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C H A P T E R 2

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Your involvement in public organizations, whether in your career or as a private citizen, will inevitably center on the development, implementation, and evaluation of pub- lic policies. You may work for an agency charged with devising new approaches to familiar problems, you may want to see that a particular policy or proposal is framed in a way that is consistent with your beliefs, or you may simply want to better under- stand the implications of a particular direction in national policy. In any case, it will be helpful for you to know how public policies are designed and put into practice.

Talk of public policy is, of course, quite familiar. From one day to another, we hear criticisms of the U.S. policy in the Middle East, calls for a more effective drug enforce- ment policy, challenges to a school district’s approach to violence in the schools, ideas for changing a city’s policy toward the homeless, or proposals for altering an organization’s hiring practices. Uses of the term policy are varied and the process by which policies are developed is even more complex.

We may think of a policy as a statement of goals and intentions with respect to a par- ticular problem or set of problems, a statement often accompanied by a more detailed set of plans, programs, or instructions for pursuing those goals. Public policies are authorita- tive statements made by legitimate governmental actors (the chief executive, the legisla- ture, public agencies) or nongovernmental actors (nonprofi t organizations, foundations, quasi-governmental organizations, private corporations) about important, and sometimes not so important, public problems. We expect decision makers at all levels to spend con- siderable time and energy dealing with such topics as foreign affairs, health, education, employment, the economy, civil rights, the environment, energy, transportation, housing, agriculture, law enforcement, and myriad other issues. But in each of these areas, public policy is simply what an agency or an entire network of public, private, and nonprofi t organizations decides to do or not do.

Organizations in all sectors are deeply involved in carrying out public policy— executing or “implementing.” But these organizations are also involved in developing policy. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations play an important role in shap- ing public policy. Proposals are written and submitted by agency personnel; testimony and other expert advice are presented; and representatives of various agencies, especially political appointees who head agencies, often seek to build public support for particu- lar ideas. Those in government agencies, and increasingly in nonprofi t organizations, are often asked to elaborate on or clarify legislative intentions, and, in doing so, they continue the process of policy development.

Moreover, public, private, and nonprofi t organizations not only develop policies that guide their own activities, but they also seek to infl uence the course of public policy on

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behalf of their members or other constituencies. Many such groups limit their activities to providing public information and seeking to affect indirectly the formation of policies in their area of interest. But others are far more direct, employing lobbyists and others whose specifi c job is to infl uence the policy process.

To understand the conduct of specifi c groups, namely public and nonprofi t organiza- tions, in the policy process, you must have some understanding of the context in which these organizations operate. That context is not merely physical; it includes the beliefs and values that shape our expectations of the organizations as well as the structures we have developed to try to maintain those values. In large part, the complexity of the policy pro- cess in this country is the result of the Founding Fathers’ fear of concentrated power, a fear they sought to allay by organizing the federal government into three branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—so that no one branch could exert itself above the others. As we will see, our political system has evolved in such a way that the relations between and among the various branches, and between governmental and nongovernmental institu- tions, remain a central issue in conducting public programs. This chapter focuses on the process of public policy and especially the relations between public administrators and the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary as they work together to seek important policy goals.

■ Administrative Or ganizations and Executive Leadership

As we saw in Chapter 1, public administrators work in the federal, state, and local govern- ments and in nonprofi t organizations and associations. But, understandably, the federal government, simply by virtue of its size and the range of its activities, has become the model against which others are often judged. For that reason, we begin our discussion of the political context of American public administration by examining the development of the national administrative system and the role of the chief executive in that system.

Again it is helpful to begin with a brief historical review, primarily because some of the arguments that characterized discussions of administration in the early days of our nation are quite similar to those that continue to confront us. Take, for example, the difference between the Federalist view, expressed most forcefully by Alexander Hamilton, and that of the Jeffersonians, led by (you guessed it!) Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton and his Federal- ist colleagues argued for a strong centralized government, staffed and managed by men of wealth, class, and education. “The Federalist preference for the executive branch was a faithful refl ection of their distrust of the people. An intelligent perception of sound public policy, in their view, could come only from well-educated men of affairs, men with trained minds and broad experience—in short from the upper classes” (White, 1948, p. 410).

The Jeffersonians, on the other hand, saw the administration of government as inti- mately connected to the problem of extending democracy throughout the nation. They thus preferred a more decentralized approach to the executive function and sought formal legal controls on the executive so that executive power would not be abused (Caldwell, 1964). These democratic views reached their pinnacle in the administration of Andrew

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Jackson, known for its openness to the “common man.” But the Jacksonian era was also notable for extension and formalization of the administrative apparatus of government; the administration of government began to form “a link between the nation’s political authorities and its citizens” (Crenson, 1975, p. 10; see also Nelson, 1982).

Despite these developments, the president’s role as chief executive offi cer, the head of the federal bureaucracy, was not clearly established until well into the twentieth cen- tury, when Franklin Roosevelt was able to assert his administrative management of the executive branch and to set a model for all the presidents who have followed him. Some changes were inevitable: The growing size and scope of governmental activity simply required greater attention to management and organization. Other changes refl ected a greater understanding of the administrative process, how the work of government might be accomplished more effectively.

In 1936, President Roosevelt appointed a committee on administrative management, chaired by Louis Brownlow, which included a number of respected scholars and practitio- ners in the emerging fi eld of public administration. The Brownlow committee concluded that “the president needs help” and recommended a series of possible steps to improve the president’s management of the executive branch (Karl, 1963). Though initially sidetracked in the wake of the president’s attempt to “pack” the Supreme Court, the major recommen- dations of the Brownlow committee were fi nally approved in the Reorganization Act of 1939. This act authorized the president to take the initiative in reshaping and reorganiz- ing the executive branch, subject only to congressional veto. The Reorganization Act also allowed President Roosevelt to create the Executive Offi ce of the President, composed of six assistants, to give the president the help he needed. (The Executive Offi ce of the Presi- dent continues today, but now it employs nearly 2,000 people.)

All presidents since Roosevelt have continued to assert their executive power in vari- ous ways. President Nixon, for example, sought to further centralize managerial power in the White House; President Carter sought greater managerial responsiveness through the Civil Service Reform Act. President Reagan and the fi rst President Bush pursued the same ends, by extending political control further into the bureaucracy while also develop- ing programs to reduce costs and increase productivity. President Clinton carried through on many of his promises to streamline government and improve quality and productivity through implementing the National Performance Review (NPR).

Although President Clinton’s National Performance Review offi cially ended in January 2001, the larger “Reinventing Government” movement has become a central current in the “tides” of public and nonprofi t reform (Light, 1995, 2000). Reinvention and NPR will be discussed in more detail in later chapters, but it is important that you understand generally what that effort is and why it was undertaken. Basically, NPR was a Clinton administration initiative headed by Vice President Gore and aimed at increasing the trust of the American people in their government through a broad range of improvements in the quality and productivity of government (as well as through reductions in the size of government). The National Performance Review, fi rst pre- sented to President Clinton in September 1993 and implemented over the next several years, made hundreds of recommendations aimed at cutting unnecessary red tape and burdensome regulations, empowering federal employees to make decisions while hold- ing them accountable for the results, and emphasizing service to “customers.”

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President George W. Bush introduced substantial changes in management practices, many of which we will discuss later. However, his reforms did not stop with the manage- ment practices. Referring to Bush’s decisions on national intelligence, including the estab- lishment of the new Department of Homeland Security and his initiatives in international affairs (primarily the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions), Pfi ffner (2007) describes Bush as the President who “undertook the most far-reaching reorganization of the executive branch since the National Security Act of 1947” (p. 14–15). According to Pfi ffner, Bush has had huge success in extending presidential powers: “Although presidents of both par- ties have sought to enhance and protect executive prerogatives, President Bush’s grasp has exceeded that of most of his predecessors in scope and degree, if not in kind” (Pfi ffner, 2007, p. 17).

Returning to the subject of executive powers, one important tool that presidents have employed is the executive order, a presidential mandate directed to and governing, with the effect of law, the actions of government offi cials and government agencies. Over time, the executive order has become a chief instrument of presidential power. President Bush, for example, used one of his fi rst executive orders (no. 13199, January 29, 2001) to create the Offi ce of Faith-based and Community Initiatives, which will serve as the center-point for his administration’s effort to extend federal funding to faith-based organizations. In this case and many others like it, the president is essentially making law by decree, occa- sionally in direct opposition to the wishes of Congress and constituent groups.

The president, as the chief executive offi cer of the federal government, exercises power over an enormous and wide-ranging set of public organizations. In 2006, there were some 2.7 million civilians employed by the federal government and another 1.4 million uni- formed military personnel (http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/hist.pdf). In addition, the federal government supports and pays for the work of a wide variety of activities in which the actual work is performed by someone other than a federal civil ser- vant. The Defense Department, for example, supervises almost 2 million persons in private industry involved, directly or indirectly, in defense-related work.

Administrative Organizations

You are probably already familiar with many of the agencies of government at the federal level; however, several types are particularly important: (1) the Executive Offi ce of the President; (2) the cabinet-level executive departments; (3) a variety of independent agen- cies, regulatory commissions, and public corporations; and (4) administrative agencies that support the work of the legislature and the judiciary.

The Executive Offi ce of the President

The various administrative bodies located in the Executive Offi ce of the President both advise the president and assist in formulating and implementing national policy. Several offi ces have come to play especially important policy roles. The Offi ce of Management and Budget, for example, assists the president in preparing the budget, submitting it to

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Congress, and administering it. OMB is also involved in reviewing the management of various agencies, suggesting changes in structures and procedures, and searching out capa- ble executives for service in government. The National Security Council is charged with integrating domestic, military, and foreign policy; it is made up of the president, vice presi- dent, and secretaries of state and defense and is directed by the national security adviser. Finally, the Council of Economic Advisers consists of three economists who develop pro- posals to “maintain employment, production, and purchasing power.” The council also develops a variety of economic reports.

Obviously, each of these groups, and others in the Executive Offi ce of the President, are used in different ways by different presidents according to the personality of the president and the particular issues that are most pressing at that time. Some presidents, such as Eisenhower and Reagan, have relied very heavily on their staffs, whereas others, such as Carter, have been much more personally involved in management and policy development.

Administrative Organizations and Executive Leadership 3 9

To locate information about the executive branch of the federal government, check out the following websites: http://www.whitehouse.gov and http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/ Executive.shtml. For access to executive orders, go to http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/ index.html.

NETWORKING

Cabinet-Level Executive Departments These agencies are among the most visible, if not always the largest, of the federal executive agencies. There are currently fi fteen cabinet- level departments. They are the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Treasury, Agriculture, Interior, Transportation, Justice, Commerce, State, Labor, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Education, Veterans Affairs, and—the newest— Homeland Security, established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Several depart- ments, such as Treasury and State, date back to the nation’s founding; others were created by Congress as needed.

Each cabinet-level department is headed by a secretary, who, along with a group of top-level staff people, is appointed by the president with the approval of the Senate. Each cabinet-level department is organized into smaller units, such as offi ces, services, admin- istrations, branches, and sections. The Department of Health and Human Services, for example, includes the Public Health Service, which in turn includes the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Though each department is headquartered in Washington, D.C., their offi ces are, of course, spread across the country. Indeed, just over 10 percent of the federal work- force lives in or around the District of Columbia.

The cabinet-level secretaries, along with a few others, such as the director of the Offi ce of Management and Budget and the ambassador to the United Nations, constitute the president’s cabinet, a group that some presidents have used sparingly and primarily for formal matters and others have employed extensively for help and advice. Inevitably, a

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president will come to rely informally on certain advisors, cabinet members, or others out- side the formal inner circle for advice and consultation. Historically, for example, Presi- dent Kennedy relied heavily on the advice of his brother, Robert, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, even though as attorney general his brother held no formal position that would involve him in foreign affairs.

Independent Agencies, Regulatory Commissions, and Public Corporations A variety of independent agencies have been created intentionally outside the normal cabinet orga- nization. Some are engaged in staff functions in support of other agencies. The Offi ce of Personnel Management, for example, oversees the federal personnel function, and the General Services Administration oversees the government’s property. Other agencies have simply not been viewed as appropriate to include in cabinet-level departments; among these are the Environmental Protection Agency and the Small Business Administration. With rare exceptions, these independent agencies are directed by persons appointed by the president with the confi rmation of the Senate.

Regulatory commissions, which are formed to regulate a particular area of the econ- omy, are structured quite differently. Typically, they are headed by a group of individuals (variously called directors, commissioners, or governors) appointed by the president and confi rmed by the Senate. These persons are protected in various ways from removal by the president; in some cases, their terms of appointment overlap presidential terms. Presum- ably, the regulatory commissions are to perform their tasks independently and objectively, free from undue infl uence either by the political incumbent or by the affected clientele. As we will see later, however, the nature of regulatory work makes this task exceedingly diffi cult. (Note that not all regulatory bodies are located outside the cabinet departments; for instance, the Food and Drug Administration is part of the Department of Health and Human Services.)

Public corporations are employed where the objective of the agency is essentially commercial, where the work of the agency requires greater latitude than would be typi- cal, and where the agency will acquire at least a portion of its funding in the marketplace (Moe, 2001; Walsh, 1978). The Tennessee Valley Authority, which has provided power in the Tennessee Valley for over fi fty years, is a classic example of a public corporation. Some- what more recent additions to the growing list of government corporations include the U.S. Postal Service and the National Rail Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK), both established in 1970. (Periodically, there are questions raised about the status of these two operations, indicating that the structure of public organizations is constantly subject to question.)

What Would You Do? You are in charge of the federal government’s effort to assess the scientifi c, technical, and socioeconomic impact of greenhouse gas emissions and to understand the potential for climate change caused by these emissions. Your agency has recently been accused of “sugarcoating” the data to protect the administration from potential political damage. What would you do?

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Agencies Supporting the Legislature and the Judiciary Whereas both the legislative and judicial branches require considerable direct administrative support for their members (legislative staff, committee staff, and court administrators), there are also several specifi c agencies attached to the legislative branch that are of special signifi cance. You are probably already familiar with the Government Printing Offi ce and the Library of Congress. But, although less is known about the Government Accountability Offi ce (formerly the General Accounting Offi ce), its duties have become increasingly important. Established in 1921, and headed by the Comptroller General, the GAO is responsible for auditing funds to see that they are properly spent. In recent years, however, the agency’s mission has broad- ened to include formal program evaluations within various agencies. The GAO studies the way federal money is spent and advises Congress and executive agencies on ways to improve the effi ciency and responsiveness of government. Finally, Congress is supported by the Congressional Budget Offi ce, an agency that supports the budget process and whose operations we will examine more carefully in Chapter 7.

The State Level

The organization of state governments varies considerably, according to each state’s policy interests and political development; however, there is little question that state government in this country is “big business.” In fact, if you compare the expenditures of state gov- ernments with those of the largest private companies in America, the results are striking. California would rank third between Exxon Mobil and General Motors, and New York would be seventh, just above ConocoPhillips. Even Delaware, a small state would rank in the top 500 (rank 327) near such well-known corporates as Dynegy and Federal-Mogul (http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/2005/).

Recent efforts to decrease federal involvement in domestic policy have combined with a general growth in the range of activities undertaken at the state level to support a vast increase in state activity. Between 1980 and 2006, state government employment rose from 3.7 million to 5.1 million, with an even more dramatic rise in state expenditures (from 391 billion in 1985 to 1,187 billion in 2006). From time to time, states in fact play an important role in the redistribution of governmental power. For example, in 1996, states were central to the federal government’s move to reform the nation’s welfare sys- tem, a reform agenda that has led to the devolution of many public assistance programs and a further expansion in the role of state government.

The organization and structure of state government in many ways mirrors that of the national government, but there are some distinctive features. You should note, for example, the large number of elected administrative offi cials in most state govern- ments. In most states, the people elect not only the governor and lieutenant governor, but also the attorney general, the secretary of state, and the state treasurer. Many states still elect the head of the Department of Agriculture by popular vote, and it is not uncommon to have members of various boards and commissions (for instance, the Public Service Commission) elected by the public. Obviously, these latter offi ces are fi lled at the federal level by presidential appointment. (The large number of elected offi cers at the state and local level is a carryover from a period in which democratic tendencies in this country

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were especially strong and it was felt that nearly all major offi cials of government should be elected directly by the people.)

In addition, many state departments do not report directly to the governor, but rather to boards or commissions isolated from executive control in the same way as regulatory commissions at the federal level. For example, a Department of Conservation may report to a commission appointed by the governor for periods exceeding those of the governor and, indeed, may have dedicated sources of revenue essentially outside the governor’s budgetary control. Obviously, under such circumstances, the governor’s power as chief executive is severely limited.

Despite structural limitations on gubernatorial powers, contemporary governors exercise a broad range of political and executive infl uence that enable them to play a major, even central role in the operations of state government. In recent years, these powers have even had an impact on national policy making, particularly in the welfare reform agenda mentioned previously. For example, Governors Thompson of Wisconsin and Engler of Michigan were instrumental in the framing of the 1996 federal welfare reform legislation, which built upon innovations at the state level (Katz, 2001). Most important, governors play a key symbolic role, helping to set the political agenda and to focus the attention of other political and administrative actors on a limited num- ber of special topics. Many governors have accumulated special powers with respect to the budget process through which they are able to dramatically affect the allocation of state resources and to mediate policy disputes among executive agencies (Bowman & Kearney, 1986, p. 54).

Beyond these somewhat informal powers, the strength of the governor’s for- mal executive powers is often gauged by three measures: the presence or absence of the item veto, the ability of the governor to reorganize state agencies, and the number of other elected officials. All state governors have the power to veto leg- islation. Most states also give the governor the power of an item veto (also called “line-item veto”), the capacity to veto specific items within an appropriations bill (as opposed to accepting all or nothing), which is a helpful tool in shaping legislation according to the governor’s preferences. (During his final term, President Clinton, himself a former governor, supported passage of the line-item veto at the federal level. The federal provision, however, was ultimately invalidated by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York [1998].) The gubernatorial power to reorganize is more

For information about state governments, start with the Council of State Governments at http://www.csg.org/csg/default. Then see the state and local gateway at http://www.gov.com/ statelocal and these two library-based sites: http://www.loc.gov/rr/news/stategov/stategov. html and http://www.law.indiana.edu/v-lib.

NETWORKING

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limited. Roughly half the states require either statutory or even constitutional action to reorganize. Finally, as we have seen, nearly all states have a variety of statewide elected officials in addition to the governor and lieutenant governor. Indeed, most states have between four and eight agencies that are controlled by individuals elected statewide rather than appointed.

The growing importance of state government suggests that governors will likely con- tinue to assert their executive leadership role and will seek greater control by reorganizing the executive branch. So far, however, relatively few structural moves have been made. However, some procedural changes have occurred; for example, many states have moved in the direction of more clearly establishing the governor’s leading role in the budgetary process and establishing centralized management improvement programs.

Although the organization of government varies considerably from state to state, most states have a variety of substantive agencies concerned with state and local needs (Natural Resources, Highways and Transportation, and so on), as well as several agen- cies, such as the Department of Social Services, that largely administer programs funded by the federal government. These agencies are likely to be assisted by a central manage- ment support unit, called an Offi ce of Administration or some similar title, that provides budget, personnel, and other general services. As mentioned, if there is one trend in the reorganization of state agencies, that trend would seem to be the creation of a greater number of state departments devoted to economic development. In some cases, these departments seek to coordinate many economic development activities; in others, there is a more specifi c focus on small business or on providing incentives for industrial loca- tion or relocation.

The Local Level

According to the most recent data available, there are almost 88,000 local governments (see Table 2.1). Many of these are municipalities, cities, and towns of varying sizes offering a full range of services; others are counties, typically more limited in their role but still embracing a variety of governmental functions. But most are special districts, created to serve one particular function, such as education, fi re protection, or parks and recreation. (Only special districts have substantially increased in numbers over the past several years.)

Cities American cities are organized in three ways. The mayor-council form is used by about 49 percent of all municipalities, about 56 percent of those having a population over 250,000, and three-fourths of those with a population over 1 million. In all cases, both the council and mayor are elected, the latter either by direct popular vote or a council elec- tion. One variation of the mayor council form features a strong mayor, with almost total administrative authority, including preparation and administration of the budget. Policy making in this form is a joint endeavor of the mayor and council. The weak mayor type places primary administrative control, including most appointments and development of the budget, in the hands of the council.

The power of the mayor as chief executive is obviously greater in the strong mayor system, and, consequently, that system is used in most large, industrial cities. At least in a

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formal sense, however, several large cities, including Chicago, still maintain a weak mayor system, although even under such circumstances, a particular mayor may assert consider- able strength. The legendary Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, for example, was able to utilize a well-oiled political machine to assert substantial administrative power. Though he operated in a weak mayor system, Daley was unquestionably a strong mayor.

A recent variation on the mayor-council form is the use of a professionally trained chief administrative offi cer (sometimes called a “deputy mayor”) to oversee the administrative operations of city government (such as Los Angeles, New Orleans, Washington, D.C.). We fi nd this administrative arrangement in many big cities, where mayors are often more interested in campaigning and in working with external constituencies and like to have someone else oversee the internal management of the city. But city administrators are also being hired in an increasing number of smaller mayor council communities as well, mostly in an effort to bring professional expertise to local government.

The council-manager form of local government is of special interest. It represents a structural effort to solve the classic question of the relationship between politics (or policy) and administration. In this form, the city council, usually fi ve to seven people, has respon- sibility for making policy, including passing appropriations and supervising in a general way the administration of city government. The primary executive responsibility, however, lies with a full-time professionally trained city manager; the mayor has no involvement in the administration of the city and performs primarily ceremonial duties and legislation. In its classic formulation, therefore, the council-manager form is designed so that the council makes policy and the city manager carries it out.

The council-manager plan was fi rst tried in Staunton, Virginia, in 1908, and a few years later it was adopted in Dayton, Ohio, with great success. Several reform organizations, such as the National Municipal League, felt the council-manager plan would be a good way to insulate the management of city government from the vagaries of local politics and consequently added their endorsement.

TABLE 2.1

Number of Governmental Units, by Type of Government

Federal 1

State 50

Local 87,849

County 3,034

Municipal 19,431

Township and town 16,506

School district 13,522

Special district 35,356

Total 87,900

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002 (http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/cog/2002COGprelim_report.pdf).

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For information about local government, see the National Civic League at http://www.ncl.org and the National League of Cities at http://www.nlc.org. See also the Local Government Institute at http://www.lgi.org; the Local Government Network at http://www.lgcnet.com; and the U.S. Conference of Mayors home page at http://www.usmayors.org.

NETWORKING

The number of council-manager governments has grown steadily throughout this century and continues to increase. Today, some 42 percent of American communities employ the plan. Whereas the mayor-council system is associated with larger, industrialized, and het- erogeneous cities, the council-manager plan is most frequently found in medium-sized cities. Over 60 percent of American cities with populations between 25,000 and 250,000 operate with the plan, and 32 percent of the cities with a population below 5,000 have adopted it. Although a number of large cities, such as Phoenix, San Antonio, and Kansas City, use the plan, it is rare among cities over 1 million in population. The council-manager form con- tinues to grow, however, with the number of council-manager adoptions outrunning those of the mayor-council form by three to one over the past twenty years. Those favoring the council-manager plan usually argue that it emphasizes professional expertise and adminis- trative accountability; those favoring the mayor-council plan emphasize its adaptability and its responsiveness to community needs. As a result, more than 89 million Americans now live in communities with council-manager governments (American City and County, 2006).

A small number of American cities use the commission form of government. Under this form, the people elect a set of commissioners. Each acts as a council member, but also as director of a particular city department; for example, one commissioner might head the Parks Department and another the Public Works Department. The commission form is fading; we fi nd it today primarily in smaller rural communities, although it is still found in a few cities such as Portland, Oregon.

Counties Counties (or variations, such as parishes in Louisiana) are found in nearly every state and range in population from very small to huge. Once considered an unexplored area of local government, counties are emerging as important actors in the modern gov- ernmental system. Counties have traditionally provided a range of services in behalf of state government, a role that has expanded considerably in the past few years. In addition, counties have recently assumed a wide range of new services (such as mass transit, men- tal health, waste disposal, and police services) that, for one reason or another, cannot be offered by individual municipalities (Dodge, 1988, pp. 2–3).

The traditional form of county government has been a combination of a county com- mission and a series of elected administrative offi cials, such as sheriff, auditor, treasurer, and so on. An emerging trend in county government, however, is the use of appointed county administrators, similar in many ways to the city manager at the municipal level. Still another type of county government, also increasing in use, involves the combination of a city council and an elected executive. In this system, a chief executive is elected by the people and holds powers similar to that of a governor in a state system. For example, the

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elected executive often has veto power over council actions (Henry, 1980, pp. 158–164). Trends toward a greater range of activities, especially in the social services, combined with the increasing professionalism of county government make this often overlooked area one of the most interesting arenas for public service today.

Native American Tribes

Native American tribes have a special relationship with the U.S. government. This relation- ship was fi rst articulated by Supreme Court Justice Marshall in three decision between 1827 and 1832 known as the Marshall Trilogy. In these decisions, Marshall acknowledged that American Indians had inherent rights to possess and use their land and that they had sover- eignty to run their own affairs. But even though they were seen as nations, the tribes were not foreign nations. They could not sell their land without the consent of the federal government. And the federal government had responsibilities to protect Indian land from incursions from the states and others. Marshall described this relationship as similar to guardianship.

In the last 150 years, this relationship has evolved. Infl uenced greatly by European set- tlers’ desire to move westward, Congress made treaties, fought wars, and otherwise moved Indians out of the way of western expansion. Despite efforts to assimilate Indians into the dominant culture, many Indians have clung to their heritage and maintained their tribal governance systems. Today, the Department of the Interior recognizes more than 500 tribes who have sovereignty over their internal affairs and tribal management is emerging as a growing and signifi cant fi eld in public administration. Not only do those engaged in tribal administration need to understand the special circumstances surrounding tribal gov- ernance, but also public administrators who work near or with tribes need to be aware of the legal history that has led to Native American rights that are unique in America.

Special Purpose Governments Finally, we should note again the large number of special purpose governments that operate in the United States. One type are special districts that exist at the local level: limited-purpose districts, which may operate in the areas of natural resources, fi re protection, libraries, schools, housing and community development, and so forth, are typically governed by an appointed part-time governing board and a full-time general manager or executive director, who plays the most signifi cant role in the operation of the district. Critics claim the proliferation of special districts causes fragmentation and lack of coordination, but others argue that such districts remain important because they are “close to the people.”

The largest group of special districts are school districts. There are roughly 14,000 local school districts in the United States, serving over 72 million students—55 million kindergarten, elementary, and secondary, and 17 million post secondary (http://nces. ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt05_002.asp). School districts employ over 8 million teachers, administrators, and other staff to provide elementary and secondary education to the nation’s school children, making educators the largest single category of public employees in the nation.

School districts vary in their size, organizational structure, governance, and mix of federal, state, and local funding sources. Approximately 44 percent of U.S. school districts serve fewer

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than 5,000 children. Only a little over 10 percent of school districts serve 40,000 students or more, but together these large districts serve over 62 percent of the school-age population.

One signifi cant trend, however, is the takeover of local school systems by local gov- ernments. About a dozen of the largest school districts in the country are now under the control of local governments. Boston’s mayor was given control of the schools in 1992, Chicago’s in 1995, and New York’s in 2002. Washington, D.C.’s mayor is currently mov- ing to take over the school system, as is the mayor of Los Angeles. The Los Angeles mayor, however, suffered a setback in his efforts to control the schools, when a California court declared a law giving the mayor substantial control over schools unconstitutional.

Other major types of special purpose governments include public nonprofi t corpora- tions such as economic development corporations and housing fi nance corporations at the local and state level. For example, the City of Baltimore Development Corporation is a nonprofi t corporation chartered by the city to promote economic development by attract- ing new business and assisting new and growing companies. Housing fi nance corporations may, for example, issue housing bonds, offer tax-exempt fi nancing, or other assistance to facilitate the development of low-income housing and address other housing needs.

Nonprofi t Organizations and Associations An increasingly signifi cant set of institutions in the American system of public policy falls between what we think of as the “public sector” and the “private sector.” These institutions may be described as belonging to an indepen- dent or third sector of our economy. For the most part, independent-sector organizations do not have the distribution of profi ts to shareholders as one of their major objectives. They exist instead to meet the needs of the public at large, a particular portion of the public, or the needs and interests of their own members (Boris, 1999; Salamon, 1999). Technically, nonprofi t organizations are defi ned as those prohibited by law from distributing surplus revenues (profi ts) to individuals (typically, members). Such organizations may in fact make a profi t; however, the profi t must be used for the purposes of the organization.

Nonprofi t organizations may include churches, educational institutions, civic organiza- tions, schools and colleges, charitable organizations, social and recreational groups, health and human service organizations, membership organizations (including labor unions and fraternal organizations), conservation and environmental groups, mutual organizations (including farmers’ cooperatives), trade associations, community chests, youth activi- ties (such as Boy Scouts), community betterment organizations, advocacy groups of all kinds, and many others. Their numbers range into the millions, depending on how they are counted and, as noted earlier, include some 22,000 national nonprofi ts and more than a million organizations of varying sizes across the country (see Table 2.2).

While private nonprofi t organizations account for between 6 percent and 10 percent of employment in the United States (depending again on how you count), the voluntary effort that is expended in support of these groups makes their impact far greater. Nearly 100 million American adults devote volunteer time to such organizations, an investment of time that has been estimated as the equivalent of over $200 billion a year. Over the last twenty-fi ve years, the third sector has been the fastest-growing segment of our economy.

During the past decade, nonprofi t organizations have taken a leading role in the delivery of public services. As mentioned previously, change in the federal welfare system has led to the devolution of services to the state and local level (a trend we will explore later), where

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networks of agencies, many of which are nonprofi ts, manage the implementation of public programs (Light, 2000). The current system has been characterized as “an extended chain of implementation,” in which recipients of public support in some cases will “not even encounter a government employee—federal state or local” (Kettl, 2000, pp. 492–493). Moreover, non- profi ts have become active in other areas of service delivery, including hospitals, museums, col- leges and universities, the performing arts, religion, advocacy, and research (Boris, 1999).

Nonprofi t organizations can be categorized in many ways, but perhaps most easily according to their purposes and sources of fi nancial support. Some nonprofi ts are charitable

TABLE 2.2

National Nonprofi t Organizations by Specialty, 2004

Category Number

Trade, Business, and Commercial Organizations 3,795

Health and Medical Organizations 2,800

Social Welfare Organizations 1,931

Public Affairs Organizations 1,821

Cultural Organizations 1,746

Hobby and Avocational Organizations 1,433

Engineering, Technical, and Natural and Social Sciences Organizations

1,325

Educational Organizations 1,294

Religious Organizations 1,151

Environmental and Agricultural Organizations 1,133

Legal, Government, Public Administration, and Military Organizations

830

Veterans, Hereditary, and Patriotic Organizations 808

Athletic and Sports Organizations 759

Fraternal, Nationality, and Ethnic Organizations 552

Fan Clubs 344

Greek and Non-Greek Letter Societies, Associations, and Organizations

309

Labor Unions, Associations, and Federation Organizations 211

Chambers of Commerce, Trade and Tourism Organizations 138

Total 22,380

SOURCE: Encyclopedia of Associations, 29th ed., Vol. 1, No. 2 by Gale Group © 2004. Reprinted by permission of The Gale Group.

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or public benefi t organizations, which provide services to the public at large or to some seg- ment of the public. These organizations, such as social service organizations or art museums, may receive some funding from government and some from private contribution; they are generally tax-exempt under federal statutes. Other nonprofi ts are advocacy organizations, groups that espouse a particular cause and seek to lobby for that cause, or mutual ben- efi t organizations, which produce benefi ts primarily for their members. The former would include groups like Common Cause and the Sierra Club; the latter would include trade asso- ciations, professional organizations, labor unions, and others that directly promote the inter- ests of their own members. Obviously, however, from these examples, the line between the two is not completely clear. Finally, churches are obviously charitable organizations, but are diffi cult to classify in the categories mentioned.

Indeed, the entire “independent sector” is sometimes confusing to categorize. For one thing, the distinctions among the three sectors are not clear, even to the point that a partic- ular individual might fi nd the same service provided by one or more sectors. For example, you can play golf at a municipal course (public sector), a private driving range (private sector), or a country club (independent sector). Furthermore, the sources of funding are often intermixed. For example, both governments (public sector) and private corporations (private sector) often contribute fi nancial support to local chambers of commerce.

The fact that nonprofi t organizations are required to pursue a public interest is refl ected in their legal structure (and tax-exempt status). Typically, so government can feel that a public purpose is being carried out, there are requirements that the organization be gov- erned by a board of trustees (or directors or commissioners), the purpose of which, at least in legal terms, is to promote and protect the public interest (Boris, 1999; Salamon, 1999). Such persons will also likely establish the mission and operating policies, hire an executive director, and generally oversee fi scal and programmatic operations. The executive direc- tor is responsible for day-to-day operations and often becomes the organization’s chief spokesperson. Most nonprofi t associations are highly dependent on their executive direc- tor’s leadership. More and more, such persons (and other major staff persons in nonprofi t organizations) are coming from a background in public administration.

■ Relationships with the Legislative Body

In examining the political context of public organizations, we have thus far emphasized the importance of executive leadership. For example, we noted the emergence of the president as the chief executive offi cer of our national government and the pivotal role of the chief

For information on nonprofi t organizations, see the Alliance for Nonprofi t Management at http://www.allianceonline.org and CompassPoint Nonprofi t Services at http://www. supportcenter.org. See also the following sites for information on foundations: http:// www.cof.org and http://www.foundations.org.

NETWORKING

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executive in state and local governments and in nonprofi t organizations and associations. But although we tend to associate public agencies with the executive branch of government, there are numerous administrative bodies associated with the legislative and judicial branches. More importantly, wherever agencies are located, their role in the policy process will be especially clear in their relationship with the legislature. In discussing the relationship between public agencies and legislative bodies, we will focus much more directly on the policy process.

The Policy Process

Before we examine the role of public and nonprofi t organizations in developing public pol- icy, we should review the process by which public policies are developed. We may think of the policy process as involving fi ve stages: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy legiti- mation, policy implementation, and policy evaluation and change (see Box 2.1). Whereas public and nonprofi t organizations are the primary actors in implementing public policy (indeed, most of this book focuses on ways to effectively carry out public policy), they are also signifi cant players in the fi rst two phases.

BOX 2.1

STAGES IN THE POLICY PROCESS

1. Agenda Setting 2. Policy Formulation 3. Policy Legitimation 4. Policy Implementation 5. Policy Evaluation and Change

SOURCE: Kraft, Michael E., and Scott R. Furlong. (2007). Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 80–85.

Agenda Setting Obviously, before policies are acted upon, they must get the attention of major decision makers. From among all the many and competing claims on their time and interests, decision makers must select issues that will be given priority and those that will be fi ltered out. Through the agenda-setting phase, certain problems come to be viewed as needing action, whereas others are postponed. Naturally, there is a great deal of ebb and fl ow in what is considered most important. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. foreign pol- icy was dominated by concerns for Soviet movement into such areas as the Middle East; in the 1990s attention shifted to a variety of “fl ash points” such as Somalia and Bosnia. More recently, foreign policy has focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Similarly, any particular issue area can gain or decline in prominence over time, as has the attention to energy policy over the past twenty years.

Many people contribute to setting the public policy agenda. The president, for example, has a special claim on the attention of the American people and their elected represen- tatives; a presidential speech or press conference can signifi cantly affect what decision makers see as important. But there are many others whose actions can give certain topics

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greater or less visibility. Members of Congress, executive branch offi cials, political parties, interest groups, the media, and the general public can all signifi cantly shape the question of what will be considered important. Think, for example, how concern for teen preg- nancy has been recently brought to public awareness. Who have been the leaders in shap- ing public opinion on this issue?

The agenda-setting process may be viewed as the confl uence of three streams of events: policy recognition, policy generation, and political action (Kingdon, 1995). The fi rst, pol- icy recognition, has to do with the way certain topics emerge as signifi cant issues that demand action. As you can well imagine, decision makers are subject to many infl uences in choosing what items are signifi cant. They may respond to particular indicators that come to public view, such as an increase in air traffi c problems or a rise in unemployment. Or they may get feedback on current programs that indicates some need to reassess the status of a particular issue. Finally, some items are brought to the policy agenda by events that simply demand attention, such as AIDS in Africa or the damage brought about by hurri- canes, tsunamis, or other natural disasters.

See the home pages of various “think tanks” such as the Brookings Institution at http:// www.brookings.org and the American Enterprise Institute at http://www.aei.org. Especially interesting is the site for the Urban Institute at http://www.urban.org.

NETWORKING

There are many ways people try to affect the degree of attention given to particular items. Sometimes called policy entrepreneurs, those who are willing to invest personal time, energy, and often money in pursuit of particular policy changes can use a variety of personal tactics, such as publicity campaigns, direct contacts with decision makers (letters, phone calls), petition drives, and many others. Or they can involve themselves in major institutions, such as the media, political parties, or interest groups, that provide access to decision makers. Election campaigns, for example, often help clarify or focus the policy agenda.

A second phase of the agenda-setting process may occur almost simultaneously. At the same time that attention is focusing on a particular issue, it is likely that many will be involved in trying to generate solutions to the problem. Ideas may come from decision makers themselves, members of their staffs, experts in the bureaucracy, members of the scientifi c community, policy think tanks (such as the Brookings Institution or the Ameri- can Enterprise Institute), or from the public generally. Typically, proposed solutions swirl around through speeches and articles, papers, and conversations until a few ideas begin to gain special currency. Most often these will be the ideas that not only seem to correctly address the problem, but also seem to be politically acceptable.

A third stream of events affecting the policy agenda is concerned with political action. For a proposal to reach the top of the policy agenda, it must be consistent with emerging political realities. Items that are consistent with the prevailing political climate, those that are favored by the incumbent administration and legislative majority, and those that have

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interest group support (or at least lack organized opposition) are more likely to reach the top of the agenda. These political realities, the proposed ideas or solutions, and the rec- ognition of particular topics represent streams that must come together at just the right moment for action to occur. The windows of opportunity for policy action are narrow, and it takes great skill in managing the various streams so that one’s interests are best served.

Policy Formulation Formulation of public policy involves development of formal policy statements (legislation, executive orders, administrative rules, and so on) that are viewed as legitimate. Again, we will focus here on policy making by the legislature and on the role of public administrators in the legislative process. The basics of how a bill becomes law are well known. At the federal level and in most state governments, a bill is introduced and referred to a committee (and perhaps a subcommittee), hearings are held, the com- mittee reports to the larger body, a vote is taken in both houses, a conference committee works out any differences in the two versions, and the bill is sent to the chief executive for signature. In most other jurisdictions, a similar, though often simplifi ed, approach is used. In any case, the complexity of the legislative process, and the fact that many different deci- sion points must be passed before anything is fi nal, means there are many occasions when those seeking to shape legislative outcomes can seek to exert their infl uence.

The president, of course, has both formal and informal means of infl uencing legislation, most notably through program initiatives and budget proposals. Others in the government, including many agency personnel, interact with Congress on a regular basis and may also affect policy outcomes. At the same time, those outside the government—from individual citizens to well-organized interest groups—also seek access and infl uence. Agency person- nel become involved in the legislative process in several ways. In many cases, agencies actually send program proposals to the legislature for its consideration. Such proposals are usually submitted to the legislative leadership, then passed on in turn to the appropri- ate committee chairs. Though a member of Congress will actually be the one to introduce the proposed legislation, that person may depend on those in the agency for background information and other support. Whether or not legislation has been submitted by an agency, agency personnel will often be called upon to provide testimony regarding particu- lar proposals. As you might imagine, those who staff major public agencies constitute an important source of expertise concerning public issues. For example, it’s hard to imagine a group of people better able to understand the tax laws of a particular state than those who work in the state revenue department.

Over time, the relationship between agency personnel and representatives of Congress (either members or staff) can become quite strong. After all, the two groups share common interests and concerns, along with representatives of certain interest groups. A subcommit- tee on aging, a senior citizen’s lobbying organization, and the Social Security Administra- tion, for example, are likely to agree on the need for more Social Security benefi ts. When the relationship among such interest groups, agency personnel, and members of Congress becomes especially frequent and intense, the resulting alliances are sometimes called sub- governments or iron triangles. These coalitions can often exert great, possibly even unwar- ranted, infl uence.

You should be aware of some of the special considerations facing public administra- tors at the local level and in nonprofi t organizations as they are called upon for advice

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and help during the process of policy development. As noted, the council-manager form of government was actually founded on a separation of policy and administration—the council made policy and the city manager carried it out. Over time, however, many city managers have become valued by their councils for their expertise in local government and frequently fi nd themselves commenting on or even proposing particular policies. While this situation is quite at odds with the theory underlying council-manager government, it is the reality in most council-manager cities. The same is true of executives in nonprofi t organizations and associations. Such situations are not without risk, however, for a deli- cate balance must be maintained between the executive and legislative functions. Council or board members who feel that their policy-making territory has been intruded upon may exercise another of their council prerogatives: fi ring the manager or executive!

Policy Legitimation

Kraft and Furlong (2007) defi ne policy legitimation as “giving legal force to decisions or justifying policy action” (p. 86). Legitimation, as the authors point out may be seen as sim- ple and complex. When the legitimation is analyzed in terms of a policy being approved by a recognized authority (such as passing a bill), then we may talk about a simple process of legitimation. But, the authors suggest that legitimation is more about acceptance of a new policy from the broader public. The process of policy acceptance should, therefore, be considered from the legal aspect, political culture and values, and from the level of popular support. Many times, the authors suggest, politicians bring in actors or other celebrities to testify in front of congressional committees. Frequent public meetings and public hearings as well as participation of citizen advisory bodies are other ways to legitimize policies.

The authors give the Nuclear Waste Policy Act from 1992 as an example of adopting a law that was not embraced by the public or interest groups. Since lawmakers were ‘rushing’ to adopt the new law, they misjudged public unwillingness to accept the new piece of leg- islation. The act was revised when “Congress voted to study only one possible site in the nation, at Yucca Mountain in Nevada” (p. 87). The process again was not embraced by the public or interest groups, and as a result fi fteen years later the controversy over these decisions continued as Nevada fought the federal government’s actions.

The whole process of legitimation, according to the Kraft and Furlong (pp. 87–88) is mostly political. They suggest that lawmakers ask questions before they decide to adopt a policy. Referring to public opinion poll data, considering the views of the interest groups, initiating a broad political debate, and developing an ethical analysis of the issue are only few of the many ways for achieving policy legitimation.

Policy Implementation

Members of public and nonprofi t organizations play important roles in building the policy agenda and shaping legislative policy, but they are also involved in policy making as part of the implementation process. By its very nature, legislation is general and lacking in detail. Legislators cannot foresee all the individual questions that might come up in implementing

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a program. Moreover, legislators don’t want to tie the hands of program managers by being too restrictive. Consequently, legislation typically leaves a great deal of discretion to public managers in working out the details of a particular program. The Federal Trade Commis- sion, for example, is instructed to prevent deceptive advertising, but has to decide what is deceptive; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is asked to defi ne and set safety standards for the workplace, but must defi ne more clearly what that means (Meier, 1987, p. 52). In these and many other cases, managers develop administrative rules or poli- cies to give detail to the legislation or to fi ll in the gaps, and, in effect, they make policy.

Policy implementation is the “set of activities directed toward putting a program into effect” (Jones, cited in Kraft & Furlong, 2007: pp. 82–83). According to Kraft and Furlong, policy implementation includes organization, interpretation, and application. Organization refers to the use of resources and methods to administer a particular pro- gram. Interpretation involves translating the language of regulation (or law) into language understandable to the affected parties. Application is the “routine provision of services, payments, or other agreed upon program objectives or instruments” (pp. 82–83). Policy implementation is the stage of policy process in which the public sees concrete governmen- tal actions/interventions. Implementation involves following the rules imposed in the law (or the regulation), developing program details, and then putting them into effect.

An early case involving the Environmental Protection Agency illustrates the latitude administrators are often given by Congress (and other legislative bodies) and the dif- fi culties they can cause (Reich, 1985). The EPA is required by law to develop national standards limiting the emission of hazardous air pollutants so as to provide an “ample margin of safety” to protect the public health. But there is no defi nition in the legislation of ample. This question was especially problematic in the case of a copper smelter in Tacoma, Washington. The EPA determined that, in the absence of any controls on emissions of arsenic from the plant, four new cases of cancer each year could be expected. Even with the very best control equipment, there would still be one new case each year. On the other hand, requiring actions to eliminate the threat would cost the company so much money that it could not afford to continue operations, and its annual $23 million payroll would be lost to the Tacoma community. Obviously, then EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus faced a diffi cult exercise of discretion. (We’ll see in Chapter 4 what he did.)

There have been several recent debates concerning the amount of discretion given to administrative agencies. Some analysts argue that broad grants of discretion amount to an abdication of legislative power; others point to the advantages of expertise and fl exibility residing in the agencies or with the executive. Currently, the trend appears to be in the direction of greater detail in federal legislation, though occasionally less so at other levels.

In any case, there inevitably remain many opportunities for the exercise of administra- tive discretion.

Policy Evaluation and Change

Policy evaluation “is an assessment of whether policies are working well” (Kraft & Furlong, 2007, p. 84). Policy evaluation asks whether the policy that is implemented has met the goals and the objectives of the legislation. Cost benefi t analysis is one of the most

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frequently used methods for evaluating policies. But, certainly this is only one of many evaluation methods. Evaluation methods, in this regard, should not only be considered as technical, but many times, these may involve “political judgments about a program’s worth, decisions that are likely to be of great interest to all policy actors involved. In this sense, programs are continually, if often informally, evaluated by members of Congress, interest groups, think tanks, and others” (p. 85).

The purpose of policy evaluation is to determine whether a certain program is effective, that is, whether it produces the intended results. After the evaluation stage, changes in the policy may be introduced. These changes can expand, reduce, or eliminate the program. But most programs undergo continuous incremental changes in an effort to make the policy more effective and more responsive. In this sense, the policy process actually never ends.

Types of Policy

The government develops and carries out several different types of policies, and the involvement of public and nonprofi t organizations in the policy process varies somewhat according to type. We will examine four types: regulatory, distributive, redistributive, and constituent policy (Meier, 1987). These classifi cations are not precise, however, and indeed, many agencies work in several different areas at the same time.

Regulatory Policy Regulatory policy is designed to limit the actions of persons or groups so as to protect the general public or a substantial portion of the public. For example, people are prohibited from selling certain drugs, polluting the air and water, and engaging in monopolistic business practices. One form of regulation simply focuses on illegal crimi- nal activity; it is a crime to do certain things. State and local governments have special responsibilities in this area, and certain federal agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, are active here as well. Another form of regulation focuses on Ameri- can business and seeks to ensure fair and competitive practices. Indeed, the fi rst major regulatory effort in this country came in 1887, when the federal government created the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate the railroads. Similar regulatory agencies today monitor securities (Securities and Exchange Commission), commodity exchanges (Commodity Futures Trading Association), and labor relations (National Labor Relations Board), among others.

A modern regulatory area is concerned with limiting access to certain goods available to the public generally, such as the airwaves (regulated by the Federal Communications Commission) or clean air and water (regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency). Other regulatory bodies focus on protecting health and safety in such areas as consumer protection (Consumer Product Safety Commission), air travel (Federal Aviation Adminis- tration), food (Food and Drug Administration), and workplace safety (the Occupational Safety and Health Administration).

Although federal regulation of economic activities has seen several waves of growth through the past century (Ripley & Franklin, 1987), the last two decades have seen some- what of a movement in the opposite direction. Late in the Carter administration and extending through the Reagan administration, there were several efforts to deregulate

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certain industries. The Civil Aviation Board was disbanded in 1984, and over the follow- ing decade signifi cant areas of transportation, telecommunications, and banking were deregulated. Moreover, regulations were eliminated or enforcement slowed down in areas such as the workplace, auto, and consumer products safety.

During the 1990s, however, even as other federal agencies relaxed their regulatory grip, the Food and Drug Administration attempted to expand its jurisdiction to include one of the largest industries in the country—and certainly the industry with the most profound impact on public health: tobacco. Under Commissioner David Kessler, the FDA tried to establish nicotine as a drug, a move that would have given federal regulators the power to control cigarettes and other tobacco products. Tobacco companies quickly challenged, and in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation et al. (2000) the Supreme Court ruled against the federal government. Justice O’Connor, in her summary of the majority opinion, wrote that although smoking should be considered “one of the most troubling public health problems facing our nation today . . . the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction is impermissible” (cited in Kessler, 2001, p. 384). Regulatory activities dur- ing Clinton’s administration culminated in the last three months of his term. As Dudley (Winter 2004/2005) puts it, “Using numbers of Federal Register as a proxy, President Clinton’s regulatory activity in the post-election quarter (November, December, and January) represented 52.5 percent increase over the volume of regulation issued during the same three months of his previous seven years (1993–1999)” (p. 4).

However, the new Bush administration withdrew those regulations that were not yet published and postponed the recently issued regulation for 60 days. The Bush administra- tion established two sets of guidelines: scientifi c peer review “developed with President’s Offi ce of Science and Technology” and “guidelines for conducting regulatory analysis,” which was developed in coordination with the Council of Economic Advisors (Dudley, p. 6). With these guidelines, the administration imposed additional obligations for the reg- ulatory agencies, but at the same time “reinvigorated the regulatory review process, exhib- iting a willingness to return regulations that do not meet analytical requirements” (p. 9).

Distributive Policy Distributive policy, perhaps the most common form of government policy, uses general tax revenues to provide benefi ts to individuals or groups, often by means of grants or subsidies. If the country faces a large agricultural surplus, for example, the federal government may provide incentive payments to farmers to not produce crops that would add to the surplus. Similarly, the federal government provides direct grants to state and local governments for a variety of purposes. Finally, governments often create “public goods” that all citizens can enjoy. In some cases, such as national defense, the good is provided for all; in others, such as city, state, or national parks, it is anticipated that some citizens will use the benefi t and others will not. (In Chapter 3, we will examine the growing trend toward employing user fees for certain of these traditionally public goods.)

Unlike regulatory agencies that are often at odds with a clientele group they are seeking to regulate, agencies that carry out distributive policies often develop close relationships with their constituencies and, in turn, with interested members of Congress. The growth of veterans’ benefi ts over the past several decades is an almost classic example of the operation of such a subgovernment. The Veterans Administration is now one of the largest federal agencies and provides a broad range of health benefi ts, educational assistance, pensions,

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and insurance for veterans. Such a development would not have been possible without the VA’s close relationship with veterans’ groups (such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars) and with the veterans’ committees in Congress.

Redistributive Policy Redistributive policies take taxes from certain groups and give them to another group. On rare occasions, redistribution is from the less-well-off to the better-off; many charge that capital gains proposals are of this type. Redistribution is, however, gener- ally thought of as benefi ting less-advantaged groups at the perceived expense of the advan- taged. Among major redistributive policies are those that deal with (1) income stabilization, helping to support those who are unemployed or retired; (2) social welfare, providing either direct payments to individuals or supporting state and local efforts for the indigent; and (3) health care programs, such as Medicaid and Medicare. Most federal agencies active in the redistributive area, such as the Social Security Administration or the Offi ce of Human Development, are located in the Department of Health and Human Services.

Since redistributive policies are often (though sometimes incorrectly) viewed in win- lose terms—that is, if one group benefi ts, another will surely lose—they generate perhaps more intense discussion than any other area of public policy. Despite this controversy, every American president since Roosevelt and prior to Reagan has supported some major redistributive effort. Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, however, took the oppo- site position, seeking to limit and even reduce redistributive programs. The reform agenda also infl uenced President Clinton, whose pledge to “end welfare as we know it” resulted in legislation placing a fi ve-year cap on public assistance and tying welfare benefi ts to a work requirement. And within the fi rst six months of his term, President George W. Bush showed his administration’s commitment to continuing this trend by advancing a $1.3 trillion tax cut and encouraging Congress to trim federal spending. In addition, as we noted earlier, President Bush used executive orders to implement a faith-based initiative designed to employ private and nonprofi t organizations in the delivery of social services. During these Bush years, federal, state, and local governments have sought to recruit, train, and assist religious groups to provide a broad array of social services.

Constituent Policy Constituent policies (Lowi, 1972, p. 300) are intended to benefi t the public generally or to serve the government. Foreign and defense policies are good exam- ples of the fi rst set of constituent policies, as well as good examples of the operations of a signifi cant subgovernment. The Air Force had lobbied since the 1960s to build the B-1 bomber as a mainstay of our air defense. In 1978, President Carter was able to “kill” the B-1; however, only three years later, a combination of Defense Department offi cials, repre- sentatives from the defense industry (especially contractors), and congressional supporters of increased military capabilities helped President Reagan resurrect the B-1. Incidentally, even though more than a hundred B-1 bombers were built and were in service at one time, the B-1 remains controversial, and in 2004 several B-1s were retired and cannibalized for spare parts to keep the remaining bombers fl ying.

The other set of constituent policies are those directed toward the agencies of government itself. Legislation affecting the structure and function of government agencies, as well as policies governing their operations, falls in this area. President Carter was especially inter- ested in policies impacting government agencies and was instrumental in such changes as a reorganization of the federal personnel system and a re-emphasis on affi rmative action in

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hiring practices. Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush were more interested in matters of technical effi ciency and problems of waste in government. President Clinton, early in his term, expressed an interest in managerial issues, pledging to implement some version of Total Quality Management in the federal government, as he had done in Arkansas.

As mentioned previously, President Clinton, later in his tenure and assisted in signifi cant measure by Vice President Gore, developed the National Performance Review to make government work better and cost less (and a topic we will examine in detail later). More recently, President George W. Bush has rejuvenated the Reagan-Bush drive for technical effi ciency. In an article titled “Trying to Run a Country Like a Corporation,” the New York Times characterized President Bush, the fi rst president with an MBA, as “the chairman of the board of the world’s biggest conglomerate . . . They said his administration would apply business discipline to a bloated government. And cabinet sessions do look a lot like the Business Roundtable” (Sanger, 2001, p. 1). Led by a cabinet of former CEOs, the Bush administration has placed an emphasis on developing more effi cient, businesslike practices of government.

Sources of Bureaucratic Power

There are several reasons governmental agencies have become so infl uential in the policy process. First, those who staff the agencies constitute an enormous source of expertise with respect to their areas of interest. No president, governor, mayor, or legislator could ever be expected to gain comparable expertise in all areas. Consequently, to make informed deci- sions, elected offi cials must often rely on those in the various agencies. It is often said that information is power; the information that is stored in government agencies is a distinct source of power.

You are testifying before a congressional committee in behalf of an increase in your agency’s budget so that you can better investigate intellectual property claims involving software development. It is clear that one member of the committee, who is very supportive of the increase, really doesn’t understand what’s going on, and if he did, he might not support the budget increase. What would you do?

What Would You Do?

Second, as noted earlier, legislation is often both inevitably and intentionally vague, leaving considerable discretion to the administrator. In some cases, legislators simply wish to defer to the expertise of those in the agencies to provide detailed rules and interpreta- tions. In others, they are recognizing the necessity of some fl exibility in administering pub- lic programs. In still others, they are responding to the pressures of the legislative process itself, where specifi city leads to disputes, and vagueness can often promote agreement.

Administrative discretion is also necessary because changing conditions necessitate changing policies, and it is not always possible to wait for new laws to be passed. In the 1960s, for example, the Department of Agriculture sought to maintain farm income by

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lowering the supply of agricultural products. Following shortages in the 1970s, the depart- ment sought increased production. In the 1980s, the policy once again became one of limiting production.

Flexibility is also needed as new information is discovered. For example, a few years ago, the surgeon general sent a brochure to all households in the country outlining the lat- est information about AIDS, an action not mandated by Congress but, in the judgment of the surgeon general, required by emerging events.

Through their expertise and discretionary power, those in public agencies help shape public policy. But there are more active and more political ways in which certain agencies become involved in the policy process. Whereas all agencies participate in making policy at some level, some agencies clearly are more politically adept than others. The Defense Department and the Veterans Administration, for example, both wield considerable power, whereas the Government Printing Offi ce has little.

The power, infl uence, and, in turn, the resources an agency is able to generate depend on several factors, some external to the agency, some internal. Obviously, shifts in public opinion concerning the agency’s tasks are likely to affect the support the agency receives. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has experienced wide variations in public support over the years, riding a crest of popularity with the fi rst lunar landing, but later coming under special scrutiny in the wake of the Challenger disaster. More recently, the agency has been fi ghting desperately to maintain projects such as the space station in light of proposed budget cuts. Not surprisingly, there seems to be a close correlation between favorable public opinion concerning an agency’s area of interest and the support it receives from Congress.

More specifi c support comes from clientele groups, members of the legislature, and others in the executive branch. We have already noted the support certain agencies receive from clientele groups who benefi t from the agencies’ actions. Obviously, the larger and more powerful the supporters of the agency, the more powerful the agency is likely to be. But agencies also develop opposition, which can be damaging to the agencies’ programs. The Environmental Protection Agency, for example, interacts with many different groups, including businesses, state environmental agencies, members of the scientifi c community, and groups like the Sierra Club or the National Wildlife Federation; the EPA is likely to receive support from some groups and opposition from others.

Special support can also come from individual members of the legislature who decide, for whatever reason, to champion an agency’s cause. But, as we have seen, the combination of congressional and clientele support can lead to the development of “subgovernments” within particular policy areas. These subgovernments come about, in part, because each group has something to give and something to gain from the relationship. The agency can provide quick and favorable responses to congressional requests for help as well as rulings favorable to clientele groups. In return, the agency might receive support for expansion of its budget and programs.

Support may also come from other members of the executive branch. Presidential sup- port is obviously important, whether it is diffuse support of an agency’s general work or more specifi c, such as in a president’s support for AIDS research, increased drug enforce- ment, or a particular new weapons system. But agencies are also attentive to their relation- ships with other agencies. The development of a new state park may raise environmental

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issues, economic development issues, and health issues. The parks department will clearly fare better if all the relevant groups and agencies are “on board.”

For nonprofi t organizations, the capacity to infl uence public policy tends to be limited as much by informal as formal mandates. Although federal law does set guidelines for the use of public and charitable resources for lobbying purposes, some nonprofi t leaders assume that these limitations prevent them from representing their constituents’ interests in policy decision making. Or they refrain from taking a stand on issues so as not to isolate themselves from opposing parties. Philanthropy groups, such as the Independent Sector with its Charity Lobbying in the Public Interest initiative, have launched campaigns to encourage nonprofi t leaders to be more proactive in their lobbying and to expand the advocacy role of nonprofi ts in the public policy process. The Internal Revenue Service has assisted in this effort by making available a simplifi ed set of guidelines from the federal tax code, which nonprofi ts can use to map their lobbying strategies.

In addition to the external sources of bureaucratic power, there are several internal sources of power. We have already noted the importance of the information and expertise of agency personnel. Especially in highly technical areas, such as medicine or agricultural economics, those in the agencies are likely to be far more knowledgeable than many others involved in setting policies and priorities. If they can employ their expertise credibly, dem- onstrating effective performance over time, the agency will surely benefi t.

For information on the advocacy role of nonprofi t organizations, see Center for Lobbying in the Public Interest at http://www.clpi.org. A copy of the Nonprofi t Lobbying Guide can be downloaded at http://www.clpi.org/CLPI_Publications.aspx.

NETWORKING

Agencies are also likely to benefi t by their cohesion—the degree to which members are uniformly committed to the organization and its goals. An agency that is seen as divided over major issues will suffer a loss of credibility. Conversely, a sense of unity within an agency is likely to make the agency more effective, both internally and externally.

Finally, agencies benefi t from strong and effective leadership. For example, James Baker became known as a highly effective leader (as well as an effective politician) in his several roles during the Bush administration. As secretary of state, Baker played a strong leader- ship role in U.S. policy in the Middle East and elsewhere. Similarly, in the Clinton admin- istration, Madeline Albright quickly emerged as a strong secretary of state and enjoyed a good relationship with Congress, especially in her early days in offi ce. On the other hand, the impact of effective versus ineffective leadership is illustrated by the change in the EPA under the highly effective William Ruckelshaus and the ineffective Anne Burford.

The power of particular agencies, therefore, is the result of interaction between the agency and its environment, a process to which the agency brings certain strengths, but it must also exercise considerable skill to reach its goals. The external support an agency can generate and the internal combination of its knowledge, cohesion, and leadership affect the amount of power and infl uence it can command. Whatever an agency’s degree

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of power and infl uence, however, that power and infl uence must be exercised judiciously. The agency is a creation of the legislature, and its programs are always subject to the legislature’s review, alteration, and even termination.

Legislative Supervision: Structural Controls

Obviously, most governmental programs (and the agencies that administer them) fi rst take shape in the legislative process. In response to public demands, and perhaps also executive leadership, Congress or a state legislature or a city council or a board of directors passes leg- islation or policies to correct a particular problem. The problems vary widely, from federal environmental policy to state education requirements to local trash collection practices to the establishment of local health centers, but in most cases legislation authorizes the program. Typically, especially in larger jurisdictions, money to operate the program is authorized sepa- rately through an appropriations process. With a program authorized and money appropri- ated, the building (or expansion) of a public organization can commence.

For information on Congress, see the following: http://www.loc.gov/index.html for the Library of Congress; http://www.house.gov for the House; and http://www.senate.gov for the Senate.

NETWORKING

Legislation is, however, somewhat limited as a device for controlling the day-to-day activities of public organizations, especially at the federal and state levels. (Remember that legislation is usually intentionally vague at some points.) But legislation can be used as a control device. After a program is under way, legislation may be passed to prevent members of the executive branch from taking certain actions (Meier, 1987, pp. 140–141). For example, the Boland Amendment sought to prevent covert action in support of the Contras in Nicaragua in the mid-1980s. Whereas legislation authorizing programs must inevitably be somewhat general, legislative prohibitions on administra- tive actions can be quite specifi c. However, as in the Iran-Contra scandal, members of an administration may go to great lengths to reinterpret legislation to avoid even those specifi c prohibitions.

Legislative Veto

One specifi c device legislatures employ to control public agencies is the legislative veto, a statutory provision that essentially says that any action proposed by the executive (or administrative agency) under provisions of a particular piece of legislation is subject to the approval or disapproval of Congress (or some portion of Congress), usually within

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thirty to ninety days. For example, legislation might authorize a new highway program, but require legislative consent to undertake specifi c projects. The legislative veto was fi rst used in the 1930s to permit the president to reorganize, subject to review by Congress. In the 1970s and early 1980s, however, the legislative veto began to be used in many other areas, most notably in the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which required the president to notify Congress of military action and to cease such action within sixty days unless Congress acts to continue it.

The effect of a legislative veto provision on a public agency is illustrated in the experi- ence of the Federal Trade Commission in the late 1970s and early 1980s. An aggressive consumer protection effort by the FTC in the late 1970s was countered by business groups in Congress, which successfully passed legislation to the effect that Congress could disap- prove any FTC rules it didn’t like. Congress used that provision in 1982 to disapprove an FTC rule that had been developed over a 10-year period which required used-car dealers to disclose any defects in cars they sold (Ripley & Franklin, 1987, pp. 141–142). In a similar case that found its way to the Supreme Court as Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha (1983), the Court ruled the legislative veto unconstitutional. The Court argued that the constitutional process for passing legislation requires the involvement of the president, and actions under a legislative veto provision violate the separation of pow- ers by failing to involve the executive.

Despite the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto, the interest of Congress in con- trolling the work of administrative agencies has not diminished. Indeed, Congress has found a variety of ways to get around the Chadha ruling, either informally, by adding detailed rules to legislative authorizations, or by simply continuing to include veto provi- sions in legislation despite the court’s ruling. More recently, Congress in 1996 approved a legislative review process that, although providing a veto alternative, would not be open to the types of legal challenges that limited previous procedures (Cooper, 2000, p. 172).

It should be noted that the question of legislative control over administrative agencies is not limited to the federal government. At the state level, the use of the legislative veto has been growing rapidly, and many states have adopted the veto either in the form of legislation or as part of state administrative procedures. Moreover, while state courts have reinforced the principles of Chadha (the Chadha ruling in a federal case does not itself limit the use of the legislative veto at the state level), state lawmakers continue to employ vetolike actions in their processes of legislative review (Cooper, 2000, p. 172).

Sunset Laws

Another control device that legislatures employ, to assess the performance of agencies and to eliminate those that are not successful, is the sunset law. Sunset laws are based on the assumption that certain governmental programs should periodically terminate, to con- tinue only after an evaluation of the program’s effectiveness and a specifi c vote by the leg- islature. A classic case on the problem of program continuation is the military commissary system, which was created to provide foodstuffs to the cavalry on the Western Plains in the 1800s. The program continues today, although nearly all military commissaries are within ten miles of two or more supermarkets!

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Sunset laws became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s, after the state of Colorado, at the urging of Common Cause, passed a set of laws requiring that certain regulatory agen- cies be terminated at a given point unless given new life by the legislature. Soon dozens of other states and many municipalities passed general sunset laws, applying termination dates to a set of programs, or included sunset provisions in legislation creating new programs. Proposals containing sunset provisions were also presented at the federal level.

The purpose of specifying a particular life span for a program is to force careful evalu- ation of the program at some future point. Critics of automatic terminations point out several problems, not the least of which is the cost of evaluations and the burden to the legislature and legislative staff if all programs were periodically evaluated in great detail. Questions also arise about whether sunset legislation actually changes our assumptions about continuing most programs; for example, no one would seriously anticipate that a police or fi re department would be eliminated. Finally, critics point out that most pro- grams are reviewed periodically anyway and that highly ineffective programs are often eliminated even without “sunset” provisions.

The debate over sunset provisions was fueled once again in 2001, as Congress acted to phase in key elements of the Bush administration’s $1.3 trillion tax cut over a ten-year period, but then established a sunset deadline for the end of the 10th year. Critics of the legislation viewed this as a political remedy, one that would carry serious economic impli- cations if the then-sitting Congress failed to reinstate the tax measures. In other words, if the 2010 Congress (or one before) failed to make the tax cuts permanent, as President Bush desires, the cuts would expire and go back to the levels in place at the time the legis- lation was fi rst passed in 2001.

A fi nal mechanism through which legislative bodies formally exert control over admin- istrative agencies is passage of broad legislation to govern agency conduct. Such legis- lation, applicable to all agencies, might affect administrative procedures, contracting or purchasing arrangements, human resources management, or other areas. A good example is the continuing congressional interest in access to governmental information. Following World War II, governmental agencies, probably in keeping with the military mentality of the war years, could legally classify as “confi dential” all records for which there was “good cause” to hold secret. As you can imagine, it was not diffi cult to come up with all kinds of “good causes” or reasons to withhold records. The practice of keeping secrets became so widespread that one congressional investigating group found that the Pentagon had clas- sifi ed as secret the construction of the bow and arrow and the fact that water runs down- hill! Similarly, the General Services Administration had decided photographs could not be taken in federal buildings without permission of the janitor (Archibald, 1979, p. 314).

You are the superintendent of schools in an urban school district. The mayor has approached you about using two of your high school gyms to house a nighttime recreational basketball league for inner-city youth. You are concerned that there could be serious damage to the gyms themselves and that the school buildings nearby would become a target for graffi ti. What would you do?

What Would You Do?

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As a result of fi ndings such as these, and in the belief that the public has the right to information gathered by the government, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1966. The law was based on the assumption that the public has the right to know, except in clearly defi ned and exceptional cases; in other words, it limited those in the executive branch from classifying documents for ill-defi ned purposes. Implementation of the new law was hindered by confusion about certain parts and by some agency offi cials who still tried to maintain as much secrecy as possible. These problems were addressed in a series of amendments in 1974, 1986, and 1996. The amendments required agencies to respond to inquiries quickly and even sought to penalize government offi cials who hid gov- ernment records from the public. Although problems with the Act have persisted, nearly all federal agencies have now implemented the Freedom of Information provisions. In fact, processing and responding to FOIA requests has become a substantial activity in federal agencies. The Department of Justice alone, for example, received over 235,000 requests in the year 2000 (Piotrowski and Rosenbloom, 2002).

Sunshine Laws These examples of constraints on the operation of government agencies are closely related to sunshine laws that require various agencies, especially regulatory agencies, to conduct business in public view (except under specifi c conditions). For exam- ple, early in 1993, based on a Freedom of Information request from a New York artist, NASA released forty-fi ve photographs of wreckage of the space shuttle Challenger, which had exploded some seven years earlier.

Florida’s Government-in-the-Sunshine Law provides the public the right of access to governmental proceedings at the state, county, and municipal levels, as well as other politi- cal subdivisions, such as authorities and special districts. This law requires that any gath- ering of two or more members of any board or commission be subject to the requirements of the Sunshine Law if they discuss any matter that will, in the foreseeable future, come before that board for action. The three basic requirements of the law are (1) meetings must be open to the public, (2) reasonable notice of such meetings must be given, and (3) min- utes of the meetings must be taken. In effect, the law prohibits members of any board or commission from having informal or casual discussions of board business outside an open public meeting for which reasonable notice was given.

All fi fty states now have “sunshine” provisions for their own legislative bodies, adminis- trative agencies, and local governments. In all these cases, the legislative body, in expressing its concern for the public’s right to be informed about the public’s business, has exercised control over a broad range of administrative agencies.

Legislative Supervision: Oversight

In addition to the “structural” mechanisms for legislative control, the legislature also exer- cises continuing supervision of administrative agencies through what is called the over- sight function. Each house of Congress has a government operations committee charged with overseeing the activities of all government agencies, including their relationships with other levels of government. In addition, each of the other congressional committees exer- cises oversight responsibility with respect to its particular area of interest and expertise

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(such as defense, welfare, the post offi ce). Oversight is especially connected to the legisla- tive and appropriations processes (see Box 2.2), but may occur at any time. For this reason, it is not unusual to see a cabinet secretary, complete with charts and documents, testifying before a congressional committee that is interested in his or her programs.

Holding hearings is probably the most visible oversight activity of Congress, at times assuming a circuslike atmosphere. The Iran-Contra hearings, for example, were essentially an investigation of the activities of the National Security Council, an executive agency, but they became the arena for considerable political infi ghting concerning the Reagan admin- istration’s conduct of foreign policy. (They were also noteworthy for their revelations of intentional efforts by Lt. Colonel Oliver North and Undersecretary of State Elliot Abrams to deceive Congress in the course of normal oversight activities.)

The exposure that hearings provide members of Congress is obvious. Politicians from Harry Truman to Sam Ervin to Daniel Inouye to Fred Thompson have built national repu- tations through their involvement in congressional hearings. But hearings can also provide excellent opportunities for administrative offi cials at the federal, state, and local levels, and in nonprofi t organizations, to tell their side of the story, to help educate members of the legislature and the public generally, and to build support for their programs. Con- sequently, most agencies devote considerable time and attention to legislative relations, often—at the federal level—working through a legislative liaison offi ce or—at the state and local levels—on a more individual basis.

Perhaps the most extraordinary example of legislative oversight in recent years occurred in 1998–1999, when Congress impeached, and then acquitted, President Clinton on charges stemming from an adulterous affair with a White House intern. The House of Representatives approved two articles of impeachment against the president, claiming that he perjured himself in his testimony before a federal grand jury and that he obstructed jus- tice by interfering with the investigation of the Independent Council, Ken Starr. However, the Senate voted to acquit the President on both articles of impeachment, a decision that in many ways brought to a close eight years of allegations, investigations, and scandal that had plagued the Clinton presidency.

BOX 2.2

TESTIFYING BEFORE THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

The most important thing in a committee hearing is creating an atmosphere of confi dence— so that you have confi dence in the committee and they have confi dence in you. I tell my people to be perfectly honest and to have a full, free, and frank discussion with the commit- tee, even if it hurts you a little bit. That will mean more than anything else in getting your money. Nobody likes to admit things and cast refl ections on his own shop, but don’t try to fool the congressmen. You can’t. They have a sixth sense when someone is not talking freely and frankly. If you have a perfectly open discussion, they’ll have more confi dence in you, and your appropriations troubles will be minimized.

SOURCE: An agency budget offi cer quoted in Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 298.

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Nationally, Congress can also exercise oversight through its staff agencies, most of which were signifi cantly enhanced by legislation in the early 1970s that created the Con- gressional Budget Offi ce. The CBO was charged with furnishing certain program infor- mation to Congress. At about the same time, Congress shifted the focus of the General Accounting Offi ce from its traditional fi nancial auditing to program evaluations. Now, in addition to holding hearings, Congress can exercise oversight responsibility through staff evaluations of agency operations by requesting information from the Congressional Bud- get Offi ce or by initiating audits or program evaluations by the General Accounting Offi ce. Although legislative staff capabilities at the state and local levels are considerably less, and often more focused on policy development than oversight, all levels of government have witnessed a general increase in legislative staff over the past twenty years.

Finally, there are myriad informal relationships between legislators and those in execu- tive agencies. In fact, such nonstatutory controls may be the most common form of con- gressional oversight.

Despite the array of oversight activities available to members of Congress and despite devoting increased staff resources to oversight, questions remain concerning the effective- ness of legislative oversight of executive branch operations. Part of the problem is simply that many legislators have relatively little interest in oversight activities. Instead, they tend to focus on policy issues, recognizing that they are much more likely to build their repu- tations in the policy arena than in oversight. Moreover, interest in oversight activities is likely to vary from time to time, increasing in times of crisis or public outcry, when new and different program requests are forthcoming from an agency or when a member feels a particular agency has not been responsive to constituent groups. Generally, when a mem- ber has high confi dence in a set of leaders and tends to agree with policies, the motivation for oversight decreases; conversely, when trust is low or when the member’s favored pro- grams are being ignored, the incentive for oversight is greater.

Legislative Supervision: Casework

Legislators also interact with those in public agencies on an individual basis, usually on behalf of their constituents. Obviously, legislators who wish to be re-elected must be atten- tive to requests for information or infl uence from those in their districts. On the other side of the coin, individual citizens have come to expect that they can and should receive help from their senator or representative in dealings with government. Thus, members of the legislature receive a multitude of requests for assistance, from someone who needs help to collect Social Security benefi ts to someone who hopes to infl uence the award of a par- ticular governmental contract. Intervention on behalf of individuals or groups that need assistance with or access to government agencies is called legislative casework.

At the federal level, providing services for constituents has become one of the most time-consuming and important activities for Congress members. Requests for assistance are typically handled by congressional staff members who specialize in casework. If the request requires an inquiry into an agency activity, the staffer will likely approach the agency’s congressional liaison offi ce or perhaps go directly to the agency head or a regional offi ce. In most instances, inquiries are responded to promptly, and information about the

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case and any necessary explanations of the agency’s action are returned quickly to the member of Congress.

Federal offi cials, in both the legislature and the agencies, feel the process is useful not only in providing a mechanism for review, but in clarifying agency policies and procedures and assessing agency performance (Johannes, 1984). Occasionally, however, pressure to “bend the rules” or to play political favoritism occurs. Several years ago, for example, Congressman Daniel Flood of Pennsylvania was charged with conspiracy, bribery, and perjury in connection with his efforts to obtain certain federal grants and loans for a hos- pital in his district.

Casework activities seem less routine and institutionalized at the state and local levels. Here there appear to be both benefi ts and costs. On the one hand, casework activities serve to “humanize” the bureaucracy; on the other, there are disadvantages in the disruption of administrative processes and in the possibility of political infl uence. Certainly in the more highly professionalized governmental agencies, agency heads view legislators’ involvement positively.

In many European countries, and in some American states and localities, the legislature’s casework function has been paralleled or even turned over to the offi ce of the ombudsman, a permanent offi ce that receives complaints and acts on behalf of citizens in securing infor- mation, requesting services, or pursuing grievances. Many other jurisdictions have created similar, though less formal, structures, such as public advocates, citizens’ assistance offi ces, and so on (Hill, 1982).

■ Relationships with the Judiciar y

The relationship between administrative agencies and the judiciary derives, as you might expect, from the legal foundations of administrative actions, some of which are quasi- legislative and others of which are quasi-judicial. Those that are quasi-legislative elaborate the details of legislation. As we have noted, most legislation is necessarily and intention- ally general, leaving considerable room for interpretation or discretion on the part of the administrator. For example, an agency might be required by law to set safety standards for nuclear-powered electric utilities but receive little guidance about which specifi c standards should be employed. The agency would seek to determine appropriate standards, then develop rules to govern implementation of the legislation. Rule making is concerned with establishing general guidelines that would apply to a class of people or a class of actions in the future.

At the federal level, rule making by administrative agencies, as well as many other aspects of administrative law, is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). (Similar statutes exist in each state to provide the legal framework for administrative actions.) The Act seeks to ensure that rules are based on proper legal authority; that there are both ade- quate notice of the rule making and an opportunity for citizens to be heard; that the rule is clear and unambiguous; and that people are given suffi cient advance warning that the new rule will take effect (Federal Administrative Procedures Source Book, 1992, p. 416).

In 1996, the APA celebrated its 50th anniversary, an anniversary that had some ques- tioning whether the act still provided an adequate framework to resolve the increasingly

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complex legal questions in contemporary society. Recent challenges to the APA have centered on issues of regulatory reform, including efforts by Congress to curb powers of administrative agencies. The discourse on Capitol Hill, however, has tended to be divided along partisan lines, with only a trace of common ground to advance the reform agenda, and, in fact, most of the recent criticism from Congress had little to do with “poor admin- istrative practices.” The courts, on the other hand, remain favorable to the APA and dur- ing the past three years have sustained the act’s administrative framework. So while the legislative debate goes on, the APA continues to be the primary guide for the practice of administration.

For legal research on issues of administrative law, go to http://www.fi ndlaw.com, or explore specifi c Supreme Court decisions at http://www.fi ndlaw.com/casecode/supreme.html. Information relating to the Administrative Procedures Act can be found at http://www.fda. gov/opacom/laws/adminpro.htm.

NETWORKING

In most cases, rule making is fairly straightforward, involving notice, comment, and steps to ensure an adequate record; in others, legislation requires greater detail and great formal- ity in the rule-making process. Food and Drug Administration regulations and others that involve high risks require a formal rule-making process. Formal rule-making procedures require that the agency issue its rule only after trial-type hearing procedures are completed.

Several important provisions were added to the APA during the 1970s and 1990s. These included measures that reduced regulatory demands in some circumstances involving smaller for-profi t, nonprofi t, and public-sector organizations. The fi rst of these changes, which appeared in the APA as part of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), gained approval during the Carter administration. Under the RFA, administrative agencies not only must take into account the impact of new regulations on smaller agencies, but also must ensure a requisite level of fl exibility in the rules to accommodate agency compliance and report- ing without adding to administrative costs. In 1996, Congress expanded the RFA, as part of the debt limit extension bill, by adding three statutes and approving a legislative review process for proposed regulations. With the review process, lawmakers would now have a window of opportunity to adopt a “resolution of disapproval” prior to fi nal decision mak- ing (Cooper, 2000, p. 139).

The Negotiated Rule Making Act of 1990 continued a trend toward the use of alterna- tive means of dispute resolution—that is, mechanisms for resolving disputes that would not require formal legal processes. As with other alternative means of dispute resolutions, “negotiated rule making provides a means of using consensual techniques to produce bet- ter, more acceptable results, reducing the likelihood of protracted legislation.” Essentially, negotiated rule making brings together various parties involved in a particular issue to discuss potential rules and to try to arrive at a consensus in advance of the structure and content of those rules.

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Like other forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation or arbitration, no agency is forced to use these techniques; however, many public agencies are fi nding it very helpful to do so (Federal Alternative Procedures Source Book, 1992).

Other administrative actions are quasi-judicial in that they produce orders relating to individual cases. For example, following the issuance of safety standards for nuclear power plants, an administrator might have to decide if a particular plant has met those standards. Similarly, an administrator might have to decide if a specifi c individual is eligible for work- ers’ compensation. In such cases, the administrator is making decisions that determine one’s status under the law. The substantive decisions are obviously important, but so are the procedures under which they are resolved. For example, a woman denied welfare sup- port might request a hearing to argue her case before a fi nal decision is made. The admin- istrator’s decision to grant or refuse the hearing represents another kind of quasi-judicial administrative action.

In quasi-judicial administrative actions, often called adjudication, procedural issues such as those just mentioned are of special importance. There is a desire that citizens be treated fairly and not subjected to arbitrary decisions. Consequently, where standards of due process are applied, notice of the proposed action must be given, there must be a chance for the affected party to respond, and there must be an independent decision maker and an opportunity for appeal.

The courts may review administrative actions (in rule making, adjudication, or other areas) through judicial review. Such review typically occurs when a party “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action” seeks judicial remedy (5 U.S.C., Section 702). The court reviews the case in light of con- stitutional, statutory, and executive provisions and determines the appropriateness of the administrative action. Generally speaking, courts may fi nd unlawful and set aside agency actions that are unconstitutional, that extend beyond the limits of statutory authority, that are “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion,” that are procedurally unfair or without substantive justifi cation (5 U.S.C., Section 706). However, following the Supreme Court’s fi nding in Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council (1984), if a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the issue at hand, the agency’s interpretation of the statute must be upheld if its interpretation is a reasonable one.

The deference to administrators underlying Chevron—a position referred to as contem- poraneous administrative construction—stems from the court’s belief that an administra- tive agency responsible for implementing a piece of legislation has the most knowledge of the policy and of existing legislation concerning the issue. The courts may ultimately disagree with the agency interpretation, but they start with a heavy presumption that the agency was correct. Although some suggest that Chevron is being called into ques- tion, recent Supreme Court decisions have reinforced the doctrine of judicial deference to administrative agencies.

For example, in Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the high court considered a challenge to the Bush administration’s abortion “gag rule,” which prevented family planning clinics that receive federal funding from offering counseling or referrals for abortion services, but allowed infor- mation concerning childbirth and related services. The gag rule resulted from a fundamen- tal reinterpretation of the existing statute by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Despite the fact that the Secretary’s position went against the long-standing interpretation,

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a divided court ruled that the agency’s policy should stand because Congress had given responsibility to HHS for implementing the statute. (The Rust decision also carries impor- tant implications for nonprofi t organizations in that it holds employees of nonprofi t orga- nizations that receive government funding responsible for the same requirements as public offi cials. For instance, Rust was applied recently in a case challenging the ability of nonprofi t organizations to lobby for their constituents. The Supreme Court in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez [2001] ruled that employees of nonprofi t organizations that receive government funding must adhere to the same standards and limitations as government workers with regard to advocating on issues of public policy.)

In more recent cases, including Smiley v. Citibank (1996), Auer v. Robbins (1997), and Regions Hospital v. Shalala (1998), the Supreme Court has continued to reinforce the Chevron standard, based on the principle that unless legislators give clear direction to the administering agency, the administrator’s interpretation must be upheld as long as it is permissible under the statute.

On the other hand, the courts have established parameters for Chevron, limiting the standard to regulatory measures and to circumstances in which the administering agency clearly acts within the confi nes of the statute. The courts have maintained that petitions regarding administrative issues, but whose primary concerns relate to legal matters such as contracts, should be viewed as “a question of law clearly within the competence of the courts” (Cooper, 2000 p. 254). Despite these limitations, the consistency with which the court has reinforced Chevron, and in light of lower court decisions during the same period, it can be presumed that the judiciary will maintain the capacity and scope of administra- tive agencies into the “post-Chevron” era. The list of cases in Box 2.3 provides a summary of the principles established during the past two decades.

That is not to say that the court always rules in favor of the administrative agency. Of particular interest are those cases in which the court determines that the agency has misin- terpreted (or gone beyond) the intent of the legislation. As an example, the statute creating the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor charged the agency with developing a standard for toxic substances in the workplace “which assures, to the extent feasible that no employee will suffer material impairment even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard for the period of his working life” (Cooper, 1983, p. 192). After extensive studies, OSHA determined that exposure to the toxic substance benzene created a risk of cancer and other health hazards and set a standard accordingly.

The American Petroleum Institute sought judicial review that led the courts to a dis- cussion of two rather interesting issues. One aspect of the case had to do with legislative intent. The Fifth Circuit Court focused on this issue, fi nding that the phrase “to the extent feasible” in the legislation meant that a standard had to be both technologically and eco- nomically feasible. For this reason, the court set aside the OSHA standard. The Supreme Court concentrated more on the health aspects of the case, with the majority concluding that existing standards were not dangerous and the new standard was not necessary. The justices who dissented argued that the Court should not substitute its own judgment on the technical merits of the case for that of experts within the agency. The case illustrates several of the most important diffi culties that face the courts in reviewing administrative actions (Cooper, 2000).

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BOX 2.3

LEGAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATION

The standard for judicial review requires the court to address two questions: First, has the legislature provided clear direction to the administering agency with regard to the imple- mentation of the statute? If so, then the court and the agency must follow the direction established by the legislative body. Second, if the legislature has left the implementation of the statute relatively vague, and thus granted an implicit level of authority to the agency, is the agency’s interpretation a permissible one under the statute?

Interpretation Relevant Cases The premise that a long-standing agency interpretation of a statute should be given considerable notice, although having legal precedence, does not override an administrator’s prerogative to reinterpret a statute, even if the reinterpretation represents a substantive change in policy direction. Administrators must be given the opportunity to keep pace with changing conditions, and their decisions merely have to be permissible under the statute. In other words, the administrator’s interpretation does not have to be the best or brightest choice, only a permissible one.

Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984)

The power of judicial review in cases of administrative interpretation must be limited because it is not up to the courts to negotiate among alternate interpretations of a statute or to determine which interpretation would be better from a regulatory standpoint. In such cases, the agency’s interpretation must be followed—that is, as long as the interpretation adheres to the language and principles of the statute.

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. (1983) INS v. Cardozo-Fonzeca (1987) Rust v. Sullivan (1991) NationsBank v. Variable Annuity (1995) Smiley v. Citibank (1996) Auer v. Robbins (1997) Regions Hospital v. Shalala (1998) Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (1991) Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala (1994) United States v. O’Hagan (1997)

SOURCE: Reproduced by permission of the publisher, F. E. Peacock Publishers Inc., Itasca, IL. From P. Cooper, Public Law and Public Administration, 3rd ed. © 2000. pp. 250–264, 269–270.

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The courts lately have more frequently acted not only to review agency actions, but to compel agency action “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” (5 U.S.C., Section 706). A few years ago, the Food and Drug Administration received a petition from a group of death row inmates to determine whether the materials used for lethal injections were safe and painless or whether they might leave the prisoner conscious but paralyzed, a wit- ness to his or her own slow death. The FDA responded that it did not have jurisdiction to review the practices of state corrections systems in cases such as this; however, on review, the circuit court concluded that the FDA did indeed have jurisdiction. The court wrote, “In this case FDA is clearly refusing to exercise enforcement discretion because it does not wish to become embroiled in an issue so morally and emotionally troubling as the death penalty. As a result of the FDA’s inaction, appellants face the risk of cruel execution” (Cooper, 1985, p. 649).

Closely related to the FDA’s failure to undertake an investigation are cases in which the agency refuses to make rules or delays the issuance of rules required by statute. But there have also been several recent cases in which agencies have been found to have exceeded their authority in rescinding previously established rules.

Concerns for Due Process

At the heart of our system of jurisprudence is the assurance that people will be treated fairly, that they have a right to present arguments and evidence in their own behalf, and that those who make the decisions will be unbiased and impartial. As with issues of due process in administrative adjudication—whether a hearing is required, at what point, and the format of the hearing—some patterns have emerged in the Supreme Court’s evaluation of administrative matters. During the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, the Court sought to protect the rights of citizens from arbitrary action on the part of administrative agencies by requiring that a person be allowed an opportunity to challenge a proposed action before being made to suffer serious harm. The Court would not allow cost or inconvenience to the agency as an excuse for causing harm to an individual.

Through the 1970s and 1980s, however, the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren Burger, began to alter its approach to administrative due process, treating administrative hearings not as a means of protection, but as devices for fact- fi nding. Most frequently, the Court has employed a “balancing test,” weighing the inter- ests of the individual (rather narrowly defi ned), the value of additional safeguards, and the government’s interest (including the fi scal and administrative burdens that additional procedural safeguards might impose). The material in Box 2.4 illustrates the application of this balancing test. As a result, it has become much more diffi cult for someone who feels that adequate protections have not been provided to prevail in the courts (Cooper, 2000).

The fl exibility in administrative law for due process has contributed to a variety of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) strategies, namely mediation and arbitration. In fact, the adoption of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 helped remove many of the barriers administrators face to such alternative approaches. For the most part, ADR strategies are easier to employ in less complex cases. Yet ADR should not be used to obtain settlements that fail to protect the public interest. The spirit and letter of the agreement

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must be clear or else face considerable challenge, and potential failure, during the implementation stage.

BOX 2.4 THE SPOTTED OWL AND AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute it administers, it is confronted with two questions.

First, always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques- tion at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.

If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specifi c issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

Given the ubiquity of ambiguity in regulatory statutes, Chevron looked like a recipe for judicial acquiescence to agency interpretations. It hasn’t worked out that way.

Sometimes, to be sure, the Court gives full scope to the doctrine announced in Chevron. Other times, however, the Court virtually ignores the Chevron test. Most importantly, only three years after Chevron, the Court recognized a major escape hatch from the doctrine of deference to agency interpretation.

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon—the celebrated Spotted Owl case—illustrates the indeterminacy of the Chevron doctrine. At issue was the meaning of the term harm in the Endangered Species Act. The act prohibits the “taking” of endangered animals and defi nes “take” to mean “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” According to Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, “harm” includes destruction of habitat that has the effect—although not the purpose—of harming endangered wildlife. Oregon business interests challenged this interpretation as contrary to the statute.

The fundamental problem in administrative law is that a congressional majority typi- cally favors some federal response to a problem, but no congressional majority favors any particular response. Rather than do nothing, Congress adopts general language and leaves it to the agencies—and the courts—to make the controversial choices. The Endangered Species Act is a good illustration of this. Congress knew quite well that habitat destruction poses the biggest threat to endangered species. Congress also knew, however, that regulating habitat destruction would confl ict with economic development. So Congress waffl ed.

The only clear intention Congress had regarding habitat destruction is a clear intention to have no clear intention. The problem calls less for lawyerly interpretations of authoritative language than for a policy decision made by an institution that is familiar with the problem and is held politically accountable. The agency has the advantage (over) the courts on both counts.

SOURCE: Donald A. Dripps, Trial 32, no. 2 (February 1996): 70–71. Reprinted with permission of the author.

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The Courts and Agency Administration

Over the past twenty years, one of the most dramatic developments in the relationship between administrative agencies and the judiciary is the direct involvement of federal district courts (and some state courts) in agency administration, including decisions on spending, personnel, organization, and management. This involvement has come about through court rulings in administrative equity cases, wherein individual rights, such as the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, have been violated by state and local administrative organizations.

Two landmark cases in the early 1970s set precedents for such rulings. In the fi rst, prison- ers in the Arkansas penitentiary system alleged a large number of abuses, including dangerous and unhealthy conditions in the prisons. The court ruled that confi nement in the Arkansas sys- tem amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and ordered corrections offi cials to devise a plan to remedy the problems. Similarly, in Alabama a federal district court judge found “intol- erable and deplorable” conditions in that state’s largest mental health facility and ordered corrective actions. The court also established a constitutional right to treatment, detailing actions required to meet that constitutional standard (Gilmour, 1982, pp. 26–29).

The involvement of courts in the management of public agencies is especially well illus- trated in a federal judge’s order demanding reform of the New Orleans Parish Prison. In addition to ordering adequate medical services, improved security, and development of recreational facilities, the judge directed that “the management and operation of the prison be improved immediately,” that a professional penologist be hired to manage the prison, and that personnel practices (fi lling vacancies, raising wages, etc.) be improved in specifi c ways. Although court actions such as this have obviously corrected constitutional inequi- ties, there are questions as to whether the courts are well suited for involvement in the details of administration. Moreover, many states and localities argue that court-ordered expenditures of funds on projects such as desegregation or prison reform take money away from other needed services, such as education, social welfare, or mental health. Indeed, for these various reasons, the Supreme Court has recently taken steps to limit the involvement of courts in the work of administrative agencies, requiring carefully tailored plans of lim- ited duration based on specifi c constitutional violations.

■ Summar y and Action Implications

This chapter has explored the political context of public administration, including things you will simply need to know to operate effectively in or with public or nonprofi t organi- zations. The material in this chapter (and in Chapter 3) constitutes a knowledge base on which to build your action skills. Understanding the political context of work in the public sector will enhance the effectiveness of your actions.

Public managers, and their counterparts in nonprofi t organizations, work in many dif- ferent institutional settings, but those institutions all refl ect important political values that lie at the heart of a democratic system. Whether at the federal, state, or local level, in the governmental or nongovernmental sector, a democracy’s values, especially a concern for operating in the public interest, affect the structure of public and nonprofi t organizations.

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For example, the division of powers at the federal level expresses a fear of concentrated power; similarly, the council-manager plan expresses one way to view the relationship between politics and administration. Finally, the structure of nonprofi t organizations refl ects their operation in the public interest. Knowing something about how democratic values are refl ected in the structure of the various organizations and knowing something about the role of executive leadership in administrative organizations will enable you to act with greater confi dence and authority.

As a manager, you may have important interactions with a legislative body, either the national Congress, a state legislature, a local city council, or a nonprofi t organization’s board of directors. Those serving in the public interest participate in one way or another in nearly all policy areas—a situation that our political system encourages. The distinction Woodrow Wilson suggested between politics (or policy) and administration no longer accu- rately describes the relationship between the legislative and the executive branches. Today, the legislature and the various agencies of government share in the policy process, either working together in developing policy or making separate decisions in different realms.

As a manager, you will also deal with the legislature in many other ways. Most impor- tantly, the legislature will establish the tasks your agency or association will undertake and provide human and fi nancial resources to carry them out. Moreover, the legislative body will exercise continuing, although sometimes intermittent, supervision over your work. Thus, you may spend a great deal of time developing effective working relationships with those in the legislature.

The involvement of the courts in the work of administration is both intense and inevi- table. For this reason, your understanding of the legal system and your ability to inter- act with legal and judicial offi cers will improve your effectiveness as a public manager. Whether you are dealing with the legislative body or the courts, your relationship with either need not be adversarial. Indeed, in many cases, the legislature and the courts can help to substantially improve administrative practices.

By now you should be coming to realize that your behavior as a public or nonprofi t manager is bounded by a vast and complicated network of relationships in which you are but one of many players. Within this network, you must be attentive to questions of execu- tive leadership, legislative intent and oversight, and judicial interpretation. The world of the public administrator is indeed complex!

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Agenda setting: Phase in public policy process when certain problems come to be viewed as needing attention.

Cohesion: Degree to which members of a group are uniformly committed to the group and its goals.

Constituent policy: Policy designed to benefi t the public generally or to serve the government.

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Distributive policy: Policy involving use of general tax funds to provide assistance and benefi ts to individuals or groups.

Executive order: A presidential mandate directed to and governing, with the effect of law, the actions of government offi cials and agencies.

Independent agencies: Agencies intentionally created outside the normal cabinet organization.

Iron triangle: Term given to a coalition of interest groups, agency personnel, and mem- bers of Congress created to exert infl uence on a particular policy issue.

Legislative veto: Statutory provision that gives Congress the authority to approve or disapprove certain executive actions.

Nonprofi t organizations: Organizations prohibited by law from distributing surplus revenues to individuals.

Ombudsman: Permanent offi ce that receives complaints and acts on behalf of citizens to secure information, request services, or pursue grievances.

Policy: Statement of goals and intentions with respect to a particular problem or set of problems.

Policy entrepreneur: A person willing to invest personal time, energy, and money in pur- suit of particular policy changes.

Public corporation: An essentially commercial agency where work requires greater latitude and acquires at least a portion of its funding in the marketplace (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority).

Public policy: Authoritative statements made by legitimate governmental actors about public problems.

Redistributive policy: Policy designed to take taxes from certain groups and give them to another group.

Regulatory commission: Group formed to regulate a particular area of the economy, usually headed by a group of individuals appointed by the president and confi rmed by the Senate.

Regulatory policy: Policy designed to limit actions of persons or groups to protect all or parts of the general public.

Rule making: Administrative establishment of general guidelines for application to a class of people or a class of actions at some future time.

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Sunset law: Provision that sets a specifi c termination date for a program.

Sunshine law: Provision that requires agencies to conduct business in public view.

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What do we mean by the term public policies?

2. Describe how the president’s role in the administration of government has changed since the framing of the Constitution.

3. Describe the administrative system at the federal level.

4. State and local governments have been designed to operate similarly to the national level; however, both have distinct structures for administering government initiatives.

5. Explain each level’s structure and the different approaches to operating the government bureaucracy.

6. Describe the policy process and actors who play signifi cant roles in shaping adminis- trative issues.

7. What are the four types of policy? Defi ne and give examples.

8. How do agencies maintain a power base within the government?

9. Describe some of the structural controls on bureaucratic power and how government, as a whole, benefi ts from these controls.

10. Discuss several ways the legislative and judicial branches interact with the bureaucracy. Explain why these interventions are necessary and useful.

CASES AND EXERCISES

1. We have discussed the various powers, both formal and informal, that affect the gov- ernor’s ability to exercise executive power in the administration of state government. Among the informal powers that governors exercise are political powers (including agenda setting), budgetary powers, and executive leadership.

Among the formal powers are the presence or absence of an item veto and the ability of the governor to reorganize state agencies. Another indicator of gubernatorial power is the number of other elected statewide offi cials. Analyze the power of the governor in your state, giving special attention to the governor’s power to exercise executive leader- ship over the agencies of state government. How do your governor’s executive powers

Cases and Exercises 7 7

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7 8 CHAPTER 2 The Political Context of Public Administration

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compare to those of the president of the United States? How do they compare to those of your local mayor?

2. The United States Government Manual is the handbook or encyclopedia of federal government programs and activities. (See, as an alternative, www.usa.gov.) It contains descriptions of the many programs the federal government operates, as well as infor- mation about how the government is organized to conduct those programs. Obtain a copy of the Manual (or check the Web site) and analyze the organization and structure of one cabinet-level department, such as Transportation or Health and Human Ser- vices. Then, using local sources, try to develop similar information about how your state and your local government are organized to deal with the same subject matter. What are the similarities and what are the differences? How do you explain them?

3. Attend a meeting of a congressional or state legislative committee, your local city council, or the board of directors of a local nonprofi t organization. Watch the pattern of interaction between elected members of the legislative body and full-time administra- tors. (The latter may be agency staff called to testify, legislative support staff, a city man- ager or executive director, or many others.) What strengths does each side bring to the exchange? What is the level of cooperation or competition? If possible, try to follow up with the administrator to see how he or she felt about the interchange. To what extent did the legislative body set a clear direction for the administrator’s ensuing actions? What discretion did the administrator have (or claim to have) following the meeting?

4. Consider the following case: Billie Jackson was the leader of a nonprofi t, economic development corporation in a small community in Colorado. For six years, Billie had been trying to interest members of the city council in purchasing an abandoned downtown hotel for conversion to a city-owned long-term care facility. Billie felt strongly that the community needed such a facility and that the city had a golden opportunity to meet that need through purchase of the hotel. The problem was that several extremely conservative members of the council felt differently. In their view, the city shouldn’t get into providing social services, especially where the need might be met by a private fi rm at some point in the future. Moreover, they felt the cost of the purchase and renovations would be more than the community could bear.

The hotel issue was once again on the council agenda, and Billie was determined to make the strongest appeal possible. With the help of a nearby university, she had prepared a lengthy report documenting the need for the facility and the desirability of purchasing the hotel. Just as she was beginning her presentation, one of the conserva- tive council members said, “Mrs. Jackson, we have heard more on this topic than we care to. I just don’t want to go through all this again. I move to table the issue indefi - nitely.” The motion to table carried by a quick and somewhat confused voice vote.

Assume the role of Billie Jackson. What is your immediate response? What would you do in the days and weeks that followed? Would you continue to pursue the issue? Why or why not?

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FOR ADDITIONAL READING

Anderson, James E. Public Policymaking: An Introduction. 2nd ed. Boston, MA: Houghton Miffl in, 1994.

Barry, Donald D., and Howard R. Whitcomb. The Legal Foundations of Public Administration. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers, 2005.

Beckett, Julia, and Heidi O. Koenig, eds. Public Administration and Law. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005.

Boris, Elizabeth T., and C. Eugene Steuerle, eds. Nonprofi ts and Government: Collaboration and Confl ict. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1999.

deLeon, Peter. Democracy and the Policy Sciences. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997.

Goodsell, Charles T. The Case for Bureaucracy. 3rd ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1994. Holden, Matthew. Continuity and Disruption. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. Kraft, Michael E., and Scott R. Furlong. Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives. 2nd ed.

Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007. Light, Paul C. Making Nonprofi ts Work: A Report on the Tides of Nonprofi t Management Reform.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000. Meier, Kenneth J. Politics and the Bureaucracy. 2nd ed. Pacifi c Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1987. Mier, Robert. Social Justice and Local Development Policy. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publishers,

1993. Nalbandian, John. Professionalism in Local Government: Transformation in Roles, Responsibilities

and Values of City Managers. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991. Peters, B. Guy. American Public Policy: Promise and Performance. 3rd ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham

Books, 1993. Pfi ffner, James P., ed. The Managerial Presidency. Pacifi c Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991. Piotrowski, Suzanne J., and David Rosenbloom. “Nonmission-Based Values in Results-Oriented

Public Management: The Case of Freedom of Information.” Public Administration Review 62(6), 643–657, 2002.

Reich, Robert. Locked in the Cabinet. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997. Roberts, Nancy C., and Paula J. King. Transforming Public Policy. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,

1996. Salamon, Lester M. America’s Nonprofi t Sector: A Primer. 2nd ed. New York: Foundation Center,

1999. Svara, James H. Offi cial Leadership in the City: Patterns of Confl ict and Cooperation. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1990. Rosenau, Pauline Vaillancourt. Public-Private Policy Partnerships. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

2000. Rosenbloom, David H. Administrative Law for Public Managers. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,

2003.

For Additional Reading 7 9

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