

# The Seasons of Our Lives: Erik Ericson

- Does everyone have an identity crisis?
- Does the development of human personality end with adolescence?
- Are the major tasks of life finished by retirement age?



*Erik Erikson*

[http://facultyweb.cortland.edu  
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Erik Erikson is quite different from the other theorists covered in this book. He is the only one who had no advanced degree. In fact, Erikson never went beyond high school (Woodward, 1994), yet he made it all the way up the academic ladder to a professorship at Harvard. Because he lacked formal training, he was not so devoted to the usual academic traditions in psychology. His point of view is quite cross-disciplinary, mixing Freudian with anthropological language, but it was mostly unique. Some observers may regard his orientation as more philosophic than scientific. However, unlike Fromm and others who have migrated from psychological science to philosophy, some of Erikson's concepts have received scientific support.

Despite his devotion to Freud, Erikson's basic concepts are highly original and drawn from the common language rather than psychological jargon. This inclination makes his ideas not well related to most of the other theorists' concepts. His most creative idea is the "identity crisis." It is the vehicle on which he rode into a personality territory that was virtually unexplored. Gordon Allport did write about the "mature personality,"

but it was Erikson, more than anyone else, who popularized the idea that personality development does not end with adolescence. While Allport wrote of adult life without reference to stages, Erikson elaborated three stages of adult development. Just as he has broadened the vista of personality psychology, he will expand your view of the rest of your life.

### *Erikson, the Person*

In 1902, Erik Homburger Erikson was born in the German town of Frankfurt to Danish parents (Stevens, 1983). His name, sans Homburger, meant “Erik son of Erik,” an appellation taken from his father, whose only other legacy was a genetic gift contributed during a brief affair with his mother (Woodward, 1994). Abandoned by the senior Erik even before his birth, Erikson was nurtured by the Jewish pediatrician who married his mother when he was only a few years old (Stevens, 1983).

A look at Erikson’s childhood makes it easy to see where his interest in “identity crises” originated. He was a child with an identity dilemma. As most boys are, he was pressured to pin his identity to his biological father, but it is almost impossible to tack anything onto a virtual void. Thus, he turned to his adopted father, who loved him and treated him well (Hall, 1983). Out of affection for his adopted father, Erikson initially chose Homburger as his surname. Even early in his career, including the period when he worked with Henry Murray, he went by Erik Homburger. Yet his ambivalence showed when later he relegated Homburger to a middle initial. This display of confusion about his stepfather was only a rare outward sign of the identity crises that occurred to him repeatedly. An ideal Aryan in appearance—he was tall and blond—Erikson faced taunts served up by the children at his father’s synagogue. At the same time he was shunned by some of his German schoolmates because of his stepfather’s religion. Later he toyed with the idea of following in his stepfather’s professional footsteps, but threw it aside, along with other aspirations for an advanced education. The lack of an advanced degree was itself a source of identity conflict. Was he a full-fledged academic or not? A former colleague thought that the lack of the academic “union card”—the Ph.D.—haunted Erikson when he joined the faculty at Harvard (Keniston, 1983). Later in life Erikson aptly expressed how uncertainty about his identity affected him during his youth, “I was,” he recalled, “morbidly sensitive” (“Erik Erikson,” 1970, p. 87).

In lieu of college, young Erikson took up painting (Roazen, 1976). This career move paid off in 1927 when an old friend and director of a progressive school in Vienna invited Erikson to ply his trade in the Austrian capital. Sponsors of the friend’s school included American Dorothy Burlingham, scion of the immensely rich and famous Tiffany family, who could well afford to commission portraits of her four children. It turned out that she also was undergoing psychoanalysis at the hands of the master himself, Freud. Through this connection, Burlingham became a friend of Freud’s daughter Anna, who counted the four Tiffany heirs among her first child patients. Erikson experienced only brief interaction with the four children before Burlingham and Anna Freud began persuading him to become a child analyst. Though he was unfamiliar with this new speciality, Erikson was intrigued and agreed to undergo training analysis with Anna Freud. Soon he was drawn into the inner circle of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society.

Owing to Erikson’s shyness and the oral cancer that already plagued Freud, the two seldom conversed. Nevertheless, as a follower of Freud he reveled in the excitement of a secretive psychoanalytic movement that was forced underground by the disdain of the medical establishment. In the six years that Erikson remained in Vienna, he delivered his first paper before the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, pursued an education in the Montessori method of schooling, and met his bride-to-be, a Canadian-born, U.S. student, Joan Serson.

A number of factors made Erikson view his time among the Vienna analysts as somewhat uncomfortable. Roazen (1976) thought that Erikson was “dissatisfied as one of Freud’s younger disciples” (p. 4). As a newcomer, Erikson felt called on to be a “servant for the master” (p. 4). He was even known to drive Freud around in Burlingham’s car. Also, his status as a non-M.D. “lay” analyst may have bothered him, but there were two reasons why he was at least reasonably well respected. First, being upset with the medical establishment for not openly accepting his point of view, Freud could readily overlook Erikson’s and others’ lack of “proper credentials.” Second, it was deemed less essential for child analysts to have medical

qualifications. Generally, Freud welcomed lay analysts in the hope of attracting a variety of people with broad backgrounds. Erikson was also attractive because he was one of the few men willing to pursue the fledgling profession of child analysis. Finally, he was Aryan.

Another source of discomfort was the constitution of the Vienna group, especially the child analysts. Freud had lost some of his most able male analysts and had surrounded himself with women, mostly recruited by Anna. "Erikson felt stifled by what he described as the maternalistic overprotection of the women analysts" (p. 6). Further, he, like the males who had abandoned Freud, felt the pressure to conform. He wrote about "a growing conservatism and especially a subtle yet pervasive interdiction of certain trends of thought. This concerned primarily any idea which might be reminiscent of the deviations perpetrated by those earliest and most brilliant of Freud's co-workers ... " (quoted in Roazen, 1976, pp. 6-7).

Perhaps his disaffection with Freudian thought, which he never openly admitted, accounted for his quick response to Hitler's assumption of power in Germany during 1933. Erikson and his new wife first tried to establish citizenship in Denmark. When that effort failed, they migrated to the United States, where Erikson became the first child analyst in Boston (Stevens, 1983). There he was immediately accepted by the American Association of Psychoanalysis, despite his lack of credentials, because its members so revered the International Psychoanalytic Association to which Erikson belonged and were so in awe of anyone who had been close to Freud.

Erikson did try to do something about his deficient qualifications, but he failed at graduate work in the psychology program at nearby Harvard (Roazen, 1976). That apparently was his last effort at a formal, advanced education. His alliance with Harvard, however, did not end. Soon he was working on research leading to the book that made Murray famous. During this period he had the opportunity to work with children of both the wealthy and the poor (Stevens, 1983).

After a stint at Yale's Institute of Human Relations, during which he made a side trip to a Sioux Indian reservation, the Eriksons moved to California where, in 1939, Erik took a position at the University of California at Berkeley. His observations of the Sioux and the Yurok, a Northern California tribe who preserved many of their ancient traditions, changed his orientation profoundly. These experiences convinced him that Freud's sexual ideas were not universal. Rather, he discovered that a progression through stages of identity acquisition is generalizable across cultures (Evans, 1967).

After ten years on the West Coast working on a longitudinal child development program, analyzing Hitler's speeches during the war, and studying life aboard submarines, he took a teaching post at the University of California. Unfortunately it was short-lived. When confronted with the demand that he sign an anti-Communist loyalty oath, Erikson, who was not Communist, refused and resigned (Woodward, 1994). Returning to the East Coast, he received an appointment to a psychoanalytic center specializing in child psychiatry. Soon thereafter, *Childhood and Society* (1950) made him famous. This seminal work was followed by other popular successes: *Young Man Luther*, a psychobiography of religious rebel Martin Luther, the Pulitzer prize-winning *Gandhi's Truth*, and, finally, *Life Cycle Completed*.

By 1960, he was so well known and respected that he was appointed Professor of Human Development and lecturer in psychiatry at Harvard, an extraordinary development in view of his nonexistent academic credentials. After his retirement, he and his wife returned to the San Francisco area. Until his death on May 12, 1994, he remained active advocating rights for children as well as for the elderly, and campaigning for an emphasis on people rather than nations. A colleague summed up the respect that she and others have for this prophet who proclaimed that personality development never ends: "As they used to say of Gandhi, he was a mahatama, a great soul, very wise, [a] very wide-ranging humanist" (Diana Eck, quoted in *Peoria Journal Star*, 1994).

## *Erikson's View of the Person*

### *Freudian?*

Erikson has been counted among the Freudians (or neo-Freudians). Roazen (1976) asserted that he was a self-proclaimed Freudian and there is no question that he was devoted to Freud on a personal level. Having read everything Freud wrote, including his correspondence, Erikson could not resist citing Freud at every possible opportunity. His dedication to Freud seems to stem from his beliefs about “great leaders.” During his study of Gandhi, his reflections on the Indian practitioner of nonviolent protest revealed his conception of the dilemma that followers of giants must resolve: “... who is the true representative of revolutionary advance—he who modestly continues the work of a giant and adapts it to less heroic circumstances, or he who continues to flex his muscles to see whether he may prove to have gigantic measurements himself” (Erikson, quoted in Roazen, 1976). It seems that Erikson came down on both sides, one explicitly and the other implicitly. Explicitly he pronounced himself a Freudian, often excusing the master’s personal weaknesses (e.g., his railroad phobia) and his theoretical vulnerabilities (e.g., his conception of women). Erikson waved his hand at Freud’s bizarre middle-aged abandonment of sexual relations and overlooked his nearly neurotic correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess. He felt obligated to dig for a seemingly appropriate Freudian citation with each mention of his own original ideas. In fact, Erikson credited some of his own ideas to Freud though they could be traced to his former mentor only by an enormous stretch of the imagination. Even Erikson’s most original and important idea was laid at Freud’s door. “Erikson’s many citations of Freud’s single mention of the concept of inner identity is an instance of a disciple trying to foist off an original idea onto [Freud]” (p. 12). As late as 1967, Erikson called himself a psychoanalyst. In terms of his explicit pronouncements, there is little question that Erikson was Freudian.

Accepting credit for one’s own ideas is to abandon humility. Taking credit is also accepting blame. Erikson tacitly acknowledged that it is difficult for creative people to achieve “the courage of their own originality” (Erikson, quoted in Roazen, 1976, p. 12). “When I started to write extensively about twenty-five years ago, I really thought I was merely providing new illustrations for what I had learned from Sigmund and Anna Freud. I realized only gradually that any original observation already implies a change in theory. The scientific climate has changed so much that older and new theories cannot really be compared” (quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 292). Thus, Erikson implicitly acknowledges that his ideas are more his own than Freud’s. Further, he deemphasizes sexual motivation in favor of the quest for identity. The unconscious takes a backseat to the ego, which, in Erikson’s hands, becomes molded into a form of the self. The superego becomes akin to the conventional conscience. At times he seems more like Jung than Freud, as his interest in anthropological issues and ancient cultures appears to exceed his concern for the obsessions of current, Western society. His experiences with the Sioux and Yurok made him more an anthropologist/sociologist than a psychoanalyst. Also, it made him see that Freud’s ideas were culture-bound, founded on European culture and thus not applicable to many other cultures.

He was more concerned with people’s missions in life as these quests evolve through the life span than their struggles with unresolved traumas of childhood. In fact, he openly expressed his reservations about Freud’s emphasis on cataclysmic events of early life: “If everything ‘goes back’ into childhood, then everything is somebody else’s fault, and trust in one’s own power of taking responsibility for oneself may be undermined” (quoted in Woodward, 1994, p. 56). In sum, despite the homage paid to Freud, he was certainly not a Freudian and maybe not a neo-Freudian. His theory was too much a mix of psychology, anthropology, and sociology to be “psychoanalytic.” [Box 7.1](#) shows that Erikson parted company with Freud regarding women.

## BOX 7.1 • Acknowledging Diversity: Erikson's Evolving View of Women

Erikson not only used masculine pronouns in writing, which was common in his time, he also frequently couched his pronouncements in masculine terms: "Evolution has made man ...," "mature man," "Whatever chance man has to transcend the limitations of his self ..." (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). In writing about the sexuality of male and female children, he proclaimed, "In the boy, the sexual orientation is dominated by phallic-intrusion; in the girl, by inclusive modes of attractiveness and 'motherliness' " (p. 289). He felt "stifled" by the Vienna women with whom he worked. Yet, he was an open person who appears to have changed as he matured during the early stages of the women's movement. In almost no other area did he so closely approximate declaring that Freud was "wrong." In an interview he indicated (from Evans, 1976, pp. 294–300):

Obviously [Freud and I] would not agree today with all the generalizations which have been made with regard to the Oedipus complex, least of all the female Oedipus complex. My feeling is that Freud's general judgment of the identity of women was probably the weakest part of his theory. Exactly what is to blame for that I don't know, except that he was a Victorian man, a patriarchal man. Freud's perception might also have been colored by the sexual mores of his time, which could not admit at first that an upper-class woman could have passionate and active sexual wishes and yet be refined and intelligent. At any rate, psychoanalytic literature tends to describe woman as an essentially passive and masochistic creature, who not only accepts the roles or identity assigned to her submissively, but needs all the masochism she can muster to appreciate the phallic male.

Erikson was flexible. He changed, and in so doing, moved further from Freud.

### *On the Tasks and Polarities of Life*

The "tasks of life" theme is at the heart of Erikson's theory. At each succeeding stage of human development people have new tasks to master. Thus, life and its challenges are constantly evolving. Contrary to the way Freud thought of it, or even the way Allport conceived of it, maturity to Erikson is not something most people achieve or not. Instead, it is something that people approximate well or not so well.

How well people conquer the tasks of a given stage determines toward which of two poles they migrate, one representing positive development and the other negative development. The poles symbolize the horns of a dilemma. Parents, the individual's society, interactions with peers, and the individual's own skills determine how well the dilemma is resolved. In turn, resolution promotes the development of a new **strength**, a virtue arising from dominant movement toward the positive pole. With resolution comes the ability to face the challenges of the next stage.

### *Basic Concepts: Erikson*

Erikson believed that people go through eight stages of psychosocial evolution that is termed **psychosocial development**, a union of physical yearnings and the cultural forces that act on the individual ("Erik Erikson," 1970). These phases include four childhood stages, one adolescent stage, and three adult stages. They are characterized by **epigenesis** (*epi* means "upon" and *genesis* means "emergence"): the stages literally emerge "one on top of another in space and time" (quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 294). Each is built on the other like each upper-level math course is built on lower-level courses. His most basic concepts are tied to the eight stages.

Like Jung, Erikson advocated a reality in which thesis and antithesis, the conflict of opposites, yielded synthesis, the resolution of conflict. Maturity and contentment result from synthesis; stagnation and maladjustment follow failure to resolve conflicts. The conflict at each stage is termed a "crisis." In effect, at each stage, the crisis that the individual experiences entails being stretched between the opposing positive and negative poles associated with the stage. Successful resolution of a crisis prepares the person for the next step in the quest for identity. As may have occurred to you, the popular phrase "identity crisis" originates in Erikson's conception of the psychosocial crises.

Erikson makes it clear that resolution of the crisis is never absolute. To approximate resolution people must experience a **favorable ratio**, the greater the magnitude of the pull to the positive pole relative to the

pull of the negative pole the better (Erikson, 1968a). In turn, the more favorable the ratio, the more people manifest the strength available at a given stage. Lest the reader think that Erikson's repeated references to "crises" makes a pessimist of him, it is important to note that resolution of conflicts is normal and expected, and "crises" are turning points, not threats of catastrophe (Erikson, 1968a). Each resolution of a crisis brings with it progress toward a full and rich identity, an issue explored in [Box 7.2](#).

### **BOX 7.2 • *What Are Your Own Sources of Identity?***

Exploring your own feelings of "identity" should help you get the flavor of Erikson's ideas on the subject. First, examine all of the "sources of identity" listed below. Then try to decide which are most important to you. It is a difficult task. Once Barbara Jordan, famous former Congresswoman and professor, was asked to choose between two prominent sources of identity, being Black and being a woman. This eloquent devotee of the U.S. Constitution paused to reflect for a moment. She did make a decision, but I do not recall what it was.

After examining the sources, rank them in order, giving the most important source a rank of one (1), the second most important a two (2), and so forth until all sources are ranked. Force yourself to make choices; the result of the ranking will tell you much about yourself. The choices are listed alphabetically. If you want to add other sources, do so before ranking.

career (specify present or anticipated career)  
child of my parents  
ethnic group (Black, White, Latino, Asian, or whatever applies)  
friend to several people  
gender (male or female)  
hobbyist (sports, exercise, or whatever applies)  
human being  
parent  
sibling (brother or sister)  
[others of your own choosing]

### ***Infancy: Trust and Distrust***

Infants (first year) arrive with basic physiological needs that parents must be willing and able to meet. Parents usually satisfy needs, but the inevitable delay or neglect of satisfaction and the occurrence of weaning generates the first crisis. **Basic trust** results from the infant's sense that it can count on satisfaction of its needs (Erikson, 1968a); the world takes on the aura of a "trustworthy realm." Its opposite is **basic mistrust**, the feeling of abandonment and helpless rage that accompanies uncertainty of satisfaction. Trust is injected into the infant in different ways by different mothers. Each mother is unique and, thus, conveys trust in a unique way. "Moreover, mothers in different cultures and classes and races must teach this trusting in different ways, so it will fit their cultural version of the universe" (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 293).

Erikson makes a point of the observation that both trust and mistrust are learned. We all must learn trust if we are to be fully functional humans, "But to learn to mistrust is just as important" (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 293). Mistrust is part of life also, and we must become familiar with it. We can hope, however, that trust will outweigh mistrust in the ratio of the two orientations.

Basic trust lays the foundation for the first of the strengths, hope, the enduring belief in the attainability of basic satisfactions. "You see, **hope** is a very basic human strength without which we couldn't stay alive" (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 293). It is the foundation of faith, often manifested in adult religious practices (Hall, 1983). In fact, faith is protected by religion, its **institutional safeguard**, a cultural unit that protects and promotes products of crisis resolution. Failure to develop basic trust yields mistrust and hopelessness.

## *Early Childhood: Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt (SAD; Shame/Autonomy/Doubt)*

During this second stage (age 2–3), the child develops motor skills that open up the first possibilities of independence (Erikson, 1968a). Part of the trauma the child experiences at this time is in the transition from the first to this more mature second stage. Just when the child has learned to trust its mother and the world, it must become self-willed. It must change from being the one-sided trusting soul to being also worthy of others' trust. Only by calling on others to trust it, rather than just trusting in others, can it exercise its will.

Children can now move to desired objects and thereby possess them without the aid of parents. The dawning of grasping ability allows children to experience the power of imprisoning an object within fingers, hands, and arms. Power also comes from letting go, but so does conflict. To hold can be destructive, as in restraining, or it can be positive, as in cuddling. Letting go has two additional meanings: giving up something desirable, or casually “letting it be.” Here Erikson hints at Fromm’s “dilemma of freedom”: to let go of something is to be free of it, but also to lose it.

With the newly acquired muscular skills, the child experiences doing for herself. Unfortunately, she also knows the frustration generated by needing the help of others who can do more for her than she can do for herself. For Erikson as well as Allport, self-esteem derives from doing for oneself. Consistent with this orientation, the two poles of the crisis involve the themes of independence and the self-esteem that comes with it versus the self-estrangement that accompanies dependency. **Autonomy** is independence stemming from the reasonable self-control that allows children to hold rather than restrain, to let be rather than lose. **Shame and doubt** is the estrangement that results from the feeling of being controlled and of losing self-control. It is the precursor of neurosis, a desperate struggle for control of one’s environment, and paranoia, a manifestation of feeling controlled by others. A child who is tentative and self-effacing is reflecting shame and doubt.

The strength that emerges from resolution during early childhood is **will power**, “the unbroken determination to exercise free choice as well as self-restraint in spite of the unavoidable experience of shame, doubt, and a certain rage over being controlled by others” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 288). The exercise of free choice has its institutional safeguard—the principles of law and order and of justice. However, Erikson argues that “law and order” when overblown can rob people of the very choice it is supposed to protect.

Erikson acknowledges that infants go through a Freudian “anal stage,” but “we have to consider that the anal musculature is part of musculature in general” (quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 293). The task of the infant is to learn control of his musculature, including his sphincters. In contrast to Freud, culture is emphasized rather than universal physiology in achieving sphincter control.

## *Play Age: Initiative versus Guilt*

In the fourth year, children become aware of the differences between the sexes. During this third stage, sex-role playing and sexual feelings occur for the boy. But to Erikson the girl plays the feminine role, trying to look attractive and to be nurturing, rather than being sexual. Conscience appears at this stage and forever places restraints on actions, thoughts, and fantasies. One of the poles at this stage is **initiative**, acting on one’s desires, urges, and potentials. The other is **guilt**, the harness that restrains pursuit of desires, urges, and potentials, the exercise of an overzealous conscience. The boy learns that competition for a favored position with his mother leads to the inevitable fear of damage to his genitals. The result is guilt at having taken the initiative well beyond that which is permissible (Evans, 1967). Erikson turns further from Freud when he suggests that it is only natural for the boy to fall in love with his mother, because she is everything to him. She is the center of his life and his caretaker. Any fantasies a child may have will tend to focus on what is crucial to her or his survival and prosperity. Thus, the boy’s fantasies, even those relating to his emerging genital urges, will likely center on his mother. The girl has problems relating to pursuit of her father’s attentions. For both genders, guilt arises from a failure to demonstrate capability when the initiative is taken (Evans, 1967).

At first, children’s play involves only wish fulfillment and fantasy rather than real purpose, but gradually it changes. “The child begins to envisage goals for which his locomotion and cognition have prepared him. The child also begins to think of being ‘big’ and to identify with people whose work or whose

personality he can understand and appreciate” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1967, p. 25). That is, children’s developing new strength is **purpose**, “the courage to envisage and pursue valued and tangible goals guided by conscience but not paralyzed by guilt and by fear of punishment” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 289). Failure at resolution leads to repression or inhibition and to adult pathology such as sexual impotence, overcompensation, and exhibitionism.

### *School Age: Industry versus Inferiority*

At each stage, the child becomes a somewhat different person. At the school age, the fourth stage (ages 6 through 12), children evolve into intellectually curious people. They want to know, to learn. During this time, children begin to lay the groundwork for becoming parents. They play at the parental role to prepare themselves for the real thing. For the first time, they relate to the larger society and one of its core elements, work. They learn to apply themselves to tasks that have practical outcomes such as schoolwork for grades or housework for a “salary.”

Erikson sometimes referred to the school age as asexual or the “latency period.” He is quick to add, however, that Freud missed all the cognitive development that blossoms during the school age “because he was only concerned with what happens to sexual energy during that time” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 295). One of the poles of the school age is **industry**, children’s absorption in the “tool world” of their culture—the workaday world—which prepares them “for a hierarchy of learning experiences which [they] will undergo with the help of cooperative peers and instructive adults” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 289). Of course, school is the first productive situation that provides an inkling of the “tool culture.” Here “work” is school performance. In other settings it may be athletic performance or group-play activities. In each case the child is learning adults’ rules of work, as directly seen in playing “house” or “doctor.” The other pole of the crisis, **inferiority**, occurs if children perceive their skills or status among peers to be inadequate. This perception arises because of failures at establishing competence in some specialized way, such as playing a game or spelling well. Race or ethnic background may become barriers that prevent children from experiencing success and the accompanying actualization of the will to learn. Inferiority can yield regression to the hopelessness of over-concern about the opposite-sex parent that characterized the previous stage. The triumph of inferiority leads to an obsession with work, which becomes the sole source of identity, a workaholic orientation. “If the overly conforming child accepts work as the only criterion of worthwhileness, sacrificing too readily his imagination and playfulness, he may [as an adult] ... [become] a slave of his technology ... ” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 289).

Resolution of the crisis at the school age gives children critical experiences, including working beside and with others and “division of labor.” From this resolution emerges the strength of **competence**, “the free exercise (unimpaired by an infantile sense of inferiority) of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of serious tasks” (Erikson, 1968a, pp. 289–290). With competence, children are ready for cooperative participation in some segment of the culture.

## *Adolescence: Identity versus Identity Confusion*

The adolescent search for self represents the fulcrum on which the lifelong struggle for identity is balanced. Adolescence, the fifth stage (13–19), allows a synthesis of previous stages, but it is more than the mere sum of what developed earlier. It is also an extension into the future. One pole of the adolescent crisis is **identity**, accumulated confidence that the sameness and continuity one has previously cultivated are now appreciated by others, allowing, in turn, the promise of careers and lifestyles to come. *Continuity* is an important term in the conception of identity. “Identity means an integration of all previous identifications and self-images, including the negative ones” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 297). Continuity ensures that one is all that one was, but also something new and something yet to be. The opposite of identity is **identity confusion**, the failure of previous identity developments to coalesce in such a way that it is clear what roles one is expected to play in the future. While all teens may change superficial identity periodically—Goth one month, hip-hop the next—repeated changes at short intervals may signal abnormal identity confusion. The victory of confusion predicts acute maladjustments due to a feeling of meaninglessness. Further, adolescent identity is not merely obtaining genital maturity. It is an ability to be concerned about others, because one’s own problems relating to previous periods have been largely solved (Evans, 1976). Identity problems for teens are in part related to their personal histories and in part arise from identity pitfalls peculiar to their historical era. For example, today’s teenage boys may be torn between the macho orientation that dominated their fathers’ identities and the more gender-neutral identity that seems appropriate today.

In their struggle to answer the question “Who am I?” adolescents often form cliques. These clans bolster self-images and provide a mutual defense against “enemies” whose different characteristics challenge the “truth” of their own developing identities (Hall, 1983). If teens turn this condemnation of the “different” against society, delinquency can result. In fact, modern teen gangs can be viewed as Eriksonian clans formed to foster identity development. However, adolescent rebellion is not seen by Erikson as a necessarily negative force, at least when the larger culture is considered (Erikson, 1968a). Societies must be flexible, and Erikson sees adolescent challenges as a source of cultural rejuvenation. Youth, in their quest for identity, question the norms of their society, vigorously supporting those that meet the challenge and contributing to the demise of rules that cannot bear close scrutiny. Periods of unrest among the young attest to the sickness of a society failing to meet the promise of youth—that the best will rule and the rulers will bring out the best in people. The unrest of the 1960s was a response to a society whose leaders were not “bringing out the best.” During such times, the mind of youth and that of society become one in the pursuit of ideological unification and return to coherent purpose.

The strength that comes from the adolescent period is **fidelity**, “the opportunity to fulfill personal potentialities ... to be true to himself and true to significant others ... [and to] sustain loyalties ... in spite of inevitable contradictions of value systems” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 290). For Erikson, fidelity is the cornerstone of identity. It is, however, not devotion to a particular ideology, but loyalty to ideologies that are appropriate to the individual. As Erikson put it, “I would go further and claim that we have almost an instinct for fidelity—meaning that when you reach a certain age you can and must learn to be faithful to some ideological view ... without the development of a capacity for fidelity the individual will either have ... a weak ego, or look for a deviant group to be faithful to” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 296).

The need to adopt ideologies, particularly a focal ideology, can be a trap that ensnares the impulsive teen. Erikson believed that “Adolescents are easily seduced by totalitarian [authoritarian] regimes and all kinds of totalistic fads” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 297). Like Allport and Fromm, he was especially concerned because youth are prone to succumb to the siren song of “nationalism” (exclusive devotion to one’s nation). The allure of nationalism is in its ideological simplicity and resultant promise to answer all questions and solve all problems. As far back as 1942, Erikson recognized the effect of the nationalistic narcotic on the “Hitler Youth” (Hoffman, 1993). Youth must somehow avoid impulsivity in responding to the almost instinctual demand of fidelity that one quickly adopt the most obvious ideology available. If they cannot, ideology may become the basis of their identities. Only with restraint will the magnetic force of simplistic ideologies like nationalism be resisted until broader ideologies are considered.

But what gets confused when “identity confusion” occurs? [Box 7.3](#) suggests that young people who infrequently enjoy the presence and influence of their parents may resort to other models in their search for identity. However, research by Mashek, Aron, and Boncimino (2003) suggests identity confusion might be

seen from a broader perspective than “parents versus other adult figures.” Their results indicate that how close we feel toward others with whom we engage in some kind of relationship may explain identity confusion. The teenage to young adult participants in their research (mean age averaged across three studies, 19.6 years) first named people to whom they felt close, such as “best friend” and “father.” In some studies, they also named people to whom they did not feel close: “familiar stranger” (Bill Clinton) and “non-familiar stranger” (Chelsea Clinton). Then they indicated the applicability of some trait words to themselves and, with different lists, ascribed trait words to close others (best friend) and non-close others (Bill Clinton). Finally, participants were given a memory test in which they tried to remember which trait words they had ascribed to themselves, close others, and non-close others. Results clearly showed that participants were more likely to confuse trait words ascribed to close others as having been applied to themselves than they were to confuse words ascribed to non-close others as having been applied to themselves. When we show identity confusion, we are likely to confuse our own identities with the identities of the people in our lives to whom we feel close.

### BOX 7.3 • *How Do We Become Who We Are?*

One wonders whether, in these times, some parents have set aside sufficient time and effort to have a positive impact on their children. In this era of two-income families, commuting long distances to work, and multiple ways to spend recreational time—100+ TV channels, the Web, bigger and better movies, gigantic shopping malls, and increased interest in sports—some parents may not be present often enough to influence the identities of their children. So where do the children of such parents turn? One obvious answer is to the media. Another is to other people who are “there for them,” such as teachers, coaches, clergy, and peers. In any case, it is hard to fashion an identity solely of our own choosing. We must have some influential figures in our lives who provide standards for shaping an identity.

But are our identities at adolescence and young adulthood our final identities? I once knew a college student who apparently had rejected his rather conservative, middle-class parents and all they stood for. He was a campus radical of yesterday, the tumultuous late 1960s. We would now think of him as confirmation of the hippie, draft-dodging, antiestablishmentarian, rebel stereotype. His values were free living, prolove, antiviolence, and antiwar, like the hippies. He “practiced at being gay” so he could avoid military service (he never served). He made fun of the university administration who begged him to stay on campus during breaks and weekends so he could help them calm any “out-of-control” dissidents. He ridiculed the political establishment, especially then-President Nixon. He even engaged in some minor “dirty tricks” to stick a needle in the hide of “greedy Corporate America.” He was brilliant, funny, and a catalyst for needed change. Where is he now? Unlike most former campus rebels, he has turned in the other direction. Now in his fifties, he is widely known for his conservative views.

### *Young Adulthood: Intimacy versus Isolation*

During previous stages, strengths allowed the genders to merge in cooperation and fruitful communication. When “falling in love,” teenagers attach themselves to another person in an attempt to arrive at self-definition. Teens “in love” see themselves reflected in an “idealized other,” but do not actively attempt to differentiate themselves from the other. Now, during the sixth stage (20–35), the biological differences come to the fore, so that the genders, similar in consciousness and language, become different in the mature quest for love and procreation. The two poles of this sixth stage are tied to the themes of attachment to and alienation from others. **Intimacy** “is really the ability to fuse your identity with somebody else’s without fear that you’re going to lose something yourself” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1967, p. 48). Fromm’s view of intimate relations with others is similar. It is more than the mere physical intimacy that occurs in sexual exchanges (Hall, 1983). “Of course, I mean something more—I mean intimate relationships, such as friendship, love, sexual intimacy, even intimacy with oneself, one’s inner resources, the range of one’s excitements and commitments” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 300). With this broader definition of intimacy in mind, Erikson anticipated modern theories of marital success (Allen, 2001). He asserted that intimacy is what makes meaningful marriage possible.

The other pole in the crisis for this stage is **isolation**, the failure to secure close and cooperative

relationships with the same, and especially the opposite, gender such that partners' identities are important to, but distinct from, one's own. The triumph of isolation dooms the individual to infantile fixations and lasting immaturities that interfere with love and work. On the other hand, intimacy brings the strength of this period. **Love** "is the guardian of that elusive and yet all-pervasive power of cultural and personal style which binds ... the affiliations of competition and cooperation, procreation and production" into a "way of life" (quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 291). Love is "a mutuality of devotion greater than the antagonisms inherent in [mates'] divided function[s]" (p. 291).

### *Middle Adulthood: Productivity versus Futility*

During the first dozen years I've been doing this book, my own students and students at other colleges and universities have pointed out that longevity is not what it was when Erikson first composed his stages. The average longevity for women in Western societies is approaching 80 and it is around the mid-seventies for men (it is even greater elsewhere, e.g., Japan). As students have suggested, it is high time for an additional stage. I propose a new stage called "Middle Adulthood" that spans the ages 35–60.

One pole of this stage is **productivity**, people's perception that they are contributing to society through their careers and to their community through their personal involvement. People who develop productivity through resolution at this stage are doing what Adler would hope for. They are, through their labors, generating outcomes that they see as improving society. Obviously, school teachers, social workers, farmers, physicians, college teachers, nurses, clinical psychologists, and ministers are in a position to develop productivity. Others may also perceive that their vocations contribute to society: insurance agents, attorneys, refuse collectors, energy producers, and many others can be in a position to benefit society. Anyone can support perceptions of productivity in their communities by becoming involved. Everything, from just voting in local elections, through contributing money to local charities, to visiting shut-ins, qualifies as community involvement.

The other pole is **futility**, the perception that one is on the proverbial treadmill, merely keeping body and soul together, but doing nothing for the good of society or one's community. People who fail to resolve the conflict at this stage feel that they are producing nothing worthwhile, except sustenance for their own benefit. They view their jobs not as careers, but as useless work. Any of the careers listed under "productivity" could be listed here as well, because futility, like productivity, is in the eye of the beholder: if one does not see one's work as worthwhile, it is not. But could people see their contributions as having no value when, in fact, their efforts are highly valued? Not likely, because they would be getting positive feedback from others if their works were highly valued. In almost all cases, perceptions of futility are supported by negative feedback or by the absence of positive feedback. Futility guarantees alienation from society and from one's community. Society is seen as having no use for one's efforts. In the same vein, one can offer one's community nothing of value. Depression is likely to accompany futility.

The strength of this stage would be **contentment**, the perception that one's efforts result in the promotion of human well-being and that one is revered in the local community because of "good works." A contented person perceives that what he or she does is not mere labor. Instead it is a service to society that advances the culture by improving or enriching the lives of others and it is a concrete contribution to the local community that people can see and appreciate. Contentment comes with believing that one's efforts are valued by society and by one's neighbors. **Box 7.4** is Erikson's take on cultural diversity in people's communities.

## *Mature Adulthood: Generativity versus Stagnation*

“At this stage one begins to take one’s place in society, and to help in the development and perfection of whatever [society] produces” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, pp. 301–302). Humans are not only “learning animals” they are teachers as well. It is during the maturity of adulthood (60–75) that the need to be needed and the accumulation of wisdom lead to assumption of the “teacher” role. Thus, during the seventh stage, people strive for **generativity**, “the concern with establishing and guiding the next generation” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). It is manifested in the advice that middle-aged people are inclined to offer younger individuals. Erikson admitted that *generativity* is “not an elegant word” (p. 301). He indicated that he might have used *creativity* instead of *generativity*, but the substitution would put “too much emphasis on the particular creativity which we ascribe to particular people” (p. 301). *Generativity* has a broader meaning that is applicable to people in general: “everything that is generated from generation to generation: children, products, ideas, and works of art” (p. 301).

### **BOX 7.4 • Erikson on Cultural Diversity**

Except possibly for Jung, no other theorist covered so far has left her or his theoretical door more wide open to cultural diversity than did Erikson. He recognized that mothers from different cultures must teach trusting in ways that are consistent with their traditions. You can well imagine that, compared to North America, trust is imparted differently in South American societies and Asian societies, where babies are strapped for hours on the mother’s back facing away from her. It is also taught differently in African societies, where “it takes a whole village to rear a child.” Although he believed that people of different cultures passed through the same developmental stages, his studies of non-Western cultures led him to acknowledge that the ways his stages were manifested were different for different cultures. For example, during the “school age,” the “adult rules of work” that children learn, and the role-teaching games they play, are different for different cultures. For example, Masai (East Africa) children learn how to care for livestock and Maori (New Zealand) children learn wood and stone carving. Erikson recognized as well that during the school age avoidance of inferiority was more difficult for the children of oppressed social and ethnic groups than for others. As for the teen period, Erikson observed that youth are both the architects of the cultural evolution that occurs during troubled times and the victims of it. His popularity among 1960s youth arose from his recognition that U.S. society needed changing and that youth would be the catalysts for change. His writings predicted that youth would be in the forefront of the civil rights movement and of the campaign to end the U.S. role as the world’s police.

The failure of generativity leads to **stagnation**, the arrest of the ripening process that comes with inability to funnel previous development into the formation of the next generation. Boredom is the constant companion of stagnation, as is false intimacy and adult self-indulgence. Inevitably, the failure of generativity shows up in the next generation as the aggravation of estrangements in childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood.

**Care**, the strength of maturity, is “the broadening concern for what has been generated by love, necessity, or accident—a concern that overcome[s] ... the narrowness of self-concern” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). Care is a major force behind utilization of “proven methods with which each generation meets the needs of the next” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). Erikson was at first concerned about the selection of *care* because of its multitude of connotations, including “anxious solicitude” (Evans, 1976). But he concluded that the word has evolved and now means “ ‘to care to do’ something, to ‘care for’ somebody or something, to ‘take care of’ that which needs protection and attention, and ‘to take care not to’ do something destructive” (quoted in Evans, 1976, 301).

## *Old Age: Integrity versus Despair*

Power in old age is wit in full bloom—a storehouse of knowledge, an inclusive understanding, and a maturity of judgment. These intellectual contributions provide a bridge to the next generation by reminding all that the knowledge of a given generation is not “truth,” but a cog in the infinitely large and everturning wheel of human experience. Crisis at this time (75 until death) involves contributing to the continuity of the human condition versus distraction from that noble purpose by an obsession with death. The poles for this eighth stage revolve around wholeness and completeness versus disintegration and defeat. **Integrity** is “an emotional integration faithful to the image bearers of the past and ready to take (and eventually renounce) leadership in the present” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). Integrity is the continuity that comes from being solidly founded on a past that contributes to the present and projects into the future. My grandmother had it.

Lack of resolution leads to **despair**, a feeling that time is too short for the achievement of integrity and the accompanying contribution to the connection between generations. Despair can result in bitterness at not being able to extend oneself into the future and a losing battle with death, rather than a calm acceptance of it. Despair yields psychological death before the physical counterpart. The strength that comes from resolution of the eighth crisis is **wisdom**, a “detached and yet active concern with life in the face of death,” not magical access to “higher knowledge” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 292; Hall, 1983). With wisdom, death is accepted, and one’s role in the human drama is assured.

Erikson was not entirely satisfied with the term *wisdom* “because to some people it seems to mean a too strenuous achievement for each and every old person” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 301). In fact, during old age people may show a renewal of infantile traits, even including senile childishness. *Wisdom* in any sense is not a necessity during old age. “The main point is again a developmental one: only in old age can true wisdom develop in those who are thus gifted. And, in old age, some wisdom must mature, if only in a sense that the old person comes to appreciate and to represent something of the wisdom of the ages, or plain old wit” (p. 301). Though he was not old when he died, wisdom is what Malcolm X had at the end of his life. **Table 7.1** summarizes Erikson’s eight stages, as well as my new middle adulthood stage, spanning ages 35–60, and the crisis of identity associated with each.

## *Theoretical and Empirical Support for Erikson’s Point of View*

### *Levinson: The Midlife Crisis*

Daniel Levinson was in his mid-forties when he recruited a sample of middle-aged men (1978). Levinson’s crisis, suffered at the midpoint of life, yielded creative conceptions. The *midlife transition* is a bridge between young adulthood and middle age, a time when individuals look back at their previous successes and failures and look forward to future prospects (Levinson, 1978). Because of concern about mortality, people begin to reevaluate the past in order to use the future more wisely. They raise questions about their contributions to family and career and vice versa. The result usually is *de-illusionment*, a reduction of illusions, a recognition that assumptions and beliefs about self and the world are not true. Illusions have worked well in earlier life as fuel to drive ambitions and ideals. At midlife it is time to cast them aside in favor of objective assessment.

**TABLE 7.1** *Erikson's Eight Stages and a New Stage*

<i>Stage</i>	<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Poor Resolution</i>	<i>Strength</i>
Infancy	Basic trust vs. mistrust	Confidence in satisfaction of needs	Rage due to uncertainty of satisfaction	Hope
Early childhood	Autonomy vs. shame and doubt	Independence stemming from self-control	Estrangement due to being controlled	Willpower
Play age	Initiative vs. guilt	Acting on desires, urges, potentials	Conscience restrains pursuits	Purpose
School age	Industry vs. inferiority	Absorbed in "tool world"	Skills and status inadequate	Competence
Adolescence	Identity vs. identity confusion	Confident that sameness seen by others	Previous identity developments fail	Fidelity
Young adulthood	Intimacy vs. isolation	Fusing identity with another	No close relationships	Love
Middle adulthood	Productivity vs. futility	Contributing to society and community	Feeling alienated	Contentment
Mature adulthood	Generativity vs. stagnation	Guiding the next generation	Arrest of the ripening process	Care
Old age	Integrity vs. despair	Emotional integration	"Time is short"	Wisdom

The middle adulthood stage is not one of Erikson's stages but has been added here by the author, given the increase in longevity since Erikson first composed his stages.

Reappraisal may take the form of major upheaval, the midlife crisis. The new lifestyle may replace family and career, or a simple reordering of priorities may occur. In any case, Jung's *individuation* begins, a process by which the relationship between a person's self and the external world is changed so that there is a clearer separation between self and the world. At midlife, progress to maturity defines a sharper distinction between self, family, and friends than occurs at earlier stages. Also, expectations that restrict behavior and thought are rejected. Generativity accompanies individuation.

Some people sail through the midlife transition with little questioning. Their lives may be sufficiently stable and satisfying that they do not experience severe crisis. Others accept the loss of some dreams and are able to face the future without pain. However, Levinson contends that most people's struggles with the self and the external world reach crisis proportions (80 percent in his sample). They display guilt, anguish, upset, new lifestyles, and personality changes reflected in clothing, hair styles, and use of language.

To accept middle age is to realize that life is partly over and that death must be considered. When functions decline at age 40 or so, people must think about the unthinkable. The possibility of death runs head on into our cherished assumption of immortality. The contradiction thus generated is not eliminated by giving up the illusion of immortality; instead, it is seen in a new light. If one leaves behind a *legacy*, material goods, wisdom for others to use, and examples for others to follow, one lives on despite the demise of the body.

## ***Sheehy: Women Are Different***

Gail Sheehy (1977) focused on the midlife crisis as it applies uniquely to women. Age 35 begins a dangerous period for women. It is when the last child is sent off to school, ending the period of intense child care. Now she has time to think and her thoughts may turn to her attractiveness. Fearing her beauty is fading, she uses it while it lasts. The biological clock is ticking and, as it winds down, opportunities to have children and, thus pass on her genes, begin to wane. An affair may result.

Intense child care ends about when women enter the workforce. Working outside the home is motivated by economics and a need to fill the child-care void. Once in the workforce, she is likely to stay. This move can be good or bad or both. She may be well educated and thereby equipped to succeed. If so, she will be frustrated to find that competitors for advancement, often men, are ahead of her by virtue of their greater experience. If she is poorly educated, she will soon realize that advancement is unlikely for her. Frustration caused by being behind or despair due to being stuck at a low-level job may cause a crisis.

Clay (2003) reports that researchers associated with the McArthur Foundation network have exploded some long-standing myths about “mid-life crises.” For example, David Almeida has found that it is the everyday stressors, such as fights with a spouse and work deadlines, that have the most impact on midlife, not rare events such as death of a loved one or a divorce. His work also shows that while younger adults experience more daily stressors, *overload stressors*—engaging in too many activities at the same time—are more often experienced by midlife people. However, there are gender differences. Compared to midlife men, midlife women experience more *crossover stressors*—simultaneous demands arising from several domains, such as work and family. Educational level is an additional factor: midlife people with little education report the same number of stressors as their more educated counterparts, but they rate them as more severe. Obviously, it may be the recurring relatively “small” stressors that shape midlife, not the astronomical, lifestyle changing crises that Levinson and Sheehy emphasized.

## ***Empirical Support: Research Confirming Erikson’s View***

Ochse and Plug (1986) looked at trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, intimacy, and generativity among White and Black South Africans aged 15 to 50. The seven positive poles of the first seven stages were represented by questionnaire items, along with a measure of well-being. As expected, subjects’ responses to the questionnaire indicated that, the more the positive poles were manifested in their responses, the higher their sense of well-being. Also, a factor analysis of these adults’ data revealed factors corresponding only to adult poles: intimacy versus isolation and generativity versus stagnation.

In addition, it was expected that intercorrelations among the poles relating to crises that had already been passed—those of childhood—would be relatively strong. Such was the case for White women and to some degree for White men, but not for Blacks. In fact, the intercorrelations among the poles tended to be high regardless of whether subjects had yet passed crises. This result was taken to mean that “Erikson’s personality components to some extent develop in parallel [rather one before another] and are interdependent even before the relevant crises are resolved” (p. 1246). This conclusion is contrary to “epigene-sis”: earlier crises must be resolved before later ones. However, Erikson “does suggest that all the components develop to some degree throughout life, even before their critical stages” (p. 1246).

The prediction that *intimacy* would be generally higher for women than for men was confirmed, but only for Whites. For Blacks, intimacy was higher for men than for women. This outcome was one of several where results for Blacks and Whites differed, with only Whites confirming predictions for Erikson’s theory. It reminds us of a fact that Erikson acknowledged: theories derived by people of one culture may not apply to people of another culture. One would also predict that identity would become more highly related to intimacy in the early twenties than in the teens. Further, identity would become most highly related to generativity in middle age, when generativity becomes salient. But, continuing the cultural difference trend, Erikson’s prediction was borne out only for White women. For White and Black men, only the prediction regarding generativity was supported. Other results showed that scores associated with poles of already-passed childhood stages showed declines with increases in age, but those associated with adult poles increased with

age. Also, men showed stronger autonomy, initiative, and industry, as sex-role adoption would predict. Finally, and very importantly, factor analysis revealed a strong and overriding factor: “identity” in the global sense. This result suggests that the various crises at the several stages are indeed “identity crises.”

Kowaz and Marcia (1991) developed a measure of “industry” for administration to school children, their parents, and teachers. It focused on three components: (1) cognitive (skills and knowledge); (2) behavioral (applications of skills and knowledge); and (3) affective (attitudes and experiences relating to the acquisition and application of skills and knowledge). Evidence for the validity of the concept “industry” was strong. Cognitive industry scores were positively correlated with achievement scores, whether measured by children’s subjective judgments of school achievement or grades. An overall score on industry was also positively related to achievement test scores. For teachers’ judgments, being on-task versus off-task was positively related to industry scores. Also, “level of reasoning” was positively related to the overall industry scores.

The researchers developed a measure of concern for the process involved in a task, as opposed to interest only in the task outcome. This measure was positively related to the overall measure of industry: the more the industry, the more the interest in the process versus the outcome. Finally, overall contentment was positively related to industry. Results showed that the concept “industry” strongly applies to the age-group that should orient to it, according to Erikson.

McAdams, Ruetzel, and Foley (1986) looked at a measure of generativity in relation to indexes of power and intimacy motivation as measured with use of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). Subjects were adults between the ages of 35 and 49. The index of generativity was taken from an interview in which subjects explored plans for the future. Two independent scorers looked for evidence indicating concern for guiding the next generation either directly—caring, giving, teaching, leading, mentoring—or indirectly—contributing in a literary, scientific, artistic, or altruistic sense. Results showed that TAT scores indexing power and intimacy motivation were positively associated with the measure of generativity: the greater the generativity, the greater those motives. The researchers interpreted this result to mean “that generativity calls on an adult’s fundamental needs to feel close and to feel strong vis-à-vis others” (p. 806).

McAdams and Mansfield looked at the relationship between generativity and communion: being self-sacrificing and “one with” others (Mansfield & McAdams, 1996). They found that the higher the level of communion shown by subjects, the higher was the level of generativity. The same team plus de St. Aubin and Diamond (McAdams et al., 1997) collected life stories in a two to three hour interview with people high in generativity (e.g., school teachers involved in voluntary work) and a contrasting group who were less generative. The high generativity group was significantly higher on moral steadfastness, redemptive sequences (turning negative events into positive outcomes), prosocial future goals, and early family advantage (e.g., person singled out early by family as having a special talent).

McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, and Bowman (2001) interviewed 74 adults, evenly split into high and low generativity groups, about events during their lives. Measures of redemption (bad outcomes turning into good ones) and contamination (good outcomes turning into bad) were derived from the interview data. Redemption was positively correlated with favorable traits (e.g., self-esteem) and negatively correlated with depression. The correlations for contamination were the opposite.

Pratt, Danso, Arnold, Norris, and Filyer (2001) used the generativity scale of Mc-Adams and colleagues (1997) to study the relationship between generativity and parenting style. They found that generativity positively related to mothers’ authoritative style (expecting mature behavior from their teens and enforcing reasonable rules). For mothers, generativity was positively related to positive, optimistic views of teen development. For fathers, no clear pattern emerged.

Peterson, Smirles, and Wentworth (1997) contrasted generativity with authoritarianism, the tendency toward closed-mindedness as well as overrespect of authority figures and the values they espouse. Subjects were college students and their parents who completed the same questionnaires. Generativity was positively related to political involvement, but negatively related to authoritarianism. For parents, generativity was highly positively related to openness to experience, but authoritarianism was strongly negatively related to openness. Conscientiousness and generativity were positively correlated for both students and their parents. Extraversion was positively related to generativity for both parents and offspring, but it was negatively related to authoritarianism. Parents’ high authoritarianism was strongly linked to conflict with their offspring through their authoritarian parenting style (e.g., not permitting children to have input regarding rules). Thus,

generative people, especially parents, are open, conscientious, extraverted and, as parents, tend to allow children input into the rules that govern family life. Authoritarians tended to be the opposite.

Peterson and Stewart (1993) derived TAT scores on achievement, affiliation-intimacy, and power. Generativity was separately indexed by scores on parenting involvement, personal productivity, and societal concern. For women, power motive related to parenting and achievement motive related to forms of generativity expression outside the home. Men showed the opposite tendency: power motive related to generativity outside the home and achievement motive related to parenting. It was concluded that differences in opportunities and expectations for men and women accounted for the gender difference. As the average age of subjects was 27.7, results also showed that people begin to develop generativity well before middle age.

Franz, McClelland, and Weinberger (1991) followed up research beginning in the early 1950s. Participants, aged about 41 by 1990, were 94 men and women who completed a questionnaire and submitted to an interview. The measure of generativity was taken from written details of “hopes and dreams for the future” submitted by subjects (p. 589). These plans were scored by two students using a method developed by McAdams. Results showed that psychosocial maturity—indexed by having close friends at midlife, a long, happy marriage, and children—was positively related to generativity.

McAdams (2000) pointed out that “care,” the strength associated with generativity, is similar to but not the same as the “care” expressed by parents toward their children. Erikson’s “care,” associated with mature adulthood, is broader, encompassing volunteer activities and civic obligations, as well as family concerns. It also does not imply a power differential, or a dominant/dependent relationship, as in parent vis-à-vis child. He went on to suggest that the caregiver-dependent model of attachment fits parent-child relationships well, but not romantic relationships. If he is correct, Shaver’s analogy between child-parent attachment and romantic attachment is weakened.

## *Evaluation*

### *Contributions*

Erikson’s is a remarkable story. With only a high school education, he made it to the lofty status of Harvard professor. More importantly, he formulated a theory that has heavily influenced not only academics but also the public. Erikson was a hero during the 1960s because of his views regarding youth and rebellion. His assertion that people continue to grow and change in specifiable ways not only opened new vistas to millions of older people, it also revolutionized the study of personality. Prior to Erikson, it was becoming a dogma that personality is set in stone by the end of the teens at the latest. Erikson’s unique and creative thoughts opened the eyes of other theorists to the possibility of personality growth at and after middle age. Never again will psychologists neglect older people or believe that everything currently happening in their lives was predetermined by events in their youth.

Like Adler, Horney, Fromm, Rogers, Bandura, and Allport, Erikson is important because of the person he is. Making it as an academic without academic credentials is somewhat akin to making it as a politician without the backing of the political power brokers. Like Adler and Murray, Erikson turned psychological deficiencies into ideas that not only helped him but are valuable to countless others as well. If we adopt his respect for the goals and aspirations of people of all ages, we will take an enormous stride in the direction of respecting all people everywhere.

Thanks to Erikson, there is now up-to-date evidence that people pass through something akin to Erikson’s epigenic stages. Further, two of the ideas that he took off the top of his head have been supported by research: industry and generativity.

## Limitations

While it is admirable that someone could gain the respect of academics without obtaining the academic union card, a doctorate, Erikson's lack of advanced training showed up in his thinking. There is a certain lack of logical consistency in his ideas. For example, it is not entirely clear why he chose the labels "autonomy versus shame and doubt" to characterize developments at early childhood. Likewise, why was "initiative versus guilt" chosen for the play age? While "autonomy" makes some logical sense, why is "shame and doubt" the other side of the coin representing the early childhood crisis? "Guilt" or "inferiority" or another label might fit just as well. The opposite of "autonomy" is "dependence" and the counterpart of "initiative" could be "dependence." "Competence" seems to fit as well at early childhood as "will power," which may be regarded as a cliché that has been adopted by everyone from frustrated dieters to Adolf Hitler. Erikson was openly dissatisfied with *wisdom*. Aside from the multiple meanings attached to the word, which he does mention, he might have added the fact that the word is so overused it has become trite. One could add, why eight stages?

"Fidelity" seems to be a particularly murky concept. The way Erikson defines it and the way he talks about it do not match well. If it is related to the adoption of ideologies, as Erikson indicates, one could wonder whether adolescence is the appropriate place for it. Perhaps the seeds of ideological flowering are planted during the teens, but the blossoming may well occur during young adulthood or even later. College students led the protest movement of the 1960s.

While Erikson has inspired several researchers as well as many ordinary citizens, he has apparently failed to recruit notable followers to take up his cause. There are few if any Eriksonians around, at least among well-known psychologists. Perhaps it is because his theory has relatively little practical import compared to others. It has no therapy associated with it, and, unlike other theories, Erikson's theory has been relatively little used to solve real-world problems.

## Conclusions

While Erikson's lack of academic training may be a fault that places limits on his theory, it may also be regarded as a virtue. One wonders whether he would have seen that personality development does not end at age 20 if he had been trained in the typical psychology department. As it is, his vision is characterized by greater acuity than most. He anticipated the "midlife" crisis and reminded us all that elderly people can be productive. Not only does he provide us with the possibility of productivity during old age, he points out creative tasks appropriate to the golden years.

Erikson's example reminds us that creative thoughts applicable to the lives of people are not the sole province of the highly educated. Not being encumbered by academic dogmas and methodologies, he was able to focus on what others had neglected. He brought an end to the overemphasis on youth just at the right time. As we enter the era of the "graying of the population," the thoughts of Erik Erikson will become more and more relevant. Erikson was 16th on the list of most frequently cited in journals, 11th on the list of those most frequently cited in textbooks, 17th most frequently named in the survey, and 12th overall (Haggbloom et al., 2002).

## Summary Points

1. Erikson was born the son of Danish parents, but he was reared by a Jewish physician. As a young man, a job as a children's portrait painter proved to be his passport into Vienna's secretive psychoanalytic society. In the United States, he attempted graduate work and worked with Murray. He was a professor at Yale, the University of California, and Harvard.

2. Erikson was a Freudian in that he felt he owed allegiance to Freud. Most of his important concepts, however, are distinct from Freud's. He rejected Freud's unflattering view of women. At each successive phase of life, people find themselves on the horns of a new dilemma and confronted with new tasks.

3. Erikson believed that we pass through a series of eight psychosocial stages, each building on the earlier ones (epigenesis). Each stage brings a new crisis: people are caught between two new conflicting poles. The crisis thus represented is never fully resolved, but, hopefully, the ratio of orientation to the positive pole, relative to the negative pole, is favorable.

4. In the first stage, infancy, the poles are basic trust and basic mistrust. The strength of this period is hope. It is the foundation of faith, which is protected by the institutional safeguard, religion. Early childhood presents the poles autonomy versus shame and doubt. Its strength is will power.

5. The third stage involves initiative versus guilt. The boy does fantasize about his mother, but it is because she is central to his life, not solely because of genital urges. The strength of this period is purpose. At the school age, the horns of the dilemma are industry and inferiority. The child at this stage prepares for the “tool culture.” The strength of this period is competence.

6. During adolescence the poles are identity versus identity confusion. At this stage previous identity developments either come together or not. It is a time of rebellion against the rules and norms of society. Fidelity is the strength: loyalty to self, others, and to personal ideologies. Ideologies must be adopted, but the danger is subordination of identity to ideology. Identity confusion involves confounding our identities with those of close others.

7. Erikson’s theory is in sync with diversity because he acknowledged that his stages and dilemmas would manifest themselves differently in different cultures. In young adulthood, intimacy is fusion of one’s identity with another’s without loss to self. Love binds together competition and cooperation, procreation and production. In an additional stage, middle adulthood, the poles are productivity versus futility and the strength is contentment. In mature adulthood, generativity is concern for guiding the next generation. Stagnation is the negative pole and care is the strength of this period.

8. Research indicates that midlife is shaped by daily stressors—overload and crossover stressors—not life-changing traumas. In old age, integrity opposes despair: passing on power and leadership to the next generation versus failure to establish a connection between generations. The strength is wisdom, in the sense of “wisdom of the ages.” Levinson’s midlife transition entails a show of de-illusionment and individuation. We must give up our illusion of immortality and contemplate a legacy. Women’s crisis begins at 35: lost children and lost attractiveness. Divorce, concern for “biological clocks,” and job competition with men confront women.

9. The poles for young adulthood and adulthood were extracted from factor analysis, but the lack of appearance of the other poles suggests overlap among them. An overriding factor, “identity,” was also extracted. Several predictions from Erikson’s theory were supported, but usually for Whites, not Blacks. There were also some troublesome gender differences. In another study, measures of industry predicted achievement, grades, and being on- versus off-task. Studies by the McAdams group showed that generativity is related to communion, moral steadfastness, redemption, prosocial future goals, and early family advantage. McAdams pointed out that care associated with generativity is similar to but not the same as parental care.

10. Peterson’s group found highly generative people more open, especially about family rules, as well as conscientious and extraverted compared to authoritarians. Other work found gender differences on power and achievement related to generativity. Erikson’s theoretical and career accomplishments are remarkable given that he lacked a Ph.D. He was a hero to youth of the 1960s and a champion of the elderly. Research has mostly supported his view. Unfortunately, some of his concepts seem exchangeable across stages, some are trite in meaning, some, like “fidelity,” are murky, and some have too many meanings. Research has turned up other problems and raised questions, such as “are eight stages enough?”

## *Running Comparison*

<i>Theorist</i>	<i>Erikson in Comparison</i>
Freud	He de-emphasized the unconscious: he merely mentioned oral, anal, and phallic factors and the latency period, and he played down their physical–sexual side all in favor of psychosocial aspects. He came close to calling Freud “wrong” about women.
Gordon Allport	He agreed with Allport that self-esteem derives from doing for oneself. They both deplored nationalism.
Erich Fromm	He also considered the dilemma of freedom and they had similar notions about union with another and nationalism.
Sullivan and Horney Jung	He was also concerned about early, faulty parent–child relationships. Like Jung, he emphasized the polarities (opposites).

## *Essay/Critical Thinking Questions*

1. What are the tasks of your life now and what do you expect them to be in ten years?
2. What are your major sources of identity?
3. Why have “industry” and “generativity” been singled out for special research attention?
4. Why do identity developments coalesce during adolescence? Why not at some other stage?
5. As a young adult, how can you “fuse your identity with somebody else’s without losing” it?

## *E-mail Interaction*

Write the author at [b-allen@wiu.edu](mailto:b-allen@wiu.edu). Forward any of the following, or phrase your own.

1. Was Erikson a person with deep-seated inferior feelings?
2. Indicate Erikson’s single most important contribution.
3. Was Erikson really sexist?

# The Sociopsychological Approach to Personality: Erich Fromm

- Are there basic needs rooted in the very essence of humans?
- Do some people love death?
- What can an investigation of life in a Mexican village tell us about personality?



*Erich Fromm*  
Courtesy of Wikimedia  
Commons

Erich Fromm stood at the crossroads of modern personality psychology. Similar to Erikson, some say that he came from the Freudian branch of the psychological tree. If so, he nurtured a new limb supporting a more broad-based personality theory. Fromm, compared to theorists covered earlier, described Freud's scientific contributions in glowing words: "... his discovery of unconscious processes of the dynamic nature of character traits is a unique contribution to the science of man which has altered the picture of man for all time" (Fromm, 1962, p. 12). Yet, when he compared Freud with social theorist Karl Marx, as he often did, Marx was the clear winner. "I consider Marx, the thinker, as being of much greater depth and scope than Freud" (p. 12). Further, Fromm's criticisms of Freud center on the claim that psychoanalysis "can define man scientifically" (Funk, 1982, p. 13). Indeed, Fromm believed that Freud's most basic notions are not amenable to scientific study.

Another reason that Fromm is pivotal in the history of personality theory derives from his academic training and background. He is the first of the theorists covered in this book who was trained in a university graduate school. Like Erikson, he had no medical school training, opting instead to study psychology, philosophy, and, especially, sociology. He received his Ph.D. from Heidelberg in 1922 following completion

of “a dissertation on the sociopsychological structure of three Jewish Diaspora communities ... ” (Funk, 1982, pp. 2–3). Quite naturally his orientation would be away from biological/medical matters toward a **sociopsychological orientation**, the sociological study of people that sheds light on their psychological nature. During his long career, Fromm held professorships in several departments of psychology, including those at Michigan, Michigan State, Yale, New York University, and the University of Mexico. Because his background was a mixture of sociology, political philosophy, and psychology, he was the prophet of things to come: personality research and theory were to be taken away from psychiatry/psychoanalysis and given over to psychology and allied sciences.

### *Fromm, the Person*

Erich Fromm was born in Frankfurt, Germany, March 23, 1900, the only child of Orthodox Jewish parents. As a Jewish boy in a Christian community, he experienced feelings of “clannishness” on both sides, along with occasional episodes of anti-Semitism. He characterized his father, the owner of an independent business, and his mother, a homemaker, as “highly neurotic,” and himself as an “unbearable, neurotic child” (Funk, 1982, p. 1). Fromm wrote that “an anxious and moody father and a depression-prone mother was enough to arouse my interest in the strange and mysterious reasons for human reactions” (Fromm, 1962, pp. 3–4).

Spurred by a deeply religious family, young Fromm became engrossed in the teachings of the Old Testament “which touched me and exhilarated me more than anything else I was exposed to” (Fromm, 1962, p. 5). He was enthralled by the tale of Adam’s and Eve’s disobedience, and by Jonah’s mission to Nineveh. Isaiah, Amos, and Hosea moved him not so much by their prophecies of disaster as by their visions of the “end of days” when nations “shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more” (p. 5). These words were adopted by the international peace movement to which the adult Fromm was to contribute substantially.

Fromm developed his concepts in large part by reflecting on the thoughts of Freud and Marx, whose ideas he tried to synthesize (Fromm, 1962; Weiner, 2003). His early interest in psychoanalysis was triggered by an incident that occurred during his adolescence. A 25-year-old friend of the family killed herself following the death of her widowed father, with whom she had spent nearly all of her time.

I had never heard of an Oedipus complex or of incestuous fixations between daughter and father. But I was deeply touched. I had been quite attracted to the young woman; I had loathed the unattractive father; never before had I known anyone to commit suicide. I was hit by the thought, “How is it possible?” How is it possible that a beautiful young woman should be so in love with her father, that she prefers to be buried with him to being alive to the pleasures of life...? (Fromm, 1962, p. 4)

In 1929 Fromm began a psychoanalytic apprenticeship under the tutelage of Hans Sachs and Theodor Reik at the Berlin Institute, which also was the site of Karen Horney’s training (Funk, 1982; Hausdorff, 1972). Like Horney, he had no direct exposure to Freud. Because he lacked medical training, Fromm was suspect in some corners of the Freudian world. Although Freudian concepts were rather simplistic from a biological perspective, even for the time, many Freudians thought that one needed medical training to comprehend Freud’s ideas. They probably believed that Fromm avoided Freud’s biological notions because, lacking medical training, he could not understand them.

For a short time after his psychoanalytic training, Fromm appeared to be a devout Freudian (Hausdorff, 1972). *The Development of the Dogma of Christ* (1931) supported Freud’s idea that religion is an illusion adopted in the interest of infantile gratification. But appearances can be deceiving. Although Fromm’s Freudian period continued past his move to the United States in 1934, later he was to call himself at best, “... a very unorthodox Freudian” (Hausdorff, 1972, p. 3). Fromm’s retreat from Freudianism may have begun during the writing of his highly successful book, *Escape from Freedom* (1941). This widely read declaration of independence from Freud advanced Fromm’s unique ideas concerning how a totalitarian society and its ideology (e.g., Nazi Germany) can shape the thinking of its citizens. Needless to say, *Escape* was the right book at the right time: the United States was entering World War II against Japan and Germany, models of authoritarian societies.

Fromm, like Jung and Adler, declared that World War I was “the event that determined more than anything else my development” (Fromm, 1962, p. 6). Fromm was 14 when the war began and, at first, was

confused by people's reactions to armed conflict. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, his Latin teacher, who seemed peace-loving, proclaimed his favorite "law" to be, "if you want peace, prepare for war" (p. 6). In a show of true colors, when the war began the Latin instructor was obviously delighted. "How was it possible that a man who always seemed to have been so concerned with the preservation of peace should now be so jubilant about the war?" (p. 6).

Experiences in Fromm's English class helped him deal with the "armament preserves peace" paradox. He and other students were told to learn the heart of the British national anthem over the summer. However, by the time they returned to school, the British had become "the enemy" and the students proudly announced that they would not learn the anthem. Fromm's teacher answered their defiance with a calm, prophetic reminder: "Don't kid yourself; so far England has never lost a war" (p. 7). "Here was the voice of ... realism in the midst of insane hatred—and it was the voice of a respected ... teacher!" (p. 7). Never again would Fromm think it merely odd that "arms bring peace"; it was insane.

Amidst Orwellian doubletalk of "strategic retreats" and "victorious defenses," he found that a number of uncles, cousins, and schoolmates had been killed and he again asked himself, "How is it possible?" Fromm puzzled over the bugles of war-justification blaring from the headlines of German newspapers: "was Germany not fighting against the very embodiment of slavery and oppression—the Russian Czar?" (p. 7). When he read convincing evidence that Germanic nations were responsible for the war, his consternation deepened. But confusion became mixed with horror when he realized that young men were buying their country's propaganda and paying dearly for it. They were *not* sacrificing life and limb for peace, freedom, and justice. They were being maimed and killed because their governments had declared the other side "evil," just as the other side had denounced them. This projected-image view of mutually antagonistic groups persists today in the United States's views of adversaries in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea and in their views of the United States; when one looks at the other, one sees what the other sees when looking at oneself, evil. He became "deeply suspicious of all official ideologies and declarations" (1962, p. 9).

Fromm was truly a citizen of the world. He received his academic training at the Universities of Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Munich, Germany. While in the United States, he lived in many locations. His last professorship was at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City. Retirement in 1965 was followed by a blitz of professional activity: 20 percent of his books were completed, including the report on his monumental study of Mexican villagers. In 1976, the year his last book appeared, Fromm moved to the borders of beautiful Lake Maggiore, straddling the Swiss-Italian border. He died in the Swiss town of Muralto on March 18, 1980 (Funk, 1982).

### *Fromm's View of the Person*

It was Fromm's search for answers regarding the ills of society that led him to Marx and Freud. Yet, in studying their theories he began to see flaws, defects in their attempts to be scientific and deficiencies in science itself. Eventually, he began "believing in the superior value of blending empirical observation with speculation (much of the trouble with modern social science is that it often contains empirical observations without speculations) ... I have ... [been] guided by the observation of facts and have striven to revise my theories when the observation seemed to warrant it" (pp. 9–10). With these words, he adopted the scientific-empirical method and also assigned heavy weight to speculation.

Fromm's leftist inclinations began in childhood when he talked politics with a socialist who worked with his father (Fromm, 1962). Although he considered himself at the time "not suited for political activity," after he settled in New York City he became a member of the American Socialist Party (p. 10). During the Vietnam era, he supported the peace movement and its candidate Eugene McCarthy (Funk, 1982). Fromm was a cofounder of SANE (the Organization for a Sane Nuclear Policy).

Like Adler, though Fromm was a lifetime socialist, he had serious reservations about the Soviet brand of socialism (Funk, 1982). When Fromm was in his seventies, Hausdorff (1972) asked him to define himself. Fromm replied, "[I am] a socialist who is in opposition to most Socialist and Communist parties ... " (p. 3). He saw socialism from a humanistic perspective and was repelled by what he regarded as Communist attempts at subjugation of the human spirit in the interest of perpetuating the power of party officials. That he thought of Soviet Communism as a failed attempt at instituting the Marxist form of socialism is seen in his derisive reference to the "perversion of the Russian revolution" (Fromm, 1962, p. 11). Despite these

reservations, Fromm's continued devotion to socialism, even in its Communist form, is seen in his solution to the confused social order that existed in his time. To solve social ills he offered **humanistic communitarian socialism**, a political system embracing economic, social, and moral functions wherein ordinary citizens interact cooperatively and are actively involved in the various functions (Fromm, 1955, 1976). With this process of governing, the governed would participate in all facets of society. Each person would help to ensure that all people enjoy the products of society and none be exploited. The object would be "serve the people" not "make a profit."

Fromm considered a broad spectrum of social influences on personality including the feudal system of the Medieval Age, the Protestant Reformation, nineteenth century industrialization, and twentieth century Nazism, fascism, Communism, and capitalism. Despite the diversity of his writings on social matters, his terminology remained at least somewhat psychoanalytic and he advocated the Freudian unconscious (Pietikainen, 2004). Nevertheless, he was a practicing **humanistic psychoanalyst**, one who believes in the essential worth and dignity of each person, and in the importance of helping each person to do the most with what she or he has. Fromm was convinced that psychology cannot be divorced from philosophy, ethics, values, meaning, sociology, or economics. He saw psychology as having the potential to debunk false ethical judgments and build objective, valid rules of conduct.

Fromm was also influenced by **existentialism**, an approach to understanding each person's most immediate experience, the conditions of his or her existence, and the necessity of exercising freedom of choice in a chaotic world (Binswanger, 1963; Boss, 1963; Kierkegaard, 1954; May, 1958; Merleau-Ponty, 1963; van Kaam, 1963, 1965, 1969). Existentialists encourage psychologists to get inside each person's world, to understand how that person lives, moves, and experiences his or her "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 1949). The critical existential concept *being* refers to a condition that is unique to each entity, whether it is a person or a grain of sand, and that transcends the particular qualities of the entity (size, weight, color). Being cannot be assessed by the usual scientific or psychoanalytic methods. It can only be intuitively grasped.

Existentialists value consciousness and personal responsibility (Frankl, 1963). Human freedom is defined not as freedom *from* responsibility but freedom *to accept* responsibility. Thus, one cannot rely on upbringing, early experience, heredity, or present environment to shape oneself. One must make oneself. This rather total responsibility for oneself can be burdensome and even frightening (Sartre, 1957). For this reason, existentialists often write about nothingness, alienation, despair, absurdity, and anxiety. Although influenced by existentialism, Fromm's outlook is more positive. He stressed the unique capacities of each individual to create and love, not his or her despair, alienation, and anxiety. In reference to a basic dilemma, he asserted that the aim of each person's life is to *join* with others while remaining a *free* and separate being. The uniquely human aspects of experience were emphasized, including choosing life's direction and transcendental or spiritual experiences.

## ***Basic Concepts: Fromm***

### ***Existential Needs***

According to Fromm, people are alike in that they all experience the same dilemmas and contradictions that are heart and soul of human existence. These worrisome paradoxes and conundrums are grounded in opposites that are rooted in the very essence of humans, for example, freedom–subjugation (Fromm, 1973). Thus, all people find themselves joined with others, yet alone; living, yet dying; free, yet responsible; conscious of their potentialities, yet powerless over their limitations. People also are alike in sharing **existential needs**, needs that must be met if one's existence is to be meaningful, one's inner being is to be developed, one's talents are to be fully exploited, and abnormality is to be avoided. Fromm emphasized eight such needs.

***Frame of Orientation and Object of Devotion.*** People need a **frame of orientation**, a cognitive "map" of their natural and social worlds that enables them to organize and make sense of puzzling matters and allows them to operate in the arena of rational understanding. A frame of orientation is an important factor in a person's life whether it is "true" or "false." Thus, although they are falsehoods from an objective point of

view, beliefs “in the power of a totem animal, in a rain god” or in the “superiority and destiny of [my] race” may function as frames of orientation (Fromm, 1959, p. 160). In fact, false or irrational ideologies may be particularly seductive when adopted as frames of orientation. Unlike their scientifically based counterparts, political and religious notions may seem to offer solutions to every problem. “The more an ideology pretends to give answers to all questions, the more attractive it is” (Fromm, 1973, p. 231).

In addition, people need some **object of devotion**, a *goal* that gives meaning to their existence and position in the world. Such an “ultimate concern” provides direction in life, reduces isolation, and permits transcendence beyond one’s immediate self. Fromm (1973, pp. 231–232) wrote,

The objects of man’s devotion vary. He can be devoted to an idol which requires him to kill his children or to an ideal that makes him protect children; he can be devoted to growth of life or to its destruction. He can be devoted to the goal of amassing a fortune, of acquiring power, of destruction, or to that of loving and of being productive and courageous. He can be devoted to the most diverse goals ... yet ... the need for devotion itself is a primary, existential need demanding fulfillment regardless of how this need is fulfilled.

These two motivational forces together provide a synthesis of one’s self and one’s life circumstances (Grey, 1993). A way to deal with life’s puzzles and a meaningful goal weld the self to life circumstances.

**Relatedness.** Humans have an intense need for **relatedness**, “the necessity to unite with other living beings ... [constitutes] an imperative need on the fulfillment of which man’s sanity depends” (Fromm, 1955, p. 30). Among the ways that one can fulfill the relatedness need is by joining another person in a **symbiotic union**, a coupling of beings in which each meets the needs of the other while they “live ‘together’” as “two, and yet one” (Fromm, 1956, p. 15). As birds feed on the pests that infest the crocodile and the rhinoceros, each member of a symbiotic pair serves the other.

There are two forms of the symbiotic union, both destructive. In the *passive* union, the person submits to the control of another person, institution, or substance that “directs him, guides him, protects him ... is his life and his oxygen ...” (Fromm, 1956, p. 16). Submission takes the form of masochism in that the person is used and abused by the power to which he or she has submitted. If one becomes subservient to another person, the other becomes an idol. Subjugation can involve the whole body, as in sexual submission. Horney’s moving toward others is similar. Submission can be “to fate, to sickness, to rhythmic music, to the orgiastic state produced by drugs ... —in all these instances, the person renounced his integrity, makes himself the instrument of somebody or something outside of himself ...” (p. 16). If submission is to a country or society, the subservient person may show **automaton conformity**, the condition that occurs when the person, out of fear of aloneness, gives up freedom for union with society. And she or he bends over backwards to maintain the union by strict adherence to social norms and conventions. A rigid net of cultural values ensnares us so completely that we do what *it* dictates, never what *our* inner voices demand (Lesser, 1992).

In the *active* symbiotic fusion, the theme of the union is domination involving sadism, the opposite of masochism. The dominating individual seeks to escape from aloneness by making another person a part of him or her. People of this sort sadistically achieve self-inflation by incorporating another person who, in turn, masochistically worships them. Each is so dependent on the other that neither can live without the other. “The difference is only that the sadistic person commands, exploits, hurts, humiliates, and that the masochistic person is commanded, exploited, hurt, humiliated” (Fromm, 1956, p. 17). While the sadist and the masochist are different, they also are the same: they have fused with another at the sacrifice of their personal integrity. Not surprisingly, a given person can react both sadistically and masochistically, usually toward different objects. Hitler, for example, was sadistic toward the German people, who worshiped him as a god. But he was masochistic in regard to fate: he rode destiny wherever it carried him, from the glory of conquest to the ignominy of suicide.

In contrast to the tragedy of symbiotic union, **mature love** “is union under the condition of preserving one’s integrity, one’s individuality ... [it] is an active power of man” (p. 17). The power of love demolishes the barriers that separate people. It overcomes isolation and separateness, yet it maintains personal integrity. Love is “becoming one and yet remaining two” (p. 17). There is no need to inflate either one’s own or the other person’s image and the need for illusions regarding the other person and oneself vanishes. Fromm believed that “In the act of loving, I am one with All, and yet I am myself, a unique, separate, limited, mortal

human being” (Fromm, 1955, p. 32). When one truly loves another person, one loves all of humanity, and, therefore, oneself. These ideas are reminiscent of Erikson’s identity resolution at the young adult stage.

**Rootedness.** **Rootedness** is a deep craving to maintain one’s natural ties and not be “separated” (Fromm, 1973). Without roots we would have to stand alone, in isolation and helplessness, not knowing who we are or where we are. Most people show progress in life by substituting new roots for old. When biological separation occurs, through birth and maturation, substitute attachments are sought, both symbolically (God, country) and emotionally (love, community). The more complete the original separation, the greater the need to form new roots that approximate the paradise of security represented by envelopment in the womb. The intensity of the craving for roots as deep and secure as the original ones can be so overwhelming that the individual may regress to a near infantile state in which dependence on some symbolic substitute for mother occurs. Such substitutes include “the soil,” “nature,” or “God.” The healthy opposite to this regression toward a primitive state is finding new roots in “the brotherhood of man, and by freeing [oneself] from the power of the past” (Fromm, 1973, p. 233). A destructive “symbiotic” regression was illustrated by the young woman who committed suicide after her father’s death. She was unable to separate herself from her father. An example of mature love is provided by Fromm himself in his marriage to Annis Freeman in 1953 (Hausdorff, 1982). He was truly one with her, but he clearly maintained his integrity, as reflected in the enormous productivity he showed during the years of their marriage. In sum, one can satisfy the need for roots through love, or one can take the destructive route by seeking a symbiotic relationship.

We can become detached from our roots, if, for example, we are identified as African American, Latino, Asian, or American Indian, and do not know the language, history, or traditions of our culture. Reattachment can be a powerful experience.

**Identity.** **Identity** is the need to be aware of oneself as a separate entity, and to sense oneself as the subject of one’s own actions (Fromm, 1955). The person is able to say and feel “I am I.” This need also applies to seeing others as separate persons. Members of ancient clans sometimes are unable to see themselves as existing separately from the group, expressing their identity as “I am we.” Throughout history, individuals have identified themselves with social roles. Medieval roles included “I am a peasant” or “I am a lord.” These ideas are akin to “persona,” Jung’s mask concept. When the feudal system broke down, major uncertainties were created. Peasants and lords were unable to answer the questions “Who am I?” or “How do I know who I am?” They then turned to nation, class, religion, and occupation as substitutes for unique identity. People have sought to obtain a false sense of personal identity, security, or status by adhering to such social roles as “I am an American ... a Protestant ... an executive.” Citizens living in the twentieth century also have sought to “Escape from Freedom” by giving up their individuality to totalitarian governments. Fromm maintained that we must stop this tragic and fruitless quest for identity. We must abandon “being” the roles we play or “being” as others want us to be. Instead, we must devote ourselves to “being” separate entities who can relate to others without dissolving into them. We may also wish to separate our own identities from those of people close to us as these identities may be confounded (Mashek et al., 2003).

**Unity.** **Unity** is a sense of oneness within one’s self and with the “natural and human world outside” (Fromm, 1973, p. 233). Unity can be approached through dressing in animal skins, in efforts to unite with the animal portion of nature. It can also be approached by subordinating one’s energies to an all-consuming passion for power, fame, or property. Failures to achieve unity can evade consciousness if one anesthetizes oneself through alcohol, drugs, sexual orgies, trances, or cultist rituals. These tricks played on consciousness are attempts to restore unity within oneself. Indeed, when one is drugged or drunk one achieves a sense of unitary experience that is a kind of oneness. However, Fromm believed that this method has only temporary positive effects and is counterproductive in the long run. It damages those who use it, estranges them from others, twists their judgment, and makes them dependent on the substance or passion in which they have chosen to invest themselves. The true and certain path to unity lies in developing human reason and love. Religion can be the light to illuminate that path, but only if one participates in it, rather than passively

submits to it. All the great religions of the world have a common goal: “to arrive at the experience of oneness, not by regressing to animal existence but by becoming fully human—oneness with man, oneness between man and nature, and oneness between man and other men” (Fromm, 1973, p. 234).

**Transcendence.** **Transcendence** is the act of transforming one’s accidental and passive role of “creature” into that of an active and purposeful “creator” (Fromm, 1955). As you will soon see, this idea is much like the humanistic notions of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow. It can be accomplished through various means, in as simple a process as planting seeds and producing material goods or in as complicated a manner as creating art and ideas and loving others. By creative acts, humans can rise above the “creature” in them and ascend to new heights where purposefulness and freedom dwell. But “How ... does man solve the problem of transcending himself, if he is not capable of creating, if he cannot love? There is another answer to this need for transcendence: if I cannot create life, I can destroy it. To destroy life makes me transcend it” (Fromm, 1955, p. 37). Because humans must transcend themselves, they are compelled to create or to destroy, to love or to hate. Both the destructive and the creative paths lead to transcendence. “However, the satisfaction of the need to create leads to happiness; destructiveness to suffering, most of all, for the destroyer himself” (Fromm, 1955, p. 38). It follows from this position that we must do all we can to foster creativity, a potential that exists in all of us, so that happiness prevails rather than destructiveness. Later you will read about how Carl Rogers and B. F. Skinner sought to promote creativity.

**Effectiveness.** **Effectiveness** is the need to compensate for “being in a strange and over-powering world” by developing a sense of being able to do something that will “make a dent” in life (Fromm, 1973, p. 235). To be effective is to “get things done,” “to accomplish,” and to be a person “who has the capacity to do ... something” (p. 235). It also offers some proof of one’s existence and identity, based on the realization “I am, because I effect.” People may experience joy by producing effects that are either positive or negative—making a noisy clatter, eliciting a smile from a loved one, doing what is forbidden, destroying property, or even causing terror in a victim. We first manifest effectiveness in child’s play when we experience the “joy of being a cause” (p. 235). One of the earliest expressions of effectiveness is the child utterance “I do ... I do.” As you will see, Gordon Allport argued that, to be effective, to do for oneself, is a landmark developmental event. According to Fromm, effectiveness striving arises in part from being overwhelmed by parental power: “... to rule when one had to obey; to beat when one was beaten; to do what one was forced to suffer, or to do what was forbidden to do” become principal goals of the child (p. 236). As adults we are preoccupied with effects and are compelled to produce them. We must “elicit an expression of satisfaction from the baby being nursed, a smile from the loved person, sexual response from the lover, interest from the partner in conversation” in order to feel “I am because I effect” (pp. 235–236). As with Fromm’s other concepts, this one has its downside. If we cannot by our actions elicit loving feelings in others, we can, like Shelley’s Frankenstein monster, cause them fear and suffering. The choice between construction and destruction is, as always, ours to make.

**Excitation and Stimulation.** **Excitation and stimulation** is the need for the nervous system to be “exercised,” that is, to experience a certain amount of excitation (Fromm, 1973). The importance of this need is supported by research showing brain-generated dream activity during sleep, by the abnormal reactions of infants and monkeys reared in environments lacking varied sensory stimulation, and by studies of normal young adults exposed to environments lacking in sensory variation.

Consistent with Fromm’s view, hundreds of studies on sleeping and dreaming demonstrate that the brain must be continuously stimulated, even during some phases of sleep (see Anch, Browman, Mitler, & Walsh, 1988). Because sensory stimulation is shut off during sleep, the brain, in effect, self-stimulates (Allen, 2001). During rapid eye movements (REM) associated with dreaming, the senses act as if they are functioning, even though they are receiving no information. Behind the eyes, ears, and other sense organs, the brain, even in terms of its electrical activity, operates almost as if it is awake and receiving sensory input. Thus, we can experience vivid, full-color dreams that are so real we may awake perspiring and in a state of terror (or ecstasy). When experimental subjects are deprived of dreams, by, for example, being awakened whenever

their eyes move under their lids (REM), they appear to suffer difficulties in problem solving and may show at least short-term emotional disturbances (see Anch et al., 1988, for a cautionary note). Stimulation and excitement are ever-present needs.

The work of Canadian psychologist D. O. Hebb (1949) established that proper functioning of the brain requires continuously varied sensory stimulation. Primates, experimental monkeys or children in institutions, were reared in stale environments where there was little variation in what was seen or heard or felt (recall the Sullivan chapter). Compared to monkeys and children reared amid ever-changing sights and sounds, the deprived primates' brains were underdeveloped. Thus, their intellects and perceptual capabilities were blunted. Hebb's collaborators placed normal college students in an environment designed to eliminate variation in visual, auditory, and tactile stimulation (Heron, 1957). They wore diffusing goggles that let in light, but no pattern or form. Also, they were exposed to a fan that generated "white noise" (all the auditory frequencies humans can hear scrambled together), and had their hands covered. Living two to four days under these circumstances was enough to cause the students' brains to malfunction. Not only were their electrical brain waves abnormal, they showed bizarre hallucinations ("A tiny spaceship is firing pellets at my arm"), emotional disturbances ("The experimenter is out to get me"), and intellectual deficiencies (poor problem solving). Subjects were so starved for stimulation they would have cherished a phone book to read. Environmental conditions like these were a part of the "brainwashing" methods used on U.S. prisoners of China and North Korea during the Korean War (see the movie *The Manchurian Candidate*).

According to Fromm, the need for varied sensory input can be satisfied by two kinds of stimuli: simple or activating. **Simple stimuli** generate reflexes that call for reactions rather than actions, particularly *surface reactions* that are immediate and passive in nature. Simple stimuli are often associated with "thrills": accidents, fires, crimes, wars, arguments, sex-related movies and advertisements, and television violence. These stimuli cause knee-jerk, automatic, gut reactions. Repeated presentation of them destroys their power. **Activating stimuli** are more complicated than simple stimuli, in that they cause people to become engaged in productive activity for longer periods of time. Examples include stimulation from generating ideas, reading novels, painting landscapes, enjoying music, and being with loved ones. Activating stimuli encourage their target to be a participant in the stimulation, not a passive pawn manipulated by it (Fromm, 1973, p. 240). Rather than losing their power with repetition, truly activating stimuli continue to be potent with repeated presentation. To Fromm, activating stimuli are healthier but require greater maturity because they do not lead as quickly to excitement. Activating stimuli require great effort, patience, discipline, concentration, tolerance, and critical thinking. Rather than reacting, the person must bring these stimuli to life. **Box 8.1** allows you to examine your needs.

**BOX 8.1 • Which Needs Are Most Prominent in Your Life?**

Fromm believed that all of his existential needs must be met by all people. Nevertheless, he certainly wrote or spoke nothing to contradict the possibility that some needs may be more prominent in some people than in others. In fact, part of the uniqueness of a person's individual character may be associated with paying more attention to some needs than others. An exercise will help you appreciate this point with regard to yourself in comparison to other members of your class. Below each brief statement of the several needs you will find a scale. By placing an "X" nearer one end of the scale than the other, you can indicate the degree of time and attention you devote to each need (for a given need, you can place your mark above any scale point that you deem appropriate). When you finish making the marks, you will have one more task to do before comparing your responses to those of other students.

Frame of orientation and object of devotion is a cognitive map to guide us in making sense of puzzling matters and a goal that gives meaning to our existence, respectively.

— : : : : : : : : : —

spend much time and  
attention to this need

spend little time and  
attention to this need

Relatedness is the necessity of uniting with other living beings, to relate to them; it is an imperative need on the fulfillment of which rests our sanity.

— : : : : : : : : : —

spend much time and  
spend little time and

attention to this need  
attention to this need

Rootedness is a deep craving to maintain one's natural ties and not be "separated."

— : : : : : : : : : —

spend much time and  
attention to this need

spend little time and  
attention to this need

Identity is the need to be aware of oneself as a separate entity, and to sense oneself as the subject of one's own actions.

— : : : : : : : : : —

spend much time and  
attention to this need

spend little time and  
attention to this need

Unity is a sense of oneness within one's self and with the "natural and human world outside."

— : : : : : : : : : —

spend much time and  
attention to this need

spend little time and  
attention to this need

Transcendence is the act of transforming one's accidental and passive role of "creature" into that of an active and purposeful "creator."

—:—:—:—:—:—:—:—:—

spend much time and  
attention to this need

spend little time and  
attention to this need

Effectiveness is the need to compensate for "being in a strange and overpowering world" by developing a sense of being able to do something that will "make a dent" in life.

—:—:—:—:—:—:—:—:—

spend much time and  
attention to this need

spend little time and  
attention to this need

Excitation and stimulation is the need for the nervous system to be "exercised," that is, to experience a certain amount of excitation.

—:—:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~

spend much time and  
attention to this need

spend little time and  
attention to this need

Now, draw a line from the mark on the first scale to the one on the second scale and so forth all the way down to the mark on the last scale. You have drawn your "need profile." If all students simply hold up their books so they can see each other's profiles, all can appreciate the uniqueness of individuals' profiles. Even though the number of need scales is small, it is likely that each student's profile line will be different from that of each other student (individual differences). That observation will confirm that people and their need patterns are unique; each person is an original, unduplicated by any other person in the world.

You will come across a further consideration of "needs" later in this book. Henry Murray's theory revolves around needs to a great extent, as does that of Abraham Maslow.

### **Individual and Social Character**

**Individual Differences among People.** Although they share common existential problems and needs, people are also different from each other. This is seen in Fromm's definition of **personality**: "the totality of inherited and acquired psychic qualities which are characteristic of one individual and which make the individual unique" (1947, p. 50). Inherited differences, and differences among people in their developmental histories, lead them to experience the same environment in different ways. People also show uniqueness "in the specific way they solve their human problem" (1947, p. 50).

Fromm actually devotes much greater attention to the concept of *character* than to personality. Character, which is based on the individual's relatedness to the world, has two forms. **Individual character** is the pattern of behavior characteristic of a given person, "the relatively permanent system of all non-instinctual strivings through which man relates himself to the human and natural world" (Fromm, 1973,

p. 226). Because character involves deeply rooted habits and opinions, it serves a decision-making function. It is a semi-automatic process of action and thought that saves an individual from having to make deliberate, conscious decisions every time choices must be made. Character is analogous to reflexes in that it becomes activated as soon as appropriate stimuli are present, without the intervention of thoughtfulness. Once energy is channeled in a certain way, action takes place “true to character.”

**Individual Differences among Societies.** Thus far, differences among people have been emphasized. A contribution unique to Fromm is his interest in identifying character differences among entire societies. **Social character** represents “the core of a character structure common to most people of a given culture ... [and] shows the degree to which character is formed by social and cultural patterns” (1947, p. 60). Social character is clearly the product of one’s society. In a sense, individual character becomes partly “lost” as it is subsumed by social character. Fromm put it this way: “the whole personality of the average individual is molded by the way people relate to each other, and it is determined by the socioeconomic and political structure of society to such an extent that ... one can infer from the analysis of one individual the totality of the social structure in which he lives” (Fromm, 1947, p. 79).

Fromm (1947) has identified six types of social character: receptive, exploitative, hoarding, marketing, necrophilous, and productive. These types express themselves in how individuals relate to things and to people (including themselves). Fromm classifies the first five as *nonproductive*, those that yield, at best, pseudoconnection to others and, at worst, destructive relations with others. They are distorted, incomplete, or ultimately unfulfilling. In contrast, the **productive orientation** is based on love, the mutual intimacy that preserves individual integrity. Although the types are “ideals,” one is likely to be dominant depending on cultural values. Also, because of the interaction between individual and culture, it is always possible for individuals to affect their society. Fromm casts each type in terms of **assimilation**, how people acquire things, and **socialization**, how people relate to others (see [Table 8.1 on page 191](#)). Also, four of the five nonproductive types were divided into two pairs. One pair was labeled *symbiotic* because people partaking of these types were involved in relations in which one member submits to the exploitation of the other. The second pair is dubbed *withdrawal*, as people of these types view other people as threats who are to be treated destructively or kept at considerable distance. A fifth nonproductive type is considered separately. Symbiosis and withdrawal are similar to Horney’s moving toward and moving away from others.

People of a **receptive** orientation experience the source of all good as being outside themselves (Fromm, 1947). According to Fromm, the receptive person “... believes that the only way to get what he wants—be it something material, be it affection, love, knowledge, pleasure—is to receive it from [an] outside source” (p. 62). People of this type receive from others, and they show their oral nature by being fond of food and drink. Receptive people are dependent, favor saying “yes” rather than “no,” listening to others rather than talking, and seeking to be loved and helped rather than giving love and help. They show “gratitude for the hand that feeds them and fear of ever losing it” (p. 62). Here Fromm obviously was influenced by Freud.

If people are religious, they want and expect everything from God and nothing from their own efforts. If they are not religious, they may wish for a “magic helper,” someone who will meet their every need and solve their every problem. Should they look to many people as sources of life’s benefits, they will show loyalty to many people. As a result they will stretch themselves thin and frequently get caught between conflicting loyalties and promises. More generally, they tend to be optimistic and friendly. They exude confidence in life and what it has to offer, but they show extreme anxiety when they sense that a “source of supply” may be withdrawn. In terms of assimilation, people of this type passively receive (accepting). On the socialization side, they masochistically submit (loyalty). The solution to submissiveness is not opposition to powerful others. Rather, the solution is to participate with authority figures in the implementation of power (Weiner, 2003).

The receptive orientation is found in societies that are stratified such that the lower classes depend on the upper classes. The “unfortunate members” are lead to assume that through “sacrifice, duty, and love” they will be “taken care of” by the “fortunate” (powerful) members of society (p. 108). They rationalize their masochism by arguing that it is their “lot in life” to submit to the care of others. Peasants in a feudal society may fit this model.

People of an **exploitative** orientation also experience the source of all good as outside themselves, but, rather than expecting to receive from others, they take things through force or cunning. Their orientation is to

grab, steal, and manipulate, while being suspicious, cynical, jealous, and hostile. They underrate what they have, overrate what others have, and endorse the mottos “I take what I need” and “Stolen fruits are sweetest.” Therefore, in the realm of love, stolen affection is a jewel, love freely offered by an unattached other is a lump of coal. Not surprisingly, they find married or otherwise attached people very attractive. Expressions of love are reserved for “marks”: people who are “promising objects of exploitation” (Fromm, 1947, p. 65). Fromm’s concern about exploitative people was shared by Horney.

Like the receptive type, exploitative individuals cannot do for themselves. They must take the fruits of others’ labors, including their mental efforts. People of this type are intellectual bandits. Having no useful ideas of their own, they literally pick others’ brains. More generally, they get no thrill from creating their own “goods,” but they get a rush from taking others’. In terms of traits, exploitative types are hostile and cynical. To them there are two kinds of people, those who get in the way and must be removed, and those who are useful for some selfish purpose. Instead of the optimistic, accepting attitude of the receptive type, these individuals are suspicious of others: What are they withholding? Are they trying to do to me what I want to do to them? Instead of a friendly orientation to others, they are jealous: “Whatever others have is better than what I have.” As you might guess, they are masters of the cutting remark and the subtle putdown. In terms of assimilation, people of this type are exploiting (taking). As to socialization, they relate to others in a sadistic fashion (authority). Like the receptive type, they relate to others in a symbiotic manner, but they are the takers, not the receivers.

This orientation is seen in societies dominated by dictators who exploit human and natural resources through power, ruthless competition, authoritarianism, and the “right of might.” In modern times, it seems well illustrated by the Soviet Union during the Stalinist era (1920s to the 1950s). Peasants were required to give what they produced to the “state” (actually to Stalin and party members close to him). If they refused, they were “allowed” to starve; after all, they were useless. If they protested, they were “removed”: sent to the infamous Soviet prisons, the gulags, or killed. Stalin was a true exploitative sadist who enjoyed sending warped communications to his victims. He would greet people warmly ... just before having them killed (Fromm, 1973). He would assure representatives of a Soviet ethnic group that their favorite poets would not be arrested; they would be seized shortly thereafter. [Box 8.2](#) depicts Hitler as the ultimate exploiter.

People of the **hoarding** orientation differ from the two preceding types: they believe the “goods” come from the inside not the outside, themselves not others, so security is based on an attitude of saving, of letting out as little as possible (Fromm, 1947). Rather than seeking symbiotic relations with others, they withdraw from others. They set up “a protective wall, and their main aim is to bring as much as possible into this fortified position and to let as little as possible out of it” (p. 65). Their motto is, “Mine is mine, and yours is yours” and they are misers about everything: money, material things, the past, love. They do not give love, they get it by owning the “beloved.” Everything they had in the past which is now only a memory is still cherished. They would keep everything they grabbed since they were old enough to grasp, if they could. Thus, they are “sentimental”: they ruminate endlessly about bygone experiences.

These people are sterile, “tightlipped,” even grim. Being prone to withdrawal, they are unpleasant to be around: they regard others as candidates for possession, not potential companions in a human relationship. Hoarding applies to information as well as everything else. They know much, but can do little with it, because they are rigid, bound by extreme orderliness. Hoarding types are compulsively clean, obsessively punctual, and irritatingly obstinate. “No!” is their favorite exclamation. To say “yes” threatens them with the possibility of giving up something. They peer through the gates of their fortresses, beckoning to those who would enter and be counted among their possessions, but never venturing forth into others’ world. In terms of assimilation, they are hoarding (preserving). As to socialization, they are destructive (assertiveness).

This orientation is represented by societies adopting the Puritan ethic of hard work and success, in which middleclass stability is provided through family and possession of property. North America during the late 1600s through the early 1800s may illustrate this kind of society. The Puritan religion was thriving during a great part of that period. Self-sufficient family farms were the most basic social units of that time. Farms produced almost all that a family needed, and hard work in the family interest was necessary for survival. Insofar as people had specialized professions, such as blacksmith and candlemaker, they were even more literally defined by their jobs than we are today. The European tradition of naming people for their professions came to the “new world” with the first settlers. Thus, surnames such as “Butcher” and “Goldsmith” still exist today. Nevertheless, U.S. society of this period did not wholly fit Fromm’s “hoarding”

notion: the spirit of cooperation among and within family units appears to have been much greater than Fromm would have expected.

### **BOX 8.2 • Hitler: The Ultimate Exploiter**

Adolph Hitler will forever remain something of an enigma. Was he crazy (psychotic)? Probably not: he doesn't fit the usual psychiatric categories very well. Was he psychopathic (no conscience)? Maybe, maybe not ... he did seem to care for some people (e.g., Eva Braun, his lover), but he vowed to kill his dog Blondi if she showed any signs of cowardice. However, one of his characteristics was clearly displayed. He was an exploiter. He used the Jews to obtain the power he needed to exploit the German people.

You may say, however, that if he really hated the Jews, he was not consciously exploiting them. He was "merely" acting on his hatred. But this argument falls apart when it is realized that he had no reason to hate Jews. When young Adolph spent 1909–1913 roaming the streets of Freud's Vienna, the Jews he encountered were good to him (Shirer, 1960; Toland, 1976). For example, he was allowed to stay in Jewish hostels and a Jew gave him a coat when he had no protection against the cold. Later, he showed his appreciation to a Jewish physician who ably nursed his sick mother by sparing him when Jews were sent to concentration camps.

But his experiences in Vienna probably did help him form a strategy for gaining and keeping power. Vienna was virulently anti-Semitic during the time when Hitler inhabited its street corners trying to sell his amateurish paintings. It must have been clear to him that anti-Semitic people would rally around anyone who would tell them "how to deal with the Jews." In fact, downtrodden people in need of a cause would board any vehicle that would carry them to power. Hitler found that one could recruit willing followers by convincing them that the Jews were the reason for their unemployment and lowly status. Thus, his Vienna experiences taught him how to skillfully use anti-Semitism for the purpose of gaining power that he could then use to seduce the German people.

Germany was in chaos after it lost World War I to the Allies. The once proud German people needed a savior to lead them back to glory. Hitler's strategy was to convince them that losing the war was not their fault: they were betrayed by the Jews. In turn, so cleverly did he promise to "resolve the Jewish problem" and restore the German people to supremacy that both they and he came to believe his lies about the Jews. Willingly they grafted themselves to his pale hide. In this symbiotic state he used them to wage the European component of World War II, and he would have used them up had the war lasted a few more years. They, in turn, reveled in their masochistic attachment to their Father, their Fuehrer. Never were so many people so willing to be so thoroughly exploited.

The **marketing** orientation is unique to the modern historical era in which exchanging goods for money, other goods, or services became the backbone of a "supply and demand" economy (Fromm, 1947). In this contemporary economy, supply of a commodity determined its value, not its inherent usefulness. For example, fuel is essential for running industry and automobiles and for heating homes, but its value is determined by whether it is in short supply or there is plenty of it. Thus, although the usefulness of gasoline remains constant, it is relatively inexpensive when much is available, but expensive when some world crisis decreases the supply. By analogy, people of this orientation experience themselves as saleable commodities whose "exchange value" depends on whether they are in short supply or not. They seek to package and sell themselves so that they seem unusual or rare and, thus, "in demand." While a minimum level of competence is necessary to be marketable at all, in a given profession a great many people will possess that degree of skill. Further, in almost every profession, there will be many people with much more than minimum competence. With so many people being relatively indistinguishable in terms of skills, whether a given person stands out enough "to get hired" depends on such personality traits as "'cheerful,' 'sound,' 'aggressive,' 'reliable,' 'ambitious' ..." (Fromm, 1947, p. 70). People battle to distinguish themselves so that they will look like "one of a kind" and thereby appear to be in short supply. Ironically, "since success depends largely on how one sells one's personality, one experiences oneself as ... simultaneously ... the seller and the commodity to be sold" (p. 70). Under these circumstances, people are not concerned with their lives or happiness, but with being saleable.

“One has to be in fashion on the personality market, and in order to be in fashion one has to know what kind of personality is most in demand” (p. 71). Helpfully, the media supplies the raw materials one needs to construct a marketable personality. Personality traits that have sold are depicted on TV, in the movies, and in popular magazines. “The young girl tries to emulate the facial expression, coiffure, [and] gestures of a high-priced star as the most promising way to success. The young man tries to look and be like a [role] model he sees on the screen” (p. 71). Some people do well at this game, but, in a sense, all fail in the end. One can manipulate one’s traits to form a hopefully marketable commodity, but one can never be sure whether the finished product will sell. Therefore, one’s self-esteem is at the mercy of the market: it is high if, on occasion, one “sells,” low if one does not, and one can never predict the sales outcome for sure. Assimilation is represented here in “marketing” (exchanging) and socialization in “indifference” (fairness). Because Fromm believed that the modern capitalistic society of which you are likely a member clearly generates the marketing type, no further example is needed.

The **necrophilous character** is engrossed by death, dwells on it, and glories in it (Fromm, 1973). Contrary to the well-known clinical use of the term—a desire to have sexual relations with corpses—in Fromm’s use, *necrophilous* is generalized to mean a preoccupation with death. The term dates to an incident during a speech by General Millan Astray delivered at the onset of the Spanish Civil War (1936). When one of the General’s followers shouted his favorite motto from the back of the room—“Viva la muerte!” (“Long live death!”)—Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno arose from the audience to express his disgust: “Long live death!” is a “necrophilous and senseless cry ...” (p. 331). This incident inspired Fromm’s “death-loving” character.

The necrophilous type gains meaning and identity by transforming life into death. Fromm wrote: “Necrophilia in the characterological sense can be described as the passionate *attraction* to all that is dead, decayed, putrid, sickly; it is the passion to transform that which is *alive* into something *unalive*; to destroy for the sake of destruction; the exclusive interest in all that is purely mechanical. It is the passion ‘to tear apart living structures’” (p. 332). The necrophilous person extracts a feeling of power and elation from vicariously or directly participating in the transformation of life into death. Although Fromm did not explicitly refer to assimilation and socialization for this type, it is possible to extrapolate from his writings: the assimilation term would be *necrophilous* (life to death) and the corresponding socialization concept could be “murderous” (warlike). Analogous to “symbiosis” and “withdrawal,” necrophilous types are labeled “unhumanizing” because lifeless people fascinate them.

Fromm saw the necrophilous inclination emerge from dreams and the subtle actions of people. Albert Speer, Adolf Hitler’s personal architect, later his armaments minister, and possibly his only friend, had a dream that symbolically illustrated the Nazi leader’s necrophilous tendencies (Fromm, 1973). In it Speer finds himself in Hitler’s car: “Our drive ends at a large square surrounded by government buildings. On one side is a war memorial. Hitler approaches it and lays down a wreath” (Fromm, 1973, p. 333). And Hitler lays another wreath, and another, and another. All the while he is chanting “Jesus Maria,” possibly a remnant from his Catholic upbringing. By laying the wreaths on the memorials, Hitler pays homage to death, but does so in the typical mechanical, unfeeling fashion of the necrophilous person. The chant may also be seen in symbolic terms: Hitler’s religion had become death.

Other dreams of death illustrate the destructive nature of the warlike, necrophilous person. One dreamer reported: “I have made a great invention, the ‘superdestroyer.’ It is a machine which, if one secret button is pushed that I alone know, can destroy all life in North America within the first hour, and within the next hour, all life on earth” (p. 334). Referring to another scene, the dreamer said, “I have pushed the button; I notice no more life, I am alone, I feel exuberant.” This report could describe the dream of a twisted computer-game player or perhaps a deranged devotee of Dungeons and Dragons or Puppet Master. Although necrophilous gamers are rare, current electronic games in which lifelike figures are dismembered by players’ “gunfire” are so realistic that use of them may have pushed Klebold and Harris into the tragedy at Columbine.

The mechanization of everything that so thrills the necrophilous person is well illustrated in another dream. The dreamer is at a party where young people are dancing, but their rhythm becomes slower and slower until everyone is immobile. At this moment two very large people enter the room carrying some equipment. One of them approaches a boy and bloodlessly cuts a hole in his back into which a box is inserted. The same is done to a girl by the other oversized person. Keys are inserted into the boxes and, when

switched on, the boy and girl dance vigorously. The same “operation” is performed on all other persons present. People became machines whose aliveness can be switched on or off.

Illustrations of societies that spawn the necrophilous type are numerous and familiar. Some societies of the twentieth century include those that revolved around Hitler, Italian dictator Mussolini, and the bloodthirsty Cambodian despot Pol Pot, who slaughtered two million of his people. Unfortunately, certain leaders continue to set a necrophilous tone for their people. Witness the works of Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, the Hutus of Rwanda, and certain military leaders involved in “ethnic cleansing” during the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Table 8.1 summarizes Fromm’s social character types, including the only positive one—**productive orientation**—an attitude of relatedness to the world and oneself that encompasses all realms of human experience: reasoning, loving, and working (Fromm, 1947). Productive people “comprehend the world, mentally and emotionally, through love and through reason” (p. 97). The productive orientation is not concerned with practical results or “success.”

**TABLE 8.1** *Fromm’s Social Character Types*

<i>Assimilation</i>	<i>Socialization</i>	
<i>Nonproductive Orientation</i>		
Receiving (accepting)	Masochistic (loyalty)	
		symbiosis
Exploiting (taking)	Sadistic (authority)	
Hoarding (preserving)	Destructive (assertiveness)	
		withdrawal
Marketing (exchanging)	Indifferent (fairness)	
Necrophilous	Murderous	
(life into death)	(warlike)	unhumanize
<i>Productive Orientation</i>		
Working (creating)	Loving & Reason (integrity)	humanize

The human capacity for *productive reasoning* can be used to penetrate the surface of ideas, actions and emotions, get into them, and, thereby, gain understanding of their essence. The power of *productive love* can break through walls that separate people, allowing each of us genuine understanding of other people’s mental and emotional cores. Productive love is characterized by care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge (note the resemblance to Erikson’s “care” at the adulthood stage). *Productive work* allows people to transform materials into other forms, using reason and imagination to visualize things not yet existing. It also promotes creativity and fruitful planning. These three orientations point to the opposite of necrophilia, **biophilia**, which is love of life (Eckardt, 1992).

In essence, the productive orientation provides an answer to the basic contradictions of human existence. It suggests that a person’s main task in life is to give birth to oneself, to become what one potentially is, a theme that is elaborated by the humanists covered in the next chapter. The most important product of this effort is one’s own “mature and integrated” personality. This is because Fromm, like Jung, believed that

every person is more than “a blank sheet of paper on which culture can write its text” (1947, p. 23). A human nature exists (Biancoli, 1992). Therefore, what is ethically good in Fromm’s humanistic framework is the unfolding of personal powers according to the laws of human nature. This view led Fromm (1959) to propose a positive concept of mental health that is not just the absence of sickness but the presence of “well-being.” To manifest well-being one must be aware, responsive, independent, fully active, united with the world, and able to understand that only living creatively gives meaning to life. One must be joyful in the act of living—expressing joy throughout one’s whole body—and concerned with being rather than having (Fromm, 1976). Failure to make use of one’s innate human powers results in unhappiness, psychological disturbance, and neurosis. It appears that Fromm saw no former or present major society able to reliably generate productive types. See how productive you are, and how much you are “into” the other orientations. Complete the scales in [Box 8.3](#).

### BOX 8.3 • Fromm’s Orientation Test

Indicate how much each word applies to you on the following scale: 5 (very well), 4, 3, 2, 1 (not at all).

Looking left to right, you will need to sum down for the first four orientations. Sum across all of the rows that have “sum across” to the far right, then sum down and divide by two for the last orientation (far right column).

tender__	captivating__	orderly__	witty__	sum across__
gullible__	arrogant__	stubborn__	indifferent__	
optimistic__	gracious__	reserved__	curious__	sum across__
cowardly__	conceited__	suspicious__	unprincipled__	
idealistic__	assertive__	economical__	youthful__	sum across__
submissive__	exploitative__	unimaginative__	opportunistic__	
sentimental__	seducing__	obsessive__	silly__	
loyal__	self-confident__	steady__	tolerant__	sum across__
wishful__	rash__	cold__	tactless__	
sensitive__	proud__	careful__	open-minded__	sum across__
unrealistic__	aggressive__	stingy__	childish__	
devoted__	active__	practical__	purposeful__	sum across__
sum down__	sum down__	sum down__	sum down__	sum down & divide by two__
receptive	exploitative	hoarding	marketing	productive

Scores from 12 to 24 are low, 25 to 36 medium, 37 to 48 high medium, and 49 to 60 high. This scale is for educational purposes only; don’t take your scores too seriously.

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## Evaluation

### Contributions

Many of Fromm’s important contributions revolve around his groundbreaking social character research in an actual society and his influential books.

***Social Character in Mexican Villagers: Implications for Diversity.*** Fromm and Maccoby (1970) undertook a field study of social character in a Mexican village. The goal was to show that the social character common to a group could be assessed and related to socioeconomic variables. An openended questionnaire of about 90 items was given to 406 adult residents of a Mexican farming village. Social character among the villagers was found to be high in receptive orientation and low in exploitative orientation. Men were more receptive than women, who were more hoarding. Sociopolitically, villagers were most often submissive rather than democratic or rebellious. Fixations involving parents were almost entirely directed toward the mother. More than three-quarters of adult-male villagers who were alcoholic were receptive in character, compared with about a third of abstainers. There was also evidence for productive types.

The hoarding orientation was most appropriate to the economic demands of peasant farming. By contrast, the receptive peasant was poorly adapted. It follows that women (hoarding) were better adapted than men (receptive). Overall, support was provided for the general hypothesis that “social character is the result of the adaptation of human nature to given socioeconomic conditions” (p. 230). But, unexpectedly, there was great diversity *within* the culture.

***Interesting Books on Popular Issues.*** Countless people have been influenced by Fromm’s best-selling books. *Escape from Freedom* (1941) introduced the novel idea that all people at some times, and some people all the time, may desire to relinquish their freedom to “the state” or to another person. *The Sane Society* (1955) considers the insanity of many societies and offers some alternatives. *The Art of Loving* (1956) teaches people that to be in love is not merely to desire another person. It is becoming one with another but remaining oneself. *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973) is a cogent and provocative commentary on the forces promoting life and death in contemporary culture. His 1976 book, *To Have or to Be?*, discusses humankind’s critical need to control irrational social forces and proposes guidelines for a new society.

### ***Limitations***

Fromm may be regarded as more a philosopher than a scientist. His theory consists of rather isolated categories of concepts that are not systematically related to one another. For example, those under the category labels “needs” and “character types.” In fact, there appears to be no conceptual glue capable of sticking these distinct categories of concepts together. They deal with different domains, in the one case the psychological realm, in the other, the social arena. At best, Fromm writes about “needs” in the context of “social character,” but makes no direct conceptual link between categories.

To confirm that a person has a trait, a component of personality, one must be able to look at the person’s behavior in a given situation and assume that it will generalize to many other different situations. Only then, it is widely assumed, can one say the person has a trait corresponding to the behavior. Unfortunately, personality psychologists have had major difficulties demonstrating that such a generalization is warranted (e.g., Allen, 1988a, 1988b; Allen & Potkay, 1981, 1983a; Mischel, 1968, 1977, 1984). People show a tendency to vary in their behavioral performances from one situation to the next and from one occasion to the next. If making the critical generalization at the individual level involves considerable risk, how much more cautious must we be in generalizing a social character type to many if not most members of a society? Given that people vary within themselves from occasion to occasion, as total persons they certainly must differ one from the other to a large degree. In view of the great variability within and among individuals, it is tenuous to assume that many, much less most, members of a society are “marketing types,” or “receptive types,” or any other type. Due to a lack of evidence it is unreasonable to believe that even a simple majority of any large society’s population shares the same type. Perhaps the social character types should be recast as personality types.

As indicated in [Chapter 1](#), collapsing across concepts is an act of theoretical parsimony. Fromm’s theory could certainly benefit from conceptual consolidation. In our discussions of Fromm’s personality theory, students and I have noticed several redundancies among Fromm’s concepts. For example, “relatedness,” the necessity of uniting with other beings, “rootedness,” maintaining one’s natural ties, and “unity” with the natural world, have too much in common. Students wonder, couldn’t a word like “connectedness” encompass all three concepts? Even collapsing two of the concepts would simplify Fromm’s theory and allow the new concept to apply to more phenomena than would be true of either concept alone. As it is, unity and rootedness each refers to very little.

While Fromm was an open person, he still had Western biases. In his theorizing, he virtually condemned melting into the collective, thereby losing oneself. From the Western *individualistic* perspective, his point is well taken. However, from the standpoint of many *collectivistic* Asian cultures, “melting into the collective” has been a tried and true survival technique for millennia.

There has been a notable lack of scientific research done to support Fromm’s theory. Either Fromm’s concepts are difficult to transform into concrete terms so they can be studied scientifically, or they are too alien to modern scientific thinking to be of interest to contemporary sociopsychological scientists. Even Fromm’s own research on the Mexican village failed to support the existence of a single, core character that fit most villagers. A diversity of character orientations was supported instead. Only when and if Fromm’s theory generates scientific data can it be legitimately called “scientific.”

As a contributor to the International Fromm Page ([www.er-ich-fro-mm.-de/-english/index.html](http://www.er-ich-fro-mm.-de/-english/index.html)) Daniel Burston (2001) lamented modern psychology’s and psychiatry’s failure to understand and appreciate Fromm ([www.er-ich-fro-mm.-de/-lib\\_2/burston01.html](http://www.er-ich-fro-mm.-de/-lib_2/burston01.html)). Psychoanalytic writers condemned Fromm because they incorrectly saw him as an anti-Freudian. Psychologists, blinded by dogmatic behaviorism and the need to be seen as scientists, rejected his qualitative rather than quantitative approach. Others thought his political (Marxist/socialist) inclination to be odd, especially when he applied it to psychology. Those of a more sociological bent felt that Fromm tried to “psychologize culture and society” (Weiner, 2003, p. 62). Further, his foray into “objective ethics” was alien to all those who saw ethics as a subjective, nonscientific pursuit. Burston implies that all of these slings and arrows have ensured that Fromm will have fewer followers among psychologists and psychiatrists in the future. Fromm was not listed among the top 100 psychologists of the twentieth century.

## Conclusions

Maybe Fromm was more of a philosopher than a scientific theorist. Then so be it; science is not the only legitimate approach to personality. Whatever label applies, he was an original thinker and one of our most helpful commentators on modern life. Further, he was one of the first psychologists to promote optimism (Weiner, 2003). Perhaps his concepts have received relatively little attention because they are complex and, thus, difficult to study.

While his Mexican village study may not have supported his point of view very strongly, it does have important implications for diversity: even in a small village, people differ along several diversity dimensions. Another indirect contribution relating to diversity is found in the concept of basic human nature that rides roughshod over notions of racial differences (Biancoli, 1992). Diversity has many legitimate dimensions, but, as will be argued forcefully later, racial variation is not among them.

He was also a pioneer. As an early psychological humanist he did much to shape current humanistic thought, the topic of the next two chapters. His conceptions of love, optimism, and productivity, as well as union with other people and nature, were nutrients added to the fertile soil out of which psychological humanism grew. Unfortunately, the humanistic theorists whose ideas you will consider next have made little effort to remind us of Fromm’s contributions. Therefore, in beginning to read the chapters on humanism, you will need to actively recall his groundbreaking ideas.

## Summary Points

1. Fromm praised Freud, but took a sociopsychological stance. Fromm was born into a “neurotic” German family of Jewish descent. The suicide of a young woman following the death of her father led Fromm to Freud. He was also greatly influenced by Marxism and by existential philosophy. The massive destruction and governmental doubletalk associated with World War I shaped his humanistic and antiwar orientations.

2. Each of us has a “frame of orientation,” a cognitive map of our worlds that helps us make sense of puzzling matters. We all also have “objects of devotion”: goals that give meaning to our existence. Relatedness is the need to unite with other living beings that can take on two symbiotic forms: masochistic or sadistic. The positive alternative is mature love in which there is union with another, but maintenance of one’s integrity.

3. In rootedness, the alternatives are destructive pursuit of substitutes for a secure, dependent state or

finding new roots in the brotherhood of man. Identity is the need to be aware of oneself as a separate entity. Tragically, we tend to use nations, races, or religions as sole sources of identity. Unity is a sense of inner oneness. We can seek it through the quest for power, fame, and property. Having failed to achieve unity, we may turn to some drug or passion. The productive alternative is love and reason.

4. Transcendence is the act of transforming one's passive role of creature into that of an active creator. The alternative to creativity is destruction. Effectiveness is the need to compensate for "being in a strange and overpowering world." To be effective is to accomplish and to resist parental domination. If not effective through love, we can be effective by causing others to suffer.

5. Excitation and stimulation is the nervous system's need to be "exercised." The brain must be stimulated even during sleep. Needed sensory input is of two kinds: simple and activating. People differ among themselves, the essence of "personality." However, character was emphasized by Fromm. Individual character is a personal pattern of behavior that is deeply rooted in habits and opinions.

6. Fromm postulated six social character types. Each is cast in terms of assimilation and socialization. The nonproductive types are divided into two pairs and one isolated type. One of two symbiotic nonproductive types is receptive, oriented to experience the source of all good as being outside oneself. People of this type take from and depend on others. They show unusual loyalty to their providers and may display sacrifice, duty, and love to the powerful people who care for them.

7. The exploitive type grabs, steals, and manipulates and is cynical, suspicious, and jealous. Hitler was nothing if not exploitative. One of two "withdrawal" types, hoarding people, build a fortress, take inside what is theirs, and allow others to enter only if they will become possessions. A second withdrawal type is marketing, oriented to an exchange of goods for objects of value or services. This type submits to supply and demand economies in which they are immersed and cultivate personality traits that "sell."

8. The necrophilous type is engrossed by death. The necrophilous person extracts a feeling of power and elation from vicariously or directly participating in the transformation of life into death. Necrophilous themes show up in dreams in the form of paying homage to the dead, envisioning oneself in possession of the awesome power, and seeing people as robots whose aliveness can be turned off or on. Murderous video games are necrophilous. Societies ruled by the despots of World War II and present nations ruled by war lovers provide fertile ground for this type.

9. Productive people have an attitude of relatedness to the world, and themselves, that encompasses reasoning, loving, and working. Productive people are biophilic, lovers of life. They break down walls between people and relate to others in terms of care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge. The productive type inspired Fromm's ideas about well-being. Fromm's research in a Mexican village produced evidence of three character types. It is an example of diversity, even in a small village.

10. Fromm's books dealt with sweeping issues that were of interest to many people. However, his theory is more philosophical than scientific and lacks coherence. Fromm's social character types entail difficulties and his theory has received little scientific support. Also, he showed Western World biases. His political views, criticisms of Freud, qualitative approach, and beliefs in objective ethics alienated psychiatrists and psychologists. But he was a warm person, an original thinker, and a pioneer humanist.

## *Running Comparison*

<i>Theorist</i>	<i>Fromm in Comparison</i>
Freud	He questioned Freud's scientific contributions, de-emphasized biological causation, but agreed that religion is an illusion.
Jung	He also was influenced by WWI, and willing to talk about value, ethics, and meaning. Identifying self with social roles was akin to Jung's Personas.
Erikson	His productive love is similar to Erikson's care of the adulthood stage. His mature love is similar to resolution at Erikson's young adult stage.
Carl Rogers	Transcendence was akin to some of Rogers's humanistic ideas (and Maslow's). He also was concerned about creativity.
Abraham Maslow and Henry A. Murray	Like these two theorists, he was concerned about needs.
Horney	They both embraced the pursuit of the real self. They both recognized the exploitative potential of humans.

## *Essay/Critical Thinking Questions*

1. Was Fromm more of a sociologist than a psychologist?
2. Illustrate how one of Fromm's needs has been manifested in your own experience?
3. Can you describe a symbiotic relationship from your experience?
4. Look at your own community. What social character(s) fits it best?
5. Can you defend the application of a social character type to an entire society?

## *E-mail Interaction*

Write the author at ballen@wiu.edu. Forward one of the following or phrase your own.

1. Explain why Fromm was so popular among the public.
2. Are many societies of today slipping in a more exploitative, necrophilous direction?
3. Was Fromm really a humanist?

## Every Person Is to Be Prized: Carl Rogers



*Carl Rogers*

[www.in-fed-.or-g/t-hin-ker-s/e-t-ro-ger-s.htm](http://www.in-fed-.or-g/t-hin-ker-s/e-t-ro-ger-s.htm)

- What happens when your experience conflicts with your Self?
- Can psychologists make world peace more likely?
- Imagine a therapist who refuses to offer patients any advice.
- Should therapists be equal partners with patients?

Psychologists often classify personality theories into categories: the psychoanalytic tradition begun by Freud, the humanistic tradition represented by Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, the behavioral tradition popularized by B. F. Skinner, the cognitive tradition represented by George Kelly, and the trait tradition championed by Raymond Cattell, Hans Eysenck, and Gordon Allport. Rogers is one of the leading figures in modern psychology because of the impact his humanistic principles have had on so many psychologists, professionals from other disciplines, and laypeople. His ideas have also received more systematic research, study, and validation than those of any other humanistic psychologist, and also more than some other theorists covered in this book.

## Rogers, the Person

Carl Ransom Rogers was born on January 8, 1902, in Oak Park, Illinois. The fourth of six children, he was “tender and easily hurt, yet feisty and even sarcastic in his own way,” necessary characteristics for survival in family give-and-take (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 5). His home atmosphere was marked by fundamentalist religious practices, little social mixing, and a firm belief in the virtue of hard work. Carl even recalled experiencing a slight feeling of “wickedness” while drinking his first bottle of soda pop.

Carl was a lonely, “solitary boy, who read incessantly, and went all through high school with only two dates” (Rogers, 1961, p. 6). An outstanding student, he was nicknamed “Mr. Absent-Minded Professor” by his practical family. Like Fromm, he loved reading the Bible. He also relished popular adventure stories and creating stories of his own. During adolescence, he became fascinated with night-flying moths, which he observed and bred year-round, and he enjoyed reading advanced, scientific books on agriculture.

There was no one to tell me that Morison’s *Feeds and Feeding* was not a book for a fourteen-year-old, so I ploughed through its hundreds of pages learning how experiments were conducted—how control groups were matched with experimental groups, how conditions were held constant by randomizing procedures, so that the influence of a given food on meat production or milk production could be established. I learned how difficult it is to test a hypothesis. I acquired a knowledge of and a respect for the methods of science... (Rogers, 1961, p. 6)

As you will see, Rogers fruitfully applied his knowledge of scientific procedure during his career. However, he used it more to show that his therapy was effective, to acknowledge the biological side of humans, and to render his concepts testable, than as a comprehensive approach to understanding people.

As an undergraduate at the University of Wisconsin, Rogers majored in agriculture and history. Later he dropped these initial majors, became quite religious, and began a curriculum aimed at the ministry. He was one of 12 U.S. students selected to travel to China for a World Student Christian Federation Conference. It proved “a most important experience” in broadening his thinking and teaching him that sincere and honest people could have very different beliefs. Much later in life he was to lose his religious zeal because of his objection to “original sin” (Thorne, 1990). He just was not able to accept that humans are inherently flawed by the mark of sin. Still later he reconsidered the Christianity preached by those who see humans as partakers of a divine nature. The trip to China was an intellectually liberating experience, but, because it was, he found himself withdrawing from family traditions. His newfound independence of thought caused his parents “great pain and stress,” but “looking back on it I believe that here, more than at any other one time, I became an independent person” (Rogers, 1961, p. 7).

Rogers studied religion at the very liberal Union Theological Seminary. By chance, Teachers College, Columbia University was right across the street. Perhaps because his disaffection with religion was beginning to emerge, he enrolled at Columbia and soon drifted into child psychology, “just following the activities which interested me” (Rogers, 1961, p. 9). After receiving his Ph.D. in 1928, he worked for several years at a child-guidance center in Rochester, N.Y. During this time Rogers absorbed the views of Freud. It was at this juncture that he was influenced by Adler: “I had the privilege of meeting, listening to, and observing Dr. Alfred Adler ... I was shocked by Dr. Adler’s very direct and deceptively simple manner of relating to the child and the parent. It took me some time to realize how much I learned from him” (Rogers, quoted in Ansbacher, 1990, p. 47). Adler’s example helped Rogers to reconsider the mindless testing and record keeping, as well as the dwelling on childhood traumas, that characterized the Freudian orientation at the Rochester center.

The figure having perhaps the most impact on Rogers was disaffected former Freudian, Otto Rank, who believed that the trauma of birth is the first of many “separations” people must abide during their lives (deCarvalho, 1999). Rogers invited Rank to Rochester, where the former soaked up the views of the latter during a three-day institute. The following elements of Rank’s theory had great impact on Rogers: (1) “The patient’s self-acceptance and affirmation learned in the protective environment of psychotherapy” transfers to the outside world (p. 134); (2) the pre-Oedipal mother–child relationship is the prototype of the therapist–patient relationship; (3) the role of the therapist is to create positive experiences that allow patients to discover their inner personality dynamics without fear and anxiety; (4) patients should freely verbalize their thoughts and emotions with the therapist who acts only to facilitate their self-discovery; (5) the

emphasis is on the patient's immediate emotional experience. As you will see, Rogers adopted all of these ideas in some form.

Rogers came to the realization that Freud's ideas were in great conflict with the rigorous, scientific aspects of his academic training. Relying on his own clinical experiences with people, he began formulating a person-centered point of view: the person seeking guidance should choose the direction of personality change. Unlike Freudians, he would not adopt the role of authoritarian doctor vis-à-vis a passive, subservient patient, because "it is the [person] who knows what hurts, what directions to go, what problems are crucial, what experiences have been deeply buried" (Rogers, 1961, pp. 11–12). This trusting of the person was shown by Jung and Rank when they shared the tasks of therapy with therapy patients. Thus, Rogers, like Rank, rejected the medical model, the idea that people with psychological problems are sick and need some sort of treatment, at least analogous to medication, that will make them normal again (deCarvalho, 1999; Rogers, 1987a). Consistent with this orientation, he used the term *client* instead of *patient*. He did not want to bring clients back to normal, that is, back to average. Instead he endorsed the growth model, helping people "remove whatever blocks to growth exist" so they could move beyond being normal or average (p. 40).

In subsequent years, Rogers held teaching, therapy, and administrative positions at Ohio State University, the University of Chicago, and the University of Wisconsin. In 1947, he served as president of the American Psychological Association. He was the first psychologist in the Association's history to receive both the Scientific Contribution Award and the Distinguished Professional Contribution Award. In the years before he died, Rogers continued to work very actively in La Jolla, California, at the Center for Studies of the Person, which he cofounded: "The days are not long enough to accomplish my purposes" (communication to Charles R. Potkay, May 9, 1985). Rosalind Cartwright, one of his former colleagues, has spoken of him as a living example of his own theory, "a man who has continued to grow, to discover himself, to test himself, to be genuine, to review his experiences, to learn from it, ... to live honestly, fully, in the best human sense" (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 394).

Carl Rogers died unexpectedly on February 4, 1987, following surgery for a broken hip (Gendlin, 1988). At the time he had been particularly energetic and effective. In his last years he traveled the world, from South Africa to the Soviet Union, with a stop in Northern Ireland, in order to promote world peace and an end to conflict between warring groups (see Rogers, 1987b; Rogers & Malcolm, 1987; Rogers & Ryback, 1984; Rogers & Sanford, 1987). Fortunately, he published a number of articles during these final years, many of which are used in this chapter to help you better understand this extraordinary individual and his contributions to people everywhere. [Box 9.1](#) examines the "real Carl Rogers."

**BOX 9.1 • *The Real Rogers: Not So Emotionally Neutral, Not So “Equal,” Not Really a Counselor, but a Pioneer Clinical Contributor to Understanding Diversity Issues***

Being a world-famous person, a figure larger than life, Rogers came to be regarded in stereotypic fashion. Textbook writers and some teachers have come to view him as someone (1) who never became angry, much less directed verbal aggression to someone during therapy; (2) who believed in absolute equality of therapist and client; (3) who never showed strong emotion during therapy; (4) who believed that empathy was a passive process in which the therapist merely listens to clients and simply becomes a mirror in which they could see their own emotions; and (5) who regarded himself as a counselor and was heavily identified with that area. None of these were literally true.

While conducting conflict resolution groups composed of Black and White South Africans, Rogers became enraged when a White psychologist claimed that one of the young Black revolutionaries was just trying to “get attention” (Hill-Hain & Rogers, 1988). “That was just grossly untrue ... one white guy got up and was going to hit him and I exploded at him too” (p. 62). In the same interview Rogers said, “I draw the line when I feel that one person is hurting another person in the group” (p. 65). He also referred to this event when making the point that no one is always able to step into another person’s emotional shoes, not even himself. “That’s why I offered no apology for exploding at [the White psychologist]” (p. 65).

During one of his South African group sessions, Rogers was strongly affected when a key Black participant left the group (Hill-Hain & Rogers, 1988). As he sat on the floor in the middle of the group, absorbing the agony of South African Blacks, he began to cry. It was not because others were in tears. It was because he felt like “one of the group in every sense” (p. 68). This kind of reaction was rare for him: “I’ve been in enough groups that it takes quite a lot to really touch me personally” (p. 68).

Rogers agreed with a critic’s condemnation of person-centered therapists who show absolute commitment to acting as nothing more than a sounding board, misunderstandings of empathy, and thoughtless commitment to equality between the therapist and client. “I totally agree with her ... in deploring the inauthentic, mechanical, wooden, dogmatic, client-centered therapist. In fact, I probably feel worse about such therapists than they do, because I feel personally offended” (Rogers, 1987c). In a similar vein, Rogers wrote of empathy: “It is regarded superficially; it is regarded as passive when you just sit back and listen. To be really empathic is one of the most active experiences I know. You have to really understand what it feels like to this person in this situation .... To really let oneself go into the inner world of this other person is one of the most active, difficult, and demanding things that I know” (Rogers, 1987a, p. 45).

To address the issue of client–therapist equality, Rogers considered the questions he would pose for himself before each therapy session: “‘Can I be totally present to this client? Can I be with him or her?’ ... It would never occur to me to ask myself, ‘Can I make this relationship an equal one?’” (p. 38). In fact, relationships in Rogerian therapy sometimes are not equal; they are tilted in the direction of the client. If Rogers and a Black person were in therapy, as was sometimes the case when he was at the University of Chicago, he would give himself over to being a student undergoing instruction in the African American experience. Only when a black client communicated that Rogers was adequately schooled would he attempt to feel as one with him or her. This procedure would be profitably adopted by all therapists who have clients of a different ethnicity than their own. Another of Rogers’s diversity contributions is seen in evidence, collected over 46 years as a psychologist, that his theory was having influence on those who deal with interracial and intercultural relationships.

Rogers is often identified with counseling, a multidisciplinary pursuit sometimes practiced by professionals from nonpsychological disciplines. Even the longtime colleague who wrote Rogers’s obituary regarded Rogers as a founder of counseling as a discipline, and considered him highly identified with counseling (Gendlin, 1988). In response to Gendlin’s “fine memorial,” Donald E. Super (1989), who had known Rogers since 1935, pointed to the fact that Rogers’s therapy section was called the Chicago Counseling Center and that his 1942 book was entitled *Counseling and Psychotherapy*. Then he wrote, “But Carl remained a psychotherapist, out of the mainstream of counseling psychology, a member of the Clinical but not of the Counseling Division [of the American Psychological Association]” (Super, 1989, p. 1161).

In view of these facts, why include “counseling” in the book title? Ray Bixler (1990) indicated that he and other students in Rogers’s graduate seminar were consulted by their professor concerning an appropriate book title. Professor and students decided on *counseling* because it would recruit counselors to client centered therapy and on *psychotherapy* because the term was at the heart of their professional identities. Thus, it seems, Rogers was primarily identified as a psychotherapist, but he was open to sharing his methods with others.

### *Rogers’s View of the Person*

Rogers’s point of view revolves around a subdiscipline of psychology he helped to found. **Humanistic psychology** emphasizes the present experience and essential worth of the whole person, promotes creativity, intentionalism, free choice, and spontaneity, and fosters the belief that people can solve their own psychological problems. It gained momentum during the 1950s and early 1960s with the publication of several important books (Buhler, 1962, 1965; Maslow, 1954, 1959, 1962; Rogers, 1961, 1970) and a flagship journal, the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, founded in 1961. Proponents of humanistic psychology proclaimed their movement a “major breakthrough,” because of the primary importance it placed on understanding the entire person, “the functioning and experience of a whole human being” (Bugental, 1964, p. 25). This emphasis also characterizes points of view in which every person is understood in a comprehensive and integrative manner as being more than the simple sum of his or her parts (Kohler, 1947).

Humanistic psychology emerged from two other philosophical orientations, one of which was introduced in the last chapter. Rollo May has been the leading psychological practitioner of *existentialism* and existential psychotherapy. The term *existence* comes from the root word *ex-sistere*, which means “to stand out, to emerge” (May, 1983). To May, existentialism is an attempt to “portray the human being not as a collection of static substances or mechanisms or patterns but rather as emerging and becoming, that is to say, as existing” (p. 50). *Being* is “defined as the *individual’s unique pattern of potentialities*” (May, 1969a, p. 19). He also notes that, for some existentialists, to be is *to do*, to behave in a way that has impact on self and others. In addition, he adopts Sartre’s belief that we are our choices and Ephren Ramirez’s assertion that the extent to which we accept responsibility for our lives determines the extent to which we become free moral agents.

May agreed with Viktor Frankl’s contention that, more and more, people show up for therapy not because of the usual “neurotic” symptoms, but because they are bored and fed up with the lack of meaning in their lives. In Sullivanian fashion, May sees psychotherapy as “*two-persons-existing-in-a-world, the world at the moment being represented by the consulting room of the therapist*” (May, 1969b). To May, psychotherapy addresses six basic existential issues. First, the existing person is centered in her or his self. An attack on that center is an attack on the person’s existence. What we call “neurosis” is the process by which a person attempts to preserve his or her center. Simply removing the neurosis, therefore, is not an existentially valid strategy. Instead one must address the vulnerability of the individual’s center, his or her existence. Thus, neurosis is only a sign of the real problem, not itself the real problem.

The second process involves self-affirmation, which has another name, *courage*, as in Paul Tillich’s (1952) “courage to be.” Self-affirmation requires the will to decide, to choose. Psychotherapy must create an atmosphere in which people feel free to exercise the power to make their own choices. The third process highlights the need for all existing people to go “out from their centeredness to participate in other beings” (May, 1969b, p. 74). But venturing forth from one’s centeredness poses a dilemma that must be addressed in therapy: to be, one must participate with other beings, including human beings, but to do so generates the danger that one will overidentify with others and, thereby, vacate one’s own being. Fromm is present in these notions.

The fourth process is based on the principle that “*the subjective side of centeredness is awareness*” (May, 1969b, p. 77). *Awareness* in May’s sense is a reflection of our biological side, which we share with other animals. We, like the seal that punctuates its sleep at ten-second intervals to look for predators, must pay attention to threats to our existence. *Vigilance* is the name for this animal-level of awareness that dictates one must attend to threats. The need to exercise it must be considered in therapy. The fifth process revolves around the uniquely human form of awareness, self-consciousness. In contrast to self-awareness, *self-consciousness* is the human capacity to know him- or herself as the person being threatened, which is to

know that one is not exclusively acted on, but has a world he or she can influence. Self-consciousness changes everything. Though we share a sexual side with other animals, it becomes something different for us. It is shaped by the person who is our partner. Psychotherapy must proceed so as to acknowledge that self-consciousness raises humans above the flesh that knows only the threat of nonexistence. It carries us to a level above biology where we can see ourselves in relation to other beings and envisage our capacity to affect other beings, as well as to be affected by them.

The sixth process involves anxiety, “the state of the human being in the struggle against that which would destroy his being” (May, 1969b, p. 81). Anxiety reflects the eternal struggle of *being* in conflict with *nonbeing* and is aptly captured by Freud’s Thanatos (death instinct) in its struggle with Eros, the life instinct. During psychotherapy, May would never waterdown the persons’ internal experience of the struggle between being and nonbeing. Rather, he would facilitate acceptance of responsibility for making choices that may fortify the person’s being, but can, if choices are poor, expose the person’s being to threats. To avoid choices allows one’s being to slowly erode; to make choices may preserve one’s being or make it more vulnerable. It is deciding whether to hide in the darkness in the hope it will take some time for the monster to find and devour us, or deciding to run for it, whereby we elude the monster or place ourselves directly in its path.

In remarks on May’s ideas, Rogers (1969a) applauded existentialism’s insistence on confronting modern psychology with the “fact” that we must look inside people, not just outside, if we are to understand them. He contended that U.S. psychology is “shocked” by existentialists, who speak as if people are free and responsible and have choice at the core of their existence. He also acknowledged that, consistent with existentialistic assumptions, as a developing clinician he learned to create a therapeutic atmosphere in which clients feel comfortable in making their own decisions about the course of therapy.

Far from being “unscientific,” existentialistic psychotherapy elicited a number of interesting, testable hypotheses from Rogers. Regarding May’s first process, Rogers deduced the hypothesis that “The more the self of the person is threatened, the more he will exhibit defensive neurotic behavior” (p. 89). One’s self is the soft underbelly of one’s being. It is, at the same time, the center of the person’s being and the most vulnerable part of his or her psychological anatomy. To protect it, one will resort to whatever works, even anxiety-focused methods that inflict great pain on one’s own psyche. From May’s second process Rogers deduced the hypothesis, “The more the self is free from threat, the more the individual will exhibit self-affirming behaviors” (p. 89). The less the threat, the less vulnerable is the self, and the more it can venture forth and flex its creative muscles in the interest of being “who one is.” The third process suggested the hypothesis that the more people are free from threats to their selves, the more they can actualize the potential for participation with other beings. May’s sixth process suggested the hypothesis that anxiety will recede only when one loses the fear of being the person one could be. When one accepts who one can become, she or he loses the fear of being that person. According to Rogers, all of these hypotheses are readily testable and, if confirmed, would scientifically support existentialism’s underpinnings of humanism.

The second orientation contributing to humanistic psychology is a method of addressing reality that is a strong companion to existentialism. **Phenomenology** encompasses a search for essential issues, an emphasis on consciousness, the necessity of describing experience, and a desire to grasp reality as each individual uniquely perceives it. This subjective approach to knowledge and understanding is a major characteristic of humanistic and existential psychology (Heidegger, 1949; Husserl, 1961). “The only reality I can possibly know is the world as I perceive and experience it at this moment. The only reality you can possibly know is the world as You perceive and experience it at this moment. And the only certainty is that those perceived realities are different. There are as many ‘real worlds’ as there are people!” (Rogers, 1980, p. 102). May (1969a) adds that the phenomenological approach requires “the disciplined effort to clear one’s mind of the pre-suppositions” (p. 21) that cause one to see the client only in the light of one’s own theories and dogmas. Phenomenology calls for an “attitude of openness and readiness to hear” (p. 21). An experience is real for the experiencer at the time it is experienced, as seen in the qualifiers used by Rogers in his writings, such as “real for me” and “based on my experience.” This is not to say that there is no objective world we can all agree on. Rather it affirms the subjective world and gives it at least equal status with the objective world.

On the one hand, it is up to each person to decide what he or she is to do or to be, based on an individualized vantage point. On the other hand, a person should leave how other persons behave and how

they lead their lives up to them. Thus, people must assume responsibility for their own decisions and for no one else's. Even in the last year of his life, Rogers refused the role of expert therapist who answers clients' questions such as "What do you think I should do?" (Hill-Hain & Rogers, 1988).

Apart from questions of scientific truth, the phenomenological approach has particular implications for studying people. If we wish to understand a person, we need to get inside his or her individual world of meaning. We do so by showing **empathy**, sensing and participating in the emotions of others. Thus, humanistic psychologists focus on the meaning that each person attaches to what she or he does. As theorists and therapists, therefore, humanistic psychologists seek to avoid "the sort of scientific detachment pretended to or achieved at great cost by other orientations" such as behaviorism or neuroscience (Bugental, 1964, p. 24). Instead, they validate their discoveries through subjective experience rather than impersonal tests or experiments. This approach led to new methods for studying human experience. Like Gordon Allport, humanistic psychologists typically emphasize the *idiographic* approach: the belief that meaningful and generally applicable discoveries come from understanding one person at a time. As Rogers writes, "What is most personal is most general" (1961, p. 26).

Empathy is not just a humanistic abstraction. Growing evidence from neuroscience indicates that blood-flow increases in crucial imitation and emotional areas of the brain are coordinated with imitating or observing facial expressions associated with several emotions (e.g., happiness, anger, and fear; Bower, 2003). Imitation yielded stronger effects than observation. Even non-conscious impersonations of others' emotions simulate how others feel.

Rogers adopted an organismic approach in which the human organism is viewed as a total being whose physical, psychological, and spiritual aspects cannot be separated except by artificial means. In brief, it is the person who is placed first. This is why Rogers's theory of therapy is now usually called the *person-centered* approach (formerly it was *client-centered*, a phrase still used by some therapists and Rogers, even in his last articles; Rogers, 1987c; Super, 1989). The central hypothesis of the person-centered orientation is that "Individuals have within themselves vast resources for self-understanding and for altering their self-concepts, basic attitudes, and self-directed behavior" (Rogers, 1980, p. 115). Further, these resources can be tapped by providing "a definable climate of facilitative psychological attitudes" (p. 115).

Rogers differed from Freud when he assumed that the natural development of human beings is toward the "constructive fulfillment" of their inherent potentialities. Rogers aptly put it this way (quoted in Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 250)

I am inclined to believe that fully to be a human being is to enter into the complex process of being one of the most widely sensitive, responsive, creative, and adaptive creatures on this planet. So when a Freudian such as Karl Menninger tells me ... that he perceives man as "innately evil" or more precisely, "innately destructive," I can only shake my head in wonderment.

In an application of the organismic approach, Rogers rejected the conception of learning he attributed to most universities. "A ... unique element is that [my theory] is based on a learning that is experiential as well as cognitive. That is something that seems very hard for universities to accept. Most of the universities I know think that education goes on [only] from the neck up ... That is not so! Education may be limited to that, but learning is something else" (Rogers, 1987a, p. 39). It is also an endorsement of pedagogical procedures that entail active student participation in college classroom activities. Such methods are gaining popularity among professors so rapidly they threaten to supplant the traditional 50 to 75 minutes of straight lecture (DeCarvalho, 1991). As a teacher, Rogers "distributed an optional reading list, gave a few assignments (e.g., come to class, keep a journal, write a final paper on a subject of your choice) and indicated a willingness to lecture occasionally or do a demonstration if the students requested it" (Kirschenbaum, 1991, p. 412).

Rogers recognized that his ideas had been heavily influenced by his relationships with clients in therapy. However, like Sullivan, he believed that psychotherapy relationships are only a special instance of interpersonal relationships in general, and "the same lawfulness" governs all human relationships (Rogers, 1961, p. 39). He has supported this belief in a number of popular books on such topics as freedom to learn in education (1969b), encounter groups (1970), becoming marriage partners (1972), and the revolutionary impact of personal power (1977).

## *Basic Concepts: Rogers*

### *Actualization: General and Specific*

**The General Actualizing Tendency.** All living things display the **general actualizing tendency**, an “inherent tendency of the organism to develop all its capacities in ways which serve to maintain or enhance the organism” (Rogers, 1959, p. 196). This constructive biological tendency is the “one central source of energy in the human organism,” giving rise to all other motivation (Rogers, 1980, p. 123). The actualizing tendency has four significant characteristics that express themselves through a wide range of behaviors:

1. It is *organismic*—an inborn, biological predisposition reflected in the total functioning of all living beings.
2. It is an *active* process that accounts for organisms always doing something: exploring, changing the environment, playing, creating and seeking food or sex.
3. It is *directional* rather than random; it inclines every form of life toward growth, self-regulation, fulfillment, reproduction, and independence from external control.
4. It is *selective*, meaning that not all of an organism’s potentialities are necessarily developed (for example, the ability to bear pain).

Rogers illustrated the actualizing tendency by reference to the winter potatoes his family stored in their basement:

The conditions were unfavorable, but the potatoes would begin to sprout—pale white sprouts ... these sad, spindly sprouts would grow ... toward the distant light of the [basement] window. They were in ... futile growth, a sort of desperate expression of the directional tendency ... They would ... never mature, never fulfill their real potentiality. But under the most adverse circumstances they were striving to become. Life would not give up, even if it could not flourish (Rogers, 1979/1983, p. 228).

The organismic propensity for actualization is true of beings from potatoes, through protozoa, to rabbits, all the way to humans. If passing on one’s genes is added, the organismic approach is consistent with evolutionary theory.

**Self-actualization.** In addition to the general actualizing tendency, Rogers postulated a specifically human tendency, **self-actualization**, a person’s lifelong process of realizing his or her potentialities to become a fully functioning person. The goal of self-actualization is “to be that self which one truly is” (Rogers, 1961, p. 166). The direction of self-actualization is toward “the good life,” defined as whatever is organismically valued by the total person who is inwardly free to move in any direction.

Rogers (1961) associated the process of self-actualization with enhanced functioning in three areas. First, self-actualization involves an increased openness to **experience**, which is all the emotions, cognitions, and perceptions occurring to the organism at any given moment that potentially can be consciously considered. *Awareness* is the conscious apprehension of experience. Second, the self-actualizing person lives existentially, going with the flow of each moment in life and participating fully in it. She or he is *time competent*, experiencing life in the “here and now,” without rigid preconceptions that things must be the way they have been in the past and without needing to control how things should be in the future. Third, the self-actualizing person places full trust in his or her organismic intuitions, doing what feels right after weighing all available information. She or he relies relatively little on the past or on social conventions. The self-actualizing person also is genuinely appreciative of free choice, creativity, human nature’s trustworthiness, and life’s richness.

## *The Importance of the Self*

Obviously, self-actualization implies a central role for the “self” and is dear to the humanists. His interest in the self was partly inspired by clients’ expressions made during therapy: “I wonder who *I am*”; “I don’t want anyone to know the *real me*”; “It feels good to let myself go and just *be me*.” For Rogers (1947), the person’s experience of self is a basic aspect of life. It forms and determines behavior, cognition, and feeling.

**Self as Self-perceptions.** Although Rogers has never formally defined *personality*, he did define **self**, the organized, consistent, conceptual whole composed of perceptions of the characteristics of the “I” or “me,” the values attached to these perceptions, and the relationships of the “I” or “me” to various aspects of life (Rogers, 1959, p. 200). The definition reflects Rogers’s phenomenological approach. Its emphasis is clearly on the perceptual origins of self: a person’s self is a set of perceptions that have the perceiver as its target. Further, because it is one’s perceptions of one’s self, the self is functionally equivalent to self-concept. It includes all of people’s evaluations of their organismic functions and human relationships, which they use “to order and interpret [their] experiences” (Shlien, 1970, p. 95). Also, self-perceptions relate to other people and to perceptions provided by the senses (Evans, 1975). To illustrate, a person may have the self-perception, “I am six feet tall.” She may relate this perception to other people, as in “I am taller than many people,” and place a value on it, as in “I like being tall.”

For Rogers, the **ideal self** is the self a person most values and desires to be. It is “the self-concept which the individual would most like to possess, upon which he places the highest value for himself” (Rogers, 1959, p. 100). Therefore, successfully pursuing the ideal self is a major precondition for feelings of worth. Rogerians often have a person describe actual and ideal selves and then ask her or him to compare the two descriptions. That is the purpose of [Box 9.2](#).

**Congruence with Experience.** Our self-concepts may be more or less in agreement with experiences related to self. When a person is in a state of **congruence**, his or her self-concept and experiences relating to self are consistent. The actualizing tendency is then relatively whole and unified, and the person shows maturity as well as psychological adjustment. In contrast, **incongruence** reflects an inconsistency between self-concept and experiences relating to self. Incongruence may arise out of beliefs that are rigid, distorted, unrealistic, or overgeneralized. It may also result from the defensive tactic **denial**, which involves the inability to recognize or accept the existence of an experience that has occurred. It is reflected in the reaction “No! It can’t be!” to a rumor circulating among office workers that one has failed to receive a desperately sought-after promotion. **Distortion** involves a reinterpretation of an experience so as to make it consistent with how one wants things to be, as in the reaction “You are all wrong. Yesterday the boss was very friendly to me.” You can see that Rogers, like Freud and Horney, believed that people have defenses against threatening experiences.

## BOX 9.2 • *Adjective Descriptions of Your Actual and Ideal Self*

Instructions: On the left side of a sheet of paper, write down adjectives that best describe the self you are at the present time in your life (actual self). On the right side, write down adjectives that best describe the self you would like to be (ideal self). Work quickly, and be sure to write down single words that are found in the dictionary, not sentences, paragraphs, or words that you invent. Attempt to write down between 10 and 15 self-descriptive adjectives under each heading, but not less than five under each. Do not worry if some of your words seem contradictory; just write whatever adjectives best describe your actual and ideal self.

### *Your Actual Self*

### *Your Ideal Self*

Student subjects in research conducted by Potkay and me typically wrote down about five to ten adjectives when allowed to record as many as they want (Allen & Potkay, 1983a; Potkay & Allen, 1988). How do your words compare with those of other students in class? How are your descriptions of your self *as you are* and your self *as you would like to be* the same or different? What do you make of words present on and absent from both lists? How would you transform yourself from present self into ideal self?

Consistent with the implication that you are now a certain self (actual self) and may become another self (ideal self), Rogers believes that the self is best understood as a continuing process, not a fixed endpoint. Thus, the self, yours or anyone else's, is very likely to be undergoing change. This is why a person may organize self-views in different ways at different points in time. Our self-view of today may be contrary to your self-view of the recent past.

Other people may not see you the same way you see yourself. A student at my university was quite surprised to learn of this discrepancy while doing a self-study as a term project. She had been asked to describe her trueself with adjectives and then obtain adjective descriptions of her trueself from her mother, father, boyfriend, and best girlfriend. The words she used to describe her own self—*insecure, stubborn, impatient*—were much more negative than those used by other people in her life—*intelligent, friendly, lovable*. Her explanation was that “I failed to update my ... self to match my trueself of today” (Allen & Potkay, 1983a).

The closer the correspondence between actual and ideal self, the greater the self-acceptance and adjustment. But remember that perceiving discrepancies between ideal and real selves may be a good sign: you are appreciating the need for positive change.

Self-perceptions out of tune with experiences can contribute to feelings of inner confusion, tension, and to maladaptive behavior. Rogers cites the example of a boy who had been observed lifting girls' skirts. When questioned, the boy denied what he had done, stating that it “couldn't” have been he, a disclaimer that confirmed that he was in a state of incongruence. His perceptions led him to maintain a self-concept inconsistent with his actual experience. Because his self-concept did not include sexual feelings, his organismic experiences of sexual curiosity and desire were in conflict with his self-concept. He closed off his awareness to behaviors, feelings, or attitudes inconsistent with his self-concept. The boy's denial reflected *defensiveness* aimed at maintaining the current structure of the self in the face of contradictory information (Rogers, 1959). It is a typical response when one's self-concept is threatened. “His self-picture couldn't do it, and didn't do it” (Evans, 1975, p. 17).

Movement toward growth and improved adjustment in this boy would require him to revise his self-concept toward congruence. The boy would show anxiety as he became aware of the incongruence between his self-concept and his experiences because “each of us seeks to preserve the ... picture that he has of himself and... a sharp change in that picture is quite threatening” (Rogers, quoted in Evans, 1975, p. 17). If the boy were able to lower his defenses, the new information about himself could be incorporated into his self-concept. Then he could consider an appropriate expression of sexual curiosity. If defensiveness continues, *maladjustment* could occur: the boy would remain unaware of internal conflicts and his growth would stagnate.

## *Personality Development: Some Favorable Conditions*

What determines whether a person's self-concept becomes congruent or incongruent with experience? Rogers points to external circumstances, particularly of an interpersonal nature, that cause personal growth to be facilitated or blocked. His boyhood observation of his family's potatoes highlights the importance of environmental conditions as influences on the actualizing tendency of living things. The potatoes failed to realize their fullest potentials because of unfavorable conditions outside themselves.

Similarly, the interactions between people and interpersonal environments represent an important aspect of human development. The actualization tendency points all people in the direction of becoming the persons they truly are, regardless of the social environment. However, certain interpersonal conditions facilitate actualization strivings, whereas others do not. Rogers's work with clients in therapy led him to identify some necessary and sufficient conditions for positive growth and change in personality (Orlov, 1992). The conditions are receiving unconditional positive regard, developing accurate empathy, achieving congruence in personal relations, and developing positive self-regard.

**Unconditional Positive Regard.** All people have needs that can be fulfilled only in human relationships. Chief among these is a universally learned need for **positive regard**, the experiencing of oneself as making a positive difference in the lives of other people and as receiving warmth, liking, respect, sympathy, acceptance, caring, and trust from others (Rogers, 1959; Standal, 1954). This need is met when other people in a person's life provide **unconditional positive regard**; they communicate, with no strings attached, that one is accepted, valued, worthwhile, and trusted, simply for being who one is. The person experiences others' acceptance without feeling that it depends on his or her doing some "right" thing or having to be the way others think the person "should" be. When we release people from Horney's "tyranny of the shoulds," we help them along the road to self-actualization. Further, no aspect of the person is judged "more or less worthy of positive regard than any other" (Rogers, 1959, p. 208). There is no generalized labeling of the person as "bad" or "good," only unconditional acceptance.

However, a person can receive positive regard under unproductive circumstances: only when he or she meets conditions of worth set up by others. Here the individual feels prized in some respects, but not in others. She or he then avoids certain experiences judged by other people to be relatively "unworthy" and seeks out certain other experiences judged by them as relatively "worthy." This occurs even if the person has been attracted to the "unworthy" experiences and repelled by the "worthy" experiences. The unproductive way is "conditional" because it involves contingencies stated in if-then terms. Significant others say, in effect, "If you say or do the things I like or want, then I will value you. If you don't, then I won't." When conditional acceptance characterizes the social environment, a child learns to behave and think mainly in ways approved by others, especially parents. The child learns, "If I do what my parents want, then I will be loved. If I don't, I won't be loved." This lesson generates incongruence between one's experience and "who one is." Under these circumstances, one's actualizing tendency is likely to become blocked. Then denials and distortions of personal experiences that are disapproved by others are likely to occur. Also, acceptance of experiences that are incongruent with "who one is" becomes probable.

A common misconception about unconditional positive regard is that people who provide it to a person must always approve of everything the person says or does. Rogers counters this error by carefully distinguishing between the individual as a person and the individual's freely chosen values and behaviors. For example, while thoughtful and caring parents always prize their child, they do so without valuing all of the child's behaviors equally. They may express pride when their child shares a candy bar with a friend, or displeasure when their child bites a friend. However, the child's specific behaviors are approved or disapproved, not the child as a person. It is the sharing that is approved and the biting that is disapproved, not the child. Although the parents undoubtedly wish the child would not bite, biting does not lead to rejection. The child continues to be prized, regardless of his or her behavior.

**Accurate Empathy.** If a person is to achieve congruence of self-concept with his or her experience, therapists and other people must correctly "hear" what the individual is experiencing and refrain from judging it. Rogers believed the ability to understand another person is of "enormous" value. He found it "enriching to open channels whereby others can communicate their feelings, their private perceptual worlds, to me" (1961,

p. 19). **Accurate empathy** is Rogers's term for the ability to correctly perceive the client's internal world in a nonevaluative way. Such empathic understanding goes beneath the surface of another person's words and actions, to inner feelings, attitudes, meanings, values, and motives.

***Congruence in Relations with a Therapist and Others.*** In order for a person to grow, significant other people, including a therapist, must naturally and openly demonstrate their willingness and ability to be themselves in relationships with that person. This state of genuineness on the part of one person toward another can be regarded as a kind of congruence: the two people feel the same level of comfort or emotional involvement with the issue they are considering. The therapist must exhibit an openness to inner experiences in such a way that it conveys congruence with the client. Even an experienced therapist might admit to the client, "I find myself frightened because you are touching on feelings I have never been able to resolve myself" (Rogers, 1959). A therapist uncomfortable with some aspect of the relationship with the client would be considered incongruent if she or he remained unaware of the discomfort, avoided dealing with it, or communicated reactions opposite to what is real for him or her. The therapist's lack of genuineness may create so much incongruence between therapist, client, and experiences occurring in therapy that the client's growth may be retarded.

***Developing Positive Self-regard.*** When individuals receive unconditional positive regard from others, particularly during the formative years, they will develop **positive self-regard**, a favorable attitude toward themselves. This, in turn, allows them to develop their own values in accordance with their real experiences. Although they will be aware of expectations concerning what they "should" do, they will trust their own judgments instead of being bound by those of others. Positive self-regard unlocks actualizing tendencies and allows individuals to become fully functioning humans. By contrast, when others impose conditions of worth on an individual, her or his chances of developing positive self-regard become less. In this case, people's **locus of evaluation**, the source of evidence about themselves, lies not within them but outside, in others. The judgments of others form the standard for evaluating experiences. A young woman's letter to Rogers (1980) illustrates locus of evaluation in others, rather than in oneself:

I think that I began to lose me when I was in high school. I always wanted to go into work that would be of help to people but my family resisted, and I thought they must be right ... about two years ago ... I met a guy that I thought was ideal. Then nearly a year ago I took a good look at us, and realized that I was everything that he wanted me to be and nothing that I was. I have always been emotional... . My fiance would tell me that I was just mad or just happy and I would say okay... . Then when I took this good look at us I realized that I was angry because I wasn't following my true emotions.

Perhaps part of the problem with people like this is that they have confused their selves with the selves of important people in their lives (Mashek et al., 2003). They are yielding to the pressures from important others to adopt the selves of those others.

### ***Procedures for Changing Personality: Client-Centered Therapy***

Rogers's ideas about personality development in therapy involve the assumption that, if certain conditions exist, then a characteristic process of personality change will occur (Rogers, 1959). These conditions are positive regard, accurate empathic understanding, and congruence (Bozarth & Brodley, 1991). Also important are the client's anxiety level and motivation to change. Person-centered therapy is designed to reflect these basic premises.

The direction of change for clients in Rogerian therapy is from a personality that is fixed, separated, and tied to the past to one that is spontaneous, integrated, and flowing with experiences occurring in the present. Seven characteristic stages of this process unfold during therapy (1961). It is impossible to capture all aspects of these complex and comprehensive stages as experienced by the client, but the following observations are representative:

Stage 1. The client's communications are mostly about externals, not about self.

Stage 2. The client describes feelings but does not recognize or "own" them personally.

Stage 3. The client talks about self as an object, often in terms of past experiences.

Stage 4. The client experiences feelings in the present, but mainly just describes them, with distrust and fear, rather than expressing them directly.

Stage 5. The client experiences and expresses feelings freely in the present; feelings “bubble up” into awareness with a display of desire to experience them.

Stage 6. The client accepts his or her feelings in all their immediacy and richness.

Stage 7. The client trusts new experiences and relates to others openly and freely.

If this process occurs, then certain cognitive, emotional, and behavioral changes will occur. These changes, wrought in therapy, lead the person closer to self-actualization. They reflect increases in congruence, openness to experience, adjustment, correspondence between actual and ideal self, positive self-regard, and acceptance of self and others.

Hypothetical therapeutic sessions illustrate the course of person-centered therapy. Imagine a successful lawyer who works 60 to 70 hours a week but is dissatisfied with his life. In an early session, the client begins by talking about trivia not really related to his concerns. “I can’t understand why my kids are so materialistic. They just want more junk ... everything they see on TV. I’m just the ‘horn of plenty,’ satisfying their every whim.” The therapist replies, “So you feel that your kids just use you to satisfy their needs.” The remark reflects the client’s feeling and emotions back to him so they may be affirmed, a process that makes them more available for reconsideration.

The client continues in this vein for a time and then, in a later session, he begins to express his more central emotions, but acts as if they are not his own. “It’s funny, today, how people end up with careers that are unrelated to what they want to do or are capable of doing. I know this guy who is selling insurance and making a fortune, but living for a camping trip on the weekend. He’s an outdoor type ... wanted to be a forest ranger.” The therapist nods, indicating that the client is understood.

On a later date the client begins really to talk about himself, for the first time. However, he talks about the past as if to analyze another person rather than his present self. “I can remember trying to copy the Mona Lisa when I was a kid. How naive can you get! Here was this little kid trying to act like a great artist. I did some pretty good drawings on my own ... my teachers said so, but they weren’t good enough to satisfy me.” The therapist listens intently and utters “uh huh” to communicate that the client’s feelings are appreciated.

After several sessions, the client gets around to himself in the present, but he is merely descriptive rather than analytical. “I still paint, you know. Sometimes late at night... sometimes on weekends. Did you know that I have an arrangement with an art gallery? I’ve sold some of my paintings, but didn’t get much ... can’t make a living that way. They want me to come in with them ... invest, you know, in the gallery and help manage it. Small change that would be ... but you know I’m really happy when I’m there among those paintings ... get a bigger kick out of selling a painting for a hundred bucks than settling a case for a hundred thousand.” The therapist says, “you feel that painting is very enjoyable and that you have had some success at it.” The client begins to recognize how important art is to him. In subsequent sessions, the client comes back to art more and more and talks about his current feelings to a greater and greater extent. “Well today was something else. I left work early and went to the gallery ... I have a corner in a back room where I can paint. I’m working on something right now that really excites me. I’ll have to show it to you. I know now that art is a part of me ... heart and soul.”

In the last sessions before termination of therapy, the lawyer hardly mentions law. All he can talk about is his latest work of art and his plans to slowly substitute hours at the gallery for hours at the office. Here he shows awareness of courses of action that are more in tune with his actualizing self. “I have enough money saved to help make a go of the gallery. I find that my younger colleagues take care of the law practice quite nicely. You know, I’ve never been happier. My kids don’t seem so greedy anymore. Let them have what they want... I’ll give them all I can. They’ll eventually find themselves.”

## *Evaluation*

### *General Contributions*

Rogers's phenomenological approach has had major influences on understanding personality. It has allowed individual human beings to speak for themselves about the nature of their own personal experiences. Rogers has guided psychological professionals in suspending views as to what a person *should be*, so they can understand who a person actually is. His phenomenological approach has questioned scientific psychology's so-called objective frameworks that have sought to understand people from the outside: behaviorally, mechanistically, and impersonally. Rogers has doubted the existence of an absolute way of interpreting reality, and the desirability of even seeking such a narrow "truth" (Rogers, 1980).

Rogers has also tried to enhance our understanding of people by emphasizing trust in them. Given sufficiently supportive psychological conditions, individuals can be trusted to actualize their biologically based resources and move in directions that are ultimately good for them and other people. This basic assumption is an outgrowth of Rogers's belief that all organisms have inherent, natural capacities for growth, understanding, change, purposeful direction, and the responsible use of personal freedom.

### *Caring about the Person in Human Relationships*

Rogers has stressed the role of caring, interpersonal relationships in the process of developing, maintaining, and changing personality. In person-centered therapy, the therapist is not a detached, objective observer or "expert," but a person, "a viable human being engaged in a terribly human endeavor" (Truax & Mitchell, 1971, p. 344). Under the influence of Rogers, even behavioral therapists, often criticized for ignoring interpersonal relationships, have modified procedures "which used to seem less than human to their critics" (Gendlin & Rychlak, 1970). In the best interest of the client, Rogers laid aside traditional rules of therapy. For instance, early in his career he showed his humanitarian side by departing from child-guidance procedures and answering "Yes" to a despairing mother's question "Do you ever take adults for counseling here?" (Rogers, 1961).

### *Rogers's Scientific Contributions*

Rogers has changed the field of psychotherapy through subjecting his clinical observations to research investigation (Rogers, 1989a). His (1942) case of Herbert Bryan was the first complete series of therapy sessions to be electronically recorded and transcribed (800 78rpm record sides and 170 book pages). Never before had such a wealth of information been made available to psychologists, word for word, complete with "Uhm's" and pauses. Standard procedure, beginning with Freud, was for therapists to rely entirely on memory or scant notes often composed at the end of a day's therapy sessions. By exposing their practice to the scrutiny of other professionals and the public, Rogers and his students demystified psychotherapy (Wexler & Rice, 1974). They "turned the field ... upside down" and "made possible the empirical study of highly subjective phenomena" (Rogers, 1974, p. 116).

Unlike some theorists covered so far, a number of Rogers's concepts can be translated into a form amenable to scientific testing. An outstanding example was provided by Harrington, Block, and Block (1987). They were interested in Rogers's theory about the process by which child-rearing practices determine level of creativity at adolescence. Their subject sample was composed of individuals who had been followed and periodically tested beginning at approximately age 3 and continuing to approximately age 14. They studied Rogers's writings about child rearing and creativity, then they translated his notions about that relationship into items on some instruments designed to measure child-rearing practices. One of these measures involved having parents report the practices they typically used. Some items that were judged most typical of Rogers's "creativity fostering environment" (CFE) included, "I respect my child's opinions and encourage him to express them" and "I encourage my child to be curious, to explore and question things" (p. 852). Some items judged least typical of Rogers's CFE included "I believe that children should be seen and not heard" and "I do not allow my child to question my decisions" (p. 852).

Other measures assessed parental teaching behavior during parent-child, task-completion sessions that

were observed by raters. Resultant ratings were then transformed into items related to Rogers's CFE. Items judged to be most typical of CFE included, "Parent was warm and supportive" and "Child appeared to enjoy the situation." Items judged to be least typical of CFE included, "Parent tended to control the tasks" and "Parent appeared ashamed of child" (p. 852).

Creativity was assessed when subjects were teens. Items that were judged applicable to creative individuals included, "Tends to be proud of own accomplishments" and "Is curious, exploring, eager for new experiences." Items that were judged applicable to non-creative individuals included, "Is uncomfortable with uncertainty and complexities" and "Gives up and withdraws where possible in the face of adversity" (p. 853).

Harrington, Block, and Block (1987) found statistically significant, positive relationships between data from instruments with items that measured Rogers's CFE and data from instruments with items that measured creativity. They concluded that Rogers's ideas about creativity, and the circumstances that foster it, are scientifically valid. Just looking at the items they used gives one a relatively clear impression concerning what creativity is and which parental practices promote it. **Box 9.3** follows Rogers the peace-keeper around the world.

### ***The Famous Case of Gloria: A Teaching Tool***

Rogers's encounter with Gloria (Shostrom, 1965) continues to be used for teaching Rogerian principles to undergraduate and graduate students. Although the therapy session was only thirty minutes long, the equivalent of many volumes has been written about it. One of the most intriguing contributions to the Rogers–Gloria literature is Wichman and Campbell's (2003a) essay on conceptual metaphors (CM) used during therapy. Three CMs were illustrated: (1) self as a container (SAAC), (2) knowing is feeling (KIF), and (3) knowing oneself is seeing oneself through others' eyes (KOISOTOE). Use of these metaphors by both clients and therapists allows the former to communicate conceptions and feelings about the self relatively easily and the latter to reflect back on understanding and appreciation of those conceptions and feelings.

***Self as a Container (SAAC)***. The self is a whole entity that contains much. It can be described as "deep," "full," and "whole" (Wichman & Campbell, 2003a, p. 18). Rogers helped Gloria by facilitating her attempts to accept her guilt feelings, while assuring that Gloria alone plotted the course to acceptance.

***Knowing Is Feeling (KIF)***. The answer to a crucial question defines KIF: how do you know whether something you've done is right? The answer is "It's right if it feels right." Gloria disclosed to Rogers an internal conversation to herself: "If you're not comfortable, Gloria, it's not right, something is wrong" (Wichman & Campbell, 2003a, p. 19). She was referring to having sex with a man who was not the father of her children (she was divorced) and the fear that her "misbehavior" would taint her in the eyes of her daughter, Pam. Roger facilitated Gloria's acceptance of her behaviors by exclaiming, "If I really feel all right about it, then I don't have any concern about what I tell Pam" (p. 19).

***Knowing Oneself is Seeing One's Self through Others' Eyes (KOISOTOE)***. Gloria illustrated this conceptual metaphor nicely when she declared, "I hate facing the kids; I don't like looking at myself... I want them to see me just as sweet as they see [their father]" (Wichman & Campbell, 2003a, p. 20). Rogers helped by paraphrasing: "You sort of feel, 'I want them to have just as nice a picture of me as they have of their dad'" (p. 20).

### BOX 9.3 • Carl Rogers: Globe-Trotting Peacemaker

Not all of Rogers's contributions were related to "psychotherapy" and "personality theory." Rogers had great influence on individuals involved in some of the most disturbing and serious conflicts occurring in the world today. His efforts to end disastrous conflicts took him to every quarter of the globe. On a trip to Northern Ireland he attempted to induce Protestants and Catholics to regard each other as human beings rather than mortal enemies (Rogers & Ryback, 1984). Using his client-centered method adapted to a group context, Rogers brought religious rivals together in close proximity. As you might expect, initial reactions were explosive. For example, Gilda, a Protestant, whom Rogers described as young and pretty, said, "If I seen an IRA man lying on the ground ... I would step on him, because to me he has just went out and taken the lives of innocent people" (p. 5). Yet, under Rogers's skillful guidance, individuals revealed themselves and, thereby, came to appreciate one another's humanity. After considerable interaction in the context of Rogers's group, Dennis, a Protestant, and Becky, a Catholic, spoke warmly of one another:

**Dennis** The general impression back in Belfast is, if [Becky] is a Catholic ... you just put her in a wee box and that is the end of it. But you just can't do that. She has communicated to me that she is in a worse position than what I am ... I feel that she feels the absolute despair that I would feel. I don't know how I would react if I were one of her lads. I would probably go out and get a gun ... and end up dead.

**Becky** Words couldn't describe what I feel towards Dennis from the discussion we had at dinner time. We spoke quietly for about ten minutes and I felt that here I have got a friend and that was it.

**Dennis** We sat at dinner time and had a wee bit of yarn [storytelling] quietly when you were all away for your dinner ...

**Becky** I think he fully understands me as a person.

**Dennis** I do, there is no question about that ...

**Becky** And for that reason I am very grateful and I think I have found a friend (p. 5).

These same techniques were used in the encounter between Black and White South Africans that reduced Rogers to tears (Hill-Hain & Rogers, 1988) and in the former Soviet Union (Rogers, 1987b). This last adventure in group interaction, played out in Moscow and Tbilisi, was responsive to Rogers's larger concerns. He had in mind more than just settlement of local conflicts. For the last several years of his life, Rogers wrote passionately about the need to eliminate nuclear weapons, a concern that I share with him (Allen, 1985). He believed that social scientists could contribute much toward the end of the nuclear threat (Rogers & Malcolm, 1987). In fact, it was his fervent wish that his group interaction methods, used so successfully to alleviate local tensions, might be applied to international conflicts that have the potential to produce nuclear holocaust (Rogers, 1987c, 1989b; Rogers and Ryback, 1984). I can picture a group composed of the U.S. and Russian presidents and their underlings interacting under Rogers's guidance. Because he is gone, the best we can do is to apply his wisdom and sensitivity, and we had better hurry.

Wichman and Campbell (2003b) use many of the same quotes from the Rogers–Gloria film to illustrate the three main therapeutic tools used by Rogers to facilitate a client's efforts to change: empathy, genuineness, and unconditional positive regard. Rogers "displayed empathy for Gloria's struggle" by offering, "Life is risky. To take the responsibility for being the person you would like to be with [Pam] is a hell of a responsibility" (p. 180). Rogers displayed genuineness by laying out for Gloria his nonexpert role in her pursuit of positive change. Regarding helping her get rid of her guilt feelings, Rogers told Gloria, "this is [a]... very private thing that I couldn't possibly answer for you. But I sure as anything will try to help you work toward your own answer" (p. 180). Rogers also displayed unconditional positive regard through this same statement, by assuring Gloria that he believed in her ability to solve her own problems.

## **Limitations**

Although emphasis on subjective experience is a major contribution, it creates limitations in regard to the scientific status of Rogers's personality theory and therapy. The major weaknesses thus generated are: (1) difficulty in translating some concepts into testable form; (2) problems involved in accepting self-reports; and (3) the effectiveness of nondirective therapy for some individuals. Also discussed are concerns about Rogers's basic assumptions, some allegations that Rogers's "genuineness" in therapy was limited and that, before he died, he repudiated, if not his entire point of view, at least his views on humanistic education.

**Acceptance of Conscious, Self-reported Experience.** In his classic text on personality, Gordon Allport (1937) alluded to the inclination of behaviorists and psychoanalysts "to distrust the evidence of immediate experience" and dismiss the self, ego, or "person" in psychology. While scientific evidence has shown that "self-concept" is amenable to measurement, these critics of self notions make some telling points. First, self-perceptions may be incomplete or inaccurate representations of the self because of people's limited ability to see themselves realistically. Second, accurate self-perceptions may not be reflected in self-statements if the individual is unwilling to communicate them. Third, both self-perceptions and self-statements may not correspond to what the person is doing, thinking, and feeling. While difficulty in measuring concepts does not make them useless, it does render them scientifically suspect.

**The Nondirective Approach.** Unlike most other psychotherapists, Rogers has accumulated considerable evidence supporting the effectiveness of his therapeutic procedures (see Kirschenbaum & Henderson, 1989). Nevertheless, these methods are apparently not for everyone. In the filmed psychotherapy session mentioned earlier, the client, Gloria, was rather obviously frustrated with Rogers's unwillingness to offer expert advice. Despite her continued contact with Rogers later, at the time of the session some viewers thought that Gloria preferred the other two therapists to Rogers. Not long ago I overheard some counselors expressing similar frustration. They were describing an observation of a Rogerian session in which the client was seeking advice and not getting any. It seemed obvious to them not only that the client needed advice but what advice he needed. Despite their observations, the therapist persisted in merely nodding and saying "Uh huh." Perhaps Rogers's predominantly intelligent and not-so-severely disturbed clients were better off left to their own devices. However, other clients, who may be more disturbed and less well equipped, may need some suggestions as to how they might deal with their problems. In addition, there are indications that Rogers became discouraged with two-person interactive therapy (Lakin, 1996). During his time as a professor and therapist in Wisconsin, he used the nondirective method with a wide variety of clients, ranging from the usual bright and verbal people to profoundly disturbed individuals. Apparently the results of this experiment were disappointing, because thereafter Rogers virtually abandoned two-person interactions in favor of group methods. However, currently some of his followers believe that his point of view can be useful to severely disturbed people, including those with *post-traumatic stress disorder* (PTSD, Joseph, 2004).

**Some Problems with Basic Assumptions.** Stating Rogers's basic assumptions is difficult because he did not define personality. One can approximate specification of his underlying assumptions only indirectly, by reading between the lines of his statements about "self." One of Rogers's most basic assumptions is that people are inherently "good." As classroom discussions on the topic always show, just as it is philosophically difficult to declare that humans are essentially "bad" (unworthy) it is hard to defend the blanket judgment that people are basically "good" (worthy). One can more easily argue that people are neither "good" nor "bad." Rather, they are exceedingly complex and fully capable of both goodness and badness. An alternative perspective is seen in the question, "How do we maximize the goodness and minimize the badness?"

**Allegations Regarding Rogers's Genuineness and Repudiation of His Views.** No matter who a theorist might be, no matter how benevolent, reasonable, and honest he or she may seem, no matter how solid her or his point of view may appear, it will be criticized, given only that fame finds the theorist. This fact is important to keep in mind when one considers any criticisms and allegations against anyone. Two charges have been lodged against Rogers. Quinn (1993) alleges that recordings of Rogers in therapy, including the Gloria case, show that Rogers's genuineness is limited, because he adamantly refused to be confrontational.

Supposedly, to be truly genuine, all that the therapist encounters, feels, and thinks must be fair game for placement on the therapeutic table, including feelings that the client has behaved in ways that the therapist wishes to confront. Graf (1994) countered by arguing that (1) all the recordings Quinn refers to are of short-term therapy demonstrations, too preliminary to include most of Rogers's typical reactions, and (2) including confrontation when the therapist may feel the need of it is something other than genuineness: namely it is likely to be a case of giving the therapist's issues priority over the client's. Graf concludes that viewing Rogers in more extended sessions confirms his complete genuineness.

The second allegation is that, before he died, Rogers repudiated his humanistic educational philosophy and even his entire point of view. This astounding charge was leveled by William Coulson, who, according to Kirschenbaum (1991), made the allegation in other than professional journals (for example, on the radio). Coulson claimed to have codeveloped humanistic education with Rogers and Maslow, then, along with them, abandoned it in the light of research results that failed to support it. Kirschenbaum makes it clear, by use of numerous quotes from Rogers, that Rogers never abandoned humanistic education, much less the general humanistic, person-centered point of view. In fact, Kirschenbaum shows that Rogers became an even more radical humanistic educator as time went on. Further, Coulson was never able to point out any published statements by Rogers that clearly renounce humanistic education. While Rogers was, as always, flexible and backed away from some elements of humanistic instruction, he consistently supported it. In fact, once he developed a point of view or practice he usually stuck with it (Bozarth, 1990).

## *Conclusions*

Carl Rogers was many things to many people, but disliked was hardly ever one of them. He was a person who practiced what he preached. As a result, Rogers was the warm, accepting kind of person that he hoped we would all become. In reading the various interviews with Rogers and tributes to him offered by his many disciples, it is evident that his followers were not just interested in his point of view. They were sincerely devoted to Rogers. These loving colleagues and friends comforted, protected, and nourished him, just as he did them. To them, he exemplified the best of the human spirit. He could truly meld into another person so that he became one with her or him. In so doing, he surrendered himself in the interest of someone else, perhaps the most noble act a human can perform. Rogers was 5th on the list of text citations, number 9.5 in the survey, and 6th overall, but did not make the journal citation list.

## *Summary Points*

1. Rogers learned principles of science and growth from an agricultural book. He cut his teeth on Freud, but later abandoned psychoanalysis and the medical model in favor of the growth model. He was mentored by Adler and, especially, Rank. As an adult, Rogers became a warm person who backed away from religion temporarily, but was somewhat different from his image.

2. He could become angry and agitated, he thought equality in therapy was not an issue, he was sometimes overcome with emotion during therapy, he deplored the rigid use of the client-centered method, and he was not heavily identified with counseling. At the same time, he contributed to understanding diversity as it applies to interracial relations and therapist-client ethnic mismatches.

3. Humanistic psychology emphasizes the present experience of the whole person. Rollo May offered six processes that link existential psychology to the humanistic movement. The phenomenological approach, central to Rogers's view, assumes that the reality that one knows is subjective and personal. However, we can participate in the private world of others through empathy, a process that is embedded in the brain. He applied these notions to create humanistic education.

4. People are viewed in a positive light and are seen as capable of solving their own problems. Relationships with people in therapy are only instances of those that occur everyday. People have an inherent "general actualizing tendency" that is organismic, active, directional, and selective. Self-actualization is a lifelong process of realizing one's potentialities that involves openness to experience, awareness, living existentially, and trust in one's organismic functions.

5. The existence of the self is verified by statements like "Who am I?" and "This is what I like." The self

is functionally equivalent to “self-concept.” It can be related to an “ideal self.” Congruence occurs when our self-concepts are in agreement with what we actually experience. Incongruence is the opposite. It entails denial and distortion.

6. Some necessary conditions for growth are (1) unconditional positive regard, (2) accurate empathy, and (3) congruence. Unconditional positive regard concerns being regarded with acceptance and trust just for who one is no matter what, but not necessarily acceptance of one’s behavior. Accurate empathy means correctly perceiving the client’s world in a nonevaluative way. Congruence is applicable to therapist-client relationships.

7. Unconditional positive regard can lead to positive self-regard, but not if the locus of evaluation is in other people. Personality change flows from fixed, separated, and tied-to-the-past to spontaneous, integrated, and “in-the-present.” Progress in therapy proceeds from talk about externals, to disowned descriptions of feelings, to self in the past, to feelings in the present that are merely described, to feelings freely expressed in the present, to full acceptance of feelings, to relating to others openly and freely, and trusting in new experiences.

8. Rogers’s contributions include allowing people to speak for themselves with regard to the nature of their feelings. His methods led to questioning the attempt to understand people from the outside. He promoted trusting people, attributed positive motivations to them, and honored their natural actualizing tendencies, while recognizing that they do not always behave well. The case of Gloria illustrates the use of conceptual metaphors and implementation of the three conditions for growth (see point 6).

9. Rogers, while humanizing other approaches, adopted the motto “do whatever is necessary to enhance the person.” As a scientist he has demystified psychotherapy and revised mechanized approaches to it. Some of his concepts have been translated into measurable form as evidenced by Harrington, Block, and Block’s verification of his proposed relationship between child-rearing practices and creativity. Rogers attempted to do something about serious world conflicts and nuclear war.

10. Limitations of Rogers’s point of view include problems of translation of some concepts, problems with the self-report method he used, and inadequacy of the nondirective therapy method for some people. There are also problematic issues of basic assumptions. Allegations of lack of genuineness and abandonment of humanistic education have been lodged against him. Despite these shortcomings, Rogers exemplifies human warmth and concern for the well being of each person.

## *Running Comparison*

<i>Theorists</i>	<i>Rogers in Comparison</i>
Freud	Rogers was optimistic and positive, and rejected Freud’s probing into the past, but shared his belief in defenses.
Jung	He shared Jung’s mutual participant orientation to therapy, individuation (self-actualization), interest in the self, and belief in wholeness and uniqueness of each person.
Adler	He learned to be direct and straightforward from Adler.
Abraham Maslow	He shared ideas with Maslow, especially self-actualization.
Gordon Allport	He shared Allport’s idiographic approach, humanism, and concern for the self-concept.
Harry S. Sullivan	He shared Sullivan’s interest in two-person interactions.
Karen Horney	Her real self was like self-actualization. Both pointed to the clash of actual and ideal selves.

### ***Essay/Critical Thinking Questions***\_\_\_\_\_

1. How is existentialism related to humanism?
2. Picture yourself as a self-actualized person. How would you describe yourself?
3. Indicate the ways your self-concept is incongruent with your actual experience of yourself.
4. Reconcile “original sin” with “humans are inherently good.”
5. What does it take to be truly genuine? Must one express whatever one feels?

### ***E-mail Interaction***\_\_\_\_\_

Write the author at [b-allen@wiu.edu](mailto:b-allen@wiu.edu). Forward one of the following, or phrase your own.

1. Was Rogers an atheist?
2. Was Dr. Rogers much like Mr. Rogers of TV children’s show fame?
3. Tell me what central notion was at the heart and soul of Rogers’s theory.