Question for help
ItSaulGoodman
Chapter2.pptxChapter 2
Benefit/Cost Analysis of Enforcement Decision
Introduction
The previous chapter focused on the rationale for criminalizing an activity
The model in the previous chapter assumed that there were no enforcement costs.
This chapter relaxes that assumption and builds a model focusing on the enforcement decision by police authorities.
Optimal Enforcement and the Reckless Driver Problem
The previous model contained variables that accounted for benefit to reckless drivers, costs to reckless drivers, costs to people to specific victims, and externalities to the general public.
This model introduces another variable called enforcement cost and presents the enforcement decision as a social planner problem.
Optimal Enforcement and the Reckless Driver Problem
The police choose the level of enforcement to maximize social welfare.
Social welfare/net benefit is presented as:
Optimal Enforcement and Limits on Technology and Sanctions
Enforcement costs play a major role in determining whether to criminalize an activity as well as the optimal level of enforcement and violation.
Generally speaking, the effect of enforcement on violations of the criminal law depends on their perception or reaction to the expected sanction.
Offenders perform their own economic analysis of the expected sanction. The offender must calculate the probability of arrest and conviction and estimate the expected sanction.
Deterrence Effect
The deterrent effect models criminal decision making as a function of the probability of conviction and the expected sanction.
As technology advances, it becomes easier and more affordable to increase the probability of conviction ()
Deterrence Effect
Increasing the cost of crime is not without its challenges
Increasing too much can intrude on privacy and violate civil liberties
Increasing through incarceration becomes costly and increasing through higher fines can become a source of revenue for the police.
Violations of civil liberties and excessive fines then become a form of externality
Conclusion
Cost-benefit analysis can help to improve choice of activities to criminalize and the type and level of enforcement to undertake.
It is unlikely that a maximum of net benefit occurs where offending is reduced to zero. Thus optimal offending is usually greater than zero and as enforcement cost rise, the level of offending that maximizes net social benefit increases.
Because optimal offending increases with enforcement cost, there is a tendency to focus on ways to lower this cost either by increasing surveillance, or by increasing sanction. However, significant costs and unintended consequences are associated with these effects.
Quiz
Imagine a town named Canineville in which dogs can be walked by their owners without being on a leash. However, dog owners are liable for damage done by pets. Now consider what would happen if a law required all dogs to be on a leash and subjected violating owners to criminal penalties. How would this change in treatment of dog owners influence the civil law regarding liability for pets? Would it enhance or weaken civil law? Provide an explanation or example.
Answer: This law would enhance civil law because a conviction of violating the leash law could be used by the plaintiff in a civil lawsuit, thereby increasing the probably a ruling in favor of the plaintiff.
