Before You Read This Chapter

GLOBAL STORYLINE

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN GLOBALIZATION

- Following the collapse of the three-world order, new global markets and communications networks integrate the world but also create deep inequalities.
- New technologies and vast population movements make global culture more homogeneous.
- Globalization, supranational organizations (like the World Bank, the European Union, and the United Nations), and religious fundamentalism erode the power of the nation-state.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

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FOCUS QUESTIONS

- What transnational forces eroded the power of the nation-state in the last third of the twentieth century, and how did they do so?
- What was the relationship between global migration, new technologies, and the spread of cultural influences during and after the Cold War?
- How did globalization and population changes affect the environment, and vice versa?
- To what degree did globalization change societies? How similar and different was globalization after the Cold War as compared with earlier forms of globalization?

21 Globalization, 1970–2000

Consider the following comparison. In the thirteenth century, few people could imagine moving beyond their local region. Venetian explorer Marco Polo, who voyaged through China, and Arab scholar Ibn Battuta, who traversed the Islamic world, were rare exceptions. In contrast, by the late twentieth century, people crossed in a matter of hours the distances that it took Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta years to cover. By the end of the twentieth century, many slept while flying at 30,000 feet over what Marco Polo took months to cover on a horse. And many others stayed at home while "traveling" the world via the Internet, Instagram, books, newspapers, and television.

But not all travelers moved about so comfortably. Many migrants—desperate to escape political chaos, religious persecution, or poverty—slipped across borders in the dark of night, traveled as human cargo inside containers, or used their own feet to flee their homeland. Billions of others still had no access to the global age's technological wonders and economic opportunities. Thus, while **globalization** (the development of integrated worldwide cultural and economic structures) created possibilities for some, it also caused deeper disparities.

Moreover, consider two different settings: a fishing village in the Amazon River basin and cosmopolitan Los Angeles. Picture an elderly Amazonian fisherman trying to teach his children their parents' tongue, Cocama-Cocamilla, but to no avail. All his children speak Spanish instead. "I tried to teach them," the old man laments. "It's like paddling against the current." Seven centuries ago, over 500 languages rang throughout the Amazon River basin. As of the year 2000, only 57 languages survived there. Evidently, one effect of globalization is to reduce diversity. But it can also increase local diversity. For example, Los Angeles, once the emblem of White, suburban America, became a cacophonous city with over 100 languages spoken in its public schools.

This chapter observes the impact of globalization in several ways: (1) the movement of families and groups, as well as goods and ideas, across boundaries that once divided religious, ethnic, and national communities; (2) the role of international financial organizations in addressing world financial issues; (3) the power of multinational corporations in transforming local markets into international ones; and (4) unexpected effects such as galvanizing discontent, sparking a revival of traditional religions (to counter secular and materialist influences) and driving deeper divisions among and within the world's regions—even while bringing them closer together.

GLOBAL INTEGRATION

The full impact of globalization, a process that began in the 1970s, is still unfolding. By the late twentieth century, the forces driving global integration—and inequality—were no longer the empires of old. For centuries, these empires had been the engines of convergence and conflict. By the mid-twentieth century, however, they were in retreat. The Cold War and decolonization movements produced the three-world order. But within three decades, the three-world order was also in retreat. Power structures in the First World, under such stress in the 1970s, did not crack. But those in the Second World did. The Cold War ended with the implosion of the Soviet bloc. The Third World also splintered, with some areas becoming highly advanced and others falling into deep poverty; the term **developing world** obscured these differences. Now a new architecture of power organized the world into a unified marketplace with unhindered flows of capital, commerce, culture, and labor. By 2000, most societies had endorsed electoral systems and adopted some form of market economy.

Because the United States promoted these changes, globalization has looked to some like Americanization. The United States unquestionably stood as the world's most influential society, with its music, food, principles of representative government, and free markets spreading worldwide. Yet the process did not run one way. The world also came to America and shaped its society: people living in the United States—along with their inventions, sports stars, and musical inspirations—increasingly came from somewhere else.

Nor was the United States immune from transnational forces challenging the power of the nation-state itself. In the United States, as elsewhere, globalization functioned through networks of investment, trade, and migration that operated relatively independently of nation-states. In the process, globalization shook entrenched forms of political and social identification, including religious and military authority. Members of societies now often identified more with local, subnational, or international movements or cultures, rather than with nation-states. To be sure, nation-states remained essential for establishing democratic institutions and protecting human rights, but supranational institutions like the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (see later discussion) often impinged on their autonomy. As borders became more open, money, goods, and people flowed back and forth, further undermining the autonomy of nation-states.

REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GLOBALIZATION

In the mid-1970s, political practices and institutions associated with the three-world order started to deteriorate. By the late 1980s, the communist Second World was disintegrating. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought the Cold War to an end. At the same time, the capitalist First World gave up its last colonial possessions, and the remnants of White settler supremacy disintegrated. But as this occurred, the formerly colonized Third World's dream of a "third way" also vanished. As empires withdrew, they revealed a world integrated by markets for capital, labor, culture, and technology rather than by forced loyalties to imperial masters or other foreign powers.

Ending the Cold War

A world split between hostile factions limited the prospects for a global exchange of peoples, ideas, and resources. There was widespread exchange within the rival blocs—that is, among socialist countries and among capitalist countries—but for other countries the pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States to align with a superpower imposed limits to interaction, even with neighboring nations. Tiny Nicaragua received support from the eastern bloc, but was isolated in Central America. Egypt, on the other hand, had enough clout to leave the Soviet orbit and changed the political geography of the Arab world. At the same time, the rivalry between blocs posed rising tolls. The cost was highest in contested hot spots of the Third World, but even the superpowers paid a price. Eventually, economic pressures, technological changes, and political crumbling brought down the walls that defined the three-world order and widened the scope for an explosion of trade, migration, and cultural exchange across borders.

MOUNTING COSTS The many regional conflicts of the Cold War era (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua) were deadly for countries caught in the ideological crossfire. Vietnam became a battleground for Russian, Chinese, and American ambitions. This war spilled over into Laos and Cambodia, dragging them to ruin along with Vietnam. China attracted several client states in the competition for influence in the Third World and within the communist bloc. In Afghanistan, Moscow propped up a puppet regime, only to fall into a bloody war against Islamic and tribal guerrillas financed and armed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. In Central America, U.S. president Ronald Reagan and his advisers opposed the victory of the left-leaning Nicaraguan Sandinista coalition in 1979. During the 1980s the U.S. government pumped millions of dollars to the Contras (right-wing opponents of the left-wing Sandinistas) and lent military and monetary assistance to other Central American anticommunist forces. Thus, for much of the world, the Cold War was a real confrontation with tremendously high costs for local powers.

Rivalry was costly to the superpowers, too, for the 1970s and 1980s saw the largest peacetime accumulation of arms in history. Despite myriad treaties and summits, the United States and the Soviet Union stockpiled nuclear and conventional weaponry. Furthermore, in 1983 Reagan unveiled the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"), a plan to use satellites and space missiles to insulate the United States from incoming nuclear bombs. For both sides, military spending sprees brought economic troubles. The U.S. national debt increased; Soviet life expectancy began to decline and infant mortality began to rise.

Cracks on either side of the conflict appeared in the 1970s. The intelligence organizations of both the Soviet Union and the United States produced secret memos questioning whether the Soviet bloc could sustain its global position. As stalemate in Afghanistan undermined the image of the mighty Soviet armed forces, mothers of Soviet soldiers protested the regime's refusal to acknowledge the very fact of the war in which their sons were fighting and in some cases dying. The eastern European satellites became dependent on western European loans and consumer goods. At the same time, the western alliance itself faced internal tensions. In Europe and North America, the antinuclear movement rallied millions to the streets. Western industrialists worried about competition from Japan, which had been plowing money into rapid industrialization rather than arms. Political leaders also grappled with distressingly high unemployment rates. Thus, both sides shared a common crisis: fatigue from the Cold War and an economic challenge from East Asia.

THE SOVIET BLOC COLLAPSES In the end, the Soviet bloc collapsed. (See Map 21.1.) Even though planned economies employed the entire Soviet population, they failed to fill stores with sufficient consumer goods. Socialist health care and benefits lagged behind those of the capitalist welfare states. Authoritarian political structures relied on deception and coercion rather than elections and civic activism. (See Global Themes and Sources: Primary Source 21.1.) Although the Communist Party had promised to beat capitalism by building socialism on the way to achieving full communism, the latter paradise was nowhere on the horizon. The gap between socialism and capitalism turned into a chasm.

One catalyst in socialism's undoing was Poland. A critical event was the naming of a Polish archbishop as pope in 1978. The first non-Italian pope in 455 years, John Paul opposed the Soviet form of socialism. In 1979, he made a pilgrimage to his native Poland, holding enormous outdoor masses; in 1980, he supported mass strikes at the Gdańsk shipyard, which led to the formation of the Soviet bloc's first independent trade union, Solidarity, led by a Polish nationalist and critic of Soviet control, Lech Wałęsa. As Communist Party members in Poland defected to its side, the union became a society-wide movement; it aimed not to reform socialism (as in Czechoslovakia in 1968; see discussion of the Prague Spring in Chapter 20) but to overcome it. A crackdown by the Polish military and police put most of Solidarity's leadership in prison and drove the movement underground, but Soviet intelligence officials secretly worried that Solidarity could not be easily eradicated.

The most consequential factor in the collapse of the Soviet superpower was Mikhail Gorbachev, who became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985 and launched an effort to reform the Soviet system. He focused on political changes first. Under this effort (*perestroika*, "reconstruction"), Gorbachev permitted contested elections for a new Congress of Peoples' Deputies, relaxed



Lech Wałęsa. *A Polish electrician from the Lenin Shipyard in the Baltic port city of Gdańsk, Wałęsa spearheaded the formation of Solidarity, a mass independent trade union of workers who battled the communist regime that ruled in their name. He later was elected president of post-communist Poland.*

MAP 21.1 | Collapse of the Communist Bloc in Europe

The Soviet Union's domination of eastern Europe ended precipitously in 1989. The political map of eastern and central Europe took on a different shape under European integration.

- What significant event in many communist countries signaled the collapse of communism?
- In what part of eastern and central Europe did the most political instability and conflict occur?
- According to your reading, why did the end of communist rule cause the reshuffling of political boundaries in the region?

censorship, sanctioned civic associations, legalized small nonstate businesses, granted autonomy to state firms, and encouraged the republics to be responsible for their own affairs within the Soviet Union. His foreign policy also upended decades of Soviet central control. He sought arms control to lessen the burdens on the Soviet Union. He pulled troops from Afghanistan and informed eastern European leaders that they could not count on Moscow's armed intervention to prop up their regimes.

Gorbachev wanted to rescue socialism; instead, he destabilized it. His political changes allowed civic groups to call not for the system's reform but for its liquidation. Eastern Europe bolted from the Soviet orbit, and some of the union republics began to push for independence. In response, disgruntled factions within the KGB (the main security agency of the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1991) and the Soviet military tried to hang on by staging a coup in 1991. It was a botch job. The former Communist Party boss of Moscow, Boris Yeltsin, rallied the opposition, faced down the hardliners, and was elected president of the Russian republic in the Soviet Union's first democratic election in 1991. Beleaguered Soviet elites saw an opportunity. They abandoned the socialist cause and divided up state property among themselves—and became the so-called oligarchs of the post-Soviet order.

When communist regimes collapsed, the European and Asian political maps changed dramatically. Old states died; new ones sprouted. In Asia, the division between North and South Korea lived on. But in Vietnam and China, Communist Parties embraced western capitalism. In Europe, East Germany dissolved; West Germany absorbed its remnants after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. Soon after, Yeltsin and the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus formally dissolved the old USSR into independent states. (See Map 21.2.)

But the end of Soviet-style socialism was not entirely peaceful. The worst carnage occurred in the former Yugoslavia, where political quarrels between regions, neighbors, and ethnic groups decomposed into a horrific civil war in Europe. Serbs and Croats, in particular, engaged in savage struggles over territories in the Balkans.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed eastern European states to resume their cultural, political, and economic ties with western Europe and the United States, ties previously severed by the 1945 partition of Europe.

No sooner had the Berlin Wall come down than new countries lined up to join the European Union. With the Cold War over, traditionally neutral countries like Austria and Sweden applied for admission. Then came a flood of eastern European, Balkan, and Baltic applicants. By 2004, the European Union had grown from 322 million people to 495 million. European integration and the turn west went beyond economic matters. Many of the countries that joined the European Union also entered the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** alliance, much to the distaste of Russia.

By historical standards the Cold War had been relatively brief, spanning four decades. But communism had played a major role in the military conflicts and the headlong modernization of Russia and China, and it exercised important influence on India and elsewhere in the Third World, where proxy wars were devastating. Communism, however, faced a trilemma: it could not keep up the Cold War *and* deliver the good life to its adherents *and* survive in a more competitive world economy. But ultimately, it was the inability to keep up with the consumption and technology race more than the inability to keep up with the arms race that doomed the USSR and unleashed in the early 1990s economic and cultural energies that would buoy global integration.

Africa and the End of White Rule

Although the aftermath of World War II saw the dismantling of most of Europe's empires, remnants of colonial rule remained in southern Africa. (See Chapter 20, Map 20.6.) Here, Whites

The Berlin Wall. *The breaching of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 spelled the end of the Soviet bloc. Decades of debate over whether communism could be reformed turned out to be moot. In the face of competition from the richer, consumer-oriented west, communism collapsed.*

MAP 21.2 | The Breakup of the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union broke apart in 1991. Compare this map with Map 17.5, which illustrates Russian expansion in the nineteenth century.

- Which parts of the old Russian Empire remained under Russian rule, and which of its territories established their own states?
- In what areas did large migrations accompany the breakup, and for what reasons?
- According to your reading, how did the breakup of the Soviet Union change Russia's status in Europe and Asia?

clung to centuries-old notions of their racial superiority over non-Europeans. Final decolonization meant that self-rule would return to all of Africa. The end of colonialism also set the stage for former colonies to find new trading and investment partners and to become more integrated with the wider world.

THE LAST HOLDOUTS The last fortresses under direct European control were the Portuguese colonies of southern and western Africa. However, by the mid-1970s, efforts to suppress African nationalist movements had exhausted Portugal's resources. As African nationalist demands led to a hurried Portuguese withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, formal European colonialism in Africa came to an end.

But White rule still prevailed elsewhere in Africa. In Rhodesia, a White minority resisted all international pressure to allow Black rule. In the end, independent African neighbors helped support a liberation guerrilla movement under Robert Mugabe. Surrounded, Rhodesian Whites finally capitulated. Mugabe swept to power with massive electoral support in 1979. The new constitutional government renamed the country Zimbabwe, erasing from Africa's map the name of the long-deceased British expansionist Cecil Rhodes (see Chapter 17). At first, President Mugabe worked well with the agriculturally and financially powerful former White ruling elite, but over time, under pressure from elements in his own party, he promoted land redistribution and turned against the White elite in ways that led to a steep economic decline and massive inflation.

SOUTH AFRICA AND NELSON MANDELA The final outpost of White rule was South Africa, where a European minority was larger, richer, and more entrenched than elsewhere in the region—and highly invulnerable to outside pressures. Although powerful international firms operated there, they were reluctant to risk their investments by boycotting the racist regime. In addition, the U.S. government regarded South Africa's large army as a useful tool to fight Soviet allies elsewhere in southern Africa. In any case, the ruling Afrikaner-led National Party used ruthless tactics against internal critics. Yet, in the countryside and cities, defiance of White rule was growing. Africans lobbed rocks and crude bombs (Molotov cocktails) at tanks and organized mass strikes in the multinational-owned mines.

At the same time, pressures from abroad to end the racist apartheid system were mounting. The International Olympic Committee banned South African athletes starting in 1970. American students insisted that their universities divest themselves of companies with investments in South Africa. As international pressures grew, foreign governments—even that of the United States, once South Africa's staunchest ally—applied economic sanctions against South Africa. A swelling worldwide chorus demanded that **Nelson Mandela** (1918–2013), the imprisoned leader of the African National Congress (ANC), be freed. The White political elite eventually realized that it was better to negotiate new arrangements than to endure international condemnation and years of internal warfare against a majority population. In 1990, President F. W. de Klerk (of the National Party) released Mandela from prison and legalized the ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa. Ensuing negotiations produced South Africa's first free, mass elections in 1994. These brought an overwhelming victory to the ANC, with Nelson Mandela elected as president. Majority rule had finally come to South Africa, and for the first time in centuries, Africans ruled over all of Africa.

In Nelson Mandela, South Africa's White rulers found a man of exceptional integrity and political savvy. He had spent more than two decades in prison, much of it at hard labor. But he looked beyond past injustices to ease the transition to full democracy. Besides, he was aware that with the country veering toward civil war, only a negotiated change would preserve South Africa's industries, wealth, and educational system.



The End of Apartheid. *Nelson Mandela, running for president in 1994 as the candidate of the African National Congress, here casts a ballot in the first all-races election in South Africa. This election ended apartheid and saw the African National Congress take control of the Republic of South Africa.*

The leaders of independent Africa faced immense problems in building stable political communities. Although they set out to destroy the vestiges of colonial political structures and to erect African-based public institutions, local contests for political power impeded this process. Ethnic and religious rivalries, held in check during the colonial period, now blazed forth. Civil wars erupted in many countries (most violently in Nigeria, Sudan, and Zaire), and military leaders were drawn into politics. Coups d'état were common. Nigeria, for instance, had six military coups between 1966 and 1999. By the 1990s, the continent was aflame with civil strife; armed conflicts that started with the Cold War endured well after it ended, even though White rule had finally come to an end throughout the entire continent.

UNLEASHING GLOBALIZATION

As obstacles to international integration began to dissolve, capital, commodities, people, and culture crossed borders with ever-greater freedom. Even though trade, foreign investment, migration, and cultural borrowing had long been hallmarks of modern history, the global age changed their scale. At the same time, never had there been such unequal access to the fruits of globalization. Several factors contributed to increasing integration and to new power arrangements: international banking, expanded international trade, population migrations, and technical breakthroughs in communications that facilitated the worldwide spread of cultural influences.

Finance and Trade

The increased international flow of goods and capital was well underway in the 1970s, but the end of the Cold War removed many impediments to globalization. During the 1990s, even the strongest nation-states felt the effects of economic globalization.

GLOBAL FINANCE AND DEREGULATED MARKETS Major transformations occurred in the world's financial system in the 1970s. America's budget and trade deficits prompted President Richard Nixon to take the dollar off the gold standard, an action that enabled the yen, the lira, the pound, the franc, and other national currencies to cut their ties to the American dollar. Now international financiers enjoyed greater freedom from national regulators and found fresh business opportunities.

The primary agents of the heightened global financial activity were banks. Based mainly in London, New York, and Tokyo, big banks attracted large amounts of capital for lucrative ventures around the world. Revenues from oil producers provided a large infusion of cash into the global economy in the 1970s. At the same time, banks joined forces to issue mammoth loans to developing nations.

No international financial organization was more influential than the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which came into existence after World War II with a view to raising capital from all the participating states so as to be able to lend funds to states coping with balance-of-payments shortages. During the 1980s, it emerged as a central player, especially in response to a global debt crisis. This would be the first in a series of worldwide financial shocks that summoned new global actors above and beyond nation-states. Throughout the 1970s, European, Japanese, and North American banks had loaned money on very easy terms to cash-strapped Third World and eastern-bloc borrowers. But what was once good business soon turned sour. In 1982, a wave of defaults threatened to overrun Latin America in particular. After Mexico threatened to default, South Korea, Egypt, and the Philippines also got hit. Throughout the 1980s, international banks and the IMF kept heavily indebted customers solvent. The IMF offered short-term loans to governments on strict conditions: balance budgets; compel civilian populations to give up subsidies on essential products, especially food products; slash imports; and boost exports. Latin Americans led the way in deregulating markets, privatizing state assets, reorganizing their finances, and promoting a return to a growth model based on exports and foreign markets. All across the world, tariffs and other barriers to foreign trade crumbled, state enterprises became private firms, and foreign banks and multinational companies took a greater interest in investing in these newly reformed economies. It was in developing countries, however, that the shift to globalism was most dramatic—and most destabilizing.

EFFECTS OF INTEGRATED NETWORKS New technologies and institutions enabled many more financial investors and traders to participate in the integrated networks of world finance. The Internet and online trading accelerated the mobility—and volatility—of capital across borders. Volatility soon created problems, however. In the 1990s, currency devaluations in Mexico, in Russia, and across East Asia shocked financiers. When the Mexican economy became paralyzed in 1994, the crisis was so extreme that not even the IMF could bail it out; the U.S. Treasury had to issue the largest international loan in history to pull Mexico out of its economic tailspin. Despite its role as the lender in that instance, the United States emerged in the new financial order as the world's largest borrower, because it imported far more than it exported. Early in the new millennium, its net foreign debt soared past $2 trillion—a 700 percent increase since the early 1990s. Much of this debt was owed to China, which racked up huge trade surpluses with the United States.

Globalization deepened commercial, as well as financial, interdependence. The total value of world trade increased nearly tenfold between 1973 and 1998, and trade in Asia grew even faster. In 1960, trade accounted for 24 percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP; the total value of all goods and services produced in a country in a single year). By 1995, that share had almost doubled. Where an American would once have worn American-made clothes (Levi's), driven an American car (a Ford), and watched an American television (Zenith), such was rarely the case by century's end. Increasingly, consumers bought foreign goods and services and manufacturers sold a greater share of their own output abroad. This pattern had always been true of smaller regions like Central America and southern Africa. But in the 1980s, it intensified as countries with cheap and skilled labor, like China, India, and Brazil, could set up their own manufacturing capacity and outbid their competitors, who then entered a long cycle of what is called deindustrialization. It was in this fashion that globalization led to the worldwide spread of manufacturing.

International trade also shifted the international division of labor. After World War II, Europeans and North Americans dominated manufacturing, while Third World countries supplied raw materials. But by the 1990s, this was no longer the case. Brazil became a major airplane maker, South Korea exported millions of automobiles, and China emerged as the world's largest source of textiles, footwear, and electronics.

The most remarkable global shift involved East Asian industry and commerce. Manufactured goods, including high-technology products, now issued from the eastern fringe of Afro-Eurasia as often as from its western fringe. Japan blazed the Asian trail: between 1965 and 1990, its share of world trade doubled to almost 10 percent. China, too, flexed its economic muscle, especially after Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978. (See Analyzing Global Developments: Deng Xiaoping and China's So-Called Economic Miracle.) It's hard to imagine now, but at the time China was very poor. Even as late as 1990, China's per capita income was 30 percent lower than that of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, China barely registered on the global economic scale, commanding a mere 1.6 percent of global GDP. To improve China's economy, Deng threw open the country's doors to foreign trade and investment. In addition, study missions abroad brought back ideas and encouragement. By globalizing China, Deng turned it into an economic powerhouse. By 2010, China had become the world's second-largest economy, producing 8.6 percent of global GDP. It muscled past Germany, the United States, and Japan to become the largest exporter of goods in the world. China's per capita income was now three times that of sub-Saharan Africa. For the three decades from 1990 to 2019, China chalked up astounding 10 percent annual growth rates, even maintaining 6 percent GDP growth during the global recession of 2008 to 2010 (see Chapter 22).

For East Asia as a whole, the share of world exports doubled in the same period, with smaller countries like Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong becoming mini-powerhouses. By the early 1990s, these countries and Japan were major investors abroad. As East Asia's share of world production quickly increased, the U.S. and European shares decreased.

REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS AND GROWING DISPARITIES Industrialization of previously less developed countries, combined with lower trade barriers, increased the pressures of world competition on national economies. Some areas responded by establishing regional trade blocs in an effort to create larger markets for themselves and stay competitive in an even more integrated world economy.

Globalization. *In the 1970s, East Asian countries, starting with Japan and South Korea, and China in the 1990s, became major exporters of manufactured goods while North America and Europe began their long deindustrialization. Shipping containers (like those pictured here) were crucial to this new global division of labor. Invented to haul expensive military hardware for the U.S. war in Vietnam, they proved instrumental in lowering shipping costs. They allowed ever-more-fragile goods, like electronics, to be transported safely and did away with labor-intensive systems of loading and unloading massive transport vessels. The results were massive layoffs from manufacturing and transportation jobs in some parts of the world and rapid industrialization in emerging economies.*

ANALYZING GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Deng Xiaoping and China's So-Called Economic Miracle

Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) is the person most closely associated with China's opening to the outside world and its rapid economic growth rate, which pulled half a billion people out of poverty between 1990 and 2019. Physically he was not an imposing figure. He was a mere 5 feet tall and so deaf in one ear that he had difficulty hearing remarks made at meetings of the Politburo and other important gatherings. Often his deafness precluded his participation in discussions. Even so, his commanding personality caused all eyes to fix on him when he entered a room. His communist credentials were impeccable. As a young man, he won an opportunity to travel to France, where he hoped to study. But funds ran out, and for two and a half years he earned a living as a factory worker. Dispirited by the way the French scorned the Chinese living in France—workers as well as students and businesspeople—he joined the Chinese Community Party, founded in China in 1921, and a French branch established a year later. Eventually, he left factory work to become an apparatchik in the Chinese Community Party in France. Deng spent five years in France and another year in the Soviet Union, an experience that served him well and set him off from other communists, like Mao, who had seen little of the outside world. He then returned to China and became a military commander in the fight against the Japanese and the Guomindang (the Nationalist Party). His support of Mao Zedong was ardent; he accompanied Mao on the Long March and rose in the hierarchy of the party, which seized power in 1949.

Later, Mao and Deng had a falling out, and Deng was exiled to the countryside, or rusticated, for three and a half years (1969–1973), during China's Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). During this period, China was ruled by military men and inexperienced revolutionary zealots, who sent party officials, university professors, and students to the countryside and governed chaotically and ruthlessly. The circumstances compelled Deng to think creatively about what had gone wrong in China and produced such suffering and how best to mold China's political, cultural, and economic future. After Mao's death in 1976, Deng's star rose. He became the preeminent leader in 1978, a position that enabled him to impose his vision of a transformed China on the nation.

In power, Deng was the opposite of Mao. He recognized that although Mao had used his personality cult to unify a diverse country and champion a virtuous communist ideology, he had created a number of catastrophic programs, notably the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962)—a plan designed to turn China from an agrarian society to an industrial economy that had left 30 million dead in its wake—and the Cultural Revolution. Spurning the cult of personality, Deng had no statues made of himself and he did not insist that government offices and other venues display his photo, as Mao had required. In fact, he did not even occupy the top positions in the Communist Party (the secretary-general) or the government (premier), confining himself to the positions of the vice-chairman of the party and the vice-premier. The only top position that he held was chairman of the Central Military Commission. Nonetheless, his preeminence was recognized in China itself and abroad; he made a number of visits to the United States, Britain, and other countries, where he was always fêted as China's ruler.

By 1978, Deng was seventy-four years old and was convinced that China had to open itself to the outside world. This process became easier when U.S. president Richard Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, created a liaison office between China and the United States (1973–1978), which ultimately resulted in the United States' recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1979. Deng and many Chinese officials, even those who had not traveled extensively outside the country, were aware of the astonishing economic progress of the Asian Tigers, notably Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Deng put the matter well when he declared, "Recently, our comrades had a look abroad. The more we see the more we realize how backward we are" (Vogel, p. 218). Trade and study missions were sent to Hong Kong, Japan, and eastern and western Europe. With the assistance of the British high commissioner of Hong Kong, a special free trade zone, known as the Shenzhen Economic Zone, was established between Hong Kong and the part of mainland China in proximity to Hong Kong. Its existence enabled Chinese businesspeople to meet and discuss financial issues with their Hong Kong counterparts and to manufacture goods with cheap Chinese labor for export abroad.

The most influential of these missions was the one sent to western Europe, led by Gu Wu. It visited France, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, and Belgium between May 2, 1978, and June 6, 1978. The members chosen for this and other missions were expected to head ministries and sectors of the economy for which they gathered data during these overseas missions. In western Europe, mission members expected to find an impoverished workforce and business and government officials who were hostile and secretive to the Chinese delegation, as Chinese government officials were to both foreigners and Chinese non-employees who visited Chinese factories. Instead, the members of the mission were stunned by the generosity and warmth of the European hosts, their seeming eagerness to provide capital and technological support to China, and the high living standards enjoyed by Europe's working classes.

After the four missions returned, Li Xiannian, whom Deng had put in charge of economic issues, prepared a report, *Principles to Guide Four Modernizations*, which was intended to show how China could take advantage of the new opportunities for borrowing technology and capital from the developed economies of the world. On September 7, 1978, Li Xiannian announced that a new age had arrived, adding that China could no longer remain closed to the outside world, but must import foreign technologies, equipment, capital, and management skills. He predicted, in a wildly optimistic spirit, that China would import $18 billion worth of goods and equipment between 1978 and 1985.

Although Deng Xiaoping stepped down in 1992 and died in 1997, just as rapid economic progress was occurring, he made sure that the Chinese ruling class chose as successors individuals who were committed to his program of economic growth and Communist Party control. Moreover, as a dedicated communist, he affirmed his belief that it was only the Chinese Communist Party that had the right financial and economic skills and the right governing capabilities to lead China's opening to the outside world in a way that would ensure both economic growth and political stability.

The following tables show overall economic growth rates in Britain during the industrial revolution (1750s–1870), the United States from 1850 to 1989, and China from 1961 to 2018. They demonstrate just how colossal the economic growth rate in China was, compared with the rates in these two other fast-growing countries. Deng believed that China could industrialize and grow rapidly economically without responding to citizens' demands for political participation and the end of communist control over the political and economic system. Whether this belief will continue to hold true remains to be seen.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS

- How do China's GDP overall growth rates and per capita growth rates compare with those of Britain during the industrial revolution and the United States from 1850 to 1989? How do you account for any extreme differences?
- Why have Deng Xiaoping and his successors been able to resist demands for democracy and maintain the dominant political position of the Chinese Communist Party?
- Based on your reading, compare Gorbachev's *perestroika* reform movement with Deng's vision for economic and political reform in China.
- Do you think the Chinese are likely to maintain high growth rates over the long run, given the experience of Britain and the United States? Explain your answer.

Sources: Justin Yifu Lin, "China and the Global Economy," *China Economic Journal* 4, no. 1 (2011): 1–14; Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011). The figures for Britain during the industrial revolution are from Stephen Broadberry et al., *British Economic Growth, 1270–1870* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Nicholas Crafts and Terence Mills, "Six Centuries of British Economic Growth: A Time Series Perspective," *European Review of Economic History* 21, no. 2 (May 2017): 141–58. Those for the United States are from Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States*, vol. 3 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 8. The Chinese GDP data are derived from the World Bank reports, *World Development Indicators*, for the years involved.

China's Overall GDP Annual Growth Rates	
1961–69	3.37%
1970–79	7.14%
1980–89	9.74%
1990–99	10.00%
2000–09	11.29%
2010–18	7.79%

China's GDP per Capita Annual Growth Rates	
1961–69	1.20%
1970–79	5.27%
1980–89	8.09%
1990–99	8.76%
2000–09	8.74%
2010–18	7.25%

Britain's Overall GDP Annual Growth Rates	
1760s–1780s	0.83%
1780s–1801/10	1.62%
1801/10–1830s	1.85%
1830s–1861/70	2.34%

Britain's GDP per Capita Annual Growth Rates	
1760s–1780s	0.10%
1780s–1800s	0.53%
1800s–1830s	0.41%
1830s–1860s	1.16%

United States' Overall GDP Annual Growth Rates	
1800–55	3.99%
1855–90	4.0%
1890–1927	3.50%
1929–66	3.18%
1966–89	2.69%

United States' GDP per Capita Annual Growth Rates	
1800–55	0.93%
1855–90	1.55%
1890–1927	1.86%
1929–66	1.73%
1966–89	1.67%

Meanwhile, the most complete regional integration occurred in Europe. Indeed, Europeans slashed trade barriers and harmonized their commercial policies toward the rest of the world. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty established the **European Union (EU)**, and what had been conceived as a trading and financial bloc began to evolve into a political union as well. In hopes of establishing permanent peace and prosperity, European states agreed to give up aspects of their sovereignty and allow European-wide legislative and judicial bodies (the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union) to make binding political and legal decisions. In 1990, EU members agreed to eliminate border controls and visas and created a vast open migrant zone across the old Cold War divide. The result was a migration from the east to the west. A generation later, there would be a wave from the Middle East and Africa.

The core of the EU, however, remained a common economy. In 2002, a number of the European Union states deepened their economic interdependence by adopting a single currency, the euro. A few nations—most notably the United Kingdom—did not want to give up control of their own currency. By 2020, the European Union had twenty-seven members, with nineteen members using the euro.

European countries may have gone the farthest in dismantling national borders and sovereignties. But they were not alone. The Unites States, Mexico, and Canada agreed in 1994 to create a common trade bloc. In South America, Brazil and Argentina formed the backbone of a regional fusion. And Asian countries formed what is often called a "noodle bowl" of trade agreements to create regional partnerships and multilateral agreements to liberalize trade among countries of the Asian Pacific.

Although international trade thus increased, it also became increasingly unequal. High-technology and high-value goods now occupied an ever-greater share of the manufacturing and exports of the world's richest countries. For "rich" countries as a whole, about half of total GDP reflected the production and distribution of such goods and services, giving those countries a competitive advantage. In general, where global incomes were lower and people were less educated, peoples' incomes lagged because they were less productive and faced a steeper climb up the social ladder. Poor nations remained, with few exceptions, locked in the production of low-tech goods and the export of raw materials. Increasingly, technology and knowledge now divided the world into affluent, technically sophisticated countries and poor, technically underdeveloped regions.

Migration

Migration, a constant feature of world history, became more pronounced in the twentieth century. (See Map 21.3.) After 1970, fewer Europeans were on the move, but many more Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans were chasing jobs in the richer countries. By 2000, there were 120 million migrants scattered across 152 countries, up from 75 million in 1965.

PATTERNS OF MIGRATION Migratory flows often followed the contours of past colonial and political ties. Where North America and Europe had had colonies or dependencies, their political withdrawal left tracks for migrants to follow. Indians and Pakistanis moved to Britain. Dominicans, Haitians, and Mexicans went to the United States. Algerians and Vietnamese moved to France. And where emerging rich societies cultivated close diplomatic ties, these relations opened migratory gates. This was true of Germany's relationship with Turkey, of Japan's with South Korea, and of Canada's with Hong Kong. In most cases, economic factors propelled migrants across national borders.

International migration was often an extension of regional and national migration from poorer, rural areas to urban centers. In Nigeria, for example, rural-urban migration intensified after 1970. In 1900, Nigeria's capital at the time, Lagos, had a population of 41,847. At the century's end, Lagos had more than 10 million people, with predictions that it would double by 2025. The key to Lagos's boom in the 1970s was the existence of large oil reserves inside the country and the high prices that oil fetched in international markets. When the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sent oil prices soaring, money poured into Nigeria. The government kept most of it in its largest city. That, in turn, spurred people to move to Lagos. This rural-urban migration increased Lagos's population by 14 percent per year in the 1970s and 1980s. No government—least of all a new, weakly supported one like Nigeria's—could cope with such a huge influx. Electricity supplies failed regularly. There were never enough schools, teachers, or textbooks. But the city burst with the vitality of new arrivals, prompting one immigrant to exclaim: "It's a terrible place; I want to go there!"

One of the biggest changes in world migration patterns took place in the United States. Having all but closed its coastal borders on the Pacific in the late nineteenth century and on the Atlantic in the 1920s, the United States enacted a major immigration reform in 1965 that opened its gates to the world's migrants. By 2000, 27 million immigrants lived there, accounting for almost 10 percent of the population—double the share in 1970 and approaching levels not seen since the early twentieth century. The profile of migration also changed. In 1970, there were more Canadians or Germans living in the United States than Mexicans. Over the next thirty years, the Mexican influx rose tenfold and by 2000 accounted for almost one-third of immigrants in the United States. The numbers migrating from Asia also surged, accounting for over 40 percent of all immigrants to the United States in the 1990s.

TEMPORARY MIGRANTS Some migrants moved for temporary sojourns. At least that was the original intent. In the 1950s and 1960s, southern Europeans moved northward; yet when Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy also became wealthy societies, not only did the exodus decline, but these countries also became magnets for Middle Eastern, North African, South Asian, and then eastern European migrants. The economic downturn in Europe in the 1970s, however, resulted in high unemployment and made integration difficult. Most migrants from Asia and Africa went initially to Europe in search of temporary jobs as guest workers. With time, they and their families who followed them settled in their host countries, often living in dilapidated public housing projects, isolated from city centers and public services. The existence of welfare programs made them less likely to leave and return "home" than earlier generations of labor migrants.

In Japan, too, immigrants were not easily incorporated. Tokyo's policy in the 1970s resembled the European guest worker program. Discouraging permanent settlement and immigration, Japan encouraged mainly itinerant workers to move to the country, and yet its economy required increasing numbers of these sojourners. Indeed, Japan's deep reluctance to integrate migrants led to dire labor shortages.

After Japan, the economic tigers of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia all became hosts for temporary migrants. So millions of

"Great. You move to Mexico, and we all end up working at McDonald's."

CartoonCollections.com

Trade Blocs and Outsourcing. *The creation of regional trade agreements led to more trade and migration within blocs, such as between Europe and North America. But as manufacturers sought out new locations for their factories to take advantage of cheaper labor elsewhere, they generated backlash from workers. Many had to seek out new jobs in the service sectors as assembly lines closed. This cartoon captures the resentments directed against business elites.*



Lagos, Nigeria. *During the twentieth century, Lagos was one of the fastest-growing and most crowded cities in Africa.*

THE GLOBAL VIEW



MAP 21.3 | World Migration, 1918–1998

The world's population continued to grow and move around in the twentieth century.

- Looking at this map, identify the countries that had the greatest increase in foreign-born people as a percentage of total population.
- Compare the areas of most rapid population growth during the nineteenth century with the parts of the world that, according to this map, had the highest percentage of foreign-born people in the twentieth century. What are the similarities and differences?
- During the twentieth century, which parts of the world were the sending areas, and which were the receiving territories? See also Map 18.1.

guest workers moved there, and ultimately the migrants sank deeper roots, especially once their children entered schools. This presented a challenge to host societies that were accustomed to thinking of their national communities as ethnically homogeneous. At times, discrimination led to violent conflicts between recent immigrants, long-time residents, and the state's security forces. Governments also grappled with the challenge of extending citizenship rights to and culturally assimilating newcomers who wanted to dress according to religious custom, as in the case of Muslims in France (10 percent of that country's population).

RESIDENT NONCITIZENS AND REFUGEES In the United States, arguments in Los Angeles over schools and health care for resident noncitizens became part of a global debate. In Argentina, up to 500,000 undocumented Peruvians, Bolivians, and Paraguayans also lived without rights as citizens. Even more staggering, between 3 and 8 million migrants moved from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho to South Africa. In some Middle Eastern countries, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, foreign-born workers constituted over 70 percent of the workforce. In general, migrants were only partially accommodated, while many were fully excluded from host societies. Thus, even though population movements flowed across political, kinship, and market networks, demographic reshuffling heightened national concerns about the ethnic makeup of political communities.

Finally, forced migrations remained a hallmark of the modern world. In contrast to earlier centuries' forced migration of enslaved Africans, recent involuntary flows involved refugees fleeing civil war and torture. Many suffered for weeks, months, or years in refugee camps on the periphery of violence. The greatest concentration of refugees occurred in the world's poorest region—Africa. Those Africans unable to reach wealthier areas were often caught up in ethnic and religious conflicts that generated vast refugee camps, where survival depended on the generosity of host governments and international contributions.

Global Culture

Migrations and new technologies helped create a more global entertainment culture. In this domain, globalization was often equated with Americanization. Yet American entertainments themselves reflected artistic practices from across the globe as one mass culture met another. On a global scale, there was less diversity in 2000 than in 1300, but in terms of individuals' everyday experience, the potential for experiencing cultural diversity (if one could afford the technology to do so) increased.

NEW MEDIA Technology was key in spreading entertainment. In the 1970s, for example, cassette tapes became the dominant medium for popular music, sidelining the long-playing record and the short-lived eight-track tape. Bootleggers illegally mass-reproduced cassette tapes and sold them cheaply to young consumers. Television was another globalizing force, as American producers bundled old dramas and situation comedies to stations worldwide. Brazilian soap operas began to penetrate Spanish-language American TV markets in the 1980s, often inducing Mexican viewers to rush home from work to catch the latest episode. Latin American television shows and music were distributed in the United States in areas with large Spanish-speaking populations. Bombay also produced its fair share of programs for viewers of British television and today produces roughly twice as many films per year as Hollywood. (See Current Trends in World History: Urbanization as a Global Phenomenon:



African Refugees. *During the late twentieth century, Africa became a continent of displaced persons and refugee camps. Pictured here is a camp in Chad for Sudanese driven out of the Darfur region by government-sponsored raids.*

CURRENT TRENDS IN WORLD HISTORY

Urbanization as a Global Phenomenon: Transforming Bombay into Mumbai

The city has played a pivotal role in world history since it first emerged thousands of years ago along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq). People have flocked to cities ever since for the social and economic advantages that these locations offer. By the end of the twentieth century, the proportion of people living in cities—usually defined as places having populations over 5,000 or 10,000—exceeded 50 percent in the wealthiest countries and was approaching that proportion in the less developed countries.

Of the burgeoning cities in the developing world, one of the most dynamic is Mumbai, in the state of Maharashtra, India. Acquired in the sixteenth century by the Portuguese, who then transferred its control to the English East India Company, Bombay (as it was named at the time) developed as a port city for colonial commerce. It profited from the cotton trade, developed a vibrant textile industry, attracted migrants from the countryside, and acquired a cosmopolitan image. India gained its independence from Britain in 1947, and in 1996 Bombay was renamed "Mumbai." It still epitomizes the modern face of the nation, and its increasingly heterogeneous population reflects the larger Indian melting pot.

Beginning in the 1980s, however, the nature of the city's relationship with the world economy started to change. The cotton textile industry, Bombay's economic backbone, went into a decline. Industrial employment fell sharply. The share of informal household enterprises, small shops, petty subcontractors, and casual labor rose, along with employment in banking and insurance. Economic liberalization removed hurdles for foreign businesses and brought the city directly into the global economy.

Today Mumbai occupies a strategic place in transnational geography. This is evident in the increasing presence of financial institutions, trading organizations, insurance companies, telecommunications corporations, and information technology enterprises with worldwide operations. Even the city's vibrant film industry addresses a global, not just a national, audience. Rather appropriately, Bombay cinema has been nicknamed "Bollywood." The city, however, still attracts a large number of poor migrants who live in slums or call the pavements their home. The gap between Mumbai's rich and poor has grown alarmingly. The millions who eke out a miserable living stand in stark contrast to a tiny elite enriched by the global economy.

Globalization has also affected Mumbai residents' identity. In the 1990s, the political party then in power in Maharashtra was the Shiv Sena, a nativist regional party named after a seventeenth-century Maratha chieftain who opposed the Mughal Empire. As the industrial economy and trade unions gave way to the service sector and unorganized labor, the Shiv Sena utilized the social and political fluidity produced by globalization to win support for its nativist ideology. Mumbai's cosmopolitan image went up in smoke in 1992–1993, when the Shiv Sena led pogroms against the city's Muslim residents. In response, a Muslim underworld don, according to police investigations, engineered a series of bomb blasts in March 1993. Since then, the city has experienced episodes of violence, none more gruesome than the terrorist attacks on two luxury hotels, a crowded railway station, and a Jewish center in November 2006. Ironically, the terrorists chose to attack Mumbai because of its economic importance and reputation as a cosmopolitan city.

Mumbai today illustrates the uneven effects of globalization. The society is sharply divided, economic disparities are great, and the city's politics is a cauldron of conflicting identities. These are the local forms in which this vast and influential city experiences globalization.



Bollywood. *Bombay cinema, or Bollywood, has an increasing global presence. This poster advertises Devdas, a three-hour romance that won awards in India and around the world.*

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS

- Contrast migration to Mumbai, as described here, with that to other parts of the world, notably western Europe and Japan, as described in the body of the chapter.
- How does Mumbai fit into the larger theme of "Worlds Together, Worlds Apart"?

Explore Further

Anand, Nikhil, *Hydraulic City: Water and the Infrastructures of Citizenship in Mumbai* (2017).

Mehta, Suketu, *Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found* (2005).

Prakash, Gyan, *Mumbai Fables* (2010).

Transforming Bombay to Mumbai.) In terms of box-office revenues, Hollywood remains the world's leading producer of films, helped in no small measure by its ability to export movies across borders and turn actors from around the world into global celebrities.

Television's globalizing effects were especially evident in sports. Soccer (known as football outside the United States) became an international passion, with devoted national followings for national teams. Indeed, by the 1980s, soccer was *the* world sport, with television ratings increasingly determining its schedule. Organizers of the 1986 World Cup in Mexico insisted that big soccer matches take place at midday so that games could be televised live at prime time in Europe, despite teams' having to play under the scorching sun. In many parts of the globe, major American sports made particularly deep inroads as more foreigners participated in them and as television broadcast American games in other countries. The National Basketball Association (and the athletic footwear firm Nike) was particularly successful in international marketing; in the process, it made Michael Jordan the world's best-known athlete in the late twentieth century.

Bob Marley. *In the 1970s, young Europeans and North Americans began to listen to music from the Third World. Among the most popular was Jamaican-based reggae, and its most renowned artist was Bob Marley. Marley's music combined rock and roll with African rhythms and lyrics about freedom and redemption for the downtrodden of the world.*

CULTURAL EXCHANGES Technology was not the only driving force of world cultures, for migration and exchange were also important. For example, as people moved around, they brought their own musical tastes and borrowed others. Reggae, born in the 1960s among Jamaica's Rastafarians, became a hit sensation in London and Toronto, where large West Indian communities had migrated. Reggae lyrics and realist imagery invoked a Black countercultural sensibility and a redemptive call for a return to African roots. Soon, Bob Marley and the Wailers, reggae's flagship band, played to audiences worldwide. In northeastern Brazil, where African culture emerged from decades of disdain, Bob Marley became a folk hero. In Soweto, South Africa, populated by Black workers, he was a symbol of resistance.

Reggae propelled a shift in Black American music. In broadcasting reggae, disc jockeys merged sounds and chanted lyrics over a beat, a "talkover" form that soon characterized rap music as well. This was a disruptive concept in the late 1970s, but within ten years rap had become mainstream. Rap lyrics emulated reggae realism by focusing on Black problems, but they also opened a new domain of controversies involving gang worldviews. On the world stage, Latino rappers stressed multicultural themes, often in "Spanglish." Asian rap stressed the genre as a vehicle for cross-cultural sharing.

The effects of migration on global music were also evident in Latin American transformations of North American genres. Latin music came into its own thanks to Latin American migrants to the United States. In New York and New Jersey, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans popularized boogaloo, salsa, and merengue. In Los Angeles, Mexican *corridos* (ballads) became pop hits.

What reinforced cross-cultural borrowing was not just the medium of production and distribution of entertainment across borders, but also the message. Increasingly, world popular culture was youth culture—especially its message of generational opposition. Consider Egypt's popular TV serial *The School of Troublemakers*, which carried a resolutely antiestablishment message: it showed schoolboys challenging their teachers' authority and then reveling in the chaos that resulted. In Argentina, rock and roll was crucial to the counterculture during the military dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s. Charlie García urged Buenos Aires audiences to defy authorities by daring to dream of a different order. Indeed, in countries where repressive regimes quashed public cultures, pop culture was usually counterculture.

The same globalizing effects influenced sports. Consider the staple of American identity, baseball, whose major league teams took on a more global cast. Beginning in the 1960s, the number of Latin Americans playing in North American professional leagues grew steadily. Notable in the 1980s was the Mexican pitcher Fernando Valenzuela, whose exploits as a member of the Los Angeles Dodgers made him a hero to that city's Mexican population and in his native land as well. The Dodgers also took the lead in reaching for Asian talent. In the 1990s, as Los Angeles experienced a growing Asian immigrant population, the Dodgers signed the Japanese pitcher Hideo Nomo. Meanwhile, in the Dominican Republic, baseball fans were riveted by their favorite players in the big leagues: slugger Sammy Sosa and ace pitcher Pedro Martínez. The emergence of so many Latin American and Asian baseball players epitomized the ability of what were once purely American cultural forms to spread their influences and to bring peoples all over the world together.

Baseball Goes International. *The 1980s and 1990s saw an influx of ballplayers from Latin America and quite a few from Asia as well. Left: Boston Red Sox slugger David Ortiz hails from the Dominican Republic. Right: New York Yankees superstar Ichiro Suzuki is from Japan.*

LOCAL CULTURE World cultures may have become more integrated and homogeneous, but they did not completely replace national and local cultures. Indeed, technology and migration often reinforced the appeal of "national" cultural icons as national celebrities gained popularity among immigrant groups abroad. Inexpensive new technology introduced these stars to more and more people. In Egypt, the most popular singer of the Nasser years was Umm Kulthum, who became the favorite of the middle classes via radio. In 1975, she was given a state funeral, the likes of which had rarely been seen.

As the market for world cultures grew increasingly competitive and integrated, performers borrowed from one another and employed a wider variety of styles, with some becoming commercial sensations. The result was often a challenge to convention. Consider the Indian movie industry, which has become one of the world's behemoth entertainers. When Bombay's Hindi cinema was cut off from the world, it never developed new themes and forms. But now it did. In place of the timeworn east versus west theme, it confidently embraced the global space with glamorous romance, breakout dancing, and chart-topping music. The local Hindi film became a global Indian phenomenon, at home in London, Sydney, and New York, and portrayed a global lifestyle. Bombay cinema also acquired a new brand, Bollywood, which came to increasingly depend on revenues from the United States, Europe, and the Middle East, where South Asian migrants flocked to see the latest blockbusters.

Fairuz. *Street art depicting the singer Fairuz. Born in Lebanon in 1934, Fairuz is an icon in the Arab world. Her record sales top 150 million worldwide. Although she was raised in a conservative Christian household, her voice and lyrics crossed religious and sectarian divides. Even through the horrors of the Lebanese civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s, she appealed to all sides and refused to abandon her country. Occasionally, however, her crossovers upset her fans. For instance, in 2008, when Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad's troops occupied part of Lebanon, Fairuz performed in Syria, claiming that culture should not be politicized. Some accused her of turning a blind eye.*

Among the breakthroughs that have occurred since the 1970s was the triumph of Black performers (Bob Marley, Whitney Houston, Michael Jackson), Black athletes (Pelé, Michael Jordan, Carl Lewis), and Black writers (Toni Morrison, Chinua Achebe). Competition also shattered some biases of gender and sexuality. Female performers like Madonna became popular icons. So did gay performers, starting with the Village People, whose campy multicultural anthem "YMCA" created a place for a new generation of gay or bisexual artists. In American television, the comedian and talk show host Ellen DeGeneres broke barriers as a popular lesbian performer who could elicit peals of laughter from gay and straight audiences alike. Of course, beyond Europe and North America, flirting with sexual conventions had its limits. In the Middle East, female video artists wore headscarves—but they still swung their hips. What were once relatively homogeneous national cultures, often dominated by men representing the ethnic majority, gave way to a wide variety of entertainers and artists who broke loose of confining local cultures.

Communications

Computer technology revolutionized global communications. In the late 1980s, while working in Switzerland, the British physicist Tim Berners-Lee devised a means to pool data stored on various computers. Whereas previous electronic links had existed only between major universities and research stations, Berners-Lee made data more accessible by creating the World Wide Web. With each use and each connection, and as people entered more data, however, the Web grew unmanageably crowded and difficult to

navigate. The early 1990s saw the first commercial browsers used in navigating the so-called Internet. Suddenly people were communicating across global networks more easily than with neighbors and more inexpensively than with local phone calls.

The change created a new generation of wealth. CEOs of top companies like General Motors, Royal Dutch Shell, and Merck had less net worth than Michael Dell (hardware maker), Bill Gates (software maker), and Jeff Bezos (creator of Amazon). Shares of Internet firms, known as dot-coms, swept the world's stock markets. Money from these companies flowed globally as they established offices worldwide. Software and Internet technologies developed enormous economies of scale and thus became prone to monopolization as they took over small companies.

Hardware, software, and the Internet were not purely American innovations. Within a few years of their invention, personal computers were being made in Mexico and computer chips were being mass-produced in Taiwan. The brains behind the Internet were likely to be students from Indian institutes of technology. Originally engineering schools, these institutes trained a whole generation of pioneering computing engineers, many of whom resettled in California's Silicon Valley. By 1996, Indians held half of the 55,000 temporary work visas issued by the U.S. government for high-tech employees. Roughly half of Silicon Valley start-up companies in the late 1990s were the brainchildren of Indian entrepreneurs. Google, the biggest of them all, was founded by a couple of graduate students at Stanford. One of them, Sergey Brin, was a Jewish Russian fugitive. The current CEO of the giant firm is Sundar Pichai, who grew up in Chennai, India, before moving to the United States for graduate studies.

While the Internet revolution provided new means to share and sell information, it also reinforced hierarchies between haves and have-nots. Great swaths of the world's population living outside big cities had no access to the Internet. According to World Bank calculations, in the late 1990s countries with low-income economies had, on average, 26 phone lines per 1,000 people; countries with high-income economies had 550 lines per 1,000 people. The biggest losers were the billions living in rural areas or towns neglected by state and private communications providers. The have-nots were poor not just from lack of capital but from lack of access to knowledge and new media.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER

While providing access to an unimaginable array of goods and services, globalization also deepened world inequalities. Families changed, and life spans increased. Education and good health determined one's status in society as never before. Populations expanded dramatically, requiring greater industrial and agricultural output from all parts of the world. While many regions consumed more than ever before, others struggled with famine. And as tropical rain forests were destroyed and the burning of fossil fuels increased, **global climate change** threatened the world's population.

The Demography of Globalization

It took 160 years (1800–1960) for the world's population to increase from 1 billion to 3 billion; over the next 40 years (1960–2000), it jumped from 3 billion to over 6 billion. Behind this steepening curve were two important developments: a decline in mortality, especially among children, and a rise in life expectancy.

Family Planning in China. *To control China's burgeoning population, the government enacted the one-child policy in 1979, which restricted each household to one child. While the policy was generally effective, numerous cases of forced abortions by zealous party officials and overwhelming numbers of female orphans revealed the need for a less stringent approach to population control. This 1996 propaganda billboard in Wuhan reads: "Family planning is the need of mankind." It is no accident that the single child in the ideal family illustrated beneath the slogan is a girl.*

MAP 21.4 | World Population Increases, 1950–1997

The world's population more than doubled between 1950 and 1997, rising from approximately 2.5 billion to nearly 6 billion.

- Which countries had the largest population increases over these five decades? Why do you suppose these countries experienced such high population increases?
- According to your reading, why did western Europe and Russia have the lowest population increases?

Population growth was hardly equal worldwide. (See Map 21.4.) In Europe, population growth peaked around 1900, and it moved upward only gradually from 400 million to 730 million during the twentieth century, with little growth after the 1970s. North America's population quadrupled over the same period, mainly because of immigration. The population booms in the twentieth century occurred in Asia (400 percent), Africa (550 percent), and Latin America (700 percent). China and India each passed the billion-person mark. Increases were greatest in the cities. By the 1980s, the world's largest cities were Asian, African, and Latin American. Greater Tokyo-Yokohama had 30 million inhabitants; Mexico City, 20 million; São Paulo, 17 million; Cairo, 16 million; Calcutta, 15 million; and Jakarta, 12 million.

Population growth slowed most dramatically in richer societies. For some, like Italy, the growth rate declined to zero. More recently enriched societies like Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong also had fewer births. Societies that did not see their birthrates decline by the same rate (much of Africa, southern Asia, and impoverished parts of Latin America) had difficulty raising income levels. But even among poor nations, birthrates declined after the 1970s.

The most remarkable turnaround occurred in China, where the government instituted a "one-child family" policy with rewards for compliance and penalties for transgression. Inducements included cash subsidies, preferential access to nurseries and kindergartens, priority in medical care, and the promise of favored treatment in housing, education, and employment. The policy also prompted an imbalance in sex ratio at birth. The bias in favor of sons (long a feature of China's patrilineal system, which emphasized descent through the male line), together with the availability of ultrasound scanners, promoted the widespread—albeit illegal—practice of prenatal sex selection.

In general, however, declining family size resulted from choice. In rich countries, more women deferred having children as education, career prospects, and birth control devices provided incentives and methods to postpone starting a family. In addition, love became a precondition to marriage and family formation in societies that had traditionally emphasized arranged marriages.

FAMILIES In many countries, the legal definition of families became more fluid in this period. Here again, the change reflected women's choices and the relationship between love and marriage. First, couples chose to end their marriages at unprecedented rates. In the United States, for example, the divorce rate doubled between 1970 and 1998; by the century's end, one in two marriages ended in divorce. In Belgium and Britain late in the twentieth century, fewer than half of all marriages survived. China's divorce rate soared, too. In Beijing, by century's end it approached 25 percent—double the 1990 rate. As of 2000, women initiated more than 70 percent of divorces.

As marriages became shorter-lived, new forms of child-rearing proliferated. Europeans, including the supposedly more traditional Italians and Greeks, abandoned nuclear family conventions. In those European countries where divorce remained difficult, more couples lived together without getting married. In the United States, out-of-wedlock childbirths constituted one-third of all births in the late 1990s, with only about half of American children living in households with both parents (compared with nearly three-quarters of children in the early 1970s).

AGING Longer life spans also affected family fortunes, as more infants survived childhood and lived to be old. The population of industrial nations "grayed" considerably as the median age increased and the percentage over age sixty-five grew. In western Europe and Japan, graying rates were even more marked. Japan's birthrate plummeted, and the citizenry aged at such a rate that the country began to depopulate. From a population of 127 million in 2000, estimates forecast a decline to 105 million by 2050.

The aging population presented new challenges for families. For centuries, being a parent meant providing for children until they could be self-sufficient. Old age, the years of relatively unproductive labor, was brief. Communities and households absorbed the cost of caring for the elderly. Household savings became family bequests to future, not older, generations. But as populations aged, retirees needed society's savings to survive. So public and private pension funds swelled to accumulate future pools of money for the retired. In Germany, over 30 percent of the government's social policy spending went into the state pension fund. Chinese demographers warned that the one-child policy might create an unbalanced population structure. In a society in which the family still largely provided the safety net, many people worried about having to support two parents and four grandparents.

In Africa, where publicly supported pension funds were rare, the aged faced bleaker futures. Whereas in earlier times the elderly were respected founts of wisdom, colonial rule and the postcolonial world elevated the young—especially those with western educations and lifestyles. Then, in the 1970s, as birthrates soared, the demand on family resources to care for infants and children rose at the very moment when society's resource base began to shrink. The elderly could no longer work, but neither could they rely on the household's support.

HEALTH The distribution of contagious diseases also reflected inequities in the globalized world. Although microbes have no respect for borders, the effects of public health regulations, antibiotics, and vaccination campaigns reduced the spread of contagions. By the late twentieth century, not only did nutrition and healthy habits count (as they always had), but access to medicines did, too.

What used to be universal afflictions in previous centuries (such as the Black Death) now just affected certain peoples. Water treatment and proper sewerage, for example, had banished cholera from most urban centers by the mid-twentieth century. More recently, however, its deadly grip again reached across Asia and into the eastern Mediterranean, parts of Latin America, and much of sub-Saharan Africa. From the 1970s, Africa suffered frequent outbreaks. The crucial cause of the respread of cholera was urban developers' failure to keep sanitation systems growing apace with the demand for water. Thus, diseases proliferated where urban squalor was most acute—in cities with the greatest post-1970s population growth.



Wedding Ceremonies. *Left: A bride bends down to allow the groom to tie the mangalsutra, or sacred necklace, around her neck, symbolizing their union in this Hindu wedding ceremony in India. Right: South Korean martial artist Kim Jong-bok holds his bride, actress Song Hee-jung, during their 2005 wedding ceremony, held on the Tokdo islets off the Korean Peninsula to protest Japan's claim of the territory.*





HIV/AIDS Treatment and Education. *Left: At the Thirteenth International AIDS Conference in Durban, South Africa, in July 2000, AIDS activists express their displeasure at the high prices and unavailability of lifesaving drugs for most of those in the Third World who are affected by AIDS. Right: African governments did not tackle the problem of HIV/AIDS in their severely affected continent with the energy warranted. Pictured here, however, a doctor seeks to impress on the youth of a local community how they should conduct their social and sexual lives in light of the AIDS crisis.*

In the 1970s, entirely new diseases began to devastate the world's population. Consider **HIV/AIDS**, an epidemic that, in its first two decades, killed 12 million people. Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which spreads through blood and other body fluids. The virus may remain dormant in the bodies of infected people for some time, but eventually attacks the immune system, leaving victims unable to fight off even the most common microbes. First detected in 1981, HIV/AIDS was initially stigmatized as a "gay cancer" (as it then appeared primarily in gay men) and received little attention. Gay activists in San Francisco, New York, Toronto, and Rio de Janeiro mobilized and pressured public authorities to be more responsive; at first, they were greeted with derision. But as the disease spread to heterosexuals and public awareness about it increased, a new campaign urged the practice of safe sex, control of blood supplies, and restrictions on sharing hypodermic needles. In Europe and North America, where the campaigns intensified and new drugs kept the virus under control, HIV/AIDS rates stabilized. Unfortunately, the affliction went global.

New treatments were very expensive, however, leaving the poor and disadvantaged still vulnerable to infection. By 2000, 33 million people had AIDS (the vast majority in poor countries) and even more were infected with HIV. (See Map 21.5.) At least two-thirds of those with AIDS lived in sub-Saharan Africa. In India, 7 million carried HIV; in China, the figure topped 1 million. At present, the most afflicted country is South Africa, with almost 8 million people living with HIV.

Other factors behind the geographical and demographic prevalence of HIV/AIDS were schooling and literacy. Better education led to safer sexual practices. Worldwide, more educated men and women showed higher use of condoms.

EDUCATION Access to decent education increasingly separated the haves from the have-nots. Moreover, because educational opportunities usually favored men, schooling shaped differences between the lives of men and women. In sub-Saharan Africa and in India, for example, literacy rates were, respectively, 63 and 64 percent for men and only 39 and 40 percent for women as of 2000. In the Arab world, the gap between men and women decreased somewhat by the end of the twentieth century. Yet low



African Women and Education. *Though women's education lagged behind that of men in Africa, a number of women, like Stella Kenyi, pictured here (left), graduated from African high schools and attended universities at home or abroad. Kenyi taught business skills to men and women in Sudan after completing an undergraduate degree at Davidson College in North Carolina.*

MAP 21.5 | HIV Infection across the World, 1999

HIV, which leads to AIDS, spread across the whole world within two decades, providing further evidence of global interconnectedness. The outbreak began in Africa.

- Where in Africa have the highest rates of HIV infection occurred?
- Which countries *outside* the African continent have had the highest rates of infection, and why is this so?
- Which countries have the lowest rates of HIV infection, and why is this so?

levels of literacy overall and the depressed levels for women continued to impede each region's efforts to combat poverty. (See Global Themes and Sources: Primary Source 21.3.)

Gender bias also remained in rich societies. For decades, however, women and girls pressed for equal access, with some astounding results. In the United States, by the late 1980s, more than half of all college degrees went to women (up from 38 percent in 1960). Chinese women made even greater strides, although roadblocks persisted. Ironically, with China's recent market reforms, women's access to basic education regressed, as families, particularly in rural areas, reverted to spending their limited resources on educating sons. Thus, in 2000, up to 70 percent of China's 140 million illiterates were women.

WORK Although more women held jobs outside the home, they lacked full equity at work. Limited by job discrimination and burdens of child-rearing, women's participation in the workforce reached a fairly stable level by the 1980s. The percentage of women at the top of the corporate pyramid was considerably smaller than their proportion in the labor force or their college graduation rates. In 1995, the Chinese government claimed that Chinese women had made better advances than their U.S. counterparts: there were more Chinese women (10 percent) than American women (3 percent) in senior managerial posts. Still, Chinese women graduates complained of discrimination in the job market. In 2000, some 60 percent of China's unemployed were women, and the number was growing. Women worldwide had difficulties breaking through the "glass ceiling"—a seemingly invisible barrier to women's advancement. Consequently, while income disparities between men and women narrowed, a significant gap persisted.

Working outside the home led to problems inside the home. Who would take care of the children? Changing gender norms in rich countries sparked major migration streams. Jamaican and Filipino women migrated by the thousands in the 1970s and 1980s to Canada and Australia to work as nannies to raise money to send back home, where they had often left their own children. In South Africa and Brazil, local women served as domestic servants and nannies. They were doing the jobs that once belonged to middle- and upper-class homemakers, women who now wanted the same rights as men: to parent *and* to work.

FEMINISM The deeply ingrained inequality between men and women prompted calls for change. Feminist movements arose mainly in Europe and North America in the 1960s and then become global in the 1970s. In 1975, the first truly international women's forum took place in Mexico City. But becoming global did not necessarily imply overturning local customs. What feminists called for was not the abolition of gender differences but equal treatment—equal pay and equal opportunities for obtaining jobs and advancement. In general, then, in spite of rapid population growth, women's inequities between and within societies remained prominent in this period. The most glaring were between the rich and poor countries, although well-to-do classes of women emerged everywhere and tended to congregate in big cities.

Women took increasingly active stances against discrimination in government and in the workplace. Indeed, as economic integration intensified with regional trade pacts (usually negotiated by men in the interest of male-owned and male-run firms), women struggled to ensure that globalization did not cut them out of new opportunities. For instance, after Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil negotiated the Mercosur free trade pact, traffic across South American borders soared. But as trade grew, so did government efforts to monitor illegal commerce and foster approved trade along new highways and bridges. Women were responsible for one kind of illicit commerce, because for generations they had transported goods across the river separating Argentina and Paraguay. When customs officers tried to stop this practice in the mid-1990s, Argentine and Paraguayan women locked arms to occupy the new bridge that male truckers used to ship Mercosur products, protesting the restrictions on their age-old enterprise.

The rising tide of global feminism culminated in a U.N. conference on women in Beijing in 1995. Government delegates from more than 180 countries attended the Fourth World Conference on Women to produce "a platform for action" regarding women's rights in politics, business, education, and health. Alongside the official conference was a parallel conference for nearly 30,000 representatives at the NGO Forum for Women. These grassroots activists represented 2,000 nongovernmental organizations from every corner of the globe. Representatives planned strategies and coordinated programs on how to improve women's living and working conditions. What emerged from the conference were associations and groups that pledged to lobby for the rights of women and girls worldwide. One effect was to spotlight the ongoing shortage of opportunities for the advancement of women leaders worldwide.

Forum on Women. *Women representing different cultures of the world hold out a "peace torch" at the opening ceremony of the U.N. World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.*

Production and Consumption in the Global Economy

The growing world population, the desire for more education and better health, the entry of women into paid employment, and the promise of rising standards of living spurred unprecedented production and consumption of the world's resources. The most immediate challenge was how to feed so many people while developing sustainable practices that do not use up limited natural resources.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION Changing agrarian practices made a huge difference in increasing food production. Starting in the 1950s, the "green revolution," largely involving nonfarm inputs such as chemical fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, produced dramatically larger harvests. Then, in the 1970s, biologists began offering genetically engineered crops that multiplied yields at an even faster rate.

But these breakthroughs were not evenly distributed. American farmers, the biggest innovators, were the greatest beneficiaries. For example, by century's end they produced approximately one-ninth of the world's wheat and two-fifths of its corn. From this output, American exports accounted for about one-third of the world's international wheat trade and four-fifths of all corn exports. At the heart of the innovation was political power, for farmers had the clout to force officials to maintain roads, subsidize credit and prices, and mop up surplus supply. But Asian rice farmers made impressive innovations, too. In Taiwan and Korea, chemical and biological breakthroughs allowed rice yields to jump by 53 and 132 percent, respectively, between 1965 and 1985. And as Indian

wheat farmers deployed chemical fertilizers, new seed varieties, and irrigation systems to double their output, the Ganges River basin supported an ever-larger urban population. The most miraculous transformation occurred in China. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Chinese government broke up some of the old collective farms and restored the individual household as the basic economic unit in rural areas. Thereafter, agricultural output surged by roughly 9 percent per year between 1978 and 1986.

Other agricultural producers also replied to world demand, but sometimes their added production was disruptive. While biology and chemistry allowed some farmers to get more out of their land, others simply opened up new lands to cultivation. Lacking access to credit, seed, and good land, small farmers had to go where land was cheap. In Java, farmers cleared sloping woodland to make way for coffee plantings. In southern Colombia, peasants moved into semitropical woodlands to cultivate coca bushes (the source of cocaine) at profits that other cultivators could never realize.

The most notorious frontier expansion occurred in the Amazon River basin. Populations flocked to the Amazon frontier, largely from impoverished areas in northeastern Brazil. They cleared (by fire) cheap land, staked their claims, and, like nineteenth-century American homesteaders, tried to climb the social ladder by cultivating crops and raising livestock. But the promise of bounty failed: the soils were poor and easily eroded, and land titles provided little security, especially once large speculators moved into the area. So the dwellers on the frontier moved farther inland to repeat the cycle. By the 1980s, migrants to the Amazon River basin had burned away much of the jungle, contaminated the biosphere (the environment in which life exists), reduced the stock of diverse plant and animal life, and fostered social conflict in the Brazilian hinterland.

Nor were "breadbasket areas" always able to feed exploding populations. This was especially true in Africa from the 1970s onward, when domestic food production could not keep pace with population growth. (See Map 21.6.) Food shortages thereafter increased in frequency and duration, wiping out large numbers of sub-Saharan peoples. The protruding ribs on African children became a typical image of the region.

What explained Africa's famines? As the Indian Nobel Prize–winning economist Amartya Sen observed, famines—and their increasing frequency—are not natural disasters; they

Saving the Amazon. *The rise of an international environmental movement in the 1970s led to alliances with local indigenous and environmental leaders, especially in the Amazon. Top: Farmers and ranchers cut and burned the Amazon at a ferocious rate in pursuit of frontier lands. In these remote regions, it was hard for local authorities to enforce conservation laws. Bottom: One of the most prominent advocates of the rights of indigenous people and the need to protect imperiled jungles was the British musician Sting. Here he is pictured alongside one of the Amazon's foremost Indian leaders, Bep Koroti Paiakan.*



MAP 21.6 | Food Consumption and Famine since the 1940s

There is perhaps no better indicator of the division of the world into rich and poor, haves and have-nots, than average food consumption and famine.

- Which parts of the world have had the most difficulty in feeding their populations?
- What have been some of the causes of famine and malnourishment in these regions?
- How much have famine and malnourishment been due to human actions, and how much to climate and other matters over which human beings have little control?

are human-made. (See Global Themes and Sources: Primary Source 12.4.) Food shortages in Africa stemmed largely from governments that ignored the rural sector and its politically unorganized farmers. Unable to persuade their governments to raise prices for their crops, the farmers lacked incentives to expand production. Food shortages were also by-products of global inequities. African countries, earmarking hefty chunks of their economies to agrarian exports to repay debts incurred in the 1970s, could not produce enough foodstuffs domestically and thus became food importers.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT While American farmers now produced a large share of the world's food, Americans also consumed a high proportion of its natural resources. Energy consumption presented a similar story, although America's enormous appetite for fossil fuels generated a domestic debate about reliance on foreign sources and pollution of the environment. In the 1970s, OPEC raised the price of crude oil (see Chapter 20). The cartel weakened in the 1980s, partly because new oil fields opened elsewhere in the world and partly because internal struggles divided the exporters.

The harshest conflict over oil occurred in the mid-1980s between Iran and Iraq, followed by the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iraq was poised to become dominant in the area and thus to control oil policies. The conquest of Kuwait would have given Iraq control over about 7 percent of the world's oil supplies and nearly 20 percent of the world's known reserves. Only Iraq's neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Iran, would have been larger oil exporters, and Iraq would have been in a position to menace both. As the situation threatened to unsettle the regional balance of power, the U.S. government moved to restore it. Rallying a coalition of other nations, the Americans and their allies turned to the United Nations to gain approval for a military invasion called Operation Desert Storm. The ensuing Gulf War, which ended with Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait, restored an order in which the global distribution of power favored oil consumers over producers and preserved a regional balance of power.

The consumption of water, oil, and other natural resources became matters of international concern late in the twentieth century. So did pollution control and the disposal of waste products. Part of this internationalization reflected the recognition that individual nations could not solve environmental issues on their own. Air and water, after all, do not stop flowing at political boundaries.

Americans consumed a disproportionate share of the world's natural resources. By 2000, they were using water at a per capita rate of three times the world's average. Indeed, extensive irrigation was crucial to California's agricultural sector, the most productive and profitable in the world. Gathering more water also allowed a desert metropolis like Los Angeles to grow.

In the United States and Canada, attempts to curb energy consumption saw little success, and the United States grew more dependent on oil imports. In the late 1990s, North American demand for fuel-guzzling sport utility vehicles intensified oil imports. Dependence on foreign sources locked oil importers into recurring clashes with oil exporters.

As Canadians saw their northern lakes fill up with acid rain (precipitation laced with sulfur, mainly from coal-fired plants), they urged their southern neighbor to curb emissions. Thus, reciprocal agreements between Canada and the United States took shape in the 1980s. Europeans, also beset by acidification, likewise negotiated regional environmental treaties. But some polluters simply moved overseas to poorer and less powerful nations. As the west cleaned up its environment, the rest of the world paid the price.

Other problems crossed human-made borders as well, especially the growing problem of climate change. The world was now confronted with the greenhouse effect and **global warming** (worldwide rising temperatures caused in large part by the release into the air of human-made carbons), ocean pollution, and declining biological diversity. An increase in vehicles, factories, and air-conditioned homes—the general betterment of middle-class living—meant more combustion of coal, gas, and oil. Moreover, liberalizing world trade and industrializing Asia released 4 billion metric tons of carbon into the atmosphere in 1970; the figure by 2009 was 10 billion. Fully half of the fossil fuel–induced carbon dioxide emissions worldwide since 1750 took place after 1985.

People around the planet were emitting more carbon and at the same time were increasingly aware of the catastrophic risks. On June 26, 1974, *Time* magazine announced provocatively to the world that our "prolonged streak of exceptionally good climate has probably come to an end." But it took years to turn words and science into action plans. In 1992, Rio de Janeiro hosted a massive Earth Summit of state and NGO leaders, as well as scientists from around the world, that spotlighted the global threat of climate change. The follow-up in Kyoto, Japan, did lead to a major treaty that pledged countries to curb carbon emissions. But when President George W. Bush entered the White House in early 2001, he scrapped the Kyoto Protocol—to the dismay of many scientists, activists, and partner governments.

Kyoto Protocol. *That America would no longer participate in the Kyoto Protocol was especially infuriating to the global audience, as America is the largest emitter of carbon dioxide and other major greenhouse gases. Here, Greenpeace environmental activists look on as one of their cohorts, dressed as Bush, brandishes a flaming globe in a dramatic protest outside the U.S. embassy in Mexico City.*

The response to environmental crises has been uneven at best. Where environmentalists acquired political power, they forced regulators to curb carbon emissions, a problem that grew with the rise of automobile traffic in cities like Tokyo, Mexico City, and Los Angeles. But control of fossil fuels depended on power and wealth, for it was hard to impose restrictions in societies where high energy use seemed a necessity of economic life. Even the Japanese, pioneers of clean fuel as early as the 1960s, were polluters in other spheres long thereafter. With increasing controls at home, Japanese industrialists went abroad to unload hazardous wastes. U.S. industrialists did the same, sending hazardous wastes to Mexico. Argentina and Canada sent their nuclear waste not abroad but to poor provinces desperate for jobs.

Environmental problems gained new urgency after the meltdown of a Soviet nuclear reactor in Chernobyl in 1986. Initially, communist authorities tried to cover up the disaster, but when the fallout reached Sweden, they had to accept responsibility. The delayed response was disastrous for Ukraine and Belorussia (present-day Belarus). Being relatively powerless under a centralized authoritarian regime, they had no political voice to cry out for help in addressing the contamination. As Chernobyl and global warming demonstrated, environmental concerns do not observe boundary lines. Yet at the end of the twentieth century, global guidelines for regulating the impact of human activities on the environment had eluded the world's leaders.

Chernobyl and Protest. *Among the victims of the 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl power plant, history's worst nuclear meltdown, were firefighters, such as the man pictured here, sent in to put out the blaze. Chernobyl turned Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost, or openness, into more than a slogan, and it became a rallying cry for the populace, which hoped for political change and improvements in daily life.*

CITIZENSHIP IN THE GLOBAL WORLD

Globalization distributed its benefits unequally. In general, people with access to better education and more opportunities profited from the border-crossing freedoms that the new order permitted. For most of the world's population, however, the new power structure was not so kind. Finding little opportunity in the globalized world, disadvantaged groups often invoked older religious and nationalist ideals. As globalization fostered human rights, environmental and labor standards, and women's rights worldwide, critics claimed that the language of international rights and standards was promoting neocolonial power in the form of a new "civilizing mission."

In particular, globalization posed massive problems for the nation-state. Since the nineteenth century, nation-states were supposed to be key in defining the rights of citizens. But now the rapid movement of ideas, goods, capital, and people across national boundaries undercut the authority of even the most powerful nations. Accordingly, other political spheres emerged to define and defend citizens. After the 1970s, people realized that international and supranational organizations often had more influence over their lives than did their own national governments. These organizations became increasingly important in shaping the meaning of citizenship. This was true especially in the Third World, where nation-states struggled hardest to accommodate globalization.

Supranational Organizations

New organizations with international responsibilities took shape after World War II for the purpose of facilitating global activities. These **supranational organizations** (organizations that transcend national boundaries) often successfully managed crisis situations, but they also impinged on the autonomy of all but the most powerful states.

Among the most prominent supranational organizations were the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which provided vital economic assistance to poorer nations. The World Bank, originally named the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was designed primarily to provide vital economic assistance for big development projects. In contrast, the International Monetary Fund provided funds and technical assistance to countries whose economies were in trouble. A good example of the World Bank's agenda was the financial support that it gave to the government of Ghana for the Volta River Project, which was intended to create an electrical grid for that country. Indeed, these international organizations financed and offered technical information for some of the largest development programs in the Third World. The World Bank also made available funds for a system of national parks in the Philippines to help indigenous people manage rain forests, coral reefs, and other threatened ecological zones. Nonetheless, the World Bank and the IMF required that recipient governments implement far-reaching economic reforms, such as devaluation of the currency and the privatization of public-sector companies. Many of these policies were deeply unpopular, leading to riots and charges that these international groups were agents of a new kind of imperialism.

Another set of supranational bodies, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), also stepped forward late in the twentieth century. Many championed human rights or highlighted environmental problems. Others, like the International Committee of the Red Cross, once dedicated to war relief, became more active in peacetime, sheltering the homeless or providing food for famine victims. What united NGOs was not so much their goals but the way they pursued them: autonomously from state power. NGOs created a layer of international forces that rivaled the political power of nation-states.

International NGOs reached a new level of influence in the 1970s because most nation-states at that time were still not democracies. Of the 121 countries in 1980, only 37 were democracies, accounting for only 35 percent of the world population. People found it difficult to rely on authoritarians to uphold their rights as citizens. Indeed, despite adopting a Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the United Nations (another international organization created after World War II and intended to provide a forum for settling international disputes) itself was a latecomer to enforcing human rights provisions, largely because many of its own members were the self-same authoritarians.

NGOs, then, took the lead in trying to make the language of human rights stick. The brutality of military regimes in Latin America inspired the emerging network of international human rights organizations to take action. After the overthrow of Chile's Salvador Allende in 1973, solidarity groups proliferated to protest the military junta's harsh repression. When the Argentine military began killing tens of thousands of innocent civilians in 1976 and news of their torture techniques leaked out, human rights movements again took action. Prominent among them was Amnesty International. Formed in 1961 to defend prisoners of conscience (detained for their beliefs, color, sex, ethnic origin, language, or religion), Amnesty International catalogued human rights violations worldwide. By 2000, an extensive network of associations was informing the public, lobbying governments, and pressuring U.N. member nations to live up to commitments to respect the rights of citizens.

Violence

International organizations and NGOs could play only a limited role in preserving peace and strengthening human rights. The end of the Cold War left entire regions in such turmoil that even the most effective humanitarian agencies could not prevent mass killings.

Consider the Balkans in the 1990s. In the territorial remains of Yugoslavia, groups of Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, ethnic Albanians, and others fought for control. Former neighbors, fueled by opportunistic leaders' rhetoric, no longer saw themselves as citizens of pluralistic political communities. Instead, demagogues trumpeted the superiority of ethnic Serbs. When international agencies moved in to try to bolster public authority, they failed as Yugoslavia's ethnic mosaic imploded into civil war and ethnic cleansing. The Dayton Accords of 1995 ended the bloodshed by partitioning Bosnia and assigning several international organizations to maintain peace. But in 1999, Serbian president Slobodan Milošević sent troops to suppress unrest in the province of Kosovo; only NATO air strikes on Serbia's capital, Belgrade, convinced Milošević to back down. Subsequently, Milošević was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal on sixty-six counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, but he died of a heart attack before he could be found guilty.

Bosnia in the Midst of War. *Despite extensive destruction and perpetual sniper fire, the multiethnic population of Sarajevo refused to abandon their city. With the help of U.N. soldiers and aid workers, they kept alive the hope for the peaceful coexistence of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats in Bosnia.*

Some of the most gruesome scenes of political violence occurred in Africa, where nation-states struggled to uphold the rule of law for all citizens. Here, tension often erupted in conflict between ethnic groups. The failure of African agriculture to sustain growing populations, as well as unequal access to resources like education, made ethnic rivalries worse. Droughts, famine, and corruption ignited the rivalries into riots and killings—even into bitter civil war and the breakdown of centralized authority.

Events in Rwanda reflected Africa's horrifying experience with political violence. Friction grew between the majority Hutus (agrarian people, who were often very poor) and the minority Tutsis (herders, who were better educated, were wealthier, and had been chosen by the Belgians during the colonial period to rule over the Hutus) after the two peoples had intermarried and lived side by side for many generations. Some resentful Hutus blamed the Tutsis for all their woes. As tensions mounted, the United Nations dispatched peacekeeping troops. Moderate Hutus urged peaceful coexistence, only to be shouted down by government forces in command of radio stations and a mass propaganda machine. Although alerted to the impending problem, U.N. forces, fearing a clash and uncertain of their mandate, failed to prevent the violence.

Rwandan Refugees. *Perhaps as many as 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in 1994 as the Hutus turned against the local Tutsi population while Rwanda was being invaded by a Tutsi-led army from Uganda. Not surprisingly, the massacre led to an enormous refugee crisis.*

The failure on the part of the international community, including the United States, which did not have troops on the ground and which had no clear policy toward Rwanda, gave the Hutu government an implicit green light to wipe out opponents. In 100 days of carnage in 1994, Hutu militias massacred 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. This was not, as many proclaimed, the militarization of ancient ethnic rivalries, for many Hutus were butchered as they tried to defend Tutsi friends, relatives, and neighbors. Meanwhile, the ensuing refugee crisis destabilized neighboring countries. The civil war in Rwanda sent riptides across eastern and central Africa, creating a whole new generation of conflicts.

Some societies, however, tried to put political violence behind them. In Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa, the transition to democracy compelled elected rulers to establish inquiries into past rulers' human rights abuses. These **truth commissions** were vital for creating a new aura of legitimacy for democracies and for promising to uphold the rights of individuals. In South Africa, many Black constituents backed the new president, Nelson Mandela, but also demanded a reckoning with the punitive experience of the apartheid past. To avoid a backlash against the former White rulers, the South African leadership opted to record the past events rather than avenge them. Truth, the new leaders argued, would be powerful enough to heal old wounds. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, chaired by Nobel Peace Prize winner and longtime opponent of apartheid Bishop Desmond Tutu, called on all who had been involved in political crimes, Whites as well as Blacks, to come before its tribunal and speak the truth. Although the truth alone did not fully settle old scores, a more open discussion of basic liberties fostered new bonds between public authorities and citizens.

The genocide in Rwanda represented the most egregious failure of the international community to deal with a severe humanitarian crisis. To some extent, the failure to respond was the result of the rapidity and ferocity with which the enmity toward the Tutsis exploded, catching off guard countries with the resources to deal with this level of violence. In other less politically charged crises, like famines, especially in Africa, international organizations like the Red Cross and Catholic Charities mobilized support and provided much relief.

Religious Foundations of Politics

Secular concerns for human rights and international peace were not the only foundations for politics after the Cold War. In many regions, people wanted religion to define the moral fabric of political communities. Very often, religion provided a way to reimagine the nation-state just as globalization was undermining national autonomy.

HINDU NATIONALISM In India, Hindu nationalism offered a communal identity for a country being rapidly transformed by globalization. In the 1980s, India freed market forces, privatized state firms, and withdrew from its role as welfare provider.

Economic reforms under the ruling Congress Party sparked economic growth, thereby creating Asia's largest, best-educated, and most affluent middle class. But because these changes also widened the gap between rich and poor, lower classes and castes formed political parties to challenge the traditional elites. With established hierarchies and loyalties eroding, Hindu nationalists argued that religion could now fill the role once occupied by a secular state. Claiming that the ideology of Hindutva ("Hinduness") would bring the help that secular nationalism had failed to provide, Hindu militants trumpeted the idea of India as a nation of Hindus (the majority), with minorities relegated to a lesser status.

The chief beneficiary of the politics established by economic liberalization was a Hindu nationalist party, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), or Indian People's Party. It was the political arm of an alliance of Hindu organizations devoted to establishing India as a Hindu state. By the late 1980s, the BJP and other like-minded parties were advancing an anti-minority (chiefly anti-Muslim) ideology. Claiming that the state had systematically appeased the minorities and trampled on the rights of the majority, they urged Hindus to overthrow "pseudo-secularism." This communal ideology was a winning formula, and in 1998 a BJP coalition came to power. Hindu nationalists sought to transform the secular nation-state into a moral community, but without challenging the economic forces of globalization.

ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM In some cases, religion provided a way to resist seemingly American-dominated globalization. One of the most spirited challenges arose in the Islamic Middle East. Here, many people believed that modernizing and westernizing programs were leading their societies toward rampant materialism and unchecked individualism. Critics included traditional clerics and young western-educated elites whose job prospects seemed bleak and who felt that the promise of modernization had failed. Having criticized modernizing processes since the nineteenth century, Islamic conservatives flourished once more in the 1970s, as global markets and social dislocations undermined the moral foundations of secular leadership.

The most revolutionary Islamic movement arose in Iran, where clerics forced the shah from power in 1979. The revolt pitted a cadre of religious officials possessing only pamphlets, tracts, and tapes against the military arsenal and the vast intelligence apparatus of the Iranian state. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had enjoyed U.S. technical and military support since the Americans had helped place him on the throne in 1953. His bloated army and police force, as well as his brutally effective intelligence service, had crushed all challenges to his authority. The shah had also benefited from oil revenues, which soared after 1973. Yet the uneven distribution of income, the oppressive police state, and the royal family's ostentatious lifestyle fueled widespread discontent. As discontent rose, so did repression. And as repression intensified, so did the feeling that the government had abandoned the people.



Ayatollah Khomeini. *After fifteen years of exile in France due to his outspoken opposition to the shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Tehran in 1979 to the ardent welcome of his supporters.*

The most vociferous critique came from the mullahs (Muslim scholars or religious teachers), who found in the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini a courageous leader. Khomeini used his traditional Islamic education and his training in Muslim ethics to accuse the shah's government of gross violations of Islamic norms. He also identified the shah's ally, America, as the great Satan. With opposition mounting, the shah fled the country in 1979. In his wake, Khomeini established a theocratic state ruled by a council of Islamic clerics. Although some Iranians grumbled about aspects of this return to Islam (women's reduced status, leaders' arbitrariness, ruptured relations with the west, and the failure to institute democratic procedures), they prided themselves on having inspired a revolution based on principles other than those drawn from the west.

RELIGIOUS CONSERVATISM IN THE UNITED STATES The search for moral foundations of politics in the global age reached beyond nonwestern societies. Indeed, in the United States, religion became a potent force after the 1970s as the membership and activism of conservative, fundamentalist Protestant churches eclipsed those of mainline denominations. Insisting on literal interpretation of the Bible, Protestant fundamentalists railed against secularizing trends in American society. This traditionalist crusade took up a broad range of cultural and political issues. Religious conservatives (predominantly evangelical Protestants, but including some Catholics and Orthodox Jews) attacked many of the social changes that had emerged from liberation movements of the 1960s. Shifting sexual and familial relations were sore points, but the religious conservatives especially targeted public leaders who, they felt, had abandoned the moral purpose of authority by legalizing abortion and supporting secular values.

American Hostage Crisis in Iran. *The United States was stunned in 1979 by Iran's Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the shah and brought the exiled cleric Ayatollah Khomeini to power. After radical students captured the U.S. embassy, as well as fifty-three hostages, an American rescue raid failed, leading to celebration by Iranians, as shown here.*

Acceptance of and Resistance to Democracy

New sources of power and new social movements drastically changed politics in the global age. Increasingly, international organizations were decisive in defining the conditions of democratic citizenship. Perhaps most remarkable was how much democracy spread toward the end of the twentieth century. In South Africa, Russia, and Guatemala, elections now decided politicians' fate. In this sense, the world's societies embraced the idea that people have a right to choose their own representatives. Nevertheless, democracy did not triumph everywhere.

An important holdout was China. Mao Zedong died in 1976, and within a few years his successor, Deng Xiaoping, opened the nation's economy to market forces. But Deng and other Chinese Communist Party leaders resisted multiparty competition. Instead of capitalism and western-style democracy, they maintained that China should follow its own path to modernity. By the late 1980s, economic reforms had produced spectacular increases in production and rising standards of living for most of China's people. But the widening gap between rich and poor, together with increasing public awareness of corruption within the party and the government, triggered popular discontent. Worker strikes and slowdowns, peasant unrest, and student activism spread. On April 22, 1989, some 100,000 people gathered in **Tiananmen Square** at the heart of Beijing in silent defiance of a government ban on assembling. The following month brought a greater show of defiance when television cameras and world journalists converged on China to cover the historic visit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Several hundred students, flanked by thousands of supporters, began a hunger strike at the square to demand democratic reform. Tiananmen Square was now their stage and the world their audience. Within days, the strike spread to other cities. In Beijing, where well over a million people filled the city center, a carnivalesque atmosphere prevailed as the students sang and danced to rock songs and folk ballads.

The regime responded by declaring martial law. Two huge protest demonstrations followed, and residents erected barricades to defend the city against government troops. As the protest's momentum waned, a 28-foot icon, partly inspired by the Statue of Liberty, was unveiled at the square, capturing the imagination of the crowd and the attention of the cameras. But by then the government had assembled troops to crush the movement. In a night of terror that began at dusk on June 3, the People's Liberation Army turned their guns against the people. Most students in the square negotiated a safe passage; those who lost their lives—estimates vary from 2,000 to 7,000—were the nameless people who wielded Molotov cocktails, sticks, or bricks in a futile attempt to repel the troops.

Tiananmen Square. *This white plaster and Styrofoam statue, inspired in part by the Statue of Liberty and dubbed the Goddess of Democracy, was created by students in Beijing in the spring of 1989. It was brought to Tiananmen Square and unveiled at the end of May in an attempt to reinvigorate the democracy movement and the spirits of the protesters. For five days it captured worldwide attention, until it was toppled by a tank on June 4 and crushed as the Chinese People's Liberation Army cleared the square of its democracy advocates.*

The Chinese government weathered the storm. It continued to suppress unofficial social organizations; to control access to information, including that obtained over the Internet; and to crack down on dissidents. But it could not completely control the forces of globalization. Some organizations, like the quasi-religious group Falun Gong, eluded authorities and even used the Internet to enlist international support. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, signs of change were apparent. A visible urban entrepreneurial class had emerged, whose top echelon conducted its global businesses over nearly ubiquitous cellular phones. Rural dwellers paid what little they had to be smuggled abroad, at great risk and often with lethal consequences, so that they could make a better living in America or Europe. Within China, tens of millions of people lived a transient existence, with tens of thousands daily leaving the countryside for the cities. There they often suffered economic and social exploitation, as well as abuse from police and other government officials. Existing at the margins of the new prosperity, they, too, served as reminders of the uneven effects of globalization.

In Mexico, democracy finally triumphed as the single party that had dominated the country for seventy-one years fell after the election of Vicente Fox in 2000. Until that time, Mexican rulers had combined patronage and rigged elections to stay in office. By the 1980s, corruption and abuse permeated the system. The abuse of democratic rights fell hardest on poor communities, especially those with large numbers of indigenous people.

Consider the state of Chiapas. An impoverished area with many Maya descendants, Chiapas had trouble coping with social and economic change in the 1980s. The president stripped Indians of their right to communal land and let the ruling party run Chiapas like a fiefdom. By the early 1990s, the province was demanding material betterment, cultural recognition of Indian rights, and local democracy. When one group of rebels, the Zapatistas, rose up in Mexico City against the government in 1994, the government prepared to crush the insurgents. (See Global Themes and Sources: Primary Source 21.2.) But no one anticipated how supranational forces would play a role in helping local democracy: Cable News Network (CNN) broadcast the clash worldwide, and the rebel leader created a website that drew thousands of hits. Thereafter, international news media flooded Chiapas, filming Indians waving flags and pronouncing victory. Leaders in Mexico City, deeply embarrassed, asked local church authorities to negotiate peace and spearhead a commission to hear the villagers' concerns. In 2000, national elections toppled the ruling party (including its representatives in Chiapas), and Mexico dismantled its one-party ruling system.

Mexico, South Africa, and China were powerful examples of how men and women in every corner of the earth yearned to choose their own leaders. In 1994, millions of previously disenfranchised South Africans lined up for hours to cast a vote for their new Black African president, Nelson Mandela. In 2000, the Mexican electorate turned out the ruling party, while in China the ruling Communist Party had to call in the army to prevent regime change and democratic reforms.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, new social grievances fueled new political actors, leading to a global wave of demands on governments for freedom, for human and democratic rights, and for welfare support to shelter the have-nots from the very forces unleashed by economic globalization. There were significant breakthroughs—in South Africa and a number of other African states, in many Latin American societies, and in eastern Europe, which was released from the pall of the east-west divide. Even so, dictatorial regimes like those in China, parts of Africa, and parts of the Middle East held out against protest movements and maintained their autocracies.

CONCLUSION

In the thirteenth century (as long before), a few travelers like Ibn Battuta and Marco Polo ventured over long distances to trade, to explore, and to convert souls; yet communications technology was rudimentary, making long-distance mobility and exchange

Protests in Mexico. *Top: Among the great Mexican muralists of the twentieth century, David Alfaro Siqueiros was the strongest advocate for class struggle. In this 1957 mural image,* The People in Arms, *Siqueiros portrays Mexican peasants as they pick up arms in 1910 to fight for a new order. Paintings such as these provided inspiration for movements such as the Zapatista rebellion, depicted below. Bottom: After generations of oppression and exclusion, the peasants of Chiapas, in southern Mexico, called for democracy and respect for their right to land. When Mexican authorities refused to bend, peasants took up arms. While they knew that they posed no military threat to the Mexican army, the Zapatista rebels used the world media and international organizations to embarrass the national political establishment into allowing reforms.*

expensive, rare, and perilous. The world was more a series of communities set apart than a world bound together by culture, capital, and communications networks.

By the late twentieth century, that balance had changed. Food, entertainment, clothing, and even family life were becoming more similar worldwide. To be sure, some local differences remained. In 2000, local cultures lived on and in some cases were revived through challenges to the authority of nation-states. No longer did the nation-state or any single level of community life define collective identities. At the same time, worldwide purveyors of cultural and commercial resources offered local communities the same kinds of products, from aspirin to Nike shoes. Exchanges across local and national boundaries became easier. For the first time, many of the world's peoples felt they belonged to a global culture.

New technologies, new methods of production and investment, and the greater importance of personal health and education for human betterment created new possibilities—and greater inequalities. Indeed, the disparities between haves and have-nots in 2000 were astonishing. For as humanity harnessed new technologies to accelerate exchanges across and within cultures, an ever-larger gulf separated those who participated in global networks from those who languished on the margins. This inequality produced a range of divergent political and cultural forms after the collapse of the three-world order. Thus, as the world became more integrated, it also grew apart along ever-deeper lines.

After You Read This Chapter

TRACING THE GLOBAL STORYLINE

FOCUS ON: The Emergence of Modern Globalization

Removing Obstacles to Globalization

- Communism's fall and the end of the Cold War improve prospects for global exchange of peoples, ideas, and resources.
- Final decolonization in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau and the end of apartheid in South Africa return self-rule throughout Africa.

Unleashing Globalization

- Financial deregulation and the end of gold and silver standards allow money to move freely across borders but lead to a Third World debt crisis.
- Widespread migrations occur as people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America move to Europe and America, following the tracks of their former colonizers.
- Revolutions in culture and communications make cultural diversity more possible for those who can afford it.

The New Global Order

- Globalization leads to dramatic population expansion, requiring greater agricultural and industrial output.
- Family structure changes, life spans increase, and more goods are available, yet inequalities deepen as education and good health determine social status as never before.
- As globalization erodes the power of the nation-state, greater violence occurs between and within states. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religion become resources for dealing with violence and inequality and for reimagining the nation-state.

KEY TERMS

global climate change p. 896
developing world p. 878
European Union (EU) p. 888
globalization p. 877
global warming p. 904
HIV/AIDS p. 899
Nelson Mandela p. 883
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) p. 881
supranational organizations p. 905
Tiananmen Square p. 909
truth commissions p. 907

THINKING ABOUT GLOBAL CONNECTIONS

- **Thinking about Worlds Together, Worlds Apart and Globalization** How did globalization shape patterns of inequality? After the Cold War, trade, migration, and communications reshaped the terms on which peoples interacted with one another around the world. Industry, agriculture, culture, and the arts all linked peoples and regions together in different ways. Consider differences in all these domains. What kinds of inequalities were most significant?
- **Thinking about Changing Power Relationships and Globalization** What kind of resistance movements did globalization generate, both within the world's wealthiest societies and elsewhere? How did the feminist, labor, and environmental reform movements resemble and differ from their predecessors? How did Hindu nationalism and religious conservatism differ from each other and from earlier nationalist and religious or pan movements?
- **Thinking about Environmental Impacts and Globalization** Explain the relationship between globalization, climate change, and the environment. The consumption of water, oil, and other natural resources became major national and international issues in this period. How did the organization of agricultural and industrial production change, and what influence did those changes have on global warming, acid rain, and pollution? Identify efforts to limit damage to the environment and evaluate their success.

Go to INQUIZITIVE to see what you've learned—and learn what you've missed—with personalized feedback along the way.

CHRONOLOGY





GLOBAL THEMES AND SOURCES

Comparing the Power of Grassroots Democracies

Despite the enormous economic and technological advances of the past 200 years, famine and dire poverty remain problems in many places. These problems have been particularly severe where unrepresentative, authoritarian leaders prevent foreign aid from reaching the needy and ordinary people from achieving self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency has been further undermined by pervasive discrimination against women, which has limited their access to education and has therefore compromised economic growth for everyone, men and women alike.

Written by a dissident dramatist (and future politician) in 1978, the first document, excerpted from a long essay in political philosophy, explores the possibility for individuals to maintain their independence and dignity, and ultimately to undermine the communist dictatorships of eastern Europe. In the second document, from the General Council of the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN), a group of mostly Amerindians living in a jungle region in Chiapas, Mexico, seeks international support for its conflict with Mexican authorities. In the third, researchers for the World Bank report that better education, and especially better education for girls, improves economic development among the poor. The final selection, from economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (1933–), argues that no major famine has occurred in a democratic country with a free press.

The selections presented here all call attention to the importance of grassroots democracy and equality in responding to political, economic, and ecological disasters and achieving at least a measure of autonomy. They raise big questions about the nature and location of power and the possibility of change. While there is an important comparative dimension to these selections—each understands the promise of grassroots democracy differently—they are all the product of a common context, a common reaction against monolithic, authoritarian forms of rule. Collectively, they call for both comparison and contextualization.

Analyzing the Power of Grassroots Democracies Comparatively and Contextually

- On what basis do the authors of these documents claim authority? In whose name do they speak? What goals do they seek to attain?
- What does justice mean from the perspectives of these four documents? Do the authors agree or disagree on what is just?
- What is the relationship between individual and collective rights in these documents? To what degree does each text consider individual liberties essential or harmful to the common good? Pay special attention to differences between the first document and the next three.

PRIMARY SOURCE 21.1

"The Power of the Powerless" (1978), Václav Havel

Václav Havel (1936–2011) was a Czech dramatist; a founder of Charter 77, a civic initiative under communism (1976–1982) that defended human rights; and the president of Czechoslovakia (1989–1992) and then the Czech Republic (1993–2003). His essay *The Power of the Powerless*, originally written in 1978, provided a model of what he called "living within the truth," a form of resistance against communism.

- **What does Havel mean by "living within the truth"?**
- **Explain the significance of law in this document.**
- **Compare this selection with the excerpt from Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's *Communist Manifesto* in Primary Source 16.5 (p. 687). Is Havel's view of politics compatible with the manifesto?**

A spectre is haunting eastern Europe: the spectre of what in the West is called "dissent." This spectre has not appeared out of thin air. It is a natural and inevitable consequence of the present historical phase of the system it is haunting. It was born at a time when this system, for a thousand reasons, can no longer base itself on the unadulterated, brutal, and arbitrary application of power, eliminating all expressions of nonconformity. What is more, the system has become so ossified politically that there is practically no way for such nonconformity to be implemented within its official structures.

• • •

And so the post-totalitarian system behaved in a characteristic way: it defended the integrity of the world of appearances in order to defend itself. For the crust presented by the life of lies is made of strange stuff. As long as it seals off hermetically the entire society, it appears to be made of stone. But the moment someone breaks through in one place, when one person cries out, "The emperor is naked!"—when a single person breaks the rules of the game,

thus exposing it as a game—everything suddenly appears in another light and the whole crust seems then to be made of a tissue on the point of tearing and disintegrating uncontrollably.

When I speak of living within the truth, I naturally do not have in mind only products of conceptual thought, such as a protest or a letter written by a group of intellectuals. It can be any means by which a person or a group revolts against manipulation: anything from a letter by intellectuals to a workers' strike, from a rock concert to a student demonstration, from refusing to vote in the farcical elections, to making an open speech at some official congress, or even a hunger strike, for instance. If the suppression of the aims of life is a complex process, and if it is based on the multifaceted manipulation of all expressions of life, then, by the same token, every free expression of life indirectly threatens the post-totalitarian system politically, including forms of expression to which, in other social systems, no one would attribute any potential political significance, not to mention explosive power.

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Like ideology, the legal code is an essential instrument of ritual communication outside the power structure. It is the legal code that gives the exercise of power a form, a framework, a set of rules. It is the legal code that enables all components of the system to communicate, to put themselves in a good light, to establish their own legitimacy. It provides their whole game with its "rules" and engineers with their technology. Can the exercise of post-totalitarian power be imagined at all without this universal ritual making it all possible, serving as a common language to bind the relevant sectors of the power structure together? The more important the position occupied by the repressive apparatus in the power structure, the more important that it functions according to some kind of formal code. . . .

If the exercise of power circulates through the whole power structure as blood flows through veins, then the legal code can be understood as something that reinforces the walls of those veins. Without it, the blood of power could not circulate in an organized way and the body of society would haemorrhage at random. Order would collapse.

A persistent and never-ending appeal to the laws—not just to the laws concerning human rights, but to all laws—does not mean at all that those who do so have succumbed to the illusion that in our system the law is anything other than what it is. They are well aware of the role it plays. But precisely because they know how desperately the system depends on it—on the "noble" version of the law, that is—they also know how enormously significant such appeals are. Because the system cannot do without the law, because it is hopelessly tied down by the necessity of pretending the laws are observed, it is compelled to react in some way to such appeals. Demanding that the laws be upheld is thus an act of living within the truth that threatens the whole mendacious structure at its point of maximum mendacity.

Over and over again, such appeals make the purely ritualistic nature of the law clear to society and to those who inhabit its power structures. They draw attention to its real material substance and thus, indirectly, compel all those who take refuge behind the law to affirm and make credible this agency of excuses, this means of communication, this reinforcement of the social arteries outside of which their will could not be made to circulate through society. They are compelled to do so for the sake of their own consciences, for the impression they make on outsiders, to maintain themselves in power (as part of the system's own mechanism of self-preservation and its principles of cohesion), or simply out of fear that they will be reproached for being "clumsy" in handling the ritual. They have no other choice: because they cannot discard the rules of their own game, they can only attend more carefully to those rules.

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Hope for those who would liberate themselves, therefore, lies in a symbiosis of the moral and the social, of humanity and democracy, in the realization of a social order in which the formalized and functionalized structure of society will be regulated and controlled by this "newly discovered" spontaneous civic activity, which will be a permanent and essential source of social self-awareness, while the bureaucracies ruling society shrink to assume merely compliant executive roles.

Source: Vaclav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in *The Power of the Powerless. Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*, ed. John Keane (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), pp. 23, 42–43, 74–77, 108–9.

PRIMARY SOURCE 21.2

Declaration of War against the Mexican Government (1993), EZLN

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) is a revolutionary political organization based in Chiapas, the southernmost state in Mexico. On January 1, 1994, it took up arms against the government, calling for a restoration of the principles of the Mexican Revolution and protesting the confiscation of poor people's land rights. This document, released in 1993, issues a call to arms.

- **The document opens, "We are a product of 500 years of struggle." Who is "we"? Who does the document include as insiders, and whom—whether individuals or broad social forces—does it exclude?**
- **On what basis do the authors speak for the nation?**
- **What is the relationship between this declaration and the rule of law? Do the authors claim to uphold the law, or do they reject it and seek to overthrow it?**

To the People of Mexico: Mexican Brothers and Sisters:

We are a product of 500 years of struggle: first against slavery, then during the War of Independence against Spain led by insurgents, then to avoid being absorbed by North American imperialism, then to promulgate our constitution and expel the French empire from our soil, and later the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz denied us the just application of the Reform laws and the people rebelled and leaders like Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men just like us. We have been denied the most elemental preparation so they can use us as cannon fodder and pillage the wealth of our country. They don't care that we have nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over our heads, no land, no work, no health care, no food nor education. Nor are we able to freely and democratically elect our political representatives, nor is there independence from foreigners, nor is there peace nor justice for ourselves and our children.

But today, we say ENOUGH IS ENOUGH.

We are the inheritors of the true builders of our nation. The dispossessed, we are millions and we thereby call upon our brothers and sisters to join this struggle as the only path, so that we will not die of hunger due to the insatiable ambition of a 70 year dictatorship led by a clique of traitors that represent the most conservative and sell-out groups. They are the same ones that opposed Hidalgo and Morelos, the same ones that betrayed Vicente Guerrero, the same ones that sold half our country to the foreign invader, the same ones that imported a European prince to rule our country, the same ones that formed the "scientific" Porfirista dictatorship, the same ones that opposed the Petroleum Expropriation, the same ones that massacred the railroad workers in 1958 and the students in 1968, the same ones [that] today take everything from us, absolutely everything.

To prevent the continuation of the above and as our last hope, after having tried to utilize all legal means based on our Constitution, we go to our Constitution, to apply Article 39 which says:

> "National Sovereignty essentially and originally resides in the people. All political power emanates from the people and its purpose is to help the people. The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government."

Therefore, according to our constitution, we declare the following to the Mexican federal army, the pillar of the Mexican dictatorship that we suffer from, monopolized by a one-party system and led by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the maximum and illegitimate federal executive that today holds power.

According to this Declaration of War, we ask that other powers of the nation advocate to restore the legitimacy and the stability of the nation by overthrowing the dictator.

We also ask that international organizations and the International Red Cross watch over and regulate our battles, so that our efforts are carried out while still protecting our civilian population. We declare now and always that we are subject to the Geneva Accord, forming the EZLN as our fighting arm of our liberation struggle. We have the Mexican people on our side, we have the beloved tri-colored flag highly respected by our insurgent fighters. We use black and red in our uniform as our symbol of our working people on strike. Our flag carries the following letters, "EZLN," Zapatista National Liberation Army, and we always carry our flag into combat.

Beforehand, we refuse any effort to disgrace our just cause by accusing us of being drug traffickers, drug guerrillas, thieves, or other names that might be used by our enemies. Our struggle follows the constitution which is held high by its call for justice and equality.

Therefore, according to this declaration of war, we give our military forces, the EZLN, the following orders:

First: Advance to the capital of the country, overcoming the Mexican federal army, protecting in our advance the civilian population and permitting the people in the liberated area the right to freely and democratically elect their own administrative authorities.

Second: Respect the lives of our prisoners and turn over all wounded to the International Red Cross.

Third: Initiate summary judgments against all soldiers of the Mexican federal army and the political police that have received training or have been paid by foreigners, accused of being traitors to our country, and against all those that have repressed and treated badly the civil population and robbed or stolen from or attempted crimes against the good of the people.

Fourth: Form new troops with all those Mexicans that show their interest in joining our struggle, including those that, being enemy soldiers, turn themselves in without having fought against us, and promise to take orders from the General Command of the Zapatista National Liberation Army.

Fifth: We ask for the unconditional surrender of the enemy's headquarters before we begin any combat to avoid any loss of lives.

Sixth: Suspend the robbery of our natural resources in the areas controlled by the EZLN.

To the People of Mexico: We, the men and women, full and free, are conscious that the war that we have declared is our last resort, but also a just one. The dictators are applying an undeclared genocidal war against our people for many years. Therefore we ask for your participation, your decision to support this plan that struggles for work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace. We declare that we will not stop fighting until the basic demands of our people have been met by forming a government of our country that is free and democratic.

Join the Insurgent Forces of the Zapatista National Liberation Army.

General Command of the EZLN 1993

Source: "First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle," http://struggle.ws/mexico/ezln/ezlnwa.html (http://struggle.ws/mexico.html).

PRIMARY SOURCE 21.3

Why Gender Matters (2000), World Bank

The *World Development Report* is an annual report published since 1978 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The report for 2000–2001, which included this selection, was devoted to the topic "Attacking Poverty."

- **Describe the effect of tuition on girls' school attendance.**
- **Evaluate the relative importance of barriers to girls' education posed by culture on the one hand and poverty on the other.**
- **What effect does expanding educational opportunity for girls have on boys?**

Using Subsidies to Close Gender Gaps in Education

Evaluations of recent initiatives that subsidize the costs of schooling indicate that demand-side interventions can increase girls' enrollments and close gender gaps in education. A school stipend program established in Bangladesh in 1982 subsidizes various school expenses for girls who enroll in secondary school. In the first program evaluation girls' enrollment rate in the pilot areas rose from 27 percent, similar to the national average, to 44 percent over five years, more than twice the national average. After girls' tuition was eliminated nationwide in 1992 and the stipend program was expanded to all rural areas, girls' enrollment rate climbed to 48 percent at the national level. There have also been gains in the number of girls appearing for exams and in women's enrollments at intermediate colleges. While boys' enrollment rates also rose during this period, they did not rise as quickly as girls'.

Two recent programs in Balochistan, Pakistan, illustrate the potential benefits of reducing costs and improving physical access. Before the projects there were questions about whether girls' low enrollments were due to cultural barriers that cause parents to hold their daughters out of school or to inadequate supply of appropriate schools. Program evaluations suggest that improved physical access, subsidized costs, and culturally appropriate design can sharply increase girls' enrollments.

The first program, in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, uses a subsidy tied to girls' enrollment to support the creation of schools in poor urban neighborhoods by local NGOs. The schools admit boys as long as they make up less than half of total enrollments. In rural Balochistan the second program has been expanding the supply of local, single-sex primary schools for girls by encouraging parental involvement in establishing the schools and by subsidizing the recruitment of female teachers from the local community. The results: girls' enrollments rose 33 percent in Quetta and 22 percent in rural areas. Interestingly, both programs appear to have also expanded boys' enrollments, suggesting that increasing girls' educational opportunities may have spillover benefits for boys.

Source: The World Bank, from "Using subsidies to close gender gaps in education," World Bank 2001. *World Development Report 2000–2001: Attacking Poverty*, p. 122, Box 7.2. © World Bank http://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11856 License: Creative Commons Attribution license (CC BY 3.0).

PRIMARY SOURCE 21.4

"Democracy as a Universal Value" (1999), Amartya Sen

This selection is drawn from Amartya Sen's work on the economics and politics of famines as well as political philosophy. In many famines, Sen has shown, food supplies remained adequate, while unemployment, rising prices, and unresponsive governments led to catastrophe. The current selection comes from a keynote address delivered in New Delhi, titled "Building a Worldwide Movement for Democracy."

- **What does Sen mean by democracy?**
- **What, according to Sen, is the relationship between democracy and economic dynamism?**
- **Explain the significance of famines to Sen's argument.**

In the summer of 1997, I was asked by a leading Japanese newspaper what I thought was the most important thing that had happened in the twentieth century. . . .

I did not, ultimately, have any difficulty in choosing one as the preeminent development of the period: the rise of democracy.

***

It is often claimed that nondemocratic systems are better at bringing about economic development. This belief sometimes goes by the name of "the Lee hypothesis," due to its advocacy by Lee Kuan Yew, the leader and former president of Singapore. He is certainly right that some disciplinarian states (such as South Korea, his own Singapore, and postreform China) have had faster rates of economic growth than many less authoritarian ones (including India, Jamaica, and Costa Rica). The "Lee hypothesis," however, is based on sporadic empiricism, drawing on very selective and limited information, rather than on any general statistical testing over the wide-ranging data that are available. A general relation of this kind cannot be established on the basis of very selective evidence. For example, we cannot really take the high economic growth of Singapore or China as "definitive proof" that authoritarianism does better in promoting economic growth, any more than we can draw the opposite conclusion from the fact that Botswana, the country with the best record of economic growth in Africa, indeed with one of the finest records of economic growth in the whole world, has been an oasis of democracy on that continent over the decades. We need more systematic empirical studies to sort out the claims and counterclaims.

There is, in fact, no convincing general evidence that authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial to economic development. Indeed, the general statistical picture does not permit any such induction. . . . The directional linkage seems to depend on many other circumstances, and while some statistical investigations note a weakly negative relation, others find a strongly positive one. If all the comparative studies are viewed together, the hypothesis that there is no clear relation between economic growth and democracy in *either* direction remains extremely plausible. Since democracy and political liberty have importance in themselves, the case for them therefore remains untarnished. . . .

We must go beyond the narrow confines of economic growth and scrutinize the broader demands of economic development, including the need for economic and social security. In that context, we have to look at the connection between political and civil rights, on the one hand, and the prevention of major economic disasters, on the other. Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention forcefully to general needs and to demand appropriate public action. The response of a government to the acute suffering of its people often depends on the pressure that is put on it. The exercise of political rights (such as voting, criticizing, protesting, and the like) can make a real difference to the political incentives that operate on a government.

I have discussed elsewhere the remarkable fact that, in the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press. We cannot find exceptions to this rule, no matter where we look: the recent famines of Ethiopia, Somalia, or other dictatorial regimes; famines in the Soviet Union in the 1930s; China's 1958–61 famine with the failure of the Great Leap Forward; or earlier still, the famines in Ireland or India under alien rule. China, although it was in many ways doing much better economically than India, still managed (unlike India) to have a famine, indeed the largest recorded famine in world history: Nearly 30 million people died in the famine of 1958–61, while faulty governmental policies remained uncorrected for three full years. The policies went uncriticized because there were no opposition parties in parliament, no free press, and no multiparty elections. Indeed, it is precisely this lack of challenge that allowed the deeply defective policies to continue even though they were killing millions each year. The same can be said about the world's two contemporary famines, occurring right now in North Korea and Sudan.

Famines are often associated with what look like natural disasters, and commentators often settle for the simplicity of explaining famines by pointing to these events: the floods in China during the failed Great Leap Forward, the droughts in Ethiopia, or crop failures in North Korea. Nevertheless, many countries with similar natural problems, or even worse ones, manage perfectly well, because a responsive government intervenes to help alleviate hunger. Since the primary victims of a famine are the indigent, deaths can be prevented by recreating incomes (for example, through employment programs), which makes food accessible to potential famine victims. Even the poorest democratic countries that have faced terrible droughts or floods or other natural disasters (such as India in 1973, or Zimbabwe and Botswana in the early 1980s) have been able to feed their people without experiencing a famine.

Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to do so, and a democratic government, facing elections and criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers, cannot help but make such an effort. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British rule right up to independence (the last famine, which I witnessed as a child, was in 1943, four years before independence), they disappeared suddenly with the establishment of a multiparty democracy and a free press. . . .

The issue of famine is only one example of the reach of democracy, though it is, in many ways, the easiest case to analyze. The positive role of political and civil rights applies to the prevention of economic and social disasters in general. When things go fine and everything is routinely good, this instrumental role of democracy may not be particularly missed. It is when things get fouled up, for one reason or another, that the political incentives provided by democratic governance acquire great practical value.

Source: Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (1999), 3, 6–9.

INTERPRETING VISUAL EVIDENCE

Chimerica

The term "Chimerica" refers to the idea that the People's Republic of China and the United States of America make up a single, dominant economic entity. It was coined by the historian Niall Ferguson and the economist Moritz Schularick to describe the interdependent relationship that began in the last two decades of the twentieth century and has extended into the first decades of the twenty-first century. China began to open its economy in the early 1980s, and its exports of manufactured goods, especially to the United States—which rose from $51.5 billion in 1996 to $102 billion in 2001—eventually fueled the world economy. Combined, the two countries make up roughly 13 percent of the world's land surface, a quarter of its population, more than a third of its economic production, and, by some estimates, nearly half of all economic growth in the first decade of the new millennium. Chimerica is also a play on the word *chimera*: a fire-breathing female monster in Greek mythology, or an unrealizable dream, an illusion.

Like Japan and Germany after World War II, China in this period concentrated on export-led industrial growth. But unlike those countries, China refused to let workers' wages rise as the economy grew, and its leaders refused to apply international standards to workplace safety, intellectual property, or environmental protections. In developed economies, where those protections applied and wages were higher, production costs were higher. As a result, competition from China cost millions of jobs in developed countries, including 2.9 million jobs in the United States alone from 2001 to 2012. Chinese leaders instead invested the surplus revenues abroad, mostly in the United States, where the influx of Chinese investment kept interest rates low. U.S. consumers used the resulting easy credit to purchase homes, cars, and goods like tablets and mobile phones, many of them manufactured in China.

The images presented here portray different aspects of what Ferguson and Schularick call Chimerica. The first shows modern Beijing, with massive new buildings, roadways, and smog; it shows both the robust growth of the Chinese economy—notice how new the buildings are—and its environmental costs. The second photograph shows protective nets around a factory run by Foxconn, one of Apple's leading suppliers in China, after a series of suicides in 2010 drew world attention to the company's labor practices. This image reflects some of the dire costs of producing consumer goods at low prices. The third image shows a massive retirement community near Phoenix, Arizona, filled with homes purchased at low interest rates, thanks to Chinese investment. The fourth image shows a Walmart Supercenter in Albany, New York, filled with inexpensive goods, many of them produced in China. Such "big-box" retail stores provide many jobs, but at much lower wages than the industrial jobs that have disappeared. The final image shows an unofficial Apple store in Tehran, Iran; it illustrates the dominance of global brands for Chinese-made consumer items.


Modern Beijing.

Foxconn factory with suicide nets.

Retirement community near Phoenix, Arizona.

Walmart Supercenter.

Unofficial Apple store in Tehran.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS

1. Explain the relationship between China and the United States presented by these images. How has each country benefited from this relationship, and what sacrifices has each made?
2. Looking at the first two images, identify the sacrifices ordinary Chinese people have made as a result of the policies that enabled their country to invest in the United States. What group or groups in China do you think benefited from these policies, and how?
3. With the second, third, and fourth images in mind, analyze the trade-offs for ordinary Americans that have resulted from Chinese investment in the United States.
4. Examine the final image and consider the likely consequences of the growth of Chimerica for ordinary consumers and workers around the world.