War and Security

In June 2016, France witnessed a new kind of mass murder when a truck plowed into a crowd in Nice that had gathered to watch fireworks in celebration of Bastille Day. Eighty-six people were killed, including ten children. In August 2017, Spain witnessed a similar attack when a van driver plowed into a crowd of people on a pedestrian walkway in Barcelona. At least 14 people were killed and dozens of others injured. The attacks have instigated new questions about national security. Such vehicle attacks do not require extensive planning or a wide network to carry out. Little opportunity therefore exists for authorities to detect and stop them. How can states protect their citizens from attacks such as these?

Another type of attack has begun to plague state leaders concerned with national security: cyberattacks. In June 2017, a cyberattack hit Ukraine and spread across the globe within hours. Countries' infrastructures and companies around the world were affected, including those in the United States, France, Britain, Russia, and Australia. Because such attacks stem from cyberspace, identifying the attackers is nearly impossible and the effects can spread across state borders easily and quickly. How can states protect their vital infrastructures, companies, and citizens from cyberattacks if they cannot even find the attackers after the fact and cannot secure borders to prevent them?

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The question of national security has been a central one for centuries. The nature of what is needed to protect national security, however, has changed significantly over time. A more conventional concern about physical violence stemming from other states has expanded to include concerns about individual terrorists and cyberspace. Are these attacks acts of war? Or are they something different? What types of responses are warranted when the perpetrators are not necessarily another state but individuals who reside in another state? Can a state simply go into another state to attack those individuals?

The challenge of dealing with these new issues of national security is a central problem for state leaders today. To understand the choices they face, we must answer several questions. How has the nature of national security changed over time? What constitutes war and what does not? What are the appropriate types of responses to different types of threats to national security? How might war and other threats to national security be prevented? This chapter seeks to provide answers to these fundamental questions.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

- **Define war and identify the different categories of war.**
- **Explain how the theoretical perspectives help us explain the causes of wars.**
- **Describe the key characteristics of conventional and unconventional warfare.**
- **Highlight the circumstances under which a war can be considered "just."**
- **Explain how realists, liberals, and constructivists differ in their approaches to managing state security.**

One of the central concerns of all foreign policy makers as well as scholars studying international relations is that of state (or "national") security. We can think of **national security** as the ability of a state to protect its interests, secrets, and citizens from threats—both external and internal—that endanger it. This definition has three components. The first is a focus on threat: the fact that there is some actor, object, or potential action that can endanger a nation's interests, secrets, or citizens. This threat could stem from outside or inside the state. The second is a focus on protection: the need of the nation to ensure the safety of the state's interests,

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secrets, and citizens from harm by those threats. The third is a focus on capability: the actual ability of the state to provide that protection.

In the past, national security focused on military threats to the state and a state's ability to stave off those threats. Today, the definition of national security covers a variety of factors, including economic and environmental threats as well as nonphysical threats arising in cyberspace. National security has even expanded to include the idea that threats to individuals themselves endanger the security of the state—that human security is an important component of national security. This chapter focuses on two central types of security: military security and cybersecurity. Chapter 11 discusses several issues of human security.

MILITARY SECURITY AND WAR

Wars—in particular, major wars between states—have been the focus of historians of international relations for centuries. Major works on war include Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War* (431 BCE) and Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* (1832). World War I and its aftermath (the founding of the League of Nations) led American diplomatic historians and legal scholars to create a new discipline called international relations. Since that time, prominent scholars in this field have addressed many of the critical and vexing issues surrounding war: its causes, its conduct, its consequences, its prevention, and even the possibility of its elimination. This attention to war and security is clearly warranted. Of all human values, physical security—security from violence, starvation, and the elements—comes first. All other human values that are crucially important to the quality of our lives—good government, economic development, a healthy environment—presuppose a minimal level of physical security.

History suggests that a minimum level of physical security has not always been attainable. In the past 3,400 years, the world has been entirely at peace for only 268 of them. Estimates of deaths from war throughout human history range from 150 million to 1 billion people (depending on how war is defined). Over 108 million were killed in the twentieth century alone.[1]

Following the world wars and the Korean War (1950–53), both the frequency and intensity of interstate war began a slow decline. This trend, however, is not the same for internal conflicts. In recent years, there has been a significant rise in the number of deaths from internal conflict, in particular, about a 440 percent increase from 2007 to 2016, not counting the Syrian conflict. If the Syrian conflict were included, it would be a 732 percent increase. The number of countries experiencing deaths from internal conflict has also risen over the past decade, from 26 countries in 2007 to 30 countries

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in 2016. Overall, the global peace index—which ranks countries according to their level of peacefulness using a variety of indicators—shows that by 2017 the global level of peace had deteriorated by 2.14 percent since 2008. War therefore remains perhaps the most compelling issue in world politics, and international relations theorists continue to analyze why it occurs.[2]

WHAT IS WAR?

International relations scholars debate how to define war. Over time, however, three features have emerged. First, a war involves organized, deliberate violence by an identifiable political authority. Riots are often lethal, but they are not considered "war" because, by definition, a riot is neither deliberate nor organized. Second, wars are relatively more lethal than other forms of organized violence. Pogroms, bombings, and massacres are deliberate and organized but generally not sufficiently lethal to count as war. Currently, most international relations scholars accept that at least 1,000 deaths in a calendar year are needed in order for an event to count as a war. Third, and finally, for an event to count as a war, both sides must have some

Many Rwandans fled their homes to escape persecution and violence during the 1994 genocide. What factors kept the international community from intervening?

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real capacity to harm each other, although that capacity need not be equal on both sides. We do not count genocides, massacres, terrorist attacks, and pogroms as wars because in a genocide, for example, only one side has any real capacity to kill, while the other side is effectively defenseless.

In sum, **war** is an organized and deliberate political act by an established political authority that causes 1,000 or more deaths in a 12-month period and involves at least two actors capable of harming each other.

Defining war is not simply academic. These definitions have real-world consequences. An important case in point was the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which over 750,000 men, women, and children were murdered in just four months. Had the international community named this violence properly as a genocide, the pressure to intervene militarily to halt it might have been greater, since in a genocide the side being murdered would have no chance of winning. However, the violence was instead characterized as a renewal of civil war, raising the question of whether international intervention should occur in Rwanda's internal affairs.

TYPES OF WAR

International relations scholars have developed many ways to categorize wars that pose physical threats to national security. At the broadest level, we distinguish between wars that take place between sovereign states (interstate war) and wars that take place within states (intrastate war). Scholars also distinguish between conventional and unconventional warfare, terrorism, and cyberwarfare.

Interstate War

Since the advent of the state system in the years following the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), the state as a form of political association has proven ideal at organizing and directing the resources necessary for waging war. As Charles Tilly famously put it, "War made the state and the state made war."[3] As a result, wars between states, also known as **interstate wars**, have captured the bulk of attention from international relations theorists and scholars.

Theorists are interested in wars between states, in particular, for two reasons. First, by definition, states have recognizable leaders and locations. When we say "France," we understand we are speaking about a government that controls a specific territory that others recognize as France. Therefore, states make good subjects for analysis and comparison. Second, states have formal militaries—some tiny and not much more than police forces, others vast and capable of projecting force across

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the surface of the globe and even into outer space. These militaries, and the state's capacity to marshal resources in support of them, make states formidable adversaries. Thus, interstate wars are often characterized by relatively rapid loss of life and destruction of property. At the end of World War II, the world's states faced the prospect that a future interstate war might not only destroy them as such, but also, in a nuclear exchange, destroy all human life.

World War I and World War II are two of the most prominent examples of interstate war and illustrate how devastating it can be. The same great powers fought in both wars: Britain, France, Austria-Hungary (in World War II, Germany), Japan, Russia/the Soviet Union, and the United States. Industrialization, which had occurred leading up to the beginning of World War I, revolutionized the killing power of states. The Industrial Revolution had led workers to move from rural areas to cities, making cities distinct targets to attack and allowing a state to inflict significant damage on the enemy all at once. The scope of the battlefield, once restricted to physical areas over which soldiers fought, expanded soon after World War I to include armaments and munitions workers, and eventually, even agricultural workers. The scope of the wars was astonishing. Weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons and nuclear weapons were employed, and the overall casualties were horrific: most belligerents lost 4 to 5 percent of their population in World War I, and double that in World War II.

More recently, however, wars have tended to be more limited in scope. One important set of examples of more limited interstate war is the Arab-Israeli disputes, described in Chapter 2. Israel has fought six interstate wars against its neighbors—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon—and struggled against repeated Palestinian uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza. Since the conclusion of the

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Characteristics of War

- Is an organized and deliberate political act
- Causes 1,000 or more deaths in a 12-month period
- Can be interstate or intrastate
- Can be asymmetric (between parties of unequal power) like terrorism
- Can be an act taken by established political authority
- Involves at least two actors capable of harming each other
- Can be conventional or unconventional
- Can take place in cyberspace when an act is endorsed or carried out by a state government

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1973 Yom Kippur War, however, none of the opposing states have sought the complete destruction of their foes, and the conflict has blown hot and cold. With the increased destructiveness of modern warfare, adopting more limited actions has become states' most common option when contemplating violence against other states.

Intrastate War

Intrastate wars (civil wars) are wars that take place within a state. Examples of intrastate wars include a faction and a government fighting over control of territory (Boko Haram in Nigeria); rival groups fighting to establish a government to control a failed or fragile state (Somalia or Liberia); ethnonationalist movements fighting for greater autonomy or secession (Chechens in Russia, Kachins in Myanmar); and ethnic, clan, or religious groups fighting for control of the state (Rwanda, South Sudan, Burundi, Yemen).

Civil wars tend to share several characteristics. They often last a long time, even decades, with periods of fighting punctuated by periods of relative calm. Whereas the goals may seem relatively limited in comparison to those of interstate wars, in the context of the rivalry between incumbent governments and rebels, the stakes are often very high—including secession, group autonomy, and control of the state. The human costs are therefore often substantial. Both combatants and civilians are killed and maimed, food supplies are interrupted, diseases spread as health systems suffer, money is diverted from constructive economic development to purchasing armaments, and generations of people grow up knowing only war.

The African continent provides examples of these major intrastate wars. Ethiopia's war with two of its regions (Ogaden and Eritrea) lasted decades, as did the civil wars between the north and south in both Sudan and Chad. Liberia and Sierra Leone have also been sites of civil conflict in which various factions, guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and mercenaries have fought for control.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) provides another example of a major civil war, but one that became so internationalized and so destructive that it is often called the "Great African War" or "African World War." In 1996, an internal rebellion broke out in the DRC against the longtime dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Very quickly, both Uganda and Rwanda supported the rebellion, with the latter interested in eliminating Hutu militias that had fled Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. After Mobutu was ousted and replaced with a new leader, Laurent Kabila, a wider war erupted two years later. Powerful Congolese leaders and ethnic groups, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, opposed the new government. Angola and Zimbabwe supported Kabila's government, as did Chad and Sudan. A major conflict broke out, and rebel groups and the armies of the various countries involved

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fought intensely—not only for control of the government but also for control of the DRC's vast natural resources. The war formally ended in 2003, but the repercussions lasted long after. The war destroyed the DRC's infrastructure and millions were forced to flee their homes. It is estimated that more than 5 million people died during the war and its aftermath. Despite the efforts of a large UN peacekeeping force, examined in Chapter 9, more people were killed in this war than in any other conflict since World War II.

The most prominent intrastate wars that have broken out in the twenty-first century are those following the Arab Spring of 2011, especially those in Libya (February–October 2011) and Syria (2011–present). Both qualify as wars because well over 1,000 battle deaths resulted from conflict between an incumbent government and rebels, and because each side had military capacity to harm the other (though government forces had the greater capacity). Both followed a similar course: government forces harshly repressed peaceful protests by mostly young people, which then led to an escalation of protests and international condemnation. That escalation led to a harsher government response, with protests becoming both more widespread and more violent. After evidence of government murders, rapes, torture, and massacres, there were calls for international intervention. In Libya's case, both the incumbent government and its international supporters were caught by surprise, and limited military intervention by NATO on behalf of Libyan rebels accelerated the collapse of the incumbent government. In Syria, the incumbent government was better prepared, and more importantly, it received political and military support from allies such as Russia. As if a civil war between rebel groups and Syria's government were not complicated enough, in 2013 the Islamic State (IS) began making territorial gains in eastern Syria. In 2014, the United States, along with multiple states in the Middle East, began to attack the IS inside Syria. In 2015, Russia became officially involved in the conflict militarily, conducting air strikes throughout Syria. These air strikes focused not only on the IS but also on rebel groups involved in the civil war, bringing Russia into the conflict on the side of the Syrian government. The United States also eventually became involved in the civil war (beyond just fighting the IS). It supported rebel groups standing against the Syrian government, and in direct response to a chemical weapons attack that the Syrian government carried out against its citizens in 2017, the United States fired missiles at a Syrian government airbase, thus officially entering militarily into the civil conflict. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are also involved, with Iran supporting the Syrian government, Saudi Arabia supporting the rebel groups, and Turkey providing weapons and safe havens to some rebel groups. Currently, the civil war in Syria, which has provoked a flood of refugees seeking safe haven in Europe and neighboring countries (see Chapter 11), ranks among the world's most complicated and deadly civil wars.

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As the cases of the DRC and Syria demonstrate, civil wars can become internationalized, with outside actors getting involved in the conflict on one side or the other. States, groups, and individuals from outside the warring country become involved by funding particular groups, selling weapons to various factions, and giving diplomatic or military support to one group over another. Outside states have become involved in civil wars across the globe. Recent civil wars that have experienced outside intervention include those in Mali (intervention by France and the Economic Community of West African States), Somalia (intervention by the United States, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the African Union, among others), and Yemen (intervention by Iran on one side and by a multilateral coalition led by Saudi Arabia on the other).

Conventional War

Throughout most of human history, wars were fought by people—almost invariably male—who were chosen, trained, and authorized to attack or defend against their counterparts in other political communities. Almost all societies have also considered it off-limits to kill some groups, usually women, children, the elderly, and noncombatant civilians. The tools of war reflected this restriction. Weapons of choice have ranged from swords and shields to bows, guns, and cannons; to industrialized armies fielding infantry and riding in tanks; to navies sailing in specialized ships; and to air forces flying fixed-wing aircraft. Such weapons are used to defeat the enemy on a territorial battlefield. The key attribute of conventional weapons is that their destructive effects can be limited in space and time to those who are the legitimate targets of war. Conventional wars are won or lost when the warriors of one group, or their leaders, acknowledge defeat following a clash of arms.

World War I and World War II challenged conventional war as the standard way of fighting war. World War I saw the first large-scale use of chemical weapons on the battlefield. Near the Flemish (Belgian) town of Ypres, in 1915, German forces unleashed 168 tons of chlorine gas against French positions. French troops suffered 6,000 casualties in just a few minutes as prevailing winds carried the poisonous gas across the fields and into the trenches. But German forces were unable to exploit the four-mile-wide gap in French lines that opened as a result. Many German troops had been wounded or killed in handling the gas or by moving through areas still affected, and they were unable to exploit the temporary advantages gained. In addition, the effects of the weapons proved difficult to restrict to combat. Chemicals leached into the soil and water table, affecting agriculture for months afterward. After the war, winners and losers signed a Geneva Protocol outlawing the use of chemical weapons in war.

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World War II added two additional challenges to the use of conventional weapons as the standard tools of war. First, the advent of strategic bombing led to the possibility of large-scale harm to noncombatants and to a reexamination of who or what a "noncombatant" actually was. Prior to the war, there was general agreement that civilians were to be protected from intentional harm. But the belligerents possessed large fleets of ships, armored vehicles, and planes, all of which required civilians to build and maintain them. Were those civilians to be protected, too? What about the farmers who fed the soldiers, airmen, and sailors? As the war intensified, the dividing line between those who were to be protected from deliberate harm and those who could be legitimately targeted broke down. By the war's end, both sides had taken to using massive air strikes to deliberately target civilians. In March 1945, bombers from the U.S. Eighth Air Force targeted Japan's capital, Tokyo, with incendiary bombs. The ensuing flames killed over 100,000 Japanese in a single raid, most of them civilians. Second, World War II saw the development of a nuclear weapon—a weapon that clearly could not be limited to combatants, as the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 demonstrated. Around 200,000 people died from the attacks.

Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare, which is as old as conventional warfare, is distinguished by a willingness to flout restrictions on legitimate targets of violence or refuse to accept the traditional outcomes of battles—say, the destruction of a regular army, loss of a capital, or capture of a national leader—as an indicator of victory or defeat.

Two major changes moved unconventional war from a side role to a prominent feature of war. The first is the idea of *nationalism*—a sense of national consciousness placing primary emphasis on one's own nation's culture and interests over those of other nations. Nationalism became an important feature of war during the French Revolution. French nationalism was highly prevalent when the French army under Napoleon Bonaparte was at war with other European states in the 1790s. The French army was a national one, composed of troops with nationalist pride. They felt that they were citizens fighting for their own cause. This intense devotion made the French army a formidable opponent, especially when contrasted with the general indifference of the opposing troops, who did not feel a sense of membership in their own political systems. However, nationalism can be a double-edged sword. While nationalism helped motivate Napoleon's army, the source of greatest defeats lay in nationalist-inspired resistance in Russia and Spain.

The second major change was the growth in the use of guerrilla warfare (the term comes from a Spanish word meaning "small war"). Guerrilla warfare is an old idea, but a strategic innovation by Mao Zedong led to the spread of its use

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and increased its effectiveness. Mao Zedong's strategy was first called "revolutionary guerrilla warfare." It was specifically designed to counter a technologically advanced and well-equipped industrial adversary by effectively reversing the conventional relationship between soldiers and civilians. In conventional war, soldiers risk their lives to protect civilians. In guerrilla warfare, civilians risk their lives to protect the guerrillas, who hide among them and who cannot easily be distinguished from ordinary civilians when not actually fighting.

Using revolutionary guerrilla warfare during the Chinese Civil War (1927–37, 1945–49) and in China's resistance to Japanese occupation during World War II (1937–45), Mao's People's Liberation Army was able to survive many setbacks. Eventually, it defeated the well-armed and U.S.-supplied Nationalist armies of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), whose forces fled to the island of Formosa, now Taiwan. This unexpected outcome left Mao with a vast storehouse of captured weapons and, more importantly, led to the spread of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a template for other insurgents, particularly in Asia.

Revolutionary guerrilla warfare is often used when one party in a conflict is significantly more powerful than the other. This type of conflict between a more powerful party and a significantly weaker party is referred to as **asymmetric conflict.** Asymmetric conflict is also a challenge to a conventional understanding of war. It undercuts an important proposition of both conventional warfare and nuclear war: that conventional weapons and nuclear confrontations are more likely to occur among states having rough equality of military strength and using similar strategies and tactics. If one party is decidedly weaker, the proposition goes, fear of defeat makes that party unlikely to resort to war. Asymmetric conflicts, in contrast, are conducted between parties of very unequal strength. The weaker party attempts to exploit the opponent's weaknesses.[4]

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a string of unexpected defeats in such asymmetric conflicts for the major advanced industrial powers, each of which lost wars against "weak" or "backward" adversaries. Britain was forced to grant independence to India. France was defeated in Indochina and Algeria; Portugal in Mozambique and Angola; the United States in Vietnam; the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; and Israel in Lebanon. In each case, well-equipped, industrialized militaries had sought to overcome smaller, nonindustrial adversaries and lost.

Like any strategy, however, revolutionary guerrilla warfare itself has weaknesses. In two asymmetric conflicts following World War II, the strong actors—Britain during the Malayan Emergency (1948–60) and the United States in the Philippines (1952–53)—devised a counterinsurgency strategy that effectively defeated revolutionary guerrillas. That strategy aimed not at insurgent armed forces (terrorists and guerrillas), or even their leaders, but instead at the real

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strength of successful guerrilla warfare: the people. As Mao recognized in his early writings, incumbent governments can defeat a well-led, well-organized guerrilla resistance in only two ways: either change the minds of the people (via a conciliation, or "hearts and minds," strategy) or destroy them utterly. In either case, the social support of a guerrilla resistance is destroyed, and that resistance will collapse. Mao was confident that his "Western" and democratic adversaries were too arrogant in their own power to attempt to change minds and too squeamish in their ethical conduct to pursue a genocidal counterinsurgency. Yet in both Malaya and the Philippines, incumbent governments, supported by Britain and the United States, sought to redress the grievances that had led many of the country's poor or disaffected either to active support of the guerrillas or to political apathy. Since World War II, "hearts and minds" strategies have proven the most effective method of counterinsurgency on the ground, but they are costly in political terms because they take a long time to work and, in most cases, they demand large numbers of troops.[5]

Guerrilla warfare is only one of several strategies a combatant might use to overcome a more materially powerful incumbent and its allies. Another such strategy is nonviolent resistance. Like revolutionary guerrilla warfare, nonviolent resistance deliberately places ordinary people at grave risk of harm in the pursuit of political objectives. Unlike guerrilla warfare or terrorism, however, nonviolent resistance avoids the use of violence as a means of protest. Prominent examples of nonviolent resistance include Mohandas Gandhi's resistance to British rule in the 1940s and the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s civil rights movement of the 1960s.

Terrorism

Another strategy for overcoming a materially more powerful adversary is terrorism. **Terrorism**, a particular kind of asymmetric conflict, is increasingly perceived as a serious international security threat in the world today. It is particularly seen as a threat because terrorist attacks are often unconventional and highly unpredictable.[6] Scholars of terrorism disagree on a universal definition of terrorism, but most definitions share three key elements:

1. Terrorism is *political* in nature or intent.
2. Perpetrators of terrorism are *nonstate* actors.
3. Targets of terrorism are *noncombatants*, such as ordinary citizens, political figures, or bureaucrats.

Terrorism has often been called the strategy of the weak, but this argument begs the question of what "power" actually is. Is power only the material power to kill,

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or can it reside in the power of ideas? Gandhi, for example, did not overcome the British and win India's independence by means of violent revolution. The power of ideas proved decisive. Terrorists also hope to harness the power of ideas: they invariably justify their violence by using immortality imagery. This imagery tends to take one of three forms: nationalist, Marxist, or religious. In each case, terrorists intend their violent acts to preserve the nation, the proletariat, or the faithful and ensure its immortality. In the Irish Republican Army's long struggles with British rule in Ireland, all three immortality images came into play, as predominantly nationalist, socialist, and Catholic terrorists sought to coerce Britain into abandoning Ireland's Protestant minority, among other things.

Terrorism involves physical harm, but the essence of terrorism is psychological, not physical. Whatever the aims of the individual terrorist, killing is a by-product of terrorism as a strategy. The real aim of terrorism is to call attention to a cause, while at the same time calling into question the legitimacy of a target government by highlighting its inability to protect its citizens. For example, during the 1972 Summer Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, a group of Palestinian Arab terrorists styling themselves "Black September" took 11 Israeli athletes hostage in the Olympic Village. Two of the hostages were murdered immediately. During a botched rescue attempt by the surprised and ill-prepared Germans, the remaining nine hostages were murdered by their captors. Black September was a part of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), a group founded by Yasser Arafat ir 1964 to advance the cause of Palestinian Arab statehood by means of violence But until Munich, few outside the Middle East had ever heard of the PLO. Afte the games, the PLO (and "terrorists" more broadly) became a widespread topic o conversation and state action.

Much recent terrorist activity has its roots in the Middle East—in the ongoin quest of Palestinian Arabs for self-determination and their own internal conflict over strategy, in the hostility among various Islamic groups toward Western force and ideas (in particular, what they perceive as Western support of Israel's persecu tion of Palestinian Arabs and the education and independence of women), and i the resurgence of extremist Islamic fundamentalism. Among terrorist groups wit roots in the Middle East are Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Aft September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda was the most publicized of these groups. A shadov network of extremist Islamic fundamentalists from many countries, including son outside the Middle East, Al Qaeda, originally led by the late Osama bin Laden, motivated by the desire to install strict Islamic regimes in the Middle East, suppo radical Islamic insurgencies in Southeast Asia, and punish the United States for support of Israel. When the United States and its allies began to seriously hurt Qaeda—as they did from 2009 to 2012—its leadership adapted by dispersing a forming new affiliates, such as Al Qaeda in Iraq and Al Qaeda in Yemen. With t

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TABLE 6.1

Selected Terrorist Orga[illegible]

GROUP	LOCATION	CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTACKS
Al Qaeda	Formerly in Afghanistan; now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, and Yemen	Formed by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s among Arabs who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan; responsible for bombings in Africa (1998), Yemen (2000), United States (2001), Spain (2004), Great Britain (2005), India (2006), Pakistan (2008, 2009), Algeria (2010).
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip	Its leader signed bin Laden's 1998 *fatwa* calling for attacks on U.S. interests; elected in 2006 as governing authority in Gaza.
Hezbollah (Party of God)	Lebanon	Also known as Islamic Jihad; often directed by Iran and suspected in the bombing of the U.S. embassy and marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; dominates Lebanon politically; fights against Israel.
Boko Haram (Western Ways Are Forbidden)	Northern Nigeria and neighboring countries; pushed into a final stronghold in the 23,000-square-mile Sambisa Forest in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by coalition of Nigeria and the African Union	Salafi jihadists who violently pursue the establishment of a strict version of Sharia law throughout Nigeria. Kidnapped 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Nigeria, in April 2014. Some were released in mid-2017, but about 100 are still believed to be in Boko Haram custody.
Haqqani Network	Pashtunistan (eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan)	Insurgent Islamist group; supported by U.S. CIA during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; now allied with Taliban and tacitly supported by Pakistan; fought against ISAF in Afghanistan until 2010.

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TABLE 6.1 (continued)

GROUP	LOCATION	CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTACKS
The Islamic State	Formerly centered in Syria and northern Iraq, but actively franchising to Yemen, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, and possibly Chechnya	An outgrowth of Al Qaeda in Iraq, currently led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a former senior officer in Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army and the self-proclaimed caliph; the world's wealthiest terrorist group; aims to establish an "Islamic" caliphate (no territorial boundaries) and is responsible for thousands of murders, including beheadings, as well as rapes and sexual slavery; it targets any who oppose its restrictive interpretation of Sharia law.

Preventing terrorist activity has become increasingly difficult because most perpetrators have networks of supporters in the resident populations. Protecting populations from random acts of violence is an almost impossible task, given the availability of guns and bombs in the international marketplace. Pressure on governments is very strong because people worry disproportionately about terrorism, even though it kills a relatively small number of people, and because many people believe a violent response by state security forces will help protect them. Despite advances in detection technology like face-recognition software, committed individuals or groups of terrorists are difficult to preempt or deter. Indeed, such individuals may be seen as heroes in their community.

The international community has taken action against terrorists by creating a framework of international rules dealing with terrorism. The framework includes 12 conventions that address such issues as punishing hijackers and those who protect them; protecting airports, diplomats, and nuclear materials in transport; and blocking the flow of financial resources to global terrorist networks. Individual states have also taken steps to increase state security (the United States' controversial USA Patriot Act is one example), to support counterintelligence activities and to promote cooperation among national enforcement agencies in tracking and apprehending terrorists. States have sanctioned other states they view as

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supporting terrorists, or as not taking effective enforcement measures. Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, and Iraq are prominent examples. But it is important to recall that even developed states such as the United States, Belgium, and France have had difficulty in taking effective enforcement measures against terrorists, although each has shut down many terrorist financial networks and enhanced security in airports and ports. After all, the terrorists who attacked New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, learned to fly commercial airplanes in Florida. And some of the terrorists responsible for the Paris bombings in 2015 were French citizens or were living in Belgium.

Cyberwarfare

In the past several decades, a new type of threat to national security has arisen—threats stemming from cyberspace. **Cyberspace** is more than just the Internet. As defined by Ronald Deibert, cyberspace includes "the entire spectrum of networked information and communication systems and devices" and now pervades all aspects of society, economics, and politics.[9] Given its central role in individual, national, and international relations, cyberspace is now considered to be a critical infrastructure by most state governments, transforming it into a central focus of national security. The goal is to protect the state from cyberwarfare. **Cyberwarfare** refers to state actions taken to penetrate another state's computers or networks for the purpose of causing damage or disruption. Nonstate actors can also engage in such cyberattacks—either on their own or in conjunction with state governments. The threats stemming from such attacks are as widespread as cyberspace itself.

Cyberwarfare has become increasingly common in state relations. China is thought to operate one of the most extensive cyberattack operations in the world against both government and corporate targets. It is believed that one of the first major cyberwarfare attacks—a series of coordinated attacks (labeled Titan Rain by the U.S. government) that began in 2003 and persisted for at least three years—was a Chinese operation. Russia is also a significant perpetrator of cyberattacks. In 2007, Estonia's state banking and public administration systems were frozen when millions of computers were hijacked and connected together as a "botnet" to flood the country's central computer systems. The attacks coincided with a disagreement between Estonia and Russia. Similarly, during the war over the territory of South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia, the Georgian government ministries were subject to a major denial-of-service attack (in which machines and network resources are rendered unavailable due to a disruption of servers connected to the Internet). In June 2017, a major cyberattack hit Ukraine and quickly spread worldwide. The attack was designed to hit the day before a holiday celebrating

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the adoption of Ukraine's first constitution after achieving independence from the Soviet Union. While some Russian industries were hit, Ukraine argued that Russia was behind the attack. In 2017, the United States implicated Russia in cyberattacks designed to influence the outcome of its 2016 presidential election.

One of the most prominent cyberwarfare attacks (using the Stuxnet worm) was an attack on Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities that is believed to have been organized by the United States and Israel. The attackers used multiple strategically exploitable vulnerabilities in software (zero-day exploits) and spent numerous months and millions of dollars on research and advance preparation. Although the attack brought Iranian nuclear enrichment programs to only a limited halt, it is widely seen as the first act of sabotage undertaken in cyberspace and it significantly advanced the evolution of cyberwarfare. In 2017, the United States was known to be actively pursuing this same type of cyberattack against the North Korean missile program in hopes of sabotaging test launches.

Because of the growing frequency and impact of cyberattacks, cybersecurity has become a central feature of states' strategic actions to protect themselves at the international level. The United States has placed cyberspace as equal in importance to land, air, sea, and space in its strategic doctrine and has established a special U.S. military command dedicated solely to cyberspace. Similarly, in 2010 China announced the creation of its own military unit dedicated to the investigation and prevention of cyberattacks on its own computer systems. Many states have taken similar steps.

While most actions in the realm of cybersecurity have been unilateral actions taken by individual states, some cooperative agreements have been forged. For example, the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime (CEC) was created in 2001. The agreement requires states to pass laws criminalizing certain behaviors in cyberspace and providing police with the authority to enforce these laws. In 2008, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), made up of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, adopted an "action plan" with principles similar to the law enforcement approach of the CEC. Bilateral agreements have also been created, and in some cases, these agreements involve states that have been highlighted as important sources of cybercrime. For example, in 2015 a breakthrough agreement on cybersecurity was signed between the United States and China. They agreed that they should increase communication and cooperation to investigate and prevent cybercrimes emanating from their territory. They also agreed that neither would knowingly conduct or support cyber-related theft of intellectual property. Both sides promised to establish a high-level joint dialogue on fighting cybercrime and related issues, as well as to identify, develop, and promote international norms of acceptable cyberspace behavior.

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Cooperation at the global level, however, has been limited. In 2006, the UN General Assembly called for the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on information and communications technology (ICT). Its purpose was to study existing and potential threats to states' information security and to develop possible cooperative measures to address them. By mid-2017, the GGE had met in five sets of sessions, publishing after each session a report providing advice on how states can begin to cooperate in the field of information and communications technology. The 2015 report called for states not to allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT. Most importantly, it pushed for the establishment of a number of voluntary "confidence building measures." These measures are designed to increase a state's confidence that other states will not exploit its own cooperative actions in order to better prepare an attack against it. While such measures could pave the way for increased transparency and cooperation, the 2017 GGE failed to produce a report receiving consensus support. This failure has opened up questions about the future of the GGE and cooperation in cybersecurity.

Nevertheless, almost all aspects of cybersecurity have a transnational component, as users throughout the world are often affected by actions taken in cyberspace. One response to this reality has been the creation of computer emergency response teams (CERTs), groups of nonstate experts that are designed to manage computer security incidents and are located all around the world. These nationally based teams have begun to coordinate in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). FIRST was formed in 1990; its goals are to promote information sharing among its members, to assist in rapid reaction to incidents, and most importantly, to foster cooperation and coordination in working to prevent incidents in the first place. By the beginning of 2018, FIRST had more than 300 member groups.

There are many different types of war, and all can be devastating to a state's security. Given that war is so important, we should try to understand the causes of war and examine possible ways to prevent it. The three main perspectives of international relations provide some insights.

THE CAUSES OF WAR

In an analysis of any war, we will find more than one cause for the outbreak of violence. This multiplicity of explanations can seem overwhelming. How can we study the causes of war systematically, when the causes often seem idiosyncratic? Theories of international relations highlight different factors that might help explain why wars occur.

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Realist Interpretations of the Causes of War

If one key issue distinguishes realists from their critics, it is that for realists, war is a natural, inevitable feature of interstate politics. As discussed in Chapter 3, realists see the problem of war as stemming from the fact that the international system is anarchic—in the international system there exists no hierarchically superior, coercive authority that can create laws, resolve disputes, or enforce law and order. War therefore breaks out because no authority exists to prevent it. As long as there is anarchy, there will be war. War, in such a system, might even appear to be the best course of action a state can take. War and conquest can help a state acquire resources that it can use to increase its power. Moreover, for offensive realists, war is a way to enhance a state's reputation by demonstrating its willingness to engage in conflict. Doing so can help a state get other states to join with it (bandwagon) in an effort to prevent themselves from being attacked as well.

The anarchic international system also has no legitimized authority to help peacefully resolve contending claims that states may have. John Mearsheimer calls this the "911 problem"—there is no hotline, or "central authority, to which a threatened state can turn for help."[10] One of the most common contending claims over which violence breaks out between states involves contested territory. For almost all of the previous century, the Arab-Israeli dispute rested on competing territorial claims to Palestine; in the Horn of Africa, the territorial aspirations of the Somali people remain disputed; in the Andes, Ecuador and Peru have competing territorial claims; and in the South China Sea, Japan, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam are all struggling over conflicting claims to offshore islands. Ukraine and Russia both view Crimea as part of their own territory. For realists, without an arbiter to resolve these disputes, a state might resort to violence to win the territory it claims as its own. For example, violence regularly takes place over claims to Palestine, violence has broken out on several occasions regarding the conflicting territorial claims over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and in 2014 Russia sent military troops to take Crimea from Ukraine.

Likewise, there is also no effective arbiter of competing claims to self-determination made by groups within states. Tibetans, Chechens, Catalonians, Kurds, and Quebecois all express a desire for their own state. Who decides whether their claims for self-determination are legitimate? Without an internationally legitimized arbiter, authority rests with the states themselves—with the most powerful ones often becoming the decisive, interested arbiters. The groups seeking self-determination thus often resort to force against the state. For example, the struggle between Chechnya and Russia over Chechen independence regularly involves armed conflict. It has even broken out into all-out war. In 1999, Russia invaded Chechnya after it had declared independence and succeeded in returning it to Russian control. Violence has continued to break out regularly ever since.

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

In January 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush alerted the American people to intelligence that suggested Iraq was developing nuclear weapons, causing the United States to enter war with Iraq to maintain the balance of power. Those claims were later revealed to be inaccurate.

In addition to affirming the importance of anarchy for understanding why we see war, some realists attribute war to other facets of the international system, such as the distribution of power. For example, Kenneth Organski advances a realist argument referred to as "power transition theory." This theory posits that it is not only mismatched material power that tempts states to war, but also the *anticipation* of shifts in the relative balance of power. War occurs because states believe that more power leads to expectations of more influence, wealth, and security. A power transition can therefore cause war in one of two patterns. In the first pattern, a rising power might launch a war to solidify its position. For example, ten to twenty years before the beginning of World War II, Germany's power relative to that of France and the United Kingdom was extremely small, as Germany had just been defeated in World War I. Germany's power rose significantly over those decades and had almost reached parity with that of France and the United Kingdom by the start of the war. The prediction of power transition theory that Germany would act militarily to help secure its new position in the international system played out in

this case, and World War II broke out.[11] In the second pattern, the currently most powerful state(s) might launch a preventive war to keep a rising challenger down. For example, one of the United States' reasons for going to war against Iraq in 2003 was that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons and its nuclear program needed to be dismantled before it acquired the capability to use such weapons, significantly increasing its power. Whichever pattern occurs, according to the theory, power transitions increase the likelihood of war.

Liberal Interpretations of the Causes of War

While realists focus significant attention in their analyses of war on characteristics of the international system, liberals tend to focus more on characteristics of the state and institutions (both domestic and international). State and societal explanations for war are among the oldest. Plato, for example, posited that war is less likely where the population is cohesive and enjoys a moderate level of prosperity. Since the population would be able to thwart an attack, an enemy is likely to refrain from launching such an attack. Many thinkers during the Enlightenment, including Immanuel Kant, believed that war was more likely in aristocratic states. Kant goes farther, arguing in his book *Perpetual Peace* (1795) that three factors help to foster peace—democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions. These factors are central in liberal theories about why we do (or do not) see war.

In the liberal perspective, democratic peace theory holds that democracies rarely (if ever) go to war with other democracies. There are several reasons why this is the case. First, some theorists argue that democracies share norms of compromise and cooperation. At the domestic level, democracies offer citizens who have grievances a chance to deal with these complaints by nonviolent means. This norm is projected by democracies to the international level. Thus, two democracies who share this norm of nonviolent resolution of conflicts are both likely to pursue peaceful means to resolve their disputes. War is therefore less likely between them.

Second, some theorists argue that institutional constraints exist in democracies that help to prevent them from going to war with one another. One important institutional characteristic of democracies is transparency in the decision-making process. Transparency provides leaders on the other side with trust that commitments made in negotiated agreements will be upheld, as they can observe the process by which those decisions were made. If leaders in democracies back down from their commitments, they can also face audience costs—costs that stem from negative public opinion about leaders' actions. If states negotiate an agreement, it is thus believable that democracies will uphold their end. Nondemocracies have

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more difficulty in building trust and decreasing uncertainty, due to the nontransparent nature of their regimes. Two democracies that can each trust the other side to uphold its commitments are therefore more likely to be willing to negotiate a solution to a dispute than to go to war. If a state faces a nondemocracy, and thus cannot trust that it will uphold a negotiated solution, that state is more likely to turn to violence. A lack of transparency, and a lack of audience costs at the domestic level, can therefore also be reasons why we see war when nondemocracies are involved.

Another theory from the liberal perspective—"commercial peace theory"—focuses on interdependence between states. This theory posits that states that are more interdependent, particularly through trade and investment, are less likely to go to war. Peace maintains the prospect for continued economic benefits, something both states desire. War interrupts trade and blocks profits. Thus, states that are more interconnected by commercial institutions—and thus more dependent on one another for trade and other economic gains—are less likely to go to war with one another. A lack of interdependence and connections between states can therefore be a reason why we see states resort to violence to resolve their disputes. There is significantly less cost to doing so than there is for states that are interdependent and share these connections.

Some liberal theories also highlight how international institutions might influence the outbreak of conflict. First, international institutions help build positive connections between states, and economic institutions, in particular, foster interdependence. In this way, institutions can therefore help promote peace. The lack of shared membership in such institutions might thus increase the possibility that conflict could break out between states. Second, states that are left out of institutions might feel threatened by the connections forged between states within those institutions, potentially adding to the possibility of conflict. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, the possibility that Ukraine might join NATO and sign an association agreement with the EU was seen by Russia as a threat to its interests, as membership in these institutions would bring Ukraine closer to the West. Theorists coming from a liberal perspective might argue that Russia's misgivings helped fuel the conflict that broke out between Russia and Ukraine in 2014.

Constructivist Interpretations of the Causes of War

Constructivists focus significant attention on the role of identities in international relations. Identities shape a state's interests, and thus influence its foreign policy goals and the tactics and strategies it uses to advance those goals. In this way, identities can influence whether a state is likely to be more aggressive or

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more restrained in how it pursues its foreign policy. For example, contrast the foreign policies of Switzerland and North Korea. Switzerland does not focus on military might or aggression. It identifies itself as a neutral actor in the international system, and its policy pursuits reflect this. Switzerland remained neutral in both world wars and has chosen not to join many international institutions. It did not even join the United Nations until 2002. In contrast, North Korea identifies itself in the post–Cold War period as the key "anti-imperialist, socialist bulwark" standing in opposition to the United States.[12] Its aggressive foreign policy, which centers on the defiance of international norms and development of nuclear weapons, is directly connected to this belligerent identity.[13] These contrasting identities make the likelihood that these states would become involved in a war quite different.

There is also a relational aspect to identities. The way one state views another state is shaped in important ways by the interactions that they have had. These interactions create perceptions of similarities and differences between states. Rather than pure military power, these perceptions and the identities they create influence the potential for war between different states. One state could be seen as an ally and not a threat, even if it is a militarily powerful state. Another state could be seen as an adversary even if it has fewer capabilities. For example, Canada might fear that North Korea is more of a threat than the United States, even though the United States has greater relative power than North Korea has, possesses nuclear weapons, and actually shares a border with Canada, which would make an invasion relatively simple. The difference in identities is what makes one state seem more threatening than another. So where do these identities come from?

Ideas are an important component in the construction of identities. The idea of the right to self-determination—the right of a people to determine its own future political status—contributes to the formation of common and conflicting identities and the outbreak of war. This is most clearly evident in the wars to end colonial rule in the mid-twentieth century. Examples include the 1945–50 Indonesian struggle for independence from the Netherlands and the 1945–54 Vietnamese war against France. Conflicts over self-determination have continued long since decolonization. For example, South Sudan fought a civil conflict with Sudan for over two decades, gaining its independence in 2011. Some conflicts for self-determination even continue today, as is the case with Chechnya in Russia.

Nationalism provides another example of the role ideas play in influencing war. The idea of nationalism has led to the creation of conflicting identities among nations throughout history. These conflicting identities have contributed to many wars. Ideas and identity can also be manipulated by elites to pursue their own individual goals through violence (i.e., war). Adolf Hitler used nationalism as a key

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THEORY IN BRIEF

Causes of War

Theoretical Perspective	Highlighted Causes of War
Realism	Anarchy of the international system Distribution of power in the system Power transitions
Liberalism	Lack of democratic institutions/values Lack of interdependence Lack of shared institutions
Constructivism	Aggressive state identities Divergent identities Possession of belligerent ideas

motivating factor in Germany's actions in World War II. Slobodan Milošević used nationalism to create a sense of common identity among ethnic Serbians from the various republics of Yugoslavia, as well as a sense that their identity stood in contrast to the identities of other ethnicities. This nationalism fueled war and even, arguably, genocide. As one U.S. ambassador described Milošević's manipulation of nationalist sentiments among Serbs, "He is very successful in manipulating Serbian nationalism to stay in power. If there was serious peace and prosperity, he would not survive very long."[14] Overall, ideas and identities can play a central role in instigating conflict.

PREVENTING WAR AND MANAGING STATE SECURITY

With an understanding of the causes of war, we can begin to discuss how to prevent war. The different international relations perspectives offer different analyses of how war might be prevented.

Realist Approaches to Preventing War

Realist approaches to managing security stem from the fact that for realists, war is a necessary condition of interstate politics: it can be managed but never eradicated.

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Classical realists, ranging from Thucydides to Hobbes to Hans Morgenthau, argued that human nature made transcending war unlikely. Neorealists replaced the emphasis on human nature with an emphasis on structure, arguing that war will be a permanent feature of interstate politics so long as anarchy persists. While approaching the issue from different angles, neorealists effectively share the pessimism of classical realists: as a prominent feature of interstate politics, war can never be transcended.

Although realism imagines war as an enduring feature of international politics, realists advance important arguments about how to decrease the frequency of war, as well as the intensity of war when it does break out. Power balancing and deterrence are two such approaches.

Power Balancing

In Chapter 3, we saw that a balance of power is a particular configuration of the distribution of power in the international system. But theorists use the terms in other ways as well. *Balance of power* may refer to an equilibrium between any two parties, and *balancing power* may describe an approach to managing power and state security. The latter usage is relevant here.

The core logic of power balancing is simple: when power is unbalanced, stronger states will be tempted to use their advantage to go to war with weaker states in order to secure more power. The greater the imbalance, the greater the stronger state's temptation to do so. For the stronger actor, the costs and risks of war seem low in comparison to potential gains, thus making war a rational strategy. But when aggressive, insecure, power-seeking states face others with relatively equal power, they are likely to be more hesitant to go to war because the costs of war are more likely to exceed the expected benefits.

Balance-of-power theorists therefore posit that states make rational and calculated evaluations of the costs and benefits of particular policies that determine the state's role in a balance of power. All states in the system are continually making choices to maintain their position vis-à-vis their adversaries, thereby maintaining a balance of power.

Alliances are the most important institutional tool for enhancing one's own security and balancing the perceived power potential of one's opponent. If an expanding state seems poised to achieve a dominant position, upsetting the current balance of power, threatened states can join with others against the expanding state. For example, when Germany's power rose in the lead-up to World War II, the United States and United Kingdom allied with Russia to balance against it, despite the rivalry between them.

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GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Going Nuclear: A View from North Korea

For decades, North Korean leaders have been developing a nuclear weapons program. By 2017, the program had produced a hydrogen bomb and an ICBM that North Korea argued was capable of reaching U.S. territory. The international community has reacted with condemnation, placing increasing levels of sanctions on North Korea. Why, if the program has such negative consequences, do North Korean leaders continue?

The development of North Korea's nuclear program has raised several problems for its leaders. The program is expensive, requiring North Korean leaders to spend a significant portion of the state's budget on it. From 2004 to 2014, North Korea spent almost 25 percent of its GDP on the military—the highest percentage of military spending relative to GDP of any country. With spending so focused on the military, few funds have been dedicated to providing food aid for the people, despite the country facing a critical food shortage.

This problem has been exacerbated by the increasing levels of economic sanctions that have been placed on North Korea in response to its nuclear program. These sanctions have hit the lower class the hardest. As this class already faces extreme poverty, their growing discontent with ruling elites who have remained wealthy despite these sanctions has forced the leaders of North Korea to strengthen their control and surveillance over the population, as well as to increase oppression and crackdowns.

The sanctions have also spurred the growth of an illicit economy in North Korea, with many residents beginning to support themselves through smuggling. The regime has reacted to the growth of the illicit economy by strengthening the penalties against acts associated with them. North Korean leaders even attempted a currency reform to wipe out the capital of the traders participating in the illicit economy. However, the reform unsettled the lives of many North Koreans and contributed to a surge in inflation. Overall, a growing number of people believe they are paying the price for a nuclear program that does not benefit them in any way. Why, then, do North Korean leaders continue to pursue their nuclear ambitions, given that the program is creating these domestic problems?

North Korean leaders face two other problems that have led them to continue their nuclear program despite its negative effects. First, in the face of the severe food shortage, North Korean leaders have been able to leverage their nuclear program to obtain food aid, helping them deal with the crisis without having to spend their own funds. On several occasions, North Korean leaders have stated that they would give up their nuclear ambitions in return for such aid. For example, in 2012, it announced that it would suspend its nuclear activities and stop its missile tests in exchange for food aid. This action, however, was quickly reversed once North Korea received the aid it desired. Its nuclear program remains a bargaining chip that North Korean leaders can continue to use in the future to obtain food aid and other possible types of concessions.

Second, and more importantly, North Korean leaders want to remain in power, and current geopolitics threatens their ability to do so. For North Korean leaders, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the 2011 NATO inter-

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North Korean leader King Jong-Un inspects nuclear machinery.

vention in Libya against Muammar Qaddafi demonstrated the United States' willingness to invade enemy states and overthrow their governments. North Korean leaders are highly concerned about this problem. Their choice is to either bandwagon or balance, or else face the possibility of being invaded and deposed.

North Korea's leaders cannot bandwagon with the United States without sacrificing their political legitimacy. Indeed, they frame their image as leading North Korea to be an important socialist barrier standing up in opposition to U.S. "imperialism." This political image would lose credibility if they were to bandwagon. The alternative, therefore, is to balance. According to one expert, "The lesson North Koreans learned from the [U.S.] invasion of Iraq was that if Saddam Hussein really possessed those weapons of mass destruction, he might have survived."[a] In other words, balancing could have worked for Saddam. Because North Korea's nuclear program serves to balance against U.S. power with a credible threat to use nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies, North Korean leaders believe the program helps deter military invasion.

Despite the costs, North Korean leaders' continued development of their nuclear program is rational. The effectiveness of their balancing efforts is illustrated by U.S. President Donald Trump's willingness to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un in June 2018 after almost a decade of no contact between the two countries' leaders. Whether North Korea will abandon its nuclear program in return for U.S. assurances of North Korean security remains to be seen. Some observers say that even if North Korea continues its nuclear program, the Kim-Trump meeting elevated Kim and North Korea in the eyes of the world.

a. John Delury, quoted in Stephen Evans, "Is North Korea's Leader Kim Jong-un Rational?" BBC News, March 18, 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39269783 (accessed 12/11/17)

FOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS

1. Do you think North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is rational? Why or why not?
2. What would liberal theorists recommend states do to stop North Korea's nuclear program? Do you think that solution would work? What about a realist solution?
3. Do you think that the geopolitical reasoning underlying North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is justified? Why or why not?

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Balancing power can be applied at both the international and regional level. At the international level, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a relative balance of power during the Cold War. If one of the superpowers augmented its power through the expansion of its alliances or through the acquisition of deadlier, more effective military weapons, the other responded in kind. Absolute gains were not as critical as relative gains; no matter how much total power one state accrued, neither state could afford to fall behind the other. Gaining allies among uncommitted states in the developing countries through foreign aid or military and diplomatic intervention was one way to ensure the superpowers balanced power. Not maintaining the power balance was too risky a strategy since both sides believed that their national survival was at stake.

Balances of power among states in specific geographic regions are also a way to manage state security. In South Asia, for example, a balance of power maintains a tense peace between India and Pakistan. In East Asia, Japan's alliance with the United States creates a balance of power with China. In Central Asia, the newly independent states created after the breakup of the Soviet Union are struggling for their position within a newly emerging regional balance of power that includes both Russia and China. In the Middle East, a complex set of overlapping balances has developed across different issue areas. At one level, the economically rich, oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia are balanced against the economically poor states of the core Middle East. At another level, a balance exists between Islamic militants (Iran), moderates (Egypt, Tunisia), and conservatives (Saudi Arabia).

Some realist theorists assert that balancing power is the most important technique for managing state security. It is compatible with human nature and the nature of the state, which is to act to protect one's self-interest by maintaining one's power position relative to that of others. If a state seeks preponderance through military acquisitions or offensive actions, then war against that state is acceptable under the balance-of-power system. If all states act similarly, the balance can be preserved without war.

One major limitation of the balance-of-power approach, however, is its requirement that states view established friendships with allies as expendable in times of change. According to the theory, should power shift, alliances should also shift to maintain the balance—regardless of friendship. But as liberals and constructivists observe, states exist in a kind of society and they resist giving up their "friends," even when power shifts. This idea may explain why, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, long-standing U.S. allies such as Britain did not abandon their alliance with the United States, even though the bipolar balance of power had collapsed.

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Deterrence

The *mechanism* that enables a balance of power to sustain peace is deterrence. At its most basic level, and as discussed in Chapter 5, deterrence is the manipulation of fear to prevent an unwanted action. As discussed in the context of power transition theory, when a rapidly rising state threatens the status quo distribution of power, its confidence of victory may tempt it to war. However, when power is balanced and no one state has a significant military advantage, fear of being defeated in war is expected to keep aggressive states from attacking in the first place. Deterrence is the means by which balancing power works to help states manage state security.

Deterrence theory posits that the credible *threat* of the use of force can prevent violence such as war. In its 2002 National Security Strategy, for example, the United States made the threat explicit for those who may pursue global terrorism. The United States wrote that it will defend "the United States, the American people, our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our border. . . . We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country."[15]

As initially developed, deterrence theory is based on several key assumptions.[16] First, the theory assumes that rational decision makers want to avoid resorting to war in situations in which the anticipated cost of aggression is greater than the expected gain. Second, the theory assumes that nuclear weapons—one particularly intense form of harm—pose an unacceptable risk of mutual destruction, and thus decision makers will not initiate armed aggression against a nuclear state. Third, the theory assumes that alternatives to war are available to decision makers, irrespective of the issue of contention.

For deterrence to work, then, states must form alliances or build up their arsenals to present a credible threat of retaliation if attacked. Information regarding the threat must be conveyed to the opponent. Knowing that a damaging reaction will counter an aggressive action, the opponent will decide not to resort to force and thereby destroy its own society.

As logical as deterrence sounds, and as effective as it seemed during the Cold War—after all, no nuclear war occurred between the superpowers—the very assumptions on which deterrence is based are frequently subject to challenge. Are all top decision makers rational? Might not one individual or a group of individuals risk destruction in deciding to launch a first strike? Might some states be willing to sacrifice a large number of people, as Germany's Adolf Hitler, Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, and Iraq's Saddam Hussein were willing to do in the past? How do states credibly convey information about their true capabilities to a potential

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IN FOCUS

Assumptions of Deterrence Theory

- Decision makers are rational.
- The likelihood of escalation to mutual destruction from warfare is high.
- Alternatives to war are available.
- Attempts to deter insecure states may backfire.

adversary? Should they? Or would it make more sense to bluff or to lie? For states without nuclear weapons, or for states with nuclear weapons that are launching an attack against a non-nuclear state, the risks of war may seem acceptable: when one's own society is unlikely to be threatened with destruction (as in most asymmetric conflicts), deterrence is more likely to fail.

The rise of terrorism conducted by nonstate actors also appears to decrease the possibility that deterrence will work. Because nonstate actors do not hold territory, the threat to destroy such territory in a retaliatory strike cannot be a potent deterrent. Flexible networks—such as Al Qaeda—spread over different geographic areas, rather than an organizational hierarchy located within a particular state, make eliminating those networks very difficult. The increasing willingness of some groups to use suicide terrorism to achieve their objectives has made the logic of deterrence appear particularly shaky. Deterrence depends on the calculation that rational actors will never deliberately act to invite costly reprisals, yet suicide terrorists are willing to sacrifice their own lives. Since loss of life has traditionally been thought of as the highest of all costs, suicide terrorism appears to render deterrence meaningless.

Some realists counter this argument by highlighting the important role that states play in aiding nonstate actors such as terrorists. States can deter other states from doing so through the threat of punishment, holding complicit or negligent states accountable for the actions taken by nonstate actors. This, some realists argue, can help deter states from aiding violent nonstate actors, and thus prevent those nonstate actors from being able to use violence in the first place. Deterrence, they argue, can still work.

Realist approaches to managing state security rely mainly on fear, but as we have seen, they also imagine power in almost purely material terms. To the extent that changing norms or a rise in the power of ideas has changed world politics, can realist approaches to managing state security continue to be effective?

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Liberal Approaches to Preventing War

Unlike realists, liberals have a theory that imagines a world without war. The core logic of the liberal position acknowledges the structural constraint of anarchy and accepts state insecurity as an important factor motivating interstate relations. However, liberal theorists argue that states seeking power, including economic power, will be led by self-interest into successively deeper and broader cooperation with other states, even if at times that cooperation is punctuated by war. Over time, cooperation may be institutionalized, making war less and less likely. Liberals also focus on the nature of a state's political system, arguing that, in contrast to the realist view, there are essentially "good" (democratic and economically open) and "bad" (authoritarian and economically closed) states. Over time, the rewards that accrue to good states will create pressures and incentives on more and more bad states to become responsible partners in the international system. Given these theoretical underpinnings, liberal approaches to managing state security call on the international community or international institutions (both organizations and treaties) to coordinate actions to reduce the likelihood and destructiveness of war. Two of those strategies are collective security and arms control agreements.

The Collective Security Ideal

Collective security is captured in the old adage "one for all and all for one." It posits that, in an effort to stop the aggressive and unlawful use of force by one state against another, unlawful aggression will be met by united action: all (or many) states will unite against the aggressor. Potential aggressors will know this fact ahead of time, and thus will choose not to act.

Collective security makes several fundamental assumptions.[17] One assumption is that the collective benefit of peace outweighs the individual benefits of war, even a successful war. Another assumption is that aggressors—no matter who they are, friends or foes—must be stopped. This assumption presumes that other members of the international community can easily identify the aggressor. Collective security also assumes moral clarity: the aggressor is morally wrong because all aggressors are morally wrong, and all those who are right must act in unison to meet the aggression. Finally, collective security assumes that aggressors know that the international community will act to punish an aggressor.

Of course, this idea is none other than deterrence, but with a twist. If all countries know that the international community will punish aggression, then would-be aggressors will be deterred from engaging in aggressive activity. The twist is

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that in liberal theory, states are more likely to calculate their interests collectively as shared interests than to calculate their interests individually, as in the realist view. The threat that deters potential aggressors comes from united action by the international community rather than from a singular more powerful state itself. But for collective security to work, the threat to take action must be credible, and there must be cohesion among all the potential enforcers.

Collective security does not always work. In the period between the two world wars, despite the existence of the League of Nations, which was designed to implement collective security, Japan invaded Manchuria and Italy overran Ethiopia. In neither case did other states act as if it was in their collective interest to respond. Were Manchuria and Ethiopia really worth a world war? In these instances, collective security did not work because, as realists assert, the states capable of acting to halt the violence (particularly Britain and France) did not have sufficient national interest in doing so, especially when the threat of another war with Germany seemed increasingly likely.

Collective security may also fail due to the fact that aggressors are not always easily identified. In 1967, Israel launched an armed attack against Egypt, clearly an act of aggression. The week before, however, Egypt had blocked Israeli access to the Red Sea, kicked the UN out of Sinai, and, in combination with Syria and Jordan, moved hundreds of tanks and planes closer to Israel. Clearly these, too, were acts of aggression. Twenty years earlier, the state of Israel had been carved out of Arab territory. That, too, was an act of aggression. Where does the aggression "begin"? The George W. Bush administration argued in 2003 that its invasion of Iraq was a preemptive war because Saddam Hussein was preparing to operationalize and possibly use a nuclear weapon (or transfer one to a terrorist group). So who is the aggressor?

Furthermore, even if an aggressor can be identified, is that party always morally wrong? Due to an understandable fixation on the individual and collective costs of war, collective-security theorists argue, by definition, yes. Yet others would argue that trying to right a previous wrong is not necessarily wrong; trying to make just a prior injustice is not always unjust.

Arms Control and Disarmament

Arms control and **disarmament** schemes have been the hope of many liberals over the years since the first Hague Convention of 1899. Since the nineteenth century, hundreds of treaties have been created that limit the militarization of the polar regions and space, that limit the types of weapons that may be used, and that even limit the testing and development of certain weapons (such as nuclear weapons) in the first place. Two features of these developments are particularly striking: (1)

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most signatories to these treaties actually abide by their treaty obligations, and (2) many signatories have been of an avowedly "realist" orientation. This is counter-intuitive because, as observed in Chapter 3, realists tend to conflate security with power, defined in terms of the capacity to do physical harm. Yet even at the very first Hague Convention in 1899, realist states such as Germany, France, Britain, and Russia all found themselves agreeing to limit the quantity and quality of arms they would manufacture and employ in war. Whatever the rationale for reductions in each individual case, the logic of this approach to security is both powerful and straightforward: fewer weapons means greater security. Regulating arms proliferation (arms control) and reducing the number of arms and limiting the types of weapons employed (disarmament) should logically reduce the problem of the security dilemma.

During the Cold War, many arms control agreements were negotiated to reduce the threat of nuclear war. Through a series of agreements, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit the development of particular types of weapons, and in some cases to reduce their arsenals. Since the end of the Cold War and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, new arms control agreements continue to be negotiated between the United States and Russia. These arms control agreements are a success story for liberals.

Yet the actual enforcement of these agreements is difficult. Russia has repeatedly violated the arms control treaties agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States. For example, in 2014 it tested a cruise missile in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The United States tried to persuade Russia to end the program while the missile was still in its test phase. Instead, Russia continued to develop the system, deploying a fully operational unit in 2017. Without strict enforcement rules, such violations of arms control agreements are not surprising.

More importantly, the logic of arms control agreements is not impeccable. While arms control might lessen the security dilemma, as some liberal theorists argue, it does not eliminate it. A state can still feel insecure if its enemy has greater relative military capabilities than it does, regardless of the absolute level of capabilities. For example, in early 2017 North Korea launched four missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons into seas off South Korea and Japan. In response, Hwang Kyo-ahn, the acting president of South Korea, called for the early deployment in South Korea of an American missile defense system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense). The United States and South Korea agreed to complete the THAAD deployment within the year to protect South Korea and the American military sites within it from North Korean missiles. However, China argued that THAAD would undermine its own nuclear deterrent possibilities. Even if the goal of THAAD's development was to protect against North Korea (not China), the growth in military

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capabilities of South Korea would make China less secure. Those capabilities could still be used against it. The security dilemma is still alive and well.

The complete disarmament envisioned by liberal thinkers is unlikely given how risky it would be. Unilateral disarmament would place disarmed states in a highly insecure position, and cheaters could be rewarded. But incremental disarmament—as outlined in the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons—remains a possibility. However, the increasing sophistication and miniaturization of chemical and biological weapons make them difficult to detect, so it is hard to guarantee compliance. Liberals place their faith in a combination of the self-interest of states (these programs are expensive) and international institutions. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency was created to monitor adherence to disarmament schemes. Its track record, however, is spotty at best.

Constructivist Approaches to Preventing War

Constructivists do not necessarily have a theoretical "answer" for how to prevent war. However, their focus on ideas, identities, and norms can provide important insights into the question.

Constructivists' focus on identities that are socially constructed through state interactions suggests that these identities can change as state interactions change. Cooperation could therefore arise between states that previously had been in conflict. One important example of this type of phenomenon is the interaction among the states of Europe. Two major wars—World Wars I and II—were fought on the Continent in the early and mid-twentieth century. Yet today, the same states involved in those wars are engaged in arguably the deepest level of cooperation between states in the international system: the European Union. Constructivists argue that institutions like the EU can create and regulate certain types of interactions that, over time, can influence states' perceptions of their identities and their understandings of self and others.[18] States can thus become socialized to different methods of interaction, making war highly unlikely. Indeed, although France and Germany have fought multiple wars against each other, few would argue that a war is likely to break out between these states today.

Socialization to certain norms against various aspects of military conflict is another path that constructivists might highlight as a way to reduce conflict. For example, antipersonnel land mines and cluster munitions were important tools of war for many decades. However, a campaign was taken up in the early 1990s pressuring states to ban their use because of their nondiscriminatory nature and the significant harm they inflict on noncombatants. Over time, states became socialized to these ideas, and in 1997 a treaty was created banning the use of land mines and

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THEORY IN BRIEF

Approaches to Preventing War

Theoretical Perspective	Possible Ways to Prevent War
Realism	Power balancing Deterrence
Liberalism	Collective security Arms control and disarmament
Constructivism	Socialization to cooperative norms Changing identities Spread of norms delegitimizing war

calling for the destruction of those already built. To date, 164 states have become party to the treaty. What was once an important tool of war became taboo for most states in the international system. The norm is not perfect, however, as several states, including the United States, have not joined the treaty.

A norm against the use of nuclear weapons has also spread throughout the international system. In 1968, a treaty on nuclear nonproliferation, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), was negotiated. In force since 1970, the NPT spells out the rules of nuclear proliferation. Signatory countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire or develop them. States that do have nuclear weapons promise not to transfer the technology to non-nuclear states and to eventually dismantle their own. Showing the importance of this treaty and the spread of the nonproliferation norm, three states that previously had nuclear weapons programs—South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina—dismantled their programs in the 1990s and became parties to the treaty. In addition, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons left on their territory after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As with many norms, however, adherence is not perfect. Several key nuclear states and threshold non-nuclear states remain outside the treaty, including India, Israel, and Pakistan. North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003 and has continued with its nuclear weapons development program.

Norms regarding the legitimacy of war have also spread. As discussed below, for war to be legitimate, it must be either an act of self-defense or authorized by the UN Security Council. If states abide by the desire to take legitimate actions and do not just choose to enter into war whenever they feel it is in their interest, the prevalence of war is likely to be reduced. Demonstrating the existence of the legitimacy norm, instead of simply going to war in Iraq in 2003, the United States approached the UN Security Council for authorization to use force against Iraq. If

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the norm were not in existence, there would be little explanation for this action by the United States. However, although the UN Security Council did not grant the authorization, the United States still went to war in Iraq. Whether or not this norm of legitimacy actually does constrain state behavior, and can thus help prevent war, is therefore still an open question.

"LAWS OF WAR" AND STATE SECURITY

War is not always "illegal"; in some cases, war might be justified. The question, then, is, when is it legal for states to go to war, and when is it not? And what actions are states allowed to take in war, and what are they not allowed to do? Two categories of international law are designed to deal with this issue. The first type, ***jus ad bellum***, deals with the question of when it is legal to go to war. Once the decision to go to war has been made, the second type, ***jus in bello***, deals with the question of what acts are considered legal and illegal when fighting the war.

Jus ad Bellum

Normative political theorists draw our attention to the classical "just war tradition." Although just war theory is a Western and Christian doctrine dating from medieval times, it draws on ancient Greek philosophy and precepts found in the Koran. As developed by Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, and more recently the political philosopher Michael Walzer, just war theory asserts that several criteria can make the decision to enter a war a just one.[19] There must be a just cause (self-defense or the defense of others) and a declaration of intent by a competent authority. The leaders need to have the correct intentions, desiring to end abuses and establish a just peace. They also need to have exhausted all other possibilities for ending the abuse, going to war only as a last resort. Finally, forces must be removed rapidly after the objectives have been secured. Because states choose war for a variety of reasons, however, it is rarely easy to assess the justness of a particular cause or of particular intentions.

In modern times, these ideas have been codified into international law in the UN Charter (1945). In general, using force against another sovereign state (i.e., war) is not legal under international law. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter explicitly states that states may not use force against each other: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

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There are, however, two conditions under which this general ban on the use of force against another state can be violated legally under international law. If either of these two conditions is met, it is considered legal for a state to use force against another state.

First, Article 51 of the UN Charter allows a state to use force against another state when acting in self-defense. It reads, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." So Poland's use of force in response to Germany's invasion in September 1939 at the beginning of World War II would not be considered illegal under international law today, as it would have fallen under the category of self-defense as defined by the UN Charter.

Controversy exists as to whether "preemptive self-defense" falls under this category. For example, the United States justified the 2003 Iraq War as preemptive self-defense based on the belief that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction that it could use against the United States. However, many people argue that the idea of preemptive self-defense against a hypothetical potential future attack has no basis in international law.

It is also questionable whether a state can use force against another in the name of self-defense if the reason for going to war is not that an act of aggression by the other state has taken place, but that the government of the other state has not suppressed a threat to the first state. This issue has arisen, for example, in the case of Syria. The United States asserted that Iraq had a valid right of self-defense against the Islamic State in Syria because the IS was attacking Iraq from its havens in Syria, and the Syrian government had failed to suppress that threat. Because Iraq asked the United States for assistance in defending itself, the United States asserted that its air and drone strikes in Syria were legal. These types of questions about the legality of the use of force with regard to self-defense continue to be debated.

A second article in the Charter, Article 42, allows a state to attack another state if the attack is authorized by the UN Security Council. Article 42 reads: "Should

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Jus ad Bellum (When It Is Legal to Go to War)

- When acting in self-defense
- DEBATED: When acting in preemptive self-defense
- When given permission by UN Security Council
- DEBATED: When another state fails to suppress a threat to one's own state

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the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [measures not involving the use of armed force to attempt to resolve the dispute] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." For example, in the 1991 Gulf War, the UN Security Council passed a resolution allowing a joint, multicountry force (led by the United States) to use military means to remove Iraq from Kuwait after it had invaded the country.

Jus in Bello

The just war tradition also addresses legitimate conduct in war (known as *jus in bello*). Such legitimate conduct requires several qualifications, each an important pillar of just war theory. First, combatants and noncombatants must be differentiated, with noncombatants protected from harm as much as possible—hence the principle of noncombatant immunity. Second, the means of violence used must be proportionate to the ends to be achieved—the principle of proportionality. Finally, unnecessary human suffering should be avoided at all costs. This third qualification led to the banning of the use of particularly heinous weapons.

Many of these central norms of the just war tradition were codified into legally binding treaties. In 1899 and 1907 the Hague Conventions were created to regulate methods of warfare, and in 1949 four Geneva Conventions (and their two subsequent protocols in 1977) were created to regulate the protection of noncombatants, including civilians, prisoners of war, and injured soldiers. Many other treaties have followed, targeting new and more specific aspects of just war norms. For example, because mustard gas caused especially cruel deaths during World War I, its use was subsequently outlawed, paving the way for future chemical and biological warfare conventions. Together these treaties provide the basis for international humanitarian law.

Contemporary debates surround the question of how newer killing technologies—nuclear weapons, land mines, cluster munitions, fuel air explosives, and drone strikes—affect our assessments of moral and ethical conduct during war. This question arises because in many cases, these new technologies challenge our ability to uphold the norms of the just war tradition. For example, the use of nuclear weapons has been viewed as a just war concern for two reasons. First, unlike with most conventional weapons, the destructive effects of nuclear weapons are impossible to restrict in time and space. The Japanese government estimates that over 250,000 deaths, mostly of civilians, can be directly attributed to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This violates the first pillar of just war theory—the principle of noncombatant immunity. Second, the destructive potential of

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Israeli drone strikes in Palestine have destroyed the homes and lives of many noncombatants. Should drones be used for warfare when they often harm civilian communities?

contemporary thermonuclear weapons is unprecedented. No one can say for certain what the impact of even a limited exchange of such weapons might be on the global ecosystem. An all-out exchange, in which hundreds of such weapons were deliberately detonated, might end all life on the planet, damage the atmosphere, or plunge the earth into an extended "nuclear winter." Thus, the proportionality of means and ends—the second pillar of just war theory—would be violated.

Other weapons have also come under fire under the "nondiscriminatory nature" theory of unjust war. Two of particular note include antipersonnel land mines and cluster munitions. Although land mines were originally viewed as legitimate weapons, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has succeeded in shifting perceptions of these weapons by emphasizing—as with other weapons of mass destruction—the indiscriminate effect of their capacity to harm. They pose a threat to the safety of civilians long after a war has ended. In 2008, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was signed, banning and providing assistance for clearing weapons with a high potential to harm noncombatants. The campaigns against antipersonnel land mines and cluster munitions reflect growing pressure to restrict or eliminate the use of various weapons and practices in accordance with just war principles. Constructivists can rightly cite the power of norms and socialization to alter the behavior (and identity) of both state and nonstate actors in this regard.

Another recent debate regarding morals and ethics in war has surfaced due to advances in the use of drones and drone strikes. Initially, drones were used to provide surveillance over combat areas without risking pilots and expensive aircraft. But the tactics they are used for have changed radically in recent years.

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IN FOCUS

Jus in Bello (Legal Requirements When Engaged in War)

- Combatants and noncombatants must be differentiated.
- Noncombatants must be protected from harm as much as possible (noncombatant immunity).
- The means of violence used must be proportionate to the ends to be achieved (proportionality).
- Unnecessary human suffering should be avoided at all costs.

Many U.S. drones are armed with missiles that operators can aim and launch from thousands of miles away, sometimes killing civilians as well as combatants. In July 2016, the United States estimated that outside conventional war zones, 2,372 to 2,581 combatants and 64 to 116 civilians have been killed in its drone strikes since 2009. These numbers are debated, however, and several independent organizations have estimated that anywhere from 200 to 800 civilians have been killed.[20]

Drone strikes thus raise the questions of noncombatant immunity and proportionality. Most of those targeted do not wear uniforms, nor do they formally serve a state, and the process by which U.S. intelligence agencies determine targets remains classified. Also, is the harm caused by drone missile strikes controlled so that noncombatant immunity is ensured to the greatest degree possible?

Cyberwarfare and Just War

Cyberwarfare has added a new dimension to the question of "just" war. In particular, the question is whether a cyberattack is prohibited under international law and under what conditions a cyberattack can justify legal retaliation in self-defense. First, the UN Charter's general prohibition on war is framed in terms of a prohibition on the "threat or use of force." Second, the UN Charter allows for retaliation in self-defense when "an armed attack occurs" against a state. Does a cyberattack constitute a "use of force" or an "armed attack?" Are there certain conditions when it does and certain conditions when it does not? If so, what are those conditions? The centrality of this debate in international politics today was evident when a prominent legal scholar was asked to testify before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2017 "to address some of the international law questions most relevant to cyber threats and U.S. strategy. These include whether and when a cyber-attack amounts to an 'act of war,' or, more precisely, an 'armed attack' triggering a right of self-defense."[21]

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Three main positions have been put forward in the debate about cyberattacks and the right of self-defense under international law.[22] On one extreme, the "instrument-based" approach argues that a cyberattack will almost never be an armed attack because it does not have the physical characteristics of "traditional military coercion." A cyberattack can therefore only count as an armed attack if it uses military weapons. Such attacks might include bombings of computer servers or cables, but not attacks actually arising in cyberspace. On the other extreme, the "target-based" approach classifies any cyberattack that targets a sufficiently important computer system as an armed attack. In other words, a cyberattack counts as an armed attack when it penetrates any critical national infrastructure system. It would thus count as an armed attack regardless of whether it caused any physical destruction or casualties. This opens up a wide range of cyberactions that could trigger the use of force against a state acting in self-defense, and this approach is often criticized because following it could make war more likely. Falling between these two extreme positions, the "effects-based" approach classifies a cyberattack as an armed attack based on the "gravity" of its effects. This is the most mainstream of the three approaches. Debate, however, continues. The main issue is how to define what types of effects trigger the right to act in self-defense before an attack has occurred, and how to do so in a way that can be applied consistently. These questions remain unanswered, and debates are widespread among international relations scholars, legal scholars, and foreign policy makers. Indeed, disagreement regarding how cybersecurity fits in international law with regard to the use of force is the central reason why the UN Group of Governmental Experts could not reach an agreement in its 2017 meeting. These debates about cyberwarfare and *jus ad bellum* will likely continue for years to come.

Cyberwarfare also adds complications to the question of legal actions with regard to permissible conduct during war—*jus in bello.* First, a debate exists about cyberwarfare and noncombatant immunity. On the one hand, cyberattacks need to be spread to be effective. This creates a risk of affecting noncombatants, even though they might not be targeted. Moreover, because government and civilian networks are so interconnected, restricting attacks to military targets may not always be possible. For example, the Stuxnet worm was intended to target Iranian nuclear processing facilities but spread far beyond its intended targets. Some cyberattacks are even specifically designed to attack civilians and civilian industries and facilities. Cyberattacks are also known to have psychological effects. They cause significant anxiety and often influence rational political thinking, so much so that some argue that even if they do not cause physical harm, cyberattacks inevitably violate the principle of noncombatant immunity. On the other hand, others argue that cyberattacks can actually decrease the casualties suffered by noncombatants because they put noncombatants at less risk than physical wars do. Collateral

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damage may be decreased because cyberattacks can be more discriminatory than physical war. Using cyberwarfare instead of physical warfare may therefore save more noncombatants than it harms. For example, John Arquilla argues that during the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, "while there was little doubt about who would win that war, the Georgians would almost surely have fought longer and harder than the five days the conflict lasted had their command capabilities not been so seriously disrupted [by the Russian cyberattacks]." The attack therefore helped avoid greater physical violence.[23]

Second, cyberwarfare also raises the issue of proportionality. In cyberwarfare, as we have seen, the results are often unpredictable. Ensuring proportionality of an attack is therefore difficult. Moreover, because it is difficult to know what the actual effects of an attack are, and even harder to assess an attack's intended effects and the actual source of an attack, it is also difficult to judge the level of response to a cyberattack that would be proportional. Is a military attack in response to a cyberattack a proportional response? What if the attack was not carried out by a government? If so, is responding with an attack against a state proportional? Cyberwarfare raises many new questions and debates about how a "just war" can be fought today.

IN SUM: INTERNATIONAL AND STATE SECURITY TODAY

National security and conflict between states (of various forms) is a principal topic in the study of international relations today. Conflicts can occur between states, within states, and even in cyberspace. Understanding the causes of these conflicts, as well as the steps that can be taken to ensure national security, is therefore of central importance to policy makers and international relations scholars.

However, states are not always engaged in conflict. They can (and often do) cooperate. They sign treaties, they create and work together in institutions, and they negotiate ends to conflict. In addition to focusing on conflict, studying *cooperation* between states is therefore also important in the study of international relations. We turn to this issue in the next chapter.

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