

Moving toward, away from, and against Others: Karen Horney



Karen Horney

[www-shi-p.edu/~cg-boer-ee/
h-orn-ey.h-tml](http://www-shi-p.edu/~cg-boer-ee/h-orn-ey.h-tml)

- How basic is anxiety?
- What makes people jealous?
- If some women are “castrating,” why are they?
- What is your orientation to others, toward them, away from them, or against them?

Freud saw personality largely as a function of instinctive influences. Jung’s “collective unconscious” was intimately tied to humans’ ancestral past, and Adler’s point of view was anchored by present strivings for superiority. In contrast, Karen Horney’s most central concepts emerge from explorations of parent-child relationships, especially during early childhood. Interactions between parents and children are the focus, not repressed attraction to the opposite-sex parent, early experiences with remnants of humans’ ancestral past, or early childhood strivings to overcome inferiority. Nevertheless, Horney used Freud’s theory as a reference point beyond which she ventured to build a new, more socially oriented theory that revamped Freud’s conception of females and reformulated his hypotheses about parent-child relationships.

Horney, the Person

Karen Clementina Theodora Danielsen was born on September 15, 1885, in Eilbek, Germany, a community near Hamburg (Quinn, 1988), but was not really German. Her father, Berndt Henrik Wackels Danielsen, was a Norwegian sea captain working for a Hamburg-based shipping line. Her mother, Clothilde Marie Van Ronzelen, was born to a well-regarded Dutch-German family. Clothilde, called Sonni, was the beautiful and commanding daughter of Dutch architect Jacob Van Ronzelen, born during the second of his three marriages. Sonni's mother died giving birth to her and she was reared by Van Ronzelen's third wife.

Captain Danielsen was 18 years older than Sonni and had four children by a previous marriage. Karen, the second child of his second marriage, admired her father, but he was stern, a man of strong religious fervor who attempted to control her life. There was a time when she felt attracted to men like her father, "brutal and ... forceful men" (Quinn, 1988, p. 160). Perhaps to establish some bond with him, she even claimed that they made an extended sea voyage together, but Quinn has doubts. However, Karen also expressed loathing for him and they had many conflicts, especially over her education.

Because Karen was very bright, and early on expressed an interest in pursuing an advanced education, the Captain's belief that education was "for men" predicted a clash. When the inevitable happened, Karen's mother stood by her. While Sonni's support was important, Karen's determination to be an educated person may have come from knowledge of her maternal stepgrandmother's unusual childhood. Wilhelmine Lorentz-Mayer Van Ronzelen, or Minna, who reared Sonni as her own, was educated by her father along with her seven brothers, very unusual treatment at that time (Quinn, 1988). Fortunately, Captain Danielsen was at sea so often that he proved a paper barrier in Karen's path to academic success. Having thus escaped from under the thumb of her father, she submitted to the protection of her mother, which undermined her sense of security. A self-perceived lack of beauty made matters worse (Quinn, 1988). As a remedy, Horney immersed herself in her studies as if to say "Since I cannot be beautiful, I will be smart."

Horney's adolescent diaries began to overtly display a concern for human relationships and the role of women. "I think very highly of men who can bear to love a woman just as she is without demanding that she be in one certain uniform" (Horney, 1980, p. 177). By age 14 Horney resolved to be a physician, though "woman physician" was an oxymoron in her day. Fortunately, social changes then occurring in Germany increased opportunities for women to pursue "male careers." In 1905, at age 20, she became one of a very few women immersed in a sea of first-year, male, medical students at the University of Freiburg. She stood out in her long skirt and fluffy blouse when she posed for a picture surrounded by male medical students carrying swords. During the first semester, she met Oscar Horney, with whom she maintained a lively correspondence after he left almost immediately to pursue a law degree (Quinn, 1988). Four years later she married Oscar and, during the second part of her medical training, she became pregnant with the first of three daughters. While Oscar was moving up the managerial ladder of an investment firm, Karen was trying to balance mother, homemaker, and medical student roles. In 1915, she managed to complete the final requirements for her M.D. degree.

Possibly stresses involved with her protean lifestyle explain Horney's depression and alleged suicide attempt during her years in medical school. In turn, by 1910, these psychiatric conditions apparently led her into therapy with Freudian Dr. Karl Abraham. Eventually she attended meetings on psychoanalysis at Abraham's house and he became her mentor, the same role he played for Erich Fromm. The Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute emerged from these meetings, with Horney among its early members. The meetings also planted the seeds of doubt in Horney's mind regarding Freud's point of view.

Horney's early letters to Oscar revealed deep inner exploration and self-questioning. Adler's concepts of inferiority and striving for superiority, especially regarding women in social relationships, were prominent in Horney's thinking at this time. When her marriage began to dissolve in 1926, writing in search of the "truth" became her passion. She could think of nothing more unbearable than "disappearing quietly in the great mass of the average" (Horney, 1980, p. 245).

Horney emigrated to the United States in 1932, perhaps to escape the possibility that the Nazis would seize power and probably to escape the remnants of her marriage. Almost immediately she became associated with the American Psychoanalytic Institute. Although she was more positive about Freud than vice versa, she did not accept all of his ideas (Horney, 2000). After its members criticized her for questioning Freud, she and

her followers resigned and founded the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (Frosch, 1991; Horney, 2000) and the American Institute of Psychoanalysis, a training facility. Horney was a founding editor of the Association's official organ, the *American Journal of Psychoanalysis*. Her U.S. colleagues included Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Margaret Mead. Horney and the first two were members of the Zodiac Club, colleagues who believed "in the importance of interpersonal factors in human development" (Cresti, 2003, p. 196). She lived in the United States until she died of cancer in 1952.

Horney's View of the Person

I realized ... that my search for a better understanding had led me in directions that were at variance with Freud. If so many factors that Freud regarded as instinctual were culturally determined, if so much that Freud considered libidinal was a neurotic need for affection, provoked by anxiety and aimed at feeling safe with others, then the libido theory was no longer tenable. Childhood experiences remained important, but the influence they exerted on our lives appeared in a new light (Horney, 1945, p. 13).

Anxiety became a central aspect of Horney's theory, accounting for the personality's defensive and security operations. Though, like Freud, she dealt with anxiety neuroses, she discarded Freud's theory of instincts as the explanation of anxiety-related behavior. She also pointed out that oral, anal, and genital drives do not exist in all human beings (1937). For her, the aim of compulsive drives is not to satisfy sexual instincts but to provide safety from feelings of isolation, helplessness, fear, and hostility. The "Oedipus complex" was declared not universal and not central to understanding personality. In fact, she rejected Freud's sexual emphasis: "But the ... emphasis Freud [gave] sexual factors may tempt many people to single them out above others ... To be straight in sexual questions is necessary; but to be straight only with them is not enough" (1942, p. 295). Psychosexuality is relevant only to a few cases of neurotic jealousy in parent/child relationships (Horney, 1937).

Horney focused on Freud's biased postulations about women, especially his concept "penis envy" (Eckardt, 1991). Freud's extrapolation from his perception of his own culture to all other cultures showed his ignorance. While Horney acknowledged that in some cultures women may be jealous of men's anatomy, in other cultures it is the reverse (1937). Even in European-American culture, envy of male anatomy may be limited to neurotic women. Women's alleged "castrating tendencies," often associated with Freud's "penis envy," supposedly derive from women's need to take from men what women lack. To the contrary, "Much of what in psychoanalytic literature is regarded as castrative tendencies in women and is traced back to penis envy is ... the result of a wish to humiliate men," not the desire to take their penises (Horney, 1937, p. 199). Freud not only ignored other cultures, he showed a "total" disregard for the influence of cultural factors on personality.

Further, Freud's view was contrary to social experience. When Horney (1945) first came to the United States, she noted important differences between the behaviors of people in this country and in some European countries that "only the difference in civilizations" could account for. In response to Freud's neglect of culture, Horney developed alternative, socially oriented concepts. The real forces motivating human attitudes and actions were social: dependency, cooperation, interpersonal anxiety, hostility, love, jealousy, greed, competitiveness, and inferiority. Even a newborn's first experience, feeding, is one of social cooperation. Like Adler, she emphasized human interactions in cultural contexts: exchanges with parents, siblings, peers, and significant others.

In general, Horney focused on conscious processes. Thus, id influences recede into the background, but influence of superego remains important. However, it is tied to the process of **socialization**, learning one's particular culture, not just "identification." The primary vehicle of socialization, the family, derives its importance from passing society's culture to future generations, not from acting as a psychosexual agent. Miletic (2002) notes that Horney criticized Freud for neglecting the importance of motherhood. Also, to Horney, the boy's problem is that his penis is too small to accommodate his mother's genitals, not that he suffers from castration anxiety. Horney's unconventional views are further examined in [Box 5.1](#).

Basic Concepts: Horney

Basic Anxiety: Infantile Helplessness in a Hostile World

According to Horney (1950), normal personality development occurs when factors in the social environment allow children to develop basic confidence in themselves and other people. Confidence is most likely to result when parents display genuine and predictable warmth, interest, and respect for their children. Abnormal development occurs when environmental conditions obstruct a child's natural psychological growth. In this case, confidence is replaced by **basic anxiety**, "an insidiously increasing, all-pervading feeling of being lonely and helpless in a hostile world" (Horney, 1937, p. 89). The child feels "small, insignificant, helpless, deserted, endangered, in a world that is out to abuse, cheat, attack, humiliate, betray, envy" (Horney, 1937, p. 92). Basic anxiety is an irrational emotional experience involving a pervasive, unpleasant feeling of extreme discomfort.

A wide range of factors in the family environment contribute to this fundamental insecurity: parental domination, belittling attitudes, indifference, unkept promises, overprotection, a hostile home atmosphere, encouraging the child to take sides in parental disagreements, isolation from other children, and lack of respect for the child's individual needs (Horney, 1945). Perhaps Horney's sensitivity to these conditions comes from the observation that some of them existed in her own childhood home. However, "the basic evil is invariably a lack of genuine warmth and affection" because of the parents' own incapacity to give it (Horney, 1937, p. 80). In the final analysis, disturbances in human relationships are expressed in **neuroses**, "psychic disturbance[s] brought about by fears and defenses against these fears, and by attempts to find compromise solutions for conflicting tendencies" (1937, pp. 28–29). Horney thought that neurotic people require excessive reassurance and are incapable of loving.

BOX 5.1 • *Horney on Adult Sexuality and Sexual Orientation*

Although Horney largely bypassed Freud's psychosexuality, she had much to say about adult sexuality, an unusual propensity for a woman of her era. Horney regarded masturbation as normal. However, individuals who masturbate compulsively—frequently, without the ability to stop—are attempting to release anxiety through a sexual “safety-value” (Horney, 1937, p. 52). In the realm of sexual relations, Horney saw four types of troubled people, all of whom primarily seek sex for reasons other than physical gratification. The first type crave sexual interaction because it allows them to establish human contact. Unfortunately, malevolent motivation lies behind their desire for relations with others: “... it is not so much a need for affection as a striving to conquer, or more accurately, to subdue others” (1937, p. 154).

The second type “... are prone to yield to sexual advances from either sex, [and] are driven by an unending need for affection, especially by a fear of losing another person through refusing a sexual request, or through daring to defend themselves against any requests made upon them, whether just or unjust” (p. 154). However, Horney is quick to point out that such people are not genuine bisexuals, people who have a real attraction to both sexes. Rather, they have interpersonal problems that go far beyond sexuality. They become the slaves of others because they cannot bear the thought of losing them.

For the third type, sexual excitement “... is an outlet for anxiety and for pent-up psychic tensions” (p. 155). When these individuals find themselves in a context that provokes their anxiety, they become attracted to the most prominent individual present. When in therapy, they may become passionately attracted to their psychotherapists. Alternatively, they may be highly aloof, unconsciously preferring to transfer the need for sexual closeness to an “outside” person who resembles the therapist. Finally, they may manifest their need for sexual contact with the therapist only in dreams. Ironically they have a “deep disbelief in any kind of genuine affection” and feel that the analyst is interested in them only for “ulterior motives” (p. 156).

The fourth type, homosexuality of the neurotic variety, is due to fear of competitiveness. This type (1) withdraws from attempts to attract the opposite sex so that he or she may avoid competition with individuals of his or her sex, and (2) deals with the anxiety born of competitiveness with the same sex by seeking the reassurance that only affection from the same sex can provide. Apparently these individuals stand in contrast to genuine homosexuals who are as normal as heterosexuals (Bailey, Gaulin, Agyei, & Gladue, 1994; Friedman & Downey, 1994). Horney (2000) mentions what could be a subtype of this category. Repressed female homosexuals are not overtly sexual, but are attracted to women and constantly seek their company.

Horney dismisses the Freudian allegation that women are masochistic: desire to be hurt, even physically, a probable source of the myth that women wish to be raped (Allen, 2001). She issued a general statement that makes no reference to gender: “Masochistic drives are neither an essentially sexual phenomenon nor the result of biologically determined processes, but originate in personality conflicts” (1937, p. 280). Other commentators cite Horney when they attribute masochistic behavior in women to culture, not biology (Shafter, 1992).

Horney also addressed women's alleged sexual frigidity by first acknowledging that, with the close of the Victorian era, frigidity was no longer considered a “normal condition in women” (1937, p. 199). Still, it may occur as a “deficiency” for two reasons. First, women may display frigidity, not because they have no sexual desire, but because they wish to humiliate the men in their lives (Horney, 2000). This explanation is especially applicable if their men have a neurotic fear of being humiliated by women. Second, women may display frigidity because of “... a feeling of being abused, degraded and humiliated by sexual relations.” Sex was, and to some degree still is, something that was done to them, even against their wills, as implied by the popular male inquiry, “Did you make her?” In the past, marriage gave women license to have sex, but even today some still feel the need to be frigid in order to avoid the feeling that they are willingly submitting to humiliation.

Horney felt comfortable with her own sexuality. To her sex was a normal, natural, and enjoyable experience. She was known to have had meaningful affairs before, during, and after her marriage to Oscar Horney (Quinn, 1988).

In sum, Horney reminds us that sexual activity is rarely, if ever, just to achieve physical orgasm.

Almost always there are psychological reasons behind sexual expression that are far more important than physical gratification. In turn, we are reminded that any sexual interaction is complex, a human relationship not to be taken lightly or to be engaged in thoughtlessly.

Coping with Ten Neurotic Needs

The child's methods of adjusting to basic anxiety form enduring motivational patterns. These patterns are called **neurotic needs**, the coping techniques that are initiated in childhood and composed of excessive, insatiable, and unrealistic demands developed in response to the basic anxiety that dominates the person (Horney, 1950). These needs crystallize into important aspects of personality. Their aim is not instinctual satisfaction, as Freud believed, but security.

Needs are considered neurotic (1) when a person adheres to them more rigidly than do other people in the culture, and (2) when there is a discrepancy between the person's potentialities and actual accomplishments. Neurotic people lack flexibility in reacting to different situations. For example, most people are likely to react indecisively or suspiciously when they have to make a difficult choice or when they respond to evidence of insincerity from another person. However, neurotic individuals tend to be unable to make up their minds, or repeatedly indicate how impossible it is to trust anyone because "everyone" is out to get whatever they can. Further, even though they may seem to have everything going for them, they display inappropriate feelings of inferiority and unhappiness. They sense that they stand in their own way. Table 5.1 presents Horney's ten neurotic needs, together with some illustrative behaviors.

Moving toward, against, and away from People

According to Horney, identifying the characteristics of an individual's dominant needs can reveal the direction the person is likely to take in relationships with other people. The over-all pattern of needs also suggests the form that intrapsychic conflict is likely to take. For Horney (1945), contradictory dispositions toward other people constitute a critically important form of conflict.

TABLE 5.1 *Ten Neurotic Needs Identified by Horney*

	<i>Excessive needs for</i>	<i>Shown in behaviors</i>
T O W A R D	1. Affection and approval	Striving to be liked and pleasing to others, to live up to the expectations of others; dreading self-assertion and hostility
	2. Having a "partner"	Seeking to be taken over by another, through "love"; dreading being left alone
	3. Narrowly restricting one's life	Trying to be inconspicuous, undemanding, and modest; contented with little
A G A I N S T	4. Power	Seeking domination and control over others; dreading weakness
	5. Exploiting others	Taking advantage of others, using others, dreading being "stupid"
S T R I V I N G	6. Social recognition or prestige	Seeking public acceptance; dreading "humiliation"
	7. Personal achievement	Striving to be best; defeating others; ambitious; dreading failure
A W A Y	8. Personal admiration	Self-inflating; not seeking social recognition, but admiration for their idealized self-image (I'm a saint)
	9. Self-sufficiency and independence	Trying to not need others; maintaining distance, dreading closeness
	10. Perfection and unassailability	Being driven toward superiority; dreading flaws and criticism

Conflict is an essential aspect of Horney's description of neurosis. All normal people experience conflict; however, conflict of neurotic proportions is an excessive deviation from the cultural norm.

Eventually, neurotic conflict comes to involve contradictory orientations to the self that pervade the entire personality. Horney (1945) discussed three generalized trends that individuals may show in regard to others and themselves. These trends may be thought of as a synthesis of the neurotic needs. Each trend is “a whole way of life” and each encompasses a subgroup of the ten needs summarized in [Table 5.1](#).

Moving toward people reflects neurotic needs for a partner and for affection; it also involves compulsive modesty. This trend is associated with the first three needs listed in [Table 5.1](#). Predominant characteristics are helplessness and compliance. Such people accept their own helplessness, and, despite their estrangement and fears, try to win the affection of others and to lean on them. Only in this way can they feel safe with other people. If there is conflict in their personal community, they will attach themselves to the most powerful person or group. By complying with sources of power, they gain a feeling of belonging and support that makes them feel less weak and less isolated.

A neurotic solution to anxiety often adopted by people extreme in this orientation is called **self-effacing**, a mode of responding to others in which the person will seek accommodation at any price including backing down whenever there is an interpersonal conflict in order to avoid loss of friendship, support, or love of others (Horney, 2000; Muller, 1993). It is modesty gone awry. Individuals displaying this characterological profile will sabotage their own best interest, deny their own points of view, and derogate themselves publicly if it seems necessary in order to keep the affections and attentions of others.

Moving against people reflects compulsive, exaggerated cravings for power and prestige, as well as personal ambition (needs 4, 5, 6, and 7 in [Table 5.1](#)). There is such an overemphasis on hostility that these people may be thought of as suffering from “basic hostility.” In this case, people accept and take for granted the hostility around them, and determine, consciously or unconsciously, to fight. They implicitly distrust the feelings and intentions of others toward themselves and rebel in whatever ways are available. They want to be the stronger and defeat others, partly for protection, partly for revenge.

The extreme neurotic solution in this case is called **expansive**, to be “in control,” to not admit that one is incorrect (or another person is correct), and to never give an inch in a conflict (Muller, 1993). These people are invested in avoiding the “horror” of being the “controlled” rather than the “controller.” They must always determine who does what in a setting, never letting others determine behavioral outcomes. They are also afflicted with **hyper-competitiveness**, the indiscriminate need of individuals to compete and win (and avoid losing) at any cost as a means of maintaining or enhancing feelings of self-worth. To them, winning is everything; how the game is played is nothing.

Moving away from people reflects a person’s concern with self, as seen in needs for admiration and perfectionism (needs 8, 9, and 10 in [Table 5.1](#)). The predominant characteristic is seeking isolation. This type “wants neither to belong nor to fight, but keeps apart. He feels he has not much in common with them, they do not understand him ... He builds up a world of his own—with nature, with his dolls, his books, his dreams” (p 43). [Box 5.2](#) illustrates the dangers of extreme adherence to these orientations.

In this case, the neurotic solution is termed **resignation**, which is to free oneself from the risks involved in approaching or attacking others by being an onlooker, a non-competitor, an avoider, and a reactive person who is hypersensitive to influence attempts (Horney, 1950; Muller, 1993). He or she literally resigns from social discourse. When conflict arises, these people are inclined to say “What difference does it make?” (Muller, 1993, p. 266). Muller has also pointed out that people showing this syndrome resemble the “borderline” personality type as classified in the American Psychiatric Association’s manual of abnormal behaviors.

These orientations can exist within a single person. **Basic conflict** involves contradictory orientations to move toward, away from, and against others, all existing within a neurotic. Likewise, a single person can show, at times, elements of self-effacement, expansiveness, and resignation.

Developing an Idealized versus a Real Image of Self

Once firmly established, basic anxiety gives rise to additional feelings of alienation from one's real self and growing self-hatred. Genuine realization of the self is sacrificed to an **idealized image of self**, an artificial pride system that the person creates to give the personality a sense of unity that does not exist. For example, imagine a heavyset, middle-aged adult looking in a mirror and seeing a trim, young adult (Horney, 1945). Such an idealized image serves five functions: (1) it substitutes for the absence of realistic self-confidence and pride, through an inflated but unsupported feeling of significance and power; (2) it counteracts the presence of real inner weakness and self-contempt by allowing the individual to feign being more worthy than others; (3) it compensates for a lack of genuine ideals, without the presumption of which the individual would feel lost; (4) it represents an idealized, private mirror on which to rely so that one's most blatant shortcomings disappear or take on an attractive coloration; and (5) it offers the appearance but not the actual reconciliation of conflicts and inconsistencies within the individual's personality. By contrast, the **real self** is the potential for growth beyond the artificial idealized image of self. It is the self one can become if all the potentialities that one has are fully developed (Cresti, 2003). *Self-realization* is the process of real self development.

BOX 5.2 • The Controllers

The present case is a composite of those considered in the media, but has a particular case at its core. Randall and Jullianne had been "going steady" since their junior year in high school. Rarely was one seen without the other. If Randall was observed alone in public, it was a good bet that Jullianne was home with her parents. Neither had many friends, especially Jullianne. Her friends had long since given up trying to spend time with her. If they wanted to see her, Randall had to be there and his cold surveillance of their interactions made the experience too uncomfortable. When they were seen in public, Randall always had a hand on Jullianne. Typically, he had his fingers around her upper arm, or placed a hand at the junction of her neck and back as if to steer her. People joked that she was really a puppet and he a master puppeteer. No one noticed that, when a young and handsome man happened to pass them, Jullianne averted her eyes.

After high school, Jullianne's insistence that they finish college before marrying met with such an angry escalation of Randall's controlling behavior that she threatened to break off their relationship. His response was much more of the same. He would literally stand between her and other people with whom she was attempting to converse. When another man approached as if to speak to her, his cold stare lapsed into a snarl. Jullianne fled such scenes quickly lest a fight ensue.

Overwhelmed finally, Jullianne broke off the relationship. Randall's incessant calls to her house were answered with "She isn't home." Assuming the truth of these statements, he went looking for her. Occasionally he found her driving around or walking into a store and shadowed her. Once he threatened a male clerk with whom she was conversing. However, his behavior remained a mere nuisance until Jullianne began to date other men. One Saturday Randall could no longer bear the thought of her being with another man. He followed Jullianne and her date to a bar, and slipped in after them. As soon as they were seated, he approached, began to shout at them, and abruptly punched the date. After the bouncer tossed him from the bar, he waited in his car for Jullianne and the date to emerge. As they were getting into the date's car, he gunned his engine, slipped his foot off the brake pedal, and, with the squealing sound of spinning tires, the car lunged toward the helpless couple. The date was clear of the point of impact and sustained minor injuries, but Jullianne was crushed and died instantly. Randall suffered head and spinal injuries. He is now free: the court declared that his mental deficiency made him no longer a threat. In the months during which he seemed profoundly retarded when he appeared in court, he was doing very well in college.

Creation of an idealized self takes place unconsciously. It also may be accompanied by other forms of pretense, such as **externalization**, the tendency to experience internal processes as if they occurred outside oneself and to hold these "exterior" factors responsible for one's difficulties. Externalization serves to eliminate oneself as the cause of personal problems by projecting or shifting blame onto entities "outside"

oneself, especially other people. Externalization is not just shifting responsibility. “Not only one’s faults are experienced in others but to a greater or lesser degree all feelings” (1945, p. 116). Thus, externalization is much broader than Freud’s defense mechanism, projection.

“Another inevitable product of externalization is a gnawing sense of emptiness and shallowness” (p. 117). Along with it comes an externalization of self-contempt in which one either despises others or feels “that it is others who look down upon oneself” (p. 118). Finally, rage results and is itself externalized in three ways. First, anger is “thrust outward” either as general irritability or as “specific irritation directed at the very faults in others that the person hates in himself” (p. 120). Second, rage is externalized in the form of an ever-present expectation that the faults “which are intolerable to oneself will infuriate others” (p. 121). Horney’s former patient whose idealized self-image was as saintly as the priest in Victor Hugo’s *Les Misérables* is a good example. The patient expected that others would have contempt for her as she was, so she hid behind a “holier than thou” facade. When she deviated from this angelic image and became angry, she was amazed to find that others liked her better. The third way to externalize rage is to channel it into physical ills, which involves incessant complaining about various vague maladies, from headaches to fatigue.

“The discrepancy between a *neurotic’s actual behavior* and his *idealized picture of himself* can be so blatant that one wonders how he himself can help seeing it” (Horney, 1945, p. 132; emphasis added). Here Horney refers to the **actual self**, who one currently is, which stands in contrast to the idealized self, who one should be, and real self, who one could be. The inevitable trauma of the brutal collision between the idealized and actual selves is akin to Adler’s shock. This destructive clash can be postponed by resorting to one or more of seven defenses (Horney, 1945).

A **blind spot** is an area of contradiction about which the individual manages to remain unaware. One of Horney’s patients never saw the contradiction between his “game” of figuratively killing colleagues at a meeting by “gunning them down” with an index finger and the “Christlike” idealized image he maintained. In **compartmentalization**, individuals separate key aspects of themselves and their life situations into “logic-tight” compartments. “There is a section for friends and one for enemies, one for the family and one for outsiders, one for professional and one for personal life ... what happens in one compartment does not appear to the neurotic to contradict what happens in another” (p. 133).

Rationalization “may be defined as self-deception by reasoning” (p. 135). By performing mental gymnastics, the individual makes despicable behavior into benevolent deportment. For example, someone who sees himself as helping another, when, in fact, “strong tendencies to dominate are present” (p. 135). **Excessive self-control** arises in reaction to a flood of contradictory emotions and involves holding feelings and behavior in a vise-grip. “Persons who exert such control will not allow themselves to be carried away, whether by enthusiasm, sexual excitement, self-pity, or rage” (p. 136). **Arbitrary rightness** is the strategy of people who see life as a merciless battle and, therefore, feel they must be definite and “right” about everything lest “foreign influence” control them. For these people, doubt is a dangerous weakness. In the event of a conflict, they can feel “in control” only if they can declare themselves “in the right.”

Elusiveness is the ability to slither away from conflicts by refusing to ever take an identifiable stand. Elusive people “resemble those characters in fairy tales who when pursued turn into fish; if not safe in this guise, they turn into deer; if the hunter catches up with them they fly away as birds. You can never pin them down to any statement” (p. 138). If one of their pronouncements is challenged, they deny having said whatever they said, say they did not really mean it, or reinterpret it. **Cynicism** is “the denying or deriding of moral values” because of a deep-seated uncertainty with regard to morality (p. 139). These people’s response to moral uncertainty is skepticism about morality. They twist wrong into right and vice versa. All that matters is doing what they please and looking good in the process. Those who reason and behave otherwise are thought to be either hypocrites or stupid.

A Basic Diversity Issue: The Psychology of Women

Women lived for centuries in a world that kept them away from economic and political responsibilities and restricted them to a private emotional sphere. They did carry responsibility and had to work, but their work was done within the confines of the family and, thus, was based on emotional rather than practical interpersonal relations. Love and devotion came to be regarded as specifically feminine ideals and virtues. To women, because their relations to men and children were their only path to happiness, security, and prestige, love represented a realistic value. In men's sphere it was earning capacity. Thus, only emotional pursuits were encouraged. Other pursuits were of secondary importance in women's minds.

Horney made significant contributions to the psychology of women by criticizing Freud and his "boy's eye" view of anatomy as the basis of psychological differences between men and women. Horney challenged Freud's speculations that lacking male anatomy led women to (1) envy men for their penises (Symonds, 1991); (2) feel shame over biological "deficiency"; (3) blame this deficiency on their mothers; (4) overvalue relationships with men; (5) become jealous of other women as competitors for anatomically superior men; (6) prefer stimulation of the clitoris because it is penis-like; and (7) strive to be submissive, dependent, and masochistic because "these traits are natural to women" (Eldredge, 1989).

Horney also challenged Freud's underlying assumptions about gender. First, she considered it illogical that persons built for specific biological functions should be obsessed with obtaining the biological attributes of the other sex. Second, cross-cultural investigations have failed to demonstrate the universality of Freud's speculation about females' wish for male anatomy. In fact, there are societies whose males show "womb envy." Third, Horney (1926) asserted that a psychological theory "written" by a man may not be wholly relevant to women. In fact, the masculine point of view pervades science and most of European and European-American thought. "Like all sciences and all valuations, the psychology of women has hitherto been considered only from the point of view of men" (Horney, 1967, p. 56).

Women have been enmeshed in social systems that have forced them into political, economic, and psychological dependency on men (Eldredge, 1989). Women have been socialized to seek "love" relationships, based on the belief "I must have a man" (1942). This belief motivated women to unconsciously conform to the demands of men and then assume, erroneously, that the behavior and feelings they adopt represent true feminine nature.

Evaluation

Contributions

Help with Everyday Problems. Horney often worked with neurotics, but, because she had much concern for the everyday problems of normal people, she promoted self-exploration in her popular books. Her books are filled with discussions of ambition, depression, self-confidence, dependency, and greed. Her purpose was not to offer clear-cut solutions to neurotic conflicts, but to provide information useful for self-examination. Her books include *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (1937), *Self-Analysis* (1942), *Our Inner Conflicts* (1945), and *Are You Considering Psychoanalysis?* (1946). Her adolescent diary is still studied today (Seiffge-Krenke & Kirsch, 2002).

Among the everyday concerns featured in Horney's books was **jealousy**, the fear of losing a relationship that is seen as the best available means of satisfying an insatiable need for affection and incessant demands for unconditional love (Horney, 1937). She recognized that jealousy is evident even in early childhood. A child can be jealous of siblings or of a parent who seems to be receiving more attention from the other parent than is the child. Furthermore, Horney acknowledged that Oedipal jealousy may also exist: a child may be jealous of the parent of the same sex for monopolizing the physical (sexual) and emotional attention of the opposite-sex parent.

Some degree of jealousy is true of all of us and may be a quite reasonable reaction to the real but generally remote possibility that an important love relationship may end. However, the kind of jealousy Horney considered is exaggerated beyond the bounds of reason. The fear of these people is so great that any

of the loved one's interests not revolving around themselves is a threat to them. "This kind of jealousy may appear in every human relation—on the part of parents toward their children who want to make friends or to marry; on the part of children toward their parents; between marriage partners ..." (1937, p. 129).

Morbid adult jealousy can be a carryover from childhood neurosis: both involve an insatiable appetite for love arising from unresolved basic anxiety. In recognizing a possible tie between jealousy involving childhood relationships and jealousy in adult relationships, Horney was ahead of her time. Philip Shaver and his colleagues have established a link between the way children relate to their parents and how they later relate to important people in their adult lives, most especially lovers (see Shaver and Hazan, 1987). As adults, certain insecure people whose childhood needs were not consistently met show the same kind of insatiable need for unconditional love to which Horney alluded. Because they cannot get enough assurance of love, they are morbidly jealous of anyone who is a rival for the attentions of their loved ones. **Box 5.3** contains information relevant to Shaver's theory and also a jealousy scale. Read and follow the instructions in the box before returning here.

DeAngelis (1994) reported on additional work by Shaver and colleagues. Shaver's first category, secure people, are high on interpersonal sensitivity, but low on compulsive, obligatory caregiving. Anxious-ambivalent adults, the second category, display exactly the opposite pattern. Avoidant individuals, the third category, tend toward "one-night stands" and find pleasure in sex without love. Secure adults enjoy experimenting sexually with all kinds of physical contact, from hugs to oral sex, but only within the context of a continuing relationship. By contrast, avoidant types like only sexual forms of physical contact. Anxious-ambivalent types like the more nurturing kinds of physical contact, but were not overly enthralled with sexual contact. Shaver wondered whether the 40,000 people who wrote Ann Landers proclaiming a preference for hugs over intercourse were predominantly anxious types.

To answer "What is it about parents that promotes development of one style or another in their children?" Levy, Blatt, and Shaver (1998) had subjects write a description of each parent. Consistent with expectations, the descriptions of anxious-ambivalent men's mothers were more ambivalent (a mix of positive and negative attributions) than descriptions of other style/gender combinations. Unexpectedly, avoidant women's descriptions of their mothers were greater in ambivalence than even anxious-ambivalent women. Secure subjects described both mothers and fathers at a higher conceptual level (more complex and abstract descriptions) than subjects with other styles, but avoidant women also described mothers and fathers at a high conceptual level. Thus, not only anxious-ambivalent types, but also avoidant women, had mixed conceptions of their mothers. They also gave conceptually complex descriptions of both parents. Perhaps because their parents sometimes rejected them during childhood, but not always, these women's parents are still heavy on their minds.

In an Internet study of 5,248 responses to questions about romantic relationship breakups, Davis, Shaver, and Vernon (2003) uncovered a laundry list of negative cognitions, emotions, and behaviors associated with attachment-related anxiety: heightened preoccupation with the lost partner, enhanced physical and emotional distress, exaggerated attempts to reestablish the relationship, increased anger and vengeful behavior, and dysfunctional coping strategies. Although attachment-related avoidance was positively related to avoidant and self-reliant coping strategies, attachment-related security was positively related to relying on friends and family for comfort.

In other recent work, Mikulincer (1998) found that secure people showed low anger proneness and dealt with angry encounters in a more even-handed, positive, and adaptive way. In contrast, anxious-ambivalent people displayed lack of anger control and a tendency to "mentally ruminate or stew over anger feelings without expressing them overtly" (p. 514). Avoidant people were high in hostility and displayed a lack of awareness of their anger, as well as attempts to deny and escape anger episodes. In the context of participation in group tasks, Rom and Mikulincer (2003) investigated attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance in relation to "closeness goals" (love), "distance goals" (self-reliance), instrumental functioning (IF) during a group task ("I took the task seriously"), and social emotional functioning (SEF) during a group task ("I helped group members work together"). Attachment anxiety was negatively related to IF and attachment avoidance was negatively related to both IF and SEF. Attachment anxiety was positively related to closeness goals and attachment avoidance was positively related to distance goals.

In recent years, there have been many studies which, like Mikulincer's, show that attachment processes are complex. For example, Cook (2000) found that attachment security level can be relationship-specific

(attachments to mother, father, and lover could all be different), attachment security is affected by the person(s) to whom one attaches, and attachment security is reciprocated (when people feel comfortable depending on others, others feel comfortable depending on them). Students often ask me, “Can attachment styles change?” The answer is a qualified “yes.” Davila and Cobb (2003) found sufficient changes in attachment styles over a one-year period to allow for meaningful associations of attachment change with several variables. Farley (2002) found low attachment instability (relatively little change) from age one to age six, but moderate to modest instability (appreciable change) for four other age ranges, including age 1 to age 19. Attachment styles are related to jealousy in [Box 5.3](#).

Anticipating Research on Concepts of Interest to the Public. “Jealousy” was only one of Horney’s ideas that was ahead of its time. She anticipated many beliefs of the humanists ([Chapters 9 and 10](#)). Like Adler, Horney’s therapy was not just for gaining what Freud called “insight.” It was for growth (Cresti, 2003). Another of Horney’s notions anticipated a popular idea of psychotherapist Albert Ellis, the psychologist who is known for his assumption that people are basically irrational (Allen, 2001). As reflected in Ellis’ concept “masturbation,” Horney believed that some people are subject to the **tyranny of the shoulds**, the belief that one should do this and that, whatever a good person *should do*, whatever is expected by others, rather than what one feels it is his or her nature to do. People afflicted with this malady think of themselves as miserable worms who must forever wriggle forth in pursuit of the elusive perfection that eludes them. Horney wrote, “Forget about the disgraceful creature you actually *are*; this is how you *should* be; and to be this idealized self is all that matters. You should be able to endure everything, to understand everything, to like everybody, to be always productive ...” (Horney, 1950, pp. 64–65). The shoulds dominate the individual, so that not to do what one “should” generates anxiety and guilt. “He should be the utmost of honesty, generosity, considerateness... . He should be the perfect lover, husband, teacher ... he should love his parents, his wife, his country ... he should never feel hurt, and he should always be serene and unruffled” (p. 65). He should be whatever others deem to be the “right kind of person,” never himself. Needless to say, many of us are bound by the chains of the “shoulds.” Horney believed that the first step in escaping this bondage is to recognize the tyrant who has tied us up. Then we may begin to acknowledge that the ideal of perfection we pursue is impossible to obtain, and, in fact, deters us from being who we could become.

Developing New Clinical Techniques: Self-analysis. Horney’s therapeutic approach involves trust, confidence, respect for each person’s individual uniqueness and constructive resources, and adherence to the principle that exploration precedes explanation. The goal is to seek the real self, not to discover some awful problem and somehow correct it (Cresti, 2003).

BOX 5.3 • Attachment Styles and Jealousy

First read the three descriptions of attachment styles and choose the one that fits you best. Then respond to Mathes's Interpersonal Jealousy Scale. Finally, refer to the information at the end of the box to learn of the relationship between the two exercises.

Part 1: Attachment Styles

An attachment style is the mode of relating to important people in your life that you developed through your relationships with your parents. Now follow the instructions.

Shaver's Attachment Styles. Read the statements below and simply check the one that is most applicable to you. If you are not sure, check the statement that is more applicable than the others.

1. I find it relatively easy to get close to others and am comfortable depending on them and having them depend on me. I don't often worry about being abandoned or about someone getting too close to me.
2. I find that others are reluctant to get as close as I would like. I often worry that my partner doesn't really love me or won't want to stay with me. I want to merge completely with another person, and this desire sometimes scares people away.
3. I am somewhat uncomfortable being close to others; I find it difficult to trust them completely, difficult to allow myself to depend on them. I am nervous when anyone gets too close, and often, love partners want me to be more intimate than I feel comfortable being.

Quoted from Shaver (1986, p. 31), with permission.

Part 2: The Interpersonal Jealousy Scale

In responding to each item, place the name of your current romantic partner in the blank of each item. If you have no romantic partner at present, use the name of a person from a past relationship. If you are married, use your spouse's name. Then, use the scale below to express your feelings concerning the truth of the item. For example, if you feel the item is "absolutely true" of you, place a 9 to the left of the item number. If it is only definitely true, place an 8 beside the item, and so on.

- 9 = absolutely true; agree completely
- 8 = definitely true
- 7 = true
- 6 = slightly true
- 5 = neither true nor false
- 4 = slightly false
- 3 = false
- 2 = definitely false
- 1 = absolutely false; disagree completely

(Gay and Lesbian individuals, please forgive and ignore the reference to "opposite sex"; place your current or past partner's name in the blanks.)

1. If _____ were to see an old friend of the opposite sex and respond with a great deal of happiness, I would be annoyed.
2. If _____ went out with same sex friends, I would feel compelled to know what he/she did.
3. If _____ admired someone of the opposite sex I would feel irritated.
4. If _____ were to help someone of the opposite sex with his/her homework, I would feel suspicious.
5. When _____ likes one of my friends I am pleased.
6. If _____ were to go away for the weekend without me, my only concern would be with whether

he/she had a good time.

7. If _____ were helpful to someone of the opposite sex, I would feel jealous.
8. When _____ talks of happy experiences of his/her past, I feel sad that I wasn't part of it.
9. If _____ were to become displeased about the time I spend with others, I would be flattered.
10. If _____ and I went to a party and I lost sight of him/her, I would become uncomfortable.
11. I want _____ to remain good friends with the people he/she used to date.
12. If _____ were to date others I would feel unhappy.
13. When I notice that _____ and a person of the opposite sex have something in common, I am envious.
14. If _____ were to become very close to someone of the opposite sex, I would feel very unhappy and/or angry.
15. I would like _____ to be faithful to me.
16. I don't think it would bother me if _____ flirted with someone of the opposite sex.
17. If someone of the opposite sex were to compliment _____, I would feel that the person was trying to take _____ away from me.
18. I feel good when _____ makes a new friend.
19. If _____ were to spend the night comforting a friend of the opposite sex who had just had a tragic experience, _____'s compassion would please me.
20. If someone of the opposite sex were to pay attention to _____, I would become possessive of him/her.
21. If _____ was to become exuberant and hug someone of the opposite sex, it would make me feel good that he/she was expressing his/her feelings openly.
22. The thought of _____ kissing someone else drives me up the wall.
23. If someone of the opposite sex lit up at the sight of _____, I would become uneasy.
24. I like to find fault with _____'s old dates.
25. I feel possessive toward _____.
26. If _____ had previously been married, I would feel resentment towards the ex-wife/husband.
27. If I saw a picture of _____ and an old date I would feel unhappy.
28. If _____ were to accidentally call me by the wrong name, I would become furious.

Note: To calculate your score, put minuses in front of the scale numbers you assigned to items 5, 6, 11, 16, 18, 19, and 21, then add these numbers. Next add the numbers for the other items. Your score is this total minus the negative total. The higher it is, the more the jealousy. Reprinted with permission of Eugene Mathes.

Part 3: Relationship between the Exercises

About the same percentage of newspaper respondents checked a given attachment style statement as university students. About 56 percent of all respondents checked the first statement, thereby indicating secure attachment, 19 percent endorsed the anxious-ambivalent statement listed second, and 25 percent checked the third statement, identifying them as tending toward avoidant attachment. More recently, Mickelson, Kessler, and Shaver (1997) found the percentages to be 59, 11.3, and 25.2, respectively (4.5 percent were unclassified because their three ratings were equal). The last two statements indicate insecure attachment styles. People with these two styles, especially the anxious-ambivalent style, are expected to be unusually jealous. Notice that Shaver's second statement indicates high need for assurance of love. It could have been made by one of Horney's patients with "an insatiable need for affection" (moving toward). The third statement has the flavor of moving away. "Moving against" is not represented, but isn't it easy to imagine an attachment style of the controlling kind?

Assume that scores on Mathes's jealousy scale of 100 or above indicate high jealousy, and scores of 25 or below indicate low jealousy. However, here are a couple of points to remember in evaluating your responses to the two exercises and the relationship between them. First, both the research associated with Shaver's statements and Mathes's scale are oriented to romantic involvements, but Horney's point of view relates to a broader range of relationships (see Mathes, Adams, & Davies, 1985). Thus, whether or not your attachment style choice matched your jealousy score reflects only partially on Horney's theory.

Second, much more information about you would be needed before solid conclusions could be drawn concerning whether or not you are a particularly jealous person and concerning what your attachment style might be.

Before leaving this box, go back to Mathes's jealousy scale one more time and look for items that fit Horney's conception of jealousy well. For example, items 7 and 17 are clear examples of what Horney meant by "morbid jealousy."

One of her relatively ignored contributions is **self-analysis**, a process whereby people come to understand themselves better through their own efforts, often outside the context of psychotherapy (Horney, 1942). It is apparently rare that people are trusted to probe their own psyches in the hope of self-discovery without their psychologist, psychiatrist, or counselor being present. But Horney regularly did what others rarely dared to do.

In Horney's view, self-analysis is certainly not the same as "self-help," which is typically done by people with no assistance, except that provided by a popular book. Rather, it is a step that a person takes in the direction of **self-recognition**, coming to know one's neuroses, idealized self-image, and real self, including positive and negative attributes. It is also a step taken under supervision. The patients described in Horney's 1942 book may have tried "self-analysis" (the book title) outside of therapy, but they had received therapy and would have it again.

I have chosen the case of Clare to illustrate self-analysis, because, of the several case histories covered in *Self Analysis*, it is the most detailed. Reading the summary of Clare's case will tell you something about self-analysis and partially reiterate Horney's theory. Clare was unwanted by her mother, who unsuccessfully attempted to abort her. Her father simply was uninterested in any of the children. However, Clare was intelligent and received a good education. By the time she entered therapy at age 30, she had been married—her husband died—and had become a successful magazine editor. During analysis she was involved with Peter, a businessman and the focus of her problems. Clare was morbidly dependent, lacking in self-confidence, and gripped by an insatiable need for reassurances of love. This account concentrates on instances of self-recognition that occurred to Clare.

Clare's whole life was wrapped up in Peter. She wanted to be with him all the time. When he failed to keep a promised date with her, which happened often, she was devastated. A lightbulb went on for Clare and illuminated both herself and her relationship with Peter when she awoke on a Sunday morning intensely irritated at an author who broke his promise to submit an article for her magazine. While reflecting on this puzzling incident, it occurred to Clare that she was not really angry with the author nor at people who fail to keep promises. Rather, she was angry because Peter had frustrated her desire to be with him by failing to show up on that weekend as promised. This realization caused her to remember the heroine of a novel who lost her feelings for her husband while he was away at war. In turn, she wondered whether she wanted to sever her emotional ties with Peter, but dismissed the thought "because I love him so much" (p. 194). Thus, despite correctly recognizing that she was really angry with Peter, she lost an important opportunity to break Peter's hold on her.

Clare "managed to shake off the whole problem" and fell back to sleep (p. 196). She dreamed of being lost in a foreign city where people spoke an unknown language and that she had left her luggage and money at the train station. Then she was at a fair where there was gambling and a freak show. Reflecting on this dream, she realized that counting on the unreliable Peter was a "crap shoot," and that he was something of a freak. This shallow analysis was, however, as far as she was able to go. She missed the symbolism of being lost without luggage and money: she had "invested" everything in Peter and it all had been lost.

One morning a notice of a shipwreck brought back a dream in which she was adrift on the waves, in danger of drowning, but a "strong man put his arms around her and saved her" (p. 202). She had a feeling of belonging and of endless protection. "He would always hold her in his arms and never leave her" (p. 202). This dream reminded her of Bruce, an older writer who had promised to be her mentor. He was a "hero" whose interest in her was described as a "blessing." These experiences moved Clare closer to recognizing that she wanted everlasting love and protection. Though she also realized that Bruce was not as brilliant as her dream implied, she did not generalize her revelation about him to the "superior" man in her life, Peter. It was to be some time before she fully acknowledged Peter's many deficiencies. Nevertheless, it was the first

time she truly recognized that Peter was not giving her what she wanted and that she was dissatisfied with the relationship.

Clare's mood hinged on every nuance of Peter's behavior. An instance of his lateness plunged her into deep depression. The smallest favor generated disproportionate joy. When he gave her a scarf, she reacted as if he had presented her with the Hope diamond. If he relented and went out with her after all, she was as grateful as a condemned man granted a last-minute pardon. Later Clare recalled a dream of a large bird flying away. It was glorious in color and grace, not unlike Peter who was handsome and a fine dancer. It meant that Peter, under whose "wing" she wanted to hide, had flown away, or was about to.

Eventually, Clare recognized that she desperately needed Peter for the protection and reassurance that she hoped he would provide, not because he was a great hero or because she had true affection for him. Fortunately she was in the process of weaning herself from him when the rumor mill told her he was having an affair. When he subsequently wrote her asking for a separation, she averted the emotional collapse that would have occurred earlier. Instead she got through the crisis and later came to recognize that her problem was broader than Peter: "her picture of herself was determined entirely by ... evaluation[s] by others" (p. 245). The revelation almost made her faint. Later, back in therapy, Clare executed the final incision to excise Peter from her psyche, but Horney asserts she likely could have done it on her own in continued self-analysis.

While self-analysis is valuable, Horney acknowledged its several shortcomings. During self-analysis, patients: (1) may perceive something about themselves that is not true, but see it as accurate; (2) may come up with correct information about themselves, but misinterpret it; (3) may have a partial and accurate recognition regarding themselves, but fail to extend it to core personality dispositions; and (4) may analyze an incident correctly with regard to its implications for themselves, but not know what to do with the result. These are all reasons why self-analysis should be done under supervision, as was always true of Horney's patients. Clare made all four errors.

Some Research Support

While research support for Horney's theory has been relatively meager, hypercompetitiveness has been significantly investigated. This "moving against" orientation is accompanied by a need to manipulate and denigrate others in a variety of situations. Ryckman, Thornton, and Butler (1994) related their index of hypercompetitiveness to several measures suggested by Horney's writings concerning the constellation of characteristics that embody hypercompetitiveness. The first of these measures was based on Horney's belief that hypercompetitive individuals are prone to be narcissistic. They are overtly self-laudatory, but beneath the bravado they feel inferior as well as powerless and insignificant.

Based on Horney's contention that hypercompetitive individuals tend to be exhibitionistic and unconventional, they should attain high scores on a second measure, Sensation Seeking. A third measure assessed a tendency to be "everything to everybody" (p. 86), a Horney-inspired disposition that is indexed by the Type E scale. Type E's, who want to be the best at everything, habitually take on multiple roles leading to overload and conflict. Hypercompetitors are also Machiavellians, a reference to Italian Prince Niccolò Machiavelli, a master of the fine art of manipulation and exploitation. Machiavellians lie and cheat, whatever it takes to beat their enemies, who are numerous, as they dislike almost everyone. The best predictors of hypercompetitiveness were narcissism, followed by Type E orientation and some measures of sensation seeking. Although not a strong predictor of hypercompetitiveness, Machiavellianism was positively correlated with it.

Ryckman, Libby, van den Borne, Gold, and Lindner (1997) compared hypercompetitiveness with individual development competitiveness. While hypercompetitiveness involves narcissistic individualism, personal development competitiveness entails no sharp boundaries between self and others. Personal development competitors endorse "I enjoy competition because it brings me and my competitors closer as human beings" while hypercompetitors endorse "It's a dog-eat-dog world. If you don't get the better of others, they will surely get the better of you" (p. 277). Both types showed values encompassing self contained individualism—achievement, hedonism, striving for an exciting and challenging life—but only hypercompetitors endorsed "power and control over others." Only personal development competitors valued respecting, caring for, and being concerned about the well-being of others. Burckle, Ryckman, Gold, Thornton, and Audesse (1999) found that "hypercompetitiveness" is strongly, positively related to eating disorder symptoms, but "personal development competitiveness" is not. Further, they reported that eating

disorder symptoms are related to “motivation to achieve in appearance” but not to “motivation to achieve academically.”

Some Application: Group Therapy

Horney was quite critical of group therapy. Among her complaints was that its outcomes were difficult to evaluate, it may generate superficial improvements “of a behavioral rather than structural nature” (Cresti, 2003, p. 196), it may generate overwhelming anxiety (possibly due to revelations of deficiencies in front of a group), and it would not be suitable for all patients. Still, Cresti (2003) saw many applications of Horney’s ideas to group therapy. The support of group members fuels true self-fulfillment. If interpersonal relations in the group are respectful and accepting, growth of self is likely. Insofar as the group climate promotes an “ethic of sympathy” (p. 197), the capacities of the true self will unfold. Growth-bolstering intimacy development can be cultivated in the group context. Finally, the group can be a “warm cocoon” (p. 197) in which intimacy and trust can foster the expression of the self’s potential.

Unfortunately, Horney’s insights into group therapy have been largely ignored, as have her ideas about jealousy. [Box 5.4](#) looks at how jealousy has been treated by evolutionary psychologists.

Limitations

The scarcity of scientific support for Horney’s theory can, in part, be traced to the difficulty of measuring her concepts. Neurotic needs, externalization, the real self, and other concepts are too abstract to be measured reliably. She, like the others covered so far, was trained as a physician–psychiatrist, not a psychological scientist. All were simply not equipped to conduct the scientific research that might have confirmed or disconfirmed their points of view. Further, none of these theorists seemed able to recognize contradictions to their theories found in their own writings. For example, according to Horney’s notions of “need for assurance of love” and “jealousy,” Clare ought to have been an especially jealous person. In fact, there are few, if any, lines in the description of her case that can be clearly interpreted as references to jealousy.

Conclusions

Although some of Horney’s concepts are too broad and general “to get a handle on,” most of them are quite specific and defined in crystal clear fashion. While other theorists are evasive, Horney is refreshingly straightforward. In fact, Horney is a superb writer, probably the best among the theorists covered in this book. Unlike the books of other theorists, I can recommend hers as both an enjoyable read and a useful source of information. Further, she, more than some others, addressed the considerations that are of interest to normal people. Her intuitively optimistic “growth approach” is a refreshing contrast to the gloomy view of the psychoanalysts (Rubin, 1991). She was known to be optimistic as a therapist (Cresti, 2003).

The alleged untestability of her concepts may also be overstated. Because she defined her concepts clearly, many should be testable. Her notions about jealousy in relation to need for reassurances of love are quite testable. Horney’s ideas on attachment clearly predated those of modern researchers. Shaver tested some of her ideas, though he does not credit her. Attachment research might be advanced if a “controlling” (moving against) style were added to the others. Given that Horney’s ideas are more testable than the lack of research on them implies, one may ask why they have not often been subjected to scientific scrutiny. The answer may well be that the only woman theorist taken seriously by modern personality psychologists is taken less seriously than male theorists. Her name is omitted from the four lists of outstanding twentieth century psychologists (Haggblom et al., 2002). A reconsideration of Horney’s writings seems in order.

BOX 5.4 • *Evolutionary Theory and Jealousy*

Evolutionary theory offers alternatives to Horney's and Shaver's notions of jealousy. In the struggle to propagate their genes, men and women face different adaptive problems. She knows that the fetus she carries has her own genes by the simple fact that it is inside her. However, he can never be absolutely sure that the fetus his mate carries is his own and, thus, is a vessel transporting his genes into the next generation. He suffers from "paternity uncertainty," an issue that is irrelevant to her. It follows that he will be very concerned about sexual infidelity: he must exercise high surveillance over her lest she have sex with another man and he risk the ultimate disaster, wasting his precious *resources* on another man's genes (Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 1992). On the other hand, she will be more concerned about emotional infidelity: that he may have sex with another woman does not matter so much relative to an emotional bond he may make with another woman who may then command his resources. Buss and colleagues (1992) conducted several simple studies to support the evolutionary point of view. Their male and female subjects were asked to choose which would bother them the most, sexual infidelity or emotional infidelity. Women showed more emotional jealousy: they were most concerned about their mates' possible emotional infidelity. Men displayed more sexual jealousy: they were most upset by the possibility of their mates' sexual infidelity. Buunk, Angleitner, Oubaid, and Buss (1996) impressively replicated these results in the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands, though the difference between men and women on sexual jealousy was somewhat smaller in the European samples. The evolutionary position also has been supported using other methods (Buss & Shackelford, 1997; Shackelford & Buss, 1997; Mason, 1997; Wilson & Daly, 1996).

However, some researchers have objected (Harris, 2004). Both Harris, and Christenfeld (1996) and DeSteno and Salovey (1996) have supported the "double shot hypothesis": cultural beliefs dictate that, sometimes, sexual infidelity may *also* imply emotional infidelity or emotional infidelity may *also* imply sexual infidelity. Harris and Christenfeld found that if a man is in love with another woman it is implied that they are having sex (double shot), but if he is having sex with another woman it does not necessarily imply he's in love (single shot). Little wonder she is not so concerned about sexual infidelity: it does not necessarily mean he is in love (emotionally involved) with someone else. On the other hand, if a woman is having sex with another man, it means she is in love (emotionally involved; double shot). Maybe his real concern is that she is in love with someone else. He attends more to sexual infidelity only because it is a sure indicator of emotional infidelity which has few other concrete, easy-to-detect manifestations. He would also attend to emotional infidelity. In fact, Harris (2003) refers to results supporting these possibilities. Consistent with Harris's and Christenfeld's and De-Steno's and Salovey's view, the latter (1996) found the less male and female subjects believed that sexual infidelity implies emotional infidelity, the less likely they were to select sexual infidelity as more distressing.

DeSteno, Bartlett, and Salovey (2002) took the issue to another level by showing that if the Buss and colleagues' forced-choice format (subjects were forced to choose between emotional and sexual infidelity as most upsetting) were replaced with Likert scales (hurt 1: 2: 3: 4: 5: 6: 7 not hurt) the gender difference disappeared. In its place, sexual infidelity elicited the most jealousy on the part of both genders. However, Buss and colleagues opened a big hole in the "double-shot hypothesis" by showing that the sex difference they had reported persisted even when questions to subjects were rephrased to prevent one kind of jealousy (sexual) from implying another (emotional) (Benson, 2002). Thus, DeSteno and colleagues (2002) resorted to a different strategy in a second study. They reasoned that if the gender difference in jealousy is accounted for by an evolutionary process dating to ancient humans, it should be branded in the reptilian brain (lower brain). Thus, it should be automatic (Harris, 2004). To test this expectation, some subjects acted under "cognitive load"—they had to remember a string of digits presented before each question. If Buss's gender difference hypothesis is correct, "load" subjects should show the difference as strongly or more strongly than subjects responding to questions without the load. Buss's gender difference was shown in the no-load condition, but in the load condition almost two-thirds of the women and nearly all of the men chose sexual infidelity as most upsetting. Buss and colleagues' expectations were not supported.

Additional research either does not entirely support evolutionary theory or qualifies it. Harris (2000) connected male and female subjects to equipment that measured their physiological reactivity (similar to

that used in lie detection) while they imagined the Buss “sexual infidelity” and “emotional infidelity” scenarios. As expected, it was men who reacted more strongly to the “sexual infidelity” scenario. However, males also reacted more strongly to a sexual than to an emotional scenario when infidelity was

not involved. Harris took these results to mean that men are generally prone to sexuality reactivity, regardless of the context in which it occurs. It is sexual obsession, more than sexual jealousy, that drives men to seek frequent sex with a variety of partners.

Pratto and Hegarty (2000) granted that evolutionary imperatives play a role in gender differences regarding reproductive behavior, but they felt that it was not the whole story. They showed that men's suspiciousness concerning sexual infidelity, their concern that they not invest in others' children, and their greater tendency to exercise surveillance over their partners were related to Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). SDO is a social power factor associated with endorsement of inequality among people. Likewise, women's desire for high status and economically powerful mates who would have many resources was related to SDO. Thus, a social factor, SDO, was part of the story about men's and women's reproductive behavior.

"Gender differences in sexual strategies" is another expectation of Buss and colleagues' evolutionary theory. Under this theory, men are programmed to have as much sex as possible with as many women as possible to maximize the odds of passing on their genes. In contrast, women can only become pregnant once every nine months. Having sex with one man who will provide resources for her children is the best strategy for passing along her genes. Mathes and Smith (1999) reported results consistent with the proposed difference in sexual strategies under conditions that rendered the parental uncertainty hypothesis moot. In their study, only men were less willing to give up sex with their partners than emotional warmth from their partners.

Buss and Schmitt (1993) refer to results consistent with their hypothesized difference between the genders in sexual strategies. The data they reported seemed to show that men pursue short-term sexual relationships with many women, while women seemed to seek long-term relationships that would necessarily involve few men. However, Miller, Putcha-Bhagavatula, and Pedersen (2002) challenged the Buss and Schmitt data in two ways. First, Miller and colleagues noted that the Buss and Schmitt data for men involved different measures of long- and short-term relationship preferences than the measures used for woman. When Miller and colleagues used the same measures for both genders, they failed to support gender differences in preferences for short- and long-term relationships. Second, if human males are so obsessed with having short-term sexual relationships with many women (promiscuous) they should show rather large testicle size relative to body size. Promiscuous males need to unload much sperm with each sexual encounter in order to ensure that they achieve pregnancy. After all, they are not likely to have a second chance with a given female (at least not before other males beat them to her). In contrast, males who are monogamous or have sex with only a few females (polygynous) can survive with smaller testicles relative to body weight, because they have many opportunities with the single or few females in their lives. First, Miller and colleagues report that human males show a rather small testicle size to body size ratio compared with other primates. Second, human male testicle size ratio is much closer to that of monogamous (gibbons) and polygynous primates (gorillas and orangutans) than to the ratio of the highly promiscuous male chimpanzees. Human males fail to measure up to the testicular size requirements demanded by Buss and colleagues' view of them seen through the lens of their sexual strategies hypothesis. Not so incidentally, it appears that sexual potency is a function of testicle size, not penis size. So, "well hung" takes on new meaning.

Even more damaging to Buss and colleagues is Christine Harris's (2003; and see 2004) extensive review of the evolutionary psychology data. First, she showed that, indeed, when the forced choice format is used to test the gender difference in sexual jealousy hypothesis, it is supported. However, in other cases, such as using Likert scales or investigating actual rather than imagined infidelity, the hypothesis is not supported. Second, she reported that when physiological measures are used, as in her study, support for evolutionary psychology hypotheses declines. Third, she challenges the "real life" data that seems to support the gender difference in sexual jealousy. Homicide statistics and data on assault of women seemed to fit the sexual jealousy hypothesis. Supposedly men beat and kill women out of sexual jealousy. After an impressively extensive and sophisticated analysis of the homicide literature, she concluded "... there is no evidence for a systematic sex difference in the role of jealousy ... in murders, with the trend running ... opposite [to the evolutionary hypothesis] (p. 110; and see Harris, 2004). As to spousal abuse, Harris refers to recent evidence that women admit to instigating family violence at about the same rate as men. Further, new evidence indicates "that women report slapping, hitting, or kicking their mates about as often as men"

(p. 115). Though the evidence is meager regarding the motivations behind attacking spouses, Harris refers to a Dutch study in which almost all the women, but only about two-thirds of the men, indicated that they would physically attack an unfaithful mate. Women in this study also scored “much higher” than men in sexual jealousy. If there is a gender difference in sexual jealousy, future research may show that women are more jealous.

Harris (2004) resorts to Social Cognitive Theory (see [Chapter 13](#)) to explain people’s jealousy. As infants we become anxious when maternal attention turns to another child (even if it’s just a doll, as it was in one study). We become jealous when a cognitive appraisal of the threat posed by a rival leads us to perceive that disruption of an important relationship may occur. The relationship can be sexual or not. A threat to any important relationship may lead to jealousy.

Finally, Levy and Kelly (reported in Anderson, 2002) bring us full circle. They looked at gender differences in jealousy and differences among subjects in attachment styles. Results showed that attachment styles were much more potent in predicting jealousy than gender differences. It mattered more whether subjects were anxious types (highly jealous) or a secure type (low jealousy) than whether they were male or female.

Putting the new evidence presented here together with the evidence reported in earlier editions of this text, it now seems that the pendulum has swung away from the evolutionary psychologists, led by Buss and colleagues, in the direction of their critics. But stay tuned.

Finally, Karen Horney was a fascinating person. Even as an adolescent she wrote extraordinarily candid, literate, and often poetic lines about herself and others close to her. If she seemed to be more troubled during her early life than other theorists, it may be because she was more self-disclosing than the others. Reading her adolescent diaries (1980) and her life story (Quinn, 1988) is more than perusing biographies of a famous figure. It will allow you to get under the skin of an interesting human being and also to follow the development of a significant contributor to understanding the human condition.

Summary Points

1. Karen Clementina Theodora Danielsen was born to Norwegian and Dutch-German parents near Hamburg, Germany. Her father, a sea captain, was often gone, but dominated her life when he could. Despite paternal resistance, Karen received a good education and entered medical school. There she met her eventual husband, Oscar Horney. Balancing school with typical homemaker “obligations” was stressful. Depression led to therapy, where she was exposed to psychoanalysis.

2. Horney questioned Freud’s sexual instincts, Oedipal theory, his view of gender differences, and the psychosexual stages. Penis envy was deemed not generally true and, in this culture, is confined to neurotic women. “Castrating tendencies” were also snubbed and Freud’s inattention to social matters criticized.

3. Horney regarded masturbation as normal and identified several sexually troubled types. She also dismissed the Freudian allegation of female masochism and frigidity. Basic anxiety is due to a number of family-background factors. Horney’s neurotic needs include affection and approval, having a “partner,” narrowly restricting one’s life, power, exploiting others, social recognition or prestige, personal admiration, personal achievement, self-sufficiency and independence, and perfection and unassailability.

4. The three orientations are moving toward people (self-effacing), moving against people (expansive, hypercompetitive, and controlling), and moving away from people (resignation). The idealized image of self is an artificial pride system. It stands in contrast to the actual self, who one currently is, and the real self, who one could become. The inevitable clash between actual behavior and idealized self can be postponed by resorting to such mechanisms as blind spots, externalization, excessive self-control, elusiveness, and cynicism.

5. Horney threw out the Freudian assumption that women long for male anatomy and the several implications of that alleged need. She noted the illogical nature of women’s alleged desire for male anatomy, the lack of evidence for the universality of Freud’s assumptions about the genders, the irrelevance to women of a theory written by men for men, and false belief “I must have a man.” Finally, Horney condemned male selection processes that create a self-fulfilling prophesy.

6. Horney wrote plain-language books for everybody. She also showed an unusual interest in concepts that are important to rank-and-file people. Morbidly jealous people show fear of losing someone's love that is way out of proportion to the actual danger. Their excessive jealousy, which may be a holdover from childhood, is due to an insatiable need for love caused by unresolved basic anxiety.

7. Horney's views of jealousy anticipated the work of Philip Shaver, who proposed three attachment styles dating to parent-child interactions, two of which predict inordinate jealousy. He and others reported differences among secure, anxious-ambivalent, and avoidant people on interpersonal sensitivity, caregiving, sexual attitudes/behavior, and anger-proneness. Anxious people show a laundry list of negative psychological symptoms. Other work revealed that avoidance was negatively related to instrumental functioning and emotional functioning. Recent work reflects the complexity of attachment security: it is relationship-specific, affected by with whom one attaches, and is reciprocated. Recent research shows that attachment styles can change.

8. Mathes's jealousy scale may relate to the attachment styles. Horney's the tyranny of the shoulds paints a vivid picture of people who feel they should do this and that, whatever is demanded by the idealized self. Horney also reoriented therapy, making it more concerned with "being a better person." She uniquely recommended self-analysis, during which one can begin to gain self-recognition.

9. Clare, a self-analysis case, was unwanted by her parents and grew to be a dependent, assurance-seeking adult. She was morbidly dependent on unreliable Peter. Several dreams gave Clare insight into what lay behind her dependency. Work by Ryckman and colleagues showed that Horney's concept, hypercompetitiveness, is related to narcissism, Type E orientation, and Sensation Seeking. Eating disorder symptoms were related to "hypercom-petitiveness" but not to "personal development competitiveness." In terms of application, Horney's theory supports the efficacy of group therapy.

10. Evolutionary theory has been challenged by alternative explanations, such as the "double shot" hypothesis. DeSteno and colleagues showed that Buss's jealousy effect disappears when Likert scales are used and is not as automatic as it should be. Miller and colleagues showed the sexual strategy effect fails if the same measures are used for both genders and human male testicle size doesn't support the sexual strategy theory. Harris reports that physiological data fails to support Buss's jealousy theory; so do gender differences in relationship violence. It may be that attachment styles predict jealousy more than gender. A lack of scientific training limited Horney's ability to test her theory, but others' neglect of scientific attention to her ideas may be due to their lack of respect for her gender. Horney was a fascinating person whose writings should be reconsidered and who is well worth reading. But she is not listed among twentieth century psychology greats.

Running Comparison

<i>Theorist</i>	<i>Horney in Comparison</i>
Freud	Disagreed with him about libido, sexual motivation, Oedipus complex, penis envy, culture, consciousness, and women.
Adler	She agreed with him on social cooperation and her discovery of conflict between the idealized and real self is akin to his "shock."
Rogers and Maslow	Her "real self" matches their recognition of people's endless potential for positive growth.
Jung	She also encouraged patients to do self-analysis, but more formally than Jung.

Essay/Critical Thinking Questions _____

1. What made U.S. psychoanalysts so upset with Horney's criticisms of Freud?
2. What is a parent to do in order to be a good parent in Horney's eyes?
3. Transform one of Horney's three directions so that it would be adaptive.
4. Write a paragraph describing a person who fits Horney's jealous type.
5. Isolate instances in which you have been victimized by the "tyranny of the shoulds."

E-mail Interaction _____

Write the author at b-allen@wiu.edu. Forward one of the following or phrase your own.

1. Tell me which of Horney's contributions is her most important.
2. What is wrong with doing what you *should* do?
3. If my mate is insanely jealous, does that mean she or he really loves me?

Personality from the Interpersonal Perspective: Harry Stack Sullivan

- Can a person with severe psychological problems give useful advice to others?
- Was your mother or father a “good parent” or a “bad parent” (or neither)?
- Are there just four ways to classify the sexual orientations of people?



Harry Stack Sullivan

[www.haverford.edu/psy-ch/
dda-vis/sullivan.html](http://www.haverford.edu/psy-ch/dda-vis/sullivan.html)

The chapters in the first half of this book may be thought of as starting with Freud and withdrawing from him gradually. Jung maintained a relationship with Freud longer than any former pupil. Adler disagreed with Freud, but his theory was in part a response to Freud's. Horney never had personal contact with Freud, but his theory was a launching pad for hers. Harry Stack Sullivan also had no personal relationship with Freud. One of his mentors even warned him against Freud (Perry, 1982). Yet Sullivan was heavily influenced by Freud, and, like Horney, used the framework of psychoanalytic theory to build his own point of view. Nevertheless, he joined the others in deserting the sexual emphasis. To Sullivan, the critical consideration in attempts to understand personality is *interpersonal relations*, the relationships between a person and each other important person in his or her life. These crucial twosomes, or dyads, were behind many of the concepts that distinguish Sullivan's theory.

Sullivan, the Person

Born in 1892 to a recent Irish immigrant family in the rural New York town of Norwich and raised on a nearby farm, Sullivan was traditionally American and clearly entitled to be called “America’s Psychiatrist” (Perry, 1982). He grew up with “farm folk” who came to the United States to better themselves and were advocates of the Protestant work ethic. However, in some ways they led lives that did not fit the idyllic image of the rural United States. The surrounding region was known for its high depression and suicide rate, with isolated farm wives most often taking their own lives, and sometimes taking their children with them.

Sullivan was an only child, worshiped by his mother, Ella Stack, but considered by his father “no good to work, for he has his nose stuck in a book all the time” (Perry, 1982, p. 85). Although Harry was prone to greatly overstate their accomplishments, the Stack family was well regarded in the community. The same could not be said for the Sullivans. This comparison is an example of the “social law of relativity”: the Stacks had relatively high status in a very humble community compared to the Sullivans. In fact, Sullivan’s family background is among the most pedestrian of the theorists covered in this book. Horney’s name on her mother’s side, Ronzelen, began with *Van*, a mark of nobility. By contrast, the Sullivans were pretty much “fresh off the boat” and working-class. One of the factors that pushed Sullivan to succeed may have been his desire to rise above his background. Alternatively, his delusions about the accomplishments of mother Ella Stack’s family may have driven him to “live up to her standards.” The vacillations of name change that he displayed may support the contention that Ella’s influence was behind his drive to achieve. When he entered medical school, he was Harry Francis Sullivan, or H. F. Sullivan (Francis was given to him at age thirteen, on his confirmation). Later he used a variety of combinations, for example, Harry F. Sullivan and just plain Harry Sullivan. But eventually Francis was dropped out in favor of the maternal surname, Stack. He shared this identity confusion with Erik Erikson.

As a person, Sullivan was lonely, somewhat reserved, fatalistic about his health, and a user of alcohol “to combat anxiety” (Perry, 1982, p. 175). Not only did he imbibe alcohol himself, he gave it to patients to loosen them up before therapy (Le Doux, 2002). He had the vulnerable, haunted look of actor James Dean. These symptoms suggest depression. During childhood and preadolescence, Sullivan was a loner who conveyed a sense of ambiguous sexuality that lingered into adulthood. Supposedly he was involved in a homosexual relationship during preadolescence. He entered puberty late, possibly not until age seventeen.

In college he did report “lust” for a girl in one of his classes, but people close to the adult Sullivan were never quite sure about his sexual orientation (Perry, 1982). Some friends believed Sullivan had both male and female sexual partners. Whether these speculations were true or not, Sullivan was known to long for marriage and to lament his bachelorhood. Perry even suggests that Sullivan may have sent proposals of marriage to astounded women with whom he was merely acquainted. At one point, he was reported to be “attentive” to Karen Horney, but despite rumors, he was not sexually involved with colleague Clara Thompson (Perry, 1982, p. 335). Nevertheless, sustained love for women was probably directed exclusively to his mother and his Aunt Maggie. Whether Sullivan was gay, bisexual, or heterosexual probably will never be known. His were not the times in which people who were other than “straight” admitted as much in public.

Psychological turmoil characterized Sullivan’s life. While a student at Cornell University, allegedly he was involved in “mail fraud,” supposedly as a part of a “criminal gang” (Perry, 1982). Scant detail of the relevant incidents led Perry to speculate that Sullivan and “the gang” were using the mail to obtain “chemicals” from a drugstore (1982). Yet the penalty meted out to Sullivan was slight: he was suspended from Cornell for a year and could have returned to school (but he never did). Between his suspension in 1909 and his arrival at medical school in 1911, Sullivan disappeared. It was remotely possible that he was in jail; maybe he was “sprung” by his uncle, a judge. More likely, Sullivan suffered a psychotic break during this period and was receiving treatment. In any case, the youthful Sullivan was known to have had bouts of *schizophrenia*, withdrawal from reality, and disturbances in thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. These episodes probably explain his burning interest in the disorder.

Sullivan was admitted to the Chicago College of Medicine and Surgery (CCMS) despite the absence of credits from Cornell, where he did poorly as a physics student (Chapman, 1976; Perry, 1982). In effect, he went directly from high school to medical school without the benefit of a full college education. Though valedictorian honors in high school implied significant academic abilities, his record in medical school was

dismal. While living in poverty and working as an elementary physics teacher and a Chicago Elevated Railway conductor, Sullivan received only one “A” at CCMS, but accumulated several “Ds” (Perry, 1982). This undistinguished performance was recorded at a school that may have been suspect in its time. Although Perry (1982) regarded CCMS as most likely average for its day, Chapman (1976) described it as one of many fly-by-night physician factories that sprung up around the turn of the century. Sullivan called it a “diploma mill” (Chapman, 1976). It was defunct by 1917, leaving no record of Sullivan’s degree (his diploma was found among his effects after he died).

These aspersions cast on CCMS and Sullivan’s performance there may seem to mean that he was mediocre as a scholar and intellect. To the contrary, he was a brilliant, original thinker who may well have “gone through the motions” during medical school to make himself eligible for what he really wanted to do, become a psychiatrist. Self-administered psychiatric training conducted at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C. (Chapman, 1976) led him to make numerous erroneous statements about psychiatry and abnormal behavior, some of them in print (Chapman, 1976). Yet, having enlisted the help of his patients in teaching himself about psychiatry, rather than relying on the dogmatic psychiatric professors of the day, may have permitted the creative ideas that made him famous. Of the ironies that surround Sullivan’s training, none is more profound than the observation that he is a central figure in the development of psychiatric training (Conci, 1993). Sullivan’s most significant clinical work involved schizophrenic men, for whom he established a successful residential treatment program founded on interpersonal trust (Sullivan, 1927/1994).

Harry Stack Sullivan died under mysterious circumstances on January 14, 1949 (Perry, 1982). He was found in a Paris hotel room, sprawled on the floor, his heart medication scattered about him. Rumors of self-destruction circulated immediately, especially in the suicide-ridden rural community where he was reared. However, Perry was well acquainted with Sullivan’s heart ailment and knew that the official cause of death, “meningeal hemorrhage,” was entirely plausible in view of his medical condition. Still, she wondered whether certain thoughts that may have occurred to him on the day of his death had not contributed to his demise, or even caused it. When he arose on the day of the fatal attack, the fact that it was his deceased mother Ella’s birthday must have been on his mind. It was also close to the anniversary of a dear friend’s death, and he may have remembered that relative Leo Stack had died of a similar attack in a hotel room on a day in January. Finally, Sullivan’s prediction, made in 1931, that he would die of a “rupture of the middle meningeal artery at the age of 57 ...” was astoundingly accurate. Perhaps memories of these four events came together to hasten what was already inevitable. The mystery may never be solved, but psychiatry suffered from his early demise. [Box 6.1](#) indicates that Sullivan’s problems were his connection to diversity.

Sullivan’s poor health and early death may be explained in part by his relatively low socioeconomic status (SES; Adler & Snibbe, 2003). Recent evidence indicates that the lower the SES the greater the likelihood of early death. Among the health liabilities of low SES are an increased likelihood of cardiovascular disease, such as that which killed Sullivan, and increased odds of becoming schizophrenic and depressed. While high levels of the personality factor *optimism* are known to positively affect health, low SES people tend toward pessimism. Higher education and income level appears to provide people with the information they need to pursue good health and the means to access the best health care. Although Sullivan’s family may not have been poor, because it was an immigrant family, it probably had a history of poverty. Even if individuals move out of poverty, the more time spent in that state the greater the health deficits (Adler & Snibbe, 2003).

People of lower SES face more stressful environments. They are more likely to be subjected to social conflict, overcrowding, crime, and other sources of stress. Poor people may develop techniques to combat sources of stress that work in the short term, such as arming themselves against criminals. However, while these methods may create temporary feelings of security, the continued high vigilance needed to maintain security (preparations to fight criminals) likely will increase stress in the long term. Over time, the accumulation of adaptations to stressors, such as protecting oneself against criminals, increases wear and tear on physiological and psychological systems (called “allostatic load”). In turn, the accumulating stress load associated with relatively low SES takes such a heavy toll on physiological and psychological systems that health will almost surely suffer. The cardiovascular disease that killed Sullivan, and the schizophrenia and depression from which he suffered, must have in part been generated by a family history of relatively low SES and the stress he suffered in his rural community, at Cornell, and during his medical training.

BOX 6.1 • *Sullivan: Diversity Incarnate*

When we think of diversity we often dwell on issues of race. There are, however, many more dimensions to diversity, religion, for example. Although neither Freud nor Adler was a devout Jew, being Jewish was an apparent source of insecurity for Freud. Sullivan's investment in religion was apparently minimal, but being Catholic may have had something to do with his family's immigration to the United States. In any case, that Sullivan was Irish almost certainly affected him. His was an era of prejudice against recent immigrants, including those from Ireland. It was the same time in which the Kennedy family battled anti-Irish bigotry.

That Sullivan was possibly gay or bisexual placed him on another dimension of diversity. Ambiguities surrounding his sexual orientation probably greatly affected his interpersonal relations. Finally, still another dimension, mental health status, probably shaped Sullivan's life to a degree. He may have suffered from the "schizophrenia" stigma most of his life.

Sullivan's View of the Person

Significant Others and the Self

Sullivan's theory revolves around the idea that a person's needs and developmental tasks are met in a series of two-person relationships, beginning with "a mothering one" and culminating in the selection of a sexual partner. While he believed we have as many personalities as we have interpersonal relationships, he formally defined **personality** as "the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life" (1953, pp. 110–111). This orientation is certainly different from that of Freud, but Sullivan did see himself as a psychoanalyst. Further, he used many of Freud's methods. Nevertheless, he backed away from Freud's underlying assumptions revolving around psychosexuality. Sullivan's orientation is, however, in the spirit of Adler's "social interest." It also bears some similarity to Horney's emphasis on anxiety dating to infancy and on relationships. Little wonder they were in sync.

Significant others are those people who are most meaningful to us in our lives. In essence, personality does not exist in the absence of important other people. Without them, there can be no development of a **self-system**, "that part of personality which is born entirely out of the influences of significant others upon one's feeling of well-being" (Sullivan, 1954, p. 101). As most people know, our senses of self-esteem depend largely on the positive and negative evaluations we receive from other people. Interestingly, these relationships with others may be fantasized or real: we may relate to imaginary playmates, literary characters, and public figures. An example is John Hinckley's fantasized relationship with movie actress Jodie Foster, whom he tried to impress by attempting to assassinate Ronald Reagan.

A Need for Tenderness

Personality is derived from human experiences that involve the reduction of two kinds of tensions: like Freud, physical needs, and, in contrast with Freud, interpersonal anxiety. *Needs* seek *satisfactions*: "... all those end states which are rather closely connected with the bodily organization" such as relief from want of oxygen, water, food, body warmth, and so forth (Sullivan, 1947, p. 6). **Interpersonal anxiety** is a tension that is alleviated in relationships with significant others or in feelings of well-being.

Like Horney, Sullivan saw infants as being totally powerless and at the mercy of other people for their security. However, Sullivan further theorized that the infant's nearly absolute dependency revolves around a **mothering one**, a "... significant, relatively adult personality whose cooperation is necessary to keep the infant alive" (1953, p. 54). This critically important individual addresses the infant's **need for tenderness** which, different from "love," refers to relief from various tensions (1953). Sullivan effectively captured the essence of the close connection between the infant and the mothering one: "The observed activity of the infant arising from the tension of needs induces tension in the mothering one, which ... is experienced as tenderness and [leads] to activities [that provide] relief of the infant's needs" (1953, p. 39).

Basic Concepts: Sullivan

Empathy, Anxiety, and Security

“The tension of anxiety, when present in the mothering one, induces anxiety in the infant” (1953, p. 41). Anxiety may be transferred to the infant when it is subjected to unsympathetic behaviors by the mothering one that communicate something is “bad” or “disapproved,” even though the origin of the mothering one’s tension has no direct connection with the infant. It may be due to the caregiver’s personality, uncertainty about the parenting role, or circumstances unrelated to the infant, such as parental illness, fatigue, or upset due to bad news. However, the infant has no way of knowing about these possibilities. She or he simply participates in the caregiver’s tension or discomfort through **empathy**, “the term that we use to refer to the peculiar emotional linkage [that exists between the] infant [and] other significant people—the mother or the nurse” (1947, p. 8). It involves the reciprocal role-taking seen in the infant’s expression of need for tenderness and the mother’s motivation to provide tenderness (Hayes, 1994). Anxiety acquired by this and other means can interfere with the satisfaction of physical and tenderness needs. For example, the infant may cry or regurgitate, thereby disrupting critical behaviors such as feeding, which further increases both its own and the mothering one’s anxiety. Because it has no effective means to remove, reduce, or escape from the anxiety, the infant is totally dependent on a caretaker for relief. Due to the infant’s helpless condition, only the mothering one can provide relief in the form of **interpersonal security**, “relaxation of the tension of anxiety,” which is experienced as a return to a tranquil, untroubled state (1953, p. 42). This unique experience is different from the satisfaction that occurs when physical needs are met.

Three Modes of Experience and Six Stages of Development

Sullivanian personality development encompasses six stages, spanning infancy through late adolescence, each centering on a unique kind of interpersonal relationship. Because three of the stages revolve around his rather abstract and complex “modes of experience,” which are difficult to “put a finger on,” it is best to consider them first.

Modes of Experience. The **prototaxic** mode is the earliest (infancy), most primitive type of experience, a state of generalized sensation or feeling, in the absence of thought (Sullivan, 1953). The infant knows only what William James called a “big, blooming, buzzing confusion,” vague perceptions of momentary states having no “before” or “after.” There is no awareness of self as separate from the world. Sullivan, who often avoided formal definitions, is rescued by Patrick Mullahy’s translation of *prototaxic*:

The infant vaguely feels or ‘prehends’ earlier and later states without realizing any serial connection between them.... He has no awareness of himself as an entity separate from the rest of the world. In other words, his felt experience is all of a piece, undifferentiated, without definite limits. It is as if his experiences were “cosmic” (Mullahy, 1948, in Sullivan, 1953, p. 28).

The **parataxic** mode is experienced as the infant becomes a child who begins to use speech, but still makes few logical connections within the sequence of its experiences (approximately the preschool years; Sullivan, 1953). Thinking and speech are disorganized and disjunctive as in a dream, and understanding remains minimal. There is a sense of “magic” in which things “just happen,” as in seeing colorful Christmas lights suddenly appear with the simple flip of a switch. In adults, parataxic experience may serve as a rough basis for memories related to habits. Examples include routine activities that often occur without conscious thought: dressing, walking to class, eating, or doing repetitive arithmetic. Again, Mullahy comes to Sullivan’s aid:

As the infant develops ... , the original undifferentiated wholeness of experience is broken. However, the ‘parts’ ... are not related or connected in a logical fashion... . The child cannot yet relate them to one another or make logical distinctions among them... . Since no connections or relations are established, there is no logical movement of ‘thought’ from one idea to the next. The parataxic mode is not a step by step process (Mullahy, 1948, in Sullivan, 1953, p. 28).

In other words, the unbroken mass—like a glob of jelly—that was feeling and perception is now segmented into parts, like separate cubes of jelly. Nevertheless, the parts are disconnected and not logically related to one another.

The **syntactic** mode becomes important when the meaning of words becomes shared with most other people so that experience, judgments, and observations can be shared (approximately the early elementary school years; Sullivan, 1953). The individual and another person can communicate syntactic experiences because both define language symbols alike. This is the stage of “consensual validation” in which children learn to separate experiences they share with others from experiences peculiar to themselves, make their thoughts and feelings clear to others, and appreciate what others are thinking and feeling (Sullivan, 1953). Again, Mullahy provides clarity:

The child gradually learns the ... meaning of language... . These meanings have been acquired from group activities, interpersonal activities, social experience. Consensually validated symbol activity involves an appeal to principles which are accepted as true by the hearer (Mullahy, 1948, in Sullivan, 1953, p. 28).

When children acquire the syntactic mode, others have taught them the shared rules of organizing thoughts so that thoughts and speech are no longer disconnected. The undifferentiated mass that became the unsystematically linked assortment of pieces has now become an assemblage of separate parts, each bearing some relationship to some of the others. The direction of development as reflected by the three modes is toward increased socialization. Over time, the “social majority” rules over personal interpretations.

Infancy: Prototaxic Feelings about “Good” and “Bad” Caregivers. The **infancy** stage starts at birth and continues until the appearance of speech (Sullivan, 1953). The development of personality begins with feeding, because the infant’s initial interpersonal situation is “nipple-in-lips”: the infant’s mouth to the mother’s breast or to the bottle. The experience integrates the infant’s need for water, food, and contact, and the caregiver’s need to show tenderness. The infant’s accompanying hand and foot movements—touching, grasping, pushing, rubbing, and cuddling—become an increasingly important part of this first interpersonal situation.

As the infant begins to accumulate experiences, it forms **personifications**, investments of human attributes in persons or objects that do not actually possess the assigned traits, at least not in the degree to which they are applied. For example, if the infant’s need for nourishment is accommodated by the willing presentation of a satisfying nipple, it forms the early personification “good nipple.” When the infant’s interactions with the mothering one are experienced as satisfying, warm, and comforting, it forms the personification “good mother.” This empathic sensory image is not of the real mother, but of the infant’s vague, prototaxic sense that feeding experiences are “good” because they result in relaxation of tensions. If the same caregiver interacts with the infant in ways that are “rough, sound unpleasant, hurt the baby, and generally discompose him,” the infant will be led to form the “bad mother” personification, which entails the “nipple of anxiety” (Sullivan, 1953, pp. 116 and 87). Sullivan summarized these personifications: “... all relations with ... people ... [who] are a part of ... satisfying ... the infant’s needs blend into a single personification which I call the good mother ... all experience ... which results in severe anxiety blends into a single personification which I call ... the bad mother” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 120).

These personifications may endure in memory as “eidetic people”: “illusory people,” “imaginary people,” or “past people” who are sometimes dredged up and matched to people in adult life (boss as “bad mother”). Personal personifications develop as well. The individual comes to know “me,” “good me,” “bad me,” and “not me.” Interestingly, Blechner (1994) has proposed a fifth category. “Maybe me” is a me under consideration, a potential me that involves some dissociated aspect of personality that the individual has yet to muster the courage to accept. The threatening, aggressive side of the infant is an example. Later the sexual facet of the child would fit the “maybe me.”

You may wonder how the primitive prototaxic skills of the infant allow it to differentiate between “bad mother” and “good mother.” The infant cannot understand what the mothering one says, nor can it interpret “appearances” (Sullivan, 1953). “Good” and “bad” mothers may look the same in basic physical appearance, including clothing. The “good nipple” and the “bad nipple” are identical in appearance. The signs the infant

must read to tell “good” from “bad” are subtle. In the case of the “bad mother” they are **forbidding gestures**, negative, covert cues such as a wrinkled brow, a cold tone of voice, a too tight grasp, a hesitancy, reluctance, or even revulsion at having to interact with the infant. Sullivan put it this way:

The discrimination of heard differences in the mother’s vocalization and seen differences in the postural tensions of the mother’s face, and perhaps later of differences in speed and rhythm of her gross bodily movements in coming toward the infant, presenting the bottle, changing the diapers ... all these ... discriminations ... are frequently associated with ... anxiety, including the nipple of anxiety ... (Sullivan, 1953, pp. 86–87).

Early experiences with others allow the infant to begin differentiating its own self-system from the world around it. Experiences of positive satisfactions, in which the mothering one is pleased, are organized around a personification of “good me.” In this case, interpersonal security prevails. On the other hand, experiences of anxiety in the parent– infant relationship are organized around a personification of “bad me,” resulting in insecurity. Undifferentiated early experience begins to break down into parts. The infant learns to make some distinctions between itself and the world.

What creates “bad mothers?” Serbin and Karp (2003) believe that people’s parenting styles result from observing behavior modeled by their parents and from their own behavioral orientations evidenced early in life. These researchers note that both current parents and the next generation of parents, their children, are influenced by environmental contexts such as poverty, foster care, and dangerous neighborhoods. Parental modeling of aggressive, belittling, rejecting behavior and harsh environmental contexts produce children who will grow up to be hostile, insensitive, punishing parents. This destructive process generates a vicious cycle of bad parenting that extends from generation to generation.

On the other hand, “good mothers” participate with their children in a *mutually responsive orientation* (MRO; Kodhanska, 2002). MRO involves parents who are responsive to their children’s needs and who share their own “positive affect” with their children. They create a chronic positive mood in their children that binds their offspring to themselves. The “good mother” can read her children’s most subtle “signals of distress, unhappiness, needs, bids for attention, or attempts to exert influence” (p. 192). Such a close bond develops that the child not only seeks to please the parent, but also strives to become like her. Among the positive attributes displayed by children of MRO relationships is a strong conscience. The MRO relationship is illustrated in [Box 6.2](#).

Childhood: Parataxic Learning Applicable to Social Habits and Self. The **childhood stage** emerges with articulate speech and ends with the appearance of the need for peers. A number of important developmental tasks are begun during this stage. First, the child is rapidly socialized regarding what is “proper.” Children come to accept parents’ lessons on feeding, toilet use, cleanliness, obedience, oughts, and musts. Second, language becomes a tool for manipulating the social world into alleviating the child’s tensions. Third, there is continuing development of the self-system, which functions to minimize anxiety. As its ability to learn matures, the child becomes more skillful at reading the forbidding gestures of significant others. The self-system is partly like Freud’s “ego” in that it seeks satisfaction in ways that avoid anxiety. The self-system minimizes anxiety through *selective inattention* to threatening events and by anticipating, and thereby avoiding, experiences that are incompatible with its past development. It sinks into maladjustment when it resorts to *dissociation*, severing any connection of the threatening events or experiences to the self. It is through our self-systems that we psychologically carry our parents around with us throughout our lives, as a continuing reminder of what is “approved” and “disapproved.” Thus, the self-system is also similar to Freud’s “superego.”

Fourth, negative emotions such as disgust, shame, anger, and resentment are learned. The child also learns negative social interaction orientations such as *malevolence*, perhaps the most disastrous lesson taught during childhood personality development. Ironically, the child may develop malevolence while seeking tenderness.

[M]any children ... when they need tenderness, ... are not only denied tenderness, but they are treated in a fashion to provoke anxiety... . A child may discover that ... the need for tenderness toward the potent figures ... leads ... to his being ... made anxious, ... made fun of... . Under those circumstances, the developmental course changes [so]

that the ... need for tenderness brings a foresight of anxiety... . The child learns ... that it is highly disadvantageous to show any need for tender cooperation from the ... figures around him, in which case he shows ... the basic malevolent attitude, the attitude that one really lives among enemies ... (Sullivan, 1953, p. 214).

BOX 6.2 • *The Good Mother*

Adam was Sara's first baby, but you wouldn't know it by watching them interact. There seems to be an invisible connection between the two, as if the umbilical cord were still intact, but incorporeal and infinitely stretchable. If Adam is in his room and Sara down the hall, he can make certain sounds that not only bring her to him, but also induce her to carry whatever he needs with her. She arrives promptly with a blanket, if he requires warmth, a bottle, if he needs nourishment, or a fresh diaper if he needs changing. When she picks him up, there isn't the awkward tensing and wriggling that some babies display. He tends to smile faintly, coo, and maintain his relaxed posture as she raises him to her shoulder. Once snugly against her, Adam shuffles his knees up and down and rubs his head against her in an apparent attempt to get even closer. If she should have to leave him for a time, he waits patiently, confident that she will appear when he needs her. When Sara's friends come to visit he is comfortable with their presence. Drawn by the symphony of interpersonal harmony performed by mother and child, they show up regularly. He does not react when Sara leaves the room while they attend to him. In fact, he smiles sweetly when they murmur to him or playfully tickle him. But, even though he can't see her when she returns and despite the cacophony of voices, he spontaneously moves his head in her direction when she speaks. When she is ill or feeling down, he senses her mood and summons her to him as though he wishes to comfort her. Likewise, she knows when he is "coming down with something" before he gets it. Her pediatrician is amazed that Sara can spot Adam's medical problems before they show overt signs such as fever. Sara and Adam are two parts of one whole. Their interactions are a marvel of cooperation, coordination, and synchronous affection.

Having a strong interest in the processes by which children learn, Sullivan proposed five main avenues to acquiring new, useful information. Three of these are straightforward, commonsensical, and rather self-evident: (1) *trial and success* (behaviors that succeed are stamped into memory as habits); (2) *rewards and punishments*; and (3) *trial and error* (noting errors in order to avoid them). However, one of them is unique and innovative. Children may **learn by anxiety**: when anxiety is not severe, individuals may become acquainted with the situations in which it is present so that those circumstances may be avoided. Even infants can learn that some situation or object is not desirable, thus to be avoided. Later, with the arrival of language ability, such circumstances can be labeled as anxiety-provoking, making them easier to shun. A still higher plane of learning by anxiety involves the **anxiety gradient**, "learning to discriminate increasing from diminishing anxiety and to alter activity in the direction of the latter" (Sullivan, 1953, p. 452). Children must be able to monitor sometimes subtle changes in their feelings and become aware of the situations in which the changes occur. Then, when anxiety rises, they can move themselves to circumstances that will lower it. For example, the child might learn that playing with the genitals when the mothering one is present causes steadily rising anxiety. To change the gradient, when the mothering one is present the child must stop manipulating the genitals and apply its hands to a task that is associated with lowered anxiety. An example would be drawing pictures that please the mothering one.

Sullivan wrote about three contributions to *socialization* of the child—becoming a functional citizen of society. The *frequency* with which the child behaves can cue the child and trainers as to which behaviors are being acquired. Attention to frequency may allow cultivation of behaviors that are socially desirable and culling of those that are undesirable. *Consistency* is the "repetition of particular patterns of events." If the child behaves consistently, learned behaviors are being performed or behavioral acquisition is underway. *Sanity* is an attribute of parents who fully understand the assets and deficits of their children so that educational demands are reasonable and appropriate. Without sanity children may not discover what they are good at, and, thus, at later stages, they may be uncertain as to their worthiness (Bromberg, 1993). [Box 6.3](#) allows you to experiment with learning processes.

BOX 6.3 • *What Learning Processes Were Involved in Your Childhood Training?*

Four of Sullivan's learning processes are arranged into two categories and each is briefly defined. For each of the four, pick a number between 0 and 100 to represent the percentage of your training—instituted by you or your par-ents—that employed the process in question. Your four numbers should add up to one hundred. For example, you might assign 10 to “learning by anxiety,” 20 to “rewards and punishments,” 40 to “trial and success,” and 30 to “trial and error.”

Positively Oriented Processes

Process

Number out of 100

Trial and success— attempting a behavior until it succeeds.

Trial and error— observing own and others' behavior to profit by knowledge of mistakes.

Negatively Oriented Processes

Process

Number out of 100

Learn by anxiety— individuals become acquainted with anxiety-provoking situations so that these may be avoided.

Rewards and punishments— arranging for pleasure to encourage a behavior and punishment to discourage its undesirable counterpart.

Note which process you assigned the largest number. If its assigned number is 40 or greater, you are indicating that it was clearly the primary training procedure in your learning history. Tally by category: add the two numbers in the positive category and the two in the negative category. If one of these two subtotals is 60 or more, you are indicating that you were primarily subjected to positively or negatively oriented processes, depending on the category to which the number applies.

Juvenile Era: Syntactic Experiences of Finding Playmates and Questioning Parents. The **juvenile era** is ushered in with the child's need for peer companions, or “playmates rather like oneself.” During the elementary school years, the child has many opportunities to learn the ways of other children and show social subordination to new authority figures such as teachers, coaches, and club leaders. During this time, children gain *compeers*, playmates who teach them more about their social capabilities and shield them from loneliness.

The juvenile develops an appreciation of certain variations in living never conceived of before, some “right” and some “wrong.” Ideas and social operations learned at home may be inapplicable at school or with friends, and are reformulated. Authorities, including one's parents, are reduced from godlike figures to people. Along with cooperation are experiences of competition, stereotyping, ostracism, and compromise. References are made to “our team” and “our teacher.” Social accommodation is partly motivated by peer pressure. A personally meaningful orientation to living takes form, based on a growing understanding of one's needs and future goals.

Preadolescence: Collaborating with a Chum. The period of **preadolescence** is brief, beginning with the need for interpersonal intimacy in the form of a close relationship with another person “of comparable status.” Somewhere between the ages of 8½ and 10, the child “begins to develop a real sensitivity to what matters to another person” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 245). One's predominant interest is in establishing a relationship with a *chum*, a particular member of the same sex who becomes a friend and confidant. Preadolescents contribute to the happiness of their friends through collaboration. Each makes adjustments aimed at providing mutual satisfactions. When two young people become important to each other, the worth

of both is supported by the process of consensual validation, in this case, sharing beliefs. Preadolescents may spend hours in shared daydreaming. Participation in cliques or gangs may be traced to interlocking, two-person relationships in which pair members A and B each also have relationships with pair members C and D. Loneliness resulting from the absence of close peers may be overcome by acting on an irresistible need for cooperative companionship. This need is so powerful that people seek relations with others despite fear of rejection.

Early Adolescence: Experiencing Lust toward a Sexual Partner. Early adolescence erupts at puberty when the need for intimacy evolves toward lustful feelings of closeness and tenderness with a sexual partner. Interest in a member of one's own sex is usually replaced by interest in a member of the opposite sex, a person who is "very different." During this time, patterns of behavior emerge that satisfy **lust**, Sullivan's term for "certain tensions of or pertaining to the genitals," culminating in orgasm (1953, p. 109). "Lust," along with *intimacy* needs, now become important.

Sullivan classified lust and intimacy needs into three categories: (1) orientation to others on the basis of intimacy needs; (2) orientation to others on the basis of partner's status (self or other, same or different gender, human or not, alive or dead; lust); and (3) orientation to others on the basis of how the genitals are used during sexual interaction (lust).

Sullivan used the Greek root word "philos," meaning "loving," as the suffix for terms referring to expressions of intimacy needs. In this category (1) he postulated choices of *intimacy expression* that correspond to three kinds of people. First, there is the **autophilic person**, one who manifests no preadolescent development, because it has not occurred or was attempted without success, causing the continuation of self-directed love. This kind of person's intimacy expressions have the flavor of "narcissism." "An **isophilic person** has been unable to progress past preadolescence, and continues to regard as suitable for intimacy only people who are as like himself as possible ... that is, members of his own sex" (Sullivan, 1953, p. 192). Finally, "A **heterophilic person** has ... made the early adolescent change in which he has become intensely interested in achieving intimacy with members of ... the other sex" (Sullivan, 1953, p. 192).

The "orientation to others according to status" category (2) is related to lust and contains mostly familiar entries. *Homosexuals* orient to the same sex, *heterosexuals* orient to the opposite sex, and *autosexuals* orient to themselves. Less familiar is the *katosexual*, who prefers nonhumans such as animals or dead people.

Lust regarding use of the genitals (3; *Oh Please Make Amends*) has four unique varieties. **Orthogenital** involves the integration of one's own genitals with the "natural receptor genitals" of the opposite sex, that is, heterosexual use of the genitals (p. 293). In **paragenital** use of the sex organs one acts to seek contact with genitals opposite one's own, but in such a way that impregnation will not occur. Rubbing one's own genitals against those of an opposite-sex person is an obvious example. **Metagenital** use does not involve one's own genitals, but another person's genitals are involved. Masturbating someone else or performing oral sex on another person are examples. **Amphigenital** refers to the case in which one or both members of a pair, who both may be homosexual or heterosexual, take on a role that is different from their usual role. For example, a woman straps on a penis-like device and uses it in sex with her partner. Two other varieties predate Sullivan: *mutual masturbation*, which is self-explanatory, or *onanism*, which refers to heterosexual intercourse that is terminated before orgasm occurs. Theories of homosexuality are further explored in [Box 6.4](#).

Late Adolescence: Establishing Love Relationships. What separates early and late adolescence is not so much biological as interpersonal maturation. Partially developed aspects of personality fall into place in the late stage. People are able to tolerate some previously avoided anxiety, which allows favorable changes to be made in the self-system. **Late adolescence** begins with the acknowledgment of an orientation to genital behavior and how to fit that revelation into the rest of life, then ends with "the establishment of a fully human or mature repertory of interpersonal relations" (Sullivan, 1953, p. 297). Being able to take first steps on adult legs, one can "establish relationships of love for some other person, in which relationship the other person is as significant, or nearly as significant, as one's self" (p. 34). [Table 6.1](#) summarizes the six stages along with the corresponding benchmarks.

Evaluation

Contributions

Physical Contact and Peer Relationships. Human infants show a need to have intimate physical contact with a parental figure, termed “primary object-clinging” by John Bowlby (1969). In a 1951 report to the World Health Organization, Bowlby concluded that mental health in infants requires a warm, intimate, and continuous relationship with a maternal figure, not necessarily the biological mother. He indicated that infants placed in institutional settings, such as orphanages, who do not receive physical contact from a nurturing figure, show developmental and survival difficulties attributable to interpersonal deprivation.

BOX 6.4 • *Theories of Homosexuality: More Sophisticated Than in Sullivan’s Time*

One will not be surprised to find that there is no theory about homosexuality that most scientists accept. Theories of homosexuality come in two varieties. Some scientists think that it is learned during the course of growing up, while others believe that it is biologically determined. A modern example of the “learning” hypothesis has been offered by Michael Storms (1982). Supposedly, individuals who reach sexual maturity early direct their new sexual urges toward those who are most readily available, the same-sex friends with whom children their age exclusively associate. People who mature on time or late have already given up exclusive same-sex associations in favor of interaction with the opposite sex. Therefore, they direct their sexuality to people of the opposite sex. Storm’s theory has faded in recent years for want of supporting data.

Daryl Bem’s (Azar, 1997; Bem, 1996) “exotic is erotic” theory is similar in that early interactions with peers are crucial, but this time it is relating with the opposite gender that is important. Bem’s view is that, if, for example, one is a boy who spends most of his time with girls and prefers girl-typical activities, he will see boys as different from himself. Because other boys are different, thus exotic, the same gender becomes sexually attractive.

Evidence relevant to gay male development is found in the typical male ring-finger-longer-than-the-index-finger configuration. Homosexual men show the longer ring finger configuration less than heterosexual men (Lippa, 2003). Other work indicates that lesbian and bisexual women are in-between heterosexual women and men in magnitude of the inner ear’s response to a certain auditory click (Holden, 1998). Exposure to male hormones in the womb may be the causative factor. In multiple-pup rat litters, a female fetus surrounded by two male fetuses shows clear male physical characteristics and behaviors after it is born (Vanderbergh, 2003).

A neurological study of the hypothalamus, a brain body known to have sexual function, has revealed a difference between homosexual and heterosexual males. LeVay (1991) found differences between the structures of gay and “straight” men’s hypothalamuses. However, some biological paths have been dead-ends. Initial enthusiasm for a gene on the maternal X chromosome that may predispose men to homosexuality has been dampened (Rice, Anderson, Risch, & Ebers, 1999).

TABLE 6.1 Sullivan's Six Developmental Epochs

<i>Epochs</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Capacities for</i>
Infancy	Need for contact with caregiver; prototaxic experience	Beginning speech
Childhood	Need for adult participation in activities	Language
Juvenile Era	Parataxic experience	Compeer or playmate relationships;
Preadolescence	Need for acceptance by peers	Close, same-sex relationship—chum
Early Adolescence	Syntactic experience	Close, opposite-sex relationships; patterning of lustful or genital behavior
Late Adolescence	Need for intimate exchange with a loved one	Mature and independent development of love relationships in which another person is as important as oneself

To illustrate, Spitz (1946) observed symptoms of depression in 45 of 123 infants who had been placed in nursery homes following separation from their parents. Symptoms included loss of appetite, trouble sleeping, crying, slow motor movements, apathy, physical withdrawal such as turning toward a wall, vulnerability to infection, and slowed development. An extreme form of this reaction is *marasmus*, a syndrome of neglected infants who “waste away” in the absence of any physical cause (Bosselman, 1958). That marasmus is counteracted by daily physical contact with a particular adult caregiver has been translated into international prevention programs involving routine, daily “cuddling” of all babies in institutions. After the fall of the Communist regime in Rumania, many institutionalized infants and children were found to be suffering from a condition similar to that described by Spitz. During the 1990s, many U.S. citizens traveled to Rumania and Russia to bring children back with them, or stayed to provide the close and warm interaction that promotes survival.

Separation may elicit attachment behaviors, through which infants try to find the missing caregiver and reestablish physical contact. Also, infants, especially those subjected to more prolonged separation, may show detachment behaviors of indifference, protest, or despair (Bowlby, 1969; Suomi, Collins, Harlow, & Ruppenthal, 1976). Ainsworth (1979) linked personality adjustment in the first few years to what are now called secure and anxious-ambivalent attachment styles, finding that, in later years, the secure were better adjusted than the anxious ambivalent.

Harlow placed infant rhesus monkeys in individual cages containing two substitute or surrogate mothers (see Harlow, 1958). One “mother” was made of wire mesh equipped with a milk-supplying nipple. The other was made of terry cloth, and in some cases, also contained a nipple. Observations revealed that infant monkeys spent far more time clinging to the cloth-covered surrogate, regardless of whether it was the source of milk. When frightening stimuli were introduced into the cages, such as a mechanical teddy bear beating a drum, the infants immediately sought security by running to the cloth mothers.

Suomi and Harlow (1972) reported fascinating use of younger-age peers as “therapists” in successfully rehabilitating monkeys who previously had been socially isolated for six months. The supportive behaviors of the young monkey “therapists” that were caged with the former isolates may be analogous to the “trust” and the gradual “reeducation” characteristic of Sullivan’s approaches to therapy with humans. It certainly is analogous to the benefits peers offer one another, as seen in the notions of “compeer” and “chum.”

The “Psychiatric Interview”: *A Contribution to Helping People Achieve Psychological Adjustment.* Sullivan’s (1954) posthumous book, *The Psychiatric Interview*, is a classic text on the most widely used assessment technique, the interview of individuals with psychological problems. Sullivan saw the interview as an alternative to Freud’s methods because it appears to work better with a wider range of patients, from the

mildly to the seriously disturbed. His three contributions to interviewing encompass: (1) assumptions about the nature of interview data; (2) structural outlines for obtaining and organizing information; and (3) guidelines for interpreting the interview process and defining the roles of the participants.

To Sullivan (1954), two factors determine that “there are no purely objective data in psychiatry” (p. 3). First, much inference is required before the information people provide about themselves begins to make sense. Second, the interviewer directly influences the information people provide. In brief, data about the patient passes through the interviewer, who operates as a *participant observer*:

the psychiatrist cannot stand off to one side and ... [notice] what someone else does, without becoming personally implicated in the operation. His principal instrument of observation is his self—his personality, him as a person. The processes ... that make up the data ... subjected to scientific study occur, not in the subject person nor in the observer, but in the situation which is created between the observer and his subject (Sullivan, 1954, p. 3).

Sullivan’s statement indicates an ironic circumstance, not fully recognized by Freud and others. Attempts to assess the personality of another individual inevitably involve the intrusion of the assessor’s personality, which contaminates the data bearing on the interviewee’s personality. Then one is stuck with a dilemma: to what degree does the data tell us about the interviewee’s personality and to what degree does it inform us about the interviewer’s personality? The heart and soul of the interview and major source of revelations about the personality is:

a situation of primarily *vocal* communication in a *two-person* group ... [which involves] a progressively unfolding expert–client ... [relationship that illuminates] *characteristic patterns of living* [and offers the] ... benefit[s] [that derive from learning about] ... patterns he experiences as particularly troublesome or especially valuable (Sullivan, 1954, p. 4).

The first of four interview stages is called the *inception*, the formal reception of the client and inquiry about why he or she has come to the interviewer. Second, the *reconnaissance* stage “consists in obtaining a rough outline of the social or personal history of the patient” (p. 40). In the critically important third phase, *detailed inquiry*, in-depth exploration occurs that involves many “subtleties and complexities” of technique all employed in the interest of examining “another person’s life” (p. 410). In the fourth phase, *interruption* signals that a particular interview session has come to an end, but other sessions are expected to occur, and *termination* means no further sessions are expected.

The detailed inquiry, the core of the psychiatric interview, begins with the therapist’s attempts to gain an accurate impression of the patient. This pursuit is hindered by the patient’s understandable concern about what the “doctor” thinks of him or her. Initially the patient attempts to avoid a bad impression if not to create a good one. At this point, the job of the therapist is to gain the patient’s confidence so that he or she will make honest self-disclosures. This task may be accomplished by showing irritation-free tolerance for the patient’s circuitous answers to questions, “walking around the obvious,” as Sullivan put it (p. 98). Eventually, the patient will see that direct and forthright answers will be favorably received.

Beyond the initial game of cat and mouse played by interviewer and patient, there are two substantive issues addressed during the detailed inquiry phase. The interviewee may signal anxiety, the first issue, by abrupt changes or transitions in the course of the interview. The interviewer may take advantage of these changes to either lessen anxiety, for the comfort of the patient, or raise it, for the purpose of exploring it. Episodes of anxiety may be especially intense when the patient is concerned about the therapist’s view of her or him. In any case, these episodes are uniformly unwanted. Unlike fear, which may sometimes attract us—we may attend a scary movie or ride a roller coaster—anxiety is never wanted. Thus, in therapy, as in everyday life, when anxiety is on the rise, patients do whatever is necessary to lower it. They may even sometimes “act ... like asses” (Sullivan, 1954, p. 101). Episodes of anxiety during interviews cue interviewers that they have “hit a nerve.”

The second substantive issue involves the self-system. During the later part of childhood, the individual refines **security operations**, skills that allow avoidance of forbidding gestures. When these skills are properly and successfully applied, the child can maintain a state of relative euphoria. Should these abilities fail—the self-system is unable to protect the person’s feeling of well-being—a drop in euphoria occurs and is experienced as anxiety. Thus, protecting well-being or relative euphoria is a basic task of everyone from infant to adult and certainly is a major goal of the patient during the interview. The exercise of security

operations gives the person better **foresight**, the capacity to look ahead in search of good experiences and in the interest of avoiding bad ones. Foresight is facilitated by looking constantly for signs of approval and disapproval in others.

What the patient needs from the interviewer are signals indicating that he or she is doing fine and is “approved.” Absent or ambiguous signals from the therapist generate anxiety, which may reactivate the game of cat and mouse: “you are reading me and I look good ... No! I’m coming across badly ... I’ll try to communicate another impression.” All these signals and miscommunications are evidence that the self-system is “up and running.” The job of the interviewer is then to help the patient tune the self-system, make it run right so that she or he can receive euphoria-maintaining signals.

These are the therapeutic tasks of the psychiatric interview, but what can patients do for themselves? Believing, like Adler, that troubled people must take action in their own behalf, Sullivan outlined three tasks for patients (Sullivan, 1947). First, the patient, and everyone else, can learn to **notice changes in the body** that signal decreases or increases in the tension signifying anxiety. By monitoring their bodies, patients can recognize when anxiety is rising or falling and the situations in which these events occur. Being aware of the situations associated with increases or decreases of anxiety is a kind of insight that precedes coping with anxiety.

Second, the patient—and the rest of us—can learn to **notice marginal thoughts**, thoughts that monitor, critique, and alter speech in terms of formation and grammar, and in terms of errors that may cause incomplete or misunderstood communications to others. There are two kinds of “critics.” The first is called I_1 and is merely concerned with the mechanics of speech. We are often aware of this “rather unfriendly critic” (Sullivan, 1954, p. 99). It is an irritant that chastises us for our failures to speak correctly. By contrast, I_2 , a “rather intelligent creature,” is concerned with more central matters: how well we are presenting ourselves to other people. I_2 is a mirror that reflects the impression we are making on others back to us. We may pay attention to I_1 and, based on its feedback, correct ourselves as we go. However, I_2 , because it deals with more threatening interpersonal matters, is likely to be beyond our conscious awareness and show up only in increased tensions. Should we be able to tune in to I_2 , we would be taking the first step toward dealing with the interpersonal issues that face us, and, at the same time, move toward lowering tension. The third action that all of us can take, patients or not, is to **make prompt statements of all that comes to mind**, a process that is enabled by trusting the “situation to the extent of expressing the thoughts that it provokes” (p. 100). Performing this feat is easier said than done, however, because of inhibitory factors. People are likely to be plagued with thoughts of past behavioral disasters. They may wonder whether they are creating a bad impression on the interviewer and, therefore, may be reluctant to “speak their minds” about whatever is being discussed. Instead they may provide “a circumstantial account of some insignificant current event, or an extravagant report of the marvelous good results that have ... been achieved by exposure to the ...” therapist (p. 100). Only when they learn to speak candidly about the current situation will they be able to provide the information that the interviewer needs to help them. The detailed inquiry phase may continue in any subsequent session. The interviewer’s tasks, relating to anxiety and the self-system, and the three actions by the patient, jointly constitute the therapeutic benefits of the psychiatric interview. The interview is a productive “two-person group” partnership benefiting the patient.

Limitations

Formal science was not well understood nor highly valued by Sullivan, who was marginally trained as a physician and psychiatrist. Like Freud, Horney, Adler, and Jung, he was a clinician and theorist rather than a scientist. Sullivan declared the virtual impossibility of “doing science” with regard to personality and relied on informal methods of study such as clinical observation. More generally, unlike psychologists of Sullivan’s day, psychiatrists of his time did not make “doing science” a major priority. They were strictly therapists who were more apt to be guided by nonscience concerns, such as addressing people’s psychological problems. In view of these circumstances, it is little wonder that, to this day, there is a virtual absence of direct scientific support for Sullivan’s theory. Although consistent with Sullivan’s ideas, even the results of the “monkey” studies by Harlow were not directly inspired by Sullivanian theory. In fact, these studies support the ideas of Bowlby, as well as those of many other theorists including Horney, not just Sullivan. It seems that Sullivanians must look to other people for support of their ideas, as they have generated precious little of their own.

While many of Sullivan’s concepts approached profundity, others bordered on the trivial and still others appeared to be borrowed from someone else. For example, “rewards and punishments” is a common sense notion familiar to everybody’s grandmother, and “trial and success” appears borrowed from E. L. Thorndike, without credit. Sullivan seemed to theorize about everything, but it mattered little to him whether others had already thoroughly “covered the subject.” Because Sullivan used many of Freud’s concepts (free association, repression, and insight) one may wonder whether he was really a Freudian who developed a language that made him “sound” different. In any case, he may have gotten major orientations from other theorists. For example, did he originate the emphasis on anxiety, or did he get it from Horney, a theorist with whom he was personally familiar? Sullivan is not listed among the greatest psychologists of the twentieth century (Haggbloom et al., 2002).

Conclusions

It has been argued that some of what readers of Sullivan attribute to Freud is actually original Sullivanian thought that was not even inspired by Freud (Robbins, 1989). As you have seen, his theory and therapy bears only superficial resemblance to Freud’s. He may also have sometimes written about trivia, but he certainly introduced some highly original and useful ideas, including “prototaxic, parataxic, and syntaxic,” which originated with Sullivan and anticipated modern cognitive developmental theories. Also, one may wonder, who “stole” from whom? Maybe Horney was heavily influenced by Sullivan. Finally, some of his ideas laid a solid foundation for future theory and research. “Foresight”—being pulled by the future rather than being pushed by the past—was one of his creative ideas that has several modern advocates. Forbidding gestures, subtle signs often communicated without words, was an early consideration of what has become the currently fascinating field of “nonverbal communication.”

Some individuals question the credibility of a disturbed psychiatrist who tried to offer the rest of us advice concerning our problems. However, one must remember that many creative contributors to the human condition, scientists, artists, and entertainers, were individuals who had “brilliant lights in the attic that sometimes blinked erratically.” The revered artist Van Gogh was considerably off-center. Relativity theorist Albert Einstein and “the father of the atomic bomb,” Robert Oppenheimer, were at least eccentric. Even extraordinary comedians, such as Lenny Bruce, Jonathan Winters, Robin Williams, and Richard Pryor led troubled lives (the Woody Allen you see on the screen could well be the real Woody). In fact, even profoundly disturbed people, such as schizophrenics, can be unusually creative (Carson & Butcher, 1992). Perhaps what some of us may view as “obscurity in Sullivan’s writings” is creative thinking that is too unique and complex to be penetrated by less than deeply reflective contemplation. Perhaps we should reconsider Sullivan’s works, this time with attention to what is “written between the lines.”

Summary Points

1. Sullivan's family lived in rural New York. His achievements may have been spurred by a desire to rise above his background. His life reflects the diversity he represented: Irish, recent immigrant family, possibly gay or bisexual, Catholic, and probably schizophrenic. He suddenly disappeared from Cornell, possibly because he suffered a psychotic episode. When he surfaced, it was to enter a medical school of uncertain reputation where he performed poorly.

2. Without benefit of a formal residency, he became a psychiatrist interested in schizophrenia. His family history of low SES may have hastened his death. Sullivan died under mysterious circumstances. His family history of low SES may have hastened his death. Sullivan's definition of personality highlighted his "two persons at a time" approach. The core part of personality is the self-system. Sullivan postulated that people experience two kinds of tensions: (1) physical needs and (2) interpersonal anxiety. He believed the infant's tension induced tension in the mothering one, which is experienced as tenderness that meets the infant's needs.

3. "Empathy" is the mode through which the infant participates in the other person's tension. Anxiety aroused through the empathy mechanism can lead to disruptive behavior. Relief is provided by interpersonal security. Sullivan postulated three modes of experience: the infant's speechless prototaxic reality, the parataxic mode, involving speech but little logical connectiveness, and the syntactic mode, entailing the advent of shared meanings.

4. In infancy "nipple-to-lips" contact with a mothering one becomes central. Personifications and the ability to read "forbidding gestures" occur at this time. The self-system is an example of the organizing, integrating process. "Bad mothering" may be passed down through generations and "good mothering" may operate through MRO. During the childhood stage, speech and the need for peers emerge. The self-system continues to develop greater facility at avoiding anxiety.

5. Manifestations of the need for tenderness become more complex: what once brought tenderness may now bring pain; because seeking tenderness may be disadvantageous, the child may develop a malevolent attitude. Sullivan posed five learning processes of which "learning by anxiety" is unique. Sullivan also pointed out the importance of frequency, consistency, and sanity in child training.

6. During the juvenile era, peers become central. Here, what the child has learned at home may not apply to life among peers. Parents lose their godlike aura and children begin to see themselves as members of groups and connected to nonfamily. During preadolescence, the child becomes genuinely sensitive to the needs of others and seeks a comparable status person for a close relationship. During early adolescence, lustful feelings arise and tenderness with a sexual partner is sought.

7. Expression of intimacy needs takes several different forms: (1) autophilic, intimacy need directed to self; (2) isophilic, directed to similar people; (3) heterophilic, directed to the opposite sex. The sexual orientations are autosexual, homosexual, or heterosexual. Genital use forms are: (1) orthogenital, integration with opposite sex person; (2) paragenital, sex without the risk of pregnancy; (3) metagenital, one's own genitals are not involved; and (4) amphigenital, pair members switch roles.

8. Modern theories of homosexuality include "early sexual maturity," "exotic is erotic," finger configuration, auditory click, hormonal exposure in the womb, and hypothalamic structure. Harlow's work with wire and cloth "monkey mothers" confirms the critical importance of close physical intimacy. Spitz showed that motherless infants develop severe depression. Other work indicates that separation from a mothering one may elicit attachment seeking in some infants and detachment in others. "Monkey therapists" improved the condition of socially isolated monkeys.

9. Limitations of the psychiatric interview are: (1) inference is required to interpret the information that people provide, and (2) the interviewer may influence what the interviewee provides. The four stages are: (1) inception; (2) reconnaissance; (3) detailed inquiry; and (4) interruption or termination. In Stage 3 patients are concerned with the impression they make. The self-system institutes security operations to maintain a state of relative euphoria. Patient contributions to the success of therapy are: (1) notice changes in the body that

herald tension changes; (2) notice marginal thoughts, especially I_2 ; and (3) make prompt statements of all that comes to mind.

10. Because Sullivan was a clinician, not a scientist, there has been very little scientific research in direct support of his theory. Readers may have to scramble for additional information to interpret Sullivan's writings. He used so many of Freud's concepts that one wonders whether Sullivanian theory is actually Freudian. Nevertheless, many of Sullivan's ideas are highly original and extremely useful. Others, such as foresight and forbidding gestures, anticipated much modern theory and research. If he was a troubled person, disturbed individuals are often creative.

Running Comparison

<i>Theorist</i>	<i>Sullivan in Comparison</i>
Freud	He questioned Freud's "sexual instincts" but agreed on physical needs. He used "oral gratification," other Freudian terms. The self-system is somewhat ego-like and a little superego-like.
Adler	Some of his ideas had the flavor of social interest (compeer and chum) and he, like Adler, believed people must do for themselves.
Horney	They both showed interest in anxiety dating to infancy and in human relationships.
Fromm	The "katasexual" was somewhat like the necrophilous character of Fromm.
Carl Rogers	Both sought to make patients feel approved and both thought that patients could do much for themselves.

Essay/Critical Thinking Questions

1. Can a person's fears or perceptions that it is time to die hasten her or his death?
2. Can you develop an argument against Sullivan's two people at a time orientation?
3. What are the critical traits of a "mothering one"? Is gender an important factor?
4. Can you break up Sullivan's detailed inquiry stage into at least three parts?
5. Which modern theory of homosexuality fits Sullivan best?

E-mail Interaction

Write the author at b-allen@wiu.edu. Forward one of the following or phrase your own.

1. What is the central idea that distinguishes Sullivan from the other theorists covered so far?
2. What is the real truth about Sullivan's sexual orientation?
3. Why are researchers ignoring Sullivan's ideas?

The Seasons of Our Lives: Erik Ericson

- Does everyone have an identity crisis?
- Does the development of human personality end with adolescence?
- Are the major tasks of life finished by retirement age?



Erik Erikson

[http://facultyweb.cortland.edu
/~andersmd/erik/welcome.html](http://facultyweb.cortland.edu/~andersmd/erik/welcome.html)

Erik Erikson is quite different from the other theorists covered in this book. He is the only one who had no advanced degree. In fact, Erikson never went beyond high school (Woodward, 1994), yet he made it all the way up the academic ladder to a professorship at Harvard. Because he lacked formal training, he was not so devoted to the usual academic traditions in psychology. His point of view is quite cross-disciplinary, mixing Freudian with anthropological language, but it was mostly unique. Some observers may regard his orientation as more philosophic than scientific. However, unlike Fromm and others who have migrated from psychological science to philosophy, some of Erikson's concepts have received scientific support.

Despite his devotion to Freud, Erikson's basic concepts are highly original and drawn from the common language rather than psychological jargon. This inclination makes his ideas not well related to most of the other theorists' concepts. His most creative idea is the "identity crisis." It is the vehicle on which he rode into a personality territory that was virtually unexplored. Gordon Allport did write about the "mature personality,"

but it was Erikson, more than anyone else, who popularized the idea that personality development does not end with adolescence. While Allport wrote of adult life without reference to stages, Erikson elaborated three stages of adult development. Just as he has broadened the vista of personality psychology, he will expand your view of the rest of your life.

Erikson, the Person

In 1902, Erik Homburger Erikson was born in the German town of Frankfurt to Danish parents (Stevens, 1983). His name, sans Homburger, meant “Erik son of Erik,” an appellation taken from his father, whose only other legacy was a genetic gift contributed during a brief affair with his mother (Woodward, 1994). Abandoned by the senior Erik even before his birth, Erikson was nurtured by the Jewish pediatrician who married his mother when he was only a few years old (Stevens, 1983).

A look at Erikson’s childhood makes it easy to see where his interest in “identity crises” originated. He was a child with an identity dilemma. As most boys are, he was pressured to pin his identity to his biological father, but it is almost impossible to tack anything onto a virtual void. Thus, he turned to his adopted father, who loved him and treated him well (Hall, 1983). Out of affection for his adopted father, Erikson initially chose Homburger as his surname. Even early in his career, including the period when he worked with Henry Murray, he went by Erik Homburger. Yet his ambivalence showed when later he relegated Homburger to a middle initial. This display of confusion about his stepfather was only a rare outward sign of the identity crises that occurred to him repeatedly. An ideal Aryan in appearance—he was tall and blond—Erikson faced taunts served up by the children at his father’s synagogue. At the same time he was shunned by some of his German schoolmates because of his stepfather’s religion. Later he toyed with the idea of following in his stepfather’s professional footsteps, but threw it aside, along with other aspirations for an advanced education. The lack of an advanced degree was itself a source of identity conflict. Was he a full-fledged academic or not? A former colleague thought that the lack of the academic “union card”—the Ph.D.—haunted Erikson when he joined the faculty at Harvard (Keniston, 1983). Later in life Erikson aptly expressed how uncertainty about his identity affected him during his youth, “I was,” he recalled, “morbidly sensitive” (“Erik Erikson,” 1970, p. 87).

In lieu of college, young Erikson took up painting (Roazen, 1976). This career move paid off in 1927 when an old friend and director of a progressive school in Vienna invited Erikson to ply his trade in the Austrian capital. Sponsors of the friend’s school included American Dorothy Burlingham, scion of the immensely rich and famous Tiffany family, who could well afford to commission portraits of her four children. It turned out that she also was undergoing psychoanalysis at the hands of the master himself, Freud. Through this connection, Burlingham became a friend of Freud’s daughter Anna, who counted the four Tiffany heirs among her first child patients. Erikson experienced only brief interaction with the four children before Burlingham and Anna Freud began persuading him to become a child analyst. Though he was unfamiliar with this new speciality, Erikson was intrigued and agreed to undergo training analysis with Anna Freud. Soon he was drawn into the inner circle of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society.

Owing to Erikson’s shyness and the oral cancer that already plagued Freud, the two seldom conversed. Nevertheless, as a follower of Freud he reveled in the excitement of a secretive psychoanalytic movement that was forced underground by the disdain of the medical establishment. In the six years that Erikson remained in Vienna, he delivered his first paper before the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, pursued an education in the Montessori method of schooling, and met his bride-to-be, a Canadian-born, U.S. student, Joan Serson.

A number of factors made Erikson view his time among the Vienna analysts as somewhat uncomfortable. Roazen (1976) thought that Erikson was “dissatisfied as one of Freud’s younger disciples” (p. 4). As a newcomer, Erikson felt called on to be a “servant for the master” (p. 4). He was even known to drive Freud around in Burlingham’s car. Also, his status as a non-M.D. “lay” analyst may have bothered him, but there were two reasons why he was at least reasonably well respected. First, being upset with the medical establishment for not openly accepting his point of view, Freud could readily overlook Erikson’s and others’ lack of “proper credentials.” Second, it was deemed less essential for child analysts to have medical

qualifications. Generally, Freud welcomed lay analysts in the hope of attracting a variety of people with broad backgrounds. Erikson was also attractive because he was one of the few men willing to pursue the fledgling profession of child analysis. Finally, he was Aryan.

Another source of discomfort was the constitution of the Vienna group, especially the child analysts. Freud had lost some of his most able male analysts and had surrounded himself with women, mostly recruited by Anna. "Erikson felt stifled by what he described as the maternalistic overprotection of the women analysts" (p. 6). Further, he, like the males who had abandoned Freud, felt the pressure to conform. He wrote about "a growing conservatism and especially a subtle yet pervasive interdiction of certain trends of thought. This concerned primarily any idea which might be reminiscent of the deviations perpetrated by those earliest and most brilliant of Freud's co-workers ... " (quoted in Roazen, 1976, pp. 6-7).

Perhaps his disaffection with Freudian thought, which he never openly admitted, accounted for his quick response to Hitler's assumption of power in Germany during 1933. Erikson and his new wife first tried to establish citizenship in Denmark. When that effort failed, they migrated to the United States, where Erikson became the first child analyst in Boston (Stevens, 1983). There he was immediately accepted by the American Association of Psychoanalysis, despite his lack of credentials, because its members so revered the International Psychoanalytic Association to which Erikson belonged and were so in awe of anyone who had been close to Freud.

Erikson did try to do something about his deficient qualifications, but he failed at graduate work in the psychology program at nearby Harvard (Roazen, 1976). That apparently was his last effort at a formal, advanced education. His alliance with Harvard, however, did not end. Soon he was working on research leading to the book that made Murray famous. During this period he had the opportunity to work with children of both the wealthy and the poor (Stevens, 1983).

After a stint at Yale's Institute of Human Relations, during which he made a side trip to a Sioux Indian reservation, the Eriksons moved to California where, in 1939, Erik took a position at the University of California at Berkeley. His observations of the Sioux and the Yurok, a Northern California tribe who preserved many of their ancient traditions, changed his orientation profoundly. These experiences convinced him that Freud's sexual ideas were not universal. Rather, he discovered that a progression through stages of identity acquisition is generalizable across cultures (Evans, 1967).

After ten years on the West Coast working on a longitudinal child development program, analyzing Hitler's speeches during the war, and studying life aboard submarines, he took a teaching post at the University of California. Unfortunately it was short-lived. When confronted with the demand that he sign an anti-Communist loyalty oath, Erikson, who was not Communist, refused and resigned (Woodward, 1994). Returning to the East Coast, he received an appointment to a psychoanalytic center specializing in child psychiatry. Soon thereafter, *Childhood and Society* (1950) made him famous. This seminal work was followed by other popular successes: *Young Man Luther*, a psychobiography of religious rebel Martin Luther, the Pulitzer prize-winning *Gandhi's Truth*, and, finally, *Life Cycle Completed*.

By 1960, he was so well known and respected that he was appointed Professor of Human Development and lecturer in psychiatry at Harvard, an extraordinary development in view of his nonexistent academic credentials. After his retirement, he and his wife returned to the San Francisco area. Until his death on May 12, 1994, he remained active advocating rights for children as well as for the elderly, and campaigning for an emphasis on people rather than nations. A colleague summed up the respect that she and others have for this prophet who proclaimed that personality development never ends: "As they used to say of Gandhi, he was a mahatama, a great soul, very wise, [a] very wide-ranging humanist" (Diana Eck, quoted in *Peoria Journal Star*, 1994).

Erikson's View of the Person

Freudian?

Erikson has been counted among the Freudians (or neo-Freudians). Roazen (1976) asserted that he was a self-proclaimed Freudian and there is no question that he was devoted to Freud on a personal level. Having read everything Freud wrote, including his correspondence, Erikson could not resist citing Freud at every possible opportunity. His dedication to Freud seems to stem from his beliefs about “great leaders.” During his study of Gandhi, his reflections on the Indian practitioner of nonviolent protest revealed his conception of the dilemma that followers of giants must resolve: “... who is the true representative of revolutionary advance—he who modestly continues the work of a giant and adapts it to less heroic circumstances, or he who continues to flex his muscles to see whether he may prove to have gigantic measurements himself” (Erikson, quoted in Roazen, 1976). It seems that Erikson came down on both sides, one explicitly and the other implicitly. Explicitly he pronounced himself a Freudian, often excusing the master’s personal weaknesses (e.g., his railroad phobia) and his theoretical vulnerabilities (e.g., his conception of women). Erikson waved his hand at Freud’s bizarre middle-aged abandonment of sexual relations and overlooked his nearly neurotic correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess. He felt obligated to dig for a seemingly appropriate Freudian citation with each mention of his own original ideas. In fact, Erikson credited some of his own ideas to Freud though they could be traced to his former mentor only by an enormous stretch of the imagination. Even Erikson’s most original and important idea was laid at Freud’s door. “Erikson’s many citations of Freud’s single mention of the concept of inner identity is an instance of a disciple trying to foist off an original idea onto [Freud]” (p. 12). As late as 1967, Erikson called himself a psychoanalyst. In terms of his explicit pronouncements, there is little question that Erikson was Freudian.

Accepting credit for one’s own ideas is to abandon humility. Taking credit is also accepting blame. Erikson tacitly acknowledged that it is difficult for creative people to achieve “the courage of their own originality” (Erikson, quoted in Roazen, 1976, p. 12). “When I started to write extensively about twenty-five years ago, I really thought I was merely providing new illustrations for what I had learned from Sigmund and Anna Freud. I realized only gradually that any original observation already implies a change in theory. The scientific climate has changed so much that older and new theories cannot really be compared” (quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 292). Thus, Erikson implicitly acknowledges that his ideas are more his own than Freud’s. Further, he deemphasizes sexual motivation in favor of the quest for identity. The unconscious takes a backseat to the ego, which, in Erikson’s hands, becomes molded into a form of the self. The superego becomes akin to the conventional conscience. At times he seems more like Jung than Freud, as his interest in anthropological issues and ancient cultures appears to exceed his concern for the obsessions of current, Western society. His experiences with the Sioux and Yurok made him more an anthropologist/sociologist than a psychoanalyst. Also, it made him see that Freud’s ideas were culture-bound, founded on European culture and thus not applicable to many other cultures.

He was more concerned with people’s missions in life as these quests evolve through the life span than their struggles with unresolved traumas of childhood. In fact, he openly expressed his reservations about Freud’s emphasis on cataclysmic events of early life: “If everything ‘goes back’ into childhood, then everything is somebody else’s fault, and trust in one’s own power of taking responsibility for oneself may be undermined” (quoted in Woodward, 1994, p. 56). In sum, despite the homage paid to Freud, he was certainly not a Freudian and maybe not a neo-Freudian. His theory was too much a mix of psychology, anthropology, and sociology to be “psychoanalytic.” [Box 7.1](#) shows that Erikson parted company with Freud regarding women.

BOX 7.1 • Acknowledging Diversity: Erikson's Evolving View of Women

Erikson not only used masculine pronouns in writing, which was common in his time, he also frequently couched his pronouncements in masculine terms: "Evolution has made man ...," "mature man," "Whatever chance man has to transcend the limitations of his self ..." (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). In writing about the sexuality of male and female children, he proclaimed, "In the boy, the sexual orientation is dominated by phallic-intrusion; in the girl, by inclusive modes of attractiveness and 'motherliness'" (p. 289). He felt "stifled" by the Vienna women with whom he worked. Yet, he was an open person who appears to have changed as he matured during the early stages of the women's movement. In almost no other area did he so closely approximate declaring that Freud was "wrong." In an interview he indicated (from Evans, 1976, pp. 294–300):

Obviously [Freud and I] would not agree today with all the generalizations which have been made with regard to the Oedipus complex, least of all the female Oedipus complex. My feeling is that Freud's general judgment of the identity of women was probably the weakest part of his theory. Exactly what is to blame for that I don't know, except that he was a Victorian man, a patriarchal man. Freud's perception might also have been colored by the sexual mores of his time, which could not admit at first that an upper-class woman could have passionate and active sexual wishes and yet be refined and intelligent. At any rate, psychoanalytic literature tends to describe woman as an essentially passive and masochistic creature, who not only accepts the roles or identity assigned to her submissively, but needs all the masochism she can muster to appreciate the phallic male.

Erikson was flexible. He changed, and in so doing, moved further from Freud.

On the Tasks and Polarities of Life

The "tasks of life" theme is at the heart of Erikson's theory. At each succeeding stage of human development people have new tasks to master. Thus, life and its challenges are constantly evolving. Contrary to the way Freud thought of it, or even the way Allport conceived of it, maturity to Erikson is not something most people achieve or not. Instead, it is something that people approximate well or not so well.

How well people conquer the tasks of a given stage determines toward which of two poles they migrate, one representing positive development and the other negative development. The poles symbolize the horns of a dilemma. Parents, the individual's society, interactions with peers, and the individual's own skills determine how well the dilemma is resolved. In turn, resolution promotes the development of a new **strength**, a virtue arising from dominant movement toward the positive pole. With resolution comes the ability to face the challenges of the next stage.

Basic Concepts: Erikson

Erikson believed that people go through eight stages of psychosocial evolution that is termed **psychosocial development**, a union of physical yearnings and the cultural forces that act on the individual ("Erik Erikson," 1970). These phases include four childhood stages, one adolescent stage, and three adult stages. They are characterized by **epigenesis** (*epi* means "upon" and *genesis* means "emergence"): the stages literally emerge "one on top of another in space and time" (quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 294). Each is built on the other like each upper-level math course is built on lower-level courses. His most basic concepts are tied to the eight stages.

Like Jung, Erikson advocated a reality in which thesis and antithesis, the conflict of opposites, yielded synthesis, the resolution of conflict. Maturity and contentment result from synthesis; stagnation and maladjustment follow failure to resolve conflicts. The conflict at each stage is termed a "crisis." In effect, at each stage, the crisis that the individual experiences entails being stretched between the opposing positive and negative poles associated with the stage. Successful resolution of a crisis prepares the person for the next step in the quest for identity. As may have occurred to you, the popular phrase "identity crisis" originates in Erikson's conception of the psychosocial crises.

Erikson makes it clear that resolution of the crisis is never absolute. To approximate resolution people must experience a **favorable ratio**, the greater the magnitude of the pull to the positive pole relative to the

pull of the negative pole the better (Erikson, 1968a). In turn, the more favorable the ratio, the more people manifest the strength available at a given stage. Lest the reader think that Erikson's repeated references to "crises" makes a pessimist of him, it is important to note that resolution of conflicts is normal and expected, and "crises" are turning points, not threats of catastrophe (Erikson, 1968a). Each resolution of a crisis brings with it progress toward a full and rich identity, an issue explored in [Box 7.2](#).

BOX 7.2 • *What Are Your Own Sources of Identity?*

Exploring your own feelings of "identity" should help you get the flavor of Erikson's ideas on the subject. First, examine all of the "sources of identity" listed below. Then try to decide which are most important to you. It is a difficult task. Once Barbara Jordan, famous former Congresswoman and professor, was asked to choose between two prominent sources of identity, being Black and being a woman. This eloquent devotee of the U.S. Constitution paused to reflect for a moment. She did make a decision, but I do not recall what it was.

After examining the sources, rank them in order, giving the most important source a rank of one (1), the second most important a two (2), and so forth until all sources are ranked. Force yourself to make choices; the result of the ranking will tell you much about yourself. The choices are listed alphabetically. If you want to add other sources, do so before ranking.

career (specify present or anticipated career)
child of my parents
ethnic group (Black, White, Latino, Asian, or whatever applies)
friend to several people
gender (male or female)
hobbyist (sports, exercise, or whatever applies)
human being
parent
sibling (brother or sister)
[others of your own choosing]

Infancy: Trust and Distrust

Infants (first year) arrive with basic physiological needs that parents must be willing and able to meet. Parents usually satisfy needs, but the inevitable delay or neglect of satisfaction and the occurrence of weaning generates the first crisis. **Basic trust** results from the infant's sense that it can count on satisfaction of its needs (Erikson, 1968a); the world takes on the aura of a "trustworthy realm." Its opposite is **basic mistrust**, the feeling of abandonment and helpless rage that accompanies uncertainty of satisfaction. Trust is injected into the infant in different ways by different mothers. Each mother is unique and, thus, conveys trust in a unique way. "Moreover, mothers in different cultures and classes and races must teach this trusting in different ways, so it will fit their cultural version of the universe" (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 293).

Erikson makes a point of the observation that both trust and mistrust are learned. We all must learn trust if we are to be fully functional humans, "But to learn to mistrust is just as important" (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 293). Mistrust is part of life also, and we must become familiar with it. We can hope, however, that trust will outweigh mistrust in the ratio of the two orientations.

Basic trust lays the foundation for the first of the strengths, hope, the enduring belief in the attainability of basic satisfactions. "You see, **hope** is a very basic human strength without which we couldn't stay alive" (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 293). It is the foundation of faith, often manifested in adult religious practices (Hall, 1983). In fact, faith is protected by religion, its **institutional safeguard**, a cultural unit that protects and promotes products of crisis resolution. Failure to develop basic trust yields mistrust and hopelessness.

Early Childhood: Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt (SAD; Shame/Autonomy/Doubt)

During this second stage (age 2–3), the child develops motor skills that open up the first possibilities of independence (Erikson, 1968a). Part of the trauma the child experiences at this time is in the transition from the first to this more mature second stage. Just when the child has learned to trust its mother and the world, it must become self-willed. It must change from being the one-sided trusting soul to being also worthy of others' trust. Only by calling on others to trust it, rather than just trusting in others, can it exercise its will.

Children can now move to desired objects and thereby possess them without the aid of parents. The dawning of grasping ability allows children to experience the power of imprisoning an object within fingers, hands, and arms. Power also comes from letting go, but so does conflict. To hold can be destructive, as in restraining, or it can be positive, as in cuddling. Letting go has two additional meanings: giving up something desirable, or casually “letting it be.” Here Erikson hints at Fromm’s “dilemma of freedom”: to let go of something is to be free of it, but also to lose it.

With the newly acquired muscular skills, the child experiences doing for herself. Unfortunately, she also knows the frustration generated by needing the help of others who can do more for her than she can do for herself. For Erikson as well as Allport, self-esteem derives from doing for oneself. Consistent with this orientation, the two poles of the crisis involve the themes of independence and the self-esteem that comes with it versus the self-estrangement that accompanies dependency. **Autonomy** is independence stemming from the reasonable self-control that allows children to hold rather than restrain, to let be rather than lose. **Shame and doubt** is the estrangement that results from the feeling of being controlled and of losing self-control. It is the precursor of neurosis, a desperate struggle for control of one’s environment, and paranoia, a manifestation of feeling controlled by others. A child who is tentative and self-effacing is reflecting shame and doubt.

The strength that emerges from resolution during early childhood is **will power**, “the unbroken determination to exercise free choice as well as self-restraint in spite of the unavoidable experience of shame, doubt, and a certain rage over being controlled by others” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 288). The exercise of free choice has its institutional safeguard—the principles of law and order and of justice. However, Erikson argues that “law and order” when overblown can rob people of the very choice it is supposed to protect.

Erikson acknowledges that infants go through a Freudian “anal stage,” but “we have to consider that the anal musculature is part of musculature in general” (quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 293). The task of the infant is to learn control of his musculature, including his sphincters. In contrast to Freud, culture is emphasized rather than universal physiology in achieving sphincter control.

Play Age: Initiative versus Guilt

In the fourth year, children become aware of the differences between the sexes. During this third stage, sex-role playing and sexual feelings occur for the boy. But to Erikson the girl plays the feminine role, trying to look attractive and to be nurturing, rather than being sexual. Conscience appears at this stage and forever places restraints on actions, thoughts, and fantasies. One of the poles at this stage is **initiative**, acting on one’s desires, urges, and potentials. The other is **guilt**, the harness that restrains pursuit of desires, urges, and potentials, the exercise of an overzealous conscience. The boy learns that competition for a favored position with his mother leads to the inevitable fear of damage to his genitals. The result is guilt at having taken the initiative well beyond that which is permissible (Evans, 1967). Erikson turns further from Freud when he suggests that it is only natural for the boy to fall in love with his mother, because she is everything to him. She is the center of his life and his caretaker. Any fantasies a child may have will tend to focus on what is crucial to her or his survival and prosperity. Thus, the boy’s fantasies, even those relating to his emerging genital urges, will likely center on his mother. The girl has problems relating to pursuit of her father’s attentions. For both genders, guilt arises from a failure to demonstrate capability when the initiative is taken (Evans, 1967).

At first, children’s play involves only wish fulfillment and fantasy rather than real purpose, but gradually it changes. “The child begins to envisage goals for which his locomotion and cognition have prepared him. The child also begins to think of being ‘big’ and to identify with people whose work or whose

personality he can understand and appreciate” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1967, p. 25). That is, children’s developing new strength is **purpose**, “the courage to envisage and pursue valued and tangible goals guided by conscience but not paralyzed by guilt and by fear of punishment” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 289). Failure at resolution leads to repression or inhibition and to adult pathology such as sexual impotence, overcompensation, and exhibitionism.

School Age: Industry versus Inferiority

At each stage, the child becomes a somewhat different person. At the school age, the fourth stage (ages 6 through 12), children evolve into intellectually curious people. They want to know, to learn. During this time, children begin to lay the groundwork for becoming parents. They play at the parental role to prepare themselves for the real thing. For the first time, they relate to the larger society and one of its core elements, work. They learn to apply themselves to tasks that have practical outcomes such as schoolwork for grades or housework for a “salary.”

Erikson sometimes referred to the school age as asexual or the “latency period.” He is quick to add, however, that Freud missed all the cognitive development that blossoms during the school age “because he was only concerned with what happens to sexual energy during that time” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 295). One of the poles of the school age is **industry**, children’s absorption in the “tool world” of their culture—the workaday world—which prepares them “for a hierarchy of learning experiences which [they] will undergo with the help of cooperative peers and instructive adults” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 289). Of course, school is the first productive situation that provides an inkling of the “tool culture.” Here “work” is school performance. In other settings it may be athletic performance or group-play activities. In each case the child is learning adults’ rules of work, as directly seen in playing “house” or “doctor.” The other pole of the crisis, **inferiority**, occurs if children perceive their skills or status among peers to be inadequate. This perception arises because of failures at establishing competence in some specialized way, such as playing a game or spelling well. Race or ethnic background may become barriers that prevent children from experiencing success and the accompanying actualization of the will to learn. Inferiority can yield regression to the hopelessness of over-concern about the opposite-sex parent that characterized the previous stage. The triumph of inferiority leads to an obsession with work, which becomes the sole source of identity, a workaholic orientation. “If the overly conforming child accepts work as the only criterion of worthwhileness, sacrificing too readily his imagination and playfulness, he may [as an adult] ... [become] a slave of his technology ... ” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 289).

Resolution of the crisis at the school age gives children critical experiences, including working beside and with others and “division of labor.” From this resolution emerges the strength of **competence**, “the free exercise (unimpaired by an infantile sense of inferiority) of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of serious tasks” (Erikson, 1968a, pp. 289–290). With competence, children are ready for cooperative participation in some segment of the culture.

Adolescence: Identity versus Identity Confusion

The adolescent search for self represents the fulcrum on which the lifelong struggle for identity is balanced. Adolescence, the fifth stage (13–19), allows a synthesis of previous stages, but it is more than the mere sum of what developed earlier. It is also an extension into the future. One pole of the adolescent crisis is **identity**, accumulated confidence that the sameness and continuity one has previously cultivated are now appreciated by others, allowing, in turn, the promise of careers and lifestyles to come. *Continuity* is an important term in the conception of identity. “Identity means an integration of all previous identifications and self-images, including the negative ones” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 297). Continuity ensures that one is all that one was, but also something new and something yet to be. The opposite of identity is **identity confusion**, the failure of previous identity developments to coalesce in such a way that it is clear what roles one is expected to play in the future. While all teens may change superficial identity periodically—Goth one month, hip-hop the next—repeated changes at short intervals may signal abnormal identity confusion. The victory of confusion predicts acute maladjustments due to a feeling of meaninglessness. Further, adolescent identity is not merely obtaining genital maturity. It is an ability to be concerned about others, because one’s own problems relating to previous periods have been largely solved (Evans, 1976). Identity problems for teens are in part related to their personal histories and in part arise from identity pitfalls peculiar to their historical era. For example, today’s teenage boys may be torn between the macho orientation that dominated their fathers’ identities and the more gender-neutral identity that seems appropriate today.

In their struggle to answer the question “Who am I?” adolescents often form cliques. These clans bolster self-images and provide a mutual defense against “enemies” whose different characteristics challenge the “truth” of their own developing identities (Hall, 1983). If teens turn this condemnation of the “different” against society, delinquency can result. In fact, modern teen gangs can be viewed as Eriksonian clans formed to foster identity development. However, adolescent rebellion is not seen by Erikson as a necessarily negative force, at least when the larger culture is considered (Erikson, 1968a). Societies must be flexible, and Erikson sees adolescent challenges as a source of cultural rejuvenation. Youth, in their quest for identity, question the norms of their society, vigorously supporting those that meet the challenge and contributing to the demise of rules that cannot bear close scrutiny. Periods of unrest among the young attest to the sickness of a society failing to meet the promise of youth—that the best will rule and the rulers will bring out the best in people. The unrest of the 1960s was a response to a society whose leaders were not “bringing out the best.” During such times, the mind of youth and that of society become one in the pursuit of ideological unification and return to coherent purpose.

The strength that comes from the adolescent period is **fidelity**, “the opportunity to fulfill personal potentialities ... to be true to himself and true to significant others ... [and to] sustain loyalties ... in spite of inevitable contradictions of value systems” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 290). For Erikson, fidelity is the cornerstone of identity. It is, however, not devotion to a particular ideology, but loyalty to ideologies that are appropriate to the individual. As Erikson put it, “I would go further and claim that we have almost an instinct for fidelity—meaning that when you reach a certain age you can and must learn to be faithful to some ideological view ... without the development of a capacity for fidelity the individual will either have ... a weak ego, or look for a deviant group to be faithful to” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 296).

The need to adopt ideologies, particularly a focal ideology, can be a trap that ensnares the impulsive teen. Erikson believed that “Adolescents are easily seduced by totalitarian [authoritarian] regimes and all kinds of totalistic fads” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 297). Like Allport and Fromm, he was especially concerned because youth are prone to succumb to the siren song of “nationalism” (exclusive devotion to one’s nation). The allure of nationalism is in its ideological simplicity and resultant promise to answer all questions and solve all problems. As far back as 1942, Erikson recognized the effect of the nationalistic narcotic on the “Hitler Youth” (Hoffman, 1993). Youth must somehow avoid impulsivity in responding to the almost instinctual demand of fidelity that one quickly adopt the most obvious ideology available. If they cannot, ideology may become the basis of their identities. Only with restraint will the magnetic force of simplistic ideologies like nationalism be resisted until broader ideologies are considered.

But what gets confused when “identity confusion” occurs? [Box 7.3](#) suggests that young people who infrequently enjoy the presence and influence of their parents may resort to other models in their search for identity. However, research by Mashek, Aron, and Boncimino (2003) suggests identity confusion might be

seen from a broader perspective than “parents versus other adult figures.” Their results indicate that how close we feel toward others with whom we engage in some kind of relationship may explain identity confusion. The teenage to young adult participants in their research (mean age averaged across three studies, 19.6 years) first named people to whom they felt close, such as “best friend” and “father.” In some studies, they also named people to whom they did not feel close: “familiar stranger” (Bill Clinton) and “non-familiar stranger” (Chelsea Clinton). Then they indicated the applicability of some trait words to themselves and, with different lists, ascribed trait words to close others (best friend) and non-close others (Bill Clinton). Finally, participants were given a memory test in which they tried to remember which trait words they had ascribed to themselves, close others, and non-close others. Results clearly showed that participants were more likely to confuse trait words ascribed to close others as having been applied to themselves than they were to confuse words ascribed to non-close others as having been applied to themselves. When we show identity confusion, we are likely to confuse our own identities with the identities of the people in our lives to whom we feel close.

BOX 7.3 • *How Do We Become Who We Are?*

One wonders whether, in these times, some parents have set aside sufficient time and effort to have a positive impact on their children. In this era of two-income families, commuting long distances to work, and multiple ways to spend recreational time—100+ TV channels, the Web, bigger and better movies, gigantic shopping malls, and increased interest in sports—some parents may not be present often enough to influence the identities of their children. So where do the children of such parents turn? One obvious answer is to the media. Another is to other people who are “there for them,” such as teachers, coaches, clergy, and peers. In any case, it is hard to fashion an identity solely of our own choosing. We must have some influential figures in our lives who provide standards for shaping an identity.

But are our identities at adolescence and young adulthood our final identities? I once knew a college student who apparently had rejected his rather conservative, middle-class parents and all they stood for. He was a campus radical of yesterday, the tumultuous late 1960s. We would now think of him as confirmation of the hippie, draft-dodging, antiestablishmentarian, rebel stereotype. His values were free living, prolove, antiviolence, and antiwar, like the hippies. He “practiced at being gay” so he could avoid military service (he never served). He made fun of the university administration who begged him to stay on campus during breaks and weekends so he could help them calm any “out-of-control” dissidents. He ridiculed the political establishment, especially then-President Nixon. He even engaged in some minor “dirty tricks” to stick a needle in the hide of “greedy Corporate America.” He was brilliant, funny, and a catalyst for needed change. Where is he now? Unlike most former campus rebels, he has turned in the other direction. Now in his fifties, he is widely known for his conservative views.

Young Adulthood: Intimacy versus Isolation

During previous stages, strengths allowed the genders to merge in cooperation and fruitful communication. When “falling in love,” teenagers attach themselves to another person in an attempt to arrive at self-definition. Teens “in love” see themselves reflected in an “idealized other,” but do not actively attempt to differentiate themselves from the other. Now, during the sixth stage (20–35), the biological differences come to the fore, so that the genders, similar in consciousness and language, become different in the mature quest for love and procreation. The two poles of this sixth stage are tied to the themes of attachment to and alienation from others. **Intimacy** “is really the ability to fuse your identity with somebody else’s without fear that you’re going to lose something yourself” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1967, p. 48). Fromm’s view of intimate relations with others is similar. It is more than the mere physical intimacy that occurs in sexual exchanges (Hall, 1983). “Of course, I mean something more—I mean intimate relationships, such as friendship, love, sexual intimacy, even intimacy with oneself, one’s inner resources, the range of one’s excitements and commitments” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 300). With this broader definition of intimacy in mind, Erikson anticipated modern theories of marital success (Allen, 2001). He asserted that intimacy is what makes meaningful marriage possible.

The other pole in the crisis for this stage is **isolation**, the failure to secure close and cooperative

relationships with the same, and especially the opposite, gender such that partners' identities are important to, but distinct from, one's own. The triumph of isolation dooms the individual to infantile fixations and lasting immaturities that interfere with love and work. On the other hand, intimacy brings the strength of this period. **Love** "is the guardian of that elusive and yet all-pervasive power of cultural and personal style which binds ... the affiliations of competition and cooperation, procreation and production" into a "way of life" (quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 291). Love is "a mutuality of devotion greater than the antagonisms inherent in [mates'] divided function[s]" (p. 291).

Middle Adulthood: Productivity versus Futility

During the first dozen years I've been doing this book, my own students and students at other colleges and universities have pointed out that longevity is not what it was when Erikson first composed his stages. The average longevity for women in Western societies is approaching 80 and it is around the mid-seventies for men (it is even greater elsewhere, e.g., Japan). As students have suggested, it is high time for an additional stage. I propose a new stage called "Middle Adulthood" that spans the ages 35–60.

One pole of this stage is **productivity**, people's perception that they are contributing to society through their careers and to their community through their personal involvement. People who develop productivity through resolution at this stage are doing what Adler would hope for. They are, through their labors, generating outcomes that they see as improving society. Obviously, school teachers, social workers, farmers, physicians, college teachers, nurses, clinical psychologists, and ministers are in a position to develop productivity. Others may also perceive that their vocations contribute to society: insurance agents, attorneys, refuse collectors, energy producers, and many others can be in a position to benefit society. Anyone can support perceptions of productivity in their communities by becoming involved. Everything, from just voting in local elections, through contributing money to local charities, to visiting shut-ins, qualifies as community involvement.

The other pole is **futility**, the perception that one is on the proverbial treadmill, merely keeping body and soul together, but doing nothing for the good of society or one's community. People who fail to resolve the conflict at this stage feel that they are producing nothing worthwhile, except sustenance for their own benefit. They view their jobs not as careers, but as useless work. Any of the careers listed under "productivity" could be listed here as well, because futility, like productivity, is in the eye of the beholder: if one does not see one's work as worthwhile, it is not. But could people see their contributions as having no value when, in fact, their efforts are highly valued? Not likely, because they would be getting positive feedback from others if their works were highly valued. In almost all cases, perceptions of futility are supported by negative feedback or by the absence of positive feedback. Futility guarantees alienation from society and from one's community. Society is seen as having no use for one's efforts. In the same vein, one can offer one's community nothing of value. Depression is likely to accompany futility.

The strength of this stage would be **contentment**, the perception that one's efforts result in the promotion of human well-being and that one is revered in the local community because of "good works." A contented person perceives that what he or she does is not mere labor. Instead it is a service to society that advances the culture by improving or enriching the lives of others and it is a concrete contribution to the local community that people can see and appreciate. Contentment comes with believing that one's efforts are valued by society and by one's neighbors. **Box 7.4** is Erikson's take on cultural diversity in people's communities.

Mature Adulthood: Generativity versus Stagnation

“At this stage one begins to take one’s place in society, and to help in the development and perfection of whatever [society] produces” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, pp. 301–302). Humans are not only “learning animals” they are teachers as well. It is during the maturity of adulthood (60–75) that the need to be needed and the accumulation of wisdom lead to assumption of the “teacher” role. Thus, during the seventh stage, people strive for **generativity**, “the concern with establishing and guiding the next generation” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). It is manifested in the advice that middle-aged people are inclined to offer younger individuals. Erikson admitted that *generativity* is “not an elegant word” (p. 301). He indicated that he might have used *creativity* instead of *generativity*, but the substitution would put “too much emphasis on the particular creativity which we ascribe to particular people” (p. 301). *Generativity* has a broader meaning that is applicable to people in general: “everything that is generated from generation to generation: children, products, ideas, and works of art” (p. 301).

BOX 7.4 • Erikson on Cultural Diversity

Except possibly for Jung, no other theorist covered so far has left her or his theoretical door more wide open to cultural diversity than did Erikson. He recognized that mothers from different cultures must teach trusting in ways that are consistent with their traditions. You can well imagine that, compared to North America, trust is imparted differently in South American societies and Asian societies, where babies are strapped for hours on the mother’s back facing away from her. It is also taught differently in African societies, where “it takes a whole village to rear a child.” Although he believed that people of different cultures passed through the same developmental stages, his studies of non-Western cultures led him to acknowledge that the ways his stages were manifested were different for different cultures. For example, during the “school age,” the “adult rules of work” that children learn, and the role-teaching games they play, are different for different cultures. For example, Masai (East Africa) children learn how to care for livestock and Maori (New Zealand) children learn wood and stone carving. Erikson recognized as well that during the school age avoidance of inferiority was more difficult for the children of oppressed social and ethnic groups than for others. As for the teen period, Erikson observed that youth are both the architects of the cultural evolution that occurs during troubled times and the victims of it. His popularity among 1960s youth arose from his recognition that U.S. society needed changing and that youth would be the catalysts for change. His writings predicted that youth would be in the forefront of the civil rights movement and of the campaign to end the U.S. role as the world’s police.

The failure of generativity leads to **stagnation**, the arrest of the ripening process that comes with inability to funnel previous development into the formation of the next generation. Boredom is the constant companion of stagnation, as is false intimacy and adult self-indulgence. Inevitably, the failure of generativity shows up in the next generation as the aggravation of estrangements in childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood.

Care, the strength of maturity, is “the broadening concern for what has been generated by love, necessity, or accident—a concern that overcome[s] ... the narrowness of self-concern” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). Care is a major force behind utilization of “proven methods with which each generation meets the needs of the next” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). Erikson was at first concerned about the selection of *care* because of its multitude of connotations, including “anxious solicitude” (Evans, 1976). But he concluded that the word has evolved and now means “ ‘to care to do’ something, to ‘care for’ somebody or something, to ‘take care of’ that which needs protection and attention, and ‘to take care not to’ do something destructive” (quoted in Evans, 1976, 301).

Old Age: Integrity versus Despair

Power in old age is wit in full bloom—a storehouse of knowledge, an inclusive understanding, and a maturity of judgment. These intellectual contributions provide a bridge to the next generation by reminding all that the knowledge of a given generation is not “truth,” but a cog in the infinitely large and everturning wheel of human experience. Crisis at this time (75 until death) involves contributing to the continuity of the human condition versus distraction from that noble purpose by an obsession with death. The poles for this eighth stage revolve around wholeness and completeness versus disintegration and defeat. **Integrity** is “an emotional integration faithful to the image bearers of the past and ready to take (and eventually renounce) leadership in the present” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 291). Integrity is the continuity that comes from being solidly founded on a past that contributes to the present and projects into the future. My grandmother had it.

Lack of resolution leads to **despair**, a feeling that time is too short for the achievement of integrity and the accompanying contribution to the connection between generations. Despair can result in bitterness at not being able to extend oneself into the future and a losing battle with death, rather than a calm acceptance of it. Despair yields psychological death before the physical counterpart. The strength that comes from resolution of the eighth crisis is **wisdom**, a “detached and yet active concern with life in the face of death,” not magical access to “higher knowledge” (Erikson, 1968a, p. 292; Hall, 1983). With wisdom, death is accepted, and one’s role in the human drama is assured.

Erikson was not entirely satisfied with the term *wisdom* “because to some people it seems to mean a too strenuous achievement for each and every old person” (Erikson, quoted in Evans, 1976, p. 301). In fact, during old age people may show a renewal of infantile traits, even including senile childishness. *Wisdom* in any sense is not a necessity during old age. “The main point is again a developmental one: only in old age can true wisdom develop in those who are thus gifted. And, in old age, some wisdom must mature, if only in a sense that the old person comes to appreciate and to represent something of the wisdom of the ages, or plain old wit” (p. 301). Though he was not old when he died, wisdom is what Malcolm X had at the end of his life. **Table 7.1** summarizes Erikson’s eight stages, as well as my new middle adulthood stage, spanning ages 35–60, and the crisis of identity associated with each.

Theoretical and Empirical Support for Erikson’s Point of View

Levinson: The Midlife Crisis

Daniel Levinson was in his mid-forties when he recruited a sample of middle-aged men (1978). Levinson’s crisis, suffered at the midpoint of life, yielded creative conceptions. The *midlife transition* is a bridge between young adulthood and middle age, a time when individuals look back at their previous successes and failures and look forward to future prospects (Levinson, 1978). Because of concern about mortality, people begin to reevaluate the past in order to use the future more wisely. They raise questions about their contributions to family and career and vice versa. The result usually is *de-illusionment*, a reduction of illusions, a recognition that assumptions and beliefs about self and the world are not true. Illusions have worked well in earlier life as fuel to drive ambitions and ideals. At midlife it is time to cast them aside in favor of objective assessment.

TABLE 7.1 Erikson's Eight Stages and a New Stage

<i>Stage</i>	<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Poor Resolution</i>	<i>Strength</i>
Infancy	Basic trust vs. mistrust	Confidence in satisfaction of needs	Rage due to uncertainty of satisfaction	Hope
Early childhood	Autonomy vs. shame and doubt	Independence stemming from self-control	Estrangement due to being controlled	Willpower
Play age	Initiative vs. guilt	Acting on desires, urges, potentials	Conscience restrains pursuits	Purpose
School age	Industry vs. inferiority	Absorbed in "tool world"	Skills and status inadequate	Competence
Adolescence	Identity vs. identity confusion	Confident that sameness seen by others	Previous identity developments fail	Fidelity
Young adulthood	Intimacy vs. isolation	Fusing identity with another	No close relationships	Love
Middle adulthood	Productivity vs. futility	Contributing to society and community	Feeling alienated	Contentment
Mature adulthood	Generativity vs. stagnation	Guiding the next generation	Arrest of the ripening process	Care
Old age	Integrity vs. despair	Emotional integration	"Time is short"	Wisdom

The middle adulthood stage is not one of Erikson's stages but has been added here by the author, given the increase in longevity since Erikson first composed his stages.

Reappraisal may take the form of major upheaval, the midlife crisis. The new lifestyle may replace family and career, or a simple reordering of priorities may occur. In any case, Jung's *individuation* begins, a process by which the relationship between a person's self and the external world is changed so that there is a clearer separation between self and the world. At midlife, progress to maturity defines a sharper distinction between self, family, and friends than occurs at earlier stages. Also, expectations that restrict behavior and thought are rejected. Generativity accompanies individuation.

Some people sail through the midlife transition with little questioning. Their lives may be sufficiently stable and satisfying that they do not experience severe crisis. Others accept the loss of some dreams and are able to face the future without pain. However, Levinson contends that most people's struggles with the self and the external world reach crisis proportions (80 percent in his sample). They display guilt, anguish, upset, new lifestyles, and personality changes reflected in clothing, hair styles, and use of language.

To accept middle age is to realize that life is partly over and that death must be considered. When functions decline at age 40 or so, people must think about the unthinkable. The possibility of death runs head on into our cherished assumption of immortality. The contradiction thus generated is not eliminated by giving up the illusion of immortality; instead, it is seen in a new light. If one leaves behind a *legacy*, material goods, wisdom for others to use, and examples for others to follow, one lives on despite the demise of the body.

Sheehy: Women Are Different

Gail Sheehy (1977) focused on the midlife crisis as it applies uniquely to women. Age 35 begins a dangerous period for women. It is when the last child is sent off to school, ending the period of intense child care. Now she has time to think and her thoughts may turn to her attractiveness. Fearing her beauty is fading, she uses it while it lasts. The biological clock is ticking and, as it winds down, opportunities to have children and, thus pass on her genes, begin to wane. An affair may result.

Intense child care ends about when women enter the workforce. Working outside the home is motivated by economics and a need to fill the child-care void. Once in the workforce, she is likely to stay. This move can be good or bad or both. She may be well educated and thereby equipped to succeed. If so, she will be frustrated to find that competitors for advancement, often men, are ahead of her by virtue of their greater experience. If she is poorly educated, she will soon realize that advancement is unlikely for her. Frustration caused by being behind or despair due to being stuck at a low-level job may cause a crisis.

Clay (2003) reports that researchers associated with the McArthur Foundation network have exploded some long-standing myths about “mid-life crises.” For example, David Almeida has found that it is the everyday stressors, such as fights with a spouse and work deadlines, that have the most impact on midlife, not rare events such as death of a loved one or a divorce. His work also shows that while younger adults experience more daily stressors, *overload stressors*—engaging in too many activities at the same time—are more often experienced by midlife people. However, there are gender differences. Compared to midlife men, midlife women experience more *crossover stressors*—simultaneous demands arising from several domains, such as work and family. Educational level is an additional factor: midlife people with little education report the same number of stressors as their more educated counterparts, but they rate them as more severe. Obviously, it may be the recurring relatively “small” stressors that shape midlife, not the astronomical, lifestyle changing crises that Levinson and Sheehy emphasized.

Empirical Support: Research Confirming Erikson's View

Ochse and Plug (1986) looked at trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, intimacy, and generativity among White and Black South Africans aged 15 to 50. The seven positive poles of the first seven stages were represented by questionnaire items, along with a measure of well-being. As expected, subjects' responses to the questionnaire indicated that, the more the positive poles were manifested in their responses, the higher their sense of well-being. Also, a factor analysis of these adults' data revealed factors corresponding only to adult poles: intimacy versus isolation and generativity versus stagnation.

In addition, it was expected that intercorrelations among the poles relating to crises that had already been passed—those of childhood—would be relatively strong. Such was the case for White women and to some degree for White men, but not for Blacks. In fact, the intercorrelations among the poles tended to be high regardless of whether subjects had yet passed crises. This result was taken to mean that “Erikson's personality components to some extent develop in parallel [rather one before another] and are interdependent even before the relevant crises are resolved” (p. 1246). This conclusion is contrary to “epigene-sis”: earlier crises must be resolved before later ones. However, Erikson “does suggest that all the components develop to some degree throughout life, even before their critical stages” (p. 1246).

The prediction that *intimacy* would be generally higher for women than for men was confirmed, but only for Whites. For Blacks, intimacy was higher for men than for women. This outcome was one of several where results for Blacks and Whites differed, with only Whites confirming predictions for Erikson's theory. It reminds us of a fact that Erikson acknowledged: theories derived by people of one culture may not apply to people of another culture. One would also predict that identity would become more highly related to intimacy in the early twenties than in the teens. Further, identity would become most highly related to generativity in middle age, when generativity becomes salient. But, continuing the cultural difference trend, Erikson's prediction was borne out only for White women. For White and Black men, only the prediction regarding generativity was supported. Other results showed that scores associated with poles of already-passed childhood stages showed declines with increases in age, but those associated with adult poles increased with

age. Also, men showed stronger autonomy, initiative, and industry, as sex-role adoption would predict. Finally, and very importantly, factor analysis revealed a strong and overriding factor: “identity” in the global sense. This result suggests that the various crises at the several stages are indeed “identity crises.”

Kowaz and Marcia (1991) developed a measure of “industry” for administration to school children, their parents, and teachers. It focused on three components: (1) cognitive (skills and knowledge); (2) behavioral (applications of skills and knowledge); and (3) affective (attitudes and experiences relating to the acquisition and application of skills and knowledge). Evidence for the validity of the concept “industry” was strong. Cognitive industry scores were positively correlated with achievement scores, whether measured by children’s subjective judgments of school achievement or grades. An overall score on industry was also positively related to achievement test scores. For teachers’ judgments, being on-task versus off-task was positively related to industry scores. Also, “level of reasoning” was positively related to the overall industry scores.

The researchers developed a measure of concern for the process involved in a task, as opposed to interest only in the task outcome. This measure was positively related to the overall measure of industry: the more the industry, the more the interest in the process versus the outcome. Finally, overall contentment was positively related to industry. Results showed that the concept “industry” strongly applies to the age-group that should orient to it, according to Erikson.

McAdams, Ruetzel, and Foley (1986) looked at a measure of generativity in relation to indexes of power and intimacy motivation as measured with use of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). Subjects were adults between the ages of 35 and 49. The index of generativity was taken from an interview in which subjects explored plans for the future. Two independent scorers looked for evidence indicating concern for guiding the next generation either directly—caring, giving, teaching, leading, mentoring—or indirectly—contributing in a literary, scientific, artistic, or altruistic sense. Results showed that TAT scores indexing power and intimacy motivation were positively associated with the measure of generativity: the greater the generativity, the greater those motives. The researchers interpreted this result to mean “that generativity calls on an adult’s fundamental needs to feel close and to feel strong vis-à-vis others” (p. 806).

McAdams and Mansfield looked at the relationship between generativity and communion: being self-sacrificing and “one with” others (Mansfield & McAdams, 1996). They found that the higher the level of communion shown by subjects, the higher was the level of generativity. The same team plus de St. Aubin and Diamond (McAdams et al., 1997) collected life stories in a two to three hour interview with people high in generativity (e.g., school teachers involved in voluntary work) and a contrasting group who were less generative. The high generativity group was significantly higher on moral steadfastness, redemptive sequences (turning negative events into positive outcomes), prosocial future goals, and early family advantage (e.g., person singled out early by family as having a special talent).

McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, and Bowman (2001) interviewed 74 adults, evenly split into high and low generativity groups, about events during their lives. Measures of redemption (bad outcomes turning into good ones) and contamination (good outcomes turning into bad) were derived from the interview data. Redemption was positively correlated with favorable traits (e.g., self-esteem) and negatively correlated with depression. The correlations for contamination were the opposite.

Pratt, Danso, Arnold, Norris, and Filyer (2001) used the generativity scale of Mc-Adams and colleagues (1997) to study the relationship between generativity and parenting style. They found that generativity positively related to mothers’ authoritative style (expecting mature behavior from their teens and enforcing reasonable rules). For mothers, generativity was positively related to positive, optimistic views of teen development. For fathers, no clear pattern emerged.

Peterson, Smirles, and Wentworth (1997) contrasted generativity with authoritarianism, the tendency toward closed-mindedness as well as overrespect of authority figures and the values they espouse. Subjects were college students and their parents who completed the same questionnaires. Generativity was positively related to political involvement, but negatively related to authoritarianism. For parents, generativity was highly positively related to openness to experience, but authoritarianism was strongly negatively related to openness. Conscientiousness and generativity were positively correlated for both students and their parents. Extraversion was positively related to generativity for both parents and offspring, but it was negatively related to authoritarianism. Parents’ high authoritarianism was strongly linked to conflict with their offspring through their authoritarian parenting style (e.g., not permitting children to have input regarding rules). Thus,

generative people, especially parents, are open, conscientious, extraverted and, as parents, tend to allow children input into the rules that govern family life. Authoritarians tended to be the opposite.

Peterson and Stewart (1993) derived TAT scores on achievement, affiliation-intimacy, and power. Generativity was separately indexed by scores on parenting involvement, personal productivity, and societal concern. For women, power motive related to parenting and achievement motive related to forms of generativity expression outside the home. Men showed the opposite tendency: power motive related to generativity outside the home and achievement motive related to parenting. It was concluded that differences in opportunities and expectations for men and women accounted for the gender difference. As the average age of subjects was 27.7, results also showed that people begin to develop generativity well before middle age.

Franz, McClelland, and Weinberger (1991) followed up research beginning in the early 1950s. Participants, aged about 41 by 1990, were 94 men and women who completed a questionnaire and submitted to an interview. The measure of generativity was taken from written details of “hopes and dreams for the future” submitted by subjects (p. 589). These plans were scored by two students using a method developed by McAdams. Results showed that psychosocial maturity—indexed by having close friends at midlife, a long, happy marriage, and children—was positively related to generativity.

McAdams (2000) pointed out that “care,” the strength associated with generativity, is similar to but not the same as the “care” expressed by parents toward their children. Erikson’s “care,” associated with mature adulthood, is broader, encompassing volunteer activities and civic obligations, as well as family concerns. It also does not imply a power differential, or a dominant/dependent relationship, as in parent vis-à-vis child. He went on to suggest that the caregiver-dependent model of attachment fits parent-child relationships well, but not romantic relationships. If he is correct, Shaver’s analogy between child-parent attachment and romantic attachment is weakened.

Evaluation

Contributions

Erikson’s is a remarkable story. With only a high school education, he made it to the lofty status of Harvard professor. More importantly, he formulated a theory that has heavily influenced not only academics but also the public. Erikson was a hero during the 1960s because of his views regarding youth and rebellion. His assertion that people continue to grow and change in specifiable ways not only opened new vistas to millions of older people, it also revolutionized the study of personality. Prior to Erikson, it was becoming a dogma that personality is set in stone by the end of the teens at the latest. Erikson’s unique and creative thoughts opened the eyes of other theorists to the possibility of personality growth at and after middle age. Never again will psychologists neglect older people or believe that everything currently happening in their lives was predetermined by events in their youth.

Like Adler, Horney, Fromm, Rogers, Bandura, and Allport, Erikson is important because of the person he is. Making it as an academic without academic credentials is somewhat akin to making it as a politician without the backing of the political power brokers. Like Adler and Murray, Erikson turned psychological deficiencies into ideas that not only helped him but are valuable to countless others as well. If we adopt his respect for the goals and aspirations of people of all ages, we will take an enormous stride in the direction of respecting all people everywhere.

Thanks to Erikson, there is now up-to-date evidence that people pass through something akin to Erikson’s epigenic stages. Further, two of the ideas that he took off the top of his head have been supported by research: industry and generativity.

Limitations

While it is admirable that someone could gain the respect of academics without obtaining the academic union card, a doctorate, Erikson's lack of advanced training showed up in his thinking. There is a certain lack of logical consistency in his ideas. For example, it is not entirely clear why he chose the labels "autonomy versus shame and doubt" to characterize developments at early childhood. Likewise, why was "initiative versus guilt" chosen for the play age? While "autonomy" makes some logical sense, why is "shame and doubt" the other side of the coin representing the early childhood crisis? "Guilt" or "inferiority" or another label might fit just as well. The opposite of "autonomy" is "dependence" and the counterpart of "initiative" could be "dependence." "Competence" seems to fit as well at early childhood as "will power," which may be regarded as a cliché that has been adopted by everyone from frustrated dieters to Adolf Hitler. Erikson was openly dissatisfied with *wisdom*. Aside from the multiple meanings attached to the word, which he does mention, he might have added the fact that the word is so overused it has become trite. One could add, why eight stages?

"Fidelity" seems to be a particularly murky concept. The way Erikson defines it and the way he talks about it do not match well. If it is related to the adoption of ideologies, as Erikson indicates, one could wonder whether adolescence is the appropriate place for it. Perhaps the seeds of ideological flowering are planted during the teens, but the blossoming may well occur during young adulthood or even later. College students led the protest movement of the 1960s.

While Erikson has inspired several researchers as well as many ordinary citizens, he has apparently failed to recruit notable followers to take up his cause. There are few if any Eriksonians around, at least among well-known psychologists. Perhaps it is because his theory has relatively little practical import compared to others. It has no therapy associated with it, and, unlike other theories, Erikson's theory has been relatively little used to solve real-world problems.

Conclusions

While Erikson's lack of academic training may be a fault that places limits on his theory, it may also be regarded as a virtue. One wonders whether he would have seen that personality development does not end at age 20 if he had been trained in the typical psychology department. As it is, his vision is characterized by greater acuity than most. He anticipated the "midlife" crisis and reminded us all that elderly people can be productive. Not only does he provide us with the possibility of productivity during old age, he points out creative tasks appropriate to the golden years.

Erikson's example reminds us that creative thoughts applicable to the lives of people are not the sole province of the highly educated. Not being encumbered by academic dogmas and methodologies, he was able to focus on what others had neglected. He brought an end to the overemphasis on youth just at the right time. As we enter the era of the "graying of the population," the thoughts of Erik Erikson will become more and more relevant. Erikson was 16th on the list of most frequently cited in journals, 11th on the list of those most frequently cited in textbooks, 17th most frequently named in the survey, and 12th overall (Haggbloom et al., 2002).

Summary Points

1. Erikson was born the son of Danish parents, but he was reared by a Jewish physician. As a young man, a job as a children's portrait painter proved to be his passport into Vienna's secretive psychoanalytic society. In the United States, he attempted graduate work and worked with Murray. He was a professor at Yale, the University of California, and Harvard.

2. Erikson was a Freudian in that he felt he owed allegiance to Freud. Most of his important concepts, however, are distinct from Freud's. He rejected Freud's unflattering view of women. At each successive phase of life, people find themselves on the horns of a new dilemma and confronted with new tasks.

3. Erikson believed that we pass through a series of eight psychosocial stages, each building on the earlier ones (epigenesis). Each stage brings a new crisis: people are caught between two new conflicting poles. The crisis thus represented is never fully resolved, but, hopefully, the ratio of orientation to the positive pole, relative to the negative pole, is favorable.

4. In the first stage, infancy, the poles are basic trust and basic mistrust. The strength of this period is hope. It is the foundation of faith, which is protected by the institutional safeguard, religion. Early childhood presents the poles autonomy versus shame and doubt. Its strength is will power.

5. The third stage involves initiative versus guilt. The boy does fantasize about his mother, but it is because she is central to his life, not solely because of genital urges. The strength of this period is purpose. At the school age, the horns of the dilemma are industry and inferiority. The child at this stage prepares for the “tool culture.” The strength of this period is competence.

6. During adolescence the poles are identity versus identity confusion. At this stage previous identity developments either come together or not. It is a time of rebellion against the rules and norms of society. Fidelity is the strength: loyalty to self, others, and to personal ideologies. Ideologies must be adopted, but the danger is subordination of identity to ideology. Identity confusion involves confounding our identities with those of close others.

7. Erikson’s theory is in sync with diversity because he acknowledged that his stages and dilemmas would manifest themselves differently in different cultures. In young adulthood, intimacy is fusion of one’s identity with another’s without loss to self. Love binds together competition and cooperation, procreation and production. In an additional stage, middle adulthood, the poles are productivity versus futility and the strength is contentment. In mature adulthood, generativity is concern for guiding the next generation. Stagnation is the negative pole and care is the strength of this period.

8. Research indicates that midlife is shaped by daily stressors—overload and crossover stressors—not life-changing traumas. In old age, integrity opposes despair: passing on power and leadership to the next generation versus failure to establish a connection between generations. The strength is wisdom, in the sense of “wisdom of the ages.” Levinson’s midlife transition entails a show of de-illusionment and individuation. We must give up our illusion of immortality and contemplate a legacy. Women’s crisis begins at 35: lost children and lost attractiveness. Divorce, concern for “biological clocks,” and job competition with men confront women.

9. The poles for young adulthood and adulthood were extracted from factor analysis, but the lack of appearance of the other poles suggests overlap among them. An overriding factor, “identity,” was also extracted. Several predictions from Erikson’s theory were supported, but usually for Whites, not Blacks. There were also some troublesome gender differences. In another study, measures of industry predicted achievement, grades, and being on- versus off-task. Studies by the McAdams group showed that generativity is related to communion, moral steadfastness, redemption, prosocial future goals, and early family advantage. McAdams pointed out that care associated with generativity is similar to but not the same as parental care.

10. Peterson’s group found highly generative people more open, especially about family rules, as well as conscientious and extraverted compared to authoritarians. Other work found gender differences on power and achievement related to generativity. Erikson’s theoretical and career accomplishments are remarkable given that he lacked a Ph.D. He was a hero to youth of the 1960s and a champion of the elderly. Research has mostly supported his view. Unfortunately, some of his concepts seem exchangeable across stages, some are trite in meaning, some, like “fidelity,” are murky, and some have too many meanings. Research has turned up other problems and raised questions, such as “are eight stages enough?”

Running Comparison

<i>Theorist</i>	<i>Erikson in Comparison</i>
Freud	He de-emphasized the unconscious: he merely mentioned oral, anal, and phallic factors and the latency period, and he played down their physical–sexual side all in favor of psychosocial aspects. He came close to calling Freud “wrong” about women.
Gordon Allport	He agreed with Allport that self-esteem derives from doing for oneself. They both deplored nationalism.
Erich Fromm	He also considered the dilemma of freedom and they had similar notions about union with another and nationalism.
Sullivan and Horney Jung	He was also concerned about early, faulty parent–child relationships. Like Jung, he emphasized the polarities (opposites).

Essay/Critical Thinking Questions

1. What are the tasks of your life now and what do you expect them to be in ten years?
2. What are your major sources of identity?
3. Why have “industry” and “generativity” been singled out for special research attention?
4. Why do identity developments coalesce during adolescence? Why not at some other stage?
5. As a young adult, how can you “fuse your identity with somebody else’s without losing” it?

E-mail Interaction

Write the author at b-allen@wiu.edu. Forward any of the following, or phrase your own.

1. Was Erikson a person with deep-seated inferior feelings?
2. Indicate Erikson’s single most important contribution.
3. Was Erikson really sexist?