Term paper

60

CHAPTER FIVE

Japanese Policy toward India

I POLICY-MAKERS IN TOKYO JAPAN’S wartime aims in India were never as clearly defined as her aims in Southeast Asia. India was not embraced in the grand design for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere first conceived in 1940. Greater East Asia would sweep through Southeast Asia westward to the Indo- Burmese border. Everywhere in Asia Western colonial rule would be driven out and independence movements encouraged. Asia for Asians became the goal and shibboleth. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would constitute an economically self-sufficient entity under Japanese tutelage. Both diplomatic and military means would be employed to realize the blueprint. But Japanese military administration would respect existing local organizations and customs.1 By late 1941 control of resources necessary for the war effort became a focal point of the plan.

Still, India bordered the western perimeter of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. And Japan was at war with the colonial power occupying India; Britain must be expelled from India. As Japan wished to see Britain purged from Asia so also Indian nationalists aspired to free India. Japan had to reckon with India for the mutual advantage of both Japan and India.

What agencies or individuals in Tokyo would do the reckoning? The Foreign Ministry was one obvious possibility. Japan had no ambassador in India under Britain, but there were consuls in the major Indian cities. In April 1941, Consul-General Okazaki in Cal- cutta, in a secret communiqué to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, des- cribed the independence movement of the Forward Bloc, a radical

05 IndNatArmy.indd 60 4/21/08 4:36:30 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

61

party in Bengal. Okazaki suggested establishing contact with this left- wing party in India and also with its leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, then in exile in Berlin. Going even further, he suggested, “We should secretly transport large quantities of weapons and substantially increase the actual strength of the Forward Bloc.”2 While Okazaki felt the movement would burgeon into a genuinely popular revolt, he felt Japan should do her part by establishing contact with Bose and aiding his party. This early Japanese notice of Bose preceded by several months Major Fujiwara’s remarks about Bose to the 8th Section, Second Bureau, IGHQ.

From Ambassador General Ōshima Hiroshi in Berlin also came communiqués regarding the Indian revolutionary Bose and his desire to go to East Asia. In January 1941 Bose had already begun to visit Ambassador Ōshima and military attaché Yamamoto Bin in Berlin with plans for military co-operation with Japan against Britain in Asia. The Gaimushō (Foreign Ministry) then learned of the presence of Bose in Berlin and of his political significance from sources both in India and in Germany. The Foreign Ministry, how- ever, refrained from any positive proposal regarding India or Bose during 1941. And when war erupted, the initiative obviously lay with the military rather than the Gaimushō.

From within the Cabinet Prime Minister Töjö made several de- clarations of policy toward India in early 1942. These pronounce- ments were articulated in speeches before the Diet. They represented official policy aims toward India. The statements were made during the four-month interval from January to April, and the timing of the pronouncements suggested that by late March or early April the fundamental lines of Japan’s India policy had already been drawn.3 The policy aims had yet to be implemented, and measures were later adopted to implement some of the goals. Announcements made by Töjö during 1943 and 1944 were designed to realize earlier decisions.

Major policy decisions on India also emanated from Liaison Con- ferences and Imperial Conferences. Liaison Conferences included important members of both the Cabinet and military high command, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Army and Navy chiefs of staff and vice-chiefs of staff. The Liaison Conferences were inaugurated by imperial order in late 1937 to provide liaison between the Cabinet and military on crucial policy questions. For a time Conferences lapsed, but they were resumed in November

05 IndNatArmy.indd 61 4/21/08 4:36:30 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

62

1940 and continued until 1944.4 A major decision reached at a Liai- son Conference was not final until ratified at an Imperial Conference, that is, the Liaison Conference plus the Emperor and President of the Privy Council. This imperial ratification in effect made a decision irrevocable.

Still another government agency directly under the Prime Minis- ter’s office was involved in Japanese policy in Asia. This was the Total War Research Institute, created in 1940 to do research on total warfare and to train officials for it. This agency was the brainchild of two officers, Colonel (later Lieutenant-General) Tatsumi Eiichi, section chief in the European and American Section, IGHQ, and Lieutenant-General Iemura Minoru, chief of staff of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. General lemura was appointed director of the Institute in January 1941 and remained in that post until October of the same year. Colonel Tatsumi, former military attaché in London, envisaged an agency on the same pattern as the Royal National War Institute in England. Topics for study by the Institute were selected at the discretion of General lemura, though the choice reflected the concerns of the military which he represented. Iemura reported directly to the Prime Minister, at that time Konoe. During August 1941 (following discussion by the Army and Navy), the Institute held a map manoeuvre on the problem of what would happen should Japan advance in the south in search of oil. The study postulated Soviet entry into the war; the conclusion was that Japan’s material strength would be deficient, and the Cabinet and Planning Board would be impelled to resign. Bureau chiefs of several cabinet ministries participated, and many top-ranking military officers observed the manoeuvre, including War Minister General Töjö.5 The Institute autonomously devised plans for the independence of Asian nations from Western colonial rule and their incorporation into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Policies recommended by the Institute were later implemented by military administration in Southeast Asia, though testimony at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal maintained the military had no special interest in the Institute.6 There was, however, no separate focus on India in the studies and manoeuvres of the Total War Research Institute during 1941.

Besides these agencies the military high command of course had a direct concern with India policy during the Pacific War. Army Chief of General Staff Sugiyama Gen took a special interest in India, de- rived from his service in India as military attaché. Sugiyama, like

05 IndNatArmy.indd 62 4/21/08 4:36:30 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

63

Töjö and Shigemitsu, developed a special sympathy for Subhas Chandra Bose. Under the Second Bureau (Intelligence) of IGHQ, headed by Major-General Okamoto (later in the war by Lieutenant- General Arisue), was the 8th Section, whose purview included India. From among staff officers in the 8th Section Major Fujiwara had been selected to establish liaison with and encourage the Indian inde- pendence movement in Southeast Asia. Fujiwara had been dismayed at the lack of information on India available in IGHQ at the time of his assignment in October 1941. Within the 8th Section Major Ozeki was assigned to deal with the Fujiwara Kikan and its successor or- ganizations, the Iwakuro Kikan and Hikari Kikan, in the field. 8th Section chiefs, for example Colonel Nagai Yatsuji, were at times called on to deal with the Indian National Army or with Bose. Civi- lian specialists on India, few though they were, were also consulted by the 8th Section during the war.

These were the major official sources from which policy decisions on India emanated during the war. There were others who influenced India policy in a private capacity. These included Töyama Mitsuru and other patriotic society members, and their military counterparts such as Ishiwara Kanji and Hashimoto Kingorö. These officers advocated Pan- Asianism of a somewhat different version from Töyama’s. Töyama, in particular, went beyond the ideology of Pan-Asianism to actively protect revolutionaries from all parts of Asia.

Another constant factor affecting Japan’s India policy was the traditional orientation of Japanese Army ideology. The Army traditionally looked northward, toward Soviet Russia and north China, rather than southward. The north was the major legitimate concern of the Army, the direction from which Japan had to be on guard. Assignment of the best officers in the thirties to Manchuria and north China, especially to the Kwantung Army, reflected this orientation. This was true through most of 1941. “In Manchuria there were many superior officers, but in the South Fujiwara was a single player,” observed Ishikawa Yoshiaki, interpreter for the Kikan throughout the war.7

II ISSUES AND POLICIES The first hypothesis to emerge regarding Japanese policy toward India is that Japan at no time planned a major invasion of India or

05 IndNatArmy.indd 63 4/21/08 4:36:31 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

64

the incorporation of India into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (contrary to the suspicions of Indians in the independence movement). There did emerge, however, several indications of more limited concern with India in late 1941 and early 1942. Decisions reached in Liaison Conferences and Prime Minister Töjö’s speeches revealed this concern.

On 15 November 1941, an Imperial Conference decision, the “Plan for Acceleration of the End of the War with America”, called among other things for 1) separation of Australia and India from Britain, and 2) stimulation of the Indian independence movement.8

One problem concerning policy toward India was the calculation of the Gaimushō that the Indian National Congress was anti-Japanese. A corollary of this was the postulate that, even if the Indian independence movement should succeed, it would be difficult for Indian revolutionaries to establish a stable orderly state. Nor would it be possible for Japan to control a nation of four hundred million in addition to her other commitments in Southeast Asia.9 On the other hand, it lay within the realm of feasibility for Japan to launch a vast propaganda effort to encourage Indian disaffection to Britain. Accordingly, a Liaison Conference decision reached on 10 January called for 1) intercepting India’s sea communications, and 2) stimulating anti-British sentiment within India.10

Töjö declared in the Diet early in 1942, “Without the liberation of India there can be no real mutual prosperity in Greater East Asia,” and further, in April, “It has been decided to strike a decisive blow against British power and military establishment in India.”11 This was a general policy statement rather than a directive to the Opera- tions Bureau of IGHQ; Töjö gave no suggestion of its tactical or even strategic implementation. Töjö mentioned India in Diet speeches on 17 January, 12 February, 14 February, 11-12 March and 4 April. Repeatedly he called on Indians to take advantage of the war to rise against British power and establish an India for Indians. Töjö also stated he hoped India would co-operate in the “establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”. This too was a general pronouncement not alluded to again, either generally or in further explication.

There was no plan for an invasion of India in 1941. At several points it was conceivable that a Japanese invasion of India might have succeeded had it been planned. The best time would have been in the spring and summer of 1942, following Japanese successes in

05 IndNatArmy.indd 64 4/21/08 4:36:31 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

65

Malaya and Burma, when Japanese air, sea and land power could not have been checked by the British. But Japan passed up the opportu- nity. Japan made no concerted attempt to establish a base in Ceylon or Calcutta, though Ceylon had been mentioned in Tokyo as a desirable base. Two years later, when Japan mounted a military offensive into the borders of India, it was with the limited objective of “securing strategic areas near Imphal and in north-east India for the defence of Burma”.12 An auxiliary objective was to disrupt the air routes between Chungking and India. This was clearly not envisioned as a full-scale invasion of India. India remained a peripheral interest for Japan in terms of 1) the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and 2) the major action of the war. Nevertheless, the attention of Tokyo had been drawn to India at the close of 1941 at the time of the outbreak of the war. One of the reasons Töjö took notice was the policy recommendation of the young Major Fujiwara, who had been sent to Bangkok on an intelligence mission late in 1941.

Another major aspect of Japanese policy, this toward the INA, was that Japan desired to use and support the INA chiefly for prop- aganda purposes, particularly to foster anti-British sentiment. All major Japanese policy decisions regarding the INA pointed toward this goal. Beginning with the Fujiwara mission in 1941 (and a brief assignment for Fujiwara in late 1940), and continuing with the ex- panded propaganda functions of the Kikan under Colonel Iwakuro, the major Japanese thrust was to encourage the proliferation of Indian intelligence activities throughout Southeast Asia. Under Fujiwara and still more under Iwakuro, training centres and liaison facilities were developed to expand propaganda and sabotage missions behind enemy lines.

Yet another aspect of Japanese policy was a corollary to the above, namely: even during the Imphal campaign and the actions in Burma, the Japanese Army was reluctant to see the INA evolve into a large fighting force, partly because of the problems of equipping such an army, partly out of questions about possible actions of such an army once the Indian border was crossed, and partly because of doubts about whether an Indian army would constitute a military asset to Japan. During the Imphal campaign Japan conceived of the INA as a series of guerrilla fighting units and special forces which would perform intelligence functions. Shah Nawaz Khan alleges that General Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army, told Bose un- equivocally that Japan did not want large formations of the INA at

05 IndNatArmy.indd 65 4/21/08 4:36:31 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

66

the front. Shah Nawaz was particularly sceptical of Japan’s motives, and charged not only Japanese inability to supply arms and provisions during the Burma campaign, but also reluctance.13

Support for the hypothesis that Japan was primarily interested in using the INA for propaganda purposes is found in several steps taken by Japan. These include the Japanese recognition of the Free India Provisional Government, the transfer of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the FIPG, and the sending of a diplomatic representative to the FIPG. In all these measures Japan conceded the form but not the substance of Bose’s demands. These steps were designed to create the impression abroad, and with Bose, that Japan was dealing with a large, independent government and army.

Another problem which beset Japan’s India policy throughout the war was a time disjunction between three factors: 1) military intelli- gence in the field and its evaluation and response in Tokyo, 2) policy planning by IGHQ, and 3) tactical implementation of policy at the operational level. Part of the delay was attributable to normal pro- cessing of proposals and policies through a bureaucratic establishment, even during wartime. For example, the decision to invite Bose from Berlin to Tokyo to evaluate his utility from the standpoint of Japanese policy was reached on 17 April 1942, jointly by the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries.14 Bose did not actually reach Tokyo until the end of May 1943. Apart from normal bureaucratic delays, part of the time lag was occasioned by the German Foreign Ministry’s reluctance to release a potentially valuable bargaining instrument in dealing with the British. Part of the delay was also caused by the presence in Tokyo of another Indian revolutionary, Rash Behari Bose, who many felt was the logical leader to work through.

Another case in point was the planning of the offensive into north- east India and its execution. In the fall of 1942, and even earlier, Töjö and IGHQ contemplated a military thrust into north-east India, Operation 21 as it was then called. But in 1942-3 there were too many obstacles to the idea—inadequate supply lines, British deter- rent strength in the Akyab sector through early 1943, a shortage of trained Indian troops for a joint campaign, not to mention events in the Pacific. Consequently the plan for an India offensive was post- poned to early 1944. In 1944, however, despite the rationale for the campaign, the above obstacles were even more acute and it was not possible for Japan to succeed.

Regarding this disjunction of time factors, it may be noted that

05 IndNatArmy.indd 66 4/21/08 4:36:31 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

67

Bose’s role in the timing of most aspects of the Japan-INA cooperation was minimal. The timing of his arrival in East Asia was not of his own choice. For over a year before he arrived in Asia he had been pressing the Japanese ambassador and military attaché in Berlin to arrange his transportation to East Asia. Bose was similarly unhappy about the timing of the Imphal campaign, but again his expressions of urgency carried little weight in Tokyo. Bose would have had Japan push across the border soon after his arrival in the summer of 1943. But because of the above reasons and because India remained for Japan a peripheral concern in the deployment of her resources for a total war, other considerations overrode the logic of not postponing the campaign. In other respects, however, Bose did make an impact on Tokyo, particularly with Töjö, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, and Chief of General Staff Sugiyama.

To summarize, then, Japan had several objectives in cooperating with the INA: to encourage anti-British sentiment in Southeast Asia, within the British-Indian Army and within India; to develop an intelligence network to implement this aim; to defend Burma and the western border of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and to support and assist the FIPG and INA, within certain limi- tations, to achieve these aims. These were both political and military objectives. There was a distinction made between the political aims, which fell within the purview of the Second Bureau, Intelligence, and the military issues, which fell within the scope of the First Bu- reau, Operations, in IGHQ. The First Bureau was the more powerful of the two.

III POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE FIELD; COLONEL IWAKURO

From the agencies of Headquarters in Tokyo directives to implement these general policies filtered down through channels to the agencies which implemented them in the field. Once the war began, orders were passed through the Headquarters of the Southern Army, then through the 25th Army staff, before they reached the F Kikan. Dur- ing 1944 the 25th Army was replaced by 15th Army Headquarters as the military channel through which the Kikan had to pass. Fujiwara felt the channels were cumbersome and bureaucratic, often diluting

05 IndNatArmy.indd 67 4/21/08 4:36:32 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

68

the urgency of his proposals regarding India. Further, he felt impa- tient with the lack of concern for India in Tokyo in late 1941. But Fujiwara’s instructions were broad and general, leaving him much room to use his own initiative. He did, proving his resourcefulness, efficiency and vision. Only as Fujiwara’s proposals were discussed in Tokyo did the limits of Japan’s India policy begin to emerge. Fujiwara seized every opportunity to present his case to officers from IGHQ or, better yet, in Tokyo in person. He was gratified when his proposals to expand the whole India project were accepted in Tokyo, even though this meant the end of his own assignment and his replacement by the enlarged operation under Colonel Iwakuro, the Iwakuro Kikan.

Reorganization of the Kikan under Iwakuro under command of Southern Army Headquarters occurred soon after he arrived in Saigon in late March, following the Sanno Conference. In May Headquarters moved to Bangkok, and branches were then operating in Rangoon, Saigon, Singapore, Penang, and Hong Kong. Under the reorganized Kikan were some two hundred and fifty members, a far cry from the handful of men with which Fujiwara began the operation five months earlier. A few months later the number of members had risen to five hundred. Fujiwara took this as a hopeful sign that IGHQ was paying more attention to his proposals for the India project. There were six departments in the Iwakuro Kikan: 1) the Administrative Section under Lieutenant-Colonel Maki Tatsuo; 2) the Political Section—most important of all—under Diet mem- ber Takaoka Taisuke, who was known as an India specialist, and including several interpreters, whose business was liaison with the IIL; 3) the Intelligence Section, like the Administrative Section under Maki Tatsuo, whose task was to co-ordinate all intelligence regarding India; 4) the Special Mission Section under another Diet member, Koyama Ryo, whose responsibility it was to send agents into India by submarine and parachute; 5) the Military Section under Major Ōgawa Saburö, who was in charge of Indian POWs, liaison with the INA, creation of intelligence units and special mis- sion units which would infiltrate behind enemy lines; and 6) the Propaganda Section under Colonel Saitö Jirö, who was to take charge of the distribution of propaganda leaflets and of radio broadcasts from Singapore, Saigon, and Rangoon.15

Iwakuro was clearly emphasizing the political and intelligence functions of the Kikan rather than solely the military function. He

05 IndNatArmy.indd 68 4/21/08 4:36:32 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

69

had under him an imposing array of men, military and civilian lead- ers alike. Iwakuro’s experience had been in intelligence and special mission projects. He had founded the Army Intelligence School, the Rikugun Nakano Gakkō. But his work in Southeast Asia was not easy, despite the legacy of goodwill among Indian patriots left by Fujiwara. There were several knotty problems confronting Iwakuro almost as soon as he arrived in Singapore.

He tried to create an initial impression of goodwill by meeting with Indian leaders in every city where there was a Kikan branch. On 21 May he met with IIL representatives in Singapore and assured them that the Japanese Government had recognized the IIL as the only political organization of Indians in Malaya. The same evening he entertained IIL representatives and certain officers of the INA at the Raffles Hotel and again sought to reassure them that he would continue Fujiwara’s policy of cooperation. He reiterated Japan’s desire to see a free and independent India and disavowed any Japan- ese territorial or political designs on India. He referred to Japan’s determination to give any assistance or cooperation necessary to free India from the yoke of British imperialism. He alluded to the century-old cultural bond between Japan and India and to Japan’s cul- tural debt to India. Japan would spare no effort to help in the libera- tion of four hundred million Indians. In other Southeast Asian cities too he reiterated these assurances.16

One problem affecting Iwakuro Kikan relations with the Indian independence movement was the problem of Burmese independence. Operations of the Kikan in Burma had begun at the time of the Singa- pore campaign when Captain Tsuchimochi was ordered back from Johore Bahru through Thailand to Rangoon. He took with him an INA unit under Second Lieutenant Ram Swarup and Ishikawa Yoshiaki as interpreter. Tsuchimochi encouraged the organization of the IIL and expansion of the INA unit in Rangoon.17 In early July Lieutenant-Colonel Kitabe Kunio was ordered to Burma to take over from Tsuchimochi. Kitabe spread the network of the Kikan north from Rangoon through the whole of Burma.

Part of Japan’s initial ideological appeal in Southeast Asia was the slogan “Asia for Asiatics” and the assurance that Japan would liberate Southeast Asian nations from Western imperialist rule. Burma, however, was still chafing under Japanese military adminis- tration, despite early promises of independence. Aung San and other Burmese leaders were becoming impatient. How could a Rangoon

05 IndNatArmy.indd 69 4/21/08 4:36:32 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

70

branch of the Iwakuro Kikan promise to help the Indian indepen- dence movement when Burma had not yet been made independent? Kitabe visited 15th Army Headquarters and asked Commander Lieutenant-General Iida to declare Burma independent as soon as possible. General Iida pointed out that this was a problem not for the 15th Army but for the Southern Army under whose command the 15th Army operated. After receiving this report from Kitabe, Iwakuro himself visited Southern Army Headquarters and asked staff officer Colonel Ishii to see what he could do about accelerating Burmese independence. Ishii was concerned with the timing of Bur- mese independence and its possible implications for India. But he opposed early independence. At the same time he assured Iwakuro of material support for the INA. Not until August 1943 did Burma gain independence. This followed closely the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose in Southeast Asia and the consequent need for a redefinition of Japanese policy. In the interim this problem continued to plague Iwakuro and his relations with IIL-INA.18

Another problem for Iwakuro was the matter of Rash Behari Bose’s leadership. This had created difficulties in IIL-INA liaison and in relations between the Tokyo Indians and those in Southeast Asia ever since the Sanno Conference. Fujiwara had not been able to resolve it, and Iwakuro was equally helpless. The feeling that Bose was a Japanese puppet and would do nothing to oppose Japanese wishes grew among Indians in Malaya. INA commander Mohan Singh grew increasingly impatient with Bose’s role as go-between and representative of Indian aims vis-à-vis the Iwakuro Kikan. This animosity was to fester until it caused a rupture at the end of the year.

The most serious problem of all, and one that underlay the others, was the ambiguity of Iwakuro’s role and uncertainty in Tokyo itself about how far Japan should go in support of Indian independence. Fujiwara had urged full and sincere support of the independence movement, but IGHQ had many reservations, some of them based on practical difficulties such as material support. For Iwakuro the limits of Tokyo’s support of the INA-IIL were not clear. His instruc- tions left him latitude for interpretation and the use of his own poli- tical acumen. Iwakuro was working from an IGHQ attitude of grudg- ing and limited support, but this still left the problem of determining the limits. The one point that was clear, about which Tokyo would not quibble, was that the India project was part of a secret war in which the weapons of intelligence and espionage were to play a key

05 IndNatArmy.indd 70 4/21/08 4:36:32 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

71

role. Political propaganda and secret diplomacy were an old story to Iwakuro. These were areas where he had proven his versatile talents, and these he made good use of in the Iwakuro Kikan. But the IIL, INA, and especially Mohan Singh continually pushed Iwakuro with specific requests to the limit of Japan’s willingness or capacity to commit herself. This fundamental problem of defining Japan’s policy limits persisted for Iwakuro and ultimately led to dissolution of the first INA. Not until the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose was Tokyo forced to re-evaluate and redefine its policy toward the Indian independence movement.

IV PENANG ISLAND PROJECTS Captain Kaneko Noboru was assigned head of the Penang Island branch of the Kikan, Actually, the Penang branch was under the Special Mission Section of the Iwakuro Kikan. Several Kikan staff members, including graduates of the Nakano Gakkō and civilian interpreters were assigned under Kaneko, who was himself a gra- duate in intelligence and sabotage techniques. They were to infiltrate into India, Ceylon, and Nepal.

One of the most important tasks of the Penang Kikan was liaison and supervision of the Swaraj Institute (Freedom Institute) under the directorship of N. Raghavan, a distinguished lawyer from Ma- dras and leader of the Indian community in Penang in peacetime. Part of the curriculum of the Institute consisted of political and cul- tural training prescribed by Raghavan. The rest of the curriculum prepared the Indian trainees for infiltration. Kaneko referred to the Swaraj Institute as “actually a Nakano Gakkō to train Indians for espionage, propaganda, counter-intelligence, etc.”19

The training course supervised by Nakano Gakkō graduates in- cluded instruction in opening letters, tapping telephones, monitoring wireless, coding and decoding, developing secret ink, forging docu- ments, making explosives, countering guerrilla warfare, and camou- flaging. Propaganda training was given in broadcasting, printing leaflets, and producing films. Field training included techniques of infiltration, secret communication, disguise, following, ambush, and escape. The Indian trainees at the Swaraj Institute developed considerable ingenuity for their missions into India.20

05 IndNatArmy.indd 71 4/21/08 4:36:33 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

72

Another small unit of trainees in Penang, the Osman group, was composed exclusively of Sikhs from the Punjab, most of them with some revolutionary experience. Leader of the group, the tall, handsome Osman, had become involved in the Mexican revolution, and, escaping from Mexican officials, had made his way to Shanghai where he became leader of the independence movement there. There he came into contact with Japanese naval officers who were impressed with his talents. The independent, martial spirit of the Sikhs had been well represented in the nationalist movement in India since early in the century, and there were Sikh exiles scattered throughout the world. Osman seemed to his Japanese colleagues a giant, and stories of his prowess in felling trees with his bare hands and breaking rocks with his fist became legendary. But he had a soft heart, a fondness for children, and was loved by his followers.

A third Indian group under Lieutenant-Colonel Gilani was com- posed entirely of Muslims. Gilani was from an aristocratic family and seemed to Kikan members a British gentleman with pro-British sentiments. Gilani was watched closely and his whole group was later arrested as spies for the British Army. Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmood Khan Durrani, after the war awarded the Victoria Cross for his counter-espionage work in the independence movement, re- calls he was asked by the Iwakuro Kikan to submit a plan for the Gilani unit project. Durrani prepared a list of sixty officers and men he knew to be hostile to the INA. He gave lectures and cooperated in this and similar projects in the hope that large numbers of Muslims would be sent into India and thereby spared suffering and charges of desertion. At the same time the purpose of the Iwakuro Kikan would be subverted, and the British-Indian Army would get first-hand information about INA activities.21 The Japanese super- visor of the Gilani unit had spent several years in the Middle East, and, assuming personal responsibility for the conduct of the group, he committed harakiri when they were arrested in April 1943.22

Still another group was organized for operations in Nepal, com- posed appropriately of Gurkhas. For liaison with this tough unit Kamimoto, the ex-F Kikan member who had promoted the famous Harimao operation in Malaya, was selected. Kamimoto had trouble “educating” the Gurkhas, who were noted for their unwavering loyalty to the British. Even for the wiry Gurkha mountaineers the hill country between Nepal and the Assam-Burma border was vir- tually impassable. Those who attempted to cross the border were

05 IndNatArmy.indd 72 4/21/08 4:36:33 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

73

either arrested or stopped by malaria. Kamimoto took a party of Gurkhas north from Rangoon for reconnaissance. The group made its way to the upper reaches of the Chindwin River and contacted Japanese units of the 15th Army in the midst of the disastrous Im- phal campaign. The unit made its way on foot through impossible jungle and mountain paths all the way to Kohima before the Imphal defeat halted its advance. A handful of Gurkhas managed to break through into Nepal, ending their epic six-thousand-mile march.23

Another group was organized on Penang to infiltrate into Ceylon and was actually sent there by submarine. The Kikan officers felt a special affinity with this group of Buddhists. An Indian sent with the unit to Ceylon later reported that they rendezvoused at the port of Trincomalee and, contacting a group of priests, successfully carried out sabotage activities.24

Another group was trained as wireless technicians for infiltration by parachute behind enemy lines. One of the problems of all the intelligence units was that, though collecting information on the spot posed no special difficulties, it was often impossible to communicate the information to headquarters where it was needed. This commu- nications unit was designed to overcome the difficulty. The unit had especially high morale, and in the evening after long fatiguing hours of training, the strains of “Bande Mataram” (“Hail, Mother” —a nationalistic Bengali song) could be heard coming from the bar- racks of the wireless technicians. After completing a six-month training programme in an accelerated two-month period, they were sent to Burma, where they were parachuted into the jungles of Bihar and Orissa by the 5th Airborne Division. They communicated valuable information on east India back to the Kikan.

The Penang Kikan also set up a laboratory for training in the ma- nufacture of incendiaries, explosives and poisons—the weapons of chemical warfare. In this laboratory trainees turned out secret ink, time bombs, hand grenades, carbide bombs, tear gas, bottled incendiary bombs, and sulphur bombs. A specialty was concealing lethal materials in whisky bottles, telephones, alarm-clocks, shaving cream and other innocuous-appearing objects.25 Most expensive and least successful of all the projects of the Penang Kikan was the attempt to devise and break codes.

The time came in the Penang Kikan timetable to send the first party of Indians home by submarine to carry out propaganda, sabo- tage, and terrorist activities within India. It would be the test of their

05 IndNatArmy.indd 73 4/21/08 4:36:33 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the

74

training. Without the knowledge of N. Raghavan, Indian director of the Swaraj Institute, two parties of ten Indian trainees each left the Penang naval base by Japanese submarine under cover of the night. When Raghavan learned the next morning that the first graduates had been spirited away without his consent, he was outraged. He resigned as principal of the institute, and no Indian could be found in Penang or Malaya to take his place. This was a serious breakdown in co-operation for the Penang branch of the Kikan. Other training centres on the island, however, continued to operate through 1944 and into 1945. From the standpoint of intelligence the missions sent to India were not a success, since they did not return from India or communicate with the Kikan. Once they reached India they either defected or were arrested.

05 IndNatArmy.indd 74 4/21/08 4:36:33 PM

https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/5E708ED5C4261C042BF82A68FAA2DB07 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of British Columbia Library, on 09 Jul 2020 at 20:32:41, subject to the