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Contemporary Urban Planning

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Chapter 7

The Social Issues

The two professions from which modern urban planning sprang are architecture and landscape architecture, both of which are concerned largely with physical design. In earlier years planners often tended to emphasize design and physical issues over social issues, as the discussion of the Plan for Chicago indicated. But planners have long recognized that what at first glance appear to be simply matters of design can have powerful social implications.

In the 1960s and 1970s, dissatisfaction within the profession reached major proportions over what many saw as an underemphasis on social issues, and many planners began to define themselves as “social planners” and to speak of a subfield of “social planning.” This change within the profession had a number of roots.

The Civil Rights movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s focused attention on issues of justice and fairness. Many planners felt that they could not simply be neutral civil servants doing the bidding of “the establishment” if they did not approve of its goals and policies. The wave of riots and arson that hit U.S. cities from Newark to Watts in Los Angeles in the mid-1960s revealed a deep well of dissatisfaction and distress among minority populations and added to the perception that we as a society must be doing something wrong. Shortly thereafter, the Vietnam War split a generation of Americans. Those who felt that the war was wrong tended to carry that perception over into many domestic issues. If the establishment was wrong in Vietnam, they felt, it was wrong also at home.

Another reason for the change in focus was that many projects which appeared to be well planned in physical terms did not work out well when considered in a broader view. Urban Renewal, discussed in [Chapter 11](#), was one such case. So, too, was public housing. The Pruitt-Igoe public housing project in St. Louis was a large project built according to what were then considered good design practices. The project won a design award from the American Institute of Architects (AIA). Socially, however, it was a failure, with high rates of crime, vandalism, illegitimacy, and so on. Ultimately, the city, unable to deal with the multiple social problems of Pruitt-Igoe, demolished the buildings and cleared the site.¹ Clearly, physical design does not solve people’s psychological, family, economic, legal, drug, alcohol, and other problems. A project, however well done from an architectural and site design perspective, but which isolated large numbers of people with serious problems in a small area simply set the stage for disaster. In general, high-rise construction has worked out very badly in public housing, and a number of other projects like Cabrini Green in Chicago have been torn down since Pruitt-Igoe. On the other hand, many high-rise condominiums and cooperative apartments have worked out very well, as indicated by the premium prices that they command.

The Social Issues in Planning for Housing

Housing is probably the area in which physical planning decisions have their greatest social effects. Land-use controls and decisions about capital facilities like water and sewer lines affect how much housing and what type of housing will be built. That decision affects rents and house prices, and thus who will live in the community. Through the mechanism of cost, one pattern of housing may favor racial integration whereas another will favor racial segregation. Because where children live determines where they go to school, housing policy can turn out to be educational policy as well. Where one lives can determine one’s access to recreation, to social services, and, perhaps most importantly, to employment. Policies and economic forces that separate the housing that low-income workers can afford from the jobs for which they are qualified can produce unemployment. Prolonged unemployment can lead to family breakup, with links to welfare dependency, alcoholism, crime, and other social pathologies. It has been persuasively argued that the formation of the “urban underclass” is, in part, due to prolonged, large-scale unemployment in urban areas.² Thus decisions about housing policy affect what many regard as one of America’s most pressing social problems.

Even if we forget matters of race, class, and poverty entirely, decisions about housing can have powerful effects on how people live. Suppose the land-use controls in a suburban town permit the building of only single-family houses on half-acre or larger lots. By limiting what can be built to a single, expensive type of structure, the town has made some very personal decisions for its residents. Many of the children who are raised in the town will not be able to afford to live there as young adults. When a couple is divorced, the partner who does not get the house may have to leave town because there is no housing that he or she can afford. A couple with a grownup intellectually disabled child who cannot live alone but could function well in a group home may be very affected by whether or not the town permits large, old, single-family houses to be converted into group homes. Many communities have experienced bitter fights over whether or not to permit group homes.

A couple who would like an elderly parent to live with them will be concerned about whether or not the town’s zoning law permits accessory—or so-called mother-in-law—apartments to be attached to or constructed adjacent to single-family houses. There are vastly more single-parent families in the United States today than there were a few decades ago. Among two-parent households, there is now a much higher percentage in which both parents work outside the home. Land-use controls that permitted homes, workplaces, and childcare facilities to be close together would simplify the lives of many families. In some communities expanding the variety of housing types to accommodate the increasing number of smaller households would be useful.

The Special Case of Private Communities

Perhaps the most important recent trend in housing construction in the United States is the remarkably rapid growth of private communities.

A *private community* is one in which residence requires becoming a member of a community association, paying fees to that association, and agreeing to abide by its rules. Private communities almost always begin as areas within a political subdivision such as a county. Planned as a whole, they are not built in conformance with the existing zoning or land-use controls but rather are developed pursuant to rezoning, the issuance of variances, or an overall site-plan review process. Essentially, the developer’s architectural or planning

consulting firm becomes the planner and the municipal planning agency, and the legislative body it advises becomes the judge or arbiter of the plan. Often private communities are said to be “master-planned” in that there is a single plan for the entire community. This is a somewhat different usage of the term *master plan*, which ordinarily means the plan for an entire city, county, or other civil division. In the great majority of cases, private communities are built in suburbia or outside metropolitan areas entirely, since that is where large blocks of undeveloped land are to be had. Private communities within established urban areas are much rarer.

In some cases private communities ultimately incorporate as separate political entities. For example, Reston, Virginia began as just described but is now incorporated as the town of Reston within Fairfax County.

Many of the first private communities were retirement communities, often with explicit age restrictions. For example, rules might stipulate that at least one member of a household be at least 55 years old and that no permanent member of the household be younger than 18 years old. More recently, however, large numbers of private communities have developed for working-age populations as well.

Many private communities are open in the sense that anyone can enter them and move about freely within them, though many community facilities such as pools and parks are open only to residents and guests. But an increasing number are now “gated,” with entrance denied to all except residents and guests. As of 2009 there were over 10 million housing units just in gated communities.³ Average household size in the United States at that time was 2.6, which gives one a rough idea of how many people may have been living in gated communities. The total in all private communities was very much larger. For the developer, the private community has a marketing advantage because the buyer is getting not just a house but a complete package. That package may include physical security, often a community of somewhat similar and like-minded people, community recreational facilities, and the benefits of an integrated design. For example, many private communities have extensive systems of bicycle and pedestrian paths. These are easily integrated into a *de nouveau* design but are usually difficult to “retrofit” into an existing urban or suburban pattern. The complete package, or parts of the package, may be fine-tuned toward particular segments of the market. Sometimes the fine-tuning can be carried quite far. In Ladera Ranch, a large planned community in Orange County, California, there is a subdivision called “Covenant Hills” with homes done in a traditional style and with a Christian school for the subdivision’s children. There is another subdivision, “Terramor,” for households that the developers referred to as “cultural creatives.” There the housing is more contemporary and it has, instead, a Montessori school.⁴

Private communities have been very popular, but they also have their critics. The key word of those who decry the trend is *balkanization*. Critics ask what happens to the sense of a larger community as more and more people opt for separate communities. Edward Blakely, a professor of planning at the University of California, Berkeley, argues,

It has been over three decades since this nation legally outlawed all forms of public discrimination—in housing, education, public transportation, and public accommodations. Yet, today, we are seeing a new form of discrimination—the gated, walled, private community. I call it the “forting up phenomenon.”⁵

He then adds,

Economic segregation is scarcely new. ... But the gated communities go farther in several respects. They create physical barriers to access. And they privatize community space, not merely

individual space. ... When offices and retail complexes are placed within the walls, the new developments create a private world. ... This fragmentation undermines the very concept of *civitas*—organized community life.

If large numbers of the more prosperous withdraw to the enclave of the private community, one might ask what the condition will be of the remainder of the population that does not have the resources to make such a move. What will happen to the quality of public services and civic life in older urban places? Blakely puts it differently when he asks, “Do we really want to give up on the American dream of racial and class integration?” But the underlying argument is the same.

This view that the private community and particularly the gated community are fundamentally balkanizing and destroy a more widespread sense of community is held by many. It fits into a larger view that higher-status and higher-income people are increasingly separating themselves from the larger culture.⁶

Green Valley, Nevada is a private community built by the American Nevada Corporation in 1978. By 1992 it had grown to a population of 34,000 on 8,400 acres and was projected to reach more than 60,000 early in this century. Writing from a critical stance, David Guterson says,

No class warfare here, no burning city. Green Valley beckons the American middle class like a fabulous and eternal dream. In the wake of our contemporary trembling and discontent, its pilgrims have sought out a corporate castle where in exchange for false security they pay with personal freedoms; where the corporation that does the job of walling others out also walls residents in.⁷

How might the proponent of the private community respond to these charges? One response is simply that private communities are clearly giving many people what they want. Their success in the market leaves no doubt about that. If we believe in maximizing consumer choice in clothing and automobiles, why not communities as well?⁸ What the residents of new communities want is not something reprehensible, but simply what they see as a good life for themselves and their families. If one big motivation for moving to a private community is concern for the well-being and safety of one’s family, just what is so terrible about that?

To Blakely’s comment on class and race integration, the would-be resident of the private community might note that we now have a large amount of class and race segregation in most metropolitan areas. It is not as though private communities were destroying some Eden of integration. He or she might also note that integration may happen most easily and naturally among people who are somewhat similar in terms of income and class, as is the situation in many private communities.

This writer does not mean to pass judgment on the private community phenomenon but only to note the arguments. Clearly, this pattern of development has social implications that far transcend the matter of physical design.

The Problem of Homelessness

In the 1980s and 1990s, most observers of the urban scene agreed that the number of homeless people was increasing. More recently, higher levels of unemployment and the wave of foreclosures following the 2008 financial crisis have undoubtedly pushed homelessness higher. Nationally, in the past several years rents have risen much faster than personal incomes. That, too, has added to the problem. Planners are certainly not the only professionals to be concerned with this problem. Social workers, mental health professionals, the police, and attorneys have much more direct contact with the problem than do planners. But the problem of homelessness does have a planning dimension.

The number of homeless people is not known with any degree of accuracy, since they are a hard group to count and to define. Those who have looked at the question attribute the homeless problem to several overlapping causes. A certain number of homeless people are so because of mental illness. The number of people with mental illness on the street

has been increased by the deinstitutionalization of mental patients in recent years. That occurred partly because of what is generally referred to as the “patient’s rights” movement, which took the position that no patient should be held against his or her will unless that patient constituted a threat to himself or herself, or to other people. But note that causality can run both ways. If someone’s mental health is already shaky, the stress of being homeless may push that person into clinical mental illness. A certain percentage of the homeless population is so because of involvement with drugs or alcohol. Obviously, there is an overlap with the first category. We also note that the stress of being homeless may push someone in the direction of drugs or alcohol.

In addition, there are those who are homeless for economic reasons. Thus unemployment or family breakup can contribute to homelessness. Writers of a conservative bent have tended to stress the character and behavior of homeless individuals. Writers on the other side of the political spectrum tend to emphasize poverty and housing costs.

The planner may be able to make some contribution to easing the problem of homelessness via his or her involvement with housing policy. Municipal housing policy affects the entire housing stock, and that includes the low-cost end of housing, whose availability is directly related to the problem of homelessness. William Tucker, among other writers, has argued that municipal housing policy has accidentally contributed to homelessness by drying up the supply of cheap housing.⁹

Urban Renewal (see [Chapter 11](#)) demolished a great deal of low-rent, low-quality housing. The goal was to eliminate low-quality housing, but doing that inevitably shrank the supply of low-cost housing at the same time. At the very bottom of the rental market, Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotels and flophouses have been particular targets of neighborhood and business district improvement programs. However, if the most that someone can afford to pay for housing is a few dollars a night, then eliminating the SRO or the flophouse renders that person homeless. Note that the SRO that is torn down in one place cannot generally be replaced with one elsewhere, since most zoning codes will not permit their construction. Then, too, the SRO is likely to be an old structure that has depreciated to a fraction of its replacement cost. Thus a new structure to serve the same purpose would not be feasible financially, even if it were legal. William Tucker, cited earlier, argues that rent controls also produce homelessness. He argues that by driving down vacancy rates, they make low-cost housing unavailable. If you need a cheap apartment, the fact that some people are now living in such, thanks to rent control, does you little good if the vacancy rate hovers near zero.

Assuming that there is some truth in the preceding line of argument, what is the planner to do? Part of the planner’s role, as suggested elsewhere in this book, is to take a big picture view and to make plain the connections, like those previously discussed, to the rest of the body politic. But the planner who sees the problem in the terms just suggested is in a difficult situation. Homeless people do not constitute a powerful political constituency, whereas businesspeople and permanent residents do. Then, too, it is easy to be sympathetic both with homeless individuals and also with those who wish homeless people to be anywhere but here. One can feel sympathy for the homeless person who stations himself or herself in the shopkeeper’s doorway and also feel sympathy for the shopkeeper, who does not want this individual to drive away his or her customers. The planner can advocate housing policies that do not reduce the supply of housing at the low end. He or she can push for some expansion of low-cost housing through more flexible zoning (for example, by permitting accessory apartments or apartments over stores). Such units may or may not house the homeless directly, but they will ease the pressure on the remaining low-cost housing stock. For those of the homeless population who for reasons of mental health cannot function on their own, the planner can advocate flexibility in zoning and housing codes so as to make it easier to build group homes and other forms of congregate housing.

Other Issues

The Social Side of Planning for Catastrophe

One might think that planning for catastrophe would be one case where there is a unitary public interest. After all, floodwaters can’t tell a rich person from a poor person. But it turns out that in initial vulnerability, safety and security immediately after the event, and in the longer term restoration and rebuilding phase, natural catastrophes do hit different categories of people very differently.

Consider the flooding of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. By and large it was poorer people who lived in the lower lying parts of the city and were thus most vulnerable to the initial event. Most of the evacuation from the city was by car, which obviously favored people who had enough income to own a car. People with adequate savings did much better in the aftermath than people who lived paycheck to paycheck or were dependent on public assistance. Just as poor people are more vulnerable, so too are older people. If nothing else, they are likely to have less strength, energy, and good health with which to tolerate stress, cold or extreme heat, exhaustion, anxiety, interruption of access to medical care, and the like.

Reconstruction after the event involves a host of distributional (who gets what) issues. What gets rebuilt, what gets written off, who gets compensated and by what amounts? If public funds are to be spent to harden the area against future events, who gets protected and how is that paid for? The subject is discussed in more detail in [Chapter 14](#).

The Social Side of Economic Development

Economic development is another area in which issues of physical planning quickly reveal a social side. Assume that a community needs jobs and new tax revenues but is handicapped by a shortage of sites suitable for commercial development. It could use its power of eminent domain to take some land, carry out the necessary site preparation, and then market the land for commercial use (as noted in [Chapter 5](#), this strategy, once very widely used, is now not legal in a number of states). But the land now contains housing, whose residents will be forced to move. Should the community do so anyway? Will a functioning neighborhood be destroyed, and, if so, are the new jobs and new tax revenues worth it? If it is to be done, what arrangements will be made to rehouse the displaced population? Or will the population that now lives there simply be given notice, a modest moving allowance, and then left to its own devices?

Very often there is a strong connection between economic development and housing markets. This is particularly true if the supply of housing is relatively inelastic, meaning that large increases in housing prices or rents evoke only small increases in the size of the housing stock. In that case, most of an increase in demand is manifest in an increase in prices and rents.

Michael Bloomberg was Mayor of New York City for 12 years, from January 2002 to January 2014. During that time the economy of the city did well, given the Great Recession beginning in 2008. Despite major job losses in the financial sector, employment in the city grew, with substantial gains in a number of high-tech activities. Bloomberg, a man who had made hundreds of millions as an entrepreneur (founding *Bloomberg News*, supplier of many kinds of financial data), was quite successful in promoting the economic development of the city.

But the economic success of the city exacerbated the already extreme tightness of the city’s housing markets, and for the majority of the city’s residents who were not earning substantial incomes that was a huge stress.¹⁰ In 2012 the city’s Rent Guidelines Board reported that one-third of all renters spent 50 percent or more of their income on rent.¹¹ Vacancy rates for all apartments under \$1,000 per month were 1.1 percent. Basically, the supply of apartments available to anyone looking for a place for \$10,000 or under per year

was negligible.¹² A certain number of people living in New York City's homeless shelters were full-time low-wage workers. They simply could not afford any housing at all.

In January 2014 Mayor Bloomberg was succeeded in office by Bill De Blasio. Bloomberg was not a candidate in the 2013 race but much of De Blasio's campaign was a run against Bloomberg's policies. De Blasio stated that his number one goal was to reduce income inequality in the city. He favored the praiseworthy goal of providing pre-kindergarten schooling for all children, which he intended to pay for with a tax on all incomes of over \$500,000. In short, he ran as a populist from the left side of the political spectrum. While Bloomberg's main thrust had been to promote economic growth, De Blasio's campaign was about reducing inequality, two very different and in some ways contradictory goals.

What is one to make of this? It is hard to be opposed to De Blasio's goal of reducing income inequality, and Bloomberg himself would probably agree with that as an abstraction. On the other hand, the city needs the jobs and the tax revenues that come from new commercial activity and also from multi-million-dollar condos in Manhattan. The "millionaires' tax" which De Blasio advocated to pay for his educational goals may seem fair to anyone who believes in the principle of progressive taxation.¹³ But the fact is that if high taxes cause wealthy people to move across the city line, then the city cannot tax them at all. Then, too, they may be less inclined to invest their capital in the city and more inclined to invest it elsewhere. In short, reasonable and well-intentioned people may differ sharply about what emphasis the city should place on economic development versus other goals.

The situation described above for New York is not unique. San Francisco may have the highest rents in the United States. The city is within commuting range of Silicon Valley (Santa Clara County) and so commuting to Silicon Valley and the growth of high-tech employment in the city itself means very many people with high incomes competing for housing. On the other hand, there is little land left for development of the city and there is citizen resistance to developing older neighborhoods at higher densities. Thus, as in New York, the dark side of economic development is high rents, low vacancy rates, and, at the extreme, homelessness.

Often the promotion of the local economy involves giving subsidies or tax breaks to firms to encourage them to locate in the community instead of elsewhere. In that case, public funds are being given indirectly to entrepreneurs, investors, and stockholders, who may be a good deal wealthier than the average taxpayer. Should we be troubled by this treatment?

Some planners are very comfortable with this approach: That is the way the game is played in this capitalist society, and by and large, the system works better than other alternatives. Another planner might tell you that he or she does not really like to see public funds used to subsidize private sector activity but that when one jurisdiction, be it a town or city or county or state, puts money on the table to attract economic activity it forces the hand of adjacent jurisdictions, so one might as well accept it without becoming upset.

Others, such as Norman Krumholz, a former planning director of the city of Cleveland, are outraged by it.¹⁴ Regardless of what position one takes on the point, it clearly contains serious questions of social philosophy.

Transportation Planning

Transportation planning has many social implications. As noted in [Chapter 11](#), much of the conflict over Urban Renewal had to do with the taking of land for urban expressways, actions that necessarily displace people and that change or destroy the basic fabric of neighborhoods. How a region's transportation system is structured and how transportation is priced affect people's access to work, to public services, and to a whole range of activities.

If you were a poor person located in the central city and without access to an automobile, and the only job you could find was in the suburbs reachable only by a two- or three-hour bus trip, that might be sufficient to keep you unemployed. This problem has been well understood for at least half a century, but it is not easily solved. A public transportation

system that offered good access between any two sections of a metropolitan area instead of the more common system which is largely radial and oriented to the central business district would be spectacularly expensive.

Environmental Policy

Environmental decisions can have major social consequences. If an environmentally fragile area is the last site in town that might accommodate some low- and moderate-income housing, there is a serious question of values to be addressed. As noted in [Chapter 15](#), one person's environmental protection may be another person's unemployment. Again, what looks like a physical question rapidly reveals a social side.

The Question of Environmental Justice

In recent years there has been considerable interest among planners in *environmental justice* and the related issue, *environmental racism*. The central question is whether the poor and minorities bear a disproportionate share of the burden of environmental problems and, if so, why. Numerous studies have been done on the subject, and books and articles have been written about it. Some planning schools offer courses in environmental justice. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has become involved in environmental justice both in administration and in funding research. The department's statement on the subject begins as follows:

Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means that no group of people, including a racial, ethnic, or a socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal programs and policies.¹⁵

Determining the facts of the matter may be difficult. Assume that a municipal landfill or incinerator is surrounded by low-cost housing occupied largely by minority-group members. Is that the result of intentional discrimination in choosing the site of the facility? Did it occur because, in the politics of making the location decision, the residents of the area had less political clout and, in effect, lost the game of "hot potato"? Or is the explanation more innocent—that the facility, its location chosen in a fair and reasonable way, reduced property values, and so over the years the area filled with residents whose low incomes limited their choice in the housing market? Answering those questions may require considerable digging into the history of the site and its surroundings.

Gender Issues

In the 1990s it was asserted that planning decisions might have a sexual-identity element. In 1997 a group called Gays and Lesbians in Planning (GALIP) was formed as a division of the American Planning Association (APA) to represent the interests of gays and lesbians.¹⁶ One item that GALIP members mentioned was the recognition of and planning for districts that, either commercially or residentially, are oriented toward gays and lesbians. Within the planning profession, reaction to the formation of GALIP was mixed. Some took an "it's-about-time" view. Others argued that planning is about serving a general public interest and that the assertion of a separate gay and lesbian interest is divisive. How big a set of gay and lesbian issues can be identified and developed remains to be seen.

Feminism and Planning

A number of planning educators who define themselves as feminists have argued that there are feminist perspectives on planning and a set of feminist issues that should be, and often are not, addressed in planning. For example, a number of feminist planners have suggested that the way many suburbs were planned seemed more to suit the interests of men than women. The argument first surfaced in a major way in the 1960s with *The Feminine Mystique*, which, among many other points, argued that a house in a suburban subdivision where there are nothing but similar houses, even though it might be a nice house equipped with all the best furnishings and appliances, is really something of a prison for the woman who stays home all day with the children, and that this isolation contributes to boredom and depression.¹⁷ In fact the author, Betty Friedan, referred to the matter as "the problem that has no name." Whether that argument has lost some importance in the intervening years, as labor force participation rates for mothers of young children have risen and as the percentage of the adult female population living in households with children has declined, is an open question. More generally, feminists have suggested that in the past, planning (like almost all other professions) was male dominated, that most of its literature was written by men, and that most of its historic figures were male.¹⁸ This naturally tended to "privilege" male over female interests. Feminists suggest that a city or a metropolitan area laid out by women rather than by men might be a very different place.¹⁹

Planning and Aging

The leading edge of the baby boom (roughly 1947–1965) is now reaching retirement age. Middle-range projections by the Bureau of the Census show the total U.S. population increasing by about 26 percent from 2010 to 2035 but the 65-and-over population growing by 80 to 90 percent. That huge age wave from the baby boom will push a whole range of social planning questions to the forefront. A more numerous retirement age population will control a larger share of the nation's income and accumulated wealth, and will constitute a larger percentage of the nation's voters.

The place where the changed demographic structure will probably have its biggest effect on planning practice is in housing and land use. Seniors, who live largely in one- and two-person households, have very different housing needs and housing preferences than other age groups. They also have different needs for health, recreation, and public services (see [Chapter 11](#)). Transportation planning (see [Chapter 12](#)) will be affected. Public transportation in the United States now, with the exception of commuter rail and metro services, is largely used by the less prosperous—those who do not own automobiles. A large number of affluent seniors who cannot or do not want to drive could put a very different spin on that.

Social Planning for Whom?

The social issues noted in this chapter reinforce a basic theme of this book, which is that almost all but very minor planning decisions impose gains and losses. Planners who define themselves as social planners often feel that they should attempt to tip society's scales toward the less fortunate (or tip them so that they favor the fortunate a bit less). But many other planners take the position that their task is to serve the majority of the community or to serve a general public interest so far as they can identify it. These planners may also argue that a single community cannot do much about broad equity issues such as the distribution of income. Therefore, such matters are necessarily left to higher levels of government, where the means are more commensurate with the size of the problem.

Who Does Social Planning?

If one asks practicing planners whether there is a separate field of “social planning” one will get answers ranging from “Of course” to “What is it?” If a planner is doing something that is directly devoted to a social end (say, administering community development funds for a day care or an adult literacy program), clearly that planner is engaged in “social planning.” The great majority of planners, however, do not spend most of their time on explicit social planning. But almost any decision that involves how sizable blocks of land will be used or how sizable sums of public money will be spent has social implications. In that sense, any planner who is conscientious and competent is engaged in social planning.

Summary

All planning decisions of significant size have social implications. For many planners and planning agencies, social issues present themselves most strongly in the realm of housing. This chapter presents some of the older housing issues such as how much variety of housing type is permitted, as well as the implications of the extremely rapid growth of private communities, both the open and the gated variety. It also notes some social issues in connection with economic development and environmental planning as well as other areas. Whether or not one recognizes a separate field of social planning, it is clear that the social side of what at first might appear to be purely physical or design questions should not be ignored.

Notes

1. A graphic and entertaining account of the Pruitt-Igoe fiasco may be found in Tom Wolfe, *From Bauhaus to Our House*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1981.
2. See William J. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1987.
3. Richard Benjamin, “The Gated Community Mentality,” *New York Times*, Op.Ed. page, March 29, 2012.
4. Bill Bishop, *The Big Sort*, Houghton Mifflin, New York, 2008, p. 212.
5. Edward Blakely, “Viewpoint,” *Planning*, January 1994, p. 46.
6. Christopher Lasch, *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1995, and Bill Bishop, *The Big Sort*.
7. David Guterson, “No Place Like Home,” *Harper’s Magazine*, November 1992, pp. 55–61.
8. The idea that a greater number of communities would maximize consumer choice (the citizen is regarded as a consumer of public services) and move the market for public services toward the economists’ model of the perfect market goes by the name of the *Tiebout hypothesis*, after the economist Charles Tiebout. A presentation of the idea may be found in Ronald C. Fisher, *State and Local Public Finance*, 2nd edn, Richard D. Irwin Co., Chicago, IL, 1996, ch. 5. The hypothesis was originally propounded in an article by Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” *Journal of Political Economy*, October 1956, p. 422.
9. William Tucker, “How Housing Regulations Cause Homelessness,” *The Public Interest*, winter 1991, pp. 78–88.
10. Despite the very large concentration of the wealthy, particularly in Manhattan, the city’s population as a whole is not particularly wealthy and, in fact, the city’s poverty rate is somewhat above the U.S. average.
11. Income and Affordability Study, 2012, New York City Rent Guidelines Board, New York, p. 9.

12. The vacancy rate is probably reduced somewhat because the city has rent controls on a substantial part of its rental stock, particularly at lower rent levels.
13. A progressive tax is one that taxes higher incomes at higher rates than it taxes lower incomes. The most prominent example in the United States is the federal income tax.
14. Pierre Clavel, *The Progressive City: Planning and Participation, 1969–1984*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1987, ch. 3.
15. EPA press release, June 22, 2004. This release and other information is available on an EPA website, www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/.
16. Karen Finucan, “Gay Today,” *Planning*, February 2000, pp. 12–16. GALIP’s website is www.geocities.com/capitolhill/lobby/7016/galip.htm.
17. Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1963.
18. At present, enrollments in U.S. planning schools are about equally divided between men and women so that however much male dominance there is in the field, this should be reduced as more women rise to senior positions.
19. For a sampling of arguments and references to the feminist planning literature, see Susan S. Fainstein and Lisa J. Servon, eds., *Gender and Planning*, Rutgers University Press, 2004; and Barbara Rahder and Carol Altilia, “Where Is Feminism in Planning Going: Appropriation or Transformation,” *Planning Theory*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2004, pp. 107–116.

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