750-1000 word response

SUMMARY

In this introduction to the Disability Studies Reader, Lennard J. Davis tells us that ‘‘we live in a world

of norms’’ that influences every part of contemporary life. Understanding how and why we think of

something as normal is an important part of understanding the disabled body. Davis tells us that the

‘‘problem’’ of disability does not lie with the person with disabilities but rather in the way that

normalcy is constructed.

Davis makes the point that despite appearing to be universal, norms haven’t always existed. The

concept of a norm is constructed, historically speaking, as a reaction to the concept of the ideal

human body, and it ‘‘implies that themajority of the populationmust or should be somehow part of the

norm.’’ Insteadof accepting that all bodies are not ideal, the power of the normmakes it so that people

are described as deviant if their bodies don’t match the norm.

By deviating from the norm, people become defined and identified by these irrepressible physical

qualities. Davis shows how eugenics and statistics developed in tandem to criminalize and dehumanize

peoplewith these qualitieswhile the idea of progressive human perfectibility created a dominant idea of

what the body should be. Believing that norms were scientifically true led to the idea that those norms

were desirable, and this association permeated everything from political ideology to psychoanalytic

practice and literature. This is a legacy that people with disabilities are still having trouble living down.

Davis introduces the critical approach to this Reader by pointing out that a disabilities-studies

consciousness can open new possibilities for the way we read novels, analyze cultural forces, and think

about the history of normality.

We live in a world of norms. Each of us endeavors to be normal or else deliberately tries to avoid that state.We considerwhat the average person does, thinks, earns, or consumes.We rank our intelligence, our cholesterol level, our weight, height, sex drive, bodily dimensions along some conceptual line from subnormal to above-average. We consume a minimum daily balance of vitamins and nutrients based onwhat an average human should consume. Our children are ranked in school and tested to determine where they fit into a normal curve of learning, of intelligence. Doctors measure and weigh them to see if they are above or below average on the height and weight curves. There is probably no area of contemporary life inwhich some idea of a norm,mean, or average has not been calculated. To understand the disabled body, one must return to the concept of the norm, the

normal body. So much of writing about disability has focused on the disabled person as

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Disability, Normality, and Power Lennard J. Davis

the object of study, just as the study of race has focused on the person of color. But as with recent scholarship on race, which has turned its attention to whiteness and intersectionality, I would like to focus not somuch on the construction of disability as on the construction of normalcy. I do this because the ‘‘problem’’ is not the person with disabilities; the problem is theway that normalcy is constructed to create the ‘‘problem’’ of the disabled person.

A common assumption would be that some concept of the norm must have always existed. After all, people seem to have an inherent desire to compare themselves to others. But the idea of a norm is less a condition of human nature than it is a feature of a certain kind of society. Recent work on the ancient Greeks, on preindustrial Europe, and on tribal peoples, for example, shows that disability was once regarded very differently from the way it is now. As we will see, the social process of disabling arrived with industrialization and with the set of practices and discourses that are linked to late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions of nationality, race, gender, criminality, sexual orientation, and so on.

I begin with the rather remarkable fact that the constellation of words describing this concept ‘‘normal,’’ ‘‘normalcy,’’ ‘‘normality,’’ ‘‘norm,’’ ‘‘average,’’ ‘‘abnormal’’—all entered the European languages rather late in human history. The word ‘‘normal’’ as ‘‘constituting, conforming to, not deviating or different from, the common type or standard, regular, usual’’ only enters the English language around 1840. (Previously, the word had meant ‘‘perpendicular’’; the carpenter’s square, called a ‘‘norm,’’ provided the root meaning.) Likewise, the word ‘‘norm,’’ in the modern sense, has only been in use since around 1855, and ‘‘normality’’ and ‘‘normalcy’’ appeared in 1849 and 1857, respectively. If the lexicographical information is relevant, it is possible to date the coming into consciousness in English of an idea of ‘‘the norm’’ over the period 1840–1860.

If we rethink our assumptions about the universality of the concept of the norm, what we might arrive at is the concept that preceded it: that of the ‘‘ideal,’’ a word we find dating from the seventeenth century. Without making too simplistic a division in the history, one can nevertheless try to imagine a world in which the concept of normality does not exist. Rather, what we have is the ideal body, as exemplified in the tradition of nude Venuses, for example. This idea presents amytho-poetic body that is linked to that of the gods (in traditions in which the god’s body is visualized). This divine body, then, this ideal body, is not attainable by a human. The notion of an ideal implies that, in this case, the human body as visualized in art or imagination must be composed from the ideal parts of livingmodels. Thesemodels individually can never embody the ideal since an ideal, by definition, cannever be found in thisworld. Pliny tells us that theGreek artist Zeuxis tried to paint Aphrodite, the goddess of love, by using as his models all the beautiful women of Crotona in order to select in each her ideal feature or body part and combine these into the ideal figure of the goddess. One young woman provides a face and another her breasts. The central point here is that in a culture with an ideal form of the body, all members of the population are below the ideal. No one young lady of Crotona can be the ideal. By definition, one can never have an ideal body. And there is no social pressure, we would imagine, that populations have bodies that conform to the ideal.

If the concept of the normor average enters European culture, or at least the European languages, only in the nineteenth century, one has to ask what is the cause of this conceptualization?One of the logical places to turn in trying to understand concepts like

2 | LENNARD J. DAVIS

‘‘norm’’ and ‘‘average’’ is that branch of knowledge known as statistics. It was the French statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1847) who contributed the most to a generalized notion of the normal as an imperative. He noticed that the ‘‘law of error,’’ used by astronomers to locate a star by plotting all the sightings and then averaging the errors, could be equally applied to the distribution of human features such as height and weight. He then took a further step of formulating the concept of ‘‘l’homme moyen’’ or the average man. Quetelet maintained that this abstract human was the average of all human attributes in a given country. Quetelet’s average man was a combination of l’homme moyen physique and l’homme moyen morale, both a physically average and a morally average construct. With such thinking, the average then becomes paradoxically a kind of ideal, a position

devoutly to be wished. As Quetelet wrote, ‘‘an individual who epitomized in himself, at a given time, all the qualities of the averageman,would represent at once all the greatness, beauty and goodness of that being’’ (cited in Porter 1986, 102). Furthermore, one must observe that Quetelet meant this hegemony of the middle to apply not only to moral qualities but to the body as well. He wrote: ‘‘deviationsmore or less great from themean have constituted [for artists] ugliness in body as well as vice in morals and a state of sickness with regard to the constitution’’ (ibid., 103). Here Zeuxis’s notion of physical beauty as an exceptional ideal becomes transformed into beauty as the average. Quetelet foresaw a kind of utopia of the norm associated with progress, just as Marx

foresaw a utopia of the norm in so far as wealth and production is concerned. Marx actually cites Quetelet’s notion of the average man in a discussion of the labor theory of value. The concept of a norm, unlike that of an ideal, implies that the majority of the

population must or should somehow be part of the norm. The norm pins down that majority of the population that falls under the arch of the standard bell-shaped curve. This curve, the graph of an exponential function, that was known variously as the astronomer’s ‘‘error law,’’ the ‘‘normal distribution,’’ the ‘‘Gaussian density function,’’ or simply ‘‘the bell curve,’’ became in its own way a symbol of the tyranny of the norm. Any bell curve will always have at its extremities those characteristics that deviate from the norm. So, with the concept of the normcomes the concept of deviations or extremes. When we think of bodies, in a society where the concept of the norm is operative, then peoplewith disabilitieswill be thought of as deviants. This, aswehave seen, is in contrast to societies with the concept of an ideal, in which all people have a non-ideal status.1

In England, there was a burst of interest in statistics during the 1830s. A statistical office was set up at the Board of Trade in 1832, and the General Register Office was created in 1837 to collect vital statistics. The use of statistics began an important movement, and there is a telling connection for the purposes of this essay between the founders of statistics and their larger intentions. The rather amazing fact is that almost all the early statisticians had one thing in common: they were eugenicists. The same is true of key figures in the eugenics movement: Sir Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, and R. A. Fisher.2 While this coincidence seems almost too striking to be true, we must remember that there is a real connection between figuring the statistical measure of humans and then hoping to improve humans so that deviations from the norm dimin- ish. Statistics is bound up with eugenics because the central insight of statistics is the idea that a population can be normed. An important consequence of the idea of the norm is that it divides the total population into standard and nonstandard

INTRODUCTION: DISABILITY, NORMALITY, AND POWER | 3

subpopulations. The next step in conceiving of the population as norm and non-norm is for the state to attempt to norm the nonstandard—the aim of eugenics. Of course such an activity is profoundly paradoxical since the inviolable rule of statistics is that all phenomena will always conform to a bell curve. So norming the non-normal is an activity as problematic as untying the Gordian knot.

MacKenzie asserts that it is not so much that Galton’s statistics made possible eugenics but rather that ‘‘the needs of eugenics in large part determined the content of Galton’s statistical theory’’ (1981, 52). In any case, a symbiotic relationship exists between statistical science and eugenic concerns. Both bring into society the concept of a norm, particularly a normal body, and thus in effect create the concept of the disabled body.

It is also worth noting the interesting triangulation of eugenicist interests. On the one hand Sir Francis Galton was cousin to Charles Darwin, whose notion of the evolutionary advantage of the fittest lays the foundation for eugenics and also for the idea of a perfectible body undergoing progressive improvement. As one scholar has put it, ‘‘Eugenics was in reality applied biology based on the central biological theory of the day, namely the Darwinian theory of evolution’’ (Farrall 1985, 55). Darwin’s ideas serve to place disabled people along the wayside as evolutionary defectives to be surpassed by natural selection. So, eugenics became obsessed with the elimination of ‘‘defectives,’’ a category which included the ‘‘feebleminded,’’ the deaf, the blind, the physically defective, and so on.

In a related discourse, Galton created the modern system of fingerprinting for personal identification. Galton’s interest came out of a desire to show that certain physical traits could be inherited. As he wrote:

one of the inducements to making these inquiries into personal identification has been to discover independent features suitable for hereditary investigation. : : : it is not improbable, and worth taking pains to inquire whether each person may not carry visibly about his body undeniable evidence of his parentage and near kinships.

(cited in MacKenzie 1981, 65)

Fingerprinting was seen as a physical mark of parentage, a kind of serial number written on thebody. But further, one can say that thenotionof fingerprinting pushes forward the idea that the human body is standardized and contains a serial number, as it were, embedded in its corporeality. Thus the body has an identity that coincides with its essence and cannot be altered by moral, artistic, or human will. This indelibility of corporeal identity only furthers the mark placed on the body by other physical qualities—intelligence, height, reaction time. By this logic, the person enters into an identical relationship with the body, the body forms the identity, and the identity is unchangeable and indelible as one’s place on the normal curve. For our purposes, then, this fingerprinting of the body means that the marks of physical difference become synonymous with the identity of the person.

Finally, Galton can be linked to that other major figure connected with the discourse of disability in the nineteenth century—Alexander Graham Bell. In 1883, the same year that Galton coined the term ‘‘eugenics,’’ Bell delivered his eugenicist speech Memoir upon the Formation of a Deaf Variety of the Human Race, warning of the ‘‘tendency among deaf-mutes to select deaf-mutes as their partners in marriage’’ (1969, 19) with the dire consequence that a race of deaf people might be created. This echoing of

4 | LENNARD J. DAVIS

Dr. Frankenstein’s fear that his monster might mate and produce a race of monsters emphasizes the terror with which the ‘‘normal’’ beholds the differently abled.3 Noting how the various interests come together in Galton, we can see evolution, fingerprint- ing, and the attempt to control the reproductive rights of the deaf as all pointing to a conception of the body as perfectible but only when subject to the necessary control of the eugenicists. The identity of people becomes defined by irrepressible identificatory physical qualities that can be measured. Deviance from the norm can be identified and indeed criminalized, particularly in the sense that fingerprints came to be associated with identifying deviants who wished to hide their identities. Galton made significant changes in statistical theory that created the concept of the

norm. He took what had been called ‘‘error theory,’’ a technique by which astronomers attempted to show that one could locate a star by taking into account the variety of sightings. The sightings, all of which could not be correct, if plotted would fall into a bell curve, withmost sightings falling into the center, that is to say, the correct location of the star. The errorswould fall to the sides of the bell curve. Galton’s contribution to statistics was to change the name of the curve from ‘‘the law of frequency of error’’ or ‘‘error curve,’’ the term used by Quetelet, to the ‘‘normal distribution’’ curve. The significanceof these changes relates directly toGalton’s eugenicist interests. In an

‘‘error curve’’ the extremes of the curve are the most mistaken in accuracy. But if one is looking at human traits, then the extremes, particularly what Galton saw as positive extremes—tallness, high intelligence, ambitiousness, strength, fertility—would have to be seen as errors. Rather than ‘‘errors’’ Galton wanted to think of the extremes as distributions of a trait. As MacKenzie notes:

Thus there was a gradual transition from use of the term ‘‘probable error’’ to the term ‘‘standard deviation’’ (which is free of the implication that a deviation is in any sense an error), and from the term ‘‘law of error’’ to the term ‘‘normal distribution.’’

(1981, 59)

But even without the idea of error, Galton still faced the problem that in a normal distribution curve that graphed height, for example, both tallness and shortness would be seen as extremes in a continuum where average stature would be the norm. The problem for Galton was that, given his desire to perfect the human race, or at least its British segment, tallness was preferable to shortness. How could both extremes be considered equally deviant from the norm? So Galton substituted the idea of ranking for the concept of averaging. That is, he changed the way one might look at the curve from one that used the mean to one that used the median—a significant change in thinking eugenically. If a trait, say intelligence, is considered by its average, then the majority of people

would determinewhat intelligence should be—and intelligencewould be defined by the mediocremiddle. Galton,wanting to avoid themiddling of desired traits,wouldprefer to think of intelligence in ranked order. Although high intelligence in a normal distribution would simply be an extreme, under a ranked system it would become the highest ranked trait. Galton divided his curve into quartiles, so that he was able to emphasize ranked orders of intelligence; that someone was in the first quartile in intelligence (low intelligence) or the fourth quartile (high intelligence). Galton’s work led directly to current ‘‘intelligence quotient’’ (IQ) and scholastic achievement tests. In fact, Galton

INTRODUCTION: DISABILITY, NORMALITY, AND POWER | 5

revised Gauss’s bell curve to show the superiority of the desired trait (for example, high intelligence). He created what he called an ‘‘ogive,’’ which is arranged in quartiles with an ascending curve that features the desired trait as ‘‘higher’’ than the undesirable deviation. As Stigler notes:

If a hundred individuals’ talents were ordered, each could be assigned the numerical value corresponding to its percentile in the curve of ‘‘deviations from an average’’: the middlemost (or median) talent had value 0 (representing mediocrity), an individual at the upper quartile was assigned the value 1 (representing one probable error above mediocrity), and so on.

(1986, 271)

What these revisions by Galton signify is an attempt to redefine the concept of the ‘‘ideal’’ in relation to the general population. First, the application of the idea of a norm to the humanbody creates the idea of deviance or a ‘‘deviant’’ body. Second, the idea of a norm pushes the normal variation of the body through a stricter template guiding the way the body ‘‘should’’ be. Third, the revision of the ‘‘normal curve of distribution’’ into quartiles, ranked in order, and so on, creates anewkindof ‘‘ideal.’’ This statistical ideal is unlike the classical notion of the ideal, which contains no imperative that everyone should strive to be perfect. The new ideal of ranked order is powered by the imperative of the norm, and then is supplementedby thenotion of progress, humanperfectibility, and the elimination of deviance, to create a dominating, hegemonic vision of what the human body should be.

While we tend to associate eugenics with a Nazi-like racial supremacy, it is important to realize that eugenicswas not the trade of a fringe group of right-wing, fascistmaniacs. Rather, it became the common belief and practice of many, if not most, European and American citizens. WhenMarx used Quetelet’s idea of the average in his formulation of average wage and abstract labor, socialists as well as others embraced eugenic claims, seeing in the perfectibility of the human body a utopian hope for social and economic improvement. Once people allowed that there were norms and ranks in human physiology, then the idea that wemightwant to, for example, increase the intelligence of humans, or decrease birth defects, did not seem so farfetched. These ideas were widely influential and the influence of eugenicist ideas persisted well into the twentieth century, so that someone like Emma Goldman could write that unless birth control was encouraged, the state would ‘‘legally encourage the increase of paupers, syphilitics, epileptics, dipsomaniacs, cripples, criminals, and degenerates’’ (Kevles 1985, 90).

Oneproblem for peoplewithdisabilitieswas that eugenicists tended to group together all allegedly ‘‘undesirable’’ traits. So, for example, criminals, the poor, and people with disabilities might be mentioned in the same breath. Take Karl Pearson, a leading figure in the eugenics movement, who defined the ‘‘unfit’’ as follows: ‘‘the habitual criminal, the professional tramp, the tuberculous, the insane, the mentally defective, the alcoholic, the diseased from birth or from excess’’ (cited in Kevles 1985, 33). In 1911, Pearson headed the Department of Applied Statistics, which included Galton and the Biometric Laboratories at University College in London. This department gathered eugenic information on the inheritance of physical and mental traits including ‘‘scientific, commercial, and legal ability, but also hermaphroditism, hemophilia, cleft palate, harelip, tuberculosis, diabetes, deaf-mutism, polydactyly (more than five fingers) or brachydactyly (stub fingers), insanity, andmental deficiency’’ (ibid., 38–39). Here again one sees a strange

6 | LENNARD J. DAVIS

selectionof disabilitiesmergedwith other types of human variations. All of these deviations from the normwere regarded in the long run as contributing to the disease of the nation. As one official in the Eugenics Record Office asserted: ‘‘the only way to keep a nation strong mentally and physically is to see that each new generation is derived chiefly from the fitter members of the generation before’’ (ibid., 39–40). The emphasis on nation and national fitness obviously plays into themetaphor of the

body. If individual citizens are not fit, if they do not fit into the nation, then the national body will not be fit. Of course, such arguments are based on a false idea of the body politic—by that notion a hunchbacked citizenry would make a hunchbacked nation. Nevertheless, the eugenic ‘‘logic’’ that individual variations would accumulate into a composite national identity was a powerful one. This belief combinedwith an industrial mentality that sawworkers as interchangeable and therefore sought to create a universal worker whose physical characteristics would be uniform, as would the result of their labors—a uniform product. One of the central foci of eugenics was what was broadly called ‘‘feeblemindedness.’’4

This term included low intelligence, mental illness, and even ‘‘pauperism,’’ since low income was equated with ‘‘relative inefficiency’’ (ibid., 46).5 Likewise, certain ethnic groups were associated with feeblemindedness and pauperism. Charles Davenport, an American eugenicist, thought that the influx of European immigrants would make the American population ‘‘darker in pigmentation, smaller in stature : : : more given to crimes of larceny, assault, murder, rape, and sex-immorality’’ (cited in ibid., 48). In his research, Davenport scrutinized the records of ‘‘prisons, hospitals, almshouses, and institutions for the mentally deficient, the deaf, the blind, and the insane’’ (ibid., 55). The association between what we would now call disability and criminal activity,

mental incompetence, sexual license, and so on established a legacy that people with disabilities are still having trouble living down. This equation was so strong that an American journalist writing in the early twentieth century could celebrate ‘‘the inspiring, the wonderful, message of the new heredity’’ as opposed to the sorrow of bearing childrenwhowere ‘‘diseased or crippled or depraved’’ (ibid., 67). The conflation of disability with depravity expressed itself in the formulation ‘‘defective class.’’ As the president of the University of Wisconsin declared after World War One, ‘‘we know enough about eugenics so that if the knowledge were applied, the defective classes would disappear within a generation’’ (ibid., 68). And it must be reiterated that the eugenics movement was not stocked with eccentrics. Averell Harriman’s sister Mary Harriman, as well as John D. Rockefeller, funded Davenport. Prime Ministers A. J. Balfour, Neville Chamberlain, and Winston Churchill, along with President Theodore Roosevelt,H.G.Wells, and JohnMaynardKeynes, amongmanyothers,weremembers of eugenicist organizations. Francis Galton was knighted in 1909 for his work, and in 1910 he received the Copley Medal, the Royal Society’s highest honor. A Galton Society met regularly in the American Museum of Natural History in New York City. In 1911 the Oxford University Union moved approval of the main principles behind eugenics by a vote of almost two to one. In Kansas, the 1920 state fair held a contest for ‘‘fitter families’’ based on their eugenic family histories; a brochure for the contest noted about the awards, ‘‘this trophy and medal are worth more than livestock sweepstakes. : : :For health is wealth and a sound mind in a sound body is the most priceless of human possessions’’ (ibid., 62). County fairs like these also administered intelligence tests, medical exams, and screened for venereal disease.

INTRODUCTION: DISABILITY, NORMALITY, AND POWER | 7

In England, bills were introduced in Parliament to controlmentally disabled people, and in 1933 the prestigious scientificmagazineNature approved theNazis’ proposal of a bill for ‘‘the avoidance of inherited diseases in posterity’’ by sterilizing the disabled. Themagazine editorial said ‘‘the Bill, as it reads, will command the appreciative attention of all who are interested in the controlled and deliberate improvement of human stock.’’ The list of disabilities for which sterilization would be appropriate were ‘‘congenital feebleminded- ness, manic depressive insanity, schizophrenia, hereditary epilepsy, hereditary St Vitus’s dance, hereditary blindness and deafness, hereditary bodily malformation and habitual alcoholism’’ (cited in MacKenzie 1981, 44). We have largely forgotten that what Hitler did in developing a hideous policy of eugenics was just to implement the theories of the British and American eugenicists. Hitler’s statement in Mein Kampf that ‘‘the struggle for the daily livelihood [between species] leaves behind, in the ruck, everything that is weak or diseased or wavering’’ (cited in Blacker 1952, 143) is not qualitatively different from any of the many similar statements we have seen before. And even the conclusions Hitler draws are not very different from those of the likes of Galton, Bell, and others.

In this matter, the State must assert itself as the trustee of a millennial future. : : : In order to fulfill this duty in a practical manner, the State will have to avail itself of modern medical discoveries. It must proclaim as unfit for procreation all those who are afflicted with some visible hereditary disease or are the carriers of it; and practical measures must be adopted to have such people rendered sterile.

(cited in Blacker 1952, 144)

One might want to add here a set of speculations about Sigmund Freud. His work was made especially possible by the idea of the normal. In fact, it is hard to imagine the existence of psychoanalysis without the concept of normalcy. Indeed, one of the core principles behind psychoanalysis was ‘‘if the vita sexualis is normal, there can be no neurosis’’ (Freud 1977, 386). Psychoanalysis through talk therapy bring patients back to their normal selves. Although I cannot go into a close analysis of Freud’s work here, it is instructive to think of the ways in which Freud is producing a eugenics of the mind— creating the concepts of normal sexuality, normal function, and then contrasting them with the perverse, abnormal, pathological, and even criminal.

The first depiction in literature of an attempt to norm an individual member of the populationoccurred in the 1850s during the development of the idea of thenormal body. In Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, Charles Bovary performs a trendy operation that would correct the clubfoot of Hippolyte, the stable boy of the local inn. This corrective oper- ation is seen as ‘‘new’’ and related to ‘‘progress’’ (Flaubert 1965, 125). Hippolyte is assailed with reasons why he should alter his foot. He is told, it ‘‘must considerably interfere with the proper performance of your work’’ (ibid., 126). And in addition to redefining him in terms of his ability to carry out work, Homais adds: ‘‘Think what would have happened if you had been called into the army, and had to fight under our national banner!’’ (ibid., 126). So national interests and again productivity are empha- sized. But Hippolyte has been doing fine in his job as stable boy; his disability has not interfered with his performance in the community under traditional standards. In fact, Hippolyte seems to use his club foot to his advantage, as the narrator notes:

But on the equine foot, wide indeed as a horse’s hoof, with is horny skin, and large toes : : : the cripple ran about like a deer frommorn till night. He was constantly to be seen on the Square,

8 | LENNARD J. DAVIS

jumping round the carts, thrusting his limping foot forwards. He seemed even stronger on that leg than the other. By dint of hard service it had acquired, as it were, moral qualities of patience and energy; andwhenhewas given someheavywork to do, hewould support himself on it in preference to the sound one.

(ibid., 126)

Hippolyte’s disability is in fact an ability, one which he relies on, and fromwhich he gets extra horsepower, as it were. But althoughHippolyte ismore than capable, the operation must be performed to bring him back to the human and away from the equine, which the first syllable of his name suggests. To have a disability is to be an animal, to be part of the Other. A newspaper article appears after the operation’s apparent initial success, praising the

spirit of progress. The article envisages Hippolyte’s welcome back into the human community adding: ‘‘Hasn’t the time come to cry out that the blind shall see, the deaf hear, the lamewalk?’’ (ibid., 128) The imperative is clear: sciencewill eradicate disability. However, by a touch of Flaubertian irony, Hippolyte’s leg becomes gangrenous and has to be amputated. The older doctor lectures Charles about his attempt to norm this individual.

This is what you get from listening to the fads from Paris! : : : We are practitioners; we cure people, and we wouldn’t dream of operating on someone who is in perfect health. Straighten club feet! As if one could straighten club feet indeed! It is as if onewished tomake a hunchback straight!

(ibid., 131)

While Flaubert’s work illustrates some of the points I have been making, it is important that we do no simply think of the novel as merely an example of how an historical development lodges within a particular text. Rather, I think there is a larger claim to be made about novels and norms. While Flaubert may parody current ideas about normalcy in medicine, there is

another sense in which the novel as a form promotes and symbolically produces normative structures. Indeed, the whole focus ofMadame Bovary is on Emma’s abnor- mality and Flaubert’s abhorrence of normal life. If we accept that novels are a social practice that arose as part of the project ofmiddle-class hegemony,6 thenwe can see that the plot and character development of novels tend to pull toward the normative. For example, most characters in nineteenth-century novels are somewhat ordinary people who are put in abnormal circumstances, as opposed to the heroic characters who rep- resent the ideal in earlier forms such as the epic. If disability appears in a novel, it is rarely centrally represented. It is unusual for amain

character to be a person with disabilities, althoughminor characters, like Tiny Tim, can be deformed in ways that arouse pity. In the case of Esther Summerson, of Dickens’ Bleak House, who is scarred by smallpox, her scars are made virtually to disappear through the agency of love. Dinah Craik’s Olive is one of the few nineteenth-century novels in which the main character has a disability (a slight spinal deformity), but even with her the emphasis on the deformity diminishes over the course of the novel so by the end it is no longer an issue. On the other hand, as sufficient research has shown, more often than not villains tend to be physically abnormal: scarred, deformed, ormutilated.7

INTRODUCTION: DISABILITY, NORMALITY, AND POWER | 9

I am not saying simply that novels embody the prejudices of society toward people with disabilities. That is clearly a truism. Rather, I am asserting that the very structures on which the novel rests tend to be normative, ideologically emphasizing the universal quality of the central character whose normativity encourages us to identify with him or her.8 Furthermore, the novel’s goal is to reproduce, on some level, the semiologically normative signs surrounding the reader, that paradoxically help the reader to read those signs in the world as well as the text. This normativity in narrative will by definition create the abnormal, theOther, thedisabled, thenative, the colonized subject, and soon.

Even on the level of plot, one can see the implication of eugenic notions of normativity. The parentage of characters in novels plays a crucial role. Rather thanbeing self-creating beings, characters in novels have deep biological debts to their forebears, even if the characters are orphans—or perhaps especially if they are orphans. The great Heliodoric plots of romance, in which lower-class characters are found actually to be noble, take a new turn in the novel. While nobility may be less important, characters nevertheless inherit bourgeois respectability, moral rectitude, and eventually money and position through their genetic connection. In the novelistic world of nature versus nurture, nature almost always wins out. Thus Oliver Twist will naturally bear the banner of bourgeois morality and linguistic normativity, even though he grows up in the workhouse. Oliver will always be normal, even in abnormal circumstances.9

A further development in the novel can be seen in Zola’s works. Before Zola, for example in the work of Balzac, the author attempted to show how the inherently good character of a protagonist was affected by the material world. Thus we read of the journey of the soul, of everyman or everywoman, through a trying and corruptingworld. But Zola’s theory of the novel depends on the idea of inherited traits and biological determinism. As Zola wrote in The Experimental Novel:

Determinismdominates everything. It is scientific investigation, it is experimental reasoning, which combats one by one the hypotheses of the idealists, and which replaces purely imaginary novels by novels of observation and experimentation.

(1964, 18)

In this view, the author is a kind of scientist watching how humans, with their naturally inherited dispositions, interact with each other. As Zola wrote, his intention in the Rougon–Macquart series was to show how heredity would influence a family ‘‘making superhuman efforts but always failing because of its own nature and the influences upon it’’ (Zola 1993, viii). This series would be a study of the ‘‘singular effect of heredity’’ (ibid.). ‘‘These young girls so pure, these youngmen so loyal, represented to us in certain novels, do not belong to the earth. : : :We tell everything, we do not make a choice, neither do we idealize’’ (ibid., 127).

My point is that a disabilities-studies consciousness can alter the way we see not just novels that have main characters who are disabled but any novel. In thinking through the issue of disability, I have come to see that almost any literary work will have some reference to the abnormal, to disability, and so on. Iwould explain this phenomenon as a result of the hegemony of normalcy. This normalcy must constantly be enforced in public venues (like the novel), must always be creating and bolstering its image by processing, comparing, constructing, deconstructing images of normalcy and the abnormal. In fact, once one begins to notice, there really is a rare novel that does not

10 | LENNARD J. DAVIS

have some characters with disabilities—characters who are lame, tubercular, dying of AIDS, chronically ill, depressed, mentally ill, and so on. Let me take the example of some novels by Joseph Conrad. I pick Conrad not because

he is especially representative, but just because I happen to be teaching a course on Conrad. Althoughhe is not remembered in any sense as awriter ondisability, Conrad is a good test case, as it turns out, because he wrote during a period when eugenics had permeated British society and when Freud had begun to write about normal and abnormal psychology. Conrad, too, was somewhat influenced by Zola, particularly in The Secret Agent. The first thing I noticed about Conrad’s work is that metaphors of disability abound.

Each book has numerous instances of phrases like the following selections from Lord Jim:

a dance of lame, blind, mute thoughts—a whirl of awful cripples. (Conrad 1986, 114)

[he] comported himself in that clatter as though he had been stone-deaf. (ibid., 183)

there was nothing of the cripple about him. (ibid., 234)

Her broken figure hovered in crippled little jumps : : : (ibid., 263)

he was made blind and deaf and without pity : : : (ibid., 300)

a blind belief in the righteousness of his will against all mankind : : : (ibid., 317)

They were erring men whom suffering had made blind to right and wrong. (ibid., 333)

you dismal cripples, you : : : (ibid., 340)

unmoved like a deaf man : : : (ibid., 319)

These references are almost like tics, appearing at regular intervals. They tend to focus on deafness, blindness, dumbness, and lameness, and they tend to use thesemetaphors to represent limitations on normal morals, ethics, and of course language. While it is entirely possible to maintain that these figures of speech are hardly more than mere linguistic convention, I would argue that the very regularity of these occurrences speaks to a reflexive patrolling function in which the author continuously checks and notes. The use of phrenology, too, is linked to the patrolling of normalcy, through the

constructionof character. So, inHeart ofDarkness, for example,whenMarlow is about to

INTRODUCTION: DISABILITY, NORMALITY, AND POWER | 11

leave for Africa a doctor measures the dimensions of his skull to enable him to discern if any quantitative changes subsequently occur as a result of the colonial encounter. So many of the characters in novels are formed from the ableist cultural repertoire of normalized head, face, and body features that characteristically signify personal qualities. Thus in The Secret Agent, the corpulent, lazy body of Verloc indicates his moral sleaziness, and Stevie’s large ears and head shape are explicitly seen by Ossipon as characteristic of degeneracy and criminality as described in the theories of the nineteenth-century eugenic phrenologist Cesare Lombroso.

In a Zolaesque moment of insight, Ossipon sees Stevie’s degeneracy as linked to his sister Winnie:

he gazed scientifically at that woman, the sister of a degenerate, a degenerate herself—of a murdering type. He gazed at her and invoked Lombroso. : : :He gazed scientifically. He gazed at her cheeks, at her nose, at her eyes, at her ears : : :Bad! : : :Fatal!

(Conrad 1968, 269)

This eugenic gaze that scrutinizesWinnie and Stevie is really only a recapitulation of the novelistic gaze that sees meaning in normative and non-normative features. In fact, every member of the Verloc family has something ‘‘wrong’’ with them, including Winnie’s mother who has trouble walking on her edematous legs. The moral turpitude and physical grimness of London is embodied in Verloc’s inner circle. Michaelis, too, is obese and ‘‘wheezed as if deadened and oppressed by the layer of fat on his chest’’ (ibid., 73). Karl Yundt is toothless, gouty, and walks with a cane. Ossipon is racially abnormal having ‘‘crinkly yellow hair : : : a flattened nose and prominent mouth cast in the rough mould of the Negro type : : : [and] almond-shaped eyes [that] leered languidly over high cheek-bones’’ (ibid., 75)—all features indicatingAfrican andAsianqualities, particularly the cunning, opiated glance. The latter links up the eugenic with the racialized and nationalized matrix of identity.

I am not claiming that this reading of Conrad is brilliant or definitive. But I do want to show that even in texts that do not appear to be about disability, the issue of normalcy is fully deployed.One can find in almost anynovel, I would argue, a kind of surveying of the terrain of the body, an attention to difference—physical, mental, and national. This activity of consolidating the hegemony of normalcy is one that needsmore attention, in addition to the kinds of work that have been done in locating the thematics of disability in literature.

What I have tried to show here is that the very term that permeates our contemporary life—the normal—is a configuration that arises in a particular historical moment. It is part of a notion of progress, of industrialization, and of ideological consolidation of the power of the bourgeoisie. The implications of the hegemony of normalcy are profound and extend into the very heart of cultural production. The novel form, that proliferator of ideology, is intricately connected with concepts of the norm. From the typicality of the central character, to thenormalizing devices of plot to bringdeviant characters back into the norms of society, to the normalizing coda of endings, the nineteenth- and twentieth- century novel promulgates and disburses notions of normalcy and by extension makes of physical differences ideological differences. Characters with disabilities are always marked with ideological meaning, as aremoments of disease or accident that transform such characters. One of the tasks for a developing consciousness of disability issues is

12 | LENNARD J. DAVIS

the attempt, then, to reverse the hegemony of the normal and to institute alternative ways of thinking about the abnormal. Many of the essays in this collection do just that. As disability studies progresses along

with postmodernism and posthumanism, we are seeing that normality continues to hold sway insofar as the body, the medical, and the push to diagnose disabilities are concerned. But thewriters in this reader are not simply trying to include disability under the rubric of normal but to question the idea of normality, and to expand the definition of disability into such concepts as neurodiversity, debility and capacity, chronic illness, invisible conditions, and the like. In other words while consolidating the idea of disability, these critics are at the same time disarticulating the elements of disability to ponder how part and whole fit together. It’s less a question of segregating the normal from the abnormal, the old eugenic game, as it is to describe, detail, theorize, andoccupy the category of disability. Along these lines, intersectionality—the subject position of holding multiple identities—makes complex the general rubric of disability itself. If anything, this collection of essays serves to render complex the simple fact of impairment while rendering simple the ideological screen of normality.

NOTES

1. Onewants tomake sure that Aristotle’s idea of themean is not confusedwith the norm. TheAristotelianmean

is a kindof fictional construct. Aristotle advocates that in choosingbetweenpersonal traits, one should tend to

choosebetween the extremes.Hedoesnot however thinkof thepopulation as falling generally into thatmean.

The mean, for Aristotle, is more of a heuristic device to assist in moral and ethical choices. In the sense of

beingamiddle termor amiddleway, it carriesmoreof a spatial sense thandoes the term ‘‘average’’ or ‘‘norm.’’

2. This rather remarkable confluence between eugenics and statistics has been pointed out by Donald A.

MacKenzie, but I do not believe his observations have had the impact they should.

3. See my Enforcing Normalcy Chapter 6 for more on the novel Frankenstein and its relation to notions of

disability.

4. Many twentieth-century prejudices against the learning disabled come from this period. The founder of the

intelligence test still in use, Alfred Binet, was a Galton acolyte. The American psychologist Henry H. Goddard

usedBinet’s tests in America and turned the numbers into categories—‘‘idiots’’ being thosewhosemental age

was 1 or 2, ‘‘imbeciles’’ ranged inmental age from 3 to 7. Goddard invented the term ‘‘moron’’ (which he took

from theGreek for ‘‘dull’’ or ‘‘stupid’’) for those between 8 and 12. Pejorative terms like ‘‘moron’’ or ‘‘retarded’’

have by now found their way into common usage (Kevles 1985, 78). And even the term ‘‘mongoloid idiot’’ to

describe a personwithDown’s syndromewas used as recently as 1970s not as a pejorative termbut inmedical

texts as a diagnosis. [SeeMichael Bérubé’s fascinating article ‘‘Life AsWe Know It’’ for more on this phenom-

enon of labelling.]

5. If this argument sounds strangely familiar, it is being repeated and promulgated in the neo-conservative book

The Bell Curve which claims that poverty and intelligence are linked through inherited characteristics.

6. This assumption is based onmy previous works—Factual Fictions: Origins of the English Novel and Resisting

Novels: Ideology and Fiction—as well as the cumulative body of writing about the relationship between

capitalism, material life, culture, and fiction. The work of Raymond Williams, Terry Eagleton, Nancy

Armstrong, Mary Poovey, John Bender, Michael McKeon, and others points in similar directions.

7. The issue of peoplewith disabilities in literature is awell-documented one and is one Iwant generally to avoid

in this work. Excellent books abound on the subject, including Alan Gartner and Tom Joe, eds., Images of the

Disabled, Disabling Images (New York: Praeger, 1987) and thework of Deborah Kent including ‘‘In Search of a

Heroine: Images of Womenwith Disabilities in Fiction and Drama’’ inMichelle Fine and Adrienne Asch, eds.

Women with Disabilities: Essays in Psychology, Culture, and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,

1988).

8. And if themaincharacter hasamajordisability, thenweare encouraged to identifywith that character’s ability

to overcome their disability.

9. The genealogical family line is both hereditary and financial in the bourgeois novel. The role of the family is

defined by Jürgen Habermas thus: ‘‘as a genealogical link it [the family] guaranteed a continuity of personnel

INTRODUCTION: DISABILITY, NORMALITY, AND POWER | 13

that consistedmaterially in the accumulation of capital and was anchored in the absence of legal restrictions

concerning the inheritance of property’’ (47). The fact that the biological connectedness and the financial

connectedness are conflated in the novel only furthers the point that normality is an enforced condition that

upholds the totality of the bourgeois system.

WORKS CITED

Bell, Alexander Graham. 1969. Memoir upon the Formation of a Deaf Variety of the Human Race. Washington,

DC: Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf.

Blacker, C. P. 1952. Eugenics: Galton and After. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Conrad, Joseph. 1986. Lord Jim. London: Penguin.

——. 1990 [1968]. The Secret Agent. London: Penguin.

Davis, Lennard J. 1995. Enforcing Normalcy. New York: Verso Books.

Farrall, Lyndsay Andrew. 1985. The Origin and Growth of the English Eugenics Movement 1865–1925. New York:

Garland.

Flaubert, Gustave. 1965. Madam Bovary. Trans. Paul de Man. New York: Norton.

Freud, Sigmund. 1977. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Trans. James Strachey. New York: Norton.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of

Bourgeois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kevles, Daniel J. 1985. In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity. New York:

Alfred A. Knopf.

MacKenzie, Donald. A. 1981. Statistics in Britain, 1865–1930. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Marx, Karl. 1970. Capital. Vol. 1. Trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. New York: International Publishers.

Porter, Theodore M. 1986. The Rise of Statistical Thinking 1820–1900. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stigler, StephenM. 1986. The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty before 1900. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Zola, Emile. 1964. The Experimental Novel and Other Essays. Trans. Belle M. Sherman. New York: Haskel House.

——. 1993. The Masterpiece. Trans. Thomas Walton. London: Oxford University Press.

14 | LENNARD J. DAVIS