Week 5 Discussion: International Organizations
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chapter9.docxChapter 9 International Relations
Chapter Objectives
1. Explain the international relations theory of realism including its basic assumptions.
2. Discuss the liberal theory of international relations along with its different types.
3. Define constructivism and its central principles.
4. Explore feminist international relations theory and its recommendations for change.
5. Examine causes of war and peace in the international arena.
When Twitter was first introduced in 2006, its founders probably could not have imagined how people would potentially use it. Over the past twelve years, Twitter has expanded to more than 330 million active monthly users throughout the world. Governments have even gotten into the act: Twitter Government (@TwitterGov) even highlights how governments and politicians throughout the world use Twitter. Politicians and elected officials quickly took to Twitter, using it as a means to communicate with voters directly. Former president Barack Obama even originated a Twitter handle for presidents (@POTUS) in 2013.
The current US president, Donald Trump, has utilized Twitter to a far greater extent than his predecessor, although he does so from his own personal account (@realDonaldTrump) rather than the official @POTUS handle. In interviews, he has argued that communicating via Twitter allows him to get his message to voters without the filter of the media with the implicit argument that the media does not do a faithful and true job in reporting his actions. As such, President Trump’s tweets often come directly from the president himself with no staff filtering or discussion. One area where the president’s tweets have been particularly influential is in the US relationship with North Korea.
As of October 2018, President Trump has tweeted about North Korea more than 150 times since taking office. And while the tweets may not appear on the official @POTUS account or come in a statement on White House letterhead, they have played an integral role in American-North Korean relations. For example, on August 11, 2017, the president tweeted this:
Military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded, should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will find another path!
At a mere twenty-three words, the president stated what could have easily been seen as a military threat against North Korea that could have led to direct conflict. Realizing the potential implications of tweets like this from the president, US officials at the February 2018 Munich Security Conference reportedly told their counterparts not to pay attention to what the president is tweeting.1 However, in March 2018, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un, apparently under pressure because of the president’s rhetoric, broached the idea of a summit between the two leaders. What followed was a historic meeting between the two leaders in June 2018 in Singapore as well as enhanced relations between North and South Korea.
Unlike the other subfields of political science where we were able to discuss individual concepts like public opinion, public policy, institutions of government, democracy, or so on, international relations is more organized around different theories of how states behave. This chapter summarizes and lays out the major arguments of four major theories of international relations: realism, liberalism, constructivism, and feminism. It ends by talking about one important area of research for international scholars aside from theoretical approaches, and that is the incidences of war and peace.
Before diving into the different theories of international relations, we should note here that these theories are just that—theories. Theories are built on simplified models of human behavior and as such, cannot explain all of the nuances of human action. Although it is easy to see some, or many, of the following characteristics in how states behave, we do not expect to see every characteristic. In other words, while these theories may help us explain and interpret state behavior, they probably won’t explain every individual situation.
Realism
For most of the history of the world, states have sought to achieve power and expand the area in which that power can be exerted. If a state is an entity that has a monopoly on the legitimate uses of force in a given area, states have usually sought to expand that area of power and influence. This rational motivation rooted in self-interest can be traced back to the days of Athens and Sparta; the Greek historian Thucydides identified the Athenian quest for power as a key driver of the Peloponnesian War. Machiavelli, in giving advice to his patron in The Prince, also endorsed this idea of states acting to protect their own sovereignty, as did Thomas Hobbes. This long tradition of realism in international relations has led to a large body of work expounding on these ideas and using them to explain the actions of states around the world and throughout history. Not only has realism been influential in academia but it has also made its mark on actual international relations around the world with many practitioners of foreign policy adopting the rationale.
Basic Assumptions
While there are many variants of realism, theories of realism all begin from the same four assumptions. One, when it comes to actors on the global stage, states are the main players. We know in the United States that there are a lot of political variables that go into calculations of what the United States will do in the world from public opinion to the balance of power between the political parties, but as far as realists are concerned, none of that matters. Realists view states as black boxes; situations go into the black box and reactions come out, but we are never privy to what goes on inside the box that leads from situation to decision. In that sense, the people involved in making decisions or the politics in play are not areas of interest for realists—only how states react and respond to one another. What happens inside the black box is seen as the purview of policy scholars who study how states make policy, including foreign policy.
A second assumption involves the idea of rationality and argues that states act in a rational, self-interested manner. What does the idea of rationality mean? People often mistake rationality for behavior that is the best choice in a certain situation, but this is not the case. Rationality is acting according to an individual’s (or in this case a state’s) ordered preferences. As uncomfortable as it may be, the easiest way to think about rationality is the case of Hitler. Many people would argue that Hitler acted irrationally in many ways, from expanding German territory to the Holocaust of the Jews. However, rationality means that Hitler acted in accordance with his preferences; in his list of preferences, expanding German power and eliminating the Jewish population were at the top. Therefore, as difficult as it is for us to think it, Hitler was acting rationally.
In the international system, a third assumption is that there is no higher authority than states; there is nobody to tell states what they can and can’t do. In realist terms, the state system is anarchic; there are no rules and nobody to enforce rules if there were any. This naturally leads to the last assumption that in a world where there are no rules, states will do anything they can to assure they survive. Survival means ensuring that they have the means to outlast threats from other states. The means by which that can be achieved is power, represented by military capability. If a state’s military is strong enough and its capabilities sufficient, it will be able to outlast any challenge to its sovereignty or its territory.
Consequences of Realist Theory
From these four basic assumptions, realist theory emerges. Much like Thomas Hobbes’s conception of human nature as inherently malevolent, realism accepts the same about states. The consequences, then, of state behavior do not necessarily lend themselves to a stable and peaceful international environment. If states want to ensure their security by building up military power, other states may interpret that build-up as threats to their own society; this is what’s known as a security dilemma. The arms race may not be directed offensively, but other states may not believe one state’s intentions as stated. If other countries begin to build up their own capabilities without sufficient cooperation and communication, the entire region may soon find itself in a devastating military conflict.
Arms races have happened often enough throughout history. In fact, World War I is a classic example of security dilemmas leading to war. States usually realize the futility of security dilemmas but all too often find themselves caught up in the system. This does not mean, however, that they do not try to find ways out of the conundrum. Paying close attention to a balance of power in a region is one of the solutions. If power is distributed roughly equally, no one state has an upper hand on any other. The Treaty of Westphalia discussed in Chapter 8 tried to enshrine a balance of power within Europe so as to avoid the devastating conflict that had pervaded Europe for centuries. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in a balance of power battle that largely led to a stalemate between the two countries directly. The balance of power can forestall the consequences of military buildups as long as all of the states in a region decide to abide by it.
There are other proposed solutions to the security dilemma posed by the search for power, one of them proposing that instead of a balance of power system wherein two or more powerful states exist so as to create a sort of equilibrium in the system; a unipolar world would find one country more powerful than all of the others and can police the rest of the system. This variation of realism assumes that a single hegemon or dominant actor seeking to expand their influence and power is able to amass enough power to keep other states weak. If weaker states attempt to move against others, the hegemon can strike and control the weak state’s actions.
National Interest
These assumptions have led to a rich body of work examining realism in international relations. In the post–World War II period, the theorist Morgenthau achieved prominence with his writings on realism. In an era where the Cold War had yet to fully begin and new faith was placed on institutions such as the United Nations to mediate conflict (to be discussed later in this chapter), the new question became what the United States’ major interests were. Morgenthau equated the US predicament with the conflict between whether man (and therefore states) is either inherently moral or immoral, the classic question of the original state of human nature.2 Morgenthau argued that abiding by the principles of realism in foreign policy rather than trust the liberal institutions and appeals to morality would lead to far more acceptable outcomes for the United States.
If one theme runs throughout Morgenthau’s writings it is that following the motivation of national interest and abiding by the principle of balance of power is the smartest strategy in foreign policy. He also endows realism with the highest of scientific principles in that realists also believe that objective laws of political science can be deduced through reason.3 He utilizes the idea of scientific principles not only to seek out the laws of realism but as a yardstick by which to measure alternative theories of international relations.4 Given that Morgenthau is also writing at a time where political science itself is continuing to press the idea of science and behavioralism in the study of politics, this is not at all surprising. Morgenthau thus presents realism not only as the natural and best way for a state to conduct its foreign policy but he also holds it up as a truly scientific, rational, and objective theory of international relations.
Another prominent realist theorist is Waltz. Waltz was a proponent of what he called structural realism—also known as neorealism. Neorealism differs from traditional realism in the emphasis on what causes states to behave as they do. For traditional realists like Morgenthau, it is the search for security in a world that is dominated by other self-interested and selfish states. Waltz and his fellow neorealists, however, recognize a more important role for the global system itself. States must respond to the conditions created by an anarchic state of international relations more than pressures from other states.
Neorealism is a natural reaction to a changing world where globalization is increasing and international organizations like the United Nations exist. The United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other international organizations undoubtedly do impact the international environment. A good example of this is the passage of sanctions in the UN Security Council or going to the UN Security Council to have security actions endorsed. Therefore, neorealists are still hemming to the original assumptions of realism, but they recognize the increased importance of the international environment to the conditioning of states’ actions. Even with the end of the Cold War, Waltz still argues that neorealism is essential to understanding the international system; even though the world became unipolar with the fall of the Soviet Union, it does not mean that the nature of the system changed. Instead, a changed world system “awaits the day when the international system is no longer populated by states that have to help themselves.”5
Realism in Practice
Realism has been dominant not only in academic debates but in real-life foreign policy. A well-known proponent of realist theory, Henry Kissinger served first as national security adviser and then concurrently as secretary of state in the Richard Nixon administration. In this position, Kissinger was a constant advocate for following US interests in crafting foreign policy. This ultimately led to the reopening of relations between the United States and China in 1972. Even though the United States had foreclosed relations with China following its establishment of a communist government, Kissinger and Nixon realized that they could exploit the schism between China and its erstwhile communist ally Russia. The main interest of the United States was to reduce tension with the Soviet Union, and to do that, it reopened relations with China to make the Soviets fear a renewed friendship between China and the United States. If that happened, the Soviets were afraid that both countries would turn against Russia. Therefore, the Soviet Union was forced to moderate its policies toward the United States, and America was thus the beneficiary not only of a new relationship with China but a better relationship with the Soviet Union.
Modern research into realism generally focuses on the relevance of realism to a changed world. Not only has globalization continued to increase the importance of international organizations in moderating state activities but non–state actors like terrorist organizations have emerged as major players on the international stage. Neither traditional realism nor neorealism have a place for these non–state actors; this has been reflected in the political science literature. Walker and Morton find that despite a dominance of realism in the international relations field from the end of World War II until 1970, international relations research from 1970 to 2000 has seen a reduced role for realism.6 Instead, liberalism (discussed in the next section) has become an integral driver of international relations research.
This is also reflected in the research that has been devoted to adopting realism to modern realities. For example, Patomaki and Wight argue for what they call critical realism, Chernoff presents a theory of scientific realism, and Sleat tries to combine liberalism and realism in a theory of liberal realism.7 And yet the traditional tenets of realism, while not being acknowledged as frequently as during the Cold War, continue to exert an influence on American reactions to the rest of the world. This is quite apparent when crises arise in other parts of the world and when considering whether the United States should become involved or not; analysts inevitably bring up questions of the interests that the United States has in becoming involved—the stipulation becomes that if the United States has no national interest in the resolution of the crisis—we should not become involved. But what about the people who do believe we should get involved in crises around the world—particularly those of a humanitarian or moral stripe? This alternative theory is known as liberalism.
Career Guidance
Ambassadors and their support staff are the face of a state to the rest of the world. In the United States, many of these personnel are drawn from the ranks of the Foreign Service. Foreign Service officers serve throughout the world and in different functional areas, including politics, economics, and public affairs. While there is no specific educational requirement to become a Foreign Service officer, to join, you must pass the Foreign Service exam and an interview, a very selective process. For more information on the Foreign Service, visit its homepage at https://careers.state.gov/work/foreign-service/officer.
Liberalism
Recall from Chapter 3 that liberal political ideology stems directly from the Enlightenment and its rejection of the divine right of kings. In accepting that people have natural rights and that one of those rights is freedom and liberty, the liberal ideology was inaugurated. Liberal political theory posits that the best normative outcome would be a situation where states integrate democratic principles and the idea of natural rights. Of course, liberalism in international affairs is a slightly different animal, but they both share the same ideological ancestor.
Liberalism in international relations theory also rejects its international relations predecessor: realism. Proponents of liberalism argue that states pursue many more objectives than simply power—how else to explain states getting involved in conflicts that have nothing to do with their national interest? Liberalism also recognizes the growing role for international organizations and the possibility that those organizations can be used to not only mediate conflict but avoid it altogether. Particularly in an era where our global connections are increasing by the day, liberals argue that cooperation in international affairs is the only route to sustained good relations in the community of states.
Because of its focus on increased interactions between states, liberalism is really a theory of its time. The earliest The earliest formulation of liberal theory came from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant in his essay “Perpetual Peace” published in 1795.8 In the essay, Kant argues that peace could be achieved within a region through a certain set of steps that all states would take. First among these was establishing a republican form of government and then recognizing the sovereignty of each state within its own territory. States would then proceed to establish open relationships between one another, stand down their armies, and agree to certain laws of war when conflict does emerge. Many of these ideas would later be enshrined in agreements such as the Geneva Convention and the UN treaty, but achieving peace and cooperation around the world still proves more difficult to achieve.
Basic Assumptions
As liberalism continued to develop as a theory, it too stipulated three assumptions to the theory. First, liberalism rejects the notion that states are only out for power as well as the idea that anarchy is the ultimate state of affairs. To be sure, believing that only anarchy reigns is a fairly dispiriting belief; there must be some other outcome possible than states constantly fearing the actions of another and preparing for an eventual war that must come. Liberals explicitly reject this, believing that something other than war can be a natural outcome of relations between states.
A second principle of liberalism is that international cooperation is not only possible but it can benefit the global community. If states are constantly wary of one another’s search for power and military buildups, conflict might be the only possible result. But liberalism argues that states can cooperate for the betterment of not only themselves but the rest of the world. We need only look at modern cooperation between states on issues ranging from poverty and hunger to global warming. Cooperation may be difficult and states still may not trust one another, but cooperation is just as plausible as conflict.
Finally, liberalism prescribes the establishment of organizations that can grease the wheel of cooperation among states. These international organizations ease cooperation, but they can also independently change the international environment—thus, shaping states’ desires and preferences. The role for international organizations also parallels the role of economic and cultural exchanges between countries. Liberal theorists propose that increased connections between states and between the peoples of free states will decrease the potential for conflict between them. For example, the extent of economic relations and ties between the United States and China greatly decrease the potential that either country would want to engage in a conflict that would disrupt the flow of goods that is so vital to each country. International organizations represent just one of the many types of ties that pull countries together and therefore encourage them to avoid conflict.
Liberalism in the Twentieth Century
Liberalism as an approach to international relations came into its own in the twentieth century. The first significant attempt at implementing liberal principles came at the end of World War I. Among Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points was a proposal to establish an institution called the League of Nations. The league was designed as a solution to the arms races and hostilities that led to the initiation of war in the first place. Although many countries signed on to it in the wake of World War I, the US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles because it would obligate the United States to joining the league. At that point in American history, many in the United States were wary of continued involvement in world affairs, believing that the conflicts of other countries would only draw the United States into a continuous war.
Needless to say, the League of Nations failed in its ultimate goal of eliminating conflict. However, the failure of the league did not prevent states from trying again after World War II. This time, the United States did agree to join the new organization called the United Nations. In addition to the establishment of the United Nations, the United States and its European allies entered into an alliance: NATO. The NATO treaty specifically obligates its member states to the idea of collective security. Collective security is a means of discouraging conflict; it compels states to the defense of other states in the case that they are attacked. The so-called Article 5 means that if one state is attacked, the others must respond as if they were attacked as well. The idea behind collective security is that it will dissuade a state from attacking another state for fear of reprisals from others.
Types of Liberalism
A strain of liberal thinking that specifically focuses on the role of international institutions is called liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalists share some of the core beliefs of realists, primarily that the natural state of global affairs is anarchic. However, they depart in thinking from there. Liberal institutionalism argues that international organizations can be arranged in such a way as to provide order and structure in the world. These institutions can serve as a global police force that ensures states do not begin the often-deadly spiral of the security dilemma. Treaties and agreements between states can also fill the role of liberal institutions. In the process of states agreeing to certain practices or rules in areas like nuclear weapons and environmental degradation, they stipulate principles that the states must adhere to and procedures for policing the adherence to the treaties.
Another variant of liberalism is an idea called the democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory posits that democratic states are much better able to avoid conflict than nondemocratic states. What is it about democracies that seem to prevent conflict? The cornerstone of modern democratic states today is that ultimately people have an opportunity to ratify the decisions of their representatives and leaders. Since leaders have to listen to the voices and opinions of their voters, liberals argue, they will be less likely to engage in a war or conflict that their countries don’t support. A good example of this was the war in Vietnam and, more recently, the US war in Iraq. When public opinion turned negative on both of these conflicts, American leaders were forced to rethink their approach and end hostile engagements.
So what do democratic peace theorists believe will lessen the incidence of conflict? If democracies are less likely to go to war, then they would prescribe more democratic governments around the world. Obviously, the extent to which states around the world can enforce this idea is doubtful. While the United States and other democratized countries can support the idea of spreading democracy, actually implementing that is very difficult. Many thought that the advent of the Arab Spring heralded a new wave of democratization, but nine years after the first protests, little in the way of actual democratic government has emerged in the Middle East. While the reasons for this are many and out of the scope of this book, it demonstrates the difficulty of prescribing democracy in regions where it is not the normal order of the day.
There is also an economic corollary to the democratic peace theory that is colloquially known as the McDonald’s thesis. The theory is that no two states with a McDonald’s have ever gone to war with one another. As Friedman puts it, “The question raised by the McDonald’s example is whether there is a tip-over point at which a country, by integrating with the global economy, opening itself up to foreign investment and empowering its consumers, permanently restricts its capacity for troublemaking and promotes gradual democratization and widening peace.”9 In other words, the more economic ties that exist between countries, the less of a chance that either of those states would want to disrupt those flows through conflict. Adding all of these ideas together leads to the theory that the more relationships that exist between the people and their governments and then between states around the world leads to decreased conflict. These relationships can be diplomatic and formal, economic, cultural, or through international organizations, but the bottom line is that when added together, they reduce conflict or the chance of conflict.
While it would seem that the establishment of liberalism would preclude further exploration of the meaning of it, current political science research into liberalism has delved back into the realm of deep theory. While some examine liberalism in modern political theory such as that of John Rawls (discussed in Chapter 3), others go back to the period of Enlightenment for insight on international relations. For example, Walker goes back to Kant and his ideas of perpetual peace and compares them to the writings of a contemporary, Thomas Paine of “Common Sense” fame.10 Walker argues that Paine and Kant, while describing early iterations of liberalism, recommend different types of intervention thereby demonstrating Walker’s overall argument that differences in liberal thought appeared early on. Ward also brings another Enlightenment thinker to bear on liberalism: this time, John Locke.11 Rengger also notes this trend of tying international relations theory to political theory, naming it international political theory.12
Another stream of research into liberalism connects us with the next topic to be discussed: constructivism. As we will see shortly, constructivism argues that ideas and words hold power, and we can imbue those words and ideas with certain perspectives that bias them one way or another. This line of research, therefore, looks at the power of ideas in liberalism from uncertainty to balance of power; these scholars attempt to show the power of language and perspective in the policy prescriptions liberals advocate.13
Constructivism
Have you ever stared at a word for so long that all of a sudden it doesn’t look like a word anymore? Or have you wondered why a certain word has the meaning that it does? For example, in feminist circles, there has been a controversy over the word bitch and whether women should try to reclaim the word for themselves instead of allowing it to be a derogatory term. These examples highlight the fact that for most ideas and concepts, society determines their meaning and whether the meanings are correct or not. This is the heart of constructivist theory; they reject both the ideas of liberals and realists and instead argue that all of international relations is socially and culturally constructed. What this means for international relations is that anarchy, power, or other consequences stemming from following either of these theories is not necessary nor inevitable; instead, we imbue these words with certain ideas that can be changed and often do change.
Wendt is one of the first political scientists to try to conceptualize constructivism. In his 1992 article, he attempts to explore what anarchy means, arguing that “anarchy is what states make of it.”14 In this basic principle, it’s obvious just how radical a departure constructivism is from realism or liberalism. Both assumed that anarchy meant one thing: no structure or overriding control of the international system. If words or concepts have no exact meaning except the meaning we give them, situations are liable to change. If situations can change, then maybe anarchy is not the natural end state; perhaps states can create a situation of their own liking simply by changing their thinking about the international system.
Constructivist Concepts
Although constructivism is not constructed in the way that liberalism and realism were with assumptions and conclusions that then follow, Wendt provides some idea as to the concepts that constructivists are concerned about. The first of these is identity. “Actors acquire identities—relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self—by participating in such collective meanings.”15 Collective meanings are the definitions we give other actors and concepts; they “constitute the structures which organize our actions.”16 Thus, in a given situation, actors take on identities based on their own understanding of who they are and who others believe them to be. Wendt’s example is that the way we perceive enemies and allies is affected by the identities we ascribe to them. What’s key in the idea of identity is that identity can shift and change. Just because one state has taken on a particular identity does not mean that it becomes permanent and incapable of change. On the contrary, constructivists stress the idea that changing identities can lead to change in the international system.
Constructivists also emphasize in a way that would be familiar to liberals, that identity can even be shared across states. A good example of this is the European Union. Even though European states fought against each other for centuries, in recent decades, they have been able to engage in the project called the European Union, establishing broader diplomatic and economic ties, hoping to foster a European identity. This shared identity is also indicative of the way in which constructivists argue that identity can change and for the better; if peoples across multiple states identify with one another, relations between states could become more peaceful.
Identity becomes very important in defining another key concept of constructivism: that of interests. Whereas realists assume that a state’s interest is stable, the pursuit of power and security, constructivists believe that the interests of a state are not at all stable and are instead capable of changing and being changed. Wendt argues that “identities are the basis of interests,” states “define their interests in the process of defining situations.”17 A good example of how this may work is how the United States and the former Soviet Union changed their interest with the end of the Cold War. Because Russia no longer had the identity of a Cold War, ideological enemy, the United States became uncertain of its interests with respect to them. The ability for interests to change once again highlights constructivism’s focus on the idea that concepts are socially constructed. Interests are backed by ideas about what is best for a country, and those ideas can and do change based on circumstances around the world.
While this focus on ever-changing ideas, interests, and identities demonstrates the fact that words mean only what we believe them to mean, Wendt’s constructivism does allow for some entities that are stable in the international arena. Institutions are “relatively stable” sets of identities and interests.18 These institutions are formed through norms and rules that are codified and known to all. Examples can include something as real as the United Nations or something as amorphous as the idea of self-help.19 Institutions can still change as they are subject to what actors know or believe, but they do provide some stability in constructivist theory.
A final concept integral to constructivism is the idea of norms or beliefs about what are acceptable behaviors, institutions, or ideas in the rest of the world. An example of just such a norm would be a prohibition against torturing or killing prisoners of war. Norms set the rules for how states can or should behave in regard to one another.
The key insight of constructivism is that not every action or belief in the international system is set in stone. Just because states want one thing today does not mean that it won’t change tomorrow. Just because relations between states are one way today doesn’t mean that they can’t get better or worse. Constructivism highlights the power of ideas and beliefs and the ability we have to change them for ourselves. Much like the saying “Behave your way to success,” constructivism says we can create the world we want if we only change the way we think.
Constructivist Research
Political research into constructivism today continues to flesh out constructivism as a theory as well as discuss connections between it and other theories of international relations. For example, Barkin argues that although realism and constructivism seem diametrically opposed, they are in fact compatible in the study of power politics.20 Similarly, Sterling-Folker argues that realism and constructivism are not only compatible but that they “need one another to correct their own worst excesses.”21 Others have examined the connections between constructivism and liberalism as well as constructivism and the feminist approach to international relations.22 All of this research aims to flesh out the relationships between constructivism—a relatively new approach to international relations and more traditional approaches.
Since constructivism is such a new theory, other political scientists have continued to sketch out a research agenda and methodology for the field. Farrell attempts to lay out a research agenda for constructivists by laying out potential objects subject to study.23 Farrell does note the difficulty in such a task, especially for constructivists who may not completely agree on the roles or meanings of concepts. Pouliot expands on this foundation in laying out how knowledge may be developed in constructivist theory thus allowing for theories to be generated and tested.24
Feminism
Much how constructivism urges us to think about international relations from a different vantage point than traditional conceptions about power and conflict, feminist international relations theory also asks us to look from another angle. For most of the history of the world, everything from business to government to social relations have been driven by men. Women have been in a historically disadvantaged position comparatively. Feminist theory reminds us that international politics and the international system may indeed be biased toward the view of men. If women are “brought back in” to the realm of international affairs, we can better understand state to state relations.
A Gendered Experience
Feminist international relations theory goes beyond the simple notion that the world discriminates against women to try and emphasize that ideas can be “gendered,” or rather take the position of masculine ideas rather than feminine. This mirrors the constructivist idea that the ideas behind words and concepts have significance and can change. Gendered norms and concepts have the same emphasis, but feminist theorists argue that the gendered norms can have significant effects on how states get along with one another. One reason this may be important is that historically, women have been discriminated against and feminine ideals and characteristics derided. Take for instance a scenario where a world leader is caught crying; it doesn’t matter if that person is a man or a woman, crying is seen as weak and feminine. But what makes crying inherently terrible? What makes it undesirable are the social norms and ideas associated with crying as a feminine characteristic.
Feminist theory also focuses on the fact that much of the world of international affairs is dominated by men. With no offense directed toward either gender, research has shown that men and women do indeed think differently. For example, research into the presence of women in state legislatures shows that legislatures that have more women in them tend to be more cooperative and pass more legislation. What if more world leaders were women? Would the way the world works change? Cohn writes about this very phenomenon in her study of the male-dominated world of defense intellectuals.25 After spending a year immersing herself in the environment of defense studies, Cohn describes that she found her own thinking changing about nuclear strategy. From this experience, she argues that we should pay better attention to the words we use to study and describe different phenomenon because different language allows us to communicate in different ways with different people.
Following up on Cohn’s piece, Enloe, one of the primary contributors to feminist international relations theory, argues that our attention to feminist issues must go beyond just the language that is used in international affairs; instead, we need to remember the role that women and girls play in the international system.26 Women not only make up half of the world’s population but they are intimately involved in the rearing and educating of children—both boy and girl. They pass on social identities and norms; they function as the heart of the family. In many countries, they are the breadwinners and supporters of their families. They are often also responsible for the care of older family members. In a way that directly ties into the international system, girls are often sold into slavery, taken across borders as slaves—sexual or otherwise—forced to carry drugs and carry out vicious attacks, and often exploited by men for their own purposes. The issues these girls and young women face are significantly tied to the international system, and without worry or concern for the most vulnerable of participants, feminists argue that we will never really get anywhere in issues of war and peace.
Know a Political Scientist Cynthia Enloe
Cynthia Enloe is a prolific feminist theorist who has taught around the world. Raised on Long Island, Enloe received her PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1967. Afterward, she joined the faculty at Clark University, where she spent the rest of her career. During her career, Enloe received Fulbright scholarships to study in Malaysia and Guyana and served as a guest professor in Japan, Britain, and Canada. Enloe’s research has focused not just on feminism but the role that gendered variables play in international and national politics. To that end, she has published fourteen books and countless articles. She received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award in 2007 and the Peace and Justice Studies Association’s Howard Zinn Lifetime Achievement Award in 2010.
Modern conflicts today also involve issues of women. Issues in the Middle East and in Islamic societies naturally bring up discussions of the role of women in society. This can be a sensitive topic. While we in the West would look at prohibitions on women driving, voting, and being full participants in society as vindictive and cruel, in many of those societies, they are culturally and socially accepted norms. This does not mean that practices such as genital mutilation, the marrying off of young girls, or harsh punishments for women who escape from marriage are any more acceptable in those societies than they would be here. But it does make relations with those countries far more difficult and nuanced. In fact, Youngs argues that understanding the role of women and gender is paramount if we are truly to understand the relationships of states.27
Recommendations for Change
While it would seem as if feminism lacks the concepts and assumptions of the theories that we have previously discussed, they do adopt a particular point of view about how we should change the way we view international relations. For example, feminist theorists have developed feminist perspectives on all types of traditional concepts examined by international relations theorists. For example, Sjoberg advances a feminist view of war in Gendering Global Conflict.28 By taking traditional concepts like international organizations, anarchy, and realism, Sjoberg shows not only how these concepts are gendered but proposes how feminist theory might be constructed around them. Zalewski takes this same approach to describing a feminist approach on issues like human rights and the military.29
Like constructivism, a strain of feminist theory has also endeavored to not only expand feminist theory but establish a methodological foundation to studying feminist issues. Responding to the critique that feminist theory has little in the way of testable theories like realism and liberalism do, Tickner attempts to identify the possible research questions that feminists can pursue using traditional social science methods.30 This in and of itself can be tricky; if traditional social science itself is dominated by men and potentially gendered in its own beliefs and views, why should feminists use such a standard by which to measure their academic work? Tickner notes that feminists have actually been loath to develop a methodological standard by which they can perform their research. Instead, they focus on methodological pluralism, descriptions of knowledge, discussions and critiques, and understanding how women view their lives and the world around them.31 Partially as a response to Tickner, Caprioli argues that feminist scholarship would do well to engage multiple methodologies and goes on to show how work on gender, social justice, and quantitative methods can all be combined to create a fruitful research project.32
To this end, Ackerly and True take on the daunting task of developing a standard by which feminist research may be judged—something they call the feminist research ethic.33 They argue that there are “four commitments that undergird a feminist research ethic: attentiveness to the power of epistemology, boundaries, relationships, and the situatedness of the researcher.”34 The last standard, the situatedness of the researcher, highlights a potentially dangerous flaw in how scholars engage feminist theory; if we are studying the projection of power in the world and at the same time are engaged in continuing to propagate and contribute to that structure, how can we objectively identify solutions and assumptions? Thus, Ackerly and True call for the researcher engaging in feminist scholarship to pay very close attention to their own subjectivities and bias.
War and Peace
At the end of the day, theories like realism, liberalism, constructivism, and feminism are merely theories. Real actions throughout the world actually affect the life and death of millions of global citizens. It’s only natural, then, that causes of war and peace would be a topic that scholars of international relations tend to study. War is particularly amenable to study because it is a phenomenon that happens, unfortunately, all too often. It is also chronicled in histories of past periods, thereby giving scholars a bevy of information to work with in divining the causes of conflict throughout the centuries.
Defining War
And yet, even though political scientists have lots of information with which to avail themselves, settling on the cause or causes of war has eluded us. Why? Well, first of all, deciding on what specifically is a war has been difficult. While this might seem silly, defining our concepts is an important part of doing political science. Is it a war when states have fought for one day, one week, or one month? In other words, is there a timetable or length associated with it? Or is it a war when so many people have died? If that’s the case, then how many people must die before a conflict is declared to be a war? Do wars differ in size and scope, and if so, how? Two political scientists took up just these questions in inaugurating what would become the Correlates of War project. Small and Singer sought to conceptualize and define what political scientists mean in invoking the terms war or state. Small and Singer defined states as entities with populations of more than half a million with diplomatic recognition from other states or international organizations such as the League of Nations or the United Nations.35 With respect to the definition of wars, Small and Singer delimited wars as being conflicts with deaths of over 1,000.36 They also identify different types of wars from interstate wars to imperial or colonial conflict.
Defining our concepts is only one barrier to understanding the patterns of war. Even though historians and political scientists have more access than ever before to information about the thoughts and actions of leaders and states, it is still difficult to dive down into the brains of the participants and to uncover exactly what was being thought about at the moment in which war is initiated. Indeed, when leaders do make statements or speeches about going to war, how can we be sure they are telling the truth about why and not playing to politics and giving the politically acceptable answer? An excellent example of this was the US intervention in Iraq, beginning in 2003. Although the George W. Bush administration claimed they were sending troops to Iraq because the Iraqis had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and supported terrorism, some critics argued that the Bush administration was really going to war to secure oil supplies in the Middle East. While this says nothing about ultimate causes or whether the motivation was correct or not, it does go a long way to demonstrating how and why it can be difficult to truly understand what states and their leaders are thinking in a time of war.
Causes of War
In looking at causes of war, there are a few directions at which we can come at the subject. The first approach is through the theories that we have just elaborated on. Realists argue that war is the result of power politics and states seeking out the assurances of their own security. The search for security can lead to the security dilemma and staggering arms races that ultimately lead to conflict. For realists, it is only rational that states do what it takes to stake their place in the global system and to protect their people, even if that means the result is war. Liberals, on the other hand, argue that “dissension and strife do not inhere in man and society; they arise instead from mistaken belief, inadequate knowledge, and defective governance. With the evils defined, the remedies become clear: educate men and their governors, strip away political abuses.”37 In other words, men (and women) are naturally at peace with one another; when states do enter into conflict, it is usually because of miscommunication or mistakes of one kind or another. The liberal solution, then, is to institute better forms of government and new forms of international organizations to minimize the chances of states coming to blows with one another.
These two perspectives on the causes of war are called structural theories; they represent explanations of war and conflict at the global, large-scale level. There are other ways that we can look at war, however. Realism and liberalism indict (or vindicate in the case of liberalism) the global system that all states live in. But what about causes at the lower levels? The next step down from the global level would be the state level. What is it about states, or types of states, that cause conflict? The democratic peace theory is an example of a theory that explains conflict, or the lack thereof, in states as a result of states being democratic. Are there other types of states that are more likely to engage in conflict? The research on this is wide and varied and not at all possible to fully in engage in here. However, we can think of some examples that may help to give us clues as to the types of states that may go to war more often.
In thinking back only on the twentieth century, the two most significant conflicts were World War I and World War II. World War I was triggered when Franz Ferdinand, nephew of the Austrian emperor, was shot but the major contributing cause was the arms race in Europe in the preceding years. For World War II, Germany was engaged in an imperialist project of overtaking or retaking portions of Europe that they deemed to be German territories. In both of these cases, the actions of aggressive states led to ultimate conflict. For the United States, in particular, this was not the end of war in the period. During the rest of the twentieth century, the United States engaged not only in the Korean and Vietnam Wars but countless smaller-scale conflicts and the moderately sized endeavor of pushing the Iraqi army back into Iraq from Kuwait. For Vietnam and Korea, the United States became involved because of an ideological conflict with communism—therefore suggesting that states with different types of regimes may be more likely to engage in war with one another. In the case of the first Gulf War, the United States and other countries were responding to the actions of an aggressor country: Iraq. These examples point the way toward the main explanations that political scientists have developed to explain war at the state level: imperialist aggression and conflict between states with dissimilar regimes.
The next level of analysis just below the state is that of the politics of the state. Some political scientists argue that instead of looking at states as black boxes as many realists and some liberals do, we need to peer inside the box and see what types of politics are occurring in the country. There are any number of political dramas on the big screen and television screen that demonstrate these ideas, and that is perhaps one of the best ways to describe them. First, in a little bit of art imitating life, the 1997 film Wag the Dog depicts an American president (fictional, of course) enduring a sex scandal. In order to take attention off the scandal, the president hires a movie producer to “produce” a war that will redirect the public’s attention. Although the movie is fictional, the scenario is very real. Following the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, the government of Russia began to come in for criticism aimed at the amount of money it had spent to prepare the Olympics site (approximately $50 billion). Partially as a means of disrupting such criticism, Russia invaded the country of Ukraine under the pretext of protecting pro-Russian separatists in the eastern part of the country.
Finally, we come to the lowest level of analysis, the individual level. At this level, political scientists seek to explore and understand individual behavior and how that may push countries to war. In some situations, wars could be attributed to the actions of one leader who may be off balance mentally. While we may colloquially ascribe the term crazy to any number of individual leaders, Hitler and Napoleon are two potential candidates for such a label who have pushed their countries to the brink. Other political scientists will argue that a leader need not be “crazy” or “insane” to take a country to war. Charismatic, well-loved leaders could influence their countries on the path to war simply because they are well liked or well spoken. In generalizing the argument, then, we could say that states that go to war may likely be influenced by significant and important leaders who have the ability to sway the opinion of the public to support engagement.
Other analysts stop short of the crazy label and argue, like Hobbes, that human aggression is natural as is the will to go to war. We can see that plain as day on our television screens most Sundays in the fall and winter as football players go helmet to helmet on the field. The desire for combat—whether it be in soldiers or athletes—could be part of the reason that states enter into conflict; the need to satisfy the desire for hard-won battles may also be part of why states go to war.
Other human characteristics can just as easily lead us down the path to war. The likelihood of individuals miscommunicating or misunderstanding each other can initiate a war. Part of international relations between leaders is being able to understand and correctly interpret the behaviors and actions of others. A good example of this was the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Although the Bush administration claimed that Saddam had WMDs, following the American invasion, it was discovered that this claim was false. Some analysts have argued that Saddam had an interest in maintaining the idea that he possessed WMDs in order to make Iran believe that it retained the ability to fight a destructive war with them. (Iraq and Iran had previously engaged in a war in the 1980s that was fought to a stalemate.) This is just one example of how leaders may misrepresent their own actions in order to make others believe something they wouldn’t otherwise. However, we can just as easily see how this can lead to war, particularly in the case of the second war in Iraq.
Chapter Summary
· Realist international relations theory proposes that states are the main actors in international relations, that they act rationally, and that their main motivation is protecting their own power. The changing geopolitical system, however, places greater pressure on realists to respond to actors other than states.
· Liberal international relations theory does not believe that anarchy is the natural state of the world; rather, it believes cooperation among states is possible. Cooperation can be encouraged through international organizations, increased economic ties, and the spreading of democracy.
· Constructivists believe that the world as we know it can be changed by changing how we see it. In that sense, “anarchy is what we make of it.” Concepts such as identify, global norms, and interests can contribute to more peaceful outcomes.
· Feminist international relations theorists argue that historically, international relations has been gendered toward men—that is, men have dominated decision making, often leaving women and their interests out of the equation altogether. They suggest that by including more women in international decision making, the issues and concerns of women will be better integrated in the global system.
· The causes of war are numerous and complicated. Scholars can use three levels of analysis to identify causes of war: systemic level, state level, and individual level.
Key Terms
· balance of power: How evenly distributed power is across a region or the world
· collective security: Compels states to defend other states if they are attacked
· constructivist: Argues that all of international relations is socially and culturally constructed
· democratic peace theory: Theory that democratic states are much better able to avoid conflict than nondemocratic states
· feminist theory: Argues that the international system may be biased toward the view of men, systematically disenfranchising and ignoring the role and views of women
· liberal institutionalism: Posits that international organizations can be arranged in such a way as to provide order and structure in the world
· liberalism: An international relations theory that proposes that states pursue things other than power and can cooperate with one another; anarchy is not a natural outcome of the global order
· neorealism: A variant of realism where states must also react to the anarchic state of the world in addition to the actions of states themselves
· rationality: Acting in accordance with one’s ordered preferences
· realism: An international relations theory that posits states are the main actors in world affairs, that they act rationally, and that the world is naturally anarchic
· security dilemma: Can occur when states interpret another state’s arms and military buildup to be a threatening act
· unipolar world: Situation wherein one country has amassed more power than any other
Notes
1. Michael Birnbaum, “Donald Trump’s Tweets on NATO, Russian Meddling, and North Korea Should Be Ignored, Say Top US Security Officials,” Independent, Feb. 19, 2018, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-ignore-tweets-nato-europe-russia-collusion-north-korea-munich-conference-hr-mcmaster-a8217201.html.
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, “Another ‘Great Debate’: The National Interest of the United States,” American Political Science Review 46, no. 4 (1952): 961–988.
3. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).
4. Morgenthau, “Another ‘Great Debate.’”
5. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 39.
6. Thomas C. Walker and Jeffrey S. Morton, “Re-assessing the ‘Power of Power Politics’ Thesis: Is Realism Still Dominant?” International Studies Review 7, no. 2 (2005): 341–356.
7. Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000): 213–237; Fred Chernoff, “Scientific Realism as a Meta-Theory of International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 2 (2002): 189–207; Matt Sleat, “Liberal Realism: A Liberal Response to the Realist Critique,” The Review of Politics 73, no. 3 (2011): 469–496.
8. Immanuel Kant (trans. Mary Campbell Smith), “Perpetual Peace,” Project Gutenberg, Jan. 14, 2016, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50922/50922-h/50922-h.htm.
9. Thomas K. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs Big Mac I,” New York Times, Dec. 8, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/08/opinion/foreign-affairs-big-mac-i.html
10. Thomas C. Walker, “Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of Intervention,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 449–468.
11. Lee Ward, “Locke on the Moral Basis of International Relations,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006): 691–705.
12. Nicholas Rengger, “Political Theory and International Relations: Promised Land or Exit from Eden,” International Affairs 76, no. 4 (2000): 755–770.
13. Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2007): 533–557; Deborah Boucoyannis, “The International Wanderings of a Liberal Idea, or Why Liberals Can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Balance of Power,” Perspectives on Politics 5 no. 4 (2007): 703–727.
14. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 395.
15. Ibid., 397.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 398.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (2003): 325–342.
21. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading,” International Studies Review 46, no. 1 (2002): 73–97.
22. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2000): 97–119; Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prugl, “Feminism and Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle Ground?” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1 (2001): 111–129.
23. Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” International Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2002): 49–72.
24. Vincent Pouliot, “‘Sobjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2007): 359–381.
25. Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” Signs 12, no. 4 (1987): 687–718.
26. Cynthia Enloe, “‘Gender’ Is Not Enough: The Need for a Feminist Consciousness,” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004): 95–97.
27. Gillian Youngs, “Feminist International Relations: A Contradiction in Terms? Or: Why Women and Gender Are Essential to Understanding the World ‘We’ Live In,” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004): 75–87.
28. Laura Sjoberg, Gendering Global conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
29. Marysia Zalewski, “Well, What Is the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?” International Affairs 71, no. 2 (1995): 339–356.
30. J. Ann Tickner, “What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (2005): 1–21.
