and maintain; socie�es need to be sure such oversight does not cost more resources than it saves. Even when authori�es impose regula�ons in service of the common good, if the people do not trust the authority or feel like the authority is not listening to their concerns, they are unlikely to follow the regula�on (Van Vugt, 2009).

Social dilemmas con�nue because we do not see the effect our behavior is having on the collec�ve, or do not know the people our behavior would impact. In a tragedy of the commons, if people see that the common resource is likely to soon be depleted, they will typically diminish their use of that resource (Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson, Messick, Ru�e, & Wilke, 1984). If fishermen were able to see how many fish were in the sea, they might reduce consump�on of fish when supplies were low. Accurate informa�on shared with all of the stakeholders is important for encouraging coopera�on (Van Vugt, 2009). In addi�on, if we know the people that may be affected by our self-interested behavior, we are less likely to compete. Therefore, we tend to find more coopera�on in social dilemmas that involve smaller groups (Seijts & Latham, 2000). We might iden�fy with the group more when the group is small, which is important for our coopera�on (Van Vugt, 2009); we are more likely to cooperate with friends than with strangers (Majolo et al., 2006).

If people are unable to engage in a behavior for reasons beyond their control, they may be unlikely to engage in coopera�ve behaviors. If one's recycling is only sporadically picked up or if the transporta�on system keeps changing the bus route, one may cease to recycle or take public transporta�on (Brucks & Van Lange, 2008). Difficulty in ac�ng posi�vely in an earlier situa�on can lead to less coopera�on in a later situa�on, even when the barriers are gone. Encountering problems seems to lower mo�va�on to act in posi�ve ways. However, when prosocial behavior is difficult social forces can be powerful in encouraging coopera�ve behavior. Individuals might recycle, despite the trouble, if it becomes a norm. Knowing one's friends and neighbors would be disappointed or disapproving may mo�vate the individual to do what is best for the collec�ve and make a personal sacrifice (Dawes, 1980).

Is there any reason to do what is best for the collec�ve, despite the costs to oneself? Some people put greater value on minimizing differences in outcomes between themselves and others and maximizing collec�ve outcomes. These individuals are described as having a high prosocial value orienta�on. Others put greater value on maximizing their own outcomes, even at the expense of others. Those high in prosocial value orienta�on are more likely to engage in coopera�ve behavior, such as carpooling or taking public transporta�on, par�cularly when their trust in others is high and others have also shown coopera�ve behavior. (Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange, Van Vugt, Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998).

Individuals who always cooperate may be taken advantage of, gaining li�le self-benefit for their ac�ons (Deutsch, Epstein, Canavan, & Gumpert, 1967; Solomon, 1960). However, their ac�ons as consistent contributors may influence their fellow group members toward be�er behavior. When their coopera�ve ac�ons tell the rest of the group that coopera�on is valued and expected, it may spark reciprocal coopera�on and, in the end, lead the en�re group to be�er behavior (Weber & Murnighan, 2008). Crea�ng a norm of coopera�on can be powerful. Even when social sanc�ons, such as expressions of disapproval from the group, are removed, people tend to con�nue their prosocial behavior well beyond what they do when financial sanc�ons encouraged prosocial behavior (Nelissen & Mulder, 2013). Our strongest mo�vators for coopera�on are other people.

Test Yourself

Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.

How might a business encourage more carpooling among its employees? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

If the company makes carpooling parking spots more available or allows carpoolers to come a li�le later to work, thus changing payoffs, that may encourage coopera�on. Encouraging communica�on among employees, making carpooling the norm, and helping employees see the effect of their driving alone may also have a posi�ve impact on behavior.

Conclusion

Although groups are made up of individual people, groups are qualita�vely different from individuals. We cannot predict group behavior by simply combining individual behavior. Groups need to be studied as en��es in and of themselves. Groups affect how the individual acts and thinks. In some instances, the person needs to sort out group interests from individual interests to determine behavior. Given the amount of �me most of us spend in groups and how the decision of groups affect our lives, understanding groups is important.

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Chapter Summary

Group Ac�ons

A group is a collec�on of at least two individuals who are interac�ng in some way. A group can affect individual performance posi�vely or nega�vely depending on the task. This is called social facilita�on. Being in a group can also affect a person's produc�on. When individual inputs cannot be iden�fied, people tend to engage in social loafing, that is, not pu�ng in full effort. The group can have posi�ve effects on individual performance, as proposed by the Köhler effect, when an individual a�empts to rise to the level of performance common in their group. Groups may also induce individuals to act in ways they normally would not. When individuals feel they cannot be iden�fied they tend to take on the iden�ty of the group and engage in ac�ons with the group.

Group Cogni�on

Although some believe that brainstorming as a group can provide the greatest number of ideas, in actuality, a combina�on of both individual and group brainstorming is best for idea genera�on. When groups discuss a�tudes, the a�tudes of individual members tend to polarize. With polariza�on, individuals become more extreme in their a�tudes a�er a discussion than they were before. When groups get together to make a decision, specific weaknesses in decision making can be iden�fied amongst cohesive groups with strong direc�ve leaders. Group decision making in general is affected by the willingness of individual members to share unique knowledge, by the decision rules imposed on the group, by the size of the group, and by the diversity within the group.

Social Dilemmas

Social dilemmas pit individual self-interest against the interest of the group. In the commons dilemma, a common resource can sustain a minimal amount of selfish behavior, but too much self-interest will destroy the resource. When individuals can contribute to a common resource that all, regardless of contribu�on, benefit from, a resource dilemma might develop. It is advantageous to the individual to take advantage of the resource without contribu�ng, but the resource disappears without some individual contribu�ons. The prisoner's dilemma involves a situa�on where coopera�on yields the best collec�ve outcome, but compe��on can provide the individual with a be�er outcome, provided that coopera�on is present on the other side. Mutual compe��on results in a poor outcome for both. Social dilemmas can be tamed by allowing for communica�on among the par�es by: making coopera�on more a�rac�ve and self-interested behavior more costly, making individuals aware of their effect on a common resource, and by using norms that encourage coopera�ve behavior.

Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons

1. If you were assigned to do a group project for a class, how might the research on social loafing help you encourage equal par�cipa�on in your group?

2. Have you experienced deindividua�on? What forces lead you to deindividua�on? Were the effects posi�ve or nega�ve?

3. When might group polariza�on have a posi�ve effect? When might group polariza�on have a nega�ve effect?

4. If you were concerned a group was likely to engage in groupthink, what might you do to combat that?

5. Social dilemmas are common in a variety of venues, from friendships to interna�onal rela�ons. Where have you seen social dilemmas at work? How might they be sa�sfactorily resolved?

Key Terms

Click on each key term to reveal the defini�on.

brainstorming (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A strategy for developing ideas as a group involving genera�ng as many ideas as possible, with encouragement to combine, improve, or expand on previous ideas.

commons dilemma (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A social dilemma in which the individual can gain the best outcome by taking advantage of a collec�ve resource; however, if too many in the group take advantage of the resource it will not be sustainable and will no longer be available. This is also called the tragedy of the commons.

coordina�on loss (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The loss of produc�on that occurs in groups because of difficulty in coordina�ng efforts.

deindividua�on (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

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The tendency for awareness of one's individual iden�ty to decline in group se�ngs.

free rider (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

An individual who does not put as much �me or energy into a group task, relying on others to invest in the ac�vity.

group (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Two or more people who are interac�ng to form some type of coherent unit.

groupthink (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A decision-making process that occurs when a desire for harmony and consensus within the group interferes with appropriate informa�on seeking and leads to poor decision making.

in�macy group (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A group made up of rela�ves or friends, that is, people who are related to or who enjoy one another's company. In�macy groups are viewed as small, long-lived, having a great deal of interac�on, and being rela�vely impermeable to outsiders.

Köhler effect (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The tendency for individuals who are less capable than their group to work harder in a group context than they would if they were working alone.

loose associa�on (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A group made up of individuals who are connected by common a�tudes, experiences, or apprecia�ons (such as an affinity for dogs). Loose associa�ons are viewed as large, poten�ally short-lived, having li�le interac�on, and being very open to outsiders.

mindguards (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Individuals who protect the leader of a group from hearing a viewpoint contrary to his or her own, resul�ng in the leader never hearing about dissen�ng opinions.

non-zero-sum games (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Games or situa�ons where the outcome is not a win-or-lose scenario but one where everyone could win or everyone could lose. The tragedy of the commons and resource dilemmas are both non-zero-sum games.

polariza�on (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The tendency for people to move toward more extremes in their opinions a�er group discussion or more a�en�on to a topic. It involves a shi� closer to whichever pole they were ini�ally leaning.

prisoner's dilemma (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A social dilemma involving two individuals in which if both individuals compete, both lose. If both cooperate, they have the best collec�ve outcome. The best individual outcome comes when one competes and the partner cooperates.

resource dilemma (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A social dilemma in which the individual can gain the best outcome by taking advantage of a collec�ve resource without contribu�ng, but the collec�ve does best if everyone contributes.

social categoriza�on (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A group made up of individuals with similar characteris�cs (such as Army veterans). Social categoriza�on is characterized as large, long-lived, poten�ally having li�le interac�on, and being rela�vely impermeable to outsiders.

social facilita�on (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

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The tendency for the presence of others to increase the dominant response tendency. For an easy or well-learned task the dominant response tendency is to do well. For a difficult or new task the dominant response tendency is to do poorly.

social iden�ty model (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A model for deindividua�on that proposes that as people lose their individual iden�ty they take on the iden�ty of the group around them.

social loafing (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The tendency for individuals to produce less or not work as hard when working with others.

task group (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A group that engages in a task together. Task groups are typically small and short-lived, and have a great deal of interac�on.

�t-for-tat strategy (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Strategy used in the prisoner's dilemma game that involves adop�ng the strategy used by one's partner on the previous turn.

win-stay, lose-shi� strategy (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Strategy used in the prisoner's dilemma game that involves using whatever strategy is providing the best outcome. If coopera�on is providing the best outcome, the individual stays with that and changes when that strategy is no longer helpful.

zero-sum games (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Games where the outcome must sum to zero. One individual or group will gain in propor�on to the amount another loses.