Week 4 Discussion: Differences and Similarities between Presidential and Parliamentary Systems
Chapter 8 Comparative Politics
Chapter Objectives
1. Outline the comparative method.
2. Explore the meaning of the state and its key characteristics.
3. Define democracy, and identify ways in which it is measured.
4. Discuss patterns in postcommunist transitions and state development.
5. Define nationalism, and identify how it can often lead to conflict.
Today’s China is an interesting amalgam of communist ideology and capitalist practice. In 1949, Mao Zedong established the People’s Republic of China with himself as the ruler. Mao’s influence on China can hardly be overstated; under his dictatorial leadership, China underwent significant social, cultural, and economic change. Mao’s “Little Red Book” of communist thought and ideology was, and still is, required reading throughout China. His modernization programs quickly industrialized the country, but the Cultural Revolution decimated professional classes and easily set China back. Following his death, the Communist Party of China instituted a term limit for presidents at two five-year terms in order to limit the type of power Mao had acquired. While Chinese presidents remain quite powerful, perhaps even authoritarian, politicians since Mao have abided by these rules.
However, in March 2018, China’s National People’s Congress agreed to abolish term limits on China’s president, which had been in place since Mao Zedong in order to allow its current president, Xi Jinping, to hold power for many years to come. In addition to his position as president, Xi also holds the positions of general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission. While many in the West had hoped that economic reforms in China, allowing for some capitalist practices, would eventually lead the country to a democratic future, Xi’s consolidation of power for the foreseeable time means that nothing like democratic principles appear to be at work. The challenge, then, for political scientists, is to understand the complex politics of a country as large and as complicated as China. With its long historical traditions and blending of communism and capitalism, it is a country that the West often misunderstands.
Comparative politics is the study of countries and politics around the world; comparativists examine the same thing political scientists do in American politics but do it in an international manner. They study institutions, political parties, public opinion, and voting all around the world. Some will compare patterns in one country to patterns in another or study the politics of an entire region. The name comparative politics also applies to another aspect of study: the methodology used. In comparing and contrasting countries, comparativists seek to understand why politics is different or the same around the world.
There are many ways of looking at politics around the world. We can look at different political institutions, the executives, legislatures, and court systems around the world. We can examine countries that are liberal democracies and those that are authoritarian. We can look at democracies versus monarchies versus oligarchies. We can look at health policy around the world or education policy or foreign policy. We can even look at the development of countries, from industrialized countries to developing countries, to the least developed.
So how to break up this chapter? If you were taking an introductory course to comparative politics, your professor may choose one of two main ways to organize the class: around regions and countries or around topic. In the country approach, you may study three or four countries in each of the following categories: industrialized democracies (think Europe here); communist and postcommunist countries such as Russia and China; and developing states such as those in Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East. Because patterns of politics are generally similar in countries in the same region or stage of development, by learning about the politics of some of these states, you can better understand the larger region. In the second approach, you may learn about major concepts such as the state, democracy, regime change, policy, and economics. This way, you learn not only about major concepts in comparative politics but can learn how to apply them across different countries. Either of these approaches is a valid and constructive way of learning about comparative politics.
For our purposes here, we’ll be using the second approach to exploring comparative politics. We certainly will not be able to address every major topic of study in comparative politics, nor will the ones addressed be considered by everyone to be the most important. However, major topics like states, including their structure, development, economy, and democracy, are some of the most important concepts you’ll come across in comparative politics. But first, we’ll need to address the methodological component of comparative politics, the comparative method.
The Comparative Method
In 1971, Lijphart wrote, “Among the several fields or subdisciplines into which the discipline of political science is usually divided, comparative politics is the only one that carries a methodological instead of a substantive label. The term, ‘comparative politics’ indicates the how but does not specify the what of the analysis.”1 Lijphart identifies the comparative method as one of the basic scientific methods that allows scientists to test out propositions and hypotheses; it is “a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables.”2
Know a Political Scientist Arend Lijphart
Arend Lijphart has been a significant influence on comparative politics since the mid-twentieth century. Born in 1936 in the Netherlands, he received his PhD from Yale in 1963. His article on comparative politics and the comparative method has been a required read for generations of political science students and has been a proponent of the idea of consociationalism, or the sharing of power in government. He later published Patterns of Democracy (1999), which is a detailed assessment of different types of government, primarily arguing for consensus democracy. Lijphart served as president of the American Political Science Association (APSA) from 1995 to 1996 and is currently research professor emeritus at the University of California, San Diego, where he spent his academic career.
Recall from Chapter 2 our discussion of research methods. When scientists, political scientists included, form hypotheses, they usually want to test them out. Most scientists can perform experiments where they control all possible variables that could affect their experiment. Let’s say we are testing the temperature at which water boils. While we’re mainly concerned about what temperature causes water to boil, there are other variables that can affect when the water does boil—air pressure and purity of the water included. In a laboratory setting, scientists can control all outside factors so as to isolate the one variable, temperature, that they are interested in. Political scientists aren’t nearly as lucky. If we had a hypothesis about what causes a state to be democratic, we cannot manipulate countries and control all of the possible other variables that may influence whether a state is a democracy or not. The comparative method is one way—other than the experimental method—that political scientists can go about testing their hypotheses.
If a political scientist does wish to test a theory about the causes of democracy, they can pick a handful of countries—some that are democratic and some that are not. However, those countries should be as similar as possible in all other respects; their populations should be approximately the same, their education levels, their economic development. In this way, the political scientist can isolate the variables that are causing the democratic outcome.
Mill’s Method of Difference and Method of Agreement
John Stuart Mill was a nineteenth-century British philosopher who wrote on topics ranging from the economy and society to logic and philosophy. In a set of writings, Mill put forward five methods of induction; inductive reasoning is the process of reasoning from a specific case to more general methods of causation. Many comparativists base their methodology on Mill’s method of difference, which he describes in A System of Logic:
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomena.
Mill built on this and also posited the joint method of agreement and difference:
If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of the circumstance; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
One easy way to illustrate this is through a matrix (see the table). On the left-hand side, there are three countries listed: the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. On the top of the matrix are a series of variables that could contribute to whether a state provides health care to its citizens or not. There are two variables of interest—government and type of political culture—that differ between the cases. However, if France and the United Kingdom differ on political culture and have the same outcome, we may be able to rule political culture out as a cause. Therefore, based on this matrix, it would appear that type of government may be linked to whether health care is government provided or not. Now, we know that there are many other variables that determine something like government provided health care, but this example illustrates how Mill’s methods of difference and agreement can be used in the comparative method.
|
|
Government |
Type of Political Culture |
Economy |
Government Health Care? |
|
United States |
Presidential republic |
Participant |
Developed |
No |
|
France |
Parliamentary |
Participant |
Developed |
Yes |
|
United Kingdom |
Constitutional monarchy |
Subject |
Developed |
Yes |
One immediate thing about this process to be noted is that there are many outside variables that could affect the main relationship; Lijphart calls this the problem of many variables, small number of cases. Given the large number of characteristics that could affect any hypothesis, it will not always be possible to find enough cases, enough countries, or enough governments to properly test the hypothesis, and even then, you may not be able to get enough cases with similar enough characteristics. And further, just because a relationship may be apparent in a test of five countries, who is to say that that relationship will hold for other regions, countries, or periods of time?
One other major problem can also be confronted when using the comparative method. Because scientists are picking the cases to study and test their hypotheses with, we sometimes see something called selection bias, or selecting on the dependent variable. This means that scientists pick the cases to study so as to ensure that their theory is not disproved. In a more technical way, Collier and Mahoney define selection bias as selecting extreme cases that could lead to biased “estimates of causal effects.”3 To be sure, scientists may not be doing this on purpose, they may not even realize that they are biasing their own results. This just means that comparativists must pay very close attention to how they choose the cases they study to ensure that selection bias does not happen.
That being said, the comparative method, when used properly, can offer political scientists the ability to understand patterns of politics around the world—particularly for countries that are similar in region, similar in history, or similar in government. This allows every state and every government in the world to come up for examination, including America. Therefore, when one studies political science in Europe, they do not recognize a difference between comparative and American politics; for everyone else, they comprise the same thing. The comparative method can be used in any study of politics, even in America.
The State
Here in America, when we say state, we’re usually referring to one of the fifty United States. While this is a legitimate use, the term state also refers to governments and countries around the world. In fact, when we refer to places like the United Kingdom, South Africa, China, or Chile, the proper term to use is state. Theorists going as far back as the Enlightenment and Thomas Hobbes have struggled with the meaning of the state—what it is, what defines it, what differentiates it from society or government. Social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke theorized that the state arises from the social contract entered into by citizens. Steinberger argues that under Hobbes’s social contract, not only is a sovereign created in which all powers are bestowed but a commonwealth that allows the sovereign to exist and act.4
Idea of the State
Early political scientists also homed in on the idea of a state, attempting to define what exactly constituted a “good” state. Weber, the same prolific German sociologist so influential in early conceptions of bureaucracy and public administration, defined the state as an entity that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Force does not include only physical, military, or police, but legal coercion. For example, the state can coerce us to pay taxes or drive the speed limit by threatening us with punishment if we don’t abide by the laws. No one else can legitimately use these types of threats under this definition of the state. This definition has stuck with political scientists as the study of the state began to decline moving into the twentieth century. In 1968, Nettl acknowledged this, writing, “The concept of the state is not much in vogue in the social sciences right now” and argued that “the erosion of the concept of state coincides in time with, and is clearly a functional part of, the shift of the center of gravity of social science to the United States.”5 Instead, political scientists focused on institutions and government, not the meaning of the term state.6
Krasner attributes the uptick in study of the state to a new generation of Marxist scholars who sought to establish a theory of the capitalist state that focused on the differences between the classes.7 Out of this and other studies of the state, Krasner presents four different ways that the state has been conceptualized: the state as government, the state as the bureaucracy or administrative apparatus, the state as the ruling class, and the state as the normative order. Out of these conceptualizations, we can see just how the “state” differs from other concepts we talk about in political science. Is the state the idea, the social contract that upholds the legitimacy of government? Is it the tools and structures of government itself? Or is it something much more amorphous, representing commonly held ideas and notions about what government should be?
In research taking on these proliferating definitions of the state, Mitchell argues that many of the distinctions drawn between the state and other parts of government are not necessarily part of the nature of the state.8 Mitchell argues that instead of trying to pin down the meaning of a state, we need to do the following:
We need to examine the detailed political processes through which the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is produced. The distinction must be taken not as the boundary between two discrete entities [state and society] but as a line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a social and political order is maintained.9
In other words, the fact that we can’t specifically tell the difference between state and society means something in and of itself and that the process by which countries draw that line for themselves can inform political scientists as to the nature of the state.
State Formation
Aside from identifying what the state is or is not, political scientists also try to understand what causes states to form and why. The origins of the modern state system date back to the times of Hobbes himself with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The treaty ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe and established principles of territorial sovereignty with competing states held in check by a balance of power. The Westphalian system led to a decline in traditional political authority like monarchies and feudalism, an increase in sovereignty over carefully defined land masses, and an increase in the complexity of governmental institutions.10
Vu takes the ideas of the state and state formation one step further, arguing that the way in which states form can tell us something about the meaning of the state itself.11 For many European states, war and the subsequent need for rulers to acquire resources to fight wars helped lead to state formation. A homogenous civil society with competing groups also seems to be a prerequisite. These characteristics can tell us a lot about when states do or not form, which is important because the largest growth in the number of states did not occur in the early period of state formation but much later. In fact, Germany as a state did not emerge until the late 1800s! Many states in Latin America and Africa did not emerge until late because they had been colonial outposts of European nations. Even then, it was not always easy for states to form; colonial powers had no interest in seeing countries develop economically and therefore compete with their mother countries. Other former colonies had, and still have, severe ethnic conflicts because colonial masters drew lines with no thought toward historical and natural conflicts. Conflicts in the Middle East and Africa demonstrate how these two problems have intertwined to either lead to late state development or the lack of development altogether.
State Strength
This last issue leads us to concerns about the strength of states. How strong or weak states are can be used to explain why state formation does or does not occur, why revolutions do or don’t happen, and how countries respond to crisis. For example, prior to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the state of Iraq under Saddam Hussein could be considered to be strong. Saddam was able to forcibly keep his country together despite the fact that three different ethnic groups all had reason to pull apart. And pull apart they did once Saddam’s regime fell; the result has been a weak Iraqi state that has been penetrated by outside forces such as the Islamic State. It isn’t easy for scholars to agree on what constitutes a strong state and what constitutes a weak state. Some have identified state strength as the ability of states to control political outcomes. Davidheiser identifies three criteria for a strong state: how deeply the state penetrates into society, the breadth of that penetration, and state autonomy.12 Correspondingly, fragile states are those that “lack the capacity to discharge their normal functions and drive forward development.”13
Fragile states can very often lead to failed states. Failed states exist where there is no entity that can exert sovereignty over their territory; this can lead to dangerous situations where no rule of law exists and chaos can reign. A prominent example of a failed state is Somalia, which has given safe harbor to modern-day pirates precisely because there is no legitimate authority or law in place to stop them. Piazza has come to this very conclusion; in studying 197 countries between 1973 and 2003, he finds that failed states are more likely to be home to transnational terrorist groups, giving safe haven to groups that are likely to strike outside of their home territory.14 On the other hand, Patrick questions this link, arguing that state failure is only imperfectly related to transnational security threats. In any case, failed states have come in for as much examination as states that do exert control over their territory.15
CASE STUDY Is ISIS a State?
What’s in a name? For the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, it is the establishment of their own country, their own sovereignty in land they believe belongs to them. For most in the West, however, the name ISIS stands for something much darker: terrorism. The movement we now know as ISIS has its roots in the late 1990s but came to play a much larger role beginning in 2013 as the Syrian Civil War raged. Taking advantage of the chaos and confusion inside Syria and the weakness of the Iraqi state, ISIS merged with several other terrorist organizations and began taking over territory in both Syria and Iran in 2014. At the same time, ISIS declared itself to be a “caliphate” with religious, political, and economic power over Muslims throughout the world—an action that most Muslims rejected. At one point, it claimed control of several large cities, including Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq. Since 2014, the United States has reengaged in Iraq and Syria to push ISIS fighters out of the territory which they claimed.
But is the name Islamic State accurate? Is ISIS a state, or was it ever a state? Let’s think about some of the characteristics of a state (discussed previously):
1. a sovereign entity, that is, an entity that holds all power in its given territory
2. legitimacy and the ability to coerce
3. governing institutions such as bureaucracies and representative bodies
How well does, or did, ISIS stack up to these characteristics? Although this is a somewhat esoteric argument, ISIS certainly is not a state in the sense that we would recognize but a terrorist group; the question highlights the changing nature of the state system in the world today. Where the Westphalian system set up a global scene populated by states, today, there are many other actors to be aware of and concerned about. Transnational terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaida make calculations about how to deal with states that shelter them difficult. In a more benign manner, nongovernmental organizations and international organizations like the United Nations or the European Union force us to reconsider ideas of cooperation and power. States under the European Union, for instance, have had to give up some of their sovereignty to the European Union itself, primarily in economic areas, thereby losing individual control over certain policies. Does that make the European Union more or less of a state or the states within it more or less of a state? What does a state look like given the complexities of world politics today?
Critical Thinking Questions
1. Does the definition of a state as political scientists have traditionally conceptualized it still apply in the modern world?
2. Is there one characteristic of a state that is more important than the others?
3. What is the definition of state, and how is its application important in a global context?
Democracy
In America, we often take the term democracy for granted. We’re taught that America represents the pinnacle of democracy without seriously thinking about what that means. For political scientists who study democracy around the world, the meaning of democracy is a very important thing, especially if we want to know what promotes democracy and what prevents it from taking hold.
Defining Democracy
Theories of democracy go back to ancient Greece, where we are told democracy means rule by the people. But what does rule by the people mean? Does it mean all people or just some people? Does it have to be all the time or just some of the time? And what if the majority of people act to take away important rights or rules? Does the fact that the majority says something is acceptable make it democratic? If we simply think about the history of American democracy, there were large periods in history where African Americans and women were not allowed to participate and had limited rights; does that mean America wasn’t a democracy? These are just some of the basic concerns of democratic theorists in trying to understand precisely what democracy is.
In the mid-twentieth century, various definitions of democracy were put forward. Lipset defined democracy as follows:
[It is] a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office.16
Lipset’s definition focuses mainly on the requirement of elections, but how often do those elections need to occur? And do they need to be fair? Dahl adds to this definition by requiring that a democracy have elections that are fair, or rather, that everyone’s vote count equally.17 Downs goes one step further by saying that democratic elections should be held periodically.18 Combining these early definitions of democracy, comparativists came to the maxim that democracies are countries that have free, fair, and frequent elections.
But what about civil liberties—things that protect citizens’ rights or the structure of government itself? Bollen argues that democracy is better defined as “the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is maximized.”19 His definition encompasses many of the structures that would allow this to happen: elections and civil liberties, protections for citizens from government. Similarly, Muller defines democratic states as follows:
(1) The executive must be elected or be responsible to an elected assembly, in (2) at least two consecutive and free and fair competitive elections in which (3) at least approximately a majority of the population has the right to vote, and during which (4) the rights of freedom of speech and assembly are respected.20
Measuring Democracy
Knowing the definition of democracy is only half the battle; how do we measure how democratic a country is? There are a number of indices, or ways, of measuring democracy that have been put together in studies of comparative politics. Some measures are simply dichotomies; either a country is democratic or is not. In their study of measures of democracy, Bollen and Paxton divide measures of democracy into two traditions: one where measurements utilize voter turnout statistics, composition of legislatures, or availability of the vote, and a second that utilizes subjective determinations by a group of experts who rate how democratic a country is.21
One example of the later approach is the Freedom House ratings, which are released every year and widely used in comparative politics. Figure 8.1 shows how the percentage of countries rated as free, partly free, and not free have changed since 1985, according to Freedom House. Another set of measurements is the Polity data set, which scores states on a scale of −10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (democracy) (see Figure 8.2). The rankings depend on specific variables: freedom of group opposition, competitiveness of the political nomination process, election of chief executive, and effectiveness of the legislature.
Figure 8.1 Freedom House Rankings through the YearsAfter years of major gains, the share of free countries has declined over the past decade, while the share of not-free countries has risen.
So what contributes to countries becoming democratic? In a comprehensive study of civic attitudes and democracy, Muller and Seligson find that the only attitude that positively contributes to democracy is a belief in gradual rather than sudden, revolutionary reform.22 Ross, in “Does Taxation Lead to Representation?” (which ironically appeared in the British Journal of Political Science), tests the idea of whether the need to raise taxes forces countries to democratize and finds support for this thesis.23 In studying Latin America, a region where patterns of democratization have been uneven, Perez-Linan and Mainwaring demonstrate the influence of history on democratization; in states with a stronger history, a stronger experience with democracy, democratization is more likely to proceed.24 All of these studies suggest that ideas in civil society and beliefs about what the government should or should not do contribute to the building of democracy. If we draw this line of inquiry out, democracy, then, can be very sensitive to place, time, and culture.
Culture is a concept that plays a role in a lot of comparative research. Some of the earliest research examining the relationship of culture to democracy was published by Almond and Verba in 1963 in a book called The Civic Culture. In examining the United States, Germany, Mexico, Italy, and the United Kingdom, Almond and Verba argue that what they call the civic culture supports a strong and vibrant democracy. Later generations of political scientists and comparativists have continued this tradition of research. Examining twenty local governments throughout Italy, Putnam identifies distinct historical legacies throughout Italy, which he argues have contributed to the strength of democracy throughout the country.25 Putnam adapted Almond and Verba’s concept of civic culture and focused on something called social capital. For Putnam, social capital represents the connections we have with one another that contribute to our resources for and abilities to contribute to a democratic life. Taken together, these two studies represent some of the major works linking culture to democracy.
Being able to measure how democratic a country is allows comparativists to study not only how democracies come about but what the effects of democracy are. Baum and Lake find that democracies lead to increased life expectancy in poor countries and increased education levels in richer countries.26 Li and Reuveny show that increased levels of democracy lead to decreased levels of environmental degradation.27 Boehmke finds an increased presence in interest group and associated activity as democracy increases.28 What else do you think democracy affects?
Globalization
A not-so-old saying says that when America sneezes, the rest of the world gets a cold. The saying refers to the connections of the global economy; if the American economy experiences a hiccup, the effects of that hiccup quickly reverberate around the world. Growing up today, it’s easy to notice the increased economic and other connections between states around the world; we call this globalization. In fact, globalization is often associated in many ways with democracy, political economy, and even culture. Without a doubt, the connection between economics, democracy, and globalization are often subtle and diverse. Does more democracy lead to globalization, or does globalization lead to democracy? How does the economy play a role in mediating these linkages?
Globalization as a process can be traced throughout history; for example, trade caravans in the Middle East, the Silk Road to China, and European colonialization beginning in the 1500s all represent globalization. While the first real coordinated efforts at setting the foundations for an international economy began at the Bretton Woods Conference after World War II, political science research into globalization did not begin in earnest until the 1980s. Kapstein describes the natural conflict inherent in the process of globalization: “how to benefit from increased economic intercourse while pursuing legitimate national objectives, such as bank safety and soundness.”29 Countries want to take advantage of increased opportunities for trade and commerce, but if one country sneezes, others need to avoid a cold.
Economic globalization means that individual state economies are increasingly knit together, something exemplified in international trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (recently renegotiated and pending ratification) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). American critics of these sorts of trade agreements argue that by eliminating or reducing barriers to trade, companies will outsource their manufacturing to other countries where wages and costs are lower, thereby reducing employment opportunities and wages for American workers. However, Scruggs and Lange find that as far as union membership is concerned, increased economic globalization produces no effect.30 While this may be the case for developed countries, Ha shows that among developing countries, globalization is associated with increased income inequality.31
Globalization does not just occur with economics but with politics; political globalization is the increasing connectedness of political institutions, particularly international organizations like the United Nations, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other nongovernmental organizations. Think about the European Union in particular; the European Union is a confederation in which member states have given up some of their state sovereignty to the central political framework, especially in economics. This brings countries as different as France, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Germany together in a political and economic relationship where the actions of one affect the actions of all others.
Bretton Woods Conference
The Bretton Woods Conference was held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1 through 22 in 1944. The participants comprised representatives from all of the Allied states then fighting in World War II. Their purpose for meeting was to set up the foundations of the international monetary and financial system after the war ended. The primary motivation for such concerns was the realization that once the war ended, there would be a need to fund major reconstruction efforts across Japan and much of Europe. Among the institutions agreed to at Bretton Woods were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Agreements were also made regarding currency exchange and exchange rates, which set the stage for international trade after the war. The IMF still operates today to support currencies around the world and provide economic security to less developed states. The Bretton Woods Conference laid the foundations for a more globalized economy in the years to come.
One of the areas in which political science research has proven fruitful has been in tracing the consequences of globalization. Li and Reuveny, for instance, show that while economic changes can contribute to the spread of democracy, the more powerful factor is the spread of democratic ideas.32 One easy way to see this finding in action is the history of the Arab Spring movement in 2011. One of the things that allowed the Arab Spring to spread across the Middle East was access to the Internet, which helped not only to organize the protestors but to familiarize them with democratic ideals. Although the effects of the Arab Spring are rather questionable, it still demonstrates the power of ideas and increased global connectedness.
Globalization also has social impacts. Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz as well as Richards and Gelleny find that increased globalization generally leads to the betterment of the status of women.33 For women, globalization often means employment and educational opportunities. An example of this is in the field of microlending, where organizations lend women in developing countries small amounts of money to develop a business, which leads to increased income for the women and their families. Mukherjee and Krieckhaus show that globalization positively affects human well-being; both child and infant mortality fall, and life expectancy rises as globalization increases.34
Communism and Postcommunism
Perhaps no other topic in comparative politics has been as researched and discussed as the phenomenon of communism. The Cold War, driven by the ideological conflict between communism and democracy, was a political battle of wills between the two great superpowers of the twentieth century. As such, it was a natural topic of research for political scientists. This brief examination will be by no means a complete record or analysis of research into communism but will briefly discuss some of the more pertinent aspects of what communism is as a concept; how political scientists have studied it; and how countries, most prominently Russia, have transitioned from communism.
Communism in Practice
The first thing to understand about communism is that the brand of communism actually practiced by the Soviet Union, China, and their subsidiaries is not the theoretical construct of communism initially envisioned by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto. Recall from Chapter 3 that Marx and Engels looked at history and saw in it a history of class struggles. The owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie, sought to have control over the working class, the proletariat. They theorized that once a society had become industrialized and education had spread so that the proletariat came to realize how they were being used, a final revolution would occur. The proletariat would overthrow the bourgeoisie and eliminate any form of the state or government; the resulting society would be one in which all people were considered equal and shared ownership of both the means and results of production.
It’s obvious why such an ideology would be attractive to those outside of the bourgeoisie. Particularly in countries where poverty and inequality were rampant, communism was easily able to gain a foothold. However, those same countries, Russia and later China, were not the theoretical hotbeds of communism that Marx and Engels envisioned. Neither were industrialized (both were incredibly agrarian in their economy), and neither country had an educated working class that had come to realize and support the communist doctrine. Instead, both countries saw revolutionary leaders emerge that took the seed of communist ideology and infused it with local flavor and characteristics that made the communism that came to be practiced unique in each country.
In Russia, the conflict between communist forces and czarist loyalists came during World War I. The Bolshevik revolution, first headed by Leon Trotsky, was soon to be taken over by Vladimir Lenin, who formed the intellectual heart of Soviet communism. Lenin, realizing that the requirements for a true communist revolution were not yet in place in Russia, modified the theory of Marx and Engels and believed that before a communist revolution could occur, there must first be a dictatorship of the proletariat to prepare the state for the coming communist movement. The leadership would ensure that conditions like industrialized and class consciousness improved such that communism could eventually be fulfilled as Marx and Engels wrote. Lenin would become the first leader of the Soviet Union to be followed by the murderous dictator Joseph Stalin. As we know today, the dictatorship of the proletariat never succeeded in preparing the way for communism; the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991.
Much of the ideological concern and conflict would not come to a head until after World War II. Indeed, for the entirety of the war, the Allies included not only France, the United Kingdom, and the United States but also the Soviet Union. But in the absence of a common foe and the introduction of the atom bomb, the burgeoning conflict between the United States, democracy, and capitalism on one side and the Soviet Union and communism on the other blossomed into the Cold War. At that time, the forces of communism seemed stronger than ever and getting stronger by the day. Not only had the Soviet Union matched the United States in terms of the atom bomb by 1949 but more countries were succumbing to communism either by force or by choice. Many Eastern European countries that fell under the Soviet Union’s purview following World War II had communist governments pushed on them from the ultimate dictator of the proletariat. And perhaps most significantly, China adopted communism in 1949.
China’s road to communism, while sharing some similarities with Russia’s, led to its own distinct form of communism. Like precommunist Russia, China was largely agrarian with little industrialization and little in the way of widespread education. What China did have, however, was a strong streak of nationalism that led to increased resentment as foreign powers came into China in the beginning of the twentieth century. This led to a Chinese civil war following World War II, which ended with communists, led by Mao Zedong, defeating the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek.
As Lenin did for the Soviet Union, Mao did for China in adopting Marxist thought to local conditions. This eventually led to a sharp split between the Soviet Union and China. Mao acknowledged that the vast majority of Chinese citizens were, in fact, peasants, and therefore that Marxist ideology would need to be adjusted to fit the circumstances in China.35 Writing in 1951 on the nature of Chinese communism, Littlejohn says this:
The ultimate oracle is at present in Moscow, whence come the highest directives, but the application of all ruling is, in my opinion, a matter of local usage. In fact I have a strong suspicion that the Chinese will before long consider their Communism to be superior to the Russian brand.36
Studies of Communism
Most of the political science literature on communism prior to 1960 focused on communism’s relation not only to individual states like Russia and China but religion and how it manifested in democratic countries like Australia. Scholar of Islam Lewis analyzed how compatible Islam would be with communism, notwithstanding Marxist communism’s prohibition on religion.37 Priestley argued that China’s assault on Christian churches had not so much to do with religion as it had to do with overcoming potential obstacles to consolidation of the regime.38 Also in regard to religion, Waddams explores the relationship between churches in Eastern Europe and the Russian Orthodox Church and the Moscow government, particularly in light of the Orthodox Church’s ability to avoid complete disintegration.39
Regional- and country-specific studies of communism continued into the Cold War. Recognition that communism was not as monolithic as it wanted to appear became commonplace. The United States was able to exploit this shift through an opening of relations with China in the early 1970s. Recognizing these distinct differences in brands of communism, Tucker, in 1967, called for a more comparative approach to studying communism that would allow analysts to more thoroughly understand the similarities and differences in communism around the world.
By the 1980s, changes in the communist world began to take their toll. With the opening of US-Chinese relations, China was rapidly industrializing, and their economy began to become the Goliath it is today. In the Soviet Union, partly under the influence of President Ronald Reagan, political and economic reforms were instituted. Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the twin policies of glasnost and perestroika were introduced. Glasnost led to political reforms centered around more transparency and openness while perestroika represented economic reforms allowing for greater private ownership. Then, in 1989, many of the Eastern European satellite communist states finally rebelled against their political masters, tore down (both literally and figuratively) the wall separating Eastern and Western Europe and transitioned to democracy. By 1991, the Soviet Union itself was incapable of surviving and collapsed.
One of the great failures of political scientists was their inability to predict in advance the imminent fall of communism. Therefore, in the years following the end of Soviet communism, much of the research about communism focused on why it all of a sudden failed. Schopflin identifies economic problems, a lack of government legitimacy, and shifts in public opinion as key drivers of the Eastern European transition.40 Di Palma adds to this the existence of a civil society in Eastern European countries that survived the communist takeover.41 Janos reexamines communist theory and the historical record to try to reconstruct patterns of political change in the communist world.42
Postcommunist Transitions
Other political scientists focused not only on the effects of the end of Soviet communism but on examining the transition from communism. Schopflin sees possible problems for the formerly communist Eastern European states stemming from their intolerance of economic inequalities that would naturally occur in capitalist societies, as well as a hostility toward a middle class.43 White and McAllister looked at membership in the Communist Party in Russia and found that while it still held some sway as being the largest of the political parties to emerge after the fall of communism, younger and more religious Russians had left the party, leaving its future very much in doubt.44 Finally, Mishler and Rose find that skepticism abounds in postcommunist countries about government, which could make consolidation of democracy more difficult to achieve.45
Communism continues to be an intriguing topic for political scientists because it has left marks on societies that will exist for decades to come. Many comparativists continue to investigate these legacies and the continuing changes in communist countries that still exist today such as China. At the base level of politics, the antagonism that existed between the former Soviet Union and the United States continues to play out on other levels today as both countries compete for influence around the world and, in particular, in the Middle East. Although the Cold War may be over, the possibility for research is not.
Authoritarianism
While communism was merely the theory behind the operations of governments in states like the Soviet Union, it is critical to remember that ideology and government type are distinct concepts. For many of the major communist states of the twentieth century, and for some noncommunist states, the style of government adopted was that of authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Totalitarianism and authoritarianism are related in the sense that both are forms of government where the governing authorities have almost total and complete power. However, totalitarianism is a type of government in which the authorities have total and complete control over their society, whereas authoritarian government, while still exerting almost complete control, allows for some political freedoms although there are no political protections or democratic procedures in place.46 A good example of the difference between these two types of government is China. Under Mao in the twentieth century, China was considered a totalitarian government with Mao, as dictator, exerting near total control over the country. However, over time, China has allowed its citizens some limited political power although the state still controls the process. As such, today, China is considered an authoritarian state.
Concerns about authoritarianism naturally arise because of its lack of democratic principles and procedures but scholarly consideration of it increased greatly after World War II and the totalitarian and authoritarian governments involved in the war. In the early 1950s, Adorno and his colleagues published The Authoritarian Personality, which proposed that authoritarianism was a psychological trait or personality type distinguished by strict obedience to authority and oppression of diverse ideas and beliefs.47 Although The Authoritarian Personality was based on a Freudian psychological analysis, scholars since the 1950s have tried to understand authoritarianism as a political attitude, its origins and causes, and its implications for democratic government. For example, if a greater number of people adopt authoritarian attitudes, they might be more willing to allow for greater government control, more limited civil liberties and civil rights, and a weakening of democratic principles.
In considering the causes of authoritarian attitudes, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists have often linked it to beliefs in traditionalism, a need to conform to group norms, fundamentalism, a need for social cohesion, and even racial prejudice. One dominant theme in the research is the influence of parental authority when an individual was young; those with more authoritarian attitudes have been found to have had parents who imposed stricter rules during their upbringing. In turn, authoritarian individuals tend to be more intolerant of minorities, to support greater use of military force, and “to condone and even endorse illegal and blatantly undemocratic government behavior.”48
One of the major findings since the 1950s is that authoritarian attitudes are often linked with right-wing, conservative political beliefs. This does not mean that there are no authoritarians who would be considered liberal but that there was a far higher number of authoritarians with right-wing beliefs.49 In assessing the prevalence of authoritarian attitudes in the United States, for instance, Cizmar and her colleagues found that the number of Americans exhibiting authoritarian attitudes has risen since the mid-twentieth century with a clear impact on political polarization itself.50 Indeed, Hetherington and Weiler make this argument explicit: that increasing polarization in the United States is most directly attributable to the rise of authoritarian attitudes.51 The rise of authoritarian attitudes is not limited to the United States; right-wing, authoritarian groups and political parties have emerged across Europe in recent years promoting racist policies, limits on judicial independence, and anti-immigrant policies. Norris notes that the share of votes that authoritarian leaders and parties have been achieving has consistently risen over this same time period.52
Why authoritarian attitudes and leaders are on the rise is more complicated. Norris suggests that the shift is a result of a backlash against more progressive social norms that threaten traditionalist and conservative ideas.53 This is further heightened by an education gap: Those with more authoritarian attitudes tend to be less educated as well as less interested in learning about politics.54 A growing inequality between the rich and the poor and the increasing pace of social change could also contribute to these trends. While authoritarian attitudes could be a result of a changing social order, there is no doubt that these changes have implications for democratic governments worldwide. Party systems across Europe are becoming more fragmented; countries have sought more sovereignty (e.g., the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union) and economic nationalism. A key question for comparativists, then, is the extent to which authoritarianism is growing and what countries are doing as a response.
Development and Developing Countries
According to the IMF, a majority of countries in the world are considered to be less developed. What does this mean, and what consequences does being more or less developed have for a country’s politics? How can international organizations aid countries that are less developed? These are just some of the topics that political scientists studying development consider.
In general, the level of development a country is at refers to its economy, but there is no agreed-upon definition of what is considered developed or not. In many ways, the study of development has roots in the historical patterns of colonization and imperialism. European colonial powers, historically, were able to exploit countries in what is now called the global South, comprising most of the countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South America. Many of these colonial empires had motivations to keep their colonies politically and economically dependent on the mother countries, all the while allowing the home countries to capitalize on the raw resources and captured economy of their colonies. This set into motion a global system where colonized states were purposefully kept weak and dependent. In previous years, these colonized countries were also referred to as the “third world” with Europe and America comprising the “first world.” However, many critics disliked this characterization because of the inference that the people of the third world were in fact third-class peoples as compared to the citizens of the industrialized, developed first world. As a result, development theorists have preferred the term less-developed countries (LDCs).
Modernization and Western Bias
Evolving out of this situation was a body of theory about how states modernize. This modernization theory posited that LDCs would developmentally advance as they adopted more Western political and economic practices. Ideally, developed countries would assist in this practice in a paternalistic, guiding way. This early modernization theory reflected past practices of colonialization and the relationship between
developed and LDCs. The ultimate stage of development according to modernization theory, however, is democracy, thereby linking development to the occurrence of democracy. This has become the implicit goal of development practices, to foster and encourage democratic governance in the LDCs, but it is not the only goal.
Development can refer to many different aspects of the human condition: social, cultural, political, and economic. However, like the terms first world and third world, there is also heavy criticism leveled at modern conceptions of development. Since the majority of political scientists, governments, and aid agencies that study and further development goals come from the developed world, they usually advocate a certain conception of development that is Western oriented. In other words, these advocates of development adhere to standards of development that may not be natural to those being targeted. For example, the Western value of equality for women is not something that is culturally believed in all parts of the world, as distasteful as it may be. What makes the Western notion of development superior or preferred to other notions of development? What about LDCs that simply do not want to develop economically, politically, or culturally? Should they be forced to? While these are what political scientists call normative concerns, we still must be aware of the meaning of many of these terms, not only to those of us in the West but to those who are being studied.
Sumner presents an excellent history of development studies in his article, appropriately titled “What Is Development Studies?”55 He traces the origins of development studies to the mid-twentieth century as previously colonized countries tried to “catch up” with Western countries economically. Early on, development theorists and advocates focused on economic development as the primary aim. Development studies aim “to improve people’s lives” with today’s focus expanding from economic improvement to improvement across society.56 This requires not only a multidisciplinary approach to development that not only involves political science but sociology, economics, and psychology along with the assistance of international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, in aiding LDCs.
Development Today
One of the primary international vehicles through which development is being pursued is a program under the United Nations called the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs were agreed to in 2000 with a goal for completing by 2015 the following eight principles:
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.
2. Achieve universal primary education.
3. Promote gender equality and empower women.
4. Reduce child mortality.
5. Improve maternal health.
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.
7. Ensure environmental stability.
8. Develop a global partnership for development.
While it is clear today that these goals were not wholly achieved, they have provided goals for development theorists and activists to consider. Political scientists have also taken on this challenge through research into not only the achievement of the MDGs but also how to go about achieving the goals. For example, Franklin argues that “results-based management” has been successful in achieving some of the measurable MDGs like those related to health but are not nearly as successful in achieving goals that do not necessarily have measurable outcomes.57 Similarly, James contends that the MDGs do not distinguish between potential and actual achievements and that this may do more harm than good.58 From the stance of actually implementing the MDGs, Bond examines how the goal to eradicate poverty has been implemented, and Clarke looks at the role of nongovernmental organizations, specifically faith-based organizations.59
But there are lessons to be learned as well. A strong line of research has emerged on what development activists have learned about development and what activities have shown to be successful. Chibba’s article on lessons from development projects highlights some of the policies that can be adopted in other countries, such as taking culture into consideration when planning development and that market-based economic policies can help alleviate poverty and hunger.60 Hope highlights some of the lessons of instituting governance reforms to increase capacity for development while Vonderlack and Schreiner detail the impact of microlending on women in the developing world and suggest an expansion of banking services for women in the developing world.61
Some of the critiques aimed at political scientists who study development relate back to the early roots of political science. Much like early political scientists, development theorists seek to improve the political, social, and economic life of those living in LDCs. This is quite similar to the early political science aim of discovering scientific, rational means of administering government and thereby improving the performance of states. With regard to development studies, Haberman and Langthaler formulate the critique in this way:
For some, the purpose of development research is primarily to influence policies, and in order to do this development research has to reframe its whole approach, language, and methodology. Others maintain that development research needs to distance itself, maintain an analytical and even critical approach towards development practice, and become an academic discipline in its own right.62
This again reflects the split in political science from being academic in perspective but also being helpful to practitioners who may not find academic advice useful at all. Nonetheless, development will continue to be a timely topic not only for the world but for political scientists—one that could be influential in helping people around the world.
CASE STUDY India
India is the world’s largest democracy with more than 1.3 billion people and for many years has been considered a developing country. Its economic statistics are staggering: Its growth rate has averaged 7 percent a year over the past two decades, it ranks fourth globally in gross domestic product (GDP) (after China, the European Union, and the United States), and it exports almost $300 billion worth of goods to the rest of the world.63 Despite that, poverty remains a concern, literacy rates are low, and per capita income remains low.64 India’s history of colonial occupation by the British adds a further dimension to the puzzle as does the Hindu religious caste system.
For our purposes here, we can think about India’s development from three points of view discussed previously: modernization theory and its relationship to democracy, economics, and cultural or social. Economics, as noted previously, represents a bright spot in Indian development. It has continued to work with organizations like the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on continuing projects, enhancing Indian infrastructure. Social and cultural development, however, is a different story; as represented by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it has also been slow in coming to India. Table 8.1 lists the MDGs and how India ranks on each. In most all categories, India ranks fairly low. Aside from the cultural and religious concerns raised by the Hindu practice of castes, a large percentage of India’s population remains below the poverty line, and inequality and human development rank low.
Table 8.1 Indian Progress on Millennium Development Goals
|
Table 8.1 Indian Progress on Millennium Development Goals |
|
|
Millennium Development Goal |
India’s Rank |
|
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger |
21.9 percent of population below poverty line |
|
Achieve universal primary education |
71.2 percent literacy rate; 134th in world in expenditures on education |
|
Promote gender equality and empower women |
in UN Gender Inequality Index |
|
Reduce child mortality |
47th in infant mortality (39.1 deaths/100,000 live births) |
|
Improve maternal health |
56th in maternal mortality rate (174 deaths/100,000 live births) |
|
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases |
3rd in people living with HIV/AIDS, 3rd in people dying from HIV/AIDS |
|
Ensure environmental stability |
4th largest emitter of carbon dioxide |
Sources: CIA World Fact Book; UN Human Development Reports.
Finally, in many ways, India is a prime example for modernization theorists. A British colony, India was economically exploited by the British until the Indian independence movement, led by Mahatma Gandhi, established independence in 1947. India created and instituted a secular and democratic constitution three years later in 1950, which borrowed much from the British parliamentary system. From the perspective of modernization theory, the British were in a place not only to foster the development of India as an independent country but that the establishment of democracy was a key contributor. However, there is a significant question as to just how democratic India has been. For much of its independent history, Indian politics was dominated by one political party; while this certainly contributed to India’s political stability, as discussed previously, democracy involves a number of elements that India may not fully satisfy.
Critical Thinking Questions
1. How would you classify India: as a developed state or still developing? Why?
2. Which characteristics of development do you believe are most important in determining a country’s level of development?
3. Can a country be developed while still falling short of social goals?
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict
One of the increasingly important concerns that has drawn attention worldwide is the phenomenon of nationalism and the consequences that flow from it. Before defining nationalism as a concept, it is appropriate to draw the distinction between state and nation. A state, while the definition is diffuse and uncertain, refers to institutions and forms of government, whereas nation refers to a social or ethnic grouping of people. Based on this, nationalism is a sense of group identity and belonging that often includes a desire for self-government based on national identity. For centuries, small states were generally referred to as nation-states or states that reflected national identities.
Career Guidance
State development requires the work of thousands of people andorganizations other than state governments. International nongovernmental organizations often assist less-developed states in improving their infrastructure, health and social outcomes, and economy. These organizations include the United Nations and its subsidiaries such as the World Health Organization and International Monetary Fund, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors without Borders, and Oxfam International. Working for a nongovernmental organization such as one of these can be an exciting career path for those with degrees in political science and an interest in comparative politics or development studies.
The concept of nationalism is not new; Hah and Martin note that it was identified as early as 1836.65 Woodrow Wilson made nationalism and self-determination a foundation of his Fourteen Points proposal following World War I. Yet, while the former political scientist Wilson was calling for self-determination, his erstwhile allies in Europe, France and the United Kingdom, were redrawing the borders of the Middle East. In their quest for colonial territory, France and the United Kingdom drew territorial lines with no concern for the traditional ethnic and religious concerns that dominated the Middle East. As such, somewhat artificial countries were created—for example, Iraq, that had no common history but different religious and ethnic groups that do not care to live together.
Conflicts spurred on by nationalist and ethnic identities are increasing in the modern world. The end of the Cold War and the increase of globalization has brought more groups into contact with each other, leading to the potential for more conflicts.66 But nationalism can be a potentially valuable attitude as well; the belief in American values and ideals is a sort of nationalism that binds and knits a country together. But it “can just as plausibly be seen as a kind of particularism denying non-citizens or culturally deviant citizens full human rights and, in the extreme cases, even denying them membership in the community of humans.”67 It is this more extreme case that has led to conflict between groups such as the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the Middle East, and Arabs and non-Arabs in Darfur.
Nationalism can exist in many forms. Economic nationalism promotes a country’s economy by protecting industries and businesses within the country and instituting tariffs and taxes to protect the domestic economy from outside economies. There exists a thread of black nationalism in American discourse. Then there is the ethnic nationalism that can often lead to the deadly conflict we see around the world today.
So why should nationalism necessarily lead to conflict? In many ethnic conflicts, the concern is about territory and sovereignty over a given parcel of land. If there are multiple ethnic or religious groups in one area and both believe they should have sovereignty, conflict will naturally develop. The Arab-Israeli conflict is yet another example of the types of conflicts that arise. And like the Arab-Israeli struggle, there is no easy answer to the question; there is no way to create more land and both groups want it and do not want to share it. Thus nationalism can also prevent solutions to conflicts.
Certainly, political scientists have been able to connect nationalism to a variety of consequences, most significantly war.68 However, de las Casas suggests that the aspects of nationalism that foster a sense of group identity and pride can lead to outcomes such as a stronger economy and less government corruption.69 It seems, then, that nationalism, like many of the concepts we’ve discussed thus far, isn’t necessarily good or bad; it’s in how it’s used that creates positive or negative effects.
CASE STUDY Yemen
Amnesty International has called the conflict in Yemen the “forgotten war.” It has raged since 2014 involving many countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Iran, yet little media attention has been paid to it, especially compared to the Syrian Civil War. At the heart of the conflict is ethnic conflict between the ruling Sunni government and Shiite rebels called the Houthi. Sunni and Shiite are two Muslim sects that have historically disagreed about who the successor to the prophet Mohammed is or should be; the Shia believed it should be a descendant of the Prophet while the Sunni believed the Muslim community should be able to decide. Interestingly enough, even though the split between the two groups took place soon after Mohammed’s death, the two groups have largely lived in peaceful coexistence.70 Conflict has emerged from time to time with the split becoming especially relevant in the twentieth century that brought with it a more “complex political dynamic involving Sunni and Shiites, Arabs and Persians, colonizers and colonized, oil, and the involvement of superpowers.”71
In Yemen, the population is majority Sunni; Muslims as a whole make up 99.1 percent of the population with Sunnis composing 65 percent and Shiite 35 percent of that population.72 Not untouched by the Arab Spring uprising that was felt across the Middle East, in 2011, the Yemeni government agreed to a political transition that forced its longtime authoritarian leader from power to be replaced with his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. As president, Hadi struggled to deal with a number of problems facing the country, which the Shiite minority took advantage of, leading to the takeover of the capital Sanaa in 2015 by the Houthi rebels.73 Since then, countries across the Middle East and the world have picked sides in the battle with the Houthi being joined by some Yemeni army groups loyal to the former president and backed by Iran. President Hadi has been supported by a number of other countries but most prominently Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, and Sudan (the United States has also provided assistance to the Sunni-led government).74
The cost of the conflict to the Yemeni people has been high. According to Amnesty International, more than 4,600 civilians have been killed with more than 8,000 injured, 3 million people have been forced from their homes by fighting, and 18.8 million Yemenis rely on humanitarian assistance simply to survive. Meanwhile, the chaos in Yemen has become a haven for terrorist groups including ISIS.
The ethnic conflict in Yemen has been spurred on by many of the same problems people across the Middle East have been facing for decades: lack of educational opportunity, lack of jobs, and inability to involve themselves in political affairs. The result has been a large group of young people who have become disillusioned and vulnerable to political and religious extremists. The Yemen conflict, then, is representative of ethnic conflict as a whole in the Middle East. Disaffected minorities, spurred by religious differences, have often taken their qualms to the streets with no easy answer or end in sight.
Critical Thinking Questions
1. In the case of Yemen, how does nationalism lead to conflict?
2. What role does religion play in stimulating conflict? Can it increase nationalistic attitudes or serve as a bridge between different groups?
3. What are the possible consequences for Yemen in terms of it being labeled a failed state?
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Chapter Summary
· Comparative politics is not only a field of study in political science but a research method. The comparative method provides a means of testing hypotheses while controlling for potentially confounding variables.
· The idea of the state is a significant one in politics. States are key actors in the political system, and being a strong or weak state can come with significant consequences. However, given increasing globalization and the role of international organizations, the role of the state could be shifting.
· Communist countries played a key role in the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. Political scientists have struggled to understand communist politics and patterns of developing in postcommunist countries.
· Many states around the world continue to develop in terms of politics, economics, and strength. Development studies examine best practices and help to identify key goals, but they are often hampered by pro-Western ideals that may not fit culturally elsewhere.
· Nationalistic attitudes and beliefs have contributed to both development and conflict. Ethnicity can reinforce nationalism and contribute to conflicts around the world.
Key Terms
· authoritarian: Type of government that, while still exerting almost complete control, allows for some political freedoms although there are no political protections or democratic procedures in place
· Cold War: Period of ideological conflict from the end of World War II to 1991 between the Soviet Union and the United States
· comparative politics: The study of countries and politics around the world
· democracy: States that have free, fair, and frequent elections and in which civil liberties are recognized and protected
· development: How advanced a state is in terms of economics and social problems
· economic nationalism: Attitudes in favor of protecting a country’s economic independence and autonomy
· failed state: No entity that can exert sovereignty over territory
· glasnost: Series of Soviet political reforms in the 1980s
· globalization: Increasing economic and other connections between states
· modernization theory: Less-developed countries (LDCs) to developmentally advance as they adopted more Western political and economic practices
· nationalism: Sense of group identity and belonging that often includes a desire for self-government based on national identity
· perestroika: Series of Soviet economic reforms in the 1980s
· selection bias: Occurs when the cases that are chosen to be studied are systematically skewed
· state: Groups of people living under a single governmental system
· state strength: The ability of states to control political outcomes
· totalitarianism: Type of government in which the authorities have total and complete control over their society
Discussion Questions
1. What is the comparative method? Give an example of how you can use it to study comparative politics.
2. What are some of the different ways democracy can be defined?
3. What are some ways in which democracy, globalization, and development might be related?
4. Do you believe globalization is a good or bad thing? What about nationalism? Why or why not?
Further Reading
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989.
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972.
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957.
Lijphart, Arend. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.” American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 682–693.
Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org
United Nations Millennium Development Goals: www.un.org/millenniumgoals
Notes
1. Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 682 (emphasis in the original).
2. Ibid., 683.
3. David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” World Politics 49, no. 1 (1996): 59.
4. Peter J. Steinberger, “Hobbes, Rousseau, and the Modern Conception of the State,” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 3 (2008): 595–611.
5. J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics 20, no. 4 (1968): 559, 561.
6. Stephen D. Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (1984): 223–246.
7. Krasner, “Approaches to the State.”
8. Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond the Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 77–96.
9. Ibid., 78.
10. David J. Samuels, Comparative Politics (Boston: Pearson, 2003).
11. Tuong Vu, “Studying the State through State Formation,” World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 148–175.
12. Evenly B. Davidheiser, “Strong States, Weak States: The Role of the State in Revolution,” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992): 463–475.
13. Eghosa E. Osaghe, “Fragile States,” Development in Practice 17, no. 4/5 (2007): 691.
14. James A. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 469–488.
15. Stewart Patrick, “‘Failed’ States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas, International Studies Review 9, no. 4 (2007): 644–662.
16. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 71.
17. Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
18. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).
19. Kenneth A. Bollen, “Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy,” American Sociological Review 45, no. 3 (1980): 372.
20. Edward N. Muller, “Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality,” American Sociological Review 53 (1988): 54.
21. Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, “Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy,” Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 1 (2000): 58–86.
22. Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 635–652.
23. Michael L. Ross, “Does Taxation Lead to Representation?” British Journal of Political Science 34, no. 2 (2004): 229–249.
24. Anibal Perez-Linan and Scott Mainwaring, “Regime Legacies and Levels of Democracy: Evidence from Latin America,” Comparative Politics 45, no. 4 (2013): 379–397.
25. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
26. Matthew A. Baum and David A. Lake, “The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital,” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 (2003): 333–347.
27. Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, “Democracy and Environmental Degradation,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2006): 935–956.
28. Frederick J. Boehmke, “The Effect of Direct Democracy on the Size and Diversity of State Interest Group Populations,” The Journal of Politics 64, no. 3 (2002): 827–844.
29. Ethan B. Kapstein, “Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations,” International Organization 43, no. 2 (1989): 324.
30. Lyle Scruggs and Peter Lange, “Where Have All the Members Gone? Globalization, Institutions, and Union Density,” The Journal of Politics 64, no. 1 (2002): 126–153.
31. Eunyoung Ha, “Globalization, Government Ideology, and Income Inequality in Developing Countries,” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 2 (2012): 541–557.
32. Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (2003): 29–54.
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37. Bernard Lewis, “Communism and Islam,” International Affairs 30, no. 1 (1954): 1–12.
38. K. E. Priestley, “Chinese Communism and Christianity,” Far Eastern Survey 21, no. 2 (1952): 17–20.
39. H. M. Waddams, “Communism and the Churches,” International Affairs 25, no. 3 (1949): 295–306.
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43. Schopflin, “Post-Communism.”
44. Stephen White and Ian McAllister, “The CPSU and Its Members: Between Communism and Postcommunism,” British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 1 (1996): 105–122.
45. William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies,” The Journal of Politics 59, no. 2 (1997): 418–451.
46. W. Phillips Shively, Power and Choice: An Introduction to Political Science (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014), 164; Charles Hausas and Melissa Haussmann, Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges, 8th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2013), 9.
47. Theodor W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).
48. Frederick Solt, “The Social Origins of Authoritarianism,” Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 4 (2012): 703.
49. Bojan Todosijevic and Zsolt Enyedi, “Authoritarianism without Dominant Ideology: Political Manifestations of Authoritarian Attitudes in Hungary,” Political Psychology 29, no. 5 (2008): 767–787.
50. Anne M. Cizmar et al., “Authoritarianism and American Political Behavior from 1952–2008,” Political Research Quarterly 67, no. 1 (2014): 71–83.
51. Marc J. Hetherington and Jonathan D. Weiler, Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
52. Pippa Norris, “It’s Not Just Trump. Authoritarian Populism Is Rising across the West,” Monkey Cage, March 11, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-just-trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/?utm_term=.eaa80f5c2218.
53. Ibid.
54. Bill E. Peterson, Lauren E. Duncan, and Joyce S. Pang, “Authoritarianism and Political Impoverishment: Deficits in Knowledge and Civic Disinterest,” Political Psychology 23, no. 1 (2002): 97–112.
55. Andrew Sumner, “What Is Development Studies?” Development in Practice 16, no. 6 (2006): 644–650.
56. Ibid., 645.
57. Thomas Franklin, “Reaching the Millennium Development Goals: Equality and Justice as Well as Results,” Development in Practice 18, no. 3 (2008): 420–423.
58. Jeffrey James, “Misguided Investments in Meeting Millennium Development Goals: A Reconsideration Using Ends-Based Targets,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2006): 443–458.
59. Patrick Bond, “Global Governance Campaigning and MDGs: From Top-Down to Bottom-Up Anti-Poverty Work,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2006): 339–354; Gerard Clarke, “Agents of Transformation? Donors, Faith-Based Organizations, and International Development,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2007): 77–96.
60. Michael Chibba, “Lessons from Selected Development Policies and Practices,” Development in Practice 19, no. 3 (2009): 365–370.
61. Kempe Ronald Hope Sr., “Capacity Development for Good Governance in Developing Societies: Lessons from the Field,” Development in Practice 19, no. 1 (2009): 79–86; Rebecca M. Vonderlack and Mark Schreiner, “Women, Microfinance, and Savings: Lessons and Proposals,” Development in Practice 12, no. 5 (2002): 602–612.
62. Birgit Haberman and Margarita Langthaler, “Changing the World of Development Research? An Insight into Theory and Practice,” Development in Practice 20, no. 7 (2010): 771.
63. CIA World Factbook, “India,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html.
64. Guardian, “Is India Still a Developing Country?,” April 6, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/apr/07/is-india-still-a-developing-country.
65. Chong-Do Hah and Jeffrey Martin, “Toward a Synthesis of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationalism,” World Politics 27, no. 3 (1975): 361–386.
66. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Ethnicity versus Nationalism,” Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 3 (1991): 263–278.
67. Ibid., 265–266.
68. Gretchen Schrock-Jacobson, “The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the Initiation of Interstate War,” Conflict Resolution 56, no. 5 (2012): 825–852.
69. Gustavo de las Casas, “Is Nationalism Good for You?” Foreign Policy 165 (March–April 2008): 50–56.
70. Mike Shuster, “The Origins of the Shiite-Sunni Split,” NPR, Feb. 12, 2007, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2007/02/12/7332087/the-origins-of-the-shiite-sunni-split.
71. Ibid.
72. CIA World Factbook, “Yemen,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html.
73. BBC News, “Yemen Crisis: Who Is Fighting Whom?” Jan. 30, 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423.
74. Amnesty International, “Yemen: The Forgotten War,” March 6, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/.