

2. Think about impacts of earlier reform movements on your life today. How is it different because of earlier labor, feminist, civil rights, environmental, and educational or political reform movements? Consider some movements that are not too old as well, such as movements to reform drunk-driving policies, to create an awareness of domestic violence as a problem, to provide access for handicapped persons, or to change laws to prevent discrimination against gay people. When you start thinking about them, you should be able to think of quite a few. You probably experience these movement consequences in a mixture of positive and negative ways. Write a short essay, or organize a discussion with your peers about these consequences.
3. Think about the causes of success and failure for particular movements. What causes some to become widely appealing and have major impacts on change? What causes others (regardless of the validity of their concerns) to simply wither away in the dustbin of history? Can you think of some that have evolved into stable organizations without much impact on social change? Can you identify others that have become stable enterprises of sorts, constantly selling T-shirts and other emblems without doing much?

NOTE

1. The terms *sex* and *gender* have different meanings, although they are often used interchangeably. Sex relates to differences between males and females that are rooted in biology (such as giving birth to and nurturing infants). Gender refers, on the other hand, to the social roles that come to be associated with sex differences in any given society. While the dividing line between sex and gender is blurry and debatable, it is quite clear that they are different things. While male and female are universal biological categories, gender is considerably more variable, both historically as well as cross-culturally. Gender relates to our learned notions about masculinity and femininity as well as behavior and rights thought appropriate for males and females in a given culture.

Chapter 9

Revolutions

In contrast to reform movements, successful revolutionary movements are important elements of the dramatic and fundamental change processes that we call social revolutions. "A revolution," writes political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, "is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activities and policies." In a different but complementary view, communist theoretician V. I. Lenin said, "Revolutions are festivals of the oppressed and exploited. At no other time are the masses of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order" (both cited in Goldstone 1986, 69). These two statements define revolutions as rapid and fundamental transformations in socioeconomic, cultural, and political institutions that are accompanied by class upheavals from below.

WHAT IS A SOCIAL REVOLUTION?

Sometimes we use the word *revolution* in a looser sense, as in the "sexual revolution" or the "computer revolution" as a metaphor for important cultural trends. But we are using the notion of revolution in a more specific sense here to mean a broader transformation that changes many areas of social life that must include a sudden collapse or overthrow of the state. It is also important to recognize that a sudden overthrow of the state, in and of itself, is not necessarily a revolution if it means only that one political elite has replaced another with no popular base or broader implications for social transformation.

Under this definition successful revolutions are fairly rare and dramatic historical events. The most dramatic and clear-cut historic examples are the revolutions in France (1789), Russia (1917), and China (1949). Whether or not the American Revolution (1776) or the Puritan revolts in England (1640) qualify as real revolutions is debatable. But if successful revolutions are relatively rare, it does not follow that they have been historically unimportant. Revolutions have played an important role in social transformations that attended the creation of modern Japan (1868), Mexico (1910), Turkey (1923), Egypt (1952), Iran (1906, 1979), and most recently, the

breakup of the Soviet Union and its satellites (1989–1991). In the 1950s and 1960s, revolutions transformed a host of developing societies, including Vietnam, Bolivia, and Cuba. And a revolution transformed Iran from a corrupt modernizing society into an Islamic fundamentalist one in 1979. In the 1980s, America found itself embroiled, as a third party, in domestic revolutionary struggles in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Grenada. Finally—as we shall see—revolutionary struggles precipitated the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s, and have fueled civil wars and civil unrest in Sudan, Liberia, and West Africa (among others).

THEORIES OF REVOLUTION

Four common ideas have shaped both popular and scholarly understanding of revolutions: (1) that increasing misery breeds revolt, (2) that revolutions result from the incompetence of the state to manage a variety of difficulties, (3) that they result from the circulation of subversive and radical ideas and ideologies, and (4) that they result from the difficulties of modernization (Goldstone 1986, 1–2). From Greek and Roman thinkers to Marx, many have argued that misery breeds revolt, but scholars of revolutions, beginning with Alexis De Tocqueville's analysis of the French Revolution, observed that, to the contrary, revolutions seem to occur after a long period of economic expansion and increasing standards of living.

Scholarly studies have suggested that state inability to manage, radical ideologies, and modernization difficulties *are* involved in revolutions, but none of these factors is adequate to explain why revolutions occur in some societies and not others. Why, for instance, did the French monarchy find the pressures of industrialization, urbanization, war, and so forth unmanageable while the English crown was able to manage similar problems without succumbing to a revolutionary collapse? Why did radical anticapitalist ideologies help stimulate revolutions in czarist Russia and imperial China, and not in industrial capitalist England and Germany (the real centers of socialist and radical Marxist thought and agitation)? Why did modernization result in revolutions in Mexico but not Costa Rica, or in Egypt but not Tunisia? These four ideas are not totally false, but, as you can see, neither are they adequate to understand much about revolutions without a great deal of qualification. If these are not very useful ideas, then what are? Let's briefly trace the development of social scientific thinking about the revolutions. You will recognize some of these ideas as specifications of the theories of social movements we discussed in Chapter 7.

The Natural History of Revolutions

In the 1920s and 1930s, a number of historians and sociologists began to study the classic Western revolutions (for example, in France, America, Russia) with the aim of discovering common patterns (Brinton 1938/1965; Edwards 1927; Pettie 1938). They found a remarkable configuration of common elements in the natural histories of these revolutions. We list seven:

The Desertion of Intellectuals. This phenomenon occurs for some time, even decades, prior to the revolution. Journalists, scholars, playwrights, poets, novelists, teachers, members of the clergy, and lawyers write condemnations of the regime and demand reforms. Even the natural supporters of the old order, such as aristocrats and landowners, become affected by the alienated tone of intellectual discourse, and there is a pervasive withdrawal of intellectual legitimation of the regime.

Attempted Reforms. Reforms are often undertaken by the regime shortly before its collapse, but these are typically “too little, too late.” They are taken as a sign of weakness and encourage pressure for more radical reforms, which the regime is incapable of granting and still retaining control. Examples include the British crown's tax concessions to American colonists and the half-hearted economic and political reforms promulgated by the czarist Russian government in the years before the revolution.

A Political Crisis. Defeat in war, state bankruptcy, general economic collapse, famine, withdrawal of loyalty by the military and police, and urban or rural riots and disorders (or some combination of these) precipitate a sudden collapse of the regime. The collapse occurs, not from pressure by revolutionary contenders for power, but rather from the inability of the state to manage or contain a multifaceted crisis. Thus, revolutionaries find themselves with the upper hand not because they have grown stronger, but because of an incapacitating paralysis of the old regime.

A Period of Dual Rule Dominated by Moderates. This phase typically follows the fall of the old regime. Moderate reformers, who seek constitutional reforms using many of the old organizational forms left over from the old regime, rule in coalition with more radical factions. Thus, the Kerensky government, which replaced the Czar, dealt with the more radical Bolsheviks, and the moderate American Continental Congress had to enter into coalition with the more radical Patriots' Societies. In more recent times, this effect could be seen when the parliamentary Bazargan government took power in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah's government and sought support from the more radical Islamic fundamentalist clergy. Radical factions mobilize, establish centers of control, and struggle with moderates to control the state.

The Triumph of the Radicals. This is the most likely outcome of the post-collapse power struggle. Moderates are likely to lose because, seeking to maintain continuity, they inherit many of the problems and disabilities to deal with them that caused the old regime to fail. Radicals are likely to succeed because, unlike the moderates, they are willing to take extreme measures both to deal with pressing problems and to secure their rule (Goldstone 1986, 4). However, as the American Revolution demonstrates, the triumph of the radicals is not inevitable. But it is only in revolts of national independence, where the old regime enemy is clearly external, that the moderates are likely to have a good chance of retaining control of the state.¹ Dramatic changes in social institutions and dominant ideology begin not shortly after the fall of the old regime, but later, when radicals succeed in wrenching control from the moderates.

A Reign of Terror. An authoritarian period typically follows the triumph of the radicals, including the coercive suppression of competing political factions and movements, the reimposition of social order from the disorderly chaos of the revolution, and the implementation of the revolutionary "program." During this period previously obscure leaders may emerge with commanding, even absolute, control. Famous revolutionary leaders who emerged in this fashion include Cromwell, Napoleon, Stalin, Mao, Castro, and the Ayatollah Khomeini. The reign of terror may involve a variety of means to consolidate the new regime and to reimpose order, such as fear of the guillotine after the French Revolution, Stalin's secret police and the *gulag* of Siberian prison camps, or Mao's Cultural Revolution, which gave radical youth gangs permission to terrorize and humiliate the rest of the population.

Moderation and Pragmatism. This balancing out eventually follows the prolonged reign of terror because the radicals may have been defeated or died. Moderates who come to power condemn the excesses of the rule of terror and are less concerned with protecting the rule of the new regime—by now an established fact—and more concerned with promoting economic progress and stable institutions (Goldstone 1986, 5). Examples of this transition include the fall of Robespierre and the Jacobins in postrevolutionary France, Khrushchev's reforms and repudiation of Stalin in the Soviet Union, and the fall of Mao's allies, the "Gang of Four," in China.

These seven durable generalizations about the phases of development of revolutions have stood the test of time. While they provide valuable insights, they leave many questions unanswered. The main limitation of the life cycle approach is that it is descriptive and does not address questions about causation. What causes revolutions? What were the sources of opposition to the existing order? A second generation of scholars has addressed these issues.

Theories of Rebellion and Political Violence

In the 1950s and 1960s, many new or newly independent nations emerged in the third world. While this phenomenon was part of the general process of modernization, it was often accompanied by various forms of political violence, such as coups, riots, rebellions, civil wars, and revolutions. Indeed, it was a common observation that revolutions are likely in societies undergoing rapid transition from traditional agrarian to modern urban-industrial societies and most unlikely in truly modern industrial democracies that spawn a multitude of reform movements (as documented in the last chapter). Scholars trying to understand the causes of revolution and its connection to the process of modernization developed general theories of revolts and political violence, all of which we have encountered before in Chapter 7 as more general perspectives about social movements. They include (1) *relative deprivation theories*, (2) *system disequilibrium theories*, and (3) *resource mobilization theories*.

Relative Deprivation Theories. These theories improve on the notion that "misery breeds revolt." Gurr (1970) and Davies (1962, 1969) in particular argue that

"people generally accept high levels of oppression and misery if they expect such discomforts to be their natural lot in life. Only when they expect a better life and have their expectations frustrated are they likely to develop feelings of resentment that breed rebellion and political violence" (Goldstone 1986, 5). Revolts are caused more by frustrated rising expectations than by increasing misery and oppression. In many emerging developing nations, generally rising expectations for material well-being are a consequence of cultural contact with developed societies. Davies argues that intense feelings of deprivation are produced when a prolonged period of prosperity that raises expectations for further improvement is followed by a sharp economic downturn that dashes those expectations (the *J-curve* of economic growth). Davies' research documents this social-psychological configuration as a precursor to rebellion in a wide variety of historical cases.

System Disequilibrium Theories. These perspectives are specifications of functionalist theory (see Chapter 2) applied to understanding rebellion and political violence. They focus not on popular discontent, but on the changing relations between social institutions. Smelser (1962) and Johnson (1966) have argued that when the institutional subsystems of a society (its economy, political system, educational system, and so forth) change at similar rates, there is continuity, political stability, and the incremental processing of demands for social reform. But when the rate of change is very different among these institutional subsystems, the resulting disequilibrium and imbalance produces widespread disorientation, radical ideologies, and challenges to the legitimacy of the status quo. Under these conditions riot, rebellion, and revolutions flourish. This line of thinking would note, for example, that most of the classical revolutions in Western history (French, Russian, and American) were preceded by dynamic and rapid economic, educational, and demographic change coupled with relatively static political contexts where an old regime was trying to hang onto a political system appropriate from the past. In functionalist theory language, differing rates of institutional change result in the accumulation of stresses and tensions until the system can no longer contain them.

Huntington (1968) combined the relative deprivation and system-disequilibrium approaches to argue that *modernization* is the broadest cause of revolution in the contemporary world. This is because the economic and educational progress associated with modernization increases people's desire to participate in politics faster than political institutions can accommodate these desires. The gap between the desire for participation and the ability to do so results in widespread frustrations about political life (Goldstone 1986, 6). Huntington more recently (1997) has suggested that the deprivation and disequilibrium that accompanies modernization has produced a "clash of civilizations," a hypothesis that cultural conflicts between modernity and premodern cultures is producing instability and conflict in the contemporary world (more on this in Chapter 12). Yet as we already mentioned, modernizing societies sometimes undergo revolutions and sometimes they do not. Scholars now recognize that not all societies undergo modernization in the same way or similarly experience the strains associated with modernizing change.

Resource Mobilization Theories. This perspective, which came to dominate the study of social movements in the 1960s, was applied to the study of revolutions. Tilly (1978) argued that neither discontent nor disequilibrium will lead to revolution if the discontented remain unorganized and lack resources. In other words, political violence and rebellion do not result in successful revolution unless the contenders for power have the resources and organization to engage in a sustained struggle with the authorities. This is why, Tilly explains, peasant revolts are usually short-lived. Revolutions may start in the countryside, but they have a better chance of succeeding when moved to the city, with the geographic concentration and the abundance of resources to make mobilization for sustained struggle more likely.

In sum, social scientists by the 1960s had come to emphasize the conditions of widespread discontent, institutional change, and the possibility of resource mobilization by contenders for power as important causes of revolution. Yet, the very generality of these arguments make it very difficult to understand with much precision where, when, and how revolutions succeed—as well as the circumstances under which they fail.

Another difficulty with these theories is that they tell us more about the outbreak of riots, revolts, and transitory political disorders than about the conditions under which revolts become successful social revolutions. The year 1848 is famous, for instance, as the year in which rebellions racked Western European nations. Widespread and simultaneous revolts of peasants and urban workers spread through Germany, France, Switzerland, Austro-Hungary, and Italy. All failed and were suppressed and destroyed by a powerful alliance of the urban middle classes, wealthy industrialists, and old royalists. To take another example, there have been many revolts in U.S. history, from the Whiskey Rebellion in the 1790s (a tax revolt among Pennsylvania farmers, suppressed by federal militia sent by President Washington) to the agrarian Populists and radical unionists mentioned in the last chapter. All failed. History is replete with instances of riots, civil disorders, and organized revolts that failed, but successful social revolutions as defined here are relatively rare events. Why? The theories we mentioned are of little help in answering this question.

A final difficulty with the theories discussed here is that they view revolutions as primarily the work of purposive collective action by revolutionary social movements. While the pressures brought by such movements are part of the process, they are by no means the entire picture. Rather than being a prolonged struggle by insurgents to overthrow a massive powerful and repressive regime, revolutions typically involve a sudden and mysterious collapse of the regime, which is unable to manage normally routine affairs as well as extraordinary challenges. Some states are able to withstand such pressures and retain control, while others are incapable of doing so. In other words, social revolutions are the products of particular *system states*, or social configurations within the society and polity, as well as the work of contenders for power. The general theories of revolts and political violence described earlier tell us little about the set of social circumstances behind the sudden internal disintegration of states and social systems. But this question is addressed by the more recent analyses of social revolutions.

Structural Theories of Revolution

Scholars have turned from general theories of rebellion to a more careful examination of the comparative historical circumstances that are present when revolutions succeed. We rely on the following discussion largely on the work of Theda Skocpol, whose groundbreaking work has reshaped the social scientific understanding of revolutions (1976, 1994).

Skocpol's argument, based on comparative studies, is quite straightforward. A social revolution succeeds because the state has been weakened by a variety of simultaneously occurring external and internal pressures that it is unable to contain and manage. These include (1) international competition and conflict with other states, (2) disaffection and obstruction of state policies by important social elites that control important material and ideological support for the regime, (3) insufficient loyalty of the military and state police, and (4) pressure from a variety of popular uprisings (see Figure 9-1). We will discuss each of these in turn.

International Pressures. States compete with each other for military strength, territory, and domination of trade. States that lose wars find themselves weakened in their capacity to resist pressures of revolution. Czarist Russia, the Ottoman Turks, and imperial China all suffered humiliating defeats by more powerful states, which weakened their legitimacy and ability to deal with internal




FIGURE 9-1 The Structural Dynamics of Revolutions.
Source: Adapted from Theda Skocpol (1979).

opponents. But it is not just war: States are affected by how well their economies compete with other national economies. Those with relatively backward and unproductive economies relative to competing states may face overwhelming outside pressures. This is an important point because capitalism is really an expanding world system containing multiple political sovereignties. As France, Russia, China, Japan, and Ottoman Turkey came under competitive pressure in a capitalist market system, they each tried to mobilize national resources to stave off foreign economic domination. When they were unable to do so, the old regimes fell victim to elite revolutions from above in Japan and Turkey and collapsed entirely in France, Russia, and China, clearing the way for a popular revolution from below (more about these different types later).

State-Elite Relations. Whether or not the state is able to mobilize economically and militarily to meet foreign competition depends on internal relations. In order to gain or protect colonies or external markets, fight wars, or stimulate production for profitable world trade, the state must raise income and increase the scope of its authority. This means increasing tax levies, raising armies by conscription, and sponsoring capital development programs. Whether or not it is able to do so depends on the support of important social elites that control resources. Indeed, such central state projects may threaten traditional elite wealth, autonomy, or privileges.

There are many examples of the importance of this state-elite relation. In competing with the English, the eighteenth-century French monarchy required the cooperation of noble-controlled parliaments, independent judicial bodies that could block and challenge the directives of the state. More recently, the Iranian clergy, because of their financial supporters in the bazaar economy, their role in the traditional courts, and their network of influence in the mosques and schools, retained control of resources to mount a challenge to the Shah. Thus, when conflicts between the monarchy and elites arose—in France over the state bankruptcies arising from the Anglo-French wars of the eighteenth century and in Iran over the Shah's ambitious modernization plans—elite opposition was able to cripple and paralyze the central government (Goldstone 1986, 8). On the other hand, the English crown was able to elicit sufficient old aristocracy and new industrialist class support for the ambitious state projects of British economic and colonial expansion during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Military Loyalty. The loyalty of the army and state police is also an important part of the stability of the state regime, particularly in times of state paralysis such as those mentioned or in times of widespread popular uprisings. The most well-known example of the importance of the loyalty of the military is in the case of the collapse of the czarist regime in Russia. Returning home from World War I defeated, demoralized, and unpaid, elements of the czarist army and navy refused to suppress urban riots (which began as food riots among the housewives of Petrograd). Not only did they mutiny and refuse to fire on rioters, but soldiers often joined in the disorders, which spread rapidly throughout the Russian cities and countryside. In the last instance, it was the undependability of the military and police that forced the czarist

monarchy to abdicate. In another example, in the last days of imperial China, the Manchu dynasty was unable to quell internal revolts (the Taiping and Boxer rebellions) and to limit foreign economic and military intrusions. The central government's projects to raise revenues and increase its control were hindered by resistance from local gentry and unreliable military units loyal to regional commanders rather than to the central government. Becoming completely paralyzed and bankrupt by 1911, coalitions between regional military commanders and the gentry-merchant leaders of provincial assemblies had enabled the provinces, one after another, to declare independence and withdraw support from the central government.

Under what conditions is the military loyal to the regime? Comparative research suggests that where recruits and officers are drawn from all classes, where there is a long training period for the rank and file, and where troops are isolated from civilians, the army is usually a reliable tool for the suppression of domestic disorders. Yet, where army officers come primarily from landed elites they may sympathize with their own class in a conflict between elites and the central government. Where troops are recently recruited and fraternize with the populace, their sympathy for their civilian peers may weaken their allegiance to the state or officers. In either of these cases, the military is likely to be unreliable for the state and increase the vulnerability of the state to revolution (Trimberger 1978).

Popular Uprisings. The Marxian approaches to revolutions held that popular uprisings were the causes of revolutions. But in the absence of some of the conditions described earlier, popular uprisings are not sufficient to create revolution. Still, it is true that popular uprisings normally play a role in revolutionary processes. Most scholars distinguish between *rural uprisings* (of peasants, small farmers, sharecroppers, or Latin American *campesinos*) and *urban uprisings*.

Peasant revolts are common in traditional agrarian societies, yet they are usually short-lived. Rural revolts are rarely caused by frustrated rising expectations, like those we discussed earlier, but rather to defend or restore their customary rights from the pressure of increasing rents and taxation (which enrich landlords or raise revenues for state projects). Peasant revolts are more about local issues than broad ideological concerns, and they dissipate when traditional rights and privileges are restored. Whether peasants can sustain continued rebellion depends on (1) whether they have communal traditions of solidarity and self-government, (2) whether they have the economic or organizational resources to do so, and (3) whether landlords have the coercive power to control their behavior or suppress uprisings (Paige 1975). Russian landlords during World War I and French landlords during the crown's bankruptcy in 1788–1789 had to face peasant uprisings without state protection or support and had no other means to defend themselves. Consequently peasant revolts spread rapidly through the countryside (Goldstone 1986, 11). Still, it is usually true that for rural uprisings to have broader social significance, they either must be linked with the actions of groups outside the peasantry or must occur simultaneously with urban disorders.

But it isn't completely true that peasant revolts are a thing of the past and urban uprisings are the wave of the future. The Zapatista rebellion in our own backyard

(Mexico) is a dramatic display of the currency of peasant and rural uprisings in the modern world.

The Zapatista rebellion began in January 1994 when a guerrilla group representing the Amerindian poor in the southeastern state of Chiapas took over several towns. The Mexican government quickly negotiated a cease-fire, but the rebellion smoldered off and on until peace talks broke down in 1996 after the Mexican government failed to carry out an agreement on the rights of indigenous peoples (Amerindians are people who claim descentance from indigenous peoples present in Mexico before the arrival of the Spanish, or people who are of mixed Spanish and indigenous ethnicity. Both groups have long been the poorest and most marginalized group in Mexican society). In December 1997, the government was implicated in a massacre of forty-five Amerindians and the situation has remained in a state of tension and unease ever since.

The July 2000 election of Vincente Fox and his radical break from the repressive policies of the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) provided renewed hope for peace. And the Zapatista rebels, led by their charismatic leader who goes by the single name of Marcos, staged a two-week march to Mexico City in 2001 where the rebel group called on the Mexican Congress to approve an indigenous bill of rights (Congress approved a watered-down version of the bill the rebels demanded). Yet, Chiapas remains poor and troubled and shows few signs of President Fox's redevelopment projects.

The Zapatista movement was sparked, in part, by the North American Free Trade agreement (NAFTA), which detractors have said devastates small farming interests in Mexico. In Chiapas, many communities still lack electricity, running water, or telephones. Marcos has spent a great deal of time speaking to the International Media (behind a ski mask to shield his identity), and he has lived in the mountains of Chiapas with anywhere from five hundred to a thousand fighters since the rebellion began in 1994. The Zapatistas have received much media attention and are the subject of numerous Web sites that publicize the plight of indigenous peoples in this isolated part of Mexico, just north of Guatemala (see, for example, <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/regin/news/arc/lanet/1996/0091.html>).

There has been little, if any, progress in the cease-fire between the rebels and the Mexican government since the 1997 massacre, the ability of government troops (estimates of their presence range from 40,000 to 70,000) to contain human rights abuses that draw international media attention has reduced international interest in the rebellion, and Mexican development money (spent largely in nonrebel areas) has prevented the rebellion from spreading.

Berger (2001) argues that the Zapatista rebellion is an example of a new form of political participation that is sparked by the contradictions of globalization and the promotion of free trade and unrestrained markets (referred to as neoliberalism). In this context, the Zapitistas are at the forefront of an indigenous population that has been left behind by a global capitalist economy that has no use for their products, services, or labor. The drastic differences in living standards between the portions of Mexico that have integrated rapidly into the global economy and those sections left behind will exacerbate the difficulties seen in Chiapas.

Urban Uprisings. Urban civil disturbances are another matter and are potentially more explosive. In cities there are dense networks of workers, concentrated resources for rebellion, and obvious targets, such as state buildings, factories, and palaces. Research has demonstrated that urban rioters are not isolated, ignorant, newly arrived immigrants, but rather tend to be long-term residents who are better educated and more affluent than their peers (Rude 1964). Two sorts of grievances stand out as causes of urban revolts: (1) *the cost of food* and (2) *the availability of employment*. In the revolutions in France, Russia, and China, and throughout Europe in 1848, high unemployment and sharp jumps in food prices combined to create widespread antigovernment protests among workers (Goldstone 1986, 11). Given the concentration of grievances and resources for rebellion in the cities and the fact that revolutionary ideologies normally circulate freely in cities, there is a great potential for urban disorders to evolve into sustained and systematic rebellion.

The recent uprising and violence throughout France is an example of an urban uprising sparked by high unemployment, widespread poverty, and the cultural marginalization felt by young immigrants who have had difficulty assimilating into traditional French society. Sparked by the accidental electrocution of two teenagers who believed they were being chased by police (October 27, 2005) and the discharge of a tear gas canister inside a mosque, rumor and indignation spread through segregated urban ghettos where young people began torching cars and fighting with police. The violence quickly spread from the suburbs of Paris to other urban areas in France where minority youth unemployment runs as high as 40 percent and there seems to be little recognition of the obstacles and discrimination new immigrants have faced in making their way in French society. So far, few people have been killed, but there has been a great deal of property damage and the uprising has led French President Jacques Chirac and others to question France's long-standing policies of assimilation through the promotion of a single French identity.

The potential for urban disorder is why many governments, both historically and in the contemporary world, have opted for cheap food policies for urban dwellers, even at the cost of levying considerable economic pain on farmers, or have subsidized food at levels that are unreasonably cheap in the context of world market prices. Governments in Communist Poland (in the 1960s) and Anwar Sadat's Egypt (in the 1970s) attempted to reduce state budgets by rescinding food subsidies and letting food prices rise to world market prices. They were faced with immediate and nationwide urban riots, and both regimes quickly reestablished food subsidies.

Urbanization per se is not a cause of rebellion. But combined with rapidly rising food prices and the inability of urban employment to provide jobs for waves of migrants from the countryside, it creates a great potential for outbreaks of political violence. Ominously, the rapid urbanization now under way in many developing nations is taking place under precisely these conditions.

Although they have a greater potential than rural uprisings to create a sustained rebellion, urban revolts alone do not make successful revolutions. Though urban revolts have featured prominently in virtually all of the revolutions we have discussed as examples, no revolution has succeeded solely on the basis of an urban uprising. The state can isolate and defeat urban rebels if it has the support of powerful

elites and a loyal military and if urban rebels do not have the support, or at least the distraction, of simultaneous revolts in the countryside.

The Role of Marginal Elites. We have discussed the role of traditional elites, such as nobles, landlords, merchants, financiers, and industrialists, in checking and paralyzing the state's capacity for effective action, but they are rarely the people who organize rebellion. Widespread disorders provide opportunities for social movement leaders to mobilize, organize, and frame disturbances in abstract ideological contexts. But rather than falling to the traditional elites, this is typically the role of what Skocpol calls *marginal elites*. Who are they? They are civil servants, lawyers, bureaucrats, intellectuals, journalists, and military officers. They are, in short, highly educated new rather than old elites, who lack independent wealth or landholdings. Their livelihood depends on rational expertise and modern credentials. Whether or not they work for the state, their careers, identities, and outlooks are intertwined with state activities. Compared with traditional elites, marginal elites are likely to have a broad, modern cultural outlook, and in times of political crisis they are likely to call for democratization, the rationalization of the state, the extension of civil liberties, or the equalization of opportunity. They are likely to be the source of radical modernizing ideologies.

In the context of state paralysis and popular disorders, marginal elites are likely to be in the forefront in mobilizing revolutionary movements to overthrow the regime. As examples, organizing radicals of the French Revolution (among whom the Jacobins were the most extreme) were drawn primarily from the ranks of the non-noble, nonwealthy lawyers, professionals, and state functionaries. Russian Bolshevik and Chinese revolutionary leadership was drawn from university-educated professionals and alienated intellectuals. Traditional elites and a disloyal military may weaken the state's capacity to act, and frustrated workers and peasants may create a climate of disorder, but it is the marginal elites who attempt to occupy the center stage and organize a new social order (Skocpol 1976). They create the movement organizations that unify various dissident groups and provide an ideological master frame that unifies opposition to the regime.

Regime Disunity and Revolution. Even if there is no strong independent marginal elite that brings pressure on the regime, conflicts within the regime may cause the state to collapse. The state may be overthrown by the most modern segments within it. Trimberger (1978) has argued that military officials and bureaucrats without strong connections to the aristocracy or landowning class may be especially threatened by military or economic failures of the state. Such officials may initiate an *elite revolution* and seize control of the state. Lacking a stake in the traditional patterns of wealth and patronage, they are likely to advocate solving the problems of the state by radical modernizing strategies, including, for example, land reform, the eradication of aristocratic privileges, and rapid industrialization. Examples include the Meiji Restoration in Japan (1868), Attaturk's takeover of the moribund Ottoman regime by the Westernized Young Turks (1923), and Nasser's Young Officers' Revolt that overthrew King Farouk's government in Egypt (1952). Such elite revolutions are

more than simple coups, because they bring with them ambitious programs of secularization, the rationalization of the state, and economic modernization.

Aside from the takeover of the state by frustrated modernizers, there is another pattern of state disunity that can lead to a collapse of the regime. Some states are what Eisenstadt (1978) has labeled *neopatrimonial systems*. That is, the top ruler maintains power not with the aid of a government bureaucracy, legal system, or even the traditional legitimacy of an aristocratic dynasty, but rather through an extensive but informal system of bribes and personal rewards to subordinates. Such systems involve a corrupt system of allocating the material rewards of the state in exchange for personal loyalties to the ruler. There are numerous contemporary examples of neopatrimonial regimes, many in sub-Saharan Africa, including Zimbabwe under President Mugabe and (until 1998 at least) Nigeria under the control of General Sani Abacha.

Since such systems are organized on the basis of the distribution of booty, they are particularly susceptible to disruption by international pressures or economic downturns that deprive the chief executives of the spoils to distribute. Thus, the patronage system crumbles and loyalties disappear. Goldstone (1986) has argued that the revolutions in Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua were of this variety, and to this list one could certainly add the collapse of the neopatrimonial system of Marcos and his cronies in the Philippines in 1989, and the Shah's regime in Iran in 1979 (more on this later in the chapter).

The structural perspective on revolutions developed here is an analytically powerful one. It provides the basis for understanding the conditions under which revolutions succeed, which is a more complex and theoretically interesting question than why rebellion occurs. So here's the important question: What would be the most likely combination of elements under which a revolution will almost certainly happen? It would be a society where

- the state experiences powerful international pressures from its economic dealings with other nations, fortunes of war, and so forth.
- state capacity for action is checked by resistance from traditional elites.
- there is significant unrest and uprisings in cities, the countryside, or both.
- an alienated but capable marginal elite seizes the opportunity to mobilize sustained resistance.
- the military is an unreliable tool of the state.
- the state itself is significantly divided into competing groups or factions.

Under this configuration of six conditions, it is almost impossible to think that a revolution would *not* occur. The point is that a state could manage one or several of these conditions, but not all of them simultaneously. In fact, a state with a reliable and efficient military can probably withstand quite a bit in terms of international pressure and popular uprisings. Exactly how many of these conditions have to be present for a revolution to happen? Well, the theory is good, but not *that* predictive.

The theory also provides an understanding of why some societies, particularly industrial democracies, seem almost revolution-proof. Developed industrial democracies not only manage international pressures, but also exercise considerable control

over the terms of competition and trade in the world economy. Industrial democracies have consensus-making processes that constrain conflicts, both within the regime, and between the regime and powerful economic elites. Democratic rulers become adept at balancing the necessity to respect and reinforce elite privilege with the need to respond to popular grievances in ways that prevent the emergence of widespread disorders. There are adequate mechanisms of institutional incorporation and channels of mobility for opinion leaders (marginal elites without independent wealth) who are the potential organizers of rebellion. Popular grievances that become manifest in reform movements are not only accommodated, but, as we have seen the last chapter, become an important basis for mobilizing popular support for the regime or administration. And a loyal military and elite opposition is available to suppress more radical challenges to the system.

But not all revolution-proof states are modern parliamentary democracies. Historically, unified aristocracies were resistant to revolution, even in times of considerable crisis, such as in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And in the modern world there are examples of thoroughly undemocratic systems that seem resistant to revolutionary collapse, such as Singapore and the (Communist) People's Republic of China even after institution of market reforms. Regime unity, support of critical elites, and a loyal military have enabled China to withstand considerable international pressure and popular unrest.

THE OUTCOMES OF REVOLUTION

Revolutions create dramatic social, cultural, economic, and political transformations. But probably no postrevolutionary society completely transcends the characteristics of the society that spawned it. And the extent to which the goals developed by revolutionary movements are implemented after the revolution is an issue hotly debated by scholars (Goldstone 1986, 13). Were the goals of colonial revolutionaries converted into reality after the American Revolution? Well, sort of. Yes, but incompletely. In fact, some historians have argued that, other than the English crown being gone, postrevolutionary America strongly resembled colonial America in its ruling elites and in its economic and political arrangements. More significant transformations occurred some decades later under pressure from Populist reform movements of the Western frontier during the Jacksonian era (the 1820s and 1830s). Did the Communist system that replaced the czarist Russia really create a "workers' paradise" of universal well-being, free from exploitation and alienation in which the state was withering away? Hardly. But beyond this question, which is often an ideologically loaded one anyway, scholars are beginning some careful comparative research about revolutionary outcomes. We'll mention only a few of these efforts here.

Most scholars agree that successful revolutions result in more centralized, bureaucratic, powerful, and often "modern" governments than existed under the old regime (Goldstone 1986, 13). Eckstein (1982) compared several Latin American countries that had revolutions with similar countries that did not. She concluded that after revolutions land reforms produced greater equality in land ownership, whereas

in nonrevolutionary nations landed oligarchies succeeded in protecting their landholdings. In general, Eckstein found that peasants were the most immediate beneficiaries of revolution. In some countries, particularly socialist Cuba, there were significant gains in raising the general standards for health care and education—as compared to nations that did not undergo revolutions.

Kelly and Klein (1977) argue that after revolutions human factors in production (for example, education, skills, and entrepreneurialism) increase in importance to ownership of land as a basis of wealth and power. But countries that have experienced revolutions do not seem better off in terms of income equality or long-term economic growth than countries without revolutions. Kelly and Klein (1977) argue that while revolution may reduce inequality in the short run and may redefine the basis of inequality in more modern terms, in the long term there is a strong tendency for inequality to reemerge, and sometimes with it a new hereditary system of privilege.

SUCCESSFUL AND FAILED REVOLUTIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT

It is tempting to view revolutions as historical artifacts without any contemporary relevance, but as we'll see in this section, that is not the case. There are numerous contemporary revolutionary conflicts and the brief discussions below are only a small sampling of current conflicts around the world.

Sudan

The Sudanese civil war has been going on since 1956 (with a ten-year break from 1972 to 1982). The major divisions in Sudan are both religious and ethnic, pitting Arab Muslims from the north who control the official government (based in Khartoum) against the black Africans, largely non-Muslim south, led by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The Sudanese government has been considered an international pariah—Sudan was the country where al-Qaeda freely operated until the late 1990s when the Khartoum government yielded to international pressure to expel Osama bin Laden and his associates (who then moved to Afghanistan).

The present manifestation of the civil war began nineteen years ago and is largely fueled by the oil riches that exist in the southern third of the country. The non-Muslim African south is seeking independence from the Arab central government, and the Khartoum government has used violence, intimidation, and an economic blockade to render the southern part of the country desperately poor. The United Nations cannot provide food relief to the destitute without the permission of the central government, and the central government directs food drops to places where its soldiers are positioned so that aid is monopolized by progovernment forces. The western province of Darfur is now receiving the brunt of the government's wrath as militias known as *janjaweed* (bandits) commit massacres and other human rights atrocities, driving some 2 million Darfuris from their homes and killing

hundreds of thousands of local people. The newly formed African Union peacekeeping force attempts to limit the violence, but it is hopelessly outgunned by the government and rebel forces. Because of the natural resources at stake, this civil war is likely to go on for some time to come in the absence of more sustained international intervention. Sudan is an example of a sharply divided state facing considerable international pressure and a populace with sharp ethnic divisions that compound very real religious differences between different parts of the country.

Liberia and West Africa

Liberia and other West African civil wars are examples of the potential revolutionary problems of states with limited capacities, dubious or nonexistent military loyalty, and widespread corruption.

Liberia, a nation founded by freed American slaves in 1847 has witnessed a more or less continuous civil war led by Charles Taylor from 1990 to 1997. In 1997, Taylor competed in a presidential election that was widely evaluated as free and fair by international observers, and won against a former UN and World Bank official who received only 10 percent of the votes. In 1999, a second rebel group began fighting Taylor's regime after claiming that there was widespread corruption and mismanagement of government resources under Taylor.

The situation in Liberia is complicated by civil wars in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, some or all of which have been tied to rebel support granted by Liberia under Taylor. A group of Liberians (Liberians United for reconciliation and Democracy and Movement for Democracy in Liberia, or MODEL) have controlled most of the countryside outside of Monrovia, the capital. Before assuming the presidency in 1997, Taylor had marched his rebel troops into Sierra Leone (in retaliation for their participation in a peacekeeping force that shielded Monrovia from the expanding civil war) and, through his locally supported rebel organization, allegedly profited from illicit trade in Sierra Leone's diamonds while taking over the countryside and murdering hundreds of thousands of people. In 2000, it took the intervention of a UN peacekeeping force, backed up by British troops, to secure the capital of Sierra Leone (Freetown) and restore peace to the country.

The Liberian regime then turned its sites on Guinea, where Taylor accused the Guinean government of harboring Liberian rebels trying to topple his regime. Taylor's contingent of ex-rebels from Sierra Leone soon controlled about one-third of Guinea and were only forced out as Liberian rebels and American military aid to the Guinean government turned the course of the conflict. The United Nations in 2003 convinced 25,000 of Taylor's former rebels to surrender their arms and the Guinean government continued to train and arm anti-Taylor Liberian rebels. The rebels fought their way to the outskirts of Monrovia and in August 2003 Taylor was forced to flee to Nigeria.

The United Nations has since installed a large peacekeeping force in Liberia (15,000 troops) that has attempted to disarm the remaining warlords and rebel factions that have haunted Liberia for some fifteen years. But a considerable number of the combatants began the civil war as children and cannot read, write, or spell their

own names. Sierra Leone (and other international groups, including the United States) would like to try Taylor for war crimes, either in Sierra Leone or at the International War Crimes Tribunal (in the Netherlands).

Perhaps the ultimate sign that years of civil strife might be behind them, a United Nations-sponsored election has produced a new President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a former finance minister who has worked for the World Bank and United Nations. She is also the first female president elected to lead an African country and she faces an uphill battle to rebuild her war-torn country and region.

Nicaragua

Nicaragua is a useful country to examine in light of our treatment of the former Soviet Union in the coming pages because it is an example of two revolutionary changes—the collapse of a neo-patrimonial state and its replacement by a revolutionary regime bent on radical change, followed by a transition to multiparty democracy. For most of the twentieth century, Nicaraguan politics was dominated by the Somoza family, beginning with the military General Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1937. Anastasio was assassinated in 1956 and replaced by his son Luis, who ruled Nicaragua until his death in 1967.

The Somoza family ruled Nicaragua as a patrimonial regime and personal fiefdom, generally in the name of large landowners who profited from plantation farming operations. In addition to the widespread corruption of the regime, the regime was also backed by a national guard and (in one form or another) by the United States as a bastion against Central American communism (the Somoza regime provided the base in Nicaragua for the failed Bay-of-Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, ordered by President Kennedy).

The Somozas faced increasing opposition at home and abroad as it became apparent that they were going to modify the election laws to remain in power indefinitely, enrich themselves through extensive control of the economy, and snuff out political opposition through the harassment of the National Guard. Luis was eventually replaced by his younger brother Anastasio, who ruled Nicaragua in office or by proxy until 1979. The beginning of the end for the Somoza regime was the aftermath of the December 1972 earthquake that left around 10,000 Nicaraguans dead, scores of homeless, and destroyed 80 percent of the commercial buildings in the capital city of Managua. But it's what followed that really brought the wrath of many ordinary Nicaraguans and the international aid community—the National Guard was involved in widespread looting of the capital, and Somoza's family profited handsomely from pirated international aid and rigged reconstruction contracts as Managua was rebuilt.

In spite of the tight control of the Somoza regime, nascent opposition movements existed and the most powerful of these was the Sandinista National Liberation Front (known by its Spanish initials, FSLN). The group had a base at the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua and was relatively unsuccessful (and the remaining opposition to Somoza fragmented) until December 1974 when a group from the FSLN took over the home of a government official and held a group of leading Nicaraguan officials (including Somoza relatives) hostage. The subsequent

payment of a \$1 million U.S. ransom established the FSLN as a force to be reckoned with, and the Somoza regime turned to further acts of repression designed to disorganize regime opponents.

In 1977, then-President Jimmy Carter urged the U.S. Congress to disinvest in Nicaragua as part of a broader international campaign to promote human rights. In February 1979, the FSLN established the National Patriotic Front to unite the opposition groups to the Somoza regime and attempt to seize power. The FSLN began receiving weapons from Venezuela, Panama, and Cuba (via Costa Rica) and launched a final offensive on Managua in June. The FSLN and other anti-Somoza factions had organized a provisional government in exile that promised Nicaraguans democratic governance, political pluralism, and universal suffrage. In July, Somoza resigned and fled to Miami, most members of the National Guard fled to Guatemala or Honduras, and the FSLN entered Managua and assumed power. The insurrection left approximately 50,000 dead and 150,000 Nicaraguans in exile.

But multiparty rule and free elections did not immediately result from the triumph of the anti-Somoza forces. The Sandinistas consolidated power by abolishing the constitution, courts, presidency, and Congress, and established a Council of State packed with their own supporters. The Sandinistas replaced the old National Guard with the Sandinista People's Army and Police (in violation of their pact signed with the other factions that created the government in exile), developed mass organizations representing popular interest groups in Nicaragua (workers, women, farmers, and peasants), and executed widespread land reforms that redistributed most of the land controlled by the Somoza family (estimated at 20 percent of the total farmable land of the country). The Sandinista consolidation of power follows closely the "triumph of the radicals" that we discussed as one path that revolutions pass through.

But the Sandinistas were able to maintain power for only about a decade. Under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the U.S. government began to provide support to ex-National Guardsmen located in Honduras, referred to under the general label of *contras*. The *contras* were able to recruit disgruntled opponents of the Somoza regime who also opposed the Sandinistas and wanted to establish a multiparty democracy. In 1984, Daniel Ortega (the leader of the Sandinistas) won a presidential election that was widely boycotted by the opposition and started a six-year presidential term. In 1986, the U.S. Congress granted \$100 million in aid and assistance to the *contra* movement, but all aid was suspended in November 1986 when it was discovered that officials of the Reagan administration were running an illegal operation that sold weapons to Iran during 1985 and diverted the profits to the *contras* (the so-called Iran-Contra scandal). In 1987, the U.S. Congress suspended all military aid and the two sides began to negotiate a mediated solution to Nicaragua's political impasse. President Ortega eventually agreed to move the next national elections to February 1990, to guarantee fair participation for opposition parties, and to allow international observers to monitor elections.

In the February 25, 1990, elections, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro received 55 percent of the vote to Ortega's 41 percent, and Chamorro took control in a peaceful transfer of power in April 1990. Ortega has remained a political player in Nicaragua, and new political parties have formed. Most recently rising fuel prices

and cost of living has brought street protests in Managua, but these protests are more a response to a temporary economic crisis than a sign of a political regime unable to deal with structural problems.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979¹

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 combines many of the elements we've discussed: a patrimonial regime plagued by international pressure and internal strife, inconsistent reforms that attempted to promote modernization while preserving traditional forms of rule, and intellectual and widespread popular opposition to growing corruption and ineptitude.

The Pahlavi regime (the absolute rule of the Iran by the Pahlavi family, the family of the Shah) has been described by most analysts as a neopatrimonial regime that was dependent on external oil revenues for its financial control. The seeds of what was to happen in the late 1970s were planted in 1953 when Royalist forces conspired with foreign interests aligned with oil companies to overthrow a democratically elected government of Premier Mosaddeq. This coup changed the structures and policies of the Iranian state in ways that aided the development of opposition to the regime. The regime shortly afterward started major economic development initiatives, more openly aligned itself with Western states and international capital, and (most important, in Moaddel's analysis) set in motion exclusionary policies by the state that limited political participation while imposing a secularist cultural ideology.

The economic development initiatives of the regime through the 1960s benefited international enterprises and a small elite (numbering perhaps a thousand families) with close ties to the monarchy. But economic development also produced a new middle class of civil servants, teachers, university students, engineers, and managers, the very intellectuals that our "life cycle" conception of revolutions discussed earlier. And both groups were created by and prospered from near record economic growth in Iran through the 1960s and early 1970s. On top of this, the monarchy engaged in repressive practices that undermined the economic standing of the Bazaris, traditional shopkeepers and handicraft producers that represented the bulk of Iran's traditional middle class. The monarchy went so far as to recommend the destruction of the bazaars and their replacement with modern shopping centers, mimicking developments in the West, and the monarchy made several attempts to set prices in bazaars as a big component of its mid-1970 anti-inflation campaign. All of these actions alienated the traditional middle class and made them readily available to join social movements opposing the regime. And, to make matters worse, the inflation that economic development sparked in urban areas turned the poor and working class against the regime as well.

Islamic clerics in Iran also had reasons for opposing the Shah and the monarchy apart from the (in their minds) deleterious effects of Western-based economic development on Iranian society. The monarchy challenged and, through state reforms, took away the traditional clerical roles in the dispensing of justice, education, and the distribution of welfare. The overall result of political and economic reforms instituted by the monarchy after the 1953 coup undermined their traditional basis of

support and left no obvious social group in their wake except for a small, wealthy elite that was dependent on the regime for economic favors and patronage.

Because the Shah controlled international oil revenues, he was not dependent on traditional classes that usually back neopatrimonialist governments. Instead, he could spend oil revenues to create new dependent classes that would support him. This was basically how the industrial capitalist class developed in Iran in the 1950s and 1960s. The military also expanded greatly after the coup, and most segments of the military remained loyal until the final demise of the regime. But both groups were completely dependent on the largesse of the monarchy through credit subsidies and royal patronage.

On top of this general lack of widespread internal support for the monarchy, there were growing indications that the state itself suffered from structural weaknesses that made the state apparatus weaker than it appeared on the surface. The support of the United States for the Pahlavi regime was widely perceived (by the monarchy at least) as inconsistent. The Carter administration in the late 1970s was not of one mind about what should be done for or against the monarchy in Iran, how much force it should use in response to potential threats, whether international pressure for structural reforms would do more harm than good, and whether any potential governing alternatives were better than the present monarchy. The state itself was organized around the person of the Shah, who set up his civil service with overlapping jurisdictions, little horizontal communications between departments and agencies, and the exploitation of disputes to keep potential rivals off balance. In short, by the late 1970s, the government depended completely on the Shah himself, who was ill with cancer as the government shifted into paralysis.

The beginning of the revolution is widely viewed as mid-1977 when liberal oppositionists began to speak out publicly about press censorship and the need for reforms in the monarchy. By late 1977, Islamic clerics called for the removal of Shah Muhammad Riza Pahlavi and their followers began participating in street demonstrations that the monarchy suppressed by force. The fatalities resulting from these conflicts provided another protest opportunity for regime opponents in the form of mourning demonstrations during and after funerals for the dead. But the conflict spread and incorporated a wider segment of the Iranian population when, in September 1978, there was a massive theater fire that killed an estimated 300 people and a subsequent massacre of peaceful demonstrators convinced that the fire was deliberately set. Shortly after that, a general strike was called that paralyzed most of the country and quickly spread. The Shah began looking for a reformist prime minister to help stem the tide of protest, but his departure from the country to receive cancer treatments in France and the United States in January 1979 was followed by the return of the exiled religious leader Imam Ruhollah Khomeini from exile. A mutiny at an air force barracks outside of Tehran sparked a citywide protest that led to Khomeini and the revolutionaries to take power when the military declared its neutrality.

Two additional points about the Iranian Revolution are relevant for our purposes. In addition to the overly centralized state and the reliance on the Shah's personal exercise of power, the response to protests over the 1960s and 1970s was an unpredictable combination of violent repression followed by reform and concessions. The

violence (in many analysts' minds) drove more people into the antimonarchist camp by increasing the grievances that the population had with the regime. But the reforms made it appear that protest activity was working, so reforms sparked still more protests and demonstrations. These demonstrations, their sheer size, and the fact that reforms often followed them gave regime opponents the impression that they were getting the upper hand.

Perhaps to his credit, the Shah himself stated repeatedly that he was unwilling to massacre his subjects in order to save the monarchy. One general allegedly offered to kill 100,000 protesters in an attempt to end spreading disorder. Another wanted to bomb the Islamic holy city of Qum. The leader of a neighboring country suggested the public execution of 700 Islamic Mullahs (!). The Shah could not save his regime but he vetoed all these plans. If the Shah had agreed to kill 100,000 demonstrators, would the demonstrations have stopped? This and much more was at stake in the collapse of the Communist system a decade later.

A WORLD REVOLUTION: THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM

From the 1940s to 1990, Communist (or state socialist) societies in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China represented powerful and threatening alternatives to industrial capitalism. Consistent with the Marxist theory of history, communism sought to destroy and replace industrial capitalism. The cold war struggle between the Communist bloc and the free world became the overarching bipolar political conflict that defined the international political system. The cold war threatened to become a "hot" war during the blockade of Berlin in the late 1940s and the Cuban missile crisis in the 1960s, and it did erupt into limited shooting wars in Korea and Vietnam. But though the cold war always threatened to explode into a vast military conflict, it was mainly a constrained struggle for dominance between two systems—conducted in terms of a war of words between diplomats and geopolitical, ideological, and economic competition.

Yet the cold war was a frightful period because the stability of the world political order was maintained by a balance of power, or—more appropriately—a balance of terror: At bottom, global stability depended on the crude balance of thermonuclear weaponry possessed by the two systems. In the post-World War II era, people became acclimated to living in permanent "garrison states" with vast military establishments. The arms race consumed high proportions of national budgets in the creation and maintenance of instruments of mass destruction so vast that they had the potential to destroy the world many times over. Individuals learned to live, not easily, with the terrifying knowledge that the world could easily erupt into a global nuclear conflagration that would end human civilization, and perhaps even the basis of human life. American popular culture had a never-ending demand for genres of film and fiction organized around international conspiracy, nuclear holocaust, and "life after the bomb" themes.

If you lived in the 1980s, you lived through what historians of the future will surely view as one of the most momentous significant changes in modern times: the

rapid transformation of the world political order because of the collapse of communism by 1991. As we have mentioned earlier, hardly anyone—scholars, politicians, or anyone else—would have predicted this outcome, particularly with the apparent suddenness and high drama with which it happened. In a span of six years (1985–1991), the world was unalterably changed. We have mentioned the significance of this change in earlier chapters, but only in passing, and now we want to return to it in some depth. In what follows, we will discuss the changes leading up to the collapse and consider the usefulness of the ideas we have sketched here about social movements and revolutionary processes to understand what took place. We believe that they provide some powerful analytic tools for understanding how the Communist system came to end as it did. We will finish by discussing several post-Soviet possibilities for change in this part of the world.

The Communist System

After the ouster of the moderates who governed briefly after the fall of the Russian czar, Lenin and the Bolsheviks gained control of the state and set about creating the Communist society in 1917. But Lenin died in 1924 and was succeeded by Stalin, who not only continued the consolidation of the communist state, but by a reign of terror created a Soviet empire composed of many national groups (such as Georgians, Armenians, and Lithuanians) but dominated by Russians. From the 1920s to the 1950s, in spite of the world Depression and World War II, Stalin and the Communist Party succeeded in creating a *mono-organizational society*. This means it was a society wholly run by networks of official hierarchies, each of them enjoying a monopoly in a given field of activity and bound together and integrated by the Communist Party apparatus into a single, centralized organizational structure (Rigby 1990, 4).

The Communist system was never completely unified or monolithic because of conflict among elites and factions, but it was as if all of the legal operating entities of society were taken over and run by a single giant firm. Stalin came to exercise dictatorial control over the party hierarchy that administered every aspect of economic, community, and cultural life. The power, status, and material rewards of persons were determined by formal position within the Party, state ministries, or their various subsidiary organizations rather than wealth, birth, or popularity. The system and its demands were legitimated by the goal of building a fully Communist society and by the Marxist-Leninist worldview in which this goal was embedded. This worldview was protected from overt criticism and competition by close control over public communication and association, backed by powerful state police organizations (Rigby 1990, 6, 166).

In addition to too much centralized planning, a major dysfunction of the system was the disease of *departmentalism* (*vedomstvennost*). State ministries' planning and management systems were based on vertical hierarchical pyramids, centralized in Moscow, which directed enterprises and administrations throughout the Soviet Union. Each subordinate entity communicated only with the office above it in the same ministry and had no meaningful communication with neighboring enterprises

that belonged to different ministries. This meant, for example, that in an urban area there was little communication or accountability among the various jurisdictions that controlled health, education, transportation, or the police, or among economic firms. This absence of horizontal linkages permeated the whole system and was a source of great inefficiency and incoherence (Lewin 1988, 105–106).

Change under the Soviet System

The Communist system under Stalin became a stable and rigid system partly because it retained a monopoly on assessing and praising itself and lacked the internal mechanisms of change that characterize more dynamic systems. In spite of these problems, the system was relatively coherent and presided over large-scale upward mobility. It enjoyed a significant base of popular support. *But it did change.*

In the decades following World War II, the urbanization and industrialization of Soviet society proceeded rapidly. During the 1930s, the Soviet Union was overwhelmingly rural, but by 1972 it had become predominantly urban. Accompanying urbanization and industrialization was the growth of a large “techno-scientific and intellectual class” (Lewin 1988, 31, 49). Living standards, though still far below those of the Western countries, increased significantly. Exact data are hard to come by, but Sovietologists agree that living standards improved in the 1950s and 1960s. The official claims that real incomes of workers increased by 55 percent in the 1950s are probably exaggerated, but not wholly misleading (Rigby 1990, 121). The significant thing was that Soviet Union was “no longer a predominantly peasant society with a primitive work force comprised largely of unskilled manual laborers and commanded by primitively undereducated political leaders. It had become a predominantly urban society, still dominated by smokestack industry, but with a sizable middle class and a growing professional intelligentsia trained at the university level” (Smith 1990, 18).

Khrushchev's Reforms

After Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became the Party leader and by 1958 had become premier of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev denounced Stalin's dictatorial policies within the party, the “cult of personality,” and attempted to restore “collective leadership” to the party: no more one-man rule, purges among party leaders, or arbitrary killing and imprisonment of “enemies of the people” by the state police; in short, an end to the rule of terror from top to bottom. A “cultural thaw” relaxed controls on the media and intellectual life. Actual political power became less concentrated in the top political leadership and slowly began to diffuse downward (Lewin 1988, 102–103). Khrushchev attempted to improve consumer life, with some success. He declared a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West, but he also boasted that the Soviet Union would quickly catch up with and overtake the West economically.

The part of the Soviet population most imbued with the spirit of reform was the “Khrushchev generation” of university-trained intellectuals and professionals.

Now in their fifties and sixties, they were liberated from the heavy pall of Stalinism during their formative university years and were given hope for greater cultural freedom and personal autonomy (Smith 1990, 20–21). Dramatic Soviet technical achievements of the era—the successful launching of the Soviet Sputnik satellite in 1957 and Yuri Gagarin's manned space flight in 1961—made it plausible that the Communist world could indeed overtake the West. The Khrushchev cohort of intellectuals and party leaders has formed the backbone of reform efforts since that time, advocating the rule of law, freer expression, greater citizen participation, and a diminished role of the state and entrenched bureaucracy. Significantly, Mikhail Gorbachev was a member of that cohort.

Yet Khrushchev's reforms failed. The slow improvements in living standards, education, and health care could not offset the dramatic failure of Soviet agriculture—which no amount of tinkering with the state farm system seemed able to improve. Food shortages were chronic, and large amounts of grain were imported yearly to make up for shortfalls. And although crude indicators of productivity (the only measures that counted in the Soviet system of assessment) improved on many fronts, the inept system of bureaucratic misplanning and the ongoing disease of *vedomstvennost* (see earlier) guaranteed that Soviet goods and services were shoddy and not supplied in any real relation to consumer needs. Khrushchev's coexistence policy and his expensive and ultimately unsuccessful foreign "adventurism" in Africa, Cuba, and Latin America cost him the support of Party leaders.

The Brezhnev Years and the Deepening Crisis

Khrushchev was ousted in 1964 and Leonid Brezhnev, who represented Party conservatives, came to power and ruled until he died in 1982. Brezhnev attempted to "make the system work" by reintroducing order, discipline, and tightening up. Initially, the system actually did improve and there were slow but steady improvements in the standard of living: Communal apartments were being replaced; better clothing, washing machines, and refrigerators became available. But Soviet efforts were concentrated in a few high-priority areas; steel and oil output actually surpassed that of the United States, and great resources were invested in the accumulation of an enormous nuclear arsenal. However it was viewed in the West, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to suppress a heretical reform movement was widely popular among Russians, who were proud that their power had been asserted to keep the empire intact (Smith 1990, 21, 23). Brezhnev's greatest success was attaining superpower status with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) that recognized the nuclear parity of the United States and the USSR.

But there were internal problems. The monopoly of power and tight controls over information gave the leaders of the upper, and even lower, echelons of the bureaucracy too many opportunities to abuse their offices, to misinform and lie, and to wallow in luxuries. A corrupt but implicit social pact had developed among the party elites, who were offered material opulence in exchange for silence and complicity (Przeworski 1991, 20). Neither rank-and-file Party members nor the newly educated intelligentsia and professionals, of whom there were considerable numbers, had a

chance to participate meaningfully in the political process or even to have reasonable control over their own careers. Widespread political apathy and cynicism ensued, with which the system had little ability to cope. It spilled over into low workplace morale and widespread alcoholism.

By the end of the 1970s, however, Soviet progress lost momentum and there began a long period of deterioration and retrogression in the quality of life.

[Bad harvests] . . . made food shortage endemic. There was rationing of meat and milk . . . Industrial sectors went into decline; labor productivity went flat. The free health-care system, a much vaunted pride of Soviet socialism, had deteriorated so much that infant mortality rates rose while male life expectancy went down. The statistics were covered up, but people could experience for themselves the horrible inadequacies of the health system: shortages of medicine, unbearably long waits for treatment, serious infections picked up in hospitals, the bribery necessary to secure treatment. The press occasionally reported stories of corruption by middle-level officials. Moscow was full of unseemly rumors that reached into Brezhnev's own family and entourage . . . the army, Party officials, and the KGB were embarrassed and angered by the corruption and sloth of the Brezhnev era. The whole country was sliding into cynicism. (Smith 1990, 23)

As economic progress dwindled, the Soviets became bogged down in an unpopular and seemingly unwinnable war in Afghanistan. Contrary to Khrushchev's boasting in the 1960s, the Soviets did not overtake or even come close to catching up with the West. Industrial capitalism "did not falter and collapse as Marx and Lenin had predicted and scores of Soviet ideologists had dutifully echoed. Just the opposite had occurred. The West had leapfrogged ahead . . . so that by the 1980s the brightest people in the Soviet system could see the telling contrast between Soviet stagnation and Western progress. They could see that the world was passing them by" (Smith 1990, 7).

By the 1980s, cultural contact with the West was broad enough, especially between Party, professional, and scientific elites, so that Western Europe became the enviable standard of comparison and these comparisons became increasingly humiliating. Knowledge of this diffused throughout the Soviet system. Communism came to be seen not as a model for the future, but an underdeveloped "something else" (Przeworski 1991, 20). At the same time, cultural controls were tightened and the ideological legitimacy declined even faster than the economy. The regime reverted to primitive propaganda, simplistic slogans, crude distortions of reality, and the heavy controls of culture and information—unmistakable signs of a worsening crisis of legitimacy (Lewin 1988, 113, 123). In every sphere, reality fell short of people's expectations and public morale took a nosedive as cynicism and alienation became pandemic.

Finally, it is important for us to note what many in the West never recognized: *that the Communist Party was itself not monolithic but divided*. Throughout the Brezhnev period, and increasingly by the end of it, there were several "wings" or factions in the Communist Party. There were Old Guard conservatives like Brezhnev protecting the status quo, neo-Stalinists who wanted a return to a tougher line, and Khrushchevite reformers who wanted Stalinism explicitly rejected and favored a looser, freer system. In addition, there were legions of opportunists and careerists who

would simply go with the flow, whatever it was. And, most important, many people rising through the Party hierarchy were as disenchanted by the system's failures and as disgusted by official corruption as non-Party intellectuals, although they dared not speak out (Smith 1990, 27–28). Brezhnev died in 1982, and after two transitional leaders (Cheminko and Andropov) it is in this context that Mikhail Gorbachev and a cohort of Nikita Khrushchev's political children came to power in 1985.

Gorbachev and Reform

Gorbachev's early years revealed little of the radical reformer he was to become. He promulgated campaigns for order and discipline and attempted to combat the widespread corruption of the Brezhnev era. Many high officials were dismissed or arrested and broad campaigns were mounted against alcoholism and slapdash performance in the workforce. Policies were aimed at increasing economic efficiency and acceleration (*uskorenie*). The only modest reforms, in fact, were to link rewards more closely with productivity and to authorize limited forms of individual and family enterprise, but the latter functioned mainly to legitimate (and tax) an extensive established "shadow" economy of black marketeers (Rigby 1990, 211–212).

In 1987, Gorbachev shifted from *revitalizing* the mono-organizational Soviet system to *changing* it. Whether he intended this all along and was using the first years as a period of consolidation or whether the difficulties of revitalization changed his mind is not clear. In any case, he began to publicly endorse the radical restructuring of the system, and particularly the Communist Party, as prerequisite for social and economic progress. "Restructuring" (*Perestroika*) meant thorough liberalization in the political sphere and the development of "commodity-money relations" (that is, market mechanisms) in the economic sphere. Paralleling *perestroika* was the advocacy of "openness" (*glasnost*) in public communications, media, and intellectual life. Gorbachev did not advocate a multiparty system, but did advocate the democratization of the Communist Party, with contested elections at all levels and the lifting of censorship and restrictions on freedom of speech and the press.

The seriousness of these sweeping reform ideas, which went far beyond any reform proposals of the Khrushchev era, was at first discounted by many Western leaders, including President Reagan, as representing nothing more than the latest version of Soviet ideological posturing and perhaps jockeying among the elite for control. But their effect on the people of the Soviet Union was electric; they unleashed and gave shape to a vast popular reservoir of popular grievances that had been pent up. In fact, by the time Gorbachev had come to power, social reform had hidden constituencies at every level in Soviet society:

mineworkers and housewives incensed about the weary of chronic consumer shortages and the dismal quality of Soviet goods; farmers and teachers demoralized by rural decay; little people outraged by the arrogant, pervasive, Mafia-like corruption of ministers and high Party officials; others embittered by the rampant black market, and by underground millionaires profiting from the gaping inefficiency of Stalinist economics . . . Scientists and engineers were worried about the Soviet Union's industrial stagnation and its growing

technological inferiority to the West. Intellectuals and young military veterans were sickened by the futile war in Afghanistan. Army generals, intelligence chiefs, and civilian technocrats were alarmed by the Soviet inability to compete in the world market and by the prospect of becoming a fourth-rate power in the twenty-first century . . . Cab drivers and poets alike were sick of the blatant hypocrisy of Soviet propaganda. There was a pervasive cynicism about the widening chasm between the pompous pretensions of Brezhnev and the bleak reality of a Russian's everyday life. (Smith 1990, 6)

The most natural and concentrated support for reform was among the growing university-educated middle class, who not only wanted a better material life—as did all Soviets—but also were eager for more personal and intellectual freedom, more respect for the individual, and more openness and honesty in Soviet life. Still, the desires for reform lay dormant until Gorbachev provided the liberal climate and political opportunity structure for them to emerge, which they did in an explosive mobilization in the late 1980s.

Probably the effect on freedom of the press was most dramatic. The press shifted overnight from being party cheerleader to the watchdog and critic of the regime. Magazines blossomed with exposés about crime, prostitution, and high-level corruption. Books formerly banned by censors (Solzenitzyn's *Gulag Archipelago*, Orwell's *1984*, Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*) were republished, widely read, and serialized on television (TV). Scientific sociology and public opinion polling about all manner of questions flourished. What was emerging was nothing short of a civil society, with important intermediary mechanisms of opinion formation and bodies of public opinion apart from the Party and the state.

An independent press not only helped create independent mechanisms of public opinion, but also accelerated the popular disillusionment with the Communist system. By the late 1980s, the Soviet press had an endless flow of stories about how well things were for the people of the West:

Television did admiring portraits of the McDonald's fast food chain . . . the efficiency of construction projects in Seattle, a well-run American family farm in Iowa, and even the way American political conventions operate. . . . Soviet viewers got an impressive look at the modern technology used by family farmers and . . . an incredible network of businesses serving the farmer. In a report on traffic congestion in New York City, Soviet TV also ran flattering shots of the interstate highway system—light-years ahead of the rutted, gutted Soviet roads. (Smith 1990, 164)

The conclusions people drew from such reports were inevitably unflattering to their own system.

Another important consequence of *glasnost* after 1987 was the emergence of a vast array of independent groups and social movement organizations (*neoformaly*). It is true that during the Brezhnev era there was a small but widely publicized "dissident" underground movement of intellectual protesters against the Soviet system. But that movement was suppressed and its leaders, such as Andrei Sakharov, were exiled. The dissident movement never numbered more than a few thousand activists

at most. But after 1987, such groups blossomed in public with few attempts to suppress them. The most spectacular were the popular-front independence movements in the Baltic republics and other minority regions. Otherwise there were organized groups of *Afghansti*, Afghanistan war veterans lobbying for health care and preferred treatment as consumers; *Zelennni Svet* (Green World), a movement protesting pollution and nuclear-power stations; *Memorial*, a nationwide group dedicated to rehabilitating the victims of Stalinism; *Spaseniye* ("Salvation") a movement to preserve monuments of history and culture and to democratize public life; and, in Moscow, democratic interest groups, such as Civic Dignity, the Club of Social Initiative, People's Action, and Democratic *Perestroika*. Later there were organizations of lawyers, peasant farmers, and even one for junior military officers, called "Shield" (Smith 1990, 431). Boris Yeltsin, then the Communist Party boss in Moscow, convened a meeting of over a hundred such groups in 1989 to form the *Democratic Russia*, which openly declared itself an opposition movement, even though they were still technically illegal. More ominously, independent unions of coal miners in Siberia and Ukraine declared a prolonged strike of 150,000 coal miners—the first truly large-scale labor strike since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.

Initially none of these movement organizations was a threat to the Party, even though Gorbachev used them as a Populist force to challenge entrenched Party bureaucrats. But as they began to merge into larger coalitions, such movement organizations began to challenge the Party openly. Change that was decreed from above became more insistent from below, outstripping anything that Gorbachev had imagined. "With the choke hold of fear broken and dissent now tolerated, Russians . . . plunged into election campaigns, mass demonstrations, environmental protests, miners' strikes . . . all evidence of a breathtaking growth of grass-roots activism" (Smith 1990, 556).

The Empire Crumbles

The most gripping news of the winter of 1989 was the dramatic collapse of state socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. The trouble began in Poland.

The contrast between Poland and the Soviet Union could not have been more striking. Poland had, for decades, a Catholic church that functioned as an ideological refuge and a countervailing force to the Communist regime. Poland had a small private sector of farms and businesses that were never turned into state enterprises. Poland had an active academic and intellectual underground with its own publications that were never effectively controlled by the regime. But most important, Poland had an independent trade union, Solidarity, that became a protest movement within the Communist system. There were, in fact, two Polish nationalisms: one a romantic popular conception of Polish nationhood, rooted in the church and popular culture, and another official Marxist nationalism, residing in the Party elite and the military.

Open rebellion began in 1976 but really flared in 1980, when Solidarity declared a crippling nationwide strike with wide support from the church, farmers, and the intelligentsia. Martial law was declared by the Polish military, an open admission that the Polish Communist Party could no longer rule without naked

repression. Still, workers struck again in 1988 and a compromise with the popular workers' movement was imposed on the Party by the military (Prezworski 1991, 21). For a brief period, a popularly elected government ruled in coalition with the military, but the military shortly bowed out. The Communist Party was gone, and the new regime quickly set about creating a market economy. The rest is history.

From Poland, the rest of the Eastern European regimes fell like dominoes. The Hungarian Communist Party split from the top, without pressure from below or being coerced by the military. Hungarians let East German refugees proceed to West Germany via Hungary, as did the Czechs. A vast crowd at Wenceslas Square in Prague forced the Czech regime to abdicate and to remand the government to popular forces without a shot being fired. The Bulgarian and Romanian governments fell in turn, with the only real civil disorders being in Romania. Yugoslavia erupted into precommunist Balkan ethnic fratricide, and Albania imploded. The capstone of the "autumn of the people" in 1989 was the dramatic collapse of the repressive, neo-Stalinist East German Communist regime, with the destruction of the Berlin Wall, reported as high drama on international TV.

In an abstract sense, the reason that all this happened was quite simple: The Soviets had let it be known that they would not send in Soviet troops and tanks to shore up Marxist regimes, as they had in Hungary in 1956 and again in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Left to their own devices, no Eastern European state was powerful enough to repress popular forces for change. The absence of the prospect of Soviet repression represented an expanded opportunity structure within which national Communist regimes collapsed to contenders for power all over Eastern Europe (Tarrow 1991, 17–18). Eastern Europe was gone from the Communist system in the blink of an eye, seemingly with Gorbachev's blessing, but to the great consternation of conservative party factions.

A more serious threat to the integrity of the Communist system was the unraveling of the empire within the Soviet Union itself. In a popular election in 1989, Lithuanian Communists were roundly defeated, and the Lithuanian parliament demanded complete independence from the Soviet Union, a move that quickly spread to the other Baltic Soviet Republics (Estonia, Latvia). Gorbachev could not tolerate this break but, in the limelight of world opinion as an international reformer and peacemaker, nor could he send in the tanks as Stalin or Brezhnev would have done. He stalled, alternately pleading and threatening a complete economic blockade, but ultimately conceded that Lithuania could secede if they were willing to go slow through "proper channels" at considerable economic costs. But all of this became moot; by 1990, eleven of the fifteen Soviet Republics, including the Russian Republic, declared not independence but their sovereignty from the central government of the Soviet Union. The center was gradually losing power to the periphery at the base of the Soviet system.

This move to local autonomy took the shape of organized opposition as the "Interregional Group," organized by autocratic politicians at the local and republic levels. The Interregional Group was a coalition of nationalists in the republics seeking some form of self-determination and Russian radical democratic reformers in Moscow and Leningrad. It shared hostility to central Party control as well as to the

power of the military and the Committee for State Security (KGB) and urged free assembly, the rule of law, and the democratic politics that Gorbachev had promised (Smith 1990, 476). All of this came to a head in 1989 and 1990 in the meetings of the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviets: the huge annual gatherings of political delegates from the far-flung Soviet empire. These meetings were historically ritual gatherings of elected delegates who gave their obedient stamp of approval to policies of the Party leaders. The 1989 and 1990 meetings were unprecedented, involving the clash of ideas, personalities, and interests, with arresting revelations, spontaneous outbursts, and passionate debate, which galvanized to TV the tens of millions of Soviet people who were watching the events unfold (Rigby 1990, 221). There was an open clash between two contending forces, the newly elected radicals bent on challenging the old system and forcing reform and the loyalist Old Guard determined to protect its power, with Gorbachev attempting to retain control by playing off one side against the other.

The Limits of Reform

Cultural and political reforms had utterly transformed the Soviet Union in the span of a few years, so much that foreign observers were literally stunned. But economic reform was, by contrast, an abysmal failure. Gorbachev had several opportunities to dismantle the old system and move toward free market systems, but each time he pulled back from real change. He did not, as did the Chinese communist reformers, build a mass constituency for economic reform by giving peasants freedom to earn more votes by putting more food on the table in the cities (Smith 1990, 559). Genuine economic reforms were not attempted because of resistance from state planners and entrenched bureaucrats who would become superfluous in a free market system. The Russian people were fearful of reform because they had little knowledge of the workings of markets and a great fear of living under a different economic system. Reform was also unsuccessful because many reformers, including Gorbachev, feared the political backlash that would be the certain consequence of the economic hardships and chaos that would attend the dismantling of the old planned economy. Gorbachev wanted reform without pain, and while the old system was under attack everywhere, no new system was created in its place. The functioning of the Soviet economy deteriorated so rapidly that to many even the Brezhnev era looked good by comparison. Public opinion polls measured the steady deterioration of popular support for Gorbachev and his reforms. Without economic improvements, freedom of expression and political democracy had become hollow reforms.

Not only the masses of people, but virtually every elite in the USSR, except the intelligentsia and reformers themselves, found reason to oppose reforms. As mentioned, powerful government officials were faced with the possible loss of their key roles as managers of state enterprises. Regional and local party bosses were responsible for sorting out economic and other problems, despite their loss of powers and staff, and they were blamed—publicly now in the press and on talk shows—for things going wrong. By 1989, many were seething with anger and resentment about the whole idea of reforms. The military fared little better, suffering cuts in military

budgets, and the careers of thousands were blighted by early retirement or nonpromotion. The state police found their power curtailed and lost their immunity to criticism. (Rigby 1990, 227–229). Party leaders were also frustrated and humiliated that Gorbachev's "new thinking" in international relations had resulted in a virtual capitulation to the West and the loss of Eastern Europe.

By 1990, Soviet politics had become a polarized conflict between left-wing democratic reformers and nationalists led by Boris Yeltsin, now the popularly elected president of the Russian Federation, and the conservative hardliner right wing of the Party, led by Valentin Pavlov and others. The democratic reformers had considerable strength in the regional governments of the republics, among rank-and-file members of the Communist Party, among urban intellectuals, and among the vast *mélange* of democratic movement organizations mentioned earlier. They controlled the municipal governments of Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities with powerful and popular mayors. The hardliners had support from the high-level party officials and state planning bureaucrats (who still ran the economy), among the state police, and among some—but not all—factions of military officers.

Between these two sides there were bitter polemics that filled the pages of the Soviet press. The hardliners accused the Democrats as selling out to the West and Zionism, of hating the Russian people, and of being prepared to create great upheaval by introducing alien ideas—pluralism and capitalism. Democrats, on the other hand, lumped all defenders of the system together and refused to differentiate among them. The notion of a moderate, responsible Communist or Russian nationalist was not something that liberal cosmopolitan intellectuals were ready to entertain (Simes 1991, 48). Gorbachev attempted to hold the system together by first placating one side and then the other, but he was occupying a shrinking middle ground. He continued to appoint hardliners among his top advisers and as directors in state ministries at the same time that he acquiesced to democratic pressures for continuing reforms. After resisting for some time, Gorbachev finally gave in to demands by the reformers to alter the Soviet constitution by rescinding the legal monopoly of the Communist Party—thus creating the constitutional basis of a multiparty democracy. Striking at the heart of Communist Party control, this action sent the hardliners into orbit.

During the winter of 1990–1991, the Soviet Union and the international community were awash with rumors of coups d'état, plots, and dark scenarios of various kinds. Liberal foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigned dramatically with the prediction that "dictatorship is returning to the Soviet Union." The Interregional Group pressed Gorbachev to sign an "All Union Treaty" that would have loosened the Kremlin's control over republics, considerably weakened central Party organizations, and begun the devolution from a union to a confederation of republics. By the summer of 1991, he was prepared to sign the treaty. For hardliners, it was the last straw.

The Empire Strikes Back

On the morning of August 19, Soviet tank battalions left their barracks outside Moscow and began rolling toward the city. Gorbachev was placed under house arrest at his vacation home in the Crimea as military units moved toward the Russian

government buildings to take over the "hotbed of democracy" of Yeltsin and his government. The coup was organized by a dozen or so leaders of the state police, state planning ministries, army, and high Party officials, some of whom were Gorbachev's cabinet advisers. A Soviet general announced martial law in the rebellious Baltic republics. The coup plotters staged an international news conference at which they announced, incredulously, that Gorbachev was too ill to continue leadership and they, led by Vice President Gennady Yanayev, were assuming leadership of the Soviet Union. Soviet visitors in the United States tried to reassure journalists who interviewed them that the hardliners would never be able to hold power, even if they succeeded in taking it, but most Americans didn't believe them. To many Americans, it was the long-feared return of the dark forces that would restore the "Evil Empire."

From the beginning, however, the coup was botched: The borders were not sealed, nor were international telephones, fax machines, or most of the media under the control of the coup leaders. Military commanders had little knowledge about what they were being sent to do. Support from the non-Russian republics failed to materialize as most leaders and military commanders adopted a "wait and see" attitude before declaring their loyalty. From inside the government buildings, Yeltsin and others were busy on phones and fax machines soliciting the support of the international community, which unanimously condemned the coup and asked for the release of Gorbachev. The coup failed because it was incompletely executed, but also for lack of elite support and an outpouring of popular resistance, particularly among the educated classes.

Tens of thousands of Muscovites flocked to the Russian Parliament buildings and erected barricades to protect Yeltsin and his parliamentarians. They stayed for three days and nights, in violation of a curfew announced by the coup leaders, and implored soldiers and tank commanders, who were showered with food, flowers, and Russian flags, not to fire on them. There were huge anticoup demonstrations in Leningrad, Kiev, and other cities, and coal miners struck again across Siberia. As the coup stalled, many leaders of the fifteen Republics finally joined world leaders in condemning the coup. In the final showdown, Soviet soldiers refused to fire on Russian citizens and some units switched sides to join in the defense of the parliament buildings. By the third day, the tanks and armored personnel vehicles had turned around and started back to their barracks. The coup was over and Yeltsin and the Russian political leaders had triumphed, but popular resistance by the people of the Soviet Union had made it possible. Coup leaders were jailed (but one committed suicide), and a dazed Gorbachev returned from the Crimea with little real comprehension of what had transpired.

The main problem was that the coup leaders, successful bureaucrats and apparatchiks, had lived too long inside the Kremlin and had failed to perceive the fundamental changes that had been taking place outside. Most of all they failed to understand the disappearance of the greatest legacy of Stalinism: fear (Sturua 1991, 65–66).

The Aftermath and the Future

Neither did Gorbachev understand the situation. He had so feared being ousted by the democratic reformers from the left that he was unprepared for a coup from the

hardliners of the right, whom he thought he could control. He assumed that he could return in triumph to rebuild the Party and revitalize the state after dealing with his enemies who had plotted his overthrow. He was, of course, dead wrong. Power now lay with the reformers, the nationalists, and the Russian people, and they chose decisively. Statues of Lenin, Stalin, and the founder of the secret police were toppled all over the country, and the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the state police were closed and their records impounded. The Russian government claimed control of all assets of the Party within the borders of the Russian Republic (other Republics followed suit). In Gorbachev's presence, Yeltsin signed a decree that suspended the Communist Party in Russia. Gorbachev tried to resist, but he subsequently resigned as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and urged the Party to dissolve. By October, the republics had agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union. The Baltic Soviet Republics declared complete independence and the others were negotiating some form of confederation. After its more than seventy-year existence, the Soviet Union was no more.

In its place, a Confederation of Sovereign Republics struggled to define autonomy and to negotiate some sort of relationship between the republics. By the mid-1990s, they had devolved into a huge Russian Republic ringed in the West and South by newly independent nations—homes of the national minorities the Soviet empire had absorbed (for example, Estonia, Armenia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan). Bad as it was, the old Soviet command economy went into a prolonged state of free fall, and living standards plummeted. Western-style markets and foreign investments slowly and incompletely emerged in a nation that had little experience or understanding of either, and many Russians found it impossible to distinguish between legitimate businesses and gangsters. This underscores the importance of institutionalized culture and law that legitimizes politics, business, and civil dispute. But in the throes of such a massive transition, that takes time to develop.

As with most such transitions, there are winners and losers, and some Russians benefit from the new order of things. Social inequality grows rapidly there, as in the rest of the contemporary world. The presidential election of 1996 exhibited noisy parties and factions from across the political spectrum (including liberal modernizers, Fascists, and old Communists). Boris Yeltsin won again, not because he was "beloved" by the Russian people, but because the other alternatives were worse. Yeltsin resigned in January 2000 and was replaced by Vladimir Putin, who inherited a government still mired in power struggles and official corruption that makes corruption in the United States and Western Europe look benign by comparison. Stalled land reform measures, stalled investments in economic infrastructure, the continued unrest in Chechnya, and threats to civil liberties and political freedoms all remain significant and debilitating problems in the new Russia (*The Economist*, 2001d).

Post-Soviet Possibilities

Now that state socialism as an economic system seems to be passing into the dustbin of history, writers and policy makers have asked: What happens next? We have

labeled this section "post-Soviet possibilities" because it is not at all clear what types of political and economic systems will develop as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the satellite states in Eastern Europe (the following discussion draws on Przeworski 1994; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Stokes 1993; Tismaneanu 1992).

There is one observation that virtually all writers agree on—"free market capitalism" (as we often call it) stands on the shoulders of a set of political and economic institutions that challenge the idea that free markets spontaneously erupt once government regulations and barriers are lifted. The economic and political institutions that make market capitalism work include:

1. A banking and credit system
2. Stable stock and securities markets
3. Institutionalized labor markets
4. A working public infrastructure (roads, sewers, power plants, transportation, and utilities)
5. A well-defined system of property rights
6. A judicial and legal system that monitors all of the above and sanctions those who break the rules

Most former state Socialist nations also are interested in multiparty democracy, though what this means varies from one country to another (and from one citizen to another!). While most popular writers automatically link the development of multiparty democracy with market capitalism, the link is far from automatic. It may not be possible to have a democracy without a market economy of some sort, but it is certainly possible to have a market economy without multiparty democracy and the political freedoms that accompany it (as the experiences with dictatorships in South America in the 1970s and contemporary developments in Singapore and China have demonstrated).

Most obviously, the end of state socialism has meant the demise of the one-party state dominated by a Communist Party. Almost everywhere this has led to multiparty elections where a vast diversity of political interests competes for seats in national legislatures of all shapes and sizes. Most of these elections are governed by proportional representation rules in which all parties above a minimum voting threshold (usually around 5 percent of all votes cast) are granted seats in the legislature. Legislators then pick prime ministers from parties that receive the most votes or from the ranks of party coalitions that link multiple parties together in a ruling group.

But does the demise of the one-party state mean that all interested parties want multiparty democracy? Hardly! As Przeworski (1994) points out, most political factions will accept multiparty democracy only if (1) all political participants are committed to it and (2) there are protections in place to shield losing parties and minority voters from retribution at the hands of the victors. The major problem in most former one-party states is that this requires an unusual amount of trust in the other parties in the system.

There are few coherent definitions of what a healthy democracy looks like, but most writers point to several basic characteristics that good democracies have. Most

real democracies don't have all of these characteristics and others have some of these characteristics in limited amounts. In healthy democracies

1. *Losing is permissible.* Losers of elections and legislative fights accept the outcomes and resolve to "do better next time." In exchange for this agreement, the winners promise to protect the expressions of opinion and political activities of those who are out of office. If the victor in an election immediately abolishes all political opposition, there's a problem. If the losing parties immediately declare a civil war against the winners, that too is a problem.
2. *Stable sets of parties send clear signals to voters.* The number of parties that participate in each election doesn't fluctuate wildly, and specific parties represent a coherent set of policy choices from one election to the next. The differences between the parties are clear (the U.S. Republican and Democratic parties score poorly on this dimension), and voters have some idea what they are getting when they cast votes for specific parties.
3. *There is a strong functioning civil society.* Civil society refers to the myriad of connections that tie people to each other in groups that participate in a common life (cf. Etzioni 1993). These connections occur mostly through independently organized groups: churches, schools, neighborhoods, clubs, and organizations that bring (mostly) adults together in a variety of settings to discuss their common interests and disagreements. While nobody is quite sure what the exact requirements for producing a functioning civil society are, one can sense when the bonds created by civil society are not present. A strong civil society does not mean that everyone likes each other; in fact, one of the signs of a functioning civil society is that conflicts are brought out in the open and discussed, often in heated but open exchanges. Democracies need functioning civil societies to build trust and to foster communication and participation.
4. *Actors focus on processes rather than outcomes.* Democracy is a way of making decisions. It doesn't guarantee that the best decision will be made. If democracy is evaluated only by the wisdom of the political decisions it produces, then it is in trouble (Elshtain 1995).

Dictatorships and other forms of government often justify themselves by promising concrete results. The process used to produce the results is viewed as the price that citizens have to pay for them. Healthy democracies place a great deal of faith in the belief that the specific processes associated with democracy will, in the long run, produce a favorable set of outcomes. But "favorable" is not the same as "best," nor does the burden of proof lie with evaluating the wisdom of any specific political choice.

From the standpoint of wedding new market economies to new multiparty democracies, however, the problems are more severe. Local populations often identify democracy with prosperity, looking to the United States and other developed nations as models. But the economic reforms required to convert a state Socialist economy into a market economy usually will make large numbers of voters worse off before it makes them better off. Citizens, who are impoverished by economic reforms, become voters who vote for antireform politicians. If enough antireform politicians are elected, then the transition toward a market economy can grind to a halt.

Why is creating a market economy so hard? Because the political and economic institutions required to maintain it are so unique. Each of the institutions listed here plays a major role in making market economies work. Systems of *property rights* determine who gets access to resources and lay out the conditions for the use and sale of that access. Because most state Socialist nations did not allow private citizens to own productive assets, these nations have had to figure out (1) how to create a market for productive assets apart from state ownership and (2) how to sell state-owned assets to get them into private hands. Not surprisingly, there is no easy or foolproof way to do this. To make matters worse, nations have to produce entirely new sets of laws regulating property rights that are completely different from those in state Socialist societies and must produce court and legal systems to enforce them.

The problems are equally as serious when we turn to systems of banking. Market economies need financial institutions to provide loans at reasonable interest rates for entrepreneurs and businesses to engage in their activities. As Stark and Bruszt (1998) have shown, the ability of a bank to make good loans depends on the system of property rights. If the system of property rights is ambiguous, then people can secure loans without incurring any penalties for not repaying them or (worse still) can turn to the state to bail them out if business turns bad. Not surprisingly, a nation with a system of property rights that can't determine who owns what will not be able to assess taxes to maintain a public infrastructure, so tax dodging is rampant.

A functioning market economy also depends on a working infrastructure that makes economic transactions easier. In the United States and most developed nations, utilities and transportation systems are rarely an impediment to economic development except in extreme cases (California in 2001 being an example). We expect the lights to come on when we turn the switch, we expect our computers to work, and we expect clean water to come from the tap when we turn it on (at the temperature we desire, to boot!). We expect our trash to be picked up and our sewage to be treated in a way that wouldn't damage the environment. We pick up the phone and expect to instantly find the person whose number we've dialed (from a cell phone no less). Citizens and businesses pay taxes to support these activities and usually pay private bills as well. The amount of money spent on these activities is a nontrivial portion of government expenditures each year and a significant portion of citizens' household budgets as well.

In state Socialist societies, these services were not provided to promote economic efficiency. Consumer- and business-oriented infrastructure was years behind where it was in the rest of the developed world and was not geared to dealing with a dynamic business environment. Systems of transportation and communications, in particular, have needed a serious overhaul. It will be years before these systems are competitive with market economies in the rest of the developed world.

BUT WAS IT A REVOLUTION?

Let us end by returning to the notion of revolutions in general. How closely does the collapse of communism resemble what we said earlier about social revolution? Given that a government collapsed with profound political, economic, and social

change, it is unavoidable to think that a revolution occurred. But scholars developed the notion of revolutions to describe kinds of movements and transformations that began in the 1700s and continued in developing regions of the contemporary world. Specialist scholars note many similarities between the collapse of communism and those processes, but also important differences.

Most conspicuously, we see what we described as revolutionary movements: a prolonged period preceding the collapse with high expectations for improvement, in conjunction with very modest actual improvement. These movements reached back to the Khrushchev period. The relative deprivation created by this dynamics was particularly pronounced after rapid actual deterioration of Soviet living standards in the mid-1970s and by the failure of Gorbachev's reforms to deliver any economic progress. Sufficient loosening of political and intellectual control created a political opportunity structure that enabled a vast mobilization of contenders for power, both within and without the regime. This effect is consistent with the resource mobilization perspectives discussed earlier.

Most of the elements of Skocpol's structural theory of revolution can be found in the collapse of communism. There is certainly ample evidence of strong international pressure on the Soviet state: the failure of the Soviets to keep up with the West economically, technologically, or militarily; the failure of Soviet schemes to gain influence among third world nations; the military debacle in Afghanistan; and the ruinous financial consequences of the military arms race are all instances. The fact that the Soviet Union could provide little in the way of economic assistance to its allies and client states while routinely importing grain and other foodstuffs became an embarrassing international demonstration of the weakness of the Soviet economy for all to see. There was certainly an alienated class of marginal elites who illustrated the "desertion of the intellectuals" discovered so long ago by Crane Brinton and others. There was no independent elite of wealthy persons or landlords to obstruct the regime, but there was certainly a high degree of factionalism and disunity within the regime and the Party, so that intrigue and plots became pandemic. In this process, power devolved from the central organs of the Party to include a much wider set of local, ideological, and opportunistic contenders for power. By the 1990s, the failure of reform had eroded Gorbachev's political base within the party. By the 1970s, public opinion in the USSR appeared to be apathetic but was really smoldering beneath the surface, ready to catch fire at the first sparks. Finally, as Skocpol theorized, the military proved an unreliable tool of the state, or in this case, a faction of the state seeking to exert its control.

The relative absence of popular uprisings and civil violence make the transition out of communism different from other revolutions. States collapsed without a shot being fired, destruction of property, or loss of life in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria. True, in Romania there was a violent revolt that resulted in the public lynching of dictator Ceausescu; Yugoslavia deteriorated into classic Balkan ethnic strife; and, as mentioned, there was periodic interethnic conflict in some non-Russian Soviet republics. But, all told, there was remarkably little violence or loss of life. During the abortive coup in Moscow three persons were killed in the confusion and maneuvering of military vehicles, but no shots were fired. All of this stands in stark contrast to the levels of violence and destruction that

attended the American, French, and the (first) Russian revolutions. The most direct and obvious driving force in the collapse of the Soviet empire was disunity and conflict among elite factions within the government and Party, who in effect progressively dismantled themselves. As you might guess, a group of international scholars has studied this phenomenon intensely (see, for example, Rozman 1992).

The transition from communism was unlike other revolutions because the regime did not resist reform but initiated it, and it could not contain this reform. It spilled out into political and social changes that could not be contained by the Communist Party-state system. When authoritarian regimes seek to liberalize, the result is uncertain democracy. When such states are under external pressure,

elements of the ruling elite permit an airing of grievances to shore up their social base. Instead of demobilizing after their demands have been met, however, key groups in society mobilize broader followings around demands for wider and more meaningful participation in the political process. If the rulers open the political arena still more to admit new contenders for power; they lose control over . . . society and are ultimately forced to hand over power to . . . [others]. (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986)

The revolutionary collapse of the Soviet system had a different dynamics than historic revolutions and those that still occur in less modern nations. It has been conventional to see Communist societies as variants of modern urban-industrial societies. But modernization was very uneven between cities and rural areas and between social classes. Perhaps as Polish scholar Adam Przeworski has suggested, Communist societies were in truth neither traditional nor wholly modern, but types of an underdeveloped "something else" (1991, 21). They will certainly connect with the world market economy. And, continuing to modernize, they will evolve societies that are not carbon copies of Western free market ones, but that combine reforms with their own history, culture, and politics. Will revolutionary collapse occur in the remaining communist states (China, Cuba, and North Korea)? Stay tuned.

IN CONCLUSION: THE INEVITABILITY OF REVOLUTIONARY SURPRISE

Let's return to the prediction of revolutionary social change for a moment. A discerning student of social change could rightfully ask, "If you guys are so smart, then why can't you do a better job of predicting revolutions?"

To answer this question, we'll use an analogy that most people (sadly) are familiar with. *Your uncle is diagnosed with cancer, and his physician says that the cancer is at an advanced stage. Your loved ones ask for an estimate of how long your uncle will live, and the physician says, "Anywhere from six months to a year."* For some of you, your uncle dies in three months. For others, the cancer goes into remission several times and he lives five years longer than the doctor's prediction.

Was the physician wrong in his diagnosis? Not necessarily! She or he has been trained to evaluate a set of conditions and render a prognosis. The prognosis assumes

that conditions wouldn't change. It is also based on how well the average patient does once a specific diagnosis is made.

Now let's shift our focus from medicine to revolutionary change. When social scientists try to explain revolutionary change, we're in much the same position as the physician with a critically ill patient. But we have a few additional disadvantages:

1. *The "patient" is a living society with different actors having different political goals and different means to carry them out.* Many of these means are hidden. Some are hidden from the participants themselves until specific historical events (natural disasters, assassinations, or wars) expose these means and produce actors that are willing to use them.
 2. *Actors don't necessarily want others to know what they're up to for fear that this knowledge will tip the political scales against them.* Government elites continue to give rousing speeches and promote political propaganda for mass consumption without revealing their private fears that the system is not working, and their citizens know it. Ordinary citizens don't want to reveal their true preferences for a different system out of very real fears that current government elites will resort to repression and violence if these preferences became known.
 3. *In the abstract, we can look at a social system and realize that something is very wrong, but for anything to change actors must step forward and take the initiative.* Social systems don't collapse by themselves. In almost all cases of rapid, revolutionary change, outsiders and challengers are emboldened to act by symptoms of weakness, ruling elites are unable to respond to calls for change, this inability emboldens the challengers still more, and change unfolds in a manner not unlike bluffing in a poker game.
 4. *The patients we study are able to alter the course of their own illness.* Ruling groups can accept the advice of outsiders and implement needed reforms. Challengers can accept aid from international organizations and foreign governments and use that aid to reform the system without input from local elites. Both sides can decide that the violence, bloodshed, famine, and social upheaval needed to produce the necessary changes aren't worth the price, no matter how inadequate they find current arrangements. These are decisions that are notoriously difficult to predict and are likely to remain so.
- Finally,
5. *Rapid, revolutionary social change alters people's preferences for change as the action unfolds.* Some people will join calls for change right away. Others will wait and join only when it becomes clear who has the upper hand. Still others will have their preferences swayed by personal tragedies ("The rebels killed my brother," "Government soldiers took our land," and so forth) that occur as the action unfolds.

All of these reasons make analysts of social change more like veterinarians than physicians.

THINKING PERSONALLY ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE

In this chapter, we use the word *revolution* in a more specific way than we do when talking about the sexual revolution, the computer revolution, or other pervasive long-term changes. Revolution here always involves a seemingly sudden change of a political

regime (and other things as well), and it is a macro-level event. But we do talk about “rebellions” and “rebellious people” in smaller organizations and families.

1. Talk to some people of various ages who are old enough to have lived through the time when Soviet communism collapsed. Talk with them about how life in the United States was different before that collapse, and what it has become since. If you can, talk with someone who lived through or remembers the 1950s, when government officials in the United States engaged in a large-scale witch hunt to find Communist subversives everywhere.
2. The United States has always had lots of reform movements (about everything imaginable!). It has had revolutionary movements, but no successful ones since the first one (though it did fight a civil war!). Why do you think this is true? How do people think about the American Revolution? How is it depicted in popular media and school textbooks? If you can, talk to some British or Canadians about how it is understood there. If you know people from Mexico or Cuba, ask them about the revolutions in their national histories. Mexicans celebrate *Cinco de Mayo* like Americans do the Fourth of July. The Cuban revolution of 1959 had implications for the United States as well as Cuba (do you live in South Florida?). Its consequences are still very obvious in American politics and foreign policy. In fact, the American relationship with Cuba remains a point of controversy among the United States and other Western Hemispheric nations, European allies, and trading partners. It has often shaped domestic politics as well. Find out something about revolutionary processes in all the Americas. In some places they continue.
3. The United States has not had successful revolutionary movements, but it has, and continues to have, revolutionaries. Read or talk with some people about radical militias, terrorist groups, “people’s courts,” the Klansmen and other Aryan Supremacist groups, and the so-called “Christian identity churches.” At the end of the last chapter, one question asked what people you spoke with thought about the diversity of reform movements. What do they think of these groups?

NOTES

1. The following is taken from Moaddel (2005), Rasler (1996), Kurzman (1996), Skocpol (1994), and Library of Congress (1998).

Chapter 10

Technology, Innovation, and Networks



Cell phones are a classic example of a technological innovation that extends existing technologies.

The last chapters were about social movements, human agency, and how large collections of people advocate or respond to change, sometimes in revolutionary ways. But change is often spurred by innovations and discoveries within a society, both scientific/technical and sociocultural ones. For instance, the invention of the internal combustion engine, television, silicon microchips, and effective birth control all significantly shaped the course of history in the twentieth century. Such innovations not only create new possibilities, but also problems and dilemmas. For instance, artificial insemination, surrogate motherhood, and medical innovations for sustaining life all created new health and reproductive potentials before the society recognized