PHILOSOPHY ASSIGNMENT

“Thomas Hobbes” Taken from “Great Traditions In Ethics” 8th ed.

Wadsworth

1. The elements of Hobbes' psychological theory are presented in a set of principles that govern

the various “motions” of the human mind.

There be in animals, two sorts of motions peculiar to them: one called vital; begun in generation,

and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the blood,

the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc., to which motions there needs

no help of imagination; the other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion; as to go,

to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense of

motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see,

hear, etc.; and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense, has been

already said in the first and second chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary

motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident,

that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although

unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible;

or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that

such motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space,

whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion,

within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible

actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOR.

This endeavor, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or

DESIRE; the latter, being the general name; and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the

desire of food, namely hunger and thirst. And when the endeavor is fromward something, it is

generally called AVERSION. These words, appetite and aversion, we have from the Latins; and

they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. . . . For nature

itself does often press upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat

beyond nature, they stumble at. For the schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual

motion at all: but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion;

which is but an absurd speech: for though words may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions

cannot.

That which men desire, they are also said to LOVE: and to HATE those things for which

they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire, we always

signify the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by

aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object.

Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food, appetite of

excretion, and exoneration, which may also and more properly be called aversions, from

somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some other appetites, not many. The rest, which are

appetites of particular things, proceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon themselves

or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further

desire, than to taste and try. But aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt

us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, nor not.

Those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are said to contemn; CONTEMPT

being nothing else by an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain

things; and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent

objects; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible

that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversions: much less

can call men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object.

2. Hobbes interprets the traditional ethical concepts, “good” and “evil,” in terms of this

mechanistic psychological theory.

But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth

good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable.

For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that

useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil,

to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves.

3. For people in a presocial state, the desires and aversions that underlie their judgments of good

and evil are directed toward their primary objective, self-preservation. Hobbes terms continual

success in preserving oneself felicity or happiness. Various objects of desire—that is, goods such

as friendship, riches, and intelligence—promote this felicity. Friends are good because they

come to our defense when we are in difficulties; riches are good because they buy the allies we

need for our security; intelligence is good because it alerts us to danger.

When the objects of desire are examined from the point of view of effectiveness in

promoting felicity, they are termed powers. Hobbes ascribes to humans in their natural state a

general tendency to “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in

death.” When several persons desire the same object, enmity arises; and because nature endows

them equally with the various mental and physical powers, the personal confidence that each one

feels intensifies the likelihood of conflict.

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be

found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet

when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as

that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as

well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest,

either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with

himself.

And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and

especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, called science; which very

few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, as

prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that

of strength. For prudence, is but experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in

those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality

incredible, is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a

greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by

fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that

howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more

learned; yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own

wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal,

than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than

that every man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And

therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they

become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and

sometimes their delectation only, endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it

comes to pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear, than another man's single power; if

one plant, sow, built, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come

prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but

also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself,

so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, for force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can,

so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his

own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking

pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther

than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest

bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by

standing only on their defense, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion

over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping

company, where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his

companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: and upon all signs of

contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavors, as far as he dares, (which amongst them that

have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to

extort a greater value from his contemnérs, by damage; and from others, by the example.

4. From his examination of the contentiousness of people in the absence of political organization,

Hobbes discovers three sources of controversy in human nature. The natural condition of human

beings, he says, is universal war. He does not claim that the “state of nature” actually existed

historically; rather, it exists in any time or place where civil society is not functioning.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition;

secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety, and the third, for reputation.

The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and

cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion,

and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred,

their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep

them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every

man, against every man. For WAR, consisteth not in battle only, or act of fighting; but in a tract

of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of

time, is to be considered in the nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of

foul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days

together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition

thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every

man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their

own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no

place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the

earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious

building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no

knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which

is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life-of man, solitary, poor,

nasty, brutish, and short....

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this;

and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they

live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small

families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live at

this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of

life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life, which

men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a civil war.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of

war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of

the independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having

their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and

guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbors; which is a

posture of war. But because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects; there does not

follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men.

5. Hobbes argues that society originates out of self-interest and fear, not out of natural feeling for

other people. He defends as natural and reasonable the interest one takes in one's own welfare

and happiness. In a state of nature, the first and only rule of life is self-protection, and human

beings have a natural right to do anything that serves this end.

All society therefore is either for gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for love of our fellows,

as for the love of ourselves. But no society can be great or lasting, which begins from vain glory.

Because that glory is like honor; if all men have it no man hath it, for they consist in comparison

and precellence. Neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in

myself; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himself without the help of

others. But though the benefits of this life may be much furthered by mutual help; since yet those

may be better attained to by dominion than by the society of others, I hope no body will doubt,

but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain

dominion, than to gain society. We must therefore resolve, that the original of all great and

lasting societies consisted not in the mutual goodwill men had towards each other, but in the

mutual fear they had of each other.

The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in their

mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to pass, that we can neither expect from others, nor

promise to ourselves the least security. For if we look on men full grown, and consider how

brittle the frame of our human body is, which perishing, all its strength, vigor, and wisdom itself

perisheth with it; and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest: there

is no reason why any man, trusting to his own strength, should conceive himself made by nature

above others. They are equals, who can do equal things one against the other; but they who can

do the greatest things, namely, kill, can do equal things. All men therefore among themselves are

by nature equal; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the civil law....

Among so many dangers therefore, as the natural lusts of men do daily threaten each

other withal, to have a care of one's self is so far from being a matter scornfully to be looked

upon, that one has neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every man is desirous

of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is

death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves

downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true

reason, for a man to use all his endeavors to preserve and defend his body and the members

thereof from death and sorrows. But that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men

account to be done justly, and with right. Neither by the word right is anything else signified,

than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his natural faculties according to right

reason. Therefore the first foundation of natural right is this, that every man as much as in him

lies endeavor to protect his life and members.

But because it is in vain for a man to have a right to the end, if the right to the necessary

means be denied him, it follows, that since every man hath a right to preserve himself, he must

also be allowed a right to use all the means, and do all the actions, without which he cannot

preserve himself.

Now whether the means which he is about to use, and the action he is performing, be

necessary to the preservation of his life and members or not, he himself, by the right of nature,

must be judge. For if it be contrary to right reason that I should judge of mine own peril, say that

another man is judge. Why now, because he judgeth of what concerns me, by the same reason,

because we are equal by nature, will I judge also of things which do belong to him. Therefore it

agrees with right reason, that is, it is the right of nature that I judge of his opinion, that is,

whether it conduce to my preservation or not.

Nature hath given to everyone a right to all; that is, it was lawful for every man, in the

bare state of nature, or before such time as men had engaged themselves by any covenants or

bonds, to do what he would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possess, use, and enjoy all

what he would, or could get. Now because whatsoever a man would, it therefore seems good to

him because he wills it, and either it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute towards

his preservation, (but we have already allowed him to be judge, in the foregoing article, whether-

it doth or not, insomuch as we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteem so), and ...

it appears that by the right of nature those things may be done, and must be had, which

necessarily conduce to the protection of life and members, it follows, that in the state of nature,

to have all, and do all, is lawful for all. And this is that which is meant by that common saying,

nature hath given all to all. From whence we understand likewise, that in the state of nature

profit is the measure of right.

But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common right to all things. For the

effects of this right are the same, almost, as if there had been no right at all. For although any

man might say of every thing, this is mine, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his neighbor,

who having equal right and equal power, would pretend the same thing to be his.

If now to this natural proclivity of men, to hurt each other, which they derive from their

passions, but chiefly from a vain esteem of themselves, you add, the right of all to all, wherewith

one by right invades, the other by right resists, and whence arise perpetual jealousies and

suspicions on all hands, and how hard a thing it is to provide against an enemy invading us with

an intention to oppress and ruin, though he come with a small number, and no great provision; it

cannot be denied but that the natural state of men, before they entered into society, was a mere

war, and that not simply, but a war of all men against all men. For what is WAR, but that same

time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared, either by words or deeds?

6. Defending himself against the possible charge of cynicism, Hobbes shows that there are no

grounds for objections against self-interested action in the natural state. Social relations are not

derived from the original nature of humanity but rather are artificially created. In fact, society is

only a means to the furthering of each individual's interests and happiness. Moreover, Hobbes

maintains, the concept of moral obligation has neither meaning nor application in the state of

nature. Rather, the basic moral concepts, right and wrong, just and unjust, arise concomitantly

with the establishment of a civil society.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that nature should thus

dissociate, and render man apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not

trusting to this inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by

experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and

seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house

he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws, and public officers, armed, to revenge

all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed;

of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks

his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But

neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves

no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that

forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have

agreed upon the person that shall make it. . . .

To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be

unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is

no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the

two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind.

If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and

passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to

the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only

that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the

ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come

out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.

The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are

necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason

suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These

articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature.

7. The termination of the perpetual warfare of the state of nature is brought about through the

instrumentality of reason. First, an individual becomes aware, through rational deliberation, of

the need for security. Second, reason discovers those precepts, or “laws of nature,” by which

peace may be realized.

A LAW OF NATURE, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which

a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of

preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though

they that speak of this subject, use to confound jus, and lex, right and law: yet they ought to be

distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW,

determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and

liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of man, as hath been declared in the precedent chapter, is a

condition of war of everyone against everyone: in which case everyone is governed by his own

reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving

his life against his enemies; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every

thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to

every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of

living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a

precept, or general rule of reason, that every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope

of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and

advantages of war. The first branch of which rule, containeth the first, and fundamental law of

nature; which is to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is,

by all means we can, to defend ourselves.

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace,

is derived this second law; that a man be willing, when others are so too, as farforth, as for

peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and

be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against

himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all

men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then

there is no reason for anyone, to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey,

which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose himself to peace.

Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it; or by transferring it to another. By

simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By

TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons.

And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his right; then is he said to

be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned,

from the benefit of it: and that he ought, and it is his DUTY, not make void that voluntary act of

his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being sine jure; the right being

before renounced, or transferred. So that injury, or injustice, in the controversies of the world, is

somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For as it is there

called an absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the beginning: so in the world, it is

called injustice, and injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily

done. . . .

Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either in consideration of

some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For

it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself.

And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood by and words, or other

signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting

them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to aim

thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and

imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the

patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell,

when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And

lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of right is introduced, is

nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life,

as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself

of the end, for which those signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or

that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be

interpreted.

8. When the egoistic nature of humans is taken into account, it is manifest that the first two laws

of nature, in and of themselves, are not binding on the individual. Consequently, another law is

necessary to make the first two effective.

From that law of nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another, such rights, as being

retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this, that men perform

their covenants made: without which, covenants are in vain, and by empty words; and the right

of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war.

And in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and original of JUSTICE. For where no

covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to

everything; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to

break it is unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performa�ce of

covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just.

But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either

part . . . are invalid; though the original of justice be the making of covenants; yet injustice

actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away; which while men are in the

natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have

place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their

covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach

of their covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in

recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection

of a commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the

schools: for they say, that justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own. And

therefore where there is no own, that is no propriety, there is no injustice; and where there is no

coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men

having right to all things: therefore where there is not commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So

that the nature of justice, consisteth in keeping of valid covenants: but the validity of covenants

begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: and

then it is also that propriety begins.

9. Hobbes concludes that the laws of nature may be summed up in a rule that everyone accepts,

the Golden Rule.

These are the laws of nature, dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in

multitudes; and which only concern the doctrine of civil society. There be other things tending to

the destruction of particular men; as drunkenness, and all other parts of internperance; which

may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the law of nature hath forbidden; but

are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.

And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature, to be taken notice

of by all men; whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest too negligent to

understand; yet to leave all men inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum,

intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that to another, which thou wouldest

not have done to thyself; which showeth him, that he has no more to do in learning the laws of

nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put

them into the center part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and

self-love, may add nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these laws of nature that will

appear unto him very reasonable.

10. Reason not only dictates peace and security in society but also prescribes the means by which

they can be ensured: a commonwealth instituted by covenant. It was apparent to Hobbes that

there must be some civil power to determine and interpret what is right and what wrong, what is

good and what bad, in society. Such authority must be vested in a single sovereign power—

either an individual or an assembly—to prevent the occurrence of jurisdictional disputes between

one authority and another.

From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the rights, and faculties of him, or them,

on whom sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled....

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former

covenant to anything repugnant hereunto. And consequently they that have already instituted a

commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one,

cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any

thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch,

cannot without his leave cast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude;

nor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another man, or other assembly of men: for

they are bound, every man to every man, to own, and be reputed author of all, that he that

already is their sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all

the rest should break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also

every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose

him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. . . .

Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make

sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen

no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any

pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. . . .

Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign; he that

dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do,

or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them

that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly convenanted,

to stand to what the major part should ordain. . . .

Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions, and

judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to

any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth

anything by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth:

but by this institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sovereign

doth: and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign, complaineth of that

whereof he himself is author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself; no nor

himself or injury; because to do injury to one's self, is impossible. It is true that they that have

sovereign power may commit iniquity; but not injustice, or injury in the proper signification. . . .

Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are

averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what

men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the

doctrines of all books before they be published. For the actions of men proceed from their

opinions; and in the well-governing of opinions, consisteth the well-governing of men's actions,

in order to their peace, and concord. And though in matter of doctrine, nothing ought to be

regarded but the truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating the same by peace. For doctrine

repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against the law of

nature. . . .

Seventhly, is annexed to the sovereignty, the whole power of prescribing the rules,

whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without

being molested by any of his fellow-subjects; and this is it men call propriety. For before

constitution of sovereign power, as hath already been shown, all men had right to all things;

which necessarily causeth war: and therefore this propriety, being necessary to peace, and

depending on sovereign power, is the act of that power, in order to the public peace. These rules

of propriety, or meum and tuum, and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful in the actions of subjects,

are the civil laws; that is to say, the laws of each commonwealth in particular.

11. Hobbes believes that matters of conscience, for example, must be controlled entirely by the

sovereign. Thus even church affairs should be dominated by the secular rules, “God's lieutenant

on earth.”

I observe the diseases of a commonwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines,

whereof one is, That every private man is judge of good and evil actions. This is true in the

condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws; and also under civil government, in such

cases as are not determined by the law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of good

and evil actions, is the civil law; and the judge the legislator, who is always representative of the

commonwealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and

dispute the commands of the commonwealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their

private judgments they shall think fit; whereby the commonwealth is distracted and weakened.

Another doctrine repugnant to civil society, is, that whatsoever a man does against his

conscience, is sin; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and

evil. For a man's conscience, and his judgment is the same thing, and as the judgment, so also the

conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law, sinneth in all

he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it

is not so with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public conscience, by

which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private

consciences, which are but private opinions, the commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no

man dare to obey the sovereign power, further than it shall seem good in his own eyes. . . . There

is [another] doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a commonwealth; and it is this,

that the sovereign power may be divided. For what is it to divide the power of a commonwealth,

but to dissolve it; for powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines, men

are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the laws, endeavor to make

them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the legislative power.

12. In its ultimate consequences, then, Hobbes' ethical theory leads to the political doctrine of

absolute sovereignty, designed to end the natural war of every person with every other person.

To the care of the sovereign, belongeth the making of good laws. But what is a good law? By a

good law, I mean not a just law: for no law can be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign

power, and all that is done by such power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people;

and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in the laws of the

commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the gamesters all agree on, is injustice to

none of them. A good law is that, which is needful, for the good of the people, and withal

perspicuous.

For the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not to bind the people from all

voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by

their own impetuous desires, rashness or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travelers, but

to keep them in their way. And therefore a law that is not needful, having not the true end of the

law, is not good. A law may be conceived to be good, when it is for the benefit of the sovereign;

though it be not necessary for the people; but it is not so. For the good of the sovereign and

people, cannot be separated. It is a weak sovereign, that has weak subjects; and a weak people,

whose sovereign wanteth power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws; but

traps for money; which where the right of sovereign power is acknowledged, are superfluous;

and where it is not acknowledged, insufficient to defend the people. . . .

The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth in the end, for

which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the

people; to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the

author of that law, and to none but him. But by safety here, is not meant a bare preservation, but

also all other contentments of life, which every man by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt

to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself.

And this is intended should be done, not by care applied to individuals, further than their

protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but by a general providence, contained in

public instruction, both of doctrine, and example; and in the making and executing of good laws,

to which individual persons may apply their own cases.

And because, if the essential rights of sovereignty. . . be taken away the commonwealth is

thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a war with every

other man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life; it is the office of the sovereign,

to maintain those rights entire.