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Chapter Introduction
Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
· Summarize the main theological points of Jihadi Salafism.
· Summarize the contribution of scholars and strategists to Jihadi Salafism.
· Summarize the major points in A Call to Global Islamic Resistance and The Management of Savagery.
· Outline the development of al Qaeda from its creation to the present.
· Describe the al Qaeda franchise system.
· Geographically locate and identify major groups in the al Qaeda franchise.
· Describe the rise and metamorphosis of al Qaeda in Iraq.
· Outline the development and current status of ISIS.
· Explain the al Qaeda–ISIS split.
· Identify some of the major Jihadi Salafist crisis points around the globe.
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, Leader of ISIS
Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger (2015, pp. 45–47) tell of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham—al Sham refers to Syria—(ISIS) blitzkrieg into the Sunni area of Iraq in the spring and early summer of 2014. More than 80 allied Sunni tribes, tribes that fought jihadists during the Iraqi insurgency, aided them. Ibrahim Ali al Badri al Sammarrai, whose nom de guerre is Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, was their religious leader. Although they faced an Iraqi army that had been trained and equipped by the United States, the army melted before the onslaught. The United States had spent $25 billion to train and equip the Iraqi army, and much of the equipment fell into ISIS hands. The important city of Mosul fell to the advancing jihadists in early June.
In addition to all of its innovative successes, ISIS stunned the Islamic world on June 29, 2014. Spokesperson Abu Mohammed al Adnani said that ISIS was restoring the caliphate, and the group would now simply be called the Islamic State. The caliphate is the historical community of all Muslims that in principle transcends divisions of race, tribes, and nation states. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, Adnani added, was declared to be the new caliph and named Caliph Ibrahim. All nation states, oaths, and alliances in the Muslim world were null and void, Adnani said. Muslims everywhere were ordered to swear loyalty to the new caliph. Jihad would be waged against the entire nonbelieving world and “heretical” Muslims until the enemies of Islam were defeated in a final great battle. Although a variation on an eschatological theme, ISIS had become the new face of terrorism in the twenty-first century.
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11-1Jihadi Salafism
After 9/11, many terrorism scholars and analysts, including this author, said that al Qaeda and its theology of hate did not represent any of the traditions in Islam. Pointing to mainstream interpretations of contemporary Sunni and Shi’a scholars who were also criticizing al Qaeda, they argued that all Islam was a religion of peace. While this is generally true and reflects the opinion of most Muslims today, it is not entirely accurate. Cole Bunzel (2015, pp. 7–11) says that al Qaeda, ISIS, and a number of other militant groups follow a puritanical strain of Islam known as Jihadi Salafism (also referred to as Salafi Jihadism, Salafism, Salafists, or Salafis), a medieval interpretation of Islam that developed when Arabs were being threated by Europeans and East Asians.
Jihadi Salafism represents a minority and frequently internally condemned interpretation of Islam, but it is a distinct theological strain of Sunni Islam supported by a global network of scholars, websites, media outlets, and social networks. Bunzel says it is deeply rooted in a theology of militancy. The Muslim Brotherhood champions one school. It formed in Egypt to oppose European imperial rule, to purify religion through education and social service, and to seek the restoration of the caliphate at some distant point in history. A more violent school, represented by ISIS and al Qaeda, seeks to purify Islam and rid Muslim lands of Western influence. ISIS embraces a more extreme intolerant version of Salafism seeking to purge the religion of what it believes are un-Islamic practices, eradicating Shi’ites, and waging offensive wars. Salafis see themselves as the only “true” Muslims, and they have assumed the authority to denounce fellow Muslims “heretics” if they disagree with Jihadi Salafi theology. William McCants (2014a) adds that Jihadi Salafism includes an apocalyptic interpretation of Islam that believes Salafis are called to usher in the final days of creation.
Bunzel (2015) says the Jihadi Salafi members of ISIS stress several concepts. ISIS jihadists are to:
1. Associate only with “true” Muslims
2. Break ties with anyone who questions narrow Salafi interpretations of Islam
3. Base governments on a Salafi interpretation of Islamic law
4. Eliminate any resistance to narrow theology; such resistance is apostasy
5. Kill Shi’ites because they are apostates
6. Root out “traitors” to Islam like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood because they compromise with non-Muslims
7. Wage offensive jihad against idolatry wherever it is found (“idolatry” includes all non-Salafi cultures)
Most Muslims scoff at these beliefs and see their faith as a religion of peace. While jihad may be waged in defense of their community, many Muslims see it as an internal struggle against sin. Jihadi Salafism is a strain of Islam, but it is not indicative of contemporary mainstream theology (see Esposito and Voll, 2001; Haneef, 2002; Saeed and Saeed, 2004).
Self-Check
· What is Jihadi Salafism?
· Why would apocalyptic ideas be attractive to Jihadi Salafists?
· What are the core beliefs of the ISIS interpretation of Islam?
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11-2Militant Scholars and Strategists
As religions develop, various interpretations arise, and this is especially true in times of crisis. Karen Armstrong (2000b) writes that reformers emerged in Islam during a crisis in the thirteenth century. Taqi al Din ibn Taymiyya introduced new ideas about purity and militancy after Arab setbacks by the Mongols and the Crusaders. Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab “rediscovered” ibn Taymiyya when he was preaching puritanical reform in Arabia 500 years later. Sayyid Qutb , who lacked theological training, militarized the ideas of ibn Taymiyya and Wahhab from Egypt in the twentieth century. Although apologists defend these men as peaceful thinkers seeking to purify the faith, critics maintain that their theological writings gave rise to militancy. In the Salafi movement, the ideas of Taymiyya and Wahhab are championed by Islamic scholars such as Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi and Abu Basir al Tartusi , although both men reject ISIS.
Although Wahhab has replaced Qutb as ISIS’s inspiration, another strain of scholarship is couched in religious language. Works frequently quote religious sources, but their focus is political and military strategy. Two militant strategists of this ilk have exerted a tremendous influence on Jihadi Salafism. Abu Musab al Suri’s A Call to Global Islamic Resistance is a do-it-yourself manual for global terrorism. Abu Bakr Naji’s The Management of Savagery is a guide for recreating the caliphate while terrorizing enemies without and within.
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11-2aTaqi al Din ibn Taymiyya
Ibn Taymiyyah believed that the Crusaders and the Mongols defeated Islamic armies because of Muslim sin. Emphasizing tawhid, the oneness of God, ibn Taymiyyah attacked anything not endorsed by Mohammed and the first four caliphs. He forbade prayers at gravesites, belief in saints, and other practices that had worked their way into Islam. He was especially harsh on the mystical Sufis, who believed that deep prayer revealed the will of God beyond the prophecy of Mohammed and the Quran. He called for a purifying jihad to be waged against all people who threatened the faith. Jihad could be waged against nonpuritanical Muslims and nonbelievers (Hourani, 1997, pp. 179–181; Esposito, 2002, pp. 45–46; see also Gerges, 2006, p. 209).
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11-2bMohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab
John Esposito (1999, pp. 6–10) says that reform movements are common throughout the history of Islam. Two recent movements became important to the jihadists. In the late eighteenth century, a purification movement started by Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–1792) took root in Arabia. Influenced by ibn Taymiyya, Wahhab preached a puritanical strain of Islam that sought to rid the religion of practices added after the first few decades following Mohammed’s death. This doctrine deeply influenced the Saud family as they fought to gain control of Arabia, and it dominates the theology of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States today. Militant application of Wahhab’s puritanical principles spread to India and other parts of Asia.
Strict Muslims who follow the practices of Wahhab argue that they are not militants, but Salafis are. Puritans who agree with Wahhab’s theology claim they are trying to rid the religion of superstition and return it to the state envisioned by Mohammed and his first followers (Haneef, 2002, pp. 10–11; see also DeLong, 2004). Critics maintain that intolerant puritanism is responsible for Jahadi Salafism. Throughout history, Wahhab’s militant followers have forced their puritanical views on those who disagree with them (Farah, 2000, p. 230).
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11-2cSayyid Qutb
Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) was an Egyptian teacher and journalist employed by the Ministry of Education. He traveled to the United States in 1948 and stayed until 1950 to earn a master’s degree. Qutb’s experience soured his opinion of Western civilization. He returned to Egypt and became an active member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb was arrested in 1954 after the Brotherhood tried to overthrow the Egyptian government, but he was released in 1964 because of health problems. He published his most famous work, Milestones, in 1965. The book outlines the theology and ideology of jihadist revolution, and its militant tone led to Qutb’s second arrest and subsequent hanging by the Egyptian government in 1966 (see Bozek, 2009). Qutb’s books and articles popularized many militant ideas, but scholars influenced by Wahhab today have replaced him. The most dangerous influences on current Jihadi Salafis are from strategists and political theorists who subscribe to militant puritanism.
11-2dAbu Musab al Suri
In the 1980s and 1990s, American right-wing extremist Louis Beam championed a concept called leaderless resistance. Marc Sageman (2008a) applied the term to the Jihadi Salafist movement. It is not a new concept. Whether resistance or jihad, it simply refers to small isolated cells or a person acting alone attacking a perceived enemy. It is autonomous, noncommunicative terrorism. In A Call to Global Islamic Resistance, Abu Musab al Suri popularized the concept in Jihadi Salafist circles.
According to a Wall Street Journal article (Samuels, 2012), CNN once referred to al Suri as the “most dangerous terrorist you’ve never heard of.” Inspired by modern Jihadi Salafist scholars, al Suri became disgusted with the elite hierarchy and unsuccessful strategy of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda could not work because Western military forces and intelligence agencies were too strong for a small group to defeat. Al Suri called for jihad on the individual level. Simply attack a target, he said, any target anywhere in the world. This strategy will eventually result in victory. According to the SITE (2011) examination of al Suri’s 1,600-page manual, Ayman al Zawahiri said it provided a “rich river” for holy warriors.
N. W. Zackie (2013), in a scholarly examination of A Call to Global Islamic Resistance, finds that two concepts dominate al Suri’s military thinking—individual action and location. Individuals and small groups must remain isolated and secretive. Geographically, jihadists should operate in areas of the world that can sustain terrorism and guerrilla war. The work begins with a long polemical history of the Islamic world. The next section starts by analyzing the reasons the West was not crippled after 9/11 and ends with a strategy for victory. Essentially, this strategy is leaderless resistance. It covers tactics and suggests areas of the world where jihadists can be successful. Although the first part seems to be designed as a religious text, Zackie concludes that it is more of a manifesto. The second part shows that al Suri is a strategic thinker.
Zackie argues that the work can be seen as a military manual, but it does more than this. It can be used to uncover the Salafi worldview. Zackie says the first section is designed to expose and convert people to militancy, get them to accept it, and then inspire them to take action. It is an exhaustive political, social, and legal treatise explaining the current plight of the Islamic world. The argument is logical within the militant puritanical strain of Islam, and it reflects common themes in religious terrorism. The oppressed have been victimized by the powerful, here is the evidence to prove it, this is the critical tipping point in cosmic history, it is time to strike, and the supreme deity is relying on the reader to take action.
The second part contains a plan of action. Al Suri (2005) equates the struggle against the United States and its allies with “light gang warfare.” It involves urban terrorism and covert attacks, especially solo actions from wholly separate resistance cells. Jihad should take place on many fronts in all parts of the world. He states that large populated areas where movement is difficult to trace are ideal for resistance, and rugged mountainous areas provide places for concealment. Soft targets create terror, and killing anybody is justified because all non-Muslims and “heretics” are the enemy. Al Suri acknowledges that this may sound like part of the long tradition of revolutionary writings, but he concludes that Jihadi Salafists will adopt revolutionary literature and utilize its tactics.
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11-2eAbu Bakr Naji
A translation by noted authority William McCants (Naji, 2006) and sponsored by Harvard University’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies is available online. Beginning with a critique of Sykes–Picot, Naji explains why it is necessary to create an Islamic state. Dystopian yet realistic, he calls for organizing well-managed, functioning governing institutions. He also calls for war, merciless war, against all enemies—both internal and external. In terms of governing, he argues that the state must brutally conduct savage public torture and butchery against all who resist. The purpose is to frighten the enemy. It is the age-old message of terrorism. Murder victims to communicate with a larger audience. The Nazis did it secretly. Naji urges the future Islamic state to show brutal repression to the world and brag about it.
Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger (2015) conclude that ISIS employs Naji’s logic to rationalize inhuman actions. This logic explains the rational contradiction of portraying ISIS as simultaneously savage and benevolent. It is possible to call the faithful to the caliphate where they all their needs will be met with images of happy children attending school, receiving food and shelter, and playing soccer by using severed heads instead of a ball. The twofold message is designed for different audiences. To enemies, it says fear us because we are coming for you. To the umma, the Islamic community, it says once the “heretics” and unbelievers are eliminated, we will live in a perfect society as God wills. Such contradictory logic provides believers with the religious justification for violence.
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11-2fWhen Do Jihadi Salafists Become Devout?
It would seem that only religious fanatics could follow the Jihadi Salafist path. After all, it is reasonable to believe that only a radical extremist could accept the logic of al Suri and Naji. A recent empirical study may suggest otherwise. Religiosity may increase after someone joins a political cause that is inspired by faith. Research from the Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point (Mironova, Mrie, and Whit, 2014) looks at the point in time when religion begins to be important to militants. The CTC researchers conducted a survey of two differing populations in the Syrian civil war, the relatively secular Free Syrian Army (FSA) and a sample of fighters in Islamist groups. Their purpose was to determine the primary motivation for joining a group or changing from one organization to another.
The researchers found that issues such as friendship, financial benefits, organizational effectiveness, and simply liking people in the group provided the most motivation for joining. Religion was not cited as frequently, but it did increase after a person entered a faith-based group. Seventy-four percent of the Islamist respondents said they became more religious after joining their group. Of those who were members of the FSA, 37 percent provided an affirmative response to the same question. Ninety-six percent of the Islamists said that religion was crucial to them compared to 42 percent of the FSA respondents. When asked whether religion should be an important element in a new Syrian government, 90 percent of Islamists and 60 percent of the FSA sample said yes.
Self-Check
· What is the basis for Jihadi Salafism?
· How can Jihadi Salafism be used to justify violence?
· What themes do al Suri and Naji emphasize?
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11-3Al Qaeda from Inception to 9/11
Al Qaeda’s origins can be traced to the Cold War. From 1945 until 1991, the United States and former Soviet Union fought one another with surrogates to avoid a direct superpower nuclear confrontation. Islamic radicals hated Communists for their atheism, and this drew the attention of Western intelligence agencies. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France began using radicals against the Soviets, and modern jihadist power grew with Western support (Cooley 2002, pp. 64–104).
Western efforts with radicals surged in 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to bolster a failing Communist regime. The United States called on Cold War allies throughout the Islamic world to support Afghan mujahedeen who resisted the Soviets. Working with Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) , Saudi Arabia, and Islamic charities, the United States funneled weapons and material to the mujahedeen. Several Muslim governments also used the war as an excuse to get rid of their own radicals. They sent local militants to join one of the many mujahedeen groups and ridded themselves of sources of domestic unrest. The Afghans had a place for a wide variety of misfits. The mujahedeen were not politically united, but they had two things in common. Most were deeply religious, and they fought the Soviets with fanatical zeal.
The Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, and to the mujahedeen, this symbolized a great victory for God over Satan. The United States and several Western powers turned their attention elsewhere, but many of the Jihadi Salafists mujahedeen thought it was time to carry the war to their other enemies, “heretical” Muslim governments, the West, and Israel. As foreign jihadis returned home, they carried the seeds of a new international terrorist network (see, for example, Benjamin and Simon, 2002, pp. 98–102; Cooley, 2002, pp. 64–75; Gunaratna, 2002, p. 18; Kepel, 2002, pp. 136–150; Shay, 2002, pp. 108-109; Ruthven, 2000, p. 365).
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11-3aOsama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and al Qaeda
Although the United States focused attention on the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991, fighting continued in Afghanistan. Shaul Shay (2002, pp. 76–81) writes that the mujahedeen groups continued to struggle for control of the country. Al Qaeda was one of many paramilitary organizations to join the fray, and the United States failed to recognize the problem on two levels. Cooley (2002, p. 122) and Napoleoni (2003, pp. 189–191) say that American oil companies sought alliances with some Afghan groups in hopes of building an oil pipeline from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. The proposed pipeline would run through Afghanistan. American oil companies paid more attention to potential profits than to the political problems brewing in Afghanistan. On another level, the United States simply ignored issues. As the Afghan groups continued to grow and strengthen, Americans celebrated the end of the Cold War. Only a few people in the United States knew the name Osama bin Laden, and fewer still had heard about a group called al Qaeda.
The report of the 9/11 Commission (2004, pp. 53–54) notes that bin Laden’s reputation began to grow as the mujahedeen searched for a continuing jihad. When international terrorist violence increased in Africa and Asia during the 1990s, bin Laden emerged as a symbol of Islamic discontent. Oil-rich Muslim countries were faced with a growing population of young men who had technical educations but no broad understanding of the humanities, social sciences, or the larger world. They also faced unemployment due to the uneven distribution of wealth in their countries. Bin Laden emerged as a spokesman for the discontented, and his own movement began to take form.
Osama bin Laden was the son of Mohammed bin Laden, a wealthy construction executive who worked closely with the Saudi royal family. The elder bin Laden divorced Osama’s mother, but he continued to provide for the family. Because of his father’s connections, bin Laden was raised in the Saudi royal court, and his tutor, Mohammed Qutb, was the brother of the Egyptian radical Sayyid Qutb. Bin Laden was influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s thoughts. Inspired by the mujahedeen of Afghanistan, bin Laden dropped out of college to join the Soviet–Afghan War. At first, he lent his support to the mujahedeen, but he later formed his own guerrilla unit (L. Wright, 2006, pp. 60–83).
While in Afghanistan, bin Laden fell under the influence of Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989), a doctor of Islamic law. Azzam was a Palestinian scholar who was also influenced by Qutb’s writings. He came to believe that a purified form of Islam was the answer to questions of poverty and the loss of political power. According to Azzam, the realm of Islam had been dominated by foreign powers for too long. It was time for all Muslims to rise up and strike Satan. He saw the Soviet–Afghan War as just the beginning of a holy war against all things foreign to Islam. At first, bin Laden found the theology of Azzam to his liking and the answer to his prayers for a path to holy war (L. Wright, 2006, pp. 99–106). The two men created al Qaeda to serve as a future headquarters for jihad (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 58).
Training in Pakistan and Afghanistan under Azzam’s spiritual mentoring, bin Laden financed mujahedeen operations and taught the guerrillas how to build field fortifications. By 1986, he had left the training field for the battlefield. Enraged with the Soviets over their wholesale slaughter of Afghan villagers and their use of poison gas, bin Laden joined the front ranks of the mujahedeen. At the end of the war, a bomb killed Azzam, and bin Laden returned home full of zeal for jihad.
The Jihadi Salafist movement took a different course in Egypt. Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri was born into a prominent Egyptian family in 1951. An intelligent, high-achieving student, he fell under the influence of violent religious philosophy in high school after being exposed to militant interpretations of Islam. His passion and intolerance grew in college as he studied at Cairo’s al Azhar University. One of his mentors was Sayyid Imam al Sharif , also known as Dr. Fadl. Sharif would eventually be jailed for his views, but he converted back to Islam and denounced violent radicalism (see Brachman, 2009). During their time together at al Azhar’s medical school, however, Sharif validated Zawahiri’s growing radical theology.
Zawahiri was arrested in 1967 and charged with being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. After his release from jail, he continued his studies to become a physician. Still active in underground politics, he opposed the government of Anwar Sadat. When Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel, Zawahiri threw himself into the resistance. Egyptian police arrested dissidents from all over Egypt after Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Zawahiri was arrested and charged with weapons violations, although he was not officially charged in the assassination. Zawahiri was sentenced to three years in prison; after serving his term, he left for Afghanistan to join the mujahedeen.
Using bin Laden’s notoriety and charisma among the Afghan mujahedeen, Zawahiri transformed the organization. Zawahiri knew from experience that an umbrella-style organization was difficult to penetrate. He persuaded bin Laden that this was the type of organization to take control of Afghanistan and spread the new Islamic empire. Using Zawahiri’s ideas, Osama bin Laden began to recruit the mujahedeen registered in his computer database for al Qaeda, while Zawahiri organized training camps and cells.
Bin Laden’s first target was the Saudi government and its “heretical” royal family. As bin Laden’s mujahedeen fighters, or “Afghans,” as he called them, either went home to their native lands to wage jihad or stayed in Afghanistan to train and fight, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia and enjoyed warm relations with the ISI. But the Saudi government, which does not tolerate diverse opinions or dissent, was not happy to see him return. When bin Laden brought several of his Afghans into his Arabian construction business, the Saudis watched carefully. While they looked on, bin Laden became independently wealthy, and his agents began making real estate purchases in Sudan (see L. Wright, 2006, pp. 140–156).
The situation changed in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United States joined Saudi Arabia in a large international coalition opposing the invasion, and bin Laden was infuriated. As thousands of non-Muslim troops arrived in Saudi Arabia, radical Muslims were appalled to find Muslims fighting Muslims under U.S. leadership. The U.S.-led coalition called this military buildup Desert Shield , and after an air campaign pummeled Iraq in late January 1991 Desert Shield became Desert Storm when the U.S.-led coalition launched a ground offensive in February. They stayed afterward at the invitation of the Saudi government. For bin Laden, this was apostasy.
Ayman al Zawahiri returned to Egypt and became the driving force behind another terrorist group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). A prototype for al Qaeda, EIJ was loosely bound, with autonomous cells taking action on their own. Zawahiri threw himself into an effort to topple the government, using Egyptians trained in Afghan camps. EIJ terrorists tried to assassinate Egypt’s interior minister, and they bombed the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. The government cracked down, and Zawahiri fled to Afghanistan with several members of EIJ in 1996 (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 45; Keats, 2002).
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11-3bDeclaring War on Americans, Jews, and Crusaders
Afghanistan was attractive to both bin Laden and al Zawahiri because the Taliban , led by Mullah Omar , took power in Kabul and instituted strict intolerant fundamentalist law. Bin Laden moved to Kandahar and established the organizational infrastructure of al Qaeda with his “Afghans,” dissidents from multiple Muslim countries. Joined by Zawahiri and other fleeing Egyptians, he consolidated power and absorbed the new jihadists in his ranks. Then bin Laden made a most unusual declaration. Seated in front of a camera in 1996 with Zawahiri and al Qaeda’s security director, Mohammed Atef, bin Laden declared war on the United States. In 1998, after absorbing EIJ and other radical groups, bin Laden and Zawahiri formed the World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders , and they ordered Muslims to kill Americans and their allies everywhere they found them (Lewis, 2003a).
In August 1998, bin Laden’s terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The Nairobi bomb killed 213 people and injured 4,500; the Dar es Salaam explosion killed 12 people and wounded 85. These attacks signaled a new phase in al Qaeda terrorism. The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombs demonstrated how al Qaeda had matured. For the first time, the group could operate a cell planted in a country hundreds of miles away from al Qaeda training camps. It used sophisticated bombs and demonstrated complex planning. Then came the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, a failed millennial New Year’s Day attack on Los Angeles International Airport, and then the attacks of September 11, 2001 (see L. Wright, 2006 for one of the best description of these actions, including 9/11). Despite al Qaeda’s reputation as an international organization, bin Laden and Zawahiri failed to emerge as the masterminds of a worldwide terror organization. They served mainly as symbols. The 9/11 plot can be traced to another operative, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who planned the attack and put the people in place to carry it out.
Self-Check
· How did the Soviet–Afghan War give rise to al Qaeda?
· How did bin Laden and Zawahiri create a new organization in Afghanistan?
· What resulted from the declaration of war and the alliance against Jews and crusaders?
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11-4Al Qaeda: Degraded, Transformed, and Franchised
Al Qaeda has become a franchise—that is, a brand name. Zawahiri provides core leadership and operates in the tribal areas of Pakistan. He has power because of an alliance with other groups in the area. Alliances include Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Pakistani version of the Taliban. Al Qaeda core’s most important ally is a large family that looks more like the mafia than a terror network. The Haqqani network runs its own militias, shadow governments, protection rackets, legitimate businesses, and terrorist groups. Dating back to the Soviet–Afghan War, leaders of the Haqqani clan are the major players in Pakistan’s tribal region. They can plan and administer highly complex terrorist attacks from a great distance. Yet, Zawahiri and al Qaeda core have been significantly degraded due to U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan and other counterterrorism efforts. Peter Berger (2009) points to the following significant al Qaeda operatives killed by drones:
· Abu Laith al Libi: led al Qaeda behind bin Laden and Zawahiri
· Abu Sulyman al Jazairi: member of Algerian jihad
· Abu Khabab al Masri: weapons of mass destruction expert
· Abdul Rehman: Taliban commander, South Waziristan
· Abu Haris: al Qaeda chief in Pakistan
· Khalid Habib: senior al Qaeda leader
· Abu Zubair al Masri: senior al Qaeda leader
· Abdullah Azzam al Saudi: senior al Qaeda leader
· Abu Jihad al Masri: al Qaeda propaganda chief
· Tahir Yulashev: commander, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
· Baitullah Mehsud: leader, Pakistani Taliban
Of course, the most public attack on al Qaeda core came on May 1, 2011, when President Barak Obama announced that U.S. Navy SEALs had attacked Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan. The nemesis from 9/11 was dead. Al Queda’s propaganda arm suffered a blow in January 2015 when an American strike killed Adam Gadahn, al Qaeda core’s American spokesperson. Yet, the threat from al Qaeda remains. Seth Jones (2014) of the RAND Corporation explains the reason.
Jones found empirical evidence to explain the degradation of al Qaeda core and its transformation and rebirth as a loose network of jihadist groups. As Paul Pillar (2004) observed, al Qaeda was weakened after the first American attacks in October 2001. The multinational organization began to crumble. Jones says new organizations appeared around the word, some of which accepted the core’s leadership and some of which were inspired by it; ironically, other jihadi groups rejected the core altogether. In the following decade, bin Laden was killed, al Qaeda was totally fractured, and the West was forced to face an expanded network that presented a variety of new challenges.
At the end of 2014, Jihadi Salafist groups posed a serious and growing threat to U.S. interests overseas, and they inspired terrorism throughout the world. Jones (2014, pp. 28–33) finds that the number of Jihadi Salafist groups is increasing, and so are their activities. The number of Jihadi Salafist groups rose 58 percent from 2010 to 2013, from 31 to 49. The largest growth in the number of groups was in North Africa and the Middle East. Membership in these groups more than doubled during the same time period. The largest jump in membership was due to rebels from Syria.
The Arab Spring opened several new areas conducive to Jihadi Salafist groups, according to Jones. Libya became a haven for such groups, and Egypt experienced an increase, although many Egyptian security operations have been effective against them. New groups in Libya and Egypt inspired jihadists in surrounding countries, both those swearing loyalty to al Qaeda core and those remaining autonomous or maintaining other allegiances. Syria was a magnet for Jihadi Salafists. ISIS, now separated from al Qaeda core, was the most active group in 2013, accounting for 43 percent of all attacks. It was followed by al Shabab (discussed as a regional group in Chapter 7) at 25 percent, Jabhat al Nusra (al Qaeda in Syria) at 21 percent, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) at 10 percent. Most attacks have been local, but Jihadi Salafists still threaten the United States and Europe as they plan transnational attacks. Returning citizens fighting with the groups also pose a threat, and Jihadi Salafists inspire homegrown terrorist attacks.
Although the leadership has been degraded, the threat continues due to the franchised approach to terrorism. Bin Laden was an important symbol, and his compound proved to be a treasure trove of intelligence. Yet, threats live on through the franchises.
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11-4aMajor Franchises Swearing Fealty to al Qaeda Core
Diverse al Qaeda movements have appeared in different parts of the world, and their effectiveness is growing (see Fig. 11.1). Some groups have demonstrated an ability to develop and support terrorist attacks beyond their immediate geographical location. Such groups are emerging as threats to regional stability; others threaten Western security. The RAND Corporation counted dozens of active Jihadi Salafist groups in 2013, with several al Qaeda affiliates (Jones, 2014). Some of the major groups are discussed in this section. They are ordered in terms of the author’s opinion of the threat they present to Western interests. The most dangerous groups appear first. (For Ansaru, Boko Haram, and al Shabab, please see Chapter 7. ISIS and Jabhat al Nursa are discussed in the following section. With the exception of Ansaru, these groups would also appear—based on threat assessment—shortly after the discussion of AQAP.)
Figure 11.1Global Jihadi Attacks
Franchise in Yemen: AQAP One of the Jihadi Salafist groups that has attempted massive attacks in the United States (see Figure 11.2) and supported the 2015 Charlie Hebdo murders in Paris grew from the tangled political situation in Yemen. It expanded during violent Yemeni political upheaval in 2014–2015. Its leaders swore loyalty to Osama bin Laden and promised to support Ayman al Zawahiri after bin Laden was killed. The group is known as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Figure 11.2Yemen
In June 2015, AQAP spokesperson Khaled al Batarfi announced the death of Nasir al Wuhayshi , the group’s leader and cofounder. The United States had targeted and killed him with a drone strike. A former aide to bin Laden, Wuhayshi trained in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen. He was arrested by Yemeni authorizes shortly after 9/11. Daniel Byman (2015) says his elimination was not simply another notch on the American gun belt. Wuhayshi transformed a failing terrorist organization in Saudi Arabia into one of the most active international terrorist groups in the world. According to Byman, Wuhayshi was an effective leader and heir to Zawahiri. Under his leadership, AQAP was able to threaten the region, Europe, and the U.S. homeland.
AQAP emerged from the complicated political system in Yemen. A smorgasbord of competing tribes and interest groups remained after a new government was organized in 1990. The government was overthrown shortly after the 2011 Arab Spring, and a new government fled from a tribal rebellion in 2014. As the rebel tribe advanced, AQAP was able to gather strength from some of the tribes that were resisting the takeover.
Wuhayshi and Qasim al Raymi formed al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) after escaping from prison with two dozen other jihadists in 2006. When members of a defeated Saudi group retreated to Yemen in 2009, Wuhayshi welcomed them into the ranks of Yemeni jihadists and formed a new group, AQAP. According to the Long War Journal (Jocelyn, 2015), Wuhayshi became the group’s leader, and Raymi served as military commander.
AQAP attracted competent jihadists, including bomb-maker Ibrahim al Asiri and American Jihadi Salafi cleric Anwar al Awlaki . Asiri became a master of his trade and created chemical bombs with the ability to pass through metal detectors. The son of a career Saudi military officer, he joined AQAP with his brother shortly after it formed in 2009. He convinced his brother to become a suicide bomber and attempted to kill a high-ranking Saudi counterterrorism official the same year. The quality of his work served as a force multiplier, and he taught bomb-making skills to others (BBC, 2014).
Daniel Byman (2015) says AQAP projects a grave international threat. Members have inspired Salafi terrorism in the United States, Europe, and the Islamic world. AQAP was behind an attempt to destroy a Northwest flight from Amsterdam on Christmas Day 2009. A year later, AQAP terrorists packed chemical explosives in printers placed aboard cargo planes bound for the United States. It was behind another failed plot to bring down a plane with an underwear bomb in 2012. Its glossy Inspire Internet magazine motivated two Americans to place homemade bombs at the finish line during the 2013 Boston Marathon. The magazine also gave them the instructions for building the bombs. It sponsored a Parisian attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices in January 2015 when three AQAP terrorists called out the names of cartoonists and methodically shot them for lampooning Islam. One of the terrorists subsequently swore allegiance to ISIS shortly before being killed by French police.
The United States has actively waged a drone campaign against AQAP’s leadership, increasing attacks in 2014 as the terrorist group gained strength. Awlaki was killed in 2011. A number of other leading figures were killed in late 2014 through 2015. These included a deputy commander, the suspect who planned the Charlie Hebdo murders, and Wuhayshi.
Franchise in Iraq and Syria: ISIS (Please see the next section.)
Franchise in Algeria: AQIM Algeria’s jihadist civil war in the 1990s spawned the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 1998, and the GSPC gave rise to a new group, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in 2006. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) says that the GPSC split from the Algerian Islamic Group (GIA) to oppose the GIA’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians (Rollins, 2010). In 2006, the GSPC announced its unity with al Qaeda and changed its name to the AQIM. It was able to raise funds from cells in Europe, but its primary income was derived from criminal activities. It made money by kidnapping, trafficking drugs and contraband, and human trafficking (Figure 11.3).
Figure 11.3Algeria
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC, 2015) says that the group began changing its targets in late 2006 and early 2007. Using roadside bombs, it began to attack the energy industry. It stepped up its activity in Algiers, the capital of Algeria, and it launched an attack against the Israeli embassy in neighboring Mauritania. The group also introduced suicide bombing, and by the end of 2007 more than 30 people in Algiers had lost their lives to AQIM attacks. This prompted a crackdown by the Algerian government, and AQIM was forced from the capital.
AQIM took advantage of political chaos in northern Mali and consolidated its power there. The group fractured after this. Some cells remained loyal to AQIM but operated independently. Other dissidents joined breakaway organizations such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Mokhtar Belmokhtar formed a new independent group with MUJWA named al Murabituom and attacked a natural gas production facility in southern Algeria in January 2013. More than 80 people were killed.
Franchise in Syria and Iraq: al Nusra (Please see the following section.)
Franchise in Somalia: al Shabab (Please see Chapter 7.)
Franchise in Niger: Boko Haram (Please see Chapter 7.)
Franchise in Libya: Ansar al Sharia, Libya Formed in 2012, Ansar al Sharia is composed of Sunni jihadists who seek to create an Islamic state in Libya, according to the Congressional Research Service (Humud et al., 2014). The group has been responsible for attacks on civilians and a number of assassinations. Ansar al Sharia operates primarily in eastern Libya and around Benghazi. One of its most noted attacks against the West was a September 11, 2012, assault on the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi. It killed two security officers and the U.S. ambassador to Libya. Ansar al Sharia has loose ties with al Qaeda core through contacts in AQIM (Humud et al., 2014).
Franchise in Egypt: ABM Ansar Bayt al Maqdis formed in 2011 after the Arab Spring. Its primary operational area is the Sinai Peninsula, but it has attempted assassinations elsewhere. Ayman al Zawahiri publically praised the group for its operations, but it has no known contact with al Qaeda core. It embeds al Qaeda videos in its propaganda. ABM may have conducted attacks against Israel, and it promised action against Western powers that engaged ISIS in late 2014.
Self-Check
· How has al Qaeda core been degraded?
· How united is the al Qaeda franchise network?
· What are the various threats posed by the franchise?
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11-4bConflict in the Franchise: Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS
The emergence of ISIS took some people in the West completely by surprise. It should not have done so. The roots of ISIS stretched back 10 years. Ahmad Fidal al Khlayleh, known by his nom de guerre Abu Musab al Zarqawi , was a street thug who was well known to police in Jordan when he left his homeland to fight in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. Covered with tattoos and a heavy drinker, he was not the personification of Islam. After developing a deep hatred of Israel and the United States, he returned to Jordan in 1993 and soon found himself in trouble and in prison (Brisard, 2005, pp. 10–41). Cole Bunzel (2015) says that while he was in prison, Zarqawi formed a close friendship with Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi, who converted him to Jihadi Salafism. He was a new man when he was released from prison in 1999.
Zarqawi left Jordan for Pakistan in 1999 and gravitated to Afghanistan a second time to support the Taliban, probably with the support of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency. According to Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger (2015, pp. 16–17), he met bin Laden after entering Afghanistan, and things did not go well. The two terrorists found they had little in common. Bin Laden was cultured and educated, while Zarqawi was an uneducated ruffian. Despite their mutual distaste for one another, bin Laden gave Zarqawi permission to set up a semiautonomous training camp, and he began training jihadists. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, he moved to Iraq and established al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). It would become the basis for the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), ISIS, and an al Qaeda franchise in Syria called Jabhat al Nusra.
In theory, AQI was extension of al Qaeda; in practice, it was not. Zarqawi was an independent operator. It is unusual to think of the term moderate when the word terrorism is used, but Zarqawi’s approach to violence was even more shocking than other Jihadi Salafists. Jennifer Cafarella (2015) illustrates the different approaches on an imaginary spectrum. Both al Qaeda core and AQI can be placed on the same continuum, but AQI sits on one side and al Qaeda is on the other. They sought the same outcomes from 2003 to 2006, yet they employed violence in different ways.
Al Qaeda killed its enemies indiscriminately, but it grew more “selective” after two American embassy bombings in 1998 accidently killed over 200 Muslims. Only a dozen Americans were killed in the two blasts. Al Qaeda learned that it had to win the support of local populations if it were to achieve its goals. It was the old lesson from Michael Collins in the Black and Tan War. General terrorism did not work, but selective terrorism increased chances for success.
U.S. intelligence units hunted Zarqawi for nearly three years. Well known for public executions, Zarqawi kidnapped Americans and sawed off their heads with a large knife in a series of Internet videos. His message reflected Abu Bakr Naji’s ideal in The Management of Savagery: Terrify your enemies with absolute ruthlessness. Zarqawi believed he fought for God in a battle to usher in the end of time.
Zarqawi’s participation in jihad came to an end on June 7, 2006. Military and intelligence personnel tracking Zarqawi kept some of his closest associates under surveillance. They spotted one of them going into a house just north of Baghdad and called on the U.S. Air Force. Within minutes, two precision-guided bombs flew into the house, and Zarqawi was eliminated.
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11-4cThe Islamic State of Iraq
U.S. officials released a photograph of Zarqawi’s corpse, a mistake when dealing with a culture that glorifies martyrdom. Ironically, Ayman al Zawahiri, who had once written a letter chastising Zarqawi for excessive violence, gave a glowing eulogy for the fallen leader of AQI. He urged AQI to form an Islamic state with support from al Qaeda and to build a popular political entity based on strict Islamic law. AQI followed Zawahiri’s advice, creating the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, not to be confused with the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence agency). Its new leader was Abu Omar al Baghdadi .
ISI made little headway. While numerous civilians were killed every day, many Sunnis were fed up. They joined General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency and drove ISI deep underground. Its membership dwindled, and its ability to operate was severely hampered. When Abu Omar al Baghdadi was killed in 2010, ISI was on the ropes. Its governing council elected another leader who had been radicalized in prison, Ibrahim Awaad Ibrahim Ali al Badri al Samarrai whose nom de guerre was Abu Bakr al Baghdadi . He was said to be directly descended from the Prophet Mohammed (Stern and Berger, 2015, p. 33).
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi took over at a time when the insurgency seemed to be over or at least winding down, but the Iraqi prime minister made a fatal political miscalculation. The prime minister adopted policies favorable to Iraq’s Shi’ite majority and ordered the arrest of some prominent Sunni government officials. He also ordered the United States to leave in 2012, and President Obama complied. The prime minster stopped supporting only Sunnis, including the tribes that participated in the counterinsurgency. He looked away when private Shi’ite militias moved into Sunni areas, frequently massacring the Sunnis. Tribal leaders and other Sunnis looked for a solution. They found it in ISI and later ISIS. Iraqis forced the prime minister from power in 2014, but ISIS had a foothold among the Sunnis.
11-4dISI Reborn
Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger (2015, pp. 38–39) say that when Abu Bakr al Baghdadi became leader of ISI in May 2010, it was in shambles. Baghdadi began rebuilding the organization, bringing trusted allies into leadership positions, packing the ranks with competent former Iraqi military commanders, and recruiting bureaucrats who knew how to create and manage governmental services. This reflected the philosophy presented in Abu Musab al Suri’s A Call to Global Islamic Resistance. Baghdadi transformed ISI into a Che Guevara–styled guerrilla army. Baghdadi also intended to manage savagery. His minions would use force to terrify external enemies and eliminate all “heretics” in conquered territory.
Writing for the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Michael Knights (2014) says that ISIS did not suddenly appear on the scene in the summer of 2014. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi began a patient and systematic campaign of organizational development when he assumed control of ISI in May 2010. ISI terrorists infiltrated Sunni communities in northwestern Iraq to identify local pro-government leaders. They systematically conducted a campaign of targeted assassinations from late 2010 until 2013.
ISI took other actions. In 2012, it trained highly mobile light infantry units of fighters with experience in Syria, Chechnya, and/or the Balkans. On July 29, 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s commanders began a new campaign called Soldier’s Harvest with these seasoned combatants. The purpose of the operation was to murder individual and small groups of Iraqi soldiers. ISI terrorists assassinated soldiers on the streets, attacked checkpoints, destroyed soldiers’ homes, and killed security force officers over the course of the next 12 months. In the process, they essentially isolated the city of Mosul from the highway and communication systems that connected it to Baghdad.
Knights (2014) says Baghdadi also built a highly structured command and control system based on veteran military officers. He created a centralized cell that would determine overall strategy and delegated authority to local commanders. Launching another operation called Breaking the Walls—a car bombing campaign from summer 2013 to summer 2014—Baghdadi’s command cell selected targets in 20 Iraqi cities, giving local commanders the power to determine when and how the attacks would be launched. Knights concludes that ISIS’s lightening success in June 2014 was the result of multiple actions that weakened Iraqi security forces prior to the offensive.
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11-4eJabhat al Nusra
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi also took advantage of the Syrian civil war. As opposition to the Syrian government grew in 2011, many autonomous groups formed to fight the Syrian army. Jenifer Cafarella (2014), a researcher with the Institute for the Study of War, says that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi sent Abu Mohammed al Jawlani to Syria with instructions to create an ISI front in Syria. Jawlani kept a low public profile when he entered Syria, and he soft-pedaled rigid Islamic law as he systematically recruited fighters to a new organization. He announced the presence of a new al Qaeda franchise, Jabhat al Nusra, in January 2012 on social media. For the next six months, Jawlani made Zarqawi’s mistake of isolating the population by using overt intensive violence. Unlike Zarqawi, he learned this was counterproductive. He abandoned the practice and sought popular support.
Cafarella (2014) argues that Jawlani implemented many ideas contained in Suri’s A Call to Global Islamic Resistance. Like Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, he was strategic and methodical. He began a systematic campaign as al Nusra built strength. The first steps were aimed at killing government leaders, military commanders, and off-duty or lightly protected soldiers. The next set of attacks focused on intelligence and security units while Jawlani increased recruitment and training. He created a small army of trained fighters, and al Nusra became the best organization in the rebel ranks. Al Nusra had equipment and funding, and it was effective. Jawlani took and held relatively large sections of Syria, and recruits flocked to the group’s ranks, including foreigners, secular fighters, and other rebels.
Stern and Berger (2015, pp. 41–42) agree with Cafarella’s belief that al Nusra became the most effective rebel group in the Syrian civil war. Secular and moderate organizations struggled for supplies and weapons, but al Nusra was funded by generous donations. It soon had the upper hand in Syria. In the summer of 2012, Jawlani’s al Nusra sought alliances, made compromises, and provided social services in the areas under his control. Back at al Qaeda core, Zawahiri was pleased and assumed that he controlled both of franchises ISI and al Nusra.
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11-4fISIS
In April 2013, ISI entered the Syrian civil war. According to Stern and Berger (2015, pp. 42–44), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi merged al Nusra and ISI into a new group, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham. Neither Jawlani nor Zawahiri were pleased. No longer soft-pedaling his al Qaeda core connections, Jawlani publicly swore allegiance to Zawahiri. Cafarella (2015) adds that one al Nusra commander said that they did not want to do it, but Baghdadi forced their hand. Stern and Berger say that Zawahiri sent a private letter to Baghdadi nullifying his announcement, and Baghdadi announced that he was ignoring it. ISIS would fight in Iraq and Syria. Baghdadi unleashed his storm of killing in Syria, and he was soon fighting Syrian military forces, secular rebels, Hamas, Hezbollah, jihadist groups, and al Nusra.
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11-4gISIS and the Caliphate
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11-4hConflict within the Jihad
Bunzel (2015) says ISIS’s actions created a firestorm of debate in the Jihadi Salafist world. Several Islamic scholars around the world argued that ISIS had the right to create the caliphate. Critics, including some of the most eminent Jihadi Salafist scholars, thought that this was rubbish. They likened ISIS to the first Islamic heretics and claimed that its theology and practices deviated from the straight path of Islam. Al Qaeda supporters said that Baghdadi lacked the power to create a caliphate. ISIS supporters responded by citing Baghdadi’s alleged genealogical link to the Prophet.
Stern and Berger (2015, pp. 178–191) say that the declaration led to fighting between al Qaeda core and ISIS. Zawahiri declared that Afghanistan was the seat of the caliphate and that the Taliban leader Mullah Omar was the caliph. Stern and Berger say that as of early 2015, ISIS seemed to be losing the ideological war. No major group had sworn allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. By the same token, new groups have sprung up and accepted Baghdadi as caliph. In addition, there was quite a bit of sympathy for ISIS in long-established groups such as AQIM, Boko Haram, and al Shabab. Some leaders in Boko Haram even pledged loyalty to both groups, and groups such as AQIM formed a splinter group that abandoned al Qaeda for ISIS. AQAP was firmly in the al Qaeda core camp under Wuhayshi. Stern and Berger conclude that when al Zawahiri is dead, all bets will be off. As of this writing, the battle for loyalty is still being waged.
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11-4iForeign Fighters
Stern and Berger (2015, pp. 77–99) examine another aspect of ISIS—its ability to attract foreigners, many of whom are from the West. They also cite jihadist expert Thomas Hegghamer’s claims that Westerners are overrepresented in ISIS media and that their zeal is understandable because they are more motivated than average Syrian rebels. Stern and Berger write that just as there is no clear estimate on the size of ISIS combat strength (estimates range from 20,000 to 35,000 fighters), there is no accurate assessment of the numbers of foreign fighters in ISIS. Yet, men and women from around the world have demonstrated a willingness to join the caliphate.
As John Horgan (2005) correctly noted a few years ago, there is no single method of radicalization. Stern and Berger say this is true concerning paths to jihad. Some experts, including Horgan, say that recruits come seeking meaning for their lives. Others seek adventure, absolution of a sinful past, martyrdom, or a religious calling. Since ISIS is willing to take anyone because the “state” needs all types of talent, men, women, professionals, and others have joined.
ISIS has another recruiting theme that is shared with all the al Qaeda franchises. The message is: If you cannot travel to the jihad, practice it at home. That problem is discussed in Chapter 12.
Self-Check
· How did Zarqawi lay the foundation for ISIS?
· Why did conflict and rivalry evolve among Jihadi Salafists?
· How has ISIS’s formation of a caliphate influenced terrorism?
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11-5A Survey of Other Groups
This chapter has focused on Central and southwestern Asia, but the Salafi movement is a global phenomenon. A quick survey of select international groups reveals an array of jihadist movements. Recall that Boko Haram and al Shabab were presented as regional groups in Chapter 7. They are also part of Jihadi Salafism and could have easily been included in this chapter. This section of the chapter will highlight some other prominent groups.
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11-5aLashkar-e-Taiba
The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was created in 1993 under the watchful eye of Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI, not to be confused with the Islamic State of Iraq) to strike at Indian targets in Jammu and Kashmir . Its philosophy and operational base have expanded. Peter Chalk (2010) says that many of the homegrown terrorist threats in Europe, North America, and Australia have LeT connections. The group seems to be emerging as a new global jihadist organization working in conjunction with al Qaeda. It is best known for its attacks in India, including a deadly series of attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, and it rejects all forms of Islam except its own interpretation.
According to Chalk, Pakistan officially banned the LeT in 2002, so it operates under a series of different names. The LeT traditionally defined its operations around the Jammu and Kashmir conflict. Its major terrorist operations include:
· 2009: swarm attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore
· 2008: multiple attacks in Mumbai
· 2006: attack in Varanasi
· 2005: series of bombs in Delhi
· 2002: massacre in Kaluchak
· 2001: attack on the Indian national parliament
· 2000: attack on the Red Fort in Delhi
· 1993: Mumbai bombings that resulted in 300 deaths
Ryan Clarke (2010) believes that the LeT is well entrenched and in a position to launch further attacks. He argues that the LeT was a part of Pakistan’s original regional strategy and an arm of the ISI. The growth of militancy in the tribal regions, however, has spawned growth in the LeT. It has moved far beyond the ISI’s ability to control the organization. Clarke fears that the LeT will not only continue to execute Mumbai-style attacks but will continue to evolve as part of the international jihadist network.
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11-5bThe Pakistani Taliban
· (1)
as a base for launching anti-NATO attacks into Afghanistan and
· (2)
to form a new Pakistani movement, the Tehrik-e-Taliban or Pakistani Taliban (Afsar, Samples, and Wood, 2008).
Figure 11.4Pakistan
There are several bases of political power in Pakistan, and the Pakistani Taliban has grown in importance in the FATA. Tariq Ali (2008, p. 24) believes that the movement does not represent the greatest power base but that it has emerged because of the war in Afghanistan and the complex political situation in Pakistan. Tribal sympathies remain with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and ISI activities have kept the Taliban strong. This has caused the militant religious movement to expand in Pakistani society, something the ISI did not necessarily want to happen. The militants moved into a moral vacuum in Pakistani society, giving them a greater power base.
The United States urged the government to move against the Pakistani Taliban, Pakistan’s DAWN (2015) news service reports. It has taken actions in the past. For example, in July 2007 the Red Mosque in Islamabad contained a madrassa full of militant students. They not only fanned the fires of rebellion, they also openly called for the prime minister’s assassination. As a result, Pakistan’s leader ordered troops to close the Red Mosque. The operation ended with more 100 dead militants (Shaikh, 2008).
The deputy leader of the Red Mosque, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, was also killed, and a group of students vowed to take revenge in his name. This spawned the Ghazi Brigades and a series of suicide attacks in several areas of Pakistan, beginning in 2009. The Ghazi Brigades are more closely allied with the Pakistani Taliban than any of Pakistan’s other terrorist groups. As a result, they do not enjoy the protection of the intelligence community. They have been targeted by the ISI, the army, and Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies (Roul, 2010).
Although the ISI was heavily involved in the formation and maintenance of jihadist groups, such as the LeT and the Taliban, its efforts began to misfire after the Red Mosque incident. The Pakistani Taliban openly challenged the government, and more radical groups emerged. One such group, the Asian Tigers, is actively fighting the Pakistani government and anyone who would ally with it, including fellow jihadists. In April 2010, the Asian Tigers captured and executed an ISI officer, and they publically displayed his body with a note claiming that he worked for the CIA. By summer, the ISI had joined the army in South Waziristan to attack the Asian Tigers. The ISI’s goal was to rid the Pakistani Taliban of its rogue organizations (Jamal, 2010).
Bruce Riedel (2008) notes that as the Pakistani Taliban expanded, the U.S. influence waned. No democratic government in Pakistan can support American interests because the United States is anchored only in the military elite. The struggle to limit jihadist networks in Pakistan, the critical battleground according to Riedel, has shifted from American military and intelligence efforts to diplomacy. Riedel argues that American aid can be directed toward the Pakistani military but that it should be conditional. The army needs to remove itself from politics as a precondition to continued aid, and its main focus should shift from confronting India to maintaining internal and regional stability. More important than military aid, though, is the need to assist average Pakistanis and to build an infrastructure. Military aid will not solve the problem of terrorism.
Religious militancy is the result of several issues that make the region a ticking time bomb. If the underlying problems are ignored, Riedel concludes, terrorism will continue, and sooner or later, India and Pakistan will be on the brink of nuclear war. If Pakistan will not agree to address these issues in a constructive manner, groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban will continue to emerge. Riedel believes that this will consume the region in a wave of terrorism. The potential expansion of terrorism, he concludes, is far more important than al Qaeda.
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11-5cThailand
Thailand is experiencing a rebellion in its southern provinces (see Figure 11.5). Although the country is dominated by Buddhism, Islam is the primary religion of the three southernmost states—states that border Islamic Malaysia. Zachary Abuza (2006b) says that Muslims failed in a revolt about 40 years ago because they were ideologically divided. The present-day revolt is smaller but more united. Abuza identifies the main groups involved in the fighting.
Figure 11.5Thailand
The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was formed in India in 1968 to create a Muslim state through armed struggle. Its leadership is aging, but it maintains a propaganda campaign via the Internet. It held a reunification meeting in Damascus in 2005, hoping to support the insurgency in the south. PULO controls no insurgents, but some of its leaders have made public threats. It claims to be secular, but Abuza says that it has Salafi undertones. New PULO, which was formed in 1995, is much more effective. Its leaders trained in Syria and Libya and have considerable bomb-making skills.
Complementing the BRN-C is the Gerakan Mujahedeen Islami Pattani (GMIP), with 40 active cells. Afghan veterans reassembled the group in 1995, but it deteriorated into a criminal gang. Abuza says that it began to embrace the insurgency by 2003 and that GMIP has contacts with Jamaat Islamiyya in Indonesia and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. The GMIP staged raids on police and army outposts in 2002.
Ian Storey (2007) notes that the southern insurgency is becoming an international affair. Militant groups in Malaysia have embraced the Muslim rebellion in Thailand, though the Malaysian government does not. Radicals in the Philippines and Indonesia see the revolt as part of the international jihad.
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11-5dJihadi Salafism in Indonesia
Jihad also grew in Southeast Asia. Zachary Abuza (2003b, pp. 121–187), in an analysis of terrorism in that region, says that jihadist groups began forming in Indonesia in the early 1990s. The International Crisis Group (2004, 2005a) says that these movements had their origins after World War II when Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands. Islamic associations became part of the political process, but they were suppressed by the government and the army in the name of nationalism. Abuza notes that new leadership gained power in 1998, and Islamic groups blossomed, asserting their independence. In 1999, fighting broke out between Christians and Muslims in the eastern islands, and militant Islamic groups grew (Figure 11.6).
Figure 11.6Indonesia
The political situation in Indonesia provided a climate for the growth of jihadist groups, but Indonesian security forces began to gain an upper hand. According to Abuza, many of the members of jihadist movements had been trained in the mujahedeen camps of Afghanistan. Lashkar Jihad was formed to fight Christians in the east. A more sinister group, Jamaat Islamiyya, was formed with the purpose of bringing Indonesia under strict Islamic law. Both groups had contact with al Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2002, pp. 174–203; Abuza, 2003b, pp. 138–142), although leaders of both groups claimed to be independent of Osama bin Laden (J. Stern, 2003b, pp. 75–76). Even though they appeared to be growing, security forces gradually reduced them. By 2012 many regions seemed to be under government control (Gindarsah, 2014).
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11-5eJihadi Salafism in the Philippines
The Philippines has also experienced jihadist violence. Historically, the relationship between the Christian islands in the north and a few Muslim islands in the south has been marked by strife (Figure 11.7). The U.S. Army fought Muslim rebels after the Spanish–American War (1898), and the Philippine government faced both Muslim and Communist rebellions in the 1950s. Religious and ideological rebellions were repeated themes in the Philippines during the twentieth century.
Figure 11.7Philippine Islands
Self-Check
· What other terrorist groups operate in Pakistan aside from al Qaeda core and terrorists associated with the Haqqani network?
· Where and why has Thailand experienced religious terrorism?
· How did religious extremism evolve in Indonesia and the Philippines?
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11-6Emphasizing the Points
Much of today’s religious militancy is fostered by Jihadi Salafism. Although most Muslims reject it, it is an interpretation of Islam dating back to the thirteenth century. It spawned al Qaeda and the growth of jihadist groups. The power of al Qaeda core in Pakistan and Afghanistan has been diminished. It maintains operational capabilities through alliances with groups such as the Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani family. ISIS grew from al Qaeda; it started as al Qaeda in Iraq. After Zarqawi’s death, AQI became the Islamic State in Iraq. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi built ISI after taking over in 2010. ISI changed its name to ISIS in 2014 after entering the Syrian civil war. ISIS became the self-declared caliphate in 2014. Al Nusra and al Qaeda are currently at odds with ISIS. There are a variety of other Jihadi Salafist movements around the world. Some of them are loosely affiliated with al Qaeda or ISIS, and others are autonomous.
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Chapter Review
11-7aSummary of Chapter Objectives
· Jihadi Salafism is a puritanical strain of Sunni Islam. Militant adherents of its most extreme form believe that Muslims must follow a narrow Salafist interpretation of religion. They also maintain that “true” Muslims can declare “false” Muslims heretics, and Shi’ites and nonbelievers are to be eliminated.
· The historical path of Jihadi Salafism can be traced from ibn Taymiyya through Wahhab. Modern militancy grew with Qutb in the twentieth century, and modern theorists such as al Suri and Naji provide guidance for operationalizing jihadist concepts. Less militant Salafi scholars denounce the violence of militants.
· Al Suri’s A Call to Global Islamic Resistance is a lengthy Jihadi Salafist treatise. The first section explains the plight of Islamic countries, and the second section contains detailed instructions for waging terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The Management of Savagery by Naji justifies rule by terror and mass murder of “heretics” and nonbelievers.
· Al Qaeda was created during the Soviet–Afghan War. It grew in the 1990s and expanded after merging with exiled Egyptian jihadists in 1996. A U.S. military offensive in Afghanistan in October 2001 drove the core organization underground. Many of its leaders and allies have been killed over the course of a long American drone campaign that has been supplemented by special operations.
· The al Qaeda franchise system grew haphazardly during the first decade of the core’s growing weakness. Regional al Qaeda organizations started with the core’s managerial and financial assistance. Some groups emerged independently and later swore allegiance to the core. Today, the franchise is a loose alliance of several groups. AQAP currently presents the greatest international threat.
· AQIM operates in Algeria and surrounding areas, AQAP is in Yemen, al Nusra is in Syria, Ansar al Sharia has a branch in Libya and Tunisia, Mokhtar Belmokhtar is in Algeria, and Abu Sayyuf is in the Philippines. Boko Haram (Nigeria) and al Shabab (Somalia) are discussed in Chapter 7 within the context of sub-Saharan Africa. There are dozens of other small regional groups.
· AQI was created as an al Qaeda franchise in Iraq after the 2003 American invasion. Its extreme violence and killing sprees soon caused a rift with al Qaeda core. AQI evolved into the Islamic State of Iraq after Zarqawi’s death in 2006.
· ISIS evolved from the Islamic State of Iraq and declared its independence from al Qaeda core. In 2014, it launched successful offensives in Syria and the Sunni area of Iraq, and it controlled significant territory in both countries. Its spokesperson declared that ISIS was the new caliphate in June 2014. He also named a caliph. ISIS has called on Muslims throughout the world to come to the caliphate. Those who cannot are asked to launch terrorist attacks where they live. The United States began a limited air war against ISIS in September 2014.
· ISIS joined the Syrian civil war in and announced that it was absorbing al Nusra. Al Nusra rejected the attempt and called on al Qaeda core to mediate. Attempts to compromise failed, and the core split from ISIS.
· Other Jihadi Salafist groups operate in areas of the world that have large Muslim populations. Some of the major crisis points are Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir, southern Thailand, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines.
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Chapter Review
11-7bLooking into the Future
As long as Jihadi Salafism is able to motivate people to take actions in their native countries, low-level terrorism will continue to be an international phenomenon. Attacks have occurred in Asia, Australia, North America, South America, and Europe. These attacks will continue to range from larger operations such as the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris to individual assaults like a hatchet attack on police officers in New York City. Technology will be a key factor. If jihadists are able to obtain chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear weapons, they may use them.
Another future development involves the path of ISIS. The West can support actions against ISIS, but no Western nation or coalition can degrade and eliminate it. Jihadi Salafism is a problem for Islamic nations. If Muslims band together, ISIS and the entire jihadist world could be hampered. Although many Americans think that Muslims do not speak out against terrorism, clerics and lay people denounce jihadists virtually every day all over the world. Scholars publish tracts about the heresy of Jihadi Salafism, and many governments in Islamic nations take action against it. Keep in mind that it took the West centuries to quell religious violence after the Reformation. Only Christians could decide to stop fighting. The analogy holds true for Islam.
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Chapter Review
11-7cKey Terms
· Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)
· Taliban
· World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders
