UNITED STATES AND AFRICA RELATIONS, 1400S TO THE PRESENT

Toyin Falola and
Raphael Chijioke Njoku

Yale
UNIVERSITY
PRESS
New Haven & London

10

THE COLD WAR: U.S. AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY RESET

While scholars and practitioners of East-West diplomacy often present the Cold War as an ideological duel between the capitalist West and the communist East, or what Michael Wesley described as "democratic alliance versus authoritarian bloc," the focus here is on how the post–World War II rivalries between the two superpowers played out in Africa, along with the far-reaching consequences for the continent.[1] One may recall that on August 14, 1941, the United States under President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Great Britain under Prime Minister Winston Churchill had released a joint statement known as the Atlantic Charter setting forth the postwar goals of both countries. Among other things, the charter contained an avowal by the Allied powers not to seek territorial gains and to respect the right of people to self-determination, disarmament, and freer exchange of trade. Ultimately, the charter inspired nationalist agitations throughout the colonized world, including Africa, and the United States strategically nurtured and advanced the ideology of self-determination as a slogan for the anticommunist campaign on the international arena. The point is that the Atlantic Charter created the expectation of national self-determination that influenced African nationalism and decolonization in the 1950s. The Cold War intensified in the 1950s and 1960s, coinciding with the period of decolonization when America's interest in Africa rose to unprecedented heights. However, this sudden shift in attention had nothing to do with America's intent to engage with the emergent African postcolonial state in a reciprocal and respectful exchange of values and cultural, political, security, and economic ideas.

Instead, the driving motive was America's strategic interests articulated in terms of a zero-sum game, or what political leaders and policymakers in Washington perceived as necessary to curb the growing presence of the Soviet Union on the African continent. For the United States, the Soviet Union's conduct of foreign policy was a serious threat to America's rising global influence. But for America to be able to contain the spread of communism in the developing world, especially in Africa, it first needed to address its domestic problems of race relations, along with the international politics of colonialism in Africa. To capture properly the context in which the United States began to navigate these problems by getting more involved with Africa in the post–World War II era, it is crucial to revisit, albeit in brief, the African and African American response to Nazism and the Allied war effort.

NAZISM IMPERILS RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Britain's declaration of war on Germany on September 3, 1939, implied that its African colonies, along with those in Asia and the Pacific, were also at war with the Axis powers. Ashley Jackson has noted that the contributions of the African colonies in the numerous wars directed by the metropole are yet to be sufficiently noted by historians, even as those of India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa have received due coverage as an integral part of the global theaters of both World War I and World War II.[2]

There is no intent here to make up for the lacunas in the historiography, and it is quite impossible to give a detailed account of Africa's role in the two world wars. Rather, the following is a short background to the politics of the Cold War as it relates to Africa and United States-Africa relations in three related domains: Africa's strategic geography; Africa's material, financial, and manpower contributions to the Allied war effort; and the pitfalls of racist ideology inspired by Nazism.

By virtue of its geography in an age of European empires, Africa occupied a strategic position in the Allied war effort. Alexander Moorhead and others have provided glimpses of the North Africa campaign (the so-called Desert War) that raged from 1940 to 1943. The ultimate prize for the armies fighting in Africa north of the Sahara was for strategic control of the Mediterranean Sea, the adjoining Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and other sea routes connecting England's North and East African imperial holdings with British India. As Moorhead noted, the fact that the Desert War was the only theater in which Allied forces directly confronted combined German and Italian forces attests to the seriousness with which both sides in the war considered the African front strategic.[3]

The principal goal for the deployment of Germany's Afrika Korps, led by Gen. Erwin Rommel, was to deter the British Air Force from striking the Ploiesti

oil fields in Romania, one of Germany's primary sources of oil. This intervention became urgent after Italy launched a failed offensive into British-occupied Egypt. As the German-led offensive scored initial successes, the possibility of a German-Italian conquest of the Middle East and a link-up with the German forces in the Caucasus region of the Soviet Union became a possibility. There was also an important campaign launched by Germany in Somalia and Ethiopia (parts of East Africa) in 1940–41, which bolstered its North African incursions. In the decisive Tunisian campaign, the Allied troops, with the help of Africans, seized as many as 275,000 Axis soldiers. Control of Italy's Libyan colony and parts of Egypt changed hands until the British Eighth Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Bernard Montgomery, joined by Indian and African soldiers and supported by U.S. forces, flushed the Axis army out of North Africa and back into Europe, thus allowing the Allied forces to gain control of North Africa.[4]

The most important part of Africa's involvement in World War II was in the material and financial support people of the continent offered to the Allies.[5] Chima J. Korieh's study of Nigeria shows that like other British colonial dominions, Nigeria was obligated to contribute to the British Win-the-War-Funds campaign, with no compensation after the war. Everywhere in the continent, the elite and opinion leaders mobilized both human and material resources needed to execute the war.[6] For example, just a couple of weeks after Great Britain declared war against Germany, the faculty, staff, and pupils of the Qua Iboe Mission Institute in Uyo, Nigeria, wrote a letter to the king of England criticizing Germans and declaring that "our ardent wish is that the Germans be brought to their knees in the shortest possible time," in order to quickly restore global peace.[7] In similar terms, the local leaders of Ututu, Nigeria, wrote the British monarchy vowing loyalty and support to the empire and pledging "to render any assistance" in the fight "for world peace."[8] In more specific terms, the chiefs of Idomi, Nigeria, declared their willingness to assist Britain by "giving full attention to kernel production."[9] Africans sustained this level of assistance to the point that the people of Ondo Province contributed funds to assist the children of London rendered homeless by German bombing raids on civilian targets. Additionally, contributions from other parts of the country brought enough funds for the purchase of Spitfire fighter aircraft for the Royal Air Force.[10]

The African press, including the nationalist newspapers, played their part in promoting anti-German sentiments among the Africans. For example, the *Gold Coast Times* of March 13, 1939, depicted Great Britain as the "great protector of small nations" standing up to evil Germany and Nazi oppression.[11] The *West African Pilot*, owned by Nnamdi Azikiwe, offered the Allies unwavering support for the war. In an editorial of September 4, 1939, the editor noted that the youths of Britain and France were "shedding their blood in order that the ideals of liberty, democracy and peace might strive in the world."[12] In another editorial, in February 1942, the paper declared that it was "the duty of every citizen of this country, as it is of every liberty-loving soul in every part of the world, to bear the greatest sacrifice ungrudgingly and contribute his maximum in every way possible, little or great to bring the success of the Allied forces nearer."[13] The *Nigerian Daily Times* added that the war was a struggle "against habits of the jungle" and "a stand for fair and free negotiation."[14]

The third crucial factor that would affect United States-Africa relations after World War II was the peril of racism. The war exposed the problems of racism in the United States and the colonial territories in Africa. For African Americans, some of whom served as volunteers, there was an explicit similarity between Nazism and White supremacy. For instance, at the end of 1938, when the Nazis started separating Jews on German railways, the *New York Amsterdam News* quickly observed that Nazis were borrowing "a leaf from United States Jim Crow practices against the Negro."[15] The paper went on to explain how the German "Elite Guards" planned to "Jim Crow Jews on German railways," calling the policy "a guaranteed democratic example" in direct reference to the same system under U.S. democracy.[16] In reaction, the famous Black newspaper the *Chicago Defender* added that "the practice of Jim-Crowism has already been adopted by the Nazis." Therefore, World War II, like World War I before it, presented African Americans with an opportunity for a "double victory," as the influential *Pittsburgh Courier* announced: the simultaneous defeat of America's racist policies at home and German racial debauchery overseas.[17] In his message to a crowd of union workers in Detroit in July 1943, Vice President Henry Wallace warned that "we cannot fight to crush Nazi brutality abroad and condone race riots at home. Those who fan the fires of racial clashes for the purpose of making political capital here at home are taking the first step toward Nazism."[18] In response to the vice president's speech, John R. Williams, correspondent of the *Pittsburgh Courier*, noted that Wallace's comments stood as a solid endorsement of the "Double V" campaign launched by African American activists and leading journalists in January 1942 to promote civil rights and the genuinely democratic society that was obstructed by poor White-Black race relations in the United States.[19]

In Africa, a similar debate was in play against slavery and colonial subjugation. Omitting account of the practices of slavery and Jim Crow in America, the Allied forces had purposefully disseminated the propaganda that Hitler and Germans were the problems of the world and that the Axis powers intended to

exterminate all the colored races. Allied propaganda emphasized that the war was waged for freedom and against racial bigotry.[20] In response, the Africans mobilized in support of the Allied forces in West, South, East, and North Africa. As the Africans deployed the dialectics of "freedom" and all that it implies, the imagery and semantic of slavery infiltrated colonial war propaganda. Bonny Ibhawoh has noted that the "propaganda literature stressed that the consequence of German victory in the war would be the enslavement, or more appropriately, the re-enslavement of Africans. Images of half-naked Africans bound in chains and flogged by menacing looking German soldiers were evocative of not so distant memories of slavery and the slave trade."[21]

In essence, Africans, like African Americans, were already negotiating their freedoms and building up hopes as World War II was running its course. In Morocco, the U.S. president, desirous of the support of Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef (Sultan Mohammed V), verbally committed to decolonization after the war. This promise recalled the "self-determination" for colonized peoples of the world promised earlier by President Woodrow Wilson, who was succeeded by Warren G. Harding in 1921 after World War I.[22] In fact, on the eve of World War II, Mohammed V was already looking forward to the postwar era in the hope that French colonial rule in Morocco would end for good. Throughout the duration of the war, Mohammed V, once exalted as an "anti-Nazi Sultan," worked with France to ensure Allied victory.[23] Over a historic dinner in a suburb of Casablanca on January 22, 1943, the sultan secured the pledge of President Roosevelt, to France's displeasure, that his kingdom would be granted independence if the sultan would support the Allies in recruiting Moroccan troops for action on the European front. Referring to these developments in the wake of his deposition in 1955, a news report commented that "during the war, particularly from 1940 to 1943, he [Mohammed V] received much flattery from the Germans and later from other Powers. He came to regard himself as a personality and was persuaded by his entourage that all kinds of promises had been made him."[24] Not only did the sultan comply with Roosevelt's request, but Moroccan veterans served with distinction in the war.[25]

Thus, the post–World War II era was a difficult time for both colonial powers and defenders of Jim Crow in America, as civil rights activists in the United States and nationalists in Africa brought profound pressure on the Allied powers to follow through on their promises of "freedom" and "self-determination." U.S. and European politicians and policymakers found themselves in an unenviable moral dilemma. The choice involved either complying with the promise of freedom for the colonized peoples or maintaining imperial control, mostly for economic considerations. The justifications for racism in America and colonial

control by Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal had died in the fight against German Nazism. In Morocco, a move by French officials to renege on decolonization by undercutting the sultan's authority turned Mohammed V into a friend of radical nationalists there. The rebellious stances taken by the African rulers after 1945 and their consequent punishment by imprisonment, deportation, or exile—all attest to the incompatibility of the new nationalist Zeitgeist with either colonial control or practices of racism and domination.

World War II established the basis on which postwar United States-Africa relations makes sense. Following the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, President Harry S. Truman, who succeeded him and directed the end of the war, came out boldly to condemn racism. Truman was moved by the evil that Blacks who fought in the war had encountered segregation and mob actions at home. Truman unambiguously expressed his disgust: "No citizen of this great country ought to be discriminated against because of his race, religion, or national origin. That is the essence of the American ideal and the American Constitution." Truman emphasized the point by stating that his "stomach turned over when I learned that Negro soldiers, just back from overseas, were being dumped out of army trucks in Mississippi and beaten. Whatever my inclinations as a native of Missouri might have been, as President I know this is bad. I shall fight to end evils like this."[26]

The continuation of racism and segregation affected Truman so deeply that in late 1946 he established, by Executive Order 9808, the President's Committee on Civil Rights, charged with implementing the U.S. Bill of Rights to the letter.[27] "I want our Bill of Rights implemented in fact. We have been trying to do this for 150 years. We're making progress, but we're not making progress fast enough."[28]

The committee's report, made public in 1947, provided a detailed record of forms of racial discrimination in areas such as housing, voting rights, education, and public accommodations.[29] By this time, the Cold War was expanding like wildfire, fueled in part by the slow pace of changes in U.S. race relations despite President Truman's leadership to end discrimination. Also, the problem of decolonization in Africa and Asia was a severe and explosive flashpoint of conflict. Incidentally, President Truman also articulated the fundamental rules of engagement with which to confront the threat of communism around the world. The Truman Doctrine, enunciated on March 12, 1947, made available both the needed cash and logistics to combat communism.[30] These ground rules shaped U.S. foreign policy from this period to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Meanwhile, sensing that the pace of change in the U.S. was too slow, Du Bois and the NAACP were not ready to relent. In October 1947, the African American leaders found supporters in Communist China and the Soviet Union, who

helped them tender a petition of the NAACP to the United Nations.[31] U.S. attorney general Tom C. Clark, a native of Jim Crow Texas, would later admit that the fact that it was the Soviet Union that brought the NAACP petition to the U.N. caused him to feel "humiliated."[32]

EISENHOWER COMES TO POWER

In his inaugural address on January 20, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961), who succeeded President Harry S. Truman (1945–1953), spent a great deal of time highlighting the Soviet threat along with the principles of engagement that would guide his foreign policy in the new world order. "Abhorring war as a chosen way to balk the purposes of those who threaten us," Eisenhower said, "we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop the strength that will deter the forces of aggression and promote the conditions of peace. For, as it must be the supreme purpose of all free men, so it must be the dedication of their leaders, to save humanity from preying upon itself."[33] How Eisenhower and the succeeding presidents of the United States would respond to the Soviet Union's presence on the African battlefront during the Cold War deeply affected the continent in many ways that are still ongoing.

To show these effects in the framework of United States-Africa relations, case studies of interest include the roles of the superpowers in supporting nonrepresentative minority governments, dictatorships, and military regimes in Africa, and in sponsoring coups d'état, assassinations, economic imperialism, and sabotage. Other frontiers of engagement include foreign aid, censorship, civil wars, and regional wars within and between African nation-states. African commentaries on and interpretations of capitalism and communism, such as Julius Nyerere's "African Socialism," Léopold Sédar Senghor's rejoinders, Siad Barre's reactions and responses, and Nnamdi Azikiwe's exploits, are discussed in light of U.S. policies toward Africa as the Western powers hunted down Marxist-Leninist "radicals" on the continent.

BACKGROUND: FLANKING AFRICA FROM THE POSITION OF STRENGTH

Reflecting on United States-Africa relations in the context of the Cold War in 2007, Letitia Lawson reiterated the clear view that American foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa was governed by self-interest. Like other emergent and developing nations in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, African nations were just a "pawn in the great global game."[34] The key word from Lawson's conclusion is "game," but what transpired in Africa over the period was more than a regular game. In conventional games, there is an expectation of fair play and a referee enforces the rules. Games have spectators or fans who acknowledge winners and losers. The Cold Warriors on both sides of the struggle (the Soviet Union and America) held the delusion that every person not on their side was out to get them. Thus, in their delusional grandeur, the superpowers and their allies left no room open for the possibility of an alternative voice or a counterideological choice.

With hardliners like Premier Joseph Stalin (1941–1953) and Nikita Khrushchev (1953–1964) directing the Soviet Union's global expansionism, President Truman voiced his alarm at the pace with which the Soviet Union was extending its global influence. His response came in the form of the Truman Doctrine, which was a policy of containment formulated by the United States to keep the Soviet Union within its existing territories and spheres of influence.[35] The economic side of the doctrine was the Marshall Plan of 1948, an initial grant of $400 million (ultimately $12 billion) in financial assistance provided by the United States to aid the failing economies of Greece and Turkey, and later the rest of Western Europe.[36] In alignment with this doctrine, President Eisenhower warned in 1953 "that common sense and common decency alike dictate the futility of appeasement, we shall never try to placate an aggressor by the false and wicked bargain of trading honor for security. Americans, indeed, all free men, remember that in the final choice a soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains."[37]

While the U.S. postwar economic gift was critical for rebuilding Europe's war-ravaged economies, the truth of the matter is that the Cold War was nothing but a bigoted ideological bazaar peddled by the emergent superpowers of the postwar world order. Armed with nuclear weapons, propaganda apparatuses such as films, radios, and televisions, espionage, assassinations, bullying, blackmail, and other instruments of coercion and intimidation, the Americans and the Soviets went about recruiting clients and supporters around the world with little or no consideration for the values of freedom, happiness, and peace they often claimed to protect. Manning Marable corroborated this view in 1984 when he noted that the "paranoid-mode of anti-communist America made it impossible for any other reform movement to exist."[38] Marable was speaking specifically about the prolonged and disturbing civil rights movement, a resolution of which some mischief-makers attempted to prolong, if not stop in total, under the false assumption that Communists drove it.

It is important to recall that before 1950, the United States had a diplomatic presence in only five African countries: Egypt (since 1849), Liberia (1864),

Morocco (1906), Ethiopia (1910), and South Africa (1930). At that time, most African countries were still colonies and, therefore, would not have qualified for diplomatic representation. However, the United States founded the colony of Liberia in 1816 and opened a consular office in Monrovia in 1864. This is irrefutable proof that America had little or no interest in African affairs until the rise of the Cold War. It is curious also that while Sierra Leone came into existence in 1787 as a symbol of freedom from the Atlantic slave trade, there was no U.S. diplomatic post there until April 27, 1961. Again, when Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) attacked Abyssinia (Ethiopia) with mustard gas, aerial assaults, and tanks on October 3, 1935, in violation of Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, both the United States (a nonmember) and the fifty-two nation-members of the world body refused to take concrete steps in defense of the African nation. This double-face was in spite of Italy's position as a founding member of the League of Nations and its verbal promises to adhere to the tenets of the league. This indifference led to the historic speech by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia at the Geneva summit in June 1936. "What [has] become of the promises made to me as long ago as October 1935? I noted with grief, but without surprise that three Powers considered their undertakings under the Covenant as absolutely of no value. Their connections with Italy impelled them to refuse to take any measures whatsoever to stop Italian aggression. On the contrary, it was a profound disappointment to me to learn the attitude of a certain Government, which, whilst ever protesting its scrupulous attachment to the Covenant, has tirelessly used all its efforts to prevent its observance."[39]

The preceding quote leads us to conclude that within the background from which contemporary American foreign policy relations with Africa emerged, Africa was a sidekick unless needed to achieve the specific interests of the superpowers. Thomas Noer highlights the United States' misconceptions of the continent and its people prior to the end of colonial rule: "Gaining their image of Africa from Tarzan movies, missionary slide shows in church basements, and Ernest Hemingway short stories, Americans saw the continent as a land of jungle and animals, not of nations in the international system. The rapid rise of independence movements in Africa and the growth of the American civil rights struggle following the Second World War finally combined to make the 'dark continent' an area of United States diplomatic activity."[40]

Then, in the 1950s and 1960s, the number of American embassies snowballed across the continent as Africans extricated themselves from the clutches of colonialism. The aim of this sudden hand of friendship extended to Africa from the 1950s by successive Republican and Democratic leaders was to support U.S.

Cold War clients in Africa and to destroy, at any cost, the legitimacy of those who were inclined toward the Soviet bloc. As the transition from colonial rule to self-rule was gaining traction, Richard Nixon, Eisenhower's vice president, acknowledged in late 1960 that "in the struggle with the Russians, Africa is the most critical area in the world."[41] Soon after Nixon's speech, President-Elect John F. Kennedy described Africa as the target of "a gigantic communist offensive."[42] These interpretations reveal that the American leaders understood that instability and chaos in Africa would not augur well for U.S. foreign policy goals on the continent, but rather would play into the hands of the Soviets. Through its actions and inactions, the United States helped create the unstable political situation it wanted to prevent in postcolonial Africa.

THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE AND CHAOS IN UNITED STATES-AFRICA RELATIONS

Writing in in 1989, Thomas J. Noer, an authority on Kennedy's African foreign policy, suggested that the Congo crisis of the early 1960s was the most challenging diplomatic debacle for the president. Noer reinforced this idea with a quote from Roger Hilsman, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research under Kennedy, who in 1960 described the Congo crisis as the most "baffling and frustrating test" for the new administration.[43] Coming from a spy chief, there is no reason to challenge Hilsman's authoritative view. However, we cannot fully understand what transpired in the Congo without starting from Ghana, whose independence in 1957 predated Congo's in 1960.

Under Nkrumah's leadership, Ghana was the capital of nationalist agitation in Africa. Thus, it presents the most outstanding case study of U.S. attempts to influence the foreign relations of the newly developing African nations in the late 1950s and 1960s. In a message to Ghanaians on March 6, 1957, President Eisenhower, speaking through Vice President Nixon, who was in Accra to convey the goodwill of the administration and the people of America, congratulated Ghana on "joining the family of independent nations." He saluted Ghana's "statesman-like cooperative effort" with the United Kingdom, in an apparent reference to the absence of violence and bloodshed in the process of independence, and then added, "I am sure that this same spirit will characterize Ghana's relationship with the free world, including the great and voluntary association of nations, the British Commonwealth." Ironically, the United States also reiterated its belief in people who cherish their independence and right to exercise their free will: "I speak for a people that cherish independence, which we deeply believe is the right of all people who are able to discharge its

responsibilities. It is with special pleasure, therefore, that we witness the establishment of your new nation and the assumption of its sovereign place in the free world." Nixon concluded by saying that he was proud that many of Ghana's eminent leaders were educated in the United States and that "many of our most accomplished citizens had their ancestry in your country. . . . I am confident that our two countries will stand as one in safeguarding this greatest of all bonds between us."[44]

What transpired throughout Africa in the following ten years, including in Ghana and the Republic of the Congo, did not corroborate America's appreciation of other countries' "independence" and the belief in their "freewill" touted by Eisenhower through Nixon in Accra in 1957. Likewise, neither Eisenhower's successors, including Kennedy (1961–1963), nor others would respect those words. Throughout the Cold War era, American presidents viewed Africa as a region of symbolic significance and a battleground for the Cold War. In early 1953, Eisenhower had avowed, "Honoring the identity and the special heritage of each nation in the world, we shall never use our strength to try to impress upon another people our own cherished political and economic institutions."[45] With Ghana as the first nation in sub-Saharan Africa to gain its independence, the United States was desperate to win President Kwame Nkrumah's friendship as a step to obtaining a firm foothold on the continent. This desire explains why Eisenhower invited Nkrumah to Washington in the first year of his administration (Fig. 10.1).[46]

In a meeting with Eisenhower during his visit in 1958, Nkrumah with characteristic candor told his host that his feeling while in the country was a general lack of understanding among the rank and file of the government about Africa's needs and problems. He said that he had heard this particularly from President Bourguiba of Tunisia.[47] President Eisenhower took Nkrumah's message literally, without realizing that while relating Bourguiba's message, the Ghanaian president was also expressing his views about United States-Ghana/Africa relations—especially about the economic needs of the Africans.[48] Uppermost on Nkrumah's mind was the Volta River Electricity Project, which he had hoped the United States would help finance by way of foreign direct investment rather than a grant. Nkrumah envisioned the Volta hydroelectric project as the cornerstone of his massive industrialization program in Ghana.[49]

Perhaps more critical during Nkrumah's visit were those things not discussed: specifically, the troubled racial relationship between White Americans and African Americans, which troubled Nkrumah more than anything else. Kevin Gaines informs us that in a discussion in March 1957, Nkrumah told Martin Luther King, Jr. that he would not accept the American notion of freedom

Figure 10.1. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and President Kwame Nkrumah. *Everett Collection Historical/Alamy Stock Photo.*

and democracy unless America first resolved its domestic racial conflict. This confidential discussion inspired King to express his belief in Nkrumah's ability as a leader "to meet the challenge ahead."[50] In other words, the line of conflict between Nkrumah and the United States was marked on the sands of history before the postcolonial state emerged and got itself entangled with American Cold War interests.

Despite his American education, Nkrumah gradually became a prominent Communist ideologue who envisaged harnessing the principles of socialism to reconstruct a postcolonial model nation in Ghana. The paradox of this resolve is evident in Nkrumah's initial vision of the liberty he wanted to bring to Africa. Nkrumah would later write in *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* that on his way home from the United States after his studies in 1945, he had accepted the American Statue of Liberty as a symbol of inspiration: "You have opened my eyes to the true meaning of liberty. I shall never rest until I have carried your message to Africa."[51] In essence, the Statue of Liberty was for Nkrumah an inspiration in the struggle to free his country and Africa from

colonial domination. The context in which this original inspiration was lost to a Communist ideal is a flashpoint in the U.S.-African relations discourse.

To proceed, it is essential to add that America's sensitivity to its European allies and former colonial overlords in Africa shaped a good part of its African foreign policy. In his address before the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in New York on September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower enthusiastically welcomed the newly independent African nations to the "commonwealth of nations." To the world, Eisenhower talked about the challenges that lay ahead as the new nations emerged from decades of colonial rule. "We can strive to master these problems," he stated, "for narrow national advantage or we can begin at once to undertake a period of constructive action which will subordinate selfish interest to the general well-being of the international community." Of particular interest was his comment on outside interference in the internal affairs of the African countries. "Outside interference with these newly emerging nations, all eager to undertake the tasks of modernization, has created a serious challenge to the authority of the United Nations."[52] As is evident in what transpired in the Republic of the Congo, Ghana, and elsewhere in Africa over this period, the various European colonial powers were privy to the United States' actions and inactions.

With a political image that towered over the African continent as the Statue of Liberty towers over New York, Nkrumah's grand plan was to construct a United States of Africa with an African high command. Not only did this ambitious goal conflict with America's interests, Nkrumah aimed to achieve it under the banner of communism. In this context, Ghana became the foremost Cold War battleground in the East-West struggle, despite steps taken by Nkrumah to lead Ghana in a nonaligned framework. Increasingly, a significant gulf emerged between the United States and Ghana as succeeding American governments came to interpret most of Nkrumah's later policies and actions to strengthen the new nation to mean that Ghana had entirely moved to the Soviet bloc. This perception and the tension it generated both at home and overseas "became more intense and fraught with grave complications. In the end, America's clandestine activities in Ghana with British support demonized Nkrumah and culminated in a coup d'état that eventually toppled Nkrumah's administration on February 24, 1966, while Nkrumah was in Vietnam on a peacemaking mission."[53]

In his study of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's activities in Ghana, John Pradoes reminded us that the U.S. government encouraged the public to believe that it was making the West African country "safe for democracy."[54] Ironically, the opposite and most significant consequence of military intervention in a nascent democracy in Black Africa was apparent. The move created a long history of unstable military dictatorships that lasted until the 1990s, when Col. Jerry J. Rawlings (1981–2000), a hotheaded military officer, commenced a program of extrajudicial executions that targeted the former heads of state of Ghana.[55] Rawlings's actions inspired others of a similar nature in Burkina Faso, where Col. Thomas Sankara seized power in a radical move taken from Rawlings's political handbook.[56] Today, most Ghanaians and Africans continue to point accusing fingers at the United States for the end of Nkrumah's visions for Ghana and the lofty dream of a united Africa.

In a revealing work titled *How America Toppled Nkrumah*, Koojo Lewis claimed that through the covert operations of the CIA the Americans executed the coup d'état that ended Nkrumah's government. Lewis exposes the motive for and method of the CIA operation and the close personal role of President Johnson. As would be replicated in other countries in Africa, the CIA's clandestine oppressions involved identifying and using aggrieved individuals and groups within the rank and file of Ghana's army to destabilize the country.[57] David Rooney, in his study *Kwame Nkrumah: Vision and Tragedy*, suggested that idealistic mistakes imperiled Nkrumah's hopes and dreams for Ghana and Africa.[58] What Rooney did not point out is that Nkrumah, as an elected leader, had the mandate of the people to choose which economic model was best for Ghana.

Now it is time to return to the events in the Republic of the Congo, which contributed in no small measure to the painful relations between Ghana and the United States. In the Congo, a fellow traveler on the Communist road, Patrice Lumumba, whose death at the hands of the army led by then Col. Mobutu Sese Seko was followed by the assassination of President Kennedy in the United States, substantially impacted the calculus of United States-Africa relations. Nkrumah had developed personal relationships with both men, and the assassinations increased his resentment of the United States.[59] Lumumba and Nkrumah shared visions for Africa, and their Pan-Africanist determination to resist neocolonial overtures did not go down well with either the Americans or the Russians.[60]

One of the major fallacies of Cold War historiography is that African leaders abandoned their postcolonial nationalist agenda for the superpowers' interests. The truth, however, is that throughout the period, the African leaders remained committed to the ideals for which they fought for independence, and the Cold War, to them, was a means to an end. On December 11, 1958, Lumumba, as president of the Congolese National Movement, addressing the Assembly of African Peoples, an international Pan-African conference sponsored by Nkrumah, articulated that collective nationalist vision: "We wish to see a modern

democratic state established in our country, which will grant its citizens freedom, justice, social peace, tolerance, well-being, and equality, with no discrimination whatsoever. In our actions aimed at winning the independence of the Congo, we have repeatedly proclaimed that we are against no one, but rather are simply against domination, injustices, and abuses, and merely want to free ourselves of the shackles of colonialism and all its consequences."[61] President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia reemphasized the nationalist policy when he declared that his country, like many other African countries, would remain nonaligned in the Cold War: "Zambia stands like the other non-aligned nations, for the abolition of colonialism and neo-colonialism in all forms; and for the right to accept help from East or West without committing our people to accept their political beliefs. Or will purchase economic development at the cost of a new type of colonialism. . . . Therefore we ask that countries which offer us their aid should not exploit our need in order to infringe our sovereignty, for this is something which we shall guard jealously."[62]

It was therefore not surprising that after the murder of Lumumba, Nkrumah lost all respect for the U.S. government and intensified his attack on the manner in which the American government conducted its foreign policies. The crime Lumumba had committed against the United States was to profess communism so loudly, without fear or favor. Tim Weiner, who made a study of the covert operations of the CIA in Africa, concluded that the U.S. government masterminded the brutal assassination of the first prime minister of the Republic of the Congo.[63] However, the truth of the matter, as documented by Ludo de Witte and others, is that Belgium prioritized the killing, and in fact, directed it.[64]

After his election in a free and fair election, Joseph Kasavubu, the first president of the Republic of the Congo (1960–1965), which gained its independence on June 30, 1960, had appointed Lumumba the country's premier. Nevertheless, the Congo fell into chaos five days later. While the forces that led to the crisis are many, the primary issue was that Belgium, the former colonial power, was not comfortable with the nationalist rhetoric of Lumumba, who they feared would nationalize their billions of investments in Congo's mineral-rich region of Katanga. As a result, Belgium advised Moise Tshombe, its stooge in Katanga, to secede his province from the central government under Kasavubu and Lumumba. After Tshombe declared the secession of Katanga on July 11, 1960, President Kasavubu instructed Lumumba to stop the secession and restore order.[65] Two days later, the United Nations authorized a peace mission operation in the Congo. The calculation of Eisenhower was to accomplish a peaceful

resolution of the crisis before the Soviets seized the opportunity to incorporate Congo into its sphere of influence.

However, Lumumba had appealed to the United States for military protection and assistance as the Congo transitioned from Belgium's brutal and exploitative colonial rule to self-government in 1960. Similar to the case with Ghana in 1957 and many other African states over the period, the appeal for help received no positive response—obviously because Belgium was opposed to Lumumba's designs for his country. Rather, the CIA in the Congo concluded that Lumumba was a Communist and marked him for elimination by poisoning.[66] In the ensuing crisis, Belgian troops invaded Leopoldville (later Kinshasa) in an attempt to retake control of the Congolese capital. At this point, Lumumba accepted Soviet planes, trucks, and "technicians" to bolster his barely functioning government.

The week the Belgian soldiers arrived, CIA Director Allen Dulles (1893–1969) sent Larry Devlin, the station chief in Brussels, to take charge of the CIA post in the capital of the Congo and assess Lumumba as a target for covert action. On August 18, after six weeks in the country, Devlin cabled CIA headquarters: "Congo experiencing classic communist effort takeover . . . whether or not Lumumba is actual commie or playing the commie game . . . there may be little time left in which to take action to avoid another Cuba."[67]

Confidential Senate testimony on "Project Wizard," delivered in 1975 by the U.S. National Security Council's recorder, Robert Johnson, reveals that at that meeting, President Eisenhower plainly instructed Dulles to have Lumumba assassinated. Eight days later, Dulles cabled the president: "In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL [Lumumba] continues to hold high office, the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to a communist takeover of the Congo . . . we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this would be a high priority of our covert action. Hence, we wish to give you wider authority along lines Leop 0772 and Leop 0785."[68]

It is difficult to detail the consequences of America's role in the destabilization of the Republic of the Congo in a work of this nature. In the meantime, following the death of Lumumba on January 17, 1961, a period of political turmoil followed as the U.N. tried to restore peace and stability in the country. The U.N. peace mission effort accomplished little because of America's determination to retain Col. Mobutu Sese Seko as a client in the Cold War struggle. In 1965, Mobutu, who would become one of Africa's most brutal dictators, launched a second coup that effectively ended Kasavubu's government. Throughout his

tenure, from 1965 to 1997, Mobutu presided over a corrupt and cruel regime that brought about a catastrophic decline in national security, state service, and looting of the state treasury. Since the 1960s, civil war has been persistent, and foreign actors, mainly from Belgium and the United States, continue to fuel the conflicts and plunder the country's enormous mineral and agricultural wealth. The American government gave this systemic exploitation an official seal on February 12, 1990, following the "Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment" treaty between Washington and the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo.[69]

Angola was another flashpoint in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for supremacy in Africa. At the height of the Vietnam War in 1975, the United States launched a covert mission to stop another Communist bid in Angola. While the effort fell short of preventing a Marxist government from ascending to power in the former Portuguese colony, it prolonged a chaotic civil war that resulted after the nationalists toppled the Portuguese colonial rule. The civil war involved the United States, the Soviet Union, and China in a grand proxy war that directly involved 50,000 Cuban soldiers on the side of the Communists, and apartheid South Africa and Congo-Zaire on the side of the United States and the rebel factions.

The making of the Angolan Cold War battleground goes back to around 1956, when in cities such as Luanda, Kinshasa, Algiers, Lisbon, Paris, and London, different progressive sectors of students, intellectuals, and European liberals promoted an anticolonial struggle through different left-wing and nationalist groups. These rather diverse groups of organizations with different nationalistic ideas mobilized around the purpose of overthrowing Portuguese colonial rule in Angola. After a rebellion in the main political prison in Luanda that caused general turmoil in 1961, those groups converged around a radical nationalist political structure: the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA). Its militants carried out clandestine operations in urban areas and villages, enduring the repression mounted by the PIDE (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado, or International and State Defense Police). While the colonial government forced many of the insurgent leaders into exile in Europe or other African countries, the insurgents kept their eyes on the target: Angola's emancipation from the Portuguese colonial stranglehold.[70]

The Angolan MPLA nationalists projected a struggle based on a particular conception of the past, a historical representation expressed as discourses and practices, in which Angola's history became a foundation for the rise of a new postcolonial society.[71] In the Alvor Agreement of January 1975, all the warring

parties agreed to put together a coalition government, and the independence of Angola was set for November of that year. However, fighting resumed in July, and when the Portuguese colonial regime caved in August 1975, the Marxist MPLA, who eventually emerged victorious, were already in control of Luanda, the capital city. However, the United States refused to recognize them but instead continued to sponsor the rebels from neighboring Congo-Zaire, the name of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1971. The United States gradually transferred its support to Jonas Savimbi, whom President Ronald Reagan welcomed to the White House in 1986 as a freedom fighter, to the outrage of the African heads of state who opposed his ambitious military and personal designs in Angola.[72] For nearly three decades, the United States supplied arms and materials to the rebels in the face of angry opposition by the Organisation of African Unity. As explained elsewhere, Savimbi was one of several career troublemakers, or "entrepreneurial warriors," who would rather go to any lengths in prosecuting and accomplishing their missions than accept any peace deals short of granting them total control of the ultimate "prize."[73] The careers of Liberia's Charles Taylor, Angola's Savimbi, and Sierra Leone's Foday Sankoh show how successful "war entrepreneurs think globally but act locally, using violence to exploit marketable natural resources without necessarily controlling the state."[74]

The eventual death of Savimbi on February 22, 2002, created an opportunity for scholars and policymakers to learn more about America's longest-lasting rebel ally in Angola. "A trove of recently declassified American documents seem to overturn conventional explanations of the war's origins."[75] These show that contrary to what the United States government had claimed, the Americans intervened in Angola weeks before the arrival of any Cubans. Additionally, it is now known that contrary to its denials, America collaborated with apartheid South Africa during the war in Angola.

Historian Piero Gleijeses, who has perused these classified documents, notes that "when the United States decided to launch the covert intervention, in June and July, not only were there no Cubans in Angola, but the U.S. government and the CIA were not even thinking about any Cuban presence in Angola." Rather, the Cuban intervention came as a response to the U.S. presence. Gleijeses further states that in a 1975 report delivered to the U.S. Senate toward the end of the year, "what you find is really nothing less than the rewriting of history."[76]

In his review of Gleijeses's book, Howard French "strongly challenges common perceptions of Cuban behavior in Africa. In the 1960s and 1970s, when Havana and Washington repeatedly clashed in central and southern Africa,

Cuban troops in the continent were typically seen as foot soldiers for Soviet imperialism." French stresses that Cuba intervened in Angola without seeking Soviet permission. The Soviets limited their activities "to providing 10 charter flights to transport Cubans to Angola in January 1976. The next year, Havana and Moscow supported opposite sides in an attempted coup in Angola, in which the Marxist government, Cuba's ally, prevailed."[77]

In Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia, then known simply as Rhodesia after 1965), which regained its independence in 1980 after a prolonged and bloody guerrilla war against an abusive White minority rule, the path to Black freedom was complicated by the actions and inactions of the United States government and its small group of White supremacist citizens. On November 11, 1965, the minority government of Prime Minister Ian Smith chose to split from Great Britain, declaring Southern Rhodesia an independent nation. Smith's unilateral action threw the country's African majority population, estimated at 4.3 million, deeper into the vortex of racial subjugation under a European population of 224,000. Gerald Horne notes that in a country whose racial structure mirrored the apartheid system of neighboring South Africa, the route chosen by the minority government escalated a raging guerrilla war.[78]

In the United States, President Johnson timidly viewed the unfolding events in Rhodesia. His prime concern was that such a racial conflict in Africa had the potential to exacerbate America's already troubled racial discord. Unexpectedly, U.S. government officials expressed concerns over Rhodesia's actions, particularly with regard to human rights violations. The United States announced sanctions against the South Rhodesian government that it never intended to enforce. Instead, an attitude of tolerance explains the U.S. response to the conflict. Scores of White American fighters volunteered on the side of the White minority government, with no concerted effort by the U.S. government to stop them.

The actions and inactions of the U.S. government, as well as some of its citizens in the Southern Rhodesia conflict, mirrored the nature of Black-White relations in the United States and Africa. There was a virulent pro-Rhodesia lobby in the U.S. government during the late 1960s and 1970s, with an office located at 2852 McGill Terrace, NW in Washington. On March 29, 1977, during President Jimmy Carter's administration, John Goshko of the *Washington Post* reported that "the office has been run since its inception by Kenneth H. Towsey, who previously had been the Smith government's 'counselor for Rhodesian affairs' within the British embassy. Towsey is assisted by another Rhodesian national, H. J. C. Hooper, who deals primarily in information matters."[79]

A lover of Africa, President Carter, who was in office from 1977 to 1981, firmly supported majority Black rule in Rhodesia. He submitted a resolution to the

United Nations and successfully lobbied the members to support the closure of offices maintained by Southern Rhodesia in other countries. Smith's minority government fell in 1980, and African nationalists led by Robert Mugabe proclaimed the independent state of Zimbabwe.

Admittedly, the United States inserted itself into African affairs in a complicated context. Until the 1960s, the Americans saw the African continent as within the Europeans' sphere of influence by virtue of their imperial claims. In a memorandum of discussion at the 375th meeting of the National Security Council held on August 7, 1958, President Eisenhower asked his adviser on the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, Clarence B. Randall (chairman of the board of the Inland Steel Company), how the United States was coordinating "our policies toward these colonial areas with the mother countries." In response, Randall explained that "this was a delicate problem." According to Randall, assisting the colonies was often less offensive to the European imperial powers "if offered in the framework of a multilateral organization, so that it appeared as a mutual effort." On this note, Eisenhower remarked that it was often difficult to cultivate good relations with colonies. The president went on to cite an occasion where "there was a great concern in Paris every time the United States spoke a friendly word to a French colony." The report of the discussion concluded that "in Africa South of the Sahara we must be careful not to get ourselves hated by both the colonies and the mother countries."[80]

Indeed, America's efforts not to infuriate its European allies did more harm to Africa than good. One of the most unfortunate incidents that took place in Africa between 1961 and 1967 was the series of seventeen nuclear-bomb tests carried out by the French government in the Algerian end of the Sahara Desert during the administration of President Charles de Gaulle.[81] To be fair, the United States did not openly support the French actions but condoned them in a desperate attempt to retain its European allies in the Cold War struggle. Discussions between President de Gaulle and U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles on July 5, 1958, concerning the use of nuclear weapons ended in disagreement because de Gaulle was intent on making France a nuclear power.[82]

The French nuclear-testing power show brought African masses and nationalists of all ideological persuasions into a unified front against what they perceived as open disdain for the continent and endangerment of the lives of its people. In August 1958, when the plans for a French test in the Sahara were first made official, Ghana's minister of transport and communications, Krobo Edusei, led a mass demonstration to the French Embassy in Accra. The French officials refused to give the peaceable demonstrators an audience and used embassy security staff to disperse the crowd. President Nkrumah immediately constituted a Ghana Council for Nuclear Disarmament (GCND) "to educate the

people in the dangers of all such tests to the health and prosperity of the African peoples."[83] Through the awareness created by the GCND, every independent African state and every freedom movement in Africa, from Morocco and Tunisia in the North to the freedom movements in South Africa, condemned the French action with one voice.

Yet, the French were deliberate and bold in their resolve to acquire nuclear capability as a deterrent in a dangerously polarized period of international relations. On February 13, 1960, France conducted its first atomic test, code-named *Gerboise Bleue* (Blue Desert Rat). The first test was followed by four more held at the Reggane Oasis in the Sahara Desert of Algeria.[84] With an explosive capacity of seventy kilotons, the first test recorded four times more destructive capacity than the atom bomb the U.S. Army Air Force had detonated over Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945. Ignoring African demands to halt its plans for a follow-up test, the French government soon announced a further series of tests—this time underground.[85] As investigations later revealed, the French authorities were already making plans for underground nuclear testing in 1959, anticipating that "scenarios relative to international agreements on nuclear testing" could make it "impossible to carry out an aerial nuclear explosion. For this reason, the Minister of Armed Forces ordered a study of the conditions for an underground explosion."[86] France went on to conduct thirteen more nuclear tests because a U.N. ban on nuclear tests in 1963 did not include a prohibition on underground tests.

Enraged by these extra tests, African governments went to the United Nations to challenge the right of the French government to carry out these tests on African soil when it fully understood the consequences of its actions: "We say to the French Government today, 'If you don't want to test them in Paris don't come to Africa to test them!'"[87] In December 1960 and November 1961, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolutions calling on member states to refrain from any nuclear tests in Africa.[88] Later, the United Nations also condemned further tests as proposed by France, by an overwhelming majority. The Ghanaian government also formed an international coalition under the leadership of Rev. Michael Scott, with representatives from Nigeria, Basutoland, the United States, Britain, and France, to protest France's actions. The team adopted a nonviolent approach to entering the testing site at Reggane, Algeria, "to challenge the right of France to endanger the life and health of innocent people, and to desecrate the soil of mother Africa."[89]

Considering that these dangerous tests came in the midst of the Algerian struggle for independence, it was predictable that African nationalists immediately linked the French actions to the political situation in Algeria. In his speech

of September 1, 1960, Joseph Tawia Adamafio, the information and broadcasting minister under Nkrumah, charged that: "The political reasons for opposing these tests are no less powerful than the humanitarian; indeed, the two cannot be separated. Does it not mean the continuation of the Algerian war which has already cost over a million lives and condemned many millions to homelessness, hunger, and utter ruin—the reports of further tests, if true, shed a sinister new light on France's continued obstinacy to grant to the Algerian people the right of self-determination which harsh political facts have forced her to accept in her other colonial territories in Africa."[90] In response, the president of Mali, M. Modibo Keita, warned France that it could not support its repressive policies in Algeria and might shortly recognize the Algerian Provisional Government.

In defense of its actions, France claimed that "its nuclear operations were carried out as safely as possible." However, the confidential military report first acquired by the authoritative newspaper *Le Parisien* in 2010 indicated that soldiers who served in Algeria had been used as "guinea pigs" to study the effects of radiation on human health: "According to the report, a 1961 nuclear test involved military personnel advancing on foot and in trucks to within a few hundred meters of the epicenter of a nuclear blast less than an hour after detonation."[91] Also, a survey conducted in 2008 by Dr. Jean Louis Valatx of AVEN, an association representing veterans of the French nuclear test, revealed that "35 percent of the polled veterans had one or more types of cancer and one in five had become infertile."[92]

One of the participants in the *Gerboise Bleue* test, Michel Verger, disclosed that he "was wearing shorts. We were made to lie face down on the ground, eyes closed and arms folded, and not watch the flash, but immediately afterward we had to get up with an apparatus around our necks and measure and photograph the impact."[93] An Algerian scientist, Kathum El-Abodi, who has conducted a study on the nuclear testing in Algeria, noted that the test "resulted in environmental degradation, such as the movement of sand dunes in areas already affected by wind erosion. Radiation furthermore led to a decline in livestock and biodiversity, including the disappearance of several migratory and endemic reptiles and birds."[94] In addition to its own soldiers, the French government willfully exposed an estimated 30,000 Algerian civilians to radiation.[95]

It seems appropriate to conclude that United States' post–World War II African foreign policy evolved in the context of the Cold War. Two critical forces determined the nature of this policy: America's strategic interest in preventing the Soviet Union from gaining control of postcolonial African states, and America's desire not to offend its European allies—the former colonial powers Britain, France, Portugal, and Belgium. American leaders considered Africa as

the Europeans' realm of influence and power. What the Americans did and did not do remains a critical factor in shaping the fate of Africa—whether we are looking at the class roots of Anwar Sadat's regime in Egypt or the international response to the Nigeria-Biafra civil war (1967–1970).[96] Other issues in which the United States' response or lack of it figured prominently involved the tensions between the "Monrovia" and "Casablanca" groups of African states (a critical Cold War political divide) that centered on African outrage at French nuclear tests in the Sahara. Across the continent, the impact of the Cold War in Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Morocco, Ghana, and elsewhere spurred a legion of intellectual and diplomatic discourses among African intellectuals and postcolonial political elite and leaders of opinion.

While some African leaders such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe fought hard to stop short of endorsing communism as the right approach to Africa's development in the immediate postcolonial order, others like Julius Nyerere promoted Ujamaa, a form of African socialism, as a path to development in Tanzania and elsewhere. In the "Arusha Declaration" of February 5, 1967, President Nyerere outlined the principles of Ujamaa, rooted in the concept of self-reliance, that were to guide the economy of the newly independent nation. To each of these discourses, the Americans reacted with either force and emotion or hatred. Admittedly, several factors brought about the failure of Ujamaa—among them poor planning, government oppression of rural Tanzanians, drought, and the collapse of commodity prices. However, in reacting against Ujamaa, the United States and its European allies denied Tanzania any development aid or bilateral cooperation until the end of the Cold War in 1989. This policy persisted even though Tanzania demonstrated exemplary leadership in Africa and its promotion of the global nonaligned movement aimed to offset the dangers of the Cold War rivalry between East and West. The legacies of the Cold War are many; they range from arrested development, light armaments, landmines, migrations, lingering attachments to ideological thinking among leaders, and revolutionary adventurers to African university professors who continue to propagate Marxist ideologies in the minds of their students.