psych 421
deefer
Chapter8.3_Themassivemodularityhypothesis-revisedfor3rdedition.pptChapter 8.3:
Massive modularity
*
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Massive modularity
• Denies the existence of central processing
• There is no isotropic and Quinean information- processing
• All information-processing is carried out by specialized sub-systems (Darwinian modules)
• Unlike Fodorean modules, Darwinian modules are not informationally encapsulated
• They are domain-specific and (perhaps) cognitively impenetrable
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Examples
• Cheater detection
• Folk psychology/mindreading
[Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis]
• Kin selection
[applying Hamilton’s argument]
• Intuitive physics
• Number sense
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Arguments for massive modularity
Direct arguments for particular modules
• arguments from reasoning data
• Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis
• experimental support (e.g. number sense)
Arguments from specialized deficits to specialized modules
General arguments against the idea of domain-general central processing
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cheater detection module
• The Cosmides/Tooby experiments seem to show specialized skills for cheater detection
• not simply specialized skills for conditional reasoning involving social exchanges
• These experimental results are integrated with the massive modularity hypothesis via an evolutionary explanation of why there needs to be a cheater detection module
• evolutionary explanation itself grounded in an account of the evolution of cooperation
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Wason selection task
- “If a card has a vowel on one side then it has an even number on the other”
- Which cards you would need to turn over in order to determine whether this conditional is true or false?
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
- The correct answer: card “E” and card “5”
- Experimental results: very few people see that the card “5” needs to be turned over, while the vast majority of experimental subjects think that the card “4” needs to be turned over.
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Deontic selection task
- Imagine that you are police officers checking for under-age drinkers. Which cards do you would need to turn over in order to assess the following conditional: If a person is drinking beer, then that person must be over 19 years of age.
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
- The correct answer: card “beer” and card “16”
- Experimental results: subjects overwhelmingly came up with the correct answers, and relatively few suggested that the third card would need to be turned over.
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Explanation of the result
- We are better at reasoning with deontic conditionals (permissions, entitlements, and/or prohibitions) than we are with ordinary conditionals.
- This suggested that we have a domain-specific competence for reasoning involving permissions and prohibitions.
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Why are we better at deontic conditionals?
- Cosmides and Tooby: when the selection task is framed in terms of permissions and entitlements it engages the cheater detection module.
- Why is there a cheater detection module?
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Emergence of cooperative behavior
- Prisoner’s dilemma
- Tit for tat strategy
Always cooperate in the first encounter
In any subsequent encounter do what your opponent did in the previous round
- It requires being able to identify instances of cooperation and defection.
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Machiavellian intelligence
- Basic idea evolution of higher cognitive processes in primates was a response to complexity of social lives
e.g. keeping track of dominance relations, shifting alliances, etc.
- Has been developed in two ways
(A) Dealing with social complexities requires heightened general intelligence
(B) Dedicated social intelligence module
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
“Social intelligence” in primates
• Claims largely based on anecdotal evidence - e.g.
An adult female spent 20 min in gradually shifting in a seated position over a distance of about 2m to a place behind a rock about 50 cm high where she began to groom the subadult male follower of the group – an interaction not tolerated by the adult male. As I was observing from a cliff slightly above [the animals] I could judge that the adult male leader could, from his resting position, see the tail, back and crown of the female’s head, but not her front, arms and face: the subadult male sat in a bent position while being groomed, and was also invisible to the leader. The leader could thus see that she was present, but probably not that she groomed. (Report by Hans Kummer quoted in Byrne 1995 p. 106)
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Note that this quote is not included in the text.
*
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Experiments
• Experimental evidence at best mixed on “theory of mind” in primates
• little/no evidence of abilities to attribute propositional attitudes
• some evidence of sensitivity to visual perspective
• Skepticism from Povinelli experiments
• More positive evidence from Hare,
Tomasello,and Call
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Note that this is not mentioned in the text.
*
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Encephalization
• Brain to body mass ratio
• Some anthropologists have suggested that the EQ
increases with group size
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Note that this is not mentioned in the text.
*
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
The “number sense”
• Distinction in quasi-perceptual representations of number
Core system 1: “subitizing” system for representing exact magnitudes
Core system 2: system sensitive to approximate magnitudes
- Subitizing system – tracking small numbers
- ANS – differences between large numerosities
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
*
Note that this is not mentioned in the text.
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Infant data on system 1
• Ratio limit (at 6 months 1:2, but not 2:3)
• Increase in precision over development (at 10 months 2:3)
• Fails on small numerosities at age 6 (e.g. 1 vs 2) – subitizing system not yet operational?
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
*
Note that this is not mentioned in the text. It comes from Feigenson, L., Dehaene, S., & Spelke, E. S. (2004). Core systems of number. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 8, 307–314.
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Animal data on ANS
• Rats trained to press a lever n times produce presses normally distributed around n
- standard deviation is linear function of target number
• Primates:
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Note that this is not mentioned in the text. It comes from Feigenson, L., Dehaene, S., & Spelke, E. S. (2004). Core systems of number. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 8, 307–314.
*
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Animal data on system 2
• Monkeys tested on a version of the cracker test were able to discriminate 1 vs 2, 2 vs 3, and 3 vs 4
• at chance with 3 vs 8 or 4 vs 8
• Can discriminate correct outcomes of simple addition, but not when sum > 5
• Can only track 4 items when dealing with small numerosities
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
*
Note that this is not mentioned in the text.
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
From deficits to modules
• Some neuropsychological deficits are thought to provide evidence for Fodor modules
e.g. Prosopagnosia
• Evolutionary psychologists have made comparable claims for more high-level deficits
e.g. autism as evidence for a dedicated theory of mind module
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
False belief task
• Young children typically pass at 4 years
- Failed by 80% of a sample of autistic children aged between 6 and 16, with mean verbal and nonverbal mental ages > 5
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Note that this is not discussed until chapter 12.
*
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Arguments for massive modularity
- Direct arguments for particular modules
• arguments from reasoning data
• Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis
• experimental support (e.g. number sense)
- Arguments from specialized deficits to specialized modules
- General arguments against the idea of domain-general central processing
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Learning and fitness
- Basic idea domain-general learning mechanisms cannot detect statistically recurrent domain-specific structure
e.g. kin selection law (RabBb > Ca)
- Cognitive systems could not learn this principle because the pay-off will only be apparent long after they are dead
- Problem: Why is this evidence for domain-specific modules, rather than innate domain-specific knowledge?
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
*
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
Fodor’s objection
• The inputs into Darwinian modules are much more sophisticated than the inputs into Fodor modules
e.g. representations of social exchanges vs zero crossings
• The processing that produces those representations must be more domain-general than in the Darwinian modules
• A regress argument will eventually take us to completely domain-general filtering mechanisms
Cognitive Science José Luis Bermúdez / Cambridge University Press 2020
*
