Labor Relations-OU

157

7

UNION ORGANIZING

Chapters 7, 8 , 9 , and 10 examine the middle (functional) level of labor relations activity. The focus in this chapter is the processes that create, or organizes labor into, new unions and the bargaining structures that determine which employees are covered by a collective bargaining contract.

In some ways, the representation election is the most important step in collective bargaining: if unorganized workers vote not to be represented by a union, collective bargaining cannot proceed. In contrast, positive expression of worker interest in representation opens the way for subsequent bargaining.

Various factors in the external environment shape the power and preferences of the parties in the organizing process. The law, for example, plays a prominent role in union-organizing drives and representation elections. Environmental factors also exert an important infl uence on the determination of the formal bargaining structures a union and management will use in the bargaining process. Strike leverage and the economic environment, for example, are prominent not only because of their effects on organizing success but also because they shape the parties’ preferences for particular bargaining structures.

Negotiations cannot take place until a bargaining representative has been duly certifi ed as the exclusive representative of the employees. Normally, this requires that a union win a representation election (although an employer may voluntarily recognize a union if the union can demonstrate that it represents a majority of the employees involved). 1 The events and regulations that surround representation elections are described below.

The Organizing Process

The key steps in the organizing and representation election process are described in Box 7.1 . Note that before the NLRB will schedule an election, at least 30 percent of the election unit must have signed an authorization card indicating they would like an election to be held. In actual practice, most unions will not request an election unless they have already signed up a signifi cant majority of potential voters.

Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 7 . I L R P r e s s .

A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . M a y n o t b e r e p r o d u c e d i n a n y f o r m w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e p u b l i s h e r , e x c e p t f a i r u s e s p e r m i t t e d u n d e r U . S . o r a p p l i c a b l e c o p y r i g h t l a w .

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158 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

BOX 7.1 Steps in Organizing a Union and Holding a Representation Election

1. Interested employees seek out a union to learn their rights and gain help in organizing, or a union seeks out a group of employees in order to explain their rights to them and explore their interest in organizing.

2. The union builds support for organizing among the employees and solicits their signatures on authorization cards.

3. When suffi cient cards are signed to indicate substantial employee support, the union asks for recognition as the bargaining agent for the employees. If at least 30 percent of the employees have signed cards, the union can petition for an NLRB certifi cation election. If over 50 percent of the employees have signed cards, the union can ask the employer for recognition, or, if this is refused and serious unfair labor practices are committed by the employer, the union can ask the NLRB for certifi cation. If the employer does not voluntarily recognize the union, either party can petition for an NLRB certifi cation election to determine whether the union has majority support.

4. The NLRB investigates to determine whether an election should be held. The board considers whether it has jurisdiction, whether there is suffi cient interest among the workers, and whether there is already a bargaining agent, and whether an election has been held in the past twelve months. Most important, the NLRB determines the appropriate bargaining unit.

5. If the NLRB fi nds that the conditions for an election have been met, it orders that one be held. Procedures of varying formality are used, depending on the level of disagreement between the parties. Expedited procedures can be used if the union has engaged in picketing to organize workers or to obtain union recognition from the employer.

6. Once an election date is set, campaigning on both sides intensifi es. Restrictions apply to both union and management behavior during this period. This is because both sides need to maintain laboratory conditions; that is, an environ- ment in which workers can make free, uncoerced choices.

7. Representatives of the NLRB conduct an election by secret ballot. The union, management, or the NLRB can challenge an individual ’ s right to vote. For example, a claim might be made that an employee does not work within the designated bargaining unit or that he or she is a supervisor and thus is excluded from coverage. If there are more than two choices on the ballot and no option receives a majority vote, a runoff election will be held between the two choices that received the most votes.

8. If the union wins the election, then, after any objections or appeals, the NLRB certifi es the union as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees. The employer has the obligation to begin negotiating a fi rst contract. If the employer wins the election, there can be no further election for twelve months.

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 159

Why Workers Might Want Union Representation

To understand how the organizing process works, it is useful to fi rst ask why an individual might seek union representation. Evidence shows that for workers to express a preference for unionizing, they must (1) be deeply dissatisfi ed with their current job and employment conditions; (2) believe that unionization can be helpful in improving those job conditions; and (3) be willing to overcome the generally negative stereotype of unions in the U.S. population.

Workers might turn to unions because of their concerns with employment conditions or because they are unsatisfi ed with the process by which decisions are made at their workplace. Thus, workers might, for example, vote in favor of the union in the hope that subsequent contractual negotiations will improve wages. Or a worker might be angered by a recent managerial decision, such as a layoff or a disappointing performance appraisal . In these cases, the worker might turn to the union with the hope that the union will either improve future management decisions or, at a minimum, give employees a greater voice in future decision making.

The evidence Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers collected on why employees vote in favor of union representation is provided in Box 7.2 . Their survey evidence shows that a very signifi cant factor in employees’ decision to unionize is their confi dence and trust in management and employees’ feelings about whether they are being treated fairly by management.

Union Campaign Practices

Unions commonly rely on organizers to rally employee support during election campaigns. These organizers often include paid full-time staff from existing unions who travel from campaign to campaign. The union also often enlists some of the work force to assist as organizers. Organizers and union supporters use a variety of mechanisms to promote a pro-union message. They often hold group meetings

BOX 7.2 Employee Motives for Voting to Unionize

Nonunion employees are more likely to say they would vote for a union when they also say that:

1. Relations between employees and management are bad. 2. They do not trust management. 3. They believe that management shows little concern for employees. 4. They dislike their job. 5. They are dissatisfi ed with their infl uence and with the workplace. 6. They believe management is unwilling to share power.

Source : Survey evidence reported in Richard B. Freeman and Joel Rogers, What Do Workers Want? (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).

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160 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

after work hours in a local church or community meeting room. Union supporters who have the opportunity to move around the work site often spread the message during work hours. 2

Management ’ s Campaign Practices

Management is rarely a passive observer in the election process. Managers often try to design personnel and other corporate policies far in advance of any repre- sentation election to dissuade employees from favoring union representation. These tactics can be as important to the election outcome as the tactics management might use during an election campaign.

Common strategies managers use before the onset of organizing campaigns to reduce the incentive to unionize include most, if not all, of the following:

1. Wages and fringe benefi ts equal to or greater than those paid to comparable workers in the local labor market.

2. A high rate of investment per worker in such employee programs as training and career development.

3. Extensive efforts to stabilize employment and avoid layoffs as much as possible.

4. Advanced systems of communications and information sharing in the company. 5. Informal mechanisms for or encouragement of participation in decision

making about the way work is to be performed. 6. Development of a psychological climate that fosters and rewards loyalty and

commitment to the company. 7. Rational administration of wages and salaries, performance appraisal, and

promotion systems that reward merit but also recognize seniority. 8. A nonunion grievance procedure (usually without binding arbitration). 9. Locating new production or service facilities in southern states or rural areas

or areas that are only sparsely unionized.

Management does not always have the will or foresight to put all these policies in place, and election campaigns can arise even when some of them are in place. When managers face a representation election, they typically will attempt to convince employees to vote against union representation. They will call meetings with employees (these might be individual or group meetings) to make their case. Under the NLRA, management is allowed to hold these meetings on company time and in company facilities (the law allows captive-audience speeches up to twenty-four hours before the vote). During such a meeting, a management spokesperson (such as the company president) might remind the employees of the direct costs of union membership (dues) or the potential losses in income to employees during any strikes that ensue.

Under the NLRA, employers may not threaten to punish workers if they join or vote for a union. The NLRA also forbids employers from making promises to workers that might encourage them to reject the union. But an employer may make a prediction about the future if the prediction is based on fact. An employer may say that workers could be laid off if the union wins the election and successfully

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 161

negotiates for a 50-cent raise, provided the employer has the evidence that a 50-cent raise would lead to layoffs.

The NLRA gives the NLRB two ways to require an employer to recognize and bargain with a union if it fi nds that an employer has committed egregious violations of the labor law during a representation campaign. One option is to issue a direct order certifying the union as the bargaining agent and requiring the employer to bargain with it, and the other is to go directly to a federal court to obtain an injunction requiring the employer to stop its illegal actions and to bargain with the union. In recent years, the NLRB has made greater use of the court injunction option because it takes less time to implement. Box 7.3 describes a recent case where the Board acted directly by issuing a bargaining order.

The Election Unit

The election unit is the group of employees that the NLRB (or the appropriate state agency with jurisdiction over the employees involved) determines is covered under the appropriate statute and is eligible to vote in the representation election.

BOX 7.3 A Rare Case Where the NLRB Ordered Union Recognition

Although the NLRB rarely exercises its authority to order management to recognize a union, this does sometimes happen in the face of egregious employer violations of the nation ’ s labor laws. A case occurred at a New York branch of Hogan Transports Company, which provides trucking services exclusively for the Save-A-Lot supermarket chain. The Teamsters union began attempting to unionize the employees in June 2013. The union alleged that the employer had committed several violations of fair labor practices after the petition for an election, including threats of job loss, coercive pay raises, and a biased termination.

The NLRB issued a bargaining order in this case by ruling that while the violations did not constitute “exceptional” or “outrageous” violations (two criteria that justify issuing a bargaining order), the employer ’ s actions met the third criteria of signifi cantly diminishing the chance that a fair election could take place. In the Hogan Transports case, supervisors held multiple captive-audience meetings at which they claimed to have received strong indications from their sole supplier, Save-A-Lot, that it might terminate its contract if the shop unionized. This claim was uncorroborated in the investigation. Also, Hogan Transports put a pay raise into effect when it learned of the union campaign, with no evidence that this would have happened if no election was to be held. Finally, a vocally pro-union employee was terminated under suspicious conditions.

Source : Hogan Transports, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 196 (May 19, 2016)

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162 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

Two main decisions must be made to defi ne the appropriate election unit. First, the range of employees to be included must be decided. This may involve choosing between a craft election unit structure (covering only workers in a single occupation), an industrial election unit structure (for example, all the blue-collar production and maintenance workers in a plant), or between employees at one plant or location and employees at multiple plants or job sites. Second, the issue of who functions as a supervisor or manager must be decided, because since the passage in 1947 of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, supervisors have been excluded from coverage of the act.

The Scope of the Unit—The NLRB ’ s Criteria

Since the composition of the electorate can infl uence the outcome of the election, the scope of the election unit is often a hotly contested issue. The union typically will seek an election unit that maximizes its ability to win the election and the employer will seek a unit that minimizes the union ’ s chances of winning. The NLRA states that the fundamental objective in choosing an election unit should be to ensure that employees have “the full freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this act.”

The NLRB and the state and local boards normally consider the following general criteria in deciding on the appropriate election unit:

1. The community of interests among the employees 2. The potential effects of alternative units on stability in the labor-management

relationship 3. The need to provide suffi cient freedom of choice to professional and skilled

employees 4. The history of bargaining or the employer ’ s decision-making structure with

similar units

This fourth criterion is useful in resolving disputes between the parties over whether certain employees should be excluded because they perform supervisory or managerial functions.

Whether craft workers are put into the same election unit as production workers in the same plant (or company) is a diffi cult part of the process of determining an election unit. Although Section 9(b)(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act was designed to limit the NLRB ’ s ability to put craft workers into industrial election units, the board has consistently rejected petitions to exclude craft workers from the large industrial units. Indeed, the board has argued that the interdependence between craft workers and production workers warrants a single comprehensive unit.

The NLRB has been somewhat more willing to grant professional employees a separate bargaining unit. Section 9(b) of Taft-Hartley prohibits the NLRB from including professional employees in a bargaining unit with nonprofessional employees unless the professionals decide by a majority vote to be included in a larger, more comprehensive unit.

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 163

Union Organizing Success Rates

In 2015, labor unions won 69.5 percent (1,128 out of 1,628) of the representation elections conducted. 3 This fi gure declined steadily from the 1960s to the mid-1990s but has risen steadily since then. However, the number of workers organized through the election process continues to be very small relative to the size of the nonunion labor force. In any given year since at least the 1990s, unions have organized less new members than the number of new entrants to the labor force. In 2015, unions organized some 61,650 workers through NLRB elections, down slightly from 64,000 in the previous year. In 2015, unions won 73 percent of elections held for units of less than 50 employees, compared to a win rate of 61 percent for units with 50–99 employees and 58 percent in units with 100–499 employees. 4 In large multi-establishment companies, unions have had trouble even securing enough signed authorization cards to certify to the NLRB that an election should be held. 5 These data make it clear that unions are not going to reverse their long-term decline by using the established procedures of the NLRA unless they make efforts to substantially increase the number of organizing drives they conduct.

Union involvement in representation elections and win rates in those elections vary somewhat by union. The Teamsters are the most active union in representation elections. They participated in 384 representation elections in 2015, accounting for approximately 20 percent of all NLRB representation elections. The union involved in the second highest number of representation elections was the SEIU, with 152 elections in 2015. SEIU, the Laborers International Union of North America and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers were the most successful unions in representation elections; each won about three-fourths of NLRB elections in which they participated.

At the same time, the low level of recent union organizing success and the fact that only 11 percent of the work force is now unionized should not be taken to mean that only a small fraction of the American work force desires union representation. 6 The most complete survey of how workers would respond to union organizing efforts on their jobs and how they would expect their employer to respond was carried out in the mid-1990s by Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers. The results showed that a sizable number of nonunion employees desire union representation. Just under one-third of nonunion private sector employees indicated that they would vote for union representation if given the chance to do so. That was essentially the same percentage who gave this response in the fi rst national survey of this kind in 1976.

More recent polls (the most recent was in 2004) indicate interest in union representation has increased to just under 50 percent of the nonunion workers who participated in nationally representative surveys. Thus, the interest of nonunion workers in joining a union has increased substantially over the past several decades even as union membership has decreased, leading Freeman and Rogers and others to conclude that there is a large representation gap in the United States.

In response to declining unionization, American unions have adopted new organizing strategies (described later in this chapter). One aspect of the new

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164 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

organizing approaches of American unions is intensifi ed efforts to organize profes- sional employees. As Box 7.4 describes, this includes organizing campaigns among university professors and graduate assistants.

Even if a union wins a majority vote in a representation election, this does not ensure that a fi rst contract will be negotiated. The NLRA requires that employers (and the union) bargain in good faith, but the law does not require that the parties reach agreement. In fact, fi rst contracts are won in only about two-thirds of newly designated units.

Does the Election Campaign Infl uence How Workers Vote?

Research has shown that workers tend to become less inclined to vote for union representation when an election is delayed. 7 Studies also show that illegal employer behavior during the election campaign (a signal of aggressive employer opposition to bargaining) further reduces the probability that a fi rst contract will be settled. 8 The effects of employer resistance is quite substantial; as we noted in Chapter 6 , the most comprehensive study of this issue found that only about 10 percent of bargaining units where a majority of workers sign authorization cards are successful in achieving a fi rst contract if the employer resists to the point that an unfair labor practice charge is fi led. 9 Evidence also shows that fi rms with previously poor worker-supervisor relations and low wages are more likely to commit violations of fair labor practices during election campaigns. 10

The results of these studies further reinforce a conclusion most unions have come to: investments in organizing through the procedures the NLRA has established have to be made very carefully, given the low probability of success and the high costs involved. Most union leaders today look for other ways to gain neutrality from employers in organizing or fi nd ways to attract members without having to use these processes. The evidence also indicates why most labor law and policy experts recognize that this feature of labor law is in need of fundamental reform. We will discuss options for reform in Chapter 16 .

In 2015, the NLRB announced some changes in how it would administer representation election processes and adjudicate claims that an employer or union was violating the rules governing these processes. Specifi cally, it indicated that it would speed up the process by no longer hearing evidence on unfair labor practice charges until after the election, by requiring employers to provide unions with the e-mail addresses of those eligible to vote (in the past, only mailing addresses were required), and requiring employers to post notices of the right of workers to form a union. These new administrative processes have been in effect only a short time and it is too early to tell whether they will make any difference in the outcomes of elections.

Union Decertifi cation

Unions lose members through decertifi cation elections . The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA prescribed the election procedures for decertifying a union.

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 165

BOX 7.4 The Unionization of University Professors and Graduate Students

Working in higher education has become increasingly precarious as universities have shifted from staffi ng full-time, tenure-track professors to relying sig- nifi cantly more on part-time adjunct professors and graduate assistants. Though these changes have made unionization necessary by lowering the standards of working conditions, they have also created greater opportunity for successful unionization efforts.

This apparent paradox can be resolved by looking at one of the major historic roadblocks to university unionization. In 1980, a conservative Supreme Court ruled in NLRB v. Yeshiva University that tenure-track professors in private universities were ineligible for unionization because they had signifi cant managerial authority in the university. However, the growth of the admin- istrative bureaucracy that enabled the transition to a contingent work force led the NLRB to decide in 2014 that “colleges and universities are increasingly run by administrators” and that therefore professors are for the most part nonsupervisory employees.

While the NLRB has recently begun to open the door for unionization for private institutions, professors in public universities not covered by the board ’ s jurisdiction have, as with other industries, unionized at a far more rapid pace than their counterparts in private universities. Of the estimated 386,000 unionized university faculty in the United States, 344,762 work in public universities.

Those who have been most affected by the changes in academia are the ones who have fought the hardest for unionization. Graduate, teaching, and research assistants have borne an increased workload as universities staff less full-time professors. These educators also face bleaker job prospects after earning their degree. Their efforts were stunted in 2004, when the NLRB ruled in a case concerning Brown University students that because graduate students were “primarily students,” they were ineligible for unionization. However, an NLRB ruling in August 2016 in favor of Columbia University students has practically overturned the 2004 ruling by stating that despite their broader relationship with the university, graduate students are still protected under the NLRA and can form a union based on the work they perform under the direction of the school. This may prove to be a watershed event in the struggle for university student unions.

Source : Noam Scheiber, “Grad Students Win Right to Unionize in an Ivy League Case,” New York Times , August 23, 2016; and David Ludwig, “Why Graduate Students of America Are Uniting,” The Atlantic , April 15, 2015.

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166 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

The decertifi cation elections held since Taft-Hartley have been far fewer than the representation elections, but in recent years their number has been increasing and unions have been losing an increasing percentage of these contests. The fi rst year after Taft-Hartley passed, for example, 97 decertifi cation elections were held, or only 3 percent of the 3,822 representation elections held that year. That ratio held steady throughout the 1950s and 1960s but began creeping upward in the 1970s. In 2015, 185 decertifi cation elections were held and unions retained representation rights in 72 (or 39 percent) of them. 11

Most union members appear to be satisfi ed with their unions and union leaders. A recent survey fi nds that union members are generally very satisfi ed with their personal experiences with the unions at their workplaces. Survey data shows that 90 percent of union members would vote to keep their union if given the chance to directly vote on the issue.

THE DEBATE OVER LABOR LAW REFORM

The diffi culties workers and unions have experienced in navigating through the representation process in the face of employer resistance has led to much debate over whether the endorsement of collective bargaining that the NLRA provided is being fulfi lled. Remember that the original objective of the law was to ensure that employees would be able to exercise free choice regarding union representation, untrammeled by an employer ’ s (or a union ’ s) false promises or false information, threats of reprisals or promises of benefi ts, or misuse of economic power. To reach this objective, the NLRB (and most state labor boards) attempted to establish laboratory conditions for the election process. The notion was that workers should be free to judge whether they wanted union representation in an environ- ment free of coercion and misinformation.

Advocates of labor law reform often argue that the penalties imposed on employers who commit unlawful acts during an election campaign are too weak. They also claim that the procedures for remedying unfair labor practices and or holding representation elections are too protracted and that too often employers merely move or close operations as part of union avoidance strategies. As we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 16 , a major congressional debate over labor law reform occurred in 1977 and 1978. The labor law reform bills introduced then would have imposed harsher penalties on labor law violators, required stricter time limits on the election process, and provided stronger remedies for victims of unfair labor practices. The bills were not passed (one bill passed the House of Representatives but died in a fi libuster in the Senate in 1978). In 1991, Congress debated labor law amendments that would limit the ability of employers to hire permanent replacements during a strike. In 1994, a presidential commission, the so-called Dunlop Commission, recommended several changes in labor laws and the application of laws to overcome delays and other tactics employers have been using to oppose union organizing. However, in the end, the Dunlop Com- mission ’ s recommendations were ignored. In 2009, after the election of Barack Obama, the labor movement mounted another effort to reform labor law with

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 167

the Employee Free Choice bill. That bill stated that a union could be certifi ed if it could demonstrate that a majority of eligible workers had signed cards authorizing the union to represent them (instead of requiring an election), strengthened the penalties for violating the law, and provided for arbitration of the fi rst contract if the parties were not successful in negotiating an agreement. This bill passed in the House of Representatives but again could not overcome a fi libuster in the Senate. These efforts and what they imply for the future of labor law reform will be discussed again in Chapter 16 . For now, it is suffi cient to note that the debate continues over the performance of the nation ’ s labor policies.

Box 7.5 summarizes some the recommendations advocates of labor law reform have made with little success. In the absence of legal reforms, many unionists and analysts suggest that aggressive employer union avoidance has become more common in recent years. This has led union activists to increase union organizing efforts and to turn to nontraditional union organizing tactics.

BOX 7.5 Selected Proposals for Reforming Representation Processes

1. Require employers to recognize a union when a majority of workers have signed cards authorizing the union to serve as their bargaining representative.

2. Give unions the right of access to employees for campaign purposes equal to the access employers have.

3. Stop attempting to regulate statements employers or unions make as part of election campaigns.

4. Speed up the enforcement of current rules governing elections and strengthen the penalties imposed on violators of the law by a. making it easier to obtain or requiring court injunctions to stop and/or

remedy serious violations of the law, such as discriminatory discharges during campaigns;

b. deferring hearings and decisions on unfair labor practice claims until after an election is held;*

c. reinstating employees quickly, in time to allow union supporters to return to employment before the campaign is over and the vote is held;

d. allowing employees or the union to sue for civil damages in cases where an employer willfully violates of an employee ’ s rights; and

e. lifting the constraint on the amount of the settlement an employee can receive in cases where employer conduct exhibits a consistent pattern of illegal behavior.**

5. Conduct speedy elections, with a very short time allowed for campaigning.*

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168 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

6. Strengthen the ability of a union to strike to achieve a fi rst contract by eliminating the ability of an employer to permanently replace strikers and by allowing other workers to boycott the goods of an employer involved in a strike.

7. Require arbitration of fi rst contracts if an impasse occurs.

*The NRLB took steps in this direction in 2015 with administrative rule changes. **Under current law, a court can only award a settlement equal to the wages lost by an employee since the time of discharge. Sources : Paul C. Weiler, “Milestone or Millstone: The Wagner Act at Fifty,” in Arbitration 1985: Law and Practice , ed. Walter J. Gershenfeld (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1986), 37–67; and Charles J. Morris, American Labor Policy: A Critical Appraisal of the National Labor Relations Act (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1987).

Nontraditional Union Organizing Tactics Such as Corporate Campaigns

Given the great diffi culties they have faced using traditional election campaign tactics, several unions have adopted more aggressive corporate campaigns and other tactics designed to increase the chances of organizing new workers. Corporate campaigns involve a variety of efforts to bring public, fi nancial, or political pressures to bear on top management.

The fi rst large-scale corporate campaign was carried out against the J. P. Stevens Company in the late 1970s. The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) waged a successful national boycott of Stevens products, threatened to withdraw the union pension funds from banks that had offi cers on Stevens ’ s board, and, eventually, after almost a decade of effort, negotiated its fi rst contract with the company. Since then, similar efforts have been mounted in attempts to organize the operations of nursing homes, hospitals, and a variety of other private sector fi rms. 12

Most of the union corporate campaigns have been accompanied by strategies designed to infl uence the employer involved in the election indirectly by putting pressure on individuals or other fi rms that do business with or have interlocking directorates with it. These efforts attest to the unfairness labor leaders perceive and the frustrations they have experienced with the election process as it has been administered by the NLRB.

Since the late 1980s, the SEIU has led a campaign to organize janitors in several regions of the country using nontraditional tactics that in some cases seek to go outside the NLRA and NLRB procedures to gain union representation. Its Justice for Janitors campaign tries to organize on a multiemployer (regional) basis and often avoids normal NLRB-style representation elections by inducing employers to voluntarily recognize the union. The janitors’ campaign often puts pressure on the primary employers that typically rely on subcontractors to provide janitorial services in their buildings, such as Apple (see Box 7.6 ). The Justice for Janitors

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 169

BOX 7.6 The Justice for Janitors Campaign

In 1985, the Service Employee International Union (SEIU) launched its Justice for Janitors campaign in response to a strike by cleaning workers at Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh. The nationwide campaign to organize cleaning service workers targeted high-profi le companies that contract out their cleaning services to nonunion cleaning companies. The SEIU targeted the large fi rms that use these nonunion cleaning companies rather than targeting the nonunion employers directly because it claims that the large fi rms set the standard for wages in the industry by determining the amount of money paid to the contractors. The union claimed that the nonunion cleaning companies committed frequent wage and hour violations and gave poor wages and benefi ts (an estimated $12,000 a year with no health care benefi ts). The same type of campaign that began in Pittsburgh has now been used in other cities.

In its Justice for Janitors campaigns the SEIU has used tactics such as picketing, demonstrations, coalitions with commercial groups, and negative publicity about the corporations that exploit cleaning workers to put pressure on both the large fi rms and the nonunion cleaning companies. The campaign targeted large companies such as Apple, Hewlett-Packard, and Toyota.

However, in the spring of 1997, SEIU president Andrew Stern publicly acknowledged that the noisy demonstrations, traffi c tie-ups, and civil disobedi- ence against Washington, D.C., employers had produced too much antago- nism. He pledged to end the strikes and pickets and the involvement of third parties in the dispute. Stern also emphasized that while it was necessary to change tactics, the union ’ s goal continued to be the achievement of decent working conditions for janitors.

In the 1990s and 2000s, SEIU successfully organized the cleaning industries in many major cities, using less dramatic tactics. Then, beginning in 2014, possibly spurred by the Occupy Wall Street movement, the SEIU funded major walkouts in the fast-food industries of several large cities, beginning with Fast Food Forward in New York. These movements coalesced under the banner of the motto Fight for $15 and used many of the strategies that Justice for Janitors had proved to be viable.

The SEIU received some criticism from members who felt that it was using valuable resources to help a nonunionized work force, but the rapid success of the movement eventually led to widespread praise. Many states and major cities responded to the civil disobedience and lobbying by passing new minimum wage increases. This nationwide success may be somewhat attributable to the attention given to the movement by two major Democratic candidates for the presidency in the 2016 election.

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170 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

The movement has also given back, in a way, to its roots. In June 2016, janitors in Denver successfully negotiated for a wage increase to $15 an hour. This is at least in part a result of the fact that the Fight for $15 campaign has normalized this previously unattainable fi gure. With these campaigns, the SEIU has proven that a broad-based approach can be effective in changing industry practices and that despite the waning infl uence of unions, they need not tread lightly to be successful.

Sources : “100,000 Janitors Covered in the SEIU Pacts Bargained During 2000 in Two Dozen Cities,” Daily Labor Report , November 28, 2000, C-1.; Kelsey Ray, “Denver Janitors Sign ‘Historic’ $15 Minimum Wage Agreement,” Colorado Independent, June 30, 2016; Josh Eidelson, “The Lessons Unions Learned from the ‘Justice for Janitors’ Protests,” Bloomberg Politics , June 16, 2015.; Steven Greenhouse, “Fast-Food Workers Seeking $15 Wage Are Planning Civil Disobedience,” New York Times, September 1, 2014.

campaign also tries to make alliances with community groups such as churches to gain public support for union-organizing efforts.

The AFL-CIO Organizing Institute and the AFL-CIO Organizing Department

The AFL-CIO has long admitted that unions have diffi culty organizing workers. In response, it created the AFL-CIO Organizing Institute . The Organizing Institute focuses exclusively on organizing and providing programs that train new organizers. The AFL-CIO gave its Organizing Department a sizable budget and the task of extending the types of activities that the Organizing Institute begins. In addition to recruiting and training new organizers, the Organizing Department provides affi liated unions with strategic planning and analysis for organizing campaigns. The AFL-CIO ’ s Union Summer program funds college interns engaged in summer union-organizing projects.

The Rank-and-File Organizing Approach

In recent years, unions have focused on reaching workers by employing young, well-educated organizers and reaching out to engage the support of community groups such as churches, immigrant groups, and other social activist organizations. This approach to organizing is called the rank-and-fi le style and contrasts with the top-down, traditional organizing style that relied on appointed organizers and formal communication strategies. Rank-and-fi le organizing also tries to modernize and broaden the issues that attract employees to unions by addressing child care, equal pay, and other issues that are of concern to the current work force. Research conducted by Kate Bronfenbrenner suggests that this rank-and-fi le method of union organizing has been more successful than traditional methods in the private sector. 13

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 171

Employer Neutrality during Representation Elections

In recent years, some unions have negotiated rules governing the organizing of new bargaining units with an employer. 14 Often included in such language is the employer ’ s agreement to remain neutral during the organizing process. In the agreements of the Communications Workers of America (CWA), the United Auto Workers (UAW), and the United Steelworkers (USW), for example, neutrality is defi ned as “neither helping nor hindering” the union ’ s organizing effort, but the contracts allow managers to communicate “facts” to workers, in some cases only in response to inquiries. A different approach is language that makes clear that the employer will not communicate opposition to union representation. 15 In a few cases, employers have gone so far as to agree to inform employees that management welcomes union representation.

Union leaders argue that management should give unions the opportunity to represent employees in new establishments of the company they work for. In some cases, management has agreed and has accepted unions in new establishments if the union demonstrates fl exibility and a commitment to labor-management cooperation .

One of the key strategic choices management faces is whether to contest unionism during a representation election or to voluntarily recognize the union in return for a more cooperative union-management relationship. Recent experience suggests that the parties can create a more positive working relationship by avoiding hostility during a campaign election and thus start the union-management relation- ship off on a good footing. Unions have pushed management in recent years to use card check recognition, discussed more fully below, which goes even further than neutrality in assisting union organizing.

Voluntary Recognition

The NLRA allows employers to voluntarily recognize a union. The law, of course, also allows employers to remain neutral during a representation election campaign. In the 1940s and 1950s, it was not uncommon for employers to either adopt voluntary recognition or maintain employer neutrality during election campaigns. Employers’ voluntary recognition of a union and employer neutrality in representation elections have declined since the 1940s and 1950s. Nonetheless, there are some important exceptions to this trend.

The Southwest Airlines Case

Southwest Airlines was fi rst formed as a regional carrier in Texas. Its founder and CEO until his retirement in 2002, Herb Kelleher, viewed cooperative and fl exible relations with the work force as a key competitive advantage for a service- oriented business. He did not oppose unionization at Southwest, and today it is one of the most highly unionized airlines in the country. The strategy has paid off well for Southwest over the years. It has grown to become the fourth largest carrier in terms of numbers of employees, it has been the most consistently profi table airline in the industry, and it has consistently ranked at or near the top

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172 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

of the industry in customer satisfaction. Part of Southwest ’ s success has been attributed to fl exible labor contracts, cooperative relationships, and the high levels of coordination achieved among workers doing different jobs. 16 Yet in recent years relations between Southwest and its unions have become more strained as its labor costs have risen to among the highest in the airline industry.

Another interesting case involving employer neutrality is the UAW ’ s experience in attempting to organize Volkswagen ’ s assembly plant in Tennessee. First it attempted to get the German company to be neutral in the organizing effort. To do so, the UAW enlisted the support of IG Metall, the union that represents workers at the parent company in Germany. While the UAW got a formal commitment from Volkswagen that it would be neutral as part of an agreement to set up a German-style works council if the union won the election in the Tennessee plant, organizers experienced strong opposition from elected offi cials in Tennessee and lost the representation election in a close vote. Subsequently, the UAW has organized a unit of skilled trades workers in the plant (see chapter 8 for further discussion of this case).

In recent years, facing increased employer hostility in representation elections and declining rates of success in those elections, unions have increasingly turned to card check recognition procedures to gain recognition. Often an employer ’ s pledge to remain neutral during any organizing drive is included with card check recognition. Unions have had mixed success with those procedures.

A few of the large telecommunication fi rms that used to be a part of the Bell System have accepted voluntary card check recognition procedures in recent years. What makes these cases so interesting is the fact that the employers were willing to agree to these policies regarding organizing because the unions that represent telecommunications employees, the CWA and the International Brother- hood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), agreed in exchange to support mergers or regulatory policies that management favored. 17

One place where card check recognition led to signifi cant organizing was at SBC Telecommunications. (Since the merger of SBC and AT&T, the relevant operations are now part of the new AT&T.) In August 2005, the CWA obtained a national card check and neutrality agreement from Cingular Wireless. Cingular agreed to recognize the union if more than 50 percent of the bargaining unit signed authorization cards. As a result, the CWA organized nearly all of AT&T ’ s customer service representatives and technicians.

However, not all neutrality and card check agreements lead to successful union organizing. For example, in August 2000, Verizon Communications signed a four-year contract with the IBEW and the CWA in which it agreed to card check recognition so long as 55 percent of the bargaining unit supported union representation. Four years after the agreement was signed, the contract expired with no more workers represented than when it began. 18 According to the CWA, although Verizon agreed to be neutral during organization drives, the company went to great lengths to keep workers from being organized. The CWA claimed that during the same year Verizon signed the contract, it prevented unions from distributing cards in a timely fashion by taking much longer to classify precise

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 173

bargaining units than was necessary. The union also argued that the company rejected the union ’ s presentation of the correct number of authorization cards and fi led a lawsuit in an attempt to prevent the union from being recognized. In Chapter 8 , we discuss in more detail how the CWA fi nally won a fi rst contract that covered customer service workers in a handful of Verizon stores in New York City as an outgrowth of a strike in 2016.

OPTIONS FOR UNION RENEWAL

The limited success unions have achieved in reversing membership declines through conventional organizing strategies has led some both inside and outside the labor movement to urge unions to experiment with alternative approaches to recruiting, organizing, and retaining workers. Some of the alternative renewal strategies various unions are using include:

• Organizing without relying on NLRB election procedures. Some unions have used their leverage in collective bargaining to gain neutrality and card check recognition agreements for new groups of employees, as discussed above and in Box 7.7 .

• Using corporate campaigns and political infl uence with government regulatory bodies to neutralize employer opposition in organizing campaigns. The United Steelworkers and the CWA have used this approach with particular effective- ness. 19 The SEIU successfully used innovative grassroots organizing and political lobbying in the process of organizing 75,000 home health care workers in California.

• Creating coalitions with community groups to build support for organizing efforts. The best-known and most successful example of this is the SEIU ’ s Justice for Janitors campaign (described above and in Box 7.8 ), which gained bargaining recognition for offi ce building owners and cleaning contractors in a number of cities.

• Recruiting individuals as “associate members” even if it is not possible to obtain exclusive representation status or a collective bargaining agreement. Teachers’ unions have used this approach for many years, and more recently unions such as the CWA have used it to establish and support temporary workers at Microsoft and employees at IBM.

Other ideas being debated in the labor movement include fi nding ways to do more to retain members once they are organized, even when they move across jobs. This would require unions to provide a range of labor market, continuous education, and training services to workers to support their movement from one job to another. Another idea is organizing and providing services to members via the Internet. A third idea is to target young people as potential members by providing career counseling and job-fi nding services and access to portable fringe benefi ts. All these efforts are a response to data that shows that many workers move in and out of union status over the course of their careers. If workers could be recruited into unions at the start of their careers and given reasons to retain

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174 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

BOX 7.7 Are Neutrality Agreements Legal?

One might not expect that a neutrality agreement would be a controversial issue. On the face of it, the employer is simply agreeing to remain neutral while employees decide for themselves whether they wish to form a union. However, these agreements have received scrutiny when they include certain provisions that might resemble a collective bargaining agreement prior to union certifi cation.

A recent case that demonstrated this controversy is the NLRB ’ s Dana Corporation decision. The UAW and the Dana Corporation, an automo- bile parts manufacturer, reached a neutrality agreement that consisted of principles that both parties agreed to adhere to if the union was certifi ed and negotiations began. Unions and employers who support these types of neutrality agreements claim that they foster a positive relationship from the start of negotiations.

Opponents, including right-to-work politicians and activists, claim that such deals are a violation of section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which makes it a crime for an employer “to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value” to a union seeking to represent its employees. The intent of this provision is to prevent unions from extorting employers and employers from bribing union offi cials.

The NLRB decided in 2010 that the agreement did not constitute extortion or bribery and therefore did not violate the Taft-Hartley Act. The Board did not dictate any specifi c test, but explained in its reasoning that a fi nal collective bargaining agreement would still require “substantial” negotiation, and that the agreement represented simply a framework for bargaining. The Court acknowledged the benefi ts of such a framework, and recognized the employer ’ s right to “engage in at least some preliminary substantive decisions with a union.” However, there remains some disagreement on this issue between different Circuit Courts, meaning that perhaps a Supreme Court decision will ultimately be necessary to resolve the issue.

Source : “Parties Weigh in on NLRB Case Involving Neutrality Agreement between Dana, UAW,” Daily Labor Report , June 21, 2006, C-1; 356 NLRB No. 49, Dana Corporation and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural– CIO and Gary L. Smeltzer Jr. and Joseph Montague and Kenneth A. Gray.

their membership as they move through their working years, both the recruitment and turnover problems could be addressed at the same time. There is likely to be considerable experimentation with these alternative strategies in the years ahead.

Expanding the Defi nition of Unions

Some nonunion organizations provide some (but not all) of the functions of traditional unions. This too is an area of considerable experimentation. The largest

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 175

BOX 7.8 The Coalition of Immokalee Workers

The Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) is a community-based labor organization that represents low-wage immigrant farmworkers on tomato farms in Florida. As unions do, the organization strives to protect its members’ well-being and increase their wages. However, how it does this is quite different from the traditional union approach. The most important aspect of the organization ’ s approach is that the way it incorporates appeals to the social responsibility principles of highly visible food retailers in order to pressure these companies to agree to better wages and working conditions. The CIW began this endeavor with its Campaign for Fair Food in 2001. The campaign reached out to many different religious groups and to students and young people, both locally and nationally, to educate them about the ongoing exploitation of farm workers. The main goal of this effort was to motivate consumers to bring pressure on large corporations to take measures that would put an end to such exploitation instead of merely using the labor power of the workers they employed. These efforts resulted in agree- ments with major companies such as Walmart, McDonalds, Whole Foods, Burger King, Trader Joe ’ s, and Chipotle.

Building on these successes, the CIW launched the Fair Food Program (FFP) in 2011. It was based on the partnership that had been established between farm workers, farm owners, and corporations. The agreements among participants in this program state that buyers will buy Florida tomatoes only from farmers who have complied with the standards of the FFP. In addition, the buyers pay a Fair Food Program premium that is passed on to the workers as a bonus. The CIW holds education sessions at which workers teach other workers the new labor standards mandated by the Fair Food Code of Conduct. These standards are enforced by a third party, the Fair Food Standards Council, which regularly audits farms and continuously investigates complaints to fi nd solutions, much the way unions have third- party arbitrators.

This approach to labor organizing has been lauded as the way forward for labor organizations and is credited with partially reviving the labor movement. The Coalition of Immokalee Workers has received national and international recognition, winning awards such as the 2015 Presidential Medal for Extraordinary Efforts to Combat Human Traffi cking and the 2012 Natural Resources Defense Council ’ s Food Justice Award. The Washington Post hailed its model of organizing as “one of the great human rights success stories of our time.”

Sources : Coalition of Immokalee Workers website, http://www.ciw-online.org ; and Michael Husebo, “Labor Agency Beyond the Union: The Coalition of Immokalee Workers and Faith-Based Community,” MS thesis, Georgia State University, http:// scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article = 1033&context = geosciences_theses .

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176 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

such organization, the Freelancers Union, began recruiting independent contract professionals in the media and graphic arts industries in New York City in 1995. 20 It provides health benefi ts, networking opportunities, and related services to 250,000 media workers and focuses on the needs of these highly mobile profes- sionals who are not covered under the National Labor Relations Act because they are independent contractors and not employees.

The Restaurant Opportunities Centers (ROC) takes another approach. 21 It seeks to organize employees of restaurants by asking customers to inquire about the working conditions of the employees who serve them and about the restaurant ’ s sustainability practices in an attempt to connect employee issues with environmental concerns. In this way, the ROC seeks to build a coalition between customers and employees by using methods similar those used by various services such as Zagats to rate the quality of restaurants. It is interesting to note that the ROC does not want to be considered a union since it does not want to be constrained by the organizing and bargaining rules and limits the NLRA mandates. Ironically, it is the restaurant industry association that is trying to convince the NLRB and the courts to defi ne the ROC as a union so it can limit its tactics. It particularly wants to disallow use of consumer boycotts.

Another organization that builds coalitions with food advocacy groups is the Coalition of Immokalee Workers. They also have negotiated with the food retailers that buy the products they harvest for the farmers that employ them and in doing so have been able to upgrade their wages and working conditions (see Box 7.8 ).

The largest new form of union membership is provided by Working America, an arm of the AFL-CIO that recruits individuals in local communities to join it to share political information and to mobilize support for worker-friendly candidates local and national elections. Working America was created under the leadership of Karen Nussbaum, the former president of 9 to 5, an organization of working women. It now has grown to a membership of over 3 million. 22 As is the case with the members of the ROC and the Freelancers Union, Working America members are not counted in the offi cial statistics of union membership because they do not negotiate collective bargaining agreements. These groups may, however, signal new forms of union-supported or quasi-union advocacy networks.

The number of such advocacy networks appears to be increasing across the country. Some of them are using social media and related information technologies to recruit, share information with, and build networks among professionals and independent contractors. One such organization is SherpaShare, a third-party provider of information for Uber, Lyft, and their drivers. 23 Since Uber and Lyft insist that their drivers are independent contractors and not employees, the drivers are not covered under the NLRA. However, this is a contested issue that has been the subject of class actions, at least one community-level ordinance (in Seattle) that states that these drivers are employees and are eligible for union representation, and another voluntary agreement that allows Uber drivers in New York City to be represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers as a drivers’ guild (see Box 7.9 ).

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 177

BOX 7.9 Uber Drivers’ Organizing Efforts

When several dozen workers in Tampa, Florida, logged off an app for an hour every week in January 2016, it may not have looked much like a traditional strike, but they were arguably at the forefront of labor ’ s next frontier. The workers were drivers for Uber, an app-based driving service, and they were protesting the company ’ s recent fare cut in Tampa. People working through Uber and other companies like it have increasingly been looking to collective action as a means of protecting their interests in the “gig economy.”

The “gig economy” is the term used for the evolving sector of jobs wherein non-employee workers freelance their labor through large app-based companies. Controversies have arisen as these companies have gained more market power and have begun to impose restrictions on workers that lead to circumstances more closely resembling an employment relationship. For instance, Uber drivers cannot set their own fares, they must conform to standards the company sets, and Uber uses user ratings as a justifi cation for terminating them.

The logouts in Tampa occurred only a month after a unanimous vote by the Seattle City Council to allow Uber drivers and drivers in other app-based taxi services to form unions. The campaign to pass this ordinance was supported by the App-Based Drivers Association, an affi liate of the Teamsters Union. Uber has faced legal challenges elsewhere, including in California, where the California Labor Commission ruled that such drivers ought to be classifi ed as employees and that as such, each California Uber driver was owed over $4,000 in missing wages. The drivers followed up with a class action suit against Uber, which remains unresolved. Similar legal challenges have been raised across the country, though none have been as successful yet.

Following the success of recent lawsuits and organizing drives, Uber responded to driver unrest in the important hub of New York City by coordinating with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers to create the Independent Drivers Guild. While this guild is not quite a union with inherent bargaining rights, it will function as a forum where drivers can voice concerns, receive discounted benefi ts, and coordinate appeals in cases of dismissal. The guild follows the model of Sara Horowitz ’ s Freelancers Union, which has expressed its support for the drivers. This move by Uber illustrates the success of both unions and independent organizations that have pressured the company to respect the rights of its drivers.

Source : Nick Wingfi eld and Mike Isaac, “Seattle Will Allow Uber and Lyft Drivers to Form Unions,” New York Times , December 14, 2015; and Paul Martyn, “Contingent Labor: Getting the Gig Economy Right,” Forbes , February 2, 2016.

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178 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

Other groups are providing information and services to unorganized groups that are similar to the services unions provide. One organization, Co-workers. org , helps workers organize surveys and petitions to employers to address specifi c workplace grievances. 24 Another group, The Workers’ Lab, serves as a start-up incubator for entrepreneurs seeking to develop new models of representation for unorganized workers and contractors. 25 As David Rolf, president of the SEIU Local 775 in Seattle and one of the originators of the Workers’ Lab states, the challenge for these new efforts is threefold: (1) to demonstrate that they can provide workers with bargaining power; (2) to grow to a scale large enough to have a signifi cant impact; and (3) to devise a business model that will make them sustainable without outside funding from foundations or other subsidies .

Another form of representation is found in the various caucus or network groups that have been established in many companies to support African American, women ’ s, gay-lesbian, and other identity groups. Many professional associations also represent their members through lobbying efforts and sometimes in more informal interactions with employers. Prime examples are the bar associations that lawyers join and branches of the American Medical Association and the more specialized doctor ’ s groups that are springing up around the country to represent medical residents seeking to reduce their hours of work (see Box 6.1 ).

Very few of these groups have formal collective bargaining rights as defi ned and protected under the National Labor Relations Act, but they do offer their members services and in some cases a form of voice at their workplaces. Whether these new types of groups and organizations will change conceptions of what a union is or whether their members should be counted as union members are open questions.

BARGAINING STRUCTURE

Once unionization occurs, whether through an election or some other procedure, bargaining over a contract begins. Bargaining structure refers to the scope of the employees and employers who are covered or affected by the bargaining agreement.

Labor and management do not necessarily bargain contracts that cover only election units. For example, the employees in the various work sites of one employer represented by a union may wish to join together to negotiate a common contract that covers the whole company. In the auto, rubber, and other industries where industrial unions exist, there are companywide collective bargaining agree- ments. In addition, employees represented by the same union in multiple companies may prefer to band together and try to negotiate a common contract covering all the companies. This occurs in the coal, construction, and trucking industries. Such company or industrywide bargaining may not develop if the employees (or unions) prefer to bargain in a more decentralized manner and maintain plant-level or company-level bargaining.

Employee and union preferences are not the only determinants of the bargaining structure, however. Before we trace some of the determinants of bargaining structure, we need some defi nitions.

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 179

Defi nitions of Bargaining Structure

A formal bargaining structure is defi ned as the bargaining unit or the negotiation unit—that is, the employees and employers who are legally bound by the terms of an agreement. The informal bargaining structure is defi ned as the employees or employers who are affected by the results of a negotiated settlement, through pattern bargaining or some other nonbinding process.

There is no exact estimate of the number of bargaining units in the United States. Each year, however, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service gets approximately 20,000 notices that a bargaining unit will be negotiating a new agreement. (These notifi cations are required for a union to engage in a lawful strike, so nearly all unions covered under the National Labor Relations Act fi le them). FMCS data from 2012 to 2015 suggests that approximately 60,000 bargaining units are covered under the NLRA at any given time. Another estimated several hundred are covered under the Railway Labor Act that governs bargaining in the railroad and airline industry. There are no reliable estimates of the number of public sector contracts, but given the decentralized nature of bargaining in local governments, the number is likely at least equal to or more than the number in the private sector.

The Predominance of Decentralized Bargaining Structures in the United States

Compared to the bargaining structures in other countries, the United States has a highly decentralized bargaining structure. In many European countries, such as Germany and Sweden, many labor contracts cover entire industries or broad regions (see Chapter 15 ). In recent years, however, many European employers have been arguing for greater decentralization of bargaining to allow individual fi rms the latitude to adjust to their particular economic circumstances. Many U.S. employers are pressing for even further decentralization of the formal and informal structures of bargaining in this country.

Types of Bargaining Units

Bargaining structures have two primary characteristics. The fi rst is the scope of employee or union interests a unit represents. There are three types: narrow craft, broad industrial, and multi-skill. The second primary characteristic is the scope of employer interests represented in the unit. These can be multiemployer (centralized), single-employer—multi-plant, or single-employer—single plant (decentralized).

Table 7.1 illustrates this classifi cation of bargaining structures. For instance, in a single-employer—multiplant environment, a narrow bargaining unit might include only craft or professional employees in one occupational class. Police, fi refi ghters, railroad workers, teachers, and airline pilots are examples of occupations typically represented in narrow craft bargaining units. At the other end of the spectrum are the broad bargaining units that might include all the production and skilled employees in a fi rm. Industrial unions bargain contracts that cover broad employee units in the auto, steel, farm equipment, state government, and textile industries.

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180 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

Table 7.1 Types and examples of bargaining structures

Employee interests covered

Employer interests covered

Multiemployer (centralized) Single employer: Multiplant

Single employer: Single plant (decentralized)

Craft (narrow) Construction trades Interstate trucking Longshoring Hospital association

Airline Teacher Police Firefi ghters Railroad

Craft union in small manufacturing plant

Hospital

Industrial or multiskill (broad)

Coal mining (underground) Basic steel (pre-1986)

Hotel association

Automobile Steel (post-1986) Farm equipment State government Textile

Industrial union in small manufacturing plant

There are also intermediate cases in which more than one but not all of the various union-represented employees in a fi rm bargain in the same unit. A manufacturing plant where workers in several crafts bargain together would be such a case.

The columns of Table 7.1 depict the degree of centralization of employer interests in the bargaining unit. A unit that represents only one plant is an example of the most decentralized bargaining unit. An example of this would be a union that negotiates a contract for the electrical (or production) workers in one plant.

A highly centralized bargaining structure covers all the work sites of companies with the same collective bargaining agreement. Although multiemployer bargaining units are relatively rare in the United States, some do exist. In the trucking industry, for example, multiple intercity and interstate trucking companies have bargained a single contract (the National Master Freight Agreement) with the Teamsters union to cover their unionized drivers. The coal industry has long had a master agreement with the United Mine Workers that covers the unionized mine workers in coal companies that were members of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association. These multiemployer units are also found in the construction, longshoring, hotel, and (in some cities) hospital industries. In all of these cases, an employer association represents management at the bargaining table. These centralized agreements might cover multiple different employers in a given locality (such as all of the private hospitals in New York City that were members of the New York Voluntary Hospitals Association) or in an industry. Professional sports teams and unions also have this type of industrywide structure that bargains with a management association that represents the owners of the various teams.

An example of the intermediate case of employer centralization is when a single contract covers multiple work sites of one employer. The automobile, steel, and farm equipment industries and many state governments use this inter- mediate bargaining structure. In these cases, employers with more than one plant negotiate a single contract that covers employees in multiple work sites as opposed

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 181

to having a separate contract for each site. Typically, these company agreements are supplemented with local agreements that cover the working conditions that are specifi c to a given site.

Another intermediate employer case occurs in public school districts, where a single agreement typically covers all the unionized teachers across the various schools in the district. Police and fi refi ghters also commonly have one contract that covers the various stations or districts in a city.

Determinants of Bargaining Structures

Bargaining leverage, public policies, and organizational factors are the major elements that affect the degree of centralization in bargaining structures. How each of these factors infl uences bargaining structure is examined below.

Bargaining Leverage

Unions can increase their bargaining leverage if they organize a large share of the product market; for example, employers that compete to make or sell the same products. One of the primary mechanisms for ensuring that workers don ’ t compete with each other over differences in wages (often referred to as “taking wages out of competition”) is to expand the bargaining structure to cover all employers making the same products .

This process is well illustrated by John R. Commons ’ s account of early unionism among Philadelphia shoemakers. Commons described how in the absence of broad and aggressive unionism, shoemakers were harmfully affected by the expansion of the shoe market (the product market) that had developed in the early 1800s because of improved transportation. 26 As it became possible for nonunion shoemakers outside the Philadelphia area to transport their products into the Philadelphia market and sell them at a low price, the bargaining power of the unionized shoemakers in Philadelphia was weakened. It therefore became important for the Philadelphia shoemakers to organize their fellow shoemakers from the surrounding areas and to see them covered under the same wage agreement to equalize and raise the price of labor.

Unions that represent construction workers, for example, have a strong incentive to equalize the wage costs among competitive bidders on the same product. Thus, in the construction industry, unions prefer to bargain with the multiple employers who are involved in a specifi c construction project. For example, where builders across a city bid for the contract to build an offi ce building, the union representing carpenters in that city will try to bargain in a structure that includes the contractors across the city.

Employers Prefer Centralized Bargaining Structures in Some Cases

It should not be inferred that unions always gain (and employers always lose) a tactical advantage in larger or more centralized bargaining structures. Employers in the service industries (such as hotels, restaurants, laundries, and local truck haulers) have sometimes found it to their advantage to form associations and to bargain in multiemployer units.

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182 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

For instance, consolidating the bargaining function allows employers to avoid being whipsawed by local union leaders. Union whipsawing occurs when a union negotiates a bargain at one plant or company and then puts pressure on the next plant or company to equal or surpass the contract terms just negotiated at the fi rst site. The unions in the airline industry used the whipsawing strategy until the late 1970s. By consolidating the bargaining structure, however, employers can sometimes reduce the possibility of union whipsawing.

Centralized Bargaining Can Stabilize Competition

In some cases, a centralized bargaining structure can serve the interests of an employer by stabilizing competition. Employers in small fi rms in a highly competitive industry may fi nd it to their advantage to bargain centrally with a union because it can reduce the union ’ s ability to whipsaw them. If a strike occurs, the centralized bargaining structure also ensures that no single employer can gain an advantage because all the fi rms are shut down simultaneously.

The benefi t an employer gains from centralized bargaining is well illustrated by the apparel industry. Employers have come to depend on the stability the apparel unions have historically provided in their highly competitive industry. Labor costs are a signifi cant component of total costs to the many small fi rms in the industry, and employers whose workers are unionized are receptive to the wage standardization unions impose. Wage standardization ensures that competition across fi rms does not depend on the ability of a fi rm to obtain low labor costs. UNITE HERE, a union that represents hotel and apparel workers, for example, likes the centralized bargaining structure because this structure helps it take wages out of competition in local areas.

Public Policies

Another crucial determinant of bargaining unit structures is the structure of the election unit that the NLRB determines in a representation election. If the NLRB certifi es that the proper election unit is an industrial unit, for example, this precludes a craft bargaining structure.

The infl uence of the NLRB is well illustrated by events at General Electric (GE). During the 1960s, the unions representing GE workers attempted to engage in coalition bargaining but met with strong resistance from the company. Coalition bargaining would have meant that multiple unions representing GE employees would have sat at the negotiating table even when the contract with only one union was under discussion. The NLRB resolved this confl ict when it ruled that unions could engage in coalition bargaining with GE. Other infl uential board decisions have been made that limit an employer ’ s ability to withdraw from a multiemployer bargaining unit until an impasse has been reached.

Some have argued that the NLRB has exhibited a strong preference for larger bargaining units and thus has aided in the trend toward greater centralization. George W. Brooks was one of the most articulate critics of the board ’ s preference for large production and maintenance bargaining units and against craft autonomy. 27 He argued that the preference for centralization reduced employees’ freedom to

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 183

choose among alternative unions and made it impossible for individual members to effectively infl uence the direction of their unions. This, he believed, produced undemocratic and unresponsive unions.

Organizational Factors

The organizational structures of employers have also generated pressures to broaden the bargaining unit. In particular, the growth of large corporations and the centralization of managerial decision making have led unions to seek centralized bargaining structures. A fundamental principle underlying their efforts is that in many cases unions will benefi t if the structure of bargaining is coterminous with the level at which critical management decisions are made. That is, when manage- ment is making most industrial relations decisions at the company level, then unions would often prefer to have bargaining occur at this level as well.

Evolving Bargaining Structure in the Telephone Industry

The telephone industry illustrates how management ’ s organizational structure has infl uenced bargaining structure as the industry has evolved over many years. The gradual centralization of managerial decision-making power at AT&T that occurred from the 1940s through the 1970s led, fi rst, to the merger of many of the independent unions of telephone workers into the Communications Workers of America (CWA), a national union, and then to the development of a centralized, nationwide contract and bargaining structure. 28

After World War II, AT&T centralized its labor relations policy making in its corporate headquarters in New York. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the CWA still bargained separately with each state affi liate of the Bell System. Con- sequently, throughout the 1960s the union sought to bring about a more centralized or national bargaining arrangement. Although the CWA succeeded in negotiating a national contract in 1974, the breakup of the Bell System into regional telephone companies in 1984 forced the union to return to a decentralized bargaining in its negotiations with the new regional telephone companies. But even after the breakup, because AT&T remained a company of national scope with a centralized management, bargaining involving AT&T employees remained centralized at the national level. Most of the newer entrants to the telecommunications industry such as Sprint and Comcast have remained nonunion, and some former Bell companies such as Verizon have avoided unions in their newer cellular divisions. Today, not only is bargaining once again decentralized to the level of individual fi rms, but also union contracts cover only a portion of the industry and in some cases only a declining portion of employees in a fi rm. We will return to the Verizon example in Chapter 8 .

The Infl uence of Diverse Labor and Management Interests

In order to participate in centralized bargaining, local union offi cials or managers must give up some of their independent authority and abide by centralized decisions. Needless to say, local unionists and managers are not always eager to limit their own authority even when doing so may lead to a greater good for

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184 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

the whole organization. Having to conform to the wishes of a centralized authority is less painful where there are common goals. Thus, another factor that infl uences the emergence of centralized bargaining structures is the extent of diversity in the objectives of local unions or individual companies and the degree to which traditions exist that generate loyalty or rivalry among these units. Box 7.10 discusses how a diversity of interests and other factors were overcome at Kaiser Permanente where an interesting coordinated national bargaining structure was created.

BOX 7.10 Creating a National Bargaining Structure at Kaiser Permanente

After forming a partnership with Kaiser Permanente (KP), the coalition of eight international and twenty-fi ve local unions faced the question of what structure to propose in collective bargaining negotiations. In the past, each local had negotiated a separate agreement. Since the various local unions had gained experience working together in negotiating the initial partnership agreement with KP, their inclination was to have the local unions negotiate together and create a single national agreement with supplements that dealt with specifi c local issues. But KP offi cials were strongly opposed to this, fearing that a single common contract deadline would greatly increase union bargaining power because of the threat of a system-wide work stoppage.

A joint task force was created to explore whether a new approach could be developed. The initial idea that the union coalition favored and the task force proposed was that the coalition negotiate a master national agreement. When the coalition fi rst proposed this idea to KP management in 1999, KP rejected it. Two of the concerns of KP management were that units located in labor market areas outside California would be unable to pay a national rate that was higher than existing rates in their region and that negotiating a master agreement would create considerable vulnerability to a system-wide strike. Since existing local agreements had different expiration dates, management felt safeguarded from the possibility of a major strike across the system.

After considerable discussion of these issues, facilitator John Stepp worked with both KP leaders and with the union leadership to fashion an alternative approach with various “gates” that the parties would move through before negotiating a national agreement. Either side could exit the process as it passed through these gates if they felt it was not moving in a constructive direction.

One important “gate” was agreement in principle that local labor market rates would continue to govern negotiations. Another critical step involved training potential participants in national and local negotiations in the concepts and skills of interest-based negotiations (IBN). Another key “gate” was that either party could pull out of the process at any point. (As it turned out,

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 185

neither party found it necessary to exercise this option.) KP and the union coalition eventually agreed to a revised proposal that called for extensive use of IBN problem-solving principles and the necessary training to prepare the parties for this very complicated process; a single integrated national negotiation that would allow local agreements to retain their respective deadlines (thereby addressing one of management ’ s fears of a common expiration date); and a series of decentralized task forces that would focus on particular issues.

Seven bargaining task groups were established to address (1) wages, (2) benefi ts, (3) work-life balance, (4) performance and work force development, (5) quality and service, (6) employee health and safety, and (7) work organiza- tion and innovation. Each group engaged in an interest-based process of joint study, problem solving, and negotiations. These task groups reported their recommendations to a centralized Common Issues Committee co-chaired by union and management chief negotiators. In addition to negotiating a national agreement, new local agreements were to be bargained, even though most of the existing local agreements were not approaching their expiration dates. The Common Issues Committee sorted through the recommendations of the bargaining task groups and identifi ed those that needed to be forwarded to local tables and those that would be applied uniformly across the system and therefore needed to be negotiated centrally by the Common Issues Committee. In the end, over 400 union and management negotiators were trained in IBN and participated in these negotiations. An agreement was reached in nine months and was ratifi ed by over 80 percent of the rank and fi le.

Source : Robert B. McKersie, Susan Eaton, and Thomas A. Kochan, “Interest Based Bargaining at Kaiser Permanente,” unpublished manuscript, MIT Sloan School of Management, 2002.

Resolving Different Issues at Different Bargaining Levels

Even in centralized bargaining structures, many issues are negotiated on a local basis. That is, in most cases the master agreement that is negotiated at the centralized level covers only broad issues that are universal in scope, such as wage rates and fringe benefi ts. Issues that are specifi c to a company or a plant, such as safety and health conditions, seniority provisions, production standards, shift changes, and overtime distribution, are often left to more decentralized levels of the bargaining structure.

James W. Kuhn has shown that the structure of bargaining extends even farther down to the level of the department or informal work group, where individual supervisors and work groups often negotiate unwritten side agreements or in fact ignore certain provisions of the contract. He called this activity fractional bargaining . 29 One of the most important developments in recent years has been the shift in bargaining down to lower levels.

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186 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

Pattern Bargaining

Pattern bargaining is an informal way of spreading the terms and conditions of employment that have been negotiated in one formal bargaining structure to another. It is an informal substitute for centralized bargaining that seeks to take wages out of competition.

Students of collective bargaining fi rst began noticing the importance of pattern bargaining after World War II. The War Labor Board (WLB) had encouraged the development of pattern settlements in two ways: fi rst, by attempting to fashion a national wage policy, and second, by making the comparison between proposed wage settlements and other industry, area, and national settlements a prime criterion for deciding wage disputes.

The WLB was not the only source of pattern bargaining. Even before centralized bargaining appeared, and in some cases before unions even existed, steel companies, among other concentrated industries, tended to adjust their wages in tandem by following the lead of a principal fi rm, the U.S. Steel Corporation (now USX). 30 Once fi rms began following patterns in their pricing policies, it was only natural that unions began seeking patterns in negotiated agreements covering these fi rms.

Patterns within a Firm

Employees who work in the same fi rm typically are very aware of what other employees in the fi rm are receiving in the way of pay or fringe benefi ts and are very jealous of any differences that emerge. The practice of internal promotion (and other features of an internal labor market) within a fi rm serves to heighten such comparisons. Pattern bargaining follows when one negotiation closely follows the terms set in another negotiation. This is most common across the blue-collar employees of the same fi rm, but it can also occur where unions represent both blue- and white-collar employees.

One of the most complicated labor relations issues arises when two unionized fi rms merge and need to integrate their compensation, seniority, and related contract provisions. The airline industry has had considerable experience with this process because of the mergers that have taken place among major airlines in recent years. Integrating pilot contracts is especially complicated because fi rm- specifi c seniority determines not only compensation but also rules about layoffs and fl ight and aircraft assignments. Often this process has ended up in arbitration. In some cases, such as the merger of US Airways and America West and then the merger of US Airways and American Airlines, the process takes long enough that unions from three or more airlines become involved.

The Trend toward Greater Decentralization in the Structure of Bargaining

In the 1980s, some bargaining units began to decentralize their structures. The steel industry is an illustration. At the beginning of the 1970s, the ten largest steel companies negotiated as a group (although each company signed a separate contract). But by 1982, the number of companies that participated in the industry association had shrunk to eight. By 1986, the association had disbanded and bargaining with

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 187

the remaining fi rms began to take place on a company-by-company basis. Although the settlements that resulted after 1986 carried through many of the common features of the earlier ones, signifi cant variations across the agreements were introduced: in wages, fringe benefi ts, profi t sharing , work rules, and the extent of employee participation in management decision making.

Since the mid-1980s, the number of fi rms in the coal and trucking industries has declined substantially. In addition, there have been major declines in the number of workers covered by multiemployer or industrywide contracts in these industries. Some of the decentralization in bargaining structures has been caused by industry deregulation. By far the most signifi cant effects of government policy on bargaining structures have come in recent years from the deregulation of product markets in trucking, airlines, and communications. In all of these cases, deregulation has opened the industry to pay wages and benefi ts below the unionized rates in the industry and has put pressures on unionized fi rms to seek labor contract terms in ways that will match the practices of the new competitors. As a result, fi rms in all three of these industries have attempted to decentralize their bargaining structures and gain more fl exibility to compete with new, often lower-paying, companies that are entering the industry. As mentioned earlier, in trucking, before the industry was deregulated in 1980, the Teamsters had negotiated a national master freight agreement that covered intercity and interstate truck drivers. All the major trucking companies that hauled freight between cities and states or across the country were covered by this single national contract.

After deregulation, however, there was an infl ux of new nonunion fi rms and small independent contractors in the full-truckload portion of the industry. In addition, intense price competition emerged among the fi rms that remained highly unionized (essentially the “less than truckload” businesses that required large networks of terminals). The net result of these pressures was considerable decen- tralization in the bargaining structure. Several full-truckload companies broke out of the master freight structure and negotiated separate contracts with different wage payment and pension arrangements. At its peak, the Teamsters’ National Master Freight Agreement covered over 800 companies and 450,000 workers. By 2016, this number had shrunk to less than a dozen companies.

In the airline industry, deregulation had the effect of weakening the pattern bargaining that had previously characterized negotiations with American, United, Northwest, and other major airlines. Under increased competitive pressure, pattern bargaining gave way to a more varied pattern of company-specifi c adjustments, including two-tiered wage agreements (that is, wage settlements that lowered the starting pay rates of future hires), changes in hours worked, wage cuts, profi t-sharing plans, and employee memberships on company boards of directors. 31

Summary

This chapter discussed union organizing and bargaining structures. These two central issues emerge early in the bargaining process. Union organizing determines

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188 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

whether there will be bargaining in the fi rst place, then the attention of the parties turns to the structure of bargaining.

An organizing campaign is initiated by union organizers, who typically include some full-time paid organizers and shop-fl oor employees. To receive authorization from the NLRB for a representation election, 30 percent of the election unit must sign authorization cards. Management typically launches a countercampaign in which it tries to convince employees not to vote for union representation. The NLRB regulates conduct during this organizing campaign by limiting union access to the work force and use of private meetings with workers (so-called captive-audience speeches) . There has been much debate in recent years over whether the NLRB has effectively maintained laboratory conditions in election campaigns.

The NLRB plays an important role in the decisions that are made about the appropriate election unit. The board takes into account both the degree to which employees have common interests and the administrative concerns of management. There is much strategic interplay in this process as the union and management try to shape an election unit in ways that increase the likelihood each will win the eventual election. Unions have not fared particularly well in their organizing efforts since the early 1980s. Management has developed personnel policies designed to weaken the appeal of unions and has conducted aggressive countercampaigns against unionization. But unions have not been passive either; they have turned to corporate campaigns and other new organizing tactics.

Bargaining structure determines which unionized employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The two key dimensions are the scope of employee interests covered—whether craft or industrial—and the degree of cen- tralization in fi rm coverage—which range from single-plant to multiple-company agreements.

Compared with bargaining structures that exist in other countries, bargaining structures in United States are relatively decentralized. Since the 1980s, previously centralized bargaining structures in trucking, steel, coal, and many other industries have either fragmented or collapsed.

Understanding the consequences of successful union organizing and the role the structure of bargaining plays requires a more detailed account of how collective bargaining agreements are negotiated. The next chapter turns to that issue.

Discussion Questions

1. Briefl y describe the organizing process. 2. What are some common strategies management uses to keep unions out of

the company? 3. Defi ne what the term bargaining structures means and discuss some of the

determining factors of bargaining structures. 4. What is pattern bargaining and how does it affect informal bargaining

structures?

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Union Organizing and Bargaining Structures 189

5. Why has collective bargaining in some fi rms and industries in the United States become more decentralized in recent years?

6. Explain what the term representation gap means.

Related Web Sites

Justice for Janitors: http://socialjusticehistory.org/projects/justiceforjanitors/timeline

Graduate student organizing at Columbia University: http://www.columbiagradunion.org/

Suggested Readings

Bronfenbrenner , Kate , Richard W. Hurd , and Ronald L. Seeber , eds . Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies . Ithaca, N.Y. : ILR Press , 1998 .

Freeman , Richard B. , and Joel Rogers . What Do Workers Want? Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press , 1999 .

Turner , Lowell , Harry C. Katz , and Richard W. Hurd , eds . Rekindling the Movement: Labor ’ s Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century . Ithaca, N.Y. : ILR Press , 2001 .

Notes

1. It is also possible for the NLRB to order an employer to bargain with a union as a remedy for a representation election that involves extensive unfair labor practices on the part of the employer. The NLRB has not issued this sort of “bargaining order” very often.

2. The NLRB can eliminate this practice if it interferes with the operation of the business. 3. “NLRB Conducted More Elections in 2015 but Percentage of Union Wins Held Steady,”

Daily Labor Report, March 1, 2015. 4. Ibid. 5. Research also has shown that national union characteristics play a role in success in union

certifi cation elections. More specifi cally, larger unions with greater internal democracy, less centralized bargaining, and lower strike activity have greater success in organizing both blue- and white-collar workers than other unions do. See Cheryl L. Maranto and Jack Fiorito, “The Effect of Union Characteristics on the Outcome of NLRB Certifi cation Elections,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40 (January 1987): 225–240.

6. A 1997 survey found that 47 percent of nonunion workers expressed a desire to join a union. See Seymour Martin Lipset and Noah M. Meltz, “Canadian and American Attitudes toward Work and Institutions,” Perspectives on Work 1, no. 3 (1998): 14–19.

7. Myron Roomkin and Hervey Juris, “Unions in the Traditional Sectors: Mid-Life Passage of the Labor Movement,” in Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association, December 28–39, 1977 , ed. Barbara D. Dennis (Madison, Wisc.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1978), 212–222.

8. William N. Cooke, Union Organizing and Public Policy: Failure to Secure First Contracts (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1985).

9. John Paul Ferguson, “Eyes of the Needle,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 62 (January 2008): 3–21.

10. Richard B. Freeman and Morris M. Kleiner, “Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing Drives,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (April 1990): 351–365.

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190 Part III. The Functional Level of Labor Relations

11. “NLRB Conducted More Elections in 2015 but Percentage of Union Wins Held Steady.”

12. A list of corporate campaigns and analysis of their success is provided in Paul Jarley and Cheryl Maranto, “Union Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (July 1990): 505–524.

13. Kate Bronfenbrenner, “The Role of Union Strategies in NLRB Certifi cation Elections,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50 (January 1997): 195–212.

14. Adrienne E. Eaton and Jill Kriesky, “Union Organizing under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55 (October 2001): 42.

15. Ibid., p. 47. 16. Jody Hoffer Gittell, The Southwest Airlines Way (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004). 17. Harry C. Katz, Rosemary Batt, and Jeffrey H. Keefe, “The Revitalization of the CWA:

Integrating Collective Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56 (July 2003): 573–589.

18. “AFL-CIO Strategic Campaign to Boost Organizing at Comcast, Verizon Wireless,” Daily Labor Report , March 5, 2004, A-12; “CWA Organizes More than 11,000 Workers at Former AT&T Wireless under Cingular Pact,” Daily Labor Report , November, 28, 2005, A-8; “Verizon Neutrality Pact with CWA, IBEW Expires after Four Years; No Units Organized,” Daily Labor Report , August 24, 2004, A-12.

19. Ibid. 20. Freelancers Union, https://www.freelancersunion.org/ . 21. Restaurant Opportunities Center United, http://rocunited.org/ . 22. “About,” Working America , http://www.workingamerica.org/membership/about . 23. SherpaShare, https://www.sherpashare.com/ . 24. Coworker.org , https://www.coworker.org/ . 25. The Workers Lab, http://theworkerslab.com/ . 26. John R. Commons, “American Shoemakers, 1648–1895: A Sketch of Industrial Evolution,”

Quarterly Journal of Economics 25 (November 1919), reprinted and revised in A Documentary History of American Society , vol. 3, ed. John R. Commons (New York: Russell and Russell, 1958), 18–58.

27. George W. Brooks, “Stability versus Employee Free Choice,” Cornell Law Review 61 (March 1976): 344–367.

28. Jeffrey Keefe and Rosemary Batt, “Telecommunications Services: Union-Management Relations in an Era of Industry Re-Consolidation,” in Collective Bargaining: Current Developments and Future Challenges , ed. P. Clark, J. Delaney, and A. Frost (Champaign, Ill.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 2003).

29. James W. Kuhn, Bargaining and Grievance Settlements (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

30. George Seltzer, “Pattern Bargaining and the United Steelworkers,” Journal of Political Economy 59 (August 1951): 322.

31. Peter Cappelli, “Competitive Pressures and Labor Relations in the Airline Industry,” Industrial Relations 24 (September 1985): 316–338.

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