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CHAPTER SEVEN

Subhas Chandra Bose, Hitler, and Töjö

I THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY ON 23 January 1897 at Cuttack, Orissa, was born Subhas Chandra Bose, ninth child of Janakinath and Prabhavati Bose. Janakinath was a lawyer of a Kayastha family, and was wealthy enough to edu- cate all his children well. By Indian standards this family of Bengali origin was well-to-do. Janakinath was raised in the atmosphere of the nineteenth century reform movements of Bengal through which English social reformist thought filtered into India. He had resigned posts within the bureaucracy of the British Raj in protest against its repressive policies. Bengal was at the same time the funnel for new ideas from the West and the province which felt most keenly the oppressive hand of the British. It was natural that Bengal nurtured leaders of the stature of Rammohan Roy, Keshab Chandra Sen, Rabindranath and Debendranath Tagore, and Bankim Chandra Chatterji.

At the age of five Subhas was enrolled in a school for European and Anglo-Indian boys run by the Baptist Mission. Subhas and his brothers and sisters were all admitted as part of a small quota for Indians. For a Bengali child of the late nineteenth century learning English was one of the first requisites of life. The curriculum also included Latin and the Bible. The school might almost have been in London rather than Cuttack, for the teachers were also British. Sanskrit, India’s classical language, and Bengali, the language of Bose’s family, were neglected. Subhas spent seven years of his life in this English public school.

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In 1909 Subhas entered a public school in Cuttack, Ravenshaw Collegiate School. Here he recalls being laughed at by his fellow students because he knew so little Bengali. At the age of fifteen Su- bhas first read the works of Vivekananda and found a goal for his life —spiritual salvation for oneself and service to humanity. Subhas began to practise yoga. From Vivekananda Subhas’s quest took him to Ramakrishna and the ideal of renunciation. He continued his meditations. Subhas felt his religious life was more important than his studies.1

At the age of sixteen Subhas was sent off to the Presidency College in Calcutta and began to make decisions apart from his family. He joined a group of students who wanted to bring about a fusion be- tween religion and nationalism. It was more moderate than some of the terrorist student groups in Bengal. Bose’s group talked with the political visionary Aurobindo Ghosh and with Surendra Nath Bannerji, one of the founders of the Indian National Congress. Bose never forgot the words of Aurobindo: “I should like to see some of you becoming great; great not for your own sake, but to make India great, so that she may stand up with head erect amongst the free nations of the world.”2 Though Bose the college student was more interested in religion and social work than politics, Aurobindo’s words were to return to him later with stunning impact.

Two things began to make Subhas politically aware. One was the behaviour of Britishers in Calcutta, whose insults to Indians in public places were galling and offensive. This was the psychological basis of the revolutionary movement in Bengal. The outbreak of World War I wrought another change in Bose’s thinking. Political emanci- pation was a desirable goal for India, but without military power India could not hope for independence. It was for Bose a significant conclusion.

In 1916 an incident occurred at the College which changed Bose’s life. There were rumours that one of the teachers, an Englishman, had manhandled some students. The teacher was attacked by a student in reprisal. Bose was held responsible, and though he had only witnessed the attack, his appeals were ignored and he was expelled. His family called him home.

For a while Bose studied then at Scottish Church College in Cal- cutta. Then he matriculated at Cambridge and prepared for the Civil Service examinations in London. At Cambridge there were again cases of social discrimination against Indian students. There

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was also discrimination in the University Officers’ Training Corps which carried over into the British Army. This was more serious and was to have repercussions for the British in India.

In the summer of 1920 Bose took the Civil Service examinations and passed fourth. The next seven months he spent in self-examina- tion, after which he renounced the security of a comfortable life in the Civil Service and resigned his appointment. He was elated at his own decision, knowing he was the first Indian to voluntarily relin- quish a Civil Service post out of patriotic motives. The rest of his life he would dedicate to the cause of Indian freedom. For Bose it was a moral decision, and the sacrifice would be far outweighed by the satisfaction of service to the motherland. The best way to end a government was to withdraw from it. Subhas had taken his first conscious step as a revolutionary.

From this point on Subhas entered the vortex of the nationalist movement, first in Calcutta, then in the National Congress. The atmosphere surrounding Bose’s decision was full of public hostility to the introduction of the repressive Rowlatt Bill of 1919. There was also shock and anger over the Amritsar massacre, in which four hundred Indian demonstrators were killed at the order of a British officer in charge of law and order in that city. Bose wrote for the newspaper Swaraj and was in charge of publicity for the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee. Bose’s political mentor was C.R. Das, principal of the Congress National College and a spokesman for the aggressive nationalism of Bengal.3

One of Bose’s first political acts was participation in the civil dis- obedience of December 1921 against the visit of the Prince of Wales. As Bose had hoped, he was arrested and given his first jail sentence, at the same time gaining the confidence of C.R. Das, who was also jailed. Bose followed Das into the Swaraj Party within the Congress. When Das became mayor of Calcutta, Bose was elected chief exec- utive officer at the age of twenty-seven. It was a far more responsible position than he could have hoped for in 1924 had he remained in the Civil Service. In a round-up of terrorists in 1925 Bose was arrested again and this time sent to jail in Mandalay, where he remained for two years.

When Bose returned to India in 1927, his mentor, C.R. Das, was dead and Bose had become a leader in his own right, with confidence and determination gained through his jail experience. He was also ill, having contracted tuberculosis in prison. He became general

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secretary of the Congress, and, with Nehru, worked to form the Indian Independence League opposing any qualification of inde- pendence.

Again in 1930 Bose was arrested and jailed for participation in a civil disobedience campaign against Dominion status. This time he emerged from prison mayor of Calcutta. Jail sentence had be- come an almost indispensable qualification for political success in India.4

During 1932 and 1933 Bose visited Berlin, Rome, and many of the capitals of Eastern Europe several times, where he met with Indian students and sponsored formation of a students’ association to help Indians in Europe. He met politicians whenever possible, in- cluding Hitler in 1936. He observed party organization, and saw communism and fascism in action. In April he returned to India, was arrested on landing at Bombay and again imprisoned.

Bose had become a leader of national stature. In 1938 he agreed to accept nomination as Congress president. He meant to take his stand on unqualified swaraj, to confront the British Raj with force if necessary. This would also mean a confrontation with Gandhi, but Bose was not prepared to compromise with freedom. He believed Gandhi had failed to meet India’s political needs. Bose opposed any hint of compromise with freedom, any co-operation with the Gov- ernment under the 1935 Government of India Act.

For Bose 1938 marked the beginning of the political stagnation of the Gandhian movement. Prior to 1938 Gandhi had maintained his political viability and leadership by absorbing elements in the programme of the political left. In 1938, however, Gandhi lost the support of part of the left, just as Bose became Congress president. This was the first overt sign of a break between Gandhi and Bose. In Bose’s presidential address to the Congress at Haripura he still paid deference to the Mahatma but insisted that Congress should continue in power after independence was won. It would have to be a strong government to achieve the reconstruction of India. But unity within the Congress was destroyed, as the followers of Bose and Gandhi chose sides.

The differences between Bose and Gandhi were sharpened by correspondence between the two men during 1939, while illness kept Bose in bed. For Bose the danger was not violence and corruption, which he felt were decreasing in India in the thirties, but submission to the British. On 2 April 1939, Gandhi finally wrote Bose that their

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views were so diametrically opposed that there did not appear to be any possibility of accommodation. Gandhi wrote, “I smell violence in the air I breathe.”5 He was also apprehensive of the widening gulf between Hindu and Muslim. Gandhi advised Bose accordingly to form his cabinet, draft his own programme, and submit it to the All-India Congress Committee. Bose demurred, maintaining their common aims were greater than their differences. There was, however, little political meeting ground between the two men.

Differences with Gandhi also led naturally to a schism between Bose and Nehru. Writing to Nehru in 1939 Bose accused Nehru of disliking him, of encouraging his opponents at every opportunity, and of talking like a doctrinaire politician.6 Many think this rift between Bose and Nehru would have been of signal political importance in post-war India had Bose lived.

Bose approached the final break with more reluctance than Gan- dhi. The stalemate between Gandhi and Bose was still unresolved when the Congress met at Tripuri in late April 1939. Bose’s proposal on the struggle for swaraj was voted down. Bose appeared at the meeting on a stretcher, still suffering from illness. He consequently delayed the appointment of the Congress Working Committee as he was unable to meet with Gandhi to discuss the appointments or the differences between the two men. Some accused Bose of tem- porizing and of dictatorial tactics. In fact, there was little room for compromise in Bose. “I am an extremist,” he once said, and his career gave witness to his statement. In late May Bose presented his resignation as Congress president to the meeting of the AICC in Calcutta.

Shortly thereafter Bose organized the Forward Bloc with the object of consolidating the political left. The Congress Socialist Party and National Front had so far failed to achieve an amalgamation of the left. Nor could Bose get the support of the Congress Socialist Party.7 This despite Bose’s programme for a modern, industrialized, socialist free India. Bose’s principal support for the Forward Bloc remained in his home state, Bengal.

Bose envisioned a strong government to reconstruct India after independence. “You cannot have a so-called democratic system, if that system has to put through economic reforms on a socialistic basis. Therefore, we must have a political system—a State—of an authoritarian character.8… with a democratic system we cannot solve the problem of Free India.” The new Indian state would em-

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body a synthesis of fascism, or national socialism, and communism. Through such a synthesis radical reform would be possible and In- dia’s pressing problems would be solved. To lead the government, Bose believed in a”strong party bound together and preventing chaos, when Indians are free and are thrown entirely on their own resour- ces”.9 Because of Bose’s programme for a synthesis of fascism and communism, many of his contemporaries were unable to decide whe- ther he should be considered politically right or left.10 Some argued that when Bose appeared in Southeast Asia in 1943 in a uniform resembling Mussolini’s and with the name Netaji (Leader or Fuehrer), he had moved close to his Axis mentors. But for Bose the synthesis between fascism and communism would achieve viability because there were traits common to both systems. “Both Communism and Fascism believe in the supremacy of the state over the individual. Both denounce parliamentarian democracy. Both believe in party rule. Both believe in dictatorship in the party and in the ruthless suppression of all dissenting minorities. Both believe in a planned industrial reorganization of the country. These common traits will form the basis of the new synthesis,”11 Bose believed.

When war erupted in Europe the Government found a pretext for Bose’s arrest. He organized a popular demonstration in Calcutta for the removal of the memorial to the Black Hole of Calcutta victims, which offended nationalist sentiment. For this and for charges of sedition, he was arrested on 2 July 1940.12 While in prison he decided the only path to independence lay through Axis assistance against Britain. He had faith in German victory. But Bose could do nothing in jail. He announced that on 29 November he would begin a fast for freedom until death. He began his fast, refused food, and six days later was allowed to go home. His trial for sedition was to begin on 26 January 1941. On that day Bose could not be found

Bose had for several days been “meditating”, refusing to see even his mother. She had no idea of his whereabouts. Those who had seen him two weeks earlier had remarked that he had grown a beard.

Before dawn on 17 January a car had pulled away from Bose’s home in Calcutta. In the car were a Muslim religious teacher and Bose’s nephew, Sisir Kumar Bose. In Muslim disguise Bose made his way by car to a town some two hundred miles west of Calcutta, where he caught a train to Peshawar. At Peshawar Bose became a deaf-mute Pathan, since he could not speak the Pashto language. A prearranged contact accompanied Bose from Peshawar to Kabul,

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Afghanistan, first by car, then, when the car broke down, on foot, with two armed Pathan guides. They travelled several nights on foot, through the rugged country of the Khyber Pass and past frontier guards until they were well inside Afghanistan. At length they found a truck to take them up the frozen valley approach to Kabul.

In Kabul there was the danger of attracting British attention. Any Indian might be a British agent. Bose tried unsuccessfully to get help at the Soviet and Japanese embassies. In early February he found refuge with another Indian, Uttam Chand. With Uttam Chand Bose hid until 18 March, when his passage from Kabul was finally arranged. It was the Italian ambassador who finally agreed to help Bose. Bose was given an Italian passport and transport to the Rus- sian border by car. Bose passed the ancient cities of Bokhara and Samarkand, reached Moscow by train, and on 28 March flew to Berlin.13 This escape began the legend of Subhas Chandra Bose, the revolutionary who could not be caught.

II AN INDIAN IN BERLIN Bose was sure he would be welcome in Berlin. His enemy was the Axis enemy. Hitler had already decided to invade Russia and to liberate the Italians in Libya. There were Indian forces fighting in the Middle East; some of them had already been taken prisoner. Hitler would be interested in Indian opinion. So might Mussolini.

Bose’s hopes were deflated. His first request was for an Axis de- claration in favour of Indian independence. Bose visited Ciano in Rome in June 1941, but Ciano refused a declaration. Ciano noted in his diary that both Berlin and Rome had received Bose with re- serve, “especially since the value of this upstart is not clear”.14

Ciano held Bose under virtual house arrest in a hotel in Rome, not knowing what to do with him.15 Returning to Berlin, Bose encoun- tered similar resistance among the Nazi High Command. The Nazis were reluctant to announce India’s liberation as one of their war aims. Hitler did not wish to make declarations which would not be followed by direct action, as Ribbentrop told Bose in late No- vember.16 The following May, Ciano was still unwilling to agree to Bose’s request for a declaration.

With a propaganda offensive from Berlin Bose had better luck. He was allowed the use of broadcasting facilities in Berlin and

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inaugurated the Azad Hind (Free India) Radio. By early March, Goebbels was willing to take some credit for influencing Bose’s activities in Berlin. Goebbels wrote in his diary of March 1, “We have succeeded in prevailing upon the Indian nationalist leader, Bose, to issue an imposing declaration of war against England. It will be published most prominently in the German press and com- mented upon. In that way we shall now begin our official fight on behalf of India, even though we don’t as yet admit it openly.”17

This way Germany, so Goebbels reasoned, would reap the benefits of the support of Indian opinion without the disadvantages of an open declaration in favour of Indian independence. Goebbels be- lieved this decision was justified by the effect Bose’s broadcasts were already having in both India and England, where Bose’s exact whereabouts were still unknown. By 12 March, Goebbels remarked of Bose, “He is an excellent worker.”18 In May, Goebbels wrote that Mussolini wanted Bose to establish a government-in-exile, but the idea had not been approved in Berlin. Hitler was still reluctant. “Also,” wrote Goebbels, “the Japanese are very eager for some such step.”19

While Bose continued his radio broadcasts and also the publica- tion of a monthly magazine, Azad Hind, he decided something more was needed to fire the imagination of Indian patriots around the world. An army equipped, armed, and trained to fight against the English for Indian freedom would strike an even bigger propaganda blow at the British. The Nazi High Command agreed, and the Indian Legion was born. Made up of POWs from units which had fought in Africa, the Indian Legion grew to approximately three thousand troops, trained and drilled by German advisers, using German com- mands. It was never as Indian as its successor in Southeast Asia, the Indian National Army. But the plan was for the Indian Legion to march with the Germans across central Asia and into north-west India, following the victory which Hitler was confident of at Stalin- grad. All Indian POWs were concentrated at Annaburg Camp near Dresden where Bose talked with the officers and men about Indian freedom. Some of the officers wanted to bargain, but Bose recruited only unconditional volunteers. There were many who volunteered without trying to bargain, swayed by Bose’s eloquent appeal for Indian independence. One Indian in Berlin, watching Bose with the soldiers, was struck by Bose as a natural leader of men. “I became convinced that Bose had an indefinable influence over them which

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they could not resist. It was almost a kind of magic and indeed there was magic in the words he used.”20 Though Bose was without any previous military experience, he got his training and discipline Ger- man-style, along with the soldiers of the Indian Legion. Bose had no real hopes that it would become a large army but was anxious that a corps of Indian POWs receive German military training and discipline. He wanted to see whether the same training which worked so well in the German Army would also work with Indians.

But Berlin was not the answer to all Bose’s hopes. Though Bose was eventually received by Hitler, the meeting was a disappointment to Bose, and “he did not like very much to speak about it”.21 An even greater source of disillusion for Bose was the German fiasco at Stalingrad. Bose began to turn elsewhere for help for the cause of Indian independence. The logical place, since Italy and Germany were both proving disappointing, was Japan. Töjö had issued state- ments in the Japanese Diet about Indian freedom in early 1942, and by March there was a Japanese proposal for a tripartite declaration on India.

III BOSE TURNS TOWARD TOKYO A direct avenue for Bose was the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. Some- time in October 1941, Colonel Yamamoto Bin, military attaché in Berlin, got a telegram from IGHQ in Tokyo. Yamamoto was ordered to “make a direct observation of a man named Bose and report”. Yamamoto first of all needed permission from the German Foreign Ministry to meet Bose, who was under the personal “protection” of the German Vice-Minister. The reply from the Foreign Ministry was discouraging. Yamamoto’s next appeal to meet the Indian exile was made in the name of the Japanese ambassador, Lieutenant- General Ōshima Hiroshi. This time there came a favourable reply. Bose himself had been attempting to contact the Japanese Embassy. Toward the end of October Bose met Ōshima and Yamamoto and talked to them for an hour of India’s desire for independence and his hopes for Japanese aid. Bose had read Okakura Tenshin and it was Okakura’s writings which first turned his thoughts toward Japan. Both Ōshima and Yamamoto were impressed by the passion of Bose’s appeal. This was the first of Bose’s frequent visits to the Ja- panese Embassy.22

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When the Pacific War exploded and Japan overran Malaya and Singapore, Bose expressed his elation to Ōshima and Yamamoto. Japan would soon be in Burma, pressing on the Indian border. India’s hour was imminent. Bose wanted to go immediately to East Asia and fight beside Japan for Indian liberation. Would Ōshima use his good offices to secure Bose’s passage to Asia?

Ōshima had received no instruction from Tokyo regarding India since the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific. He and Yamamoto had a feeling that the German Foreign Ministry would not let Bose go in any case. They were guarding Bose like a tiger cub.23 Germany would not want to let Japan lead India to independence. And Bose would serve several purposes for Germany. He was already a useful ally as an Indian patriot, and his propaganda broadcasts to India were affecting both India and Britain. Furthermore, in the event of a German defeat, Bose would be valuable for bargaining purposes, since Britain would be itching to get her hands on Bose. Bose him- self mentioned this prospect to Ōshima and to other Indians in Berlin.24

Apart from German reluctance to share Bose with Japan, there was no guarantee of Tokyo’s willingness to have Bose in Asia. Three telegrams went from the Embassy in Berlin to Tokyo before a reply came from IGHQ, and then it was couched in noncommittal bureau- cratese: “Under consideration.” In Tokyo too there was doubt about whether Germany would release Bose. Meanwhile, Bose was asking Ō shima and Yamamoto at regular intervals, “Not yet? Not yet?”25

Ō shima asked Bose to be patient a bit longer. Ō shima, unlike Yamamoto, was under direct orders from the

Gaimushō. Ōshima was advised that Bose would be welcome if he arrived in Tokyo, but Ōshima should avoid making a direct commit- ment to Bose. There was more interest in Bose for the moment in IGHQ than in the Gaimushō, and the two had not yet coordinated their views on the possible value of Bose to Japan.26 For the Gaimushō the broader problem of a tripartite policy declaration on India took precedence over the immediate question of Bose.

Aside from the questions of German and Japanese willingness, there was the problem of possible routes from Germany to Japan should agreement be reached. British power was spread athwart all routes. Germany and Japan could not risk Bose’s capture by Britain. Bose suggested a polar route, but Japan was too unsure of the Soviet attitude and wanted to wait for a Moscow-Tokyo pact.

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Töjö refused this route. Yamamoto had a feeling Tokyo was pre- varicating and promised to bend all efforts for Bose’s passage to East Asia when the former returned to Tokyo in early 1942. After Yamamoto left Berlin Bose continued to press Ōshima to expedite arrangements.

There was another reason for Tokyo’s reluctance to make com- mitments regarding Bose. There was already an Indian revolutionary named Bose working with Japan in Tokyo—Rash Behari Bose. Why go to the trouble of bringing another Indian all the way from Berlin to Tokyo through the hazards of British-controlled routes? General Arisue in the Second Bureau feared bringing Bose to Asia might lead to a rift in the Indian independence movement, with the two Boses heading two factions. These fears were allayed when Arisue asked Rash Behari Bose what would happen if Subhas were brought to Asia. “I would step down,” Rash Behari replied without hesitating. 27 It was not until the crisis of the first INA at the close of 1942, however, that Tokyo was finally convinced of the need for a stronger leader than Rash Behari Bose. This was what the Indians in Southeast Asia had been urging all along. Now at last the requests of these Indians were beginning to make sense to IGHQ. And for Bose the German fiasco at Stalingrad made it more urgent than ever that he leave for East Asia.

A cabinet-level discussion on the matter of Subhas Chandra Bose yielded a decision, “Treatment of Subhas Chandra Bose”, 17 April 1942. Present were Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries represen- tatives. There were two parts to the decision. The first read, “We shall use Subhas Chandra Bose according to present policy and concomitant with the development of the situation of the 10 January 1942 decision.” 28 It was, nevertheless, several months after this basic decision was reached regarding Bose that arrangements for his transport to East Asia were completed with the German Foreign Ministry.

It was not until January 1943 that Ōshima felt Tokyo had come around and he could approach German Foreign Minister Ribben- trop. Ōshima told Ribbentrop of Bose’s desire to leave. There was no immediate approval from the Foreign Ministry. Bose suggested he might be able to iron out problems in liaison between Berlin and Tokyo. After December 1942 the German High Command was more anxious for liaison with IGHQ in Tokyo, but now Tokyo was cool.29

The Axis alliance never yielded any Berlin-Tokyo strategy planning,

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and it was unlikely that Berlin would take Bose’s offer seriously. There was no real joint Berlin-Tokyo consideration of India policy, apart from Tokyo’s suggestion of a tripartite policy declaration on India. And Bose was under the purview of the Foreign Ministry in any case. The only Tokyo-Berlin military agreement was an accord between the German and Japanese navies which fixed the borderline of Japanese and German spheres in the Indian Ocean at 70° E. longi- tude and determined that German submarines could use the facilities at Penang harbour.30 Ōshima then made a direct appeal to Hitler, and Hitler’s response was to agree immediately to Bose’s depar- ture.31

One fascinating sidelight of Bose’s stay in Germany was his mys- terious and controversial marriage. Bose had vowed in Calcutta not to marry until India became independent. Bose’s slightly Mon- goloid features and impressive physique, added to his magnetic personality and passion for independence, had always made him extremely attractive to Indian women. Though there were women among his friends of student days and later, he had refrained from any serious alliance or thought of marriage. During his trip to Europe in the mid-thirties, he had hired as his secretary a Viennese woman, Emilie Schenkl. Now in Berlin Schenkl was again at Bose’s side. This time there was a deeper emotional involvement, a marriage performed in secret, and a daughter, Anita. Bose made no public announcement of his marriage to his Austrian secretary. Neither did he discuss or even mention his wife to any of his Indian co-revolutionaries, either in Berlin or in Southeast Asia. There were none among the officers or men of the INA who would or could acknowledge Bose’s marriage. Why would a patriot completely devoted to Indian independence have forsaken his vow and married, and then not even an Indian but a European? Bose had always been more Indian than Nehru and extremely bitter about European ex- ploitation of Asia. It was beyond the realm of logic, beyond all prob- ability. It must have been because Bose accurately gauged the prob- able impact of news of his marriage on his Indian followers that he kept the whole thing secret. Even his family went uninformed until Bose’s arrival in Asia and the involvement of the INA in the Imphal campaign. When Japan’s defeat appeared imminent Bose sent a letter to his family, telling them he had married and asking that they accept his Austrian wife as a member of the family. It was only this letter that convinced Bose’s brothers and the post-independence

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Indian Government that Mrs Bose should be honoured as the widow of Subhas Chandra Bose.32

Now that both Berlin and Tokyo had agreed on Bose’s departure from Germany, there still remained the problem of what route and carrier Bose should take. Tokyo had already refused the polar route, and in any case Germany had no planes to spare. Italy was also short of planes now. Sea lanes were unsafe. The only alternative, and the means finally selected, was for Bose to go secretly by German and Japanese submarines. This possibility had been considered earlier but had been abandoned in view of the long distance involved. Now there was no alternative, and Ōshima communicated with both Tok- yo and the German Foreign Ministry, making final arrangements. In February 1943 Bose and his Indian secretary Hassan slipped away aboard a German submarine, as stealthily as Bose had left Calcutta two years earlier in his escape from India. On 20 April by prearrange- ment, a Japanese submarine left Penang Island for the tip of Africa, under strict orders not to attack or risk detection. It was to rendez- vous south-east of Madagascar with the German submarine. On 26 April the two submarines sighted each other and confirmed identity. After waiting a day for the sea to calm, the transfer was made on a rubber raft, and a drenched Bose was welcomed aboard the Japanese submarine. The submarine avoided Penang, taking a circuitous route to Sabang Island off the north coast of Sumatra, where Bose was met by Colonel Yamamoto. From Sabang Bose and Yamamoto left for Tokyo by plane, stopping en route at Penang, Saigon, Manila, and Taiwan. On the morning of 16 May the plane landed in Tokyo, where Bose was escorted immediately to the Imperial Hotel.33

IV BOSE IN TOKYO After several weeks on a submarine Bose was exhausted and in need of rest. But he had one aim in Tokyo, an obsession. He had to meet Premier Töjö. Yamamoto after a few days arranged meetings with Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, Navy Minister Yonai, and various section chiefs of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries. Bose’s opening words to Sugiyama took the chief of staff by surprise. “The war will end in victory for Japan!” Bose boomed. Japan was in the midst of adverse circumstances in Guadalcanal and the campaign was obviously not going well for

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Japan. Perhaps Bose’s statement was a reflection of his faith in Japan’s human and material resources. Bose continued, without waiting for a response from the bemused chief of staff, “Will Japan send soldiers to India or not? We are going to fight our way to India step by step. If we don’t push on with determination we won’t be able to achieve independence.”34

The immediate reaction of Sugiyama was that Bose had none of the humility or reserve a Japanese would have shown in such an interview. But there was no doubting his sincerity or his aims. He was a known quantity, whatever the Operations Bureau of IGHQ thought of his value to Japan. Sugiyama, despite his interest and sympathy derived from two years’ experience in India, could only respond to Bose with a briefing about Japan’s current military posi- tion. Bose, dissatisfied with Sugiyama’s general discussion, explained with great fervour his hope of first taking Chittagong, then pushing on into Bengal. Sugiyama assured Bose of his sympathy with Bose’s aspirations, and Bose’s first interview in Tokyo ended more calmly than it had begun. But Bose was dissatisfied. He had to meet Töjö and get a Japanese commitment.

Yamamoto, meanwhile acting as guide for Bose, for ten days escorted him through factories, schools, and hospitals, trying to distract his attention from Töjö and keep him occupied. Bose was impressed with what he saw but not deterred from his object.

Why was Töjö putting Bose off? In the first place, there were many more pressing military problems than India, and Töjö’s pleas that he was too busy were not simply excuses. Secondly, there was a group in the Operations Bureau of IGHQ which took a dim view of India and the INA. The INA had no direct relevance to military strategy and operations in the Pacific or even in Southeast Asia. And there was no proof of Bose’s propaganda impact within India in any case. But the main reason for Töjö’s reluctance to meet Bose was Töjö’s own attitude. Töjö was a man of strong prejudices and often formed an opinion of a man before meeting him. The INA had been only a headache so far as Töjö was concerned. The trouble between Mohan Singh and Rash Behari Bose had disposed Töjö unfavourably toward the INA. And the demands in the Bangkok Resolution Töjö regarded as presumptuous.35 How could a small revolutionary group which did not even represent a government presume to make demands on the Imperial Government of Japan? There was no need for Töjö to meet another Indian, even if he had just come from Berlin.

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It was persuasion by Sugiyama and Shigemitsu which at length prevailed on Töjö to meet Bose. On 10 June the first of two meetings took place. The magic of Bose enchanted Töjö immediately. It had been the same with Sugiyama, Shigemitsu, and nearly everyone Bose met, whether Japanese or Indian.36 Apart from the impact of Bose’s words and passionate devotion to Indian independence, there was something about his face, his voice, and his eyes that captured the minds and hearts of men. Töjö was enthralled. The meeting was brief but Bose had succeeded, and Töjö promised another interview four days later. This time Shigemitsu and other officials also were present, and there was a brief but fruitful exchange of views between Bose and Töjö. Töjö explained Japan’s ideas on the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Bose, with his customary frankness, asked Töjö, “Can Japan give unconditional help to the Indian inde- pendence movement? I would like to confirm that there are no strings attached to Japanese aid.” Töjö immediately gave Bose an affirmative reply. Bose continued, “Can the Japanese Army push its operations into India proper?” This time there were complex military matters involved, and Töjö was unable to answer as decisively. But Bose had been favourably impressed and was grateful he had made a friend in Töjö.37 If Bose was to secure meaningful help from Japan for the INA Töjö’s sympathy and co-operation was the crucial point. In this Bose had succeeded admirably, and Töjö was ready to make public his official support of Bose and the INA.

On 16 June Bose visited the House of Peers in the 82nd extraordi- nary session of the Diet. Töjö made an historic address on the Great- er East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which attracted attention outside Japan. Bose listened intently in the audience to interpreters as Töjö said, “India has been for centuries under England’s cruel rule. We wish to express righteous indignation at their agony and sympathy for their aspirations for complete independence. We firmly resolve that Japan will do everything possible to help Indian independence. I am convinced the day of Indian freedom and prosperity is not far off.…” Töjö spoke too of the emancipation of all of East Asia and of the welfare of the people of Greater East Asia.38 This was not Töjö’s first mention of India in the Diet. Early in 1942 he had spoken of the Pacific War as an opportunity for India to rise against British rule. But this time when Töjö promised aid and co-operation for In- dian independence Bose was listening in the audience and felt Töjö was making him a personal promise which he would follow through.

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Bose was also ready to make public his willingness to co-operate with Japan in the struggle against Britain. On 19 June he held his first Japanese Press conference, attended by some sixty reporters. He expressed gratitude at Töjö’s Diet speech and referred to the two-thousand-year-old cultural bond between Japan and India. Bose expressed his faith in Axis victory and in the armed struggle for In- dian independence. Tokyo radio on the same day quoted Bose as saying, “General Töjö is not only taking personal interest in India but he is leaving no stone unturned in order to give all the assistance that lies within the power of the Japanese Government to help India in her struggle against British Imperialism. … I can say with utmost confidence that apart from any assistance we may receive from the Japanese Government, Prime Minister Töjö is personally anxious to see India free from the British yoke at an early date.”39 Bose re- ferred also to Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 as “the first har- binger of Asian resurgence. That victory was hailed with great joy not only by the Japanese but also by the Indians. Therefore, Indians feel that the existence of a strong Japan is essential for the reconstruc- tion of Asia.”40

Bose two days later went on the air in his first broadcast to India from radio NHK Tokyo. He appealed, as he had from Berlin, for armed revolt by the Indian masses.41 Now Töjö and Bose were both on record to cooperate against the common enemy for Indian liberation.

While in Tokyo Bose visited his older compatriot and fellow re- volutionary, Rash Behari Bose. Though the two men had communi- cated, it was their first meeting. The reputations of the two men had already engendered a mutual respect, and there was none of the an- tagonism some Japanese officials feared. The older Bose told Subhas the IIL had already voted to make him commanding general of the INA. The two men paid a visit to the first Japanese patron of Rash Behari, Toyama Mitsuru. Toyama welcomed the young revolution- ary warmly.42 Though Subhas had little time to see people outside the Government, he enjoyed this visit with the old patriotic society leader who had protected so many Asian revolutionaries.

On 27 June after a successful month in Tokyo marked by many official banquets and public statements, Bose was on his way to Southeast Asia. Colonel Iwakuro was replaced as head of the Kikan by Colonel Yamamoto, Bose’s old friend of Berlin days. IGHQ wanted to get the co-operation with Bose off to an auspicious start,

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and Yamamoto was known to be sympathetic to Bose. The name of the Iwakuro Kikan was changed to Hikari Kikan.43

V BOSE AND THE INA, IN SINGAPORE Indians gave Bose a tumultuous welcome when he arrived at the Singapore airport from Tokyo on 2 July. Everywhere he went Indians garlanded him with flowers and shouted greetings. Those who saw him recalled his stormy career as president of the Indian National Congress, as mayor of Calcutta, and as a revolutionary serving jail terms. The magic of his legend enveloped him and infected his audiences. He seemed electrified at the sight of INA soldiers and unable to take his eyes off them. Rash Behari introduced Subhas to leaders of the IIL and officers of the INA. The contrast between the two men was apparent to everyone. Rash Behari was by this time old and ill, fatigue showing in his face and his drooping posture. The younger Bose by contrast was full of energy and self-confidence, a towering, imposing figure.44 His exhilaration at being in Singapore, “graveyard of the British Empire”, was irrepressible.45

Both Boses tried to allay the doubts of some of their fellow revo- lutionaries regarding Japanese motives toward India. Rash Behari recalled his recent visit to Tokyo when Prime Minister Töjö had re- affirmed Japan’s pledge of all-out aid to India in the fight against Britain. Rash Behari had been impressed by the sympathy for India’s cause among Japanese of all walks of life. He spoke of Japan’s pro- duction of wartime needs in weapons, machinery and food in his attempt to impress his cohorts with the advantages of cooperation and assistance from Japan.46

Subhas Bose also dealt with Indian fears and suspicions about Japan. He himself had been sympathetic to China when in 1937 Japan swept through the country. He had been instrumental in sending an Indian medical mission to Chungking. Now he reminded all Indians in the independence movement that his loyalty was to India alone. Bose felt Töjö had proven his sincerity by repeated assurances of all-out aid from Japan to the Indian independence movement. Bose spoke of Japan’s “Asian consciousness”, of her desire to help other Asiatic nations achieve liberation. “This is a unique development which affords a golden opportunity to all en-

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slaved nations in Asia to emancipate themselves and set up a new order based on freedom, justice, and morality,” he remarked. He also noted that Japan’s attitude toward Burma and the Philippines would be the most convincing proof of her good faith. “If cunning British politicians could neither cajole nor deceive me, no one else can hope to do so,”47 Bose remarked. At the same time, he cautioned, “We shall have to be awake and alive, on our guard, not only against the enemy British imperialism, against imperialistically inclined Japanese bureaucrats, but against Indians in our own ranks.”48 There were individuals even among the Indian community in Southeast Asia who disappointed Bose in their lack of dedication to Indian independence. There were many dangers in the path of Indian liberation but they would be overcome. This Bose did not doubt.

For the next two weeks there were public meetings, military pa- rades, women’s rallies, and inspection tours. Bose was busy through the early hours every morning, planning the future of the INA with leaders of the independence movement. At a public meeting in the Cathay hall on 4 July, Rash Behari Bose formally handed over to Subhas Chandra Bose leadership of the IIL and command of the INA. The hall was jammed to capacity with representatives from all of Asia. In his last speech as leader of the movement Rash Behari Bose said, “Friends! This is one of the happiest moments in my life. I have brought you one of the most outstanding personalities of our great Motherland to participate in our campaign. In your presence today, I resign my office as President of the Indian Independence League in East Asia. From now on, Subhas Chandra Bose is your President, your leader in the fight for India’s independence, and I am confident that, under his leadership, you will march on to battle and to victory.”49

Subhas Bose spoke at length in response. He reviewed the political crisis in India and the war situation in Europe and Asia, expressing again his confidence in Axis victory. He accepted command of the newly named Azad Hind Fauj (Free India Army), acknowledging the honour and exhorting his audience “to do or die in the cause of India’s freedom”. He announced too his plan to organize a Provi- sional Government of Free India. “It will be the task of this Provi- sional Government to lead the Indian Revolution to its successful conclusion. … the Provisional Government will have to prepare the Indian people, inside and outside India, for an armed struggle which will be the culmination of all our national efforts since 1883.”

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Bose ended his lengthy speech with a flourish of Bengali oratory: “We have a grim fight ahead of us.... In this final march to freedom, you will have to face danger, thirst, privation, forced marches—and death. Only when you pass this test will freedom be yours.”50 The audience response was deafening.

On 5 July Premier Töjö, on a visit from Manila, arrived in Singa- pore in time for a review of INA troops. Bose addressed the soldiers on parade, saying, “Comrades, my soldiers! Let your battle cry be— Chalo Delhi! To Delhi—To Delhi! How many of us will individually win this war of freedom, I do not know. But I do know this: that we shall ultimately win and our task will not end until our surviving heroes hold the victory parade at the Red Fortress of Ancient Del- hi.”51 He continued, “If you will always follow me in life as well as in death, then I will lead you on the road to victory and freedom. It does not matter who among us will live to see India free. It is enough that India shall be free and that we shall give our all to make her free.”52 Bose called on INA troops not only to fight for freedom, but to form the nucleus of the permanent army of free India. They would be charged with national defence after Indian freedom became a reality.53

Töjö watched the march-past and listened to Bose’s call to revolu- tion. His presence at Bose’s side seemed proof again of Japan’s good faith. Töjö then addressed the gathering, repeating the assurances that Japan had no territorial, military, or economic ambitions in India, that India would achieve independence from foreign domi- nation, and that Japan would extend all-out aid for Indian libera- tion.54 Newspapers all over East Asia announced the existence of the Azad Hind Fauj, with pictures of Bose and Töjö standing together in uniform.

On 9 July there was another mass rally in Singapore, attended by Indians together with some Malays and Chinese. Bose recounted his earlier actions on behalf of India’s freedom. After many jail terms he became convinced he would have to leave India and carry on the struggle from abroad to supplement the struggle going on at home. “It will not be possible to win the freedom of India without external aid,” Bose explained. The struggle within India would require both moral and military aid. Once the INA attacked the British Army in India, “A revolution will break out, not only among the civil popu- lation at home, but also among the Indian Army which is now stand- ing under the British flag. When the British Government is thus

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attacked from both sides—from inside India and from outside—it will collapse, and the Indian people will then regain their liberty. According to my plan, therefore, it is not necessary to bother about the Axis Powers’ intentions toward India.”55 Bose’s faith that the INA would spark a revolution within India came to be shared alike by officers and men of the INA. Bose spoke for two hours in a drenching monsoon rain, but neither the audience nor the rain abated.

Bose called for total mobilization of Indian manpower and finan- cial resources in East Asia. He wanted three hundred thousand men under arms. He asked too for a unit of Indian women, to be called the Rani of Jhansi Regiment after the heroine of the 1857 Mutiny who led her troops against the British. Women volunteered imme- diately and a women’s training camp was opened under the command of Captain Lakshmi Swaminadhan, a capable woman doctor from Madras who had been practising in Singapore. The women were given uniforms and military training and took special pride in being trained to fight for Indian freedom.

So far as the Japanese were concerned, the Rani of Jhansi Regi- ment was a headache. Bose tried to overcome their opposition to the idea of a women’s regiment, opposition based on the traditional position of women in Japan. Women had no place in the Japanese military tradition, and Japanese authorities at first refused Bose a site for a camp for women. Moreover, the Japanese did not want to expend precious resources on women soldiers. Bose persisted until he won his point.56

There was a large-scale reshuffling and expansion of departments of IIL Headquarters, preparatory to organizing the Provisional Government. New departments were created: a Reconstruction Department to administer freed territory, an Intelligence Depart- ment, Planning Department, and Department of Women’s Organi- zations. The Publicity Department under S.A. Ayer was renamed the Department of Publicity, Press and Propaganda. Lieutenant- Colonel A.C. Chatterji was appointed first secretary-general of League Headquarters. Bose discussed the functions of the various departments in informal personal conversations with the new de- partment heads and members. In these chats with the leaders of the nascent Provisional Government Bose suggested that neither Gandhi nor Nehru would fight the British, that both were working for some sort of compromise.57

Bose’s new German-inspired title, Netaji, was brought into use

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by his private secretary Hassan, who had come from Berlin by sub- marine with Bose. Hassan suggested Netaji was the name by which Bose wished to be known in free India. When members of the Publi- city Department objected that the title might be interpreted as Fueh- rer, Hassan agreed, saying, “The role of India’s Fuehrer is just what Subhas Chandra Bose will fill.” From this time on the League’s four newspapers—in English, Hindustani, Tamil, and Malayalam—re- ferred to Bose as Netaji, Netaji rapidly became Bose’s popular name in Asia.58

A new greeting was also coined for Indians in the independence movement. “Jai Hind ” was a salutation which caught on among all Indians in Asia, and after the war even within India. It was not asso- ciated with any single communal group but was a symbol of a new all-Indian nationalism which the INA helped to foster.

Both Mohan Singh and Subhas Bose were very conscious of the need to appeal to all the religious groups among Indians, to cut across communal and other divisive segments of Indian society. In great measure they both succeeded. Sikhs and Muslims, together with Hindus, were prominent among the officers and men of the INA.

Soon after his arrival in Singapore Netaji was invited to Rangoon to participate in the celebration of the establishment of the new Independent Government of Burma under Dr Ba Maw. Ba Maw and the Burmese Government promised help in the struggle for In- dian liberation, for Indian and Burmese independence were linked. While in Rangoon Bose reviewed a parade of INA troops and spoke before a large gathering of Indians. He also visited the tomb of Emperor Bahadur Shah, last of the Mogul emperors.59

In August when Bose assumed command of the renamed Azad Hind Fauj he reorganized it. Though he became commander he refrained from assuming any personal military rank. This he did on advice from INA officers. Lieutenant-Colonel J.K. Bhonsle, who had maintained continuity of command after the resignation of Mohan Singh, became chief of staff. The organization of Head- quarters was as follows: ‘G’ Branch under Lieutenant-Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan, for planning, operations, training and intelli- gence; ‘A’ Branch under Lieutenant-Colonel N.S. Bhagat, for ad- ministration and the issuing of general orders; ‘Q’ Branch under Lieutenant-Colonel K.P. Thimmayya, for supply and equipment; the Medical Branch under Lieutenant-Colonel A.D. Loganadhan

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as director of medical service; and the Department of Education and Culture under Lieutenant-Colonel Jahangir for education and prop- aganda.60

Bose and his staff officers discussed with Colonel Yamamoto and other Japanese officers the role of the INA in the pending campaign on the India border. It was decided that, in view of the small size of the INA, the troops should be trained and used in guerrilla warfare. They would be lightly equipped for mobility and for penetrating enemy lines, and would have to live off the country in which they were operating.

Japanese officers gave the INA units guerrilla training, including musketry, bayonet practice, and camouflage work. The Officers’ Training School turned out men who were also able to instruct new trainees. Camps for training civilian volunteers were established under the IIL in Kuala Lumpur and at Seletar in Singapore. Volun- teers took an oath of loyalty to India and to the INA, and a pledge to Netaji as well. Bose frequently inspected the troops in their quar- ters and on manoeuvres. The training of volunteers was also car- ried on in Shanghai among Sikh policemen at the local Sikh Gurd- wara.61

When the reorganization of the INA was complete in August Ne- taji met with Field-Marshal Count Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army. Terauchi explained to Bose that Japanese forces were preparing a campaign into India. The burden of the battle would be borne by the Japanese Army, Terauchi continued. India would be freed of British domination, then handed over to the In- dians as an independent territory. What the Japanese wanted of Bose was personal co-operation. Terauchi was less impressed by Bose’s charisma and stature than any other Japanese commander who met him. His conversation with Bose clearly pointed to pro- paganda as the primary purpose of Japan’s co-operation with the INA.

Terauchi’s explanation of the INA role was unacceptable to Bose, both at this first meeting and later when the strategy of the Imphal campaign was being planned. Bose made it clear to Terauchi that the only role acceptable to the INA in an Indian campaign would be spearhead of the advance. Indian freedom had to be won by In- dians. Freedom secured through Japanese sacrifices would be worse than slavery. “The first drop of blood shed on Indian soil must be that of a soldier of the INA,” Bose asserted. Terauchi agreed to

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consider Bose’s suggestions, and the first interview between the INA commander and the Japanese commander of the Southern Army ended.62 But Terauchi continued to disagree with Tokyo over the handling of Bose. Terauchi felt Töjö was pampering Bose, giving him too much free rein. Terauchi was noticeably missing from the review of INA troops held on Bose’s arrival in Singapore.

Another delicate issue which confronted Bose soon after he arrived in Singapore was the matter of Mohan Singh, who was still under house arrest and Japanese guard. The question of what to do about Mohan Singh had been mentioned to Netaji by several officers, including Dr Raju, Bose’s personal physician, and Shah Nawaz Khan.63 Now a delegation of Sikhs came to request that Bose secure Mohan Singh’s release so that he might rejoin the struggle. “I was ill with malnutrition and malaria, in serious condition,” Mohan Singh recalls. Dr Raju took Mohan Singh milk and medicine. He told Mohan Singh there were some who were talking against him to Netaji. Next Dr Raju visited Mohan Singh with an eleven-point note from Netaji, asking for Mohan Singh’s agreement prior to their meeting. Among the eleven points was the question of whether Mohan Singh would agree to accept Bose’s leadership, not only within the INA but also within India. Mohan Singh balked at the second part of the question. The two revolutionaries finally met in December 1943. Netaji expressed his gratitude for Mohan Singh’s efforts and appreciated the problems he encountered in dealing with the Japanese. Mohan Singh in reply to Bose’s written questions told him that Nehru was Mohan Singh’s hero and he could not change his ideals overnight. In the course of the four-hour conversation Bose said to Mohan Singh, “There is a group outside who is discontent with your leadership. The moment you come out there will be trouble. It is in the interest of the movement that you remain here longer.”64

The two men also discussed Japan’s military prospects. Mohan Singh questioned Netaji about his faith in Japanese military victory and a successful campaign into India’s border.” I said it would be a misadventure,” Mohan Singh recalls. “I asked how he was so certain of Japanese victory.” Bose replied, “My name carries enough weight. When I land in Bengal everyone will revolt. Wavell’s whole army will join me.” Mohan Singh demurred, reminding Bose that at least ten thousand POWs at Singapore had failed to volunteer, even though they were dependent on Mohan Singh for water, food, even

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their lives. “How then can you expect Wavell’s army commanded mostly by British officers to desert?” Mohan Singh inquired. Bose paused in thought, his head in his hand. “There is some truth in what you say,” he responded at length. He left Mohan Singh in a somewhat altered mood.65

Though Bose was unwilling to press the Japanese for Mohan Singh’s release after their prison conversation, he secured Mohan Singh’s transfer to better quarters in a comfortable bungalow, where he spent the duration of the war. Bose told Shah Nawaz it would be inadvisable to bring Mohan Singh out as he was unwilling to accept a position under Bhonsle, chief of staff, and did not wish to accept a position secondary to anyone. Mohan Singh as commander of the first INA had superseded officers superior to him in the British- Indian Army.66

Bose made no move either to attempt to secure the release of N.S. Gill, who was also held in detention by the Japanese, under more trying prison conditions than Mohan Singh. Bose told Raju, however, that he would like to have the help of N.S. Gill.67

N. Raghavan, the lawyer from Penang, had left the IIL during the crisis with Rash Behari Bose, Mohan Singh, and the Japanese. It was understood between Rash Behari and Raghavan that he would henceforth be a liability to the movement, and he had returned to Penang to his practice. When Netaji arrived in Singapore Raghavan remained in Penang, and made no attempt to meet Bose until he re- quested it. The two men had a long conversation in Singapore. Rag- havan told Netaji that he would do anything for his country but that he would remain outside the movement, as Bose would need Japanese help. Raghavan returned to Penang. Two months later Bose wrote Raghavan asking him to come for another meeting. Raghavan told Bose nothing had changed, and he was still better off outside the movement. “Netaji looked at me,” recalls Raghavan, “and said, ‘Raghavan, the position has changed.” ‘How?” I asked. ‘It’s like this,’ Netaji continued, ‘if I had to choose between you and the Japanese I’d choose you.’” Raghavan continued, recalling the impact of Bose on him, “It broke me down. I went with him and joined the government as a minister.”68

Netaji’s arrival infused new unity and life into the INA and inde- pendence movement in Southeast Asia. He announced plans to establish a Free India Provisional Government. This would be the next step forward in the march to Delhi and a free India.

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VI BOSE AND FUJIWARA Since he had been replaced by Colonel Iwakuro as Kikan chief in 1942, Fujiwara had had little opportunity to see his Indian colleagues. But he had followed closely the problems of liaison after the Mohan Singh crisis. With Operation U (as the Indian invasion plan was called) now at the tactical planning level, Fujiwara was again involved in liaison with the INA as intelligence staff officer of the 15th Army. Now that Netaji was in Singapore, Fujiwara looked forward to meeting him.

On 26 August 1943, Fujiwara was in Singapore attending an in- telligence briefing sponsored by Southern Army Headquarters. Mutaguchi requested his chief of staff, Major-General Kunomura, to pay a protocol visit on Bose in preparation for the Imphal campaign. Fujiwara was ordered to accompany Kunomura, and old Mr Senda of the Kikan was to act as interpreter. Bose’s official residence in the Singapore suburbs was surrounded by a well-tended garden. The red and yellow cannas were so brilliant they hurt Fujiwara’s eyes and made a lovely contrast to the carefully trimmed lawn. Fujiwara saw several familiar smiling faces among the INA soldiers lined up to receive their Japanese visitors. He felt a twinge of regret that Mohan Singh was not among them. As Fujiwara watched, a huge noble figure emerged from the centre of the line smiling with digni- fied but casual assurance. It had to be Bose. He looked like a man men would follow. So this was the revolutionary all his Indian friends had begged be brought from Berlin! Bose’s face bespoke confidence, friendliness, expectancy, and, Fujiwara thought, a touch of the philosopher. Fujiwara was impressed even before Bose spoke.69

Bose was introduced to General Kunomura first by old Senda. He then turned toward Fujiwara and gripped his hand warmly. His eyes and voice made a direct impact on Fujiwara. Bose invited Fujiwara to join him on the sofa. The INA officers followed every movement. Bose’s first words to Fujiwara were, “Major Fujiwara, I’ve been looking forward to this meeting since Berlin.” Fujiwara guessed he had been mentioned in Pritam Singh’s communiqués to Berlin. Bose continued, “I have been given the revolutionary army I long hoped for. But it was you and Mr Pritam Singh and General Mohan Singh who gave birth to the INA. I want to thank you from the bottom of my heart on behalf of the Indian people.” Fujiwara was equally warm but apologized for Pritam Singh’s death in the plane

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crash and for Mohan Singh’s imprisonment. Bose interrupted, “Don’t worry about General Mohan Singh. I’ll treat his case very carefully and deliberately. I feel very secure in the cooperation between India and Japan on the Burma front because of you.”70

Bose then turned to Kunomura, who related in German the plan for the 15th Army operation. Bose listened intently. Fujiwara sud- denly felt the burden of responsibility for the Mohan Singh crisis lift from his conscience. Fujiwara felt too a sense of destiny about the coming struggle of Japan and the INA in the offensive into India.71

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