Strategic Audit Report
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Strategic Management Week 10 – Chapter 10
Organizing for Corporate Diversification
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Chapter 10 Learning Objectives
• Describe the multidivisional or M-Form and how it differs from a U-Form. • Describe how the M-Form can be used to implement a corporate
diversification strategy. • Describe the role of various stakeholders in the functioning of the M-form. • Understand key elements of implementation of corporate diversification
strategy. • Understand the key role of implementation in strategies in general.
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Where Are We in the SM Process?
Mission Objectives
External Analysis
Internal Analysis
Strategic Choice
Strategy Implementation
Competitive Advantage
Business Level Strategy
Corporate Level Strategy
How to Position a Business
in the Market? Which Businesses
to Enter?
•Vertical Integration •Diversification
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Strategies used as a means to avoid or be better than competitors
• Module 3: – Vertical Integration (8) – Corporate Diversification (9) – Organizing for diversification (10)
• Module 4: – Collusion (7) – Strategic Alliances (10) – Mergers and Acquisitions (11)
© Lucas Wenger 2018
What is Corporate Diversification?
Operation in multiple industries or markets simultaneously
à2 Categories (not mutually exclusive)
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Value of Diversification
Two Criteria
1) There must be some economy of scope
2) The focal firm must have a cost advantage over outside equity holders in exploiting any economies of scope
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Implementation Issues
• How Information Flows • Where and By Whom are Decisions Made • How to Influence the Behavior of People
© Lucas Wenger 2018
The Need for Organizational Structure
Information Processing Requirements
• as organizations become larger and more complex, information processing requirements exceed individual capacity
• bounded rationality
• organizational structure divides information processing into manageable blocks (span of control)
• satisficing
© Lucas Wenger 2018
The Agency Relationship - Managing Agency
Individual Shareholders
Institutional Shareholders
Principals Agents
Senior Executives
Corporate Staff
Division General
Managers
Shared Activity
Managers
Monitors
Board Of
Directors
Dual Role
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Strategic Planning
Corporate Finance
Corporate R&D
Corporate Marketing
ProductionFinanc e
Engineerin g
Accounting
Human Resource
s
Division Division Division
Sales & Marketing
Senior Executive
Corporate Human
Resources
Board of Directors
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Shared Activity Managers
ProductionFinance
Engineering
Division Division Division
Human Resources
Sales & Marketing
ProductionFinance
Engineering
Shared Activities
Cost Centers
Profit Centers
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Firm Presidency - CEO Duality & TMT Structure
Chairman of the Board (monitoring)
Chief Executive
Officer (strategy formulation)
Chief Operating
Officer (strategy implementation)
Chairman
CEO
COO
Chairman
CEO
COO
Chairman
CEO
COO
Chairman
CEO
COO
One Person Two People Three People
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Information Filtering
• information about the divisions’ businesses is filtered as it rises to the senior executive
• the senior executive can ‘manage’ the information flow
• information flow should not exceed the bounded rationality of managers at any level in the organization
• information should flow should be matched with decision-making authority
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Management Controls
• Evaluating Divisional Performance – Economic value added (EVA) – Allocating costs & revenues
• Allocating Capital – Managerial Motivation – Budgeting
• Transferring Intermediate Products – Negotiated – Market-based – Dual pricing
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Evaluating Divisional Performance
• A hurdle rate (common across all BU’s in the firm)
• Budgeted performance level (assigned by division)
• Avg. level of profitability in each division’s industry
• EVA = WACC * Capital employed by divison
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Allocating Capital
• GMs have an incentive to overstate prospects and understate potential problems
• Zero-based budgeting vs. incremental • Incremental
– Can lead to bloat • Zero-based
– Ranking a request’s importance is subjective & requires complete understanding of strategic role of proposed projects
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Transfer Pricing
• Intermediate Products/Services – those produced by one division and used as inputs in another division
• At the transfer the product/service is “sold” within the company – but how is the price determined without a market?
• Transfer price should = opportunities foregone by “selling” division
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Transfer Pricing Systems
• Exchange Autonomy
• Mandated Full Cost
• Mandated Market Based
• Dual Pricing
Freely negotiated b/w divisions Set at price for sales to external customers
Set equal to cost of production Set at standard cost (cost when operating at full capacity)
Transfer price is set equal to the market price in selling division's market
Transfer price for buying division is set equal to the selling division’s actual or std. cost; credit seller w/ normal profit
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Compensation Policies Compensation Committee In theory…
• represents interests of owners in setting compensation of top executive team
• sets compensation based on performance or market
In practice…
• sometimes appear to be beholden to executives • compensation decisions often bear little relationship
to performance
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Aligning Incentives
Salary
Cash Bonus
Stock Grants
Stock Options
Not Tied to Performance
Tied to Performance
Long Time Horizon
Short Time Horizon
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Tax code applicable to publically-traded firms
• §162(m): adopted in 1993, modified in 2013 • Compensation committee typically represents owners in
determining CEO/GM compensation • §162(m): adopted in 1993, modified in 2013 • Limitation on deductibility of compensation above $1M w/
exception for "performance-based compensation” (e.g. stock options, SARs issued at FMV; non-equity incentive compensation for preference “approved by an independent compensation committee”
• Utilizing these exemptions has been described as a “loophole”
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Aligning Incentives
Salary
Cash Bonus
Stock Grants
Stock Options
Not Tied to Performance
Tied to Performance
Deductible subject to $1M cap
Deductible subject to $1M cap
Likely to be fully deductible
Dependent on implementation
Pension and deferred compensation If deferred to after retirement likely
to be fully deductible
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Tax Policy & Compensation
• Should Tax Code be used to discourage exec. comp.? – Is the exception in 162 (m) a loophole? – Is favoring stock options in compensation policies tax avoidance? – Is catering packages to maximize deductibility unethical?
• How does institutional investment affect this? – Own 69% of 1000 largest US firms @ 2005 – Logically may be more interested in maximizing short-term investment – Research in US & Japan suggests not unduly myopic – High institutional investment à sale of strategically unrelated
businesses
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Refocusing Corporate level strategy may call for exiting a business
• a conglomerate discount may exist • the corporation may lack necessary skills • expected economies of scope may not exist
• the corporation may need funds for core activities
Divest Assets
Spin-off MBO
IPO or,
© Lucas Wenger 2018
Ethics & Strategy
• “Do CEOs get paid too much?” • Possible mechanism for compensation increase: at
new compensation agreement BOD will pay above average same industry, same size compensation; as this repeats compensation inevitable rises
• Corr. [(Avg. experience-based compensation– actual compensation), firm performance] is significant
• Effect on morale? Does it encourage and foster ambition or demoralize?