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CHAPTER OBJECTIVES

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Why Philosophy

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1.1 PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING

!e title of this text, Living Philosophy, is meant to suggest two themes: first, that philosophy, after two-and-one-half millennia, is still alive and relevant and influen- tial; and second, that philosophy is not only for studying but also for living—that is, for guiding our lives toward what’s true and real. Philosophy, even with its ancient lineage and seemingly remote concerns, applies to your life and your times and your world. Philosophy achieves this immediacy by being many good things at once: it is enlightening, thought provoking, life changing, liberating, theoretical, and practical. !e world is full of students and teachers who can attest to these claims. More impor- tantly, you will find proof of them in the remainder of this text—and in the writings of the great philosophers, in your e"ort to understand what they say and the reasons they give for saying it, and in your honest attempts to apply philosophy to your life.

Philosophy is the name that philosophers have given to both a discipline and a process. As a discipline, philosophy is one of the humanities. It is a field of study out of which several other fields have evolved—physics, biology, political science, and many others. As a process, philosophy is a penetrating mode of reflection for understanding life’s most important truths. !is mode is called the philosophical method—the systematic use of critical reasoning to try to find answers to fundamen- tal questions about reality, morality, and knowledge. !e method, however, is not a master key used exclusively by professional philosophers to unlock mysteries hidden from common folk. !e philosophical method is the birthright of every person, for we are all born with the capacity to reason, to question, to discover. For thousands of years, great minds like Aristotle, Plato, Confucius, Descartes, Aquinas, and Sartre have used it in their search for wisdom, and what they found has changed countless lives. But amateur philosophers like you have also used it—and continue to use it—to achieve life-altering understanding that would have eluded them otherwise.

The Good of Philosophy Philosophy is not just about ideas; it’s about fundamental ideas, those upon which other ideas depend. A fundamental belief logically supports other beliefs, and the more beliefs it supports the more fundamental it is. Your belief or disbelief in God, for ex- ample, might support a host of other beliefs about morality, life after death, heaven, hell, free will, science, evolution, prayer, abortion, miracles, homosexuality, and more. !anks to your upbringing, your culture, your peers, and other influences, you already have a head full of fundamental beliefs, some of them true, some false. Whether true or false, they constitute the framework of your whole belief system, and, as such, they help you make sense of a wide range of important issues in life—issues concerning what exists and what doesn’t, what actions are right or wrong (or neither), and what kinds of things we can know and not know. Fundamental beliefs, therefore, make up your “philosophy of life,” which informs your thinking and guides your actions.

Perhaps now you can better appreciate philosophy’s greatest practical benefit: it gives us the intellectual wherewithal to improve our lives by improving our philoso- phy of life. A faulty philosophy of life—that is, one that comprises a great many false fundamental beliefs—can lead to a misspent or misdirected life, a life less meaningful

“Science gives us knowledge, but only philosophy can give us wisdom.”

—Will Durant

philosophical method !e systematic use of critical reasoning to try to find answers to fundamental questions about reality, morality, and knowledge.

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“Philosophy should be responsive to human experience and yet critical of the defective thinking it sometimes encounters.”

—Martha Nussbaum

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than it could be. Philosophy is the most powerful instrument we have for evaluating the worth of our fundamental beliefs and for changing them for the better. !rough philosophy we exert control over the trajectory of our lives, making major course corrections by reason and reflection.

!e Greek philosopher Socrates (469–399 BCE), one of Western civilization’s great intellectual heroes, says, “!e unexamined life is not worth living.” To examine your life is to scrutinize the core ideas that shape it, and the deepest form of scrutiny is exercised through phi- losophy. !is search for answers goes to the heart of the traditional conception of philosophy as a search for wisdom (the term philosophy is derived from Greek words meaning “love of wisdom”). With the attainment of wisdom, we come to understand the true nature of real- ity and how to apply that understanding to living a good life.

Philosophy’s chief theoretical benefit is the same one that most other fields of inquiry pursue: understanding for its own sake. Even if philos- ophy had no practical applications at all, it would still hold great value for us. We want to know how the world works, what truths it hides, just for the sake of knowing. And philosophy obliges. Astronomers search the sky, physicists study subatomic particles, and archeologists hunt for ancient ruins, all the while knowing that what they find may have no practical implications at all. We humans wonder, and that’s often all the reason we need to search for answers. As the great philosopher Aristotle says, “For it is owing to their wonder that people both now begin and at first began to philosophize.”

For many people, the quest for understanding through philosophy is a spiritual, transformative endeavor, an ennobling pursuit of truths at the core of life. !us several philosophers speak of philosophy as something that enriches or nurtures the soul or mind. Socrates, speaking to the jurors who condemned him for practicing philosophy on the streets of Athens, asks, “Are you not ashamed that, while you take care to acquire as much wealth as possible, with honor and glory as well, yet you take no care or thought for understanding or truth, or for the best possible state of your soul?” In a similar vein, the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–270 BCE) says, “Let no young man delay the study of philosophy, and let no old man become weary of it; for it is never too early nor too late to care for the well-being of the soul.” And in our own era, the philosopher Walter Kaufmann (1921–1980) declares, “Philosophy means liberation from the two dimensions of routine, soaring above the well-known, seeing it in new perspectives, arousing wonder and the wish to fly.”

Along with philosophical inquiry comes freedom. We begin our lives at a particular place and time, steeped in the ideas and values of a particular cul- ture, fed ready-made beliefs that may or may not be true and that we may never think to question. If you passively accept such beliefs, then those beliefs are not really yours. If they are not really yours, and you let them guide your choices and actions, then they—not you—are in charge of your life. You thus forfeit your personal freedom.

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But philosophy helps us rise above this predicament, to transcend the narrow and obstructed standpoint from which we may view everything. It helps us sift our hand- me-down beliefs in the light of reason, look beyond the prejudices that blind us, and see what’s real and true. By using the philosophical method, we may learn that some of our beliefs are on solid ground and some are not. In either case, through philoso- phy our beliefs become truly and authentically our own.

Philosophical Terrain Philosophy’s sphere of interest is vast, encompassing fundamental beliefs drawn from many places. Philosophical questions can arise anywhere. Part of the reason for this is that ordinary beliefs that seem to have no connection with philosophy can become philosophical in short order. A physiologist may want to know how our brains work, but she ventures into the philosophical arena when she wonders whether the brain is the same thing as the mind—a question that science alone cannot answer. A lawyer studies how the death penalty is administered in Texas, but he does philosophy when he considers whether capital punishment is ever morally

“Philosophy is the highest music.”

—Plato

“To teach how to live without certainty and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation is perhaps the chief thing that phi- losophy, in our age, can do for those who study it.”

—Bertrand Russell

Your Philosophical Beliefs Where do you stand on the fundamental issues in philosophy? Here is your chance to take inventory of your views. After you finish this course, take the survey again. You may be surprised at how your perspective has changed or become more nuanced. Answer with these numbers: 5 = true; 4 = probably true; 3 = neither probable nor improbable; 2 = probably false; 1 = false.

1. !e God of traditional Western religions (an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good deity) exists.

2. !is God does not exist. 3. !e apparent design of the universe shows that it had an intelligent designer. 4. !e theory of evolution is a better explanation of the apparent design of biological life

than the theory of “intelligent design.” 5. Right actions are those commanded by God; wrong actions are those forbidden

by God. 6. God does not make actions right or wrong by commanding them to be so. 7. At least some moral norms or principles are objectively true or valid for everyone. 8. Moral standards are relative to what individuals or cultures believe. 9. Mind and body consist of two fundamentally di"erent kinds of stu"—nonphysical

stu" and physical stu". 10. !e mind, or soul, can exist without the body.

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permissible. A medical scientist wants to know how a human fetus develops, but she finds it di#cult to avoid the philosophical query of what the moral status of the fetus is. An astrophysicist studies the Big Bang, the cataclysmic explosion thought to have brought the universe into being—but then asks whether the Big Bang shows that God caused the universe to exist. On CNN you see the horrors of war and famine, but then you find yourself grappling with whether they can be squared with the exis- tence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God. Or you wonder what your moral obligations are to the poor and hungry of the world. Or you ponder whether government should help people in need or leave them to fend for themselves.

We can divide philosophy’s subject matter into four main divisions, each of which is a branch of inquiry in its own right with many subcategories. Here’s a brief rundown of these divisions and a sampling of the kinds of questions that each asks.

Metaphysics is the study of reality in the broadest sense, an inquiry into the elemental nature of the universe and the things in it. !ough it must take into account the findings of science, metaphysics generally focuses on basic questions that science alone cannot address. Questions of interest: Does the world consist only

metaphysics !e study of reality.

11. Our mental states are nothing but brain states (mind states are identical to brain states).

12. No one has free will. 13. Persons have free will (some of our actions are free). 14. Although our actions are determined, they can still be free (free will and determinism

are not in conflict). 15. We can know some things about the external world. 16. We cannot know anything about the external world. 17. Truth about something depends on what a person or culture believes. 18. Libertarianism is the correct political theory. 19. Welfare liberalism is the correct political theory. 20. Meaning in life comes from outside ourselves, from God or some other transcendent

reality. 21. Meaning in life comes from within ourselves.

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Main Divisions of Philosophy DIVISION QUESTIONS

Metaphysics Does the world consist only of matter, or is it made up of other basic things, such as ideas or mind? Is there a spiritual, ideal realm that exists beyond the material world? Is the mind the same thing as the body? How are mind and body related? Do people have immortal souls? Do humans have free will, or are they determined by forces beyond their control? Can they be both free and determined? Does God exist? How can both a good God and evil exist simultane- ously? What is the nature of causality? Can an e"ect ever precede its cause? What is the nature of time? Is time travel possible?

Epistemology What is knowledge? What is truth? Is knowledge possible—can we ever know anything? Does knowledge require certainty? What are the sources of knowledge? Is experience a source of knowledge? Is mysticism or faith a source? Can we gain knowledge of the empiri- cal world through reason alone? If we have knowledge, how much do we have? When are we justified in saying that we know some- thing? Do we have good reasons to believe that the world exists independently of our minds? Or do our minds constitute reality?

Axiology What makes an action right (or wrong)? What things are intrinsi- cally good? What is the good life? What gives life meaning? What makes someone good (or bad)? What moral principles should guide our actions and choices? Which is the best moral theory? Is killing ever morally permissible? If so, why? Are moral standards objective or subjective? Is an action right merely because a culture endorses it? Does morality depend on God? What makes a society just?

Logic What are the rules for drawing correct inferences? What is the nature and structure of deductive arguments? How can proposi- tional or predicate logic be used to evaluate arguments? Upon what logical principles does reasoning depend? Does logic describe how the world is—or just how our minds work? Can conclusions reached through inductive logic be rationally justified?

DETAILS

of matter, or is it made up of other basic things, such as ideas or mind? Is there a spiritual, ideal realm that exists beyond the material world? Is the mind the same thing as the body? Are the theories of science true, or are they just convenient fic- tions? How are mind and body related? Do people have immortal souls? Do humans have free will, or are they determined by forces beyond their control? Can they be both free and determined? Does God exist? How can both a good God and evil exist

“And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul? Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul.”

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simultaneously? What is the nature of causality? Can an e"ect ever precede its cause? What is the nature of time? Is time travel possible?

Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge. Questions of interest: What is knowledge? What is truth? Is knowledge possible—can we ever know anything? Does knowledge require certainty? What are the sources of knowledge? Is experience a source of knowledge? Is mysticism or faith a source? Can we gain knowledge of the empirical world through reason alone? If we have knowledge, how much do we have? When are we justified in saying that we know something? Do we have good reasons to believe that the world exists independently of our minds? Or do our minds constitute reality?

Axiology is the study of value, including both aesthetic value and moral value. !e study of moral value is known as ethics. Ethics involves inquiries into the nature of moral judgments, virtues, values, obligations, and theories. Questions of interest: What makes an action right (or wrong)? What things are intrinsically good? What is the good life? What gives life meaning? What makes someone good (or bad)? What moral principles should guide our actions and choices? Which is the best moral theory? Is killing ever morally permissible? If so, why? Are moral standards objective or subjective? Is an action right merely because a culture endorses it? Does morality depend on God? What makes a society just?

Logic is the study of correct reasoning. Questions of interest: What are the rules for drawing correct inferences? What is the nature and structure of deductive argu- ments? How can propositional or predicate logic be used to evaluate arguments? Upon what logical principles does reasoning depend? Does logic describe how the world is—or just how our minds work? Can conclusions reached through inductive logic be rationally justified?

In addition to these divisions, there are subdivisions of philosophy whose job is to examine critically the assumptions and principles that underlie other fields. !us we have the philosophy of science, the philosophy of law, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of language, and many others. When those laboring in a discipline begin questioning its most basic ideas—ideas that define its subject matter and principles of inquiry—philosophy, the most elemental mode of investigation, steps in.

Although this text covers mostly Western philosophy, it’s important to keep in mind that non-Western civilizations have also produced distinctive traditions of philosophical inquiry, some of which arose thousands of years ago. (See Chapter 6: “Eastern !ought.”) China, Japan, and India have been especially fruitful ground for provocative ideas and unique perspectives on philosophical issues that concern both East and West. In the past, Western philosophers took little notice of non- Western thought, but that has changed. Studying the philosophical traditions of non-Western cultures—a field called “world philosophy”—seems more worthwhile than ever in our age of globalization and increasing cultural diversity.

1.2 SOCRATES AND THE EXAMINED LIFE

!ere is no better way to understand and appreciate the philosophical quest for knowl- edge than to study the life and work of Socrates, one of philosophy’s greatest practitio- ners and the most revered figure in its history. Socrates wrote no philosophy, but we

epistemology !e philosophical study of knowledge.

axiology !e study of value, including both aesthetic value and moral value.

ethics !e study of morality using the methods of philosophy.

logic !e study of correct reasoning.

“!ere’s a di"erence between a philosophy and a bumper sticker.”

—Charles Schulz

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know about his thinking and character through his famous pupil Plato, who portrayed him in several dialogues, or conversations (notably in Euthyphro, Crito, and Apology).

For millennia Socrates has been inspiring generations by his devotion to phil- osophical inquiry, his relentless search for wisdom, and his determination to live according to his own high standards. As mentioned earlier, he famously said that “the unexamined life is not worth living,” and he became the best example of some- one living his life by that maxim.

For Socrates, an unexamined life is a tragedy because it results in grievous harm to the soul, the immaterial, divine part of a human. !e soul is harmed by lack of knowledge—ignorance of one’s own self and of the most important values in life (the good). But knowledge of these things is a mark of the soul’s excellence. A clear sign that a person has an unhealthy soul is her exclusive pursuit of social status, wealth, power, and pleasure instead of the good of the soul. !e good of the soul is attained only through an uncompromising search for what’s true and real, through the wisdom to see what is most vital in life. Such insight comes from ratio- nal self- examination and critical questioning of facile assumptions and unsupported

“!e point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it.”

—Bertrand Russell

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Plato No philosopher—with the possible exception of Aristotle—has had a deeper and more lasting e"ect on Western thought than Plato (c. 427–347 BCE). He was born in Athens into an influen- tial aristocratic family and grew up during the perilous years of the Peloponnesian War, a struggle between Athens and the Pelo- ponnesian states. He was a student and admirer of Socrates, who turned Plato’s mind toward philosophy and the pursuit of wisdom. He was horrified by Socrates’ execution in 399 for impiety and corruption of Athenian youth, so he left Athens, traveling widely, possibly to Sicily and Egypt. When he returned to Athens, he founded the Academy, a teaching college regarded as the first uni- versity, and devoted the rest of his life to teaching and writing philosophy. (!e Academy endured for hundreds of years until it was abolished by the Eastern Roman emperor Justinian I.) !e Academy’s most renowned student was Aristotle, who en- tered the school at age seventeen and remained for twenty years.

Plato’s thinking is embodied in his dialogues, twenty-five of which exist complete. !ey were written during a span of fifty years and have been divided into three periods: early, middle, and late. !e early dialogues include Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, and Gorgias. !ese early works portray Socrates as a brilliant and principled deflater of his contemporaries’ bogus claims to knowledge. !e middle dialogues include Phaedo, Republic, and !eaetetus; the late ones consist of Critias, Parmenides, Sophist, Laws, and others.

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beliefs. To get to the truth, Socrates thinks, we must go around the false certitudes of custom, tradition, and superstition and let reason be our guide. !us he played the role of philosophical gadfly, an annoying pest to the people of Athens, prodding them to wake up and seek the wisdom within their grasp.

We know very little about Socrates’ life. He spent all his days in Athens except for a term of military service when he soldiered in the Peloponnesian War.

THEN AND NOW

Socrates Café !e Socratic method is alive and well in the twenty-first century; Christopher Phillips, author and educator, has seen to that. He has traveled from one end of the country to another to facilitate philosophical discussions based on the Socratic method. !ese informal gatherings attract people of all ages from all sorts of backgrounds and life experiences. He calls the dialogues Socrates Cafés. !ey are held in co"eehouses, day care centers, senior centers, high schools, churches, and other places, and they have had a profound e"ect on him and on many people who have participated in such discussions. As Phillips says:

For a long time, I’d had a notion that the demise of a certain type of philosophy has been to the detriment of our society. It is a type of philosophy that Socrates and other philosophers practiced in Athens in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. A type that utilized a method of philosophical inquiry that “everyman” and “everywoman” could embrace and take for his or her own, and in the process rekindle the childlike—but by no means childish—sense of wonder. . . .

!e Socratic method of questioning aims to help people gain a better under- standing of themselves and their nature and their potential for excellence. At times, it can help people make more well-informed life choices, because they now are in a better position to know themselves, to comprehend who they are and what they want. It can also enable a thoughtful person to articulate and then apply his or her unique philosophy of life. !is in turn will better equip a questioning soul to engage in the endless and noble pursuit of wisdom.— Socrates Café (2001)

Phillips is the author of several books, including Socrates Café and Six Questions of Socrates: A Modern-Day Journey of Discovery through World Philosophy. He is also co-founder of the Society for Philosophical Inquiry (www.philosopher.org), which supports the creation and development of Socrates Cafés around the globe. He says there are now over six hundred Socrates Cafés worldwide.

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He was married and had three sons. He spent much of his time roaming the streets of Athens, speaking with anyone who would listen. His habit was to ask people seemingly simple questions about their views on virtue, religion, justice, or the good, challenging them to think critically about their basic assumptions. !is sort of question-and-answer dialogue in which propositions are methodically scruti- nized to uncover the truth has become known as the Socratic method. Usually when Socrates used it in conversations, or dialogues, with his fellow Athenians, their views would be exposed as false or confused. !e main point of the exercise for Socrates, however, was not to win arguments, but to get closer to the truth. He thought people who pursued this noble aim as he did should not be embarrassed by being shown to be wrong; they should be delighted to be weaned from a false opinion. Nevertheless, the Socratic conversations often ended in the humiliation of eminent Athenians. !ey were enraged by Socrates, while many youths gravitated to him. He was soon indicted, tried before a jury, and convicted of disrespecting the gods and corrupting the youth of the city.

1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPHICALLY

As we have seen, to think philosophically is to bring your powers of critical reasoning to bear on fundamental questions. When you do this, you are usually clarifying the meaning of concepts, constructing and evaluating philosophical theories, or devis- ing and evaluating logical arguments. !is latter task constitutes the principal labor of philosophy. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and other great thinkers do not deliver their philosophical insights to us without argument, as if we are to automati- cally accept their views with no questions asked. Philosophers provide reasons for thinking their ideas are plausible—that is, they give us arguments. And if we believe what they say, it should be because there are good reasons for doing so. Likewise, if we expect intelligent people to accept our philosophical views, we must argue our case. Since the philosophy we read will most likely contain arguments, our understanding of the text will hang on our ability to identify and understand those arguments.

Reasons and Arguments As you might have guessed, the term argument does not refer to heated disagree- ments or emotional squabbles. An argument is a group of statements in which one of them is supported by the others. A statement (or claim) is an assertion that some- thing is or is not the case and is therefore the kind of utterance that is either true or false. In an argument, the statement being supported is the conclusion, and the statements supporting the conclusion are the premises. !e premises are meant to provide reasons for believing that the conclusion is true. A good argument gives us good reasons for accepting a conclusion; a bad argument fails to provide good reasons. In philosophy—and in any other kind of rational inquiry—accepting a conclusion (statement) without good reasons is an elementary mistake in reasoning. Believing a statement without good reasons is a recipe for error; believing a statement for good reasons increases your chances of uncovering the truth.

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argument A group of statements in which one of them (the conclusion) is supported by the others (the premises).

statement (or claim) An assertion that something is or is not the case and is therefore the kind of utterance that is either true or false.

conclusion In an argu- ment, the statement being supported by premises.

premise A statement that supports the conclusion of an argument.

Socratic method Question- and-answer dialogue in which propositions are methodically scrutinized to uncover the truth.

“!e chief benefit, which results from philosophy, arises in an indirect manner, and proceeds more from its secret, insen- sible influence, than from its immediate application.”

—David Hume

“Astonishment is the root of philosophy.”

—Paul Tillich

“Science gives us knowl- edge, but only philosophy can give us wisdom.”

—Will Durant

5IJOLJOH�1IJMPTPQIJDBMMZ� 11

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When we do philosophy, then, we are likely at some point to be grappling with arguments—we are trying to either (1) devise an argument to sup- port a statement or (2) evaluate an argument to see if there really are good reasons for accepting its conclusion.

Note that argument in the sense used here is not synonymous with persuasion. An argument provides us with reasons for accepting a claim; it is an attempted “proof ” for an assertion. But persua- sion does not necessarily involve giving any reasons at all for accepting a claim. To persuade is to influ- ence people’s opinions, which can be accomplished by o"ering a good argument but also by mislead- ing with logical fallacies, exploiting emotions and prejudices, dazzling with rhetorical gimmicks, hiding or distorting the facts, threatening or coerc- ing people—the list is long. Good arguments prove something whether or not they persuade. Persua- sive ploys can change minds but do not necessarily prove anything.

Now consider these two simple arguments:

Argument 1

*U�T� XSPOH� UP� UBLF� UIF� MJGF� PG� BO� JOOPDFOU� QFSTPO�� "CPSUJPO� UBLFT� UIF� MJGF� PG� BO� JOOPDFOU� QFSTPO�� 5IFSFGPSF� �BCPSUJPO�JT�XSPOH�

Argument 2

(PE�EPFT�OPU�FYJTU��"GUFS�BMM �NPTU�DPMMFHF�TUVEFOUT�CFMJFWF�UIBU�UIBU� JT�UIF�DBTF�

In Argument 1, the conclusion is “abortion is wrong,” and it is backed by two premises: “It’s wrong to take the life of an innocent person” and “Abortion takes the life of an innocent person.” In Argument 2, the conclusion is “God does not exist,” which is supported by the premise “After all, most college students believe that that is the case.” Despite the di"erences between these two passages (di"erences in con- tent, the number of premises, and the order of their parts), they are both arguments because they exemplify basic argument structure: a conclusion supported by at least one premise.

!ough the components of an argument seem clear enough, people often fail to distinguish between arguments and strong statements that contain no arguments at all. Suppose we change Argument 1 to this:

"CPSUJPO�JT�XSPOH��*�DBO�U�CFMJFWF�IPX�NBOZ�QFPQMF�UIJOL�JU�T�NPSBMMZ� PLBZ��5IF�XPSME�JT�JOTBOF�

“Philosophy asks the simple question, what is it all about?”

—Alfred North Whitehead

Figure 1.4 )JUMFS�XBT�B�NBTUFS�QFSTVBEFS �SFMZJOH�OPU�PO�HPPE�BS- HVNFOUT�CVU�PO�FNPUJPOBM�SIFUPSJD��)PX�NBOZ�QFPQMF�UPEBZ�XPVME� CF� QFSTVBEFE� CZ� B� DPOUFNQPSBSZ� QPMJUJDJBO� XJUI� )JUMFS�T� SIFUPSJDBM� UBMFOUT

People tend to makeargument

basedonemotionandsubjectivethinking

le le he l l l h

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Now there is no argument, just an expression of exasperation or anger. !ere are no statements giving us reasons to believe a conclusion. What we have are some un- supported assertions that may merely appear to make a case. If we ignore the distinc- tion between genuine arguments and nonargumentative material, critical reasoning is undone.

!e simplest way to locate an argument is to find its conclusion first, then its prem- ises. Zeroing in on conclusions and premises can be a lot easier if you keep an eye out for indicator words. Indicator words often tag along with arguments and indicate that a conclusion or premise may be nearby.

Here are a few conclusion indicator words:

consequently as a result thus hence therefore so it follows that which means that

Here are some premise indicator words:

in view of the fact assuming that because since due to the fact that for because given that

Just remember that indicator words do not guarantee the presence of conclusions and premises. !ey are simply telltale signs.

Assuming we can recognize an argument when we see it, how can we tell if it is a good one? Fortunately, the general criteria for judging the merits of an argument are simple and clear. A good argument—one that gives us good reasons for believing a claim—must have (1) solid logic and (2) true premises. Requirement (1) means that the conclusion should follow logically from the premises, that there must be a proper logical connection between the supporting statements and the statement supported. Requirement (2) says that what the premises assert must in fact be the case. An argu- ment that fails in either respect is a bad argument.

!ere are two basic kinds of arguments—deductive and inductive—and our two requirements hold for both of them, even though the logical connections in each type are distinct. Deductive arguments are intended to give logically conclusive sup- port to their conclusions so that if the premises are true, the conclusion absolutely must be true. Argument 1 is a deductive argument and is therefore supposed to be constructed so that if the two premises are true, its conclusion cannot possibly be false. Here it is with its structure laid bare:

Argument 1

��� *U�T�XSPOH�UP�UBLF�UIF�MJGF�PG�BO�JOOPDFOU�QFSTPO� ��� "CPSUJPO�UBLFT�UIF�MJGF�PG�BO�JOOPDFOU�QFSTPO� ��� 5IFSFGPSF �BCPSUJPO�JT�XSPOH�

“One’s philosophy is not best expressed in words; it is expressed in the choices one makes . . . and the choices we make are ulti- mately our responsibility.”

—Eleanor Roosevelt

6.�3FDBMM�TPNF�TUBUFNFOUT� UIBU�ZPV�IBWF�IFBSE�PS� SFBE�JO�XIJDI�TUSPOH� BTTFSUJPOT�XFSF�NBEF� CVU�OP�BSHVNFOU�XBT�QSF- TFOUFE��%JE�UIF�BTTFSUJPOT� QSPWF�BOZUIJOH �8IBU�XBT� ZPVS�SFBDUJPO�BU̓UIF�UJNF � 8FSF�ZPV�QFSTVBEFE�PS� JNQSFTTFE�CZ�UIFN �

deductive argument An argument intended to give logically conclusive support to its conclusion.

l T y inorder to persuadethemselves intobelievingsth

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Do you see that, given the form or structure of this argument, if the premises are true, then the conclusion has to be true? It would be very strange—illogical, in fact—to agree that the two premises are true but that the conclusion is false.

Now look at this one:

Argument 3

��� "MM�EPHT�BSF�NBNNBMT� ��� 3FY�JT�B�EPH� ��� 5IFSFGPSF �3FY�JT�B�NBNNBM�

Again, there is no way for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false. !e deductive form of the argument guarantees this.

So a deductive argument is intended to have this sort of airtight structure. If it actually does have this structure, it is said to be valid. Argument 1 is deductive because it is intended to provide logically conclusive support to its conclusion. It is valid because, as a matter of fact, it does o"er this kind of support. A deductive argu- ment that fails to provide conclusive support to its conclusion is said to be invalid. In such an argument, it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Argument 3 is intended to have a deductive form, and because it actually does have this form, the argument is also valid.

An elementary fact about deductive arguments is that their validity (or lack thereof ) is a separate issue from the truth of the premises. Validity is a structural matter, depending on how an argument is put together. Truth concerns the nature of the claims made in the premises and conclusion. A deductive argument is sup- posed to be built so that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true—but in a particular case, the premises might not be true. A valid argument can have true or false premises and a true or false conclusion. (By definition, of course, it cannot have true premises and a false conclusion.) In any case, being invalid or having false premises dooms a deductive argument.

Inductive arguments are supposed to give probable support to their conclusions. Unlike deductive arguments, they are not designed to support their conclusions decisively. !ey can establish only that, if their premises are true, their conclusions are probably true (more likely to be true than not). Argument 2 is an inductive argument meant to demonstrate the probable truth that “God does not exist.” Like all inductive arguments (and unlike deductive ones), it can have true premises and a false conclusion. So it’s possible for the sole premise—“After all, most college stu- dents believe that that is the case”—to be true while the conclusion is false.

If inductive arguments succeed in lending very probable support to their con- clusions, they are said to be strong. Strong arguments are such that if their premises are true, their conclusions are very probably true. If they fail to provide this very probable support, they are termed weak. Argument 2 is a weak argument because its premise, even if true, does not show that more likely than not God does not exist. What college students (or any other group) believe about God does not constitute good evidence for or against God’s existence.

“Philosophy, when super- ficially studied, excites doubt; when thoroughly explored, it dispels it.”

—Francis Bacon

inductive argument An argument intended to give probable support to its conclusion.

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But consider this inductive argument:

Argument 4

��� &JHIUZ�öWF�QFSDFOU�PG�UIF�TUVEFOUT�BU�UIJT�VOJWFSTJUZ�BSF�3FQVCMJDBOT� ��� 4POJB�JT�B�TUVEFOU�BU�UIJT�VOJWFSTJUZ� ��� 5IFSFGPSF �4POJB�JT�QSPCBCMZ�B�3FQVCMJDBO�

!is argument is strong. If its premises are true, its conclusion is very likely to be true. If 85 percent of the university’s students are Republicans, and Sonia is a univer- sity student, she is more likely than not to be a Republican too.

When a valid (deductive) argument has true premises, it is a good argument. A good deductive argument is said to be sound. Argument 1 is valid, but we cannot say whether it is sound until we determine the truth of the premises. Argument 3 is valid, and if its premises are true, it is sound. When a strong (inductive) argument has true premises, it is also a good argument. A good inductive argument is said to be cogent. Argument 2 is weak, so there is no way it can be cogent. Argument 4 is strong, and if its premises are true, it is cogent.

Checking the validity or strength of an argument is often a plain, commonsense undertaking. Using our natural reasoning ability, we can examine how the premises are linked to the conclusion and can see quickly whether the conclusion follows from the premises. We are most likely to make an easy job of it when the arguments are simple. Many times, however, we need some help, and help is available in the form of methods and guidelines for evaluating arguments.

Having a familiarity with common argument patterns, or forms, is especially useful when assessing the validity of deductive arguments. We are likely to encoun- ter these forms again and again. Here is a prime example:

Argument 5

��� *G�UIF�TVSHFPO�PQFSBUFT �UIFO�UIF�QBUJFOU�XJMM�CF�DVSFE� ��� 5IF�TVSHFPO�JT�PQFSBUJOH� ��� 5IFSFGPSF �UIF�QBUJFOU�XJMM�CF�DVSFE�

!is argument form contains a conditional premise—that is, a premise consist- ing of a conditional, or if-then, statement (actually a compound statement composed of two constituent statements). Premise 1 is a conditional statement. A conditional statement has two parts: the part beginning with if (called the antecedent), and the part beginning with then (known as the consequent). So the antecedent of Premise 1 is “If the surgeon operates,” and the consequent is “then the patient will be cured.”

!e best way to appreciate the structure of such an argument (or any deductive ar- gument, for that matter) is to translate it into traditional argument symbols in which each statement is symbolized by a letter. Here is the symbolization for Argument 5:

��� *G�p �UIFO�q. 2. p. ��� 5IFSFGPSF �q.

“Philosophy is like trying to open a safe with a com- bination lock: each little adjustment of the dials seems to achieve nothing, only when everything is in place does the door open.”

—Ludwig Wittgenstein

c

5IJOLJOH�1IJMPTPQIJDBMMZ� 15

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We can see that p represents “the surgeon operates,” and q represents “the patient will be cured.” But notice that we can use this same symbolized argument form to represent countless other arguments—arguments with di"erent statements but having the same basic structure.

It just so happens that the underlying argument form for Argument 5 is extremely common—common enough to have a name, modus ponens (or a#rming the ante- cedent). !e truly useful fact about modus ponens is that any argument having this form is valid. We can plug any statements we want into the formula and the result will be a valid argument, a circumstance in which if the premises are true, the con- clusion must be true.

An equally prevalent argument form is modus tollens (or denying the consequent). For example:

Argument 6

��� *G�UIF�EPTF�JT�MPX �UIFO�UIF�IFBMJOH�JT�TMPX� ��� 5IF�IFBMJOH�JT�OPU�TMPX� ��� 5IFSFGPSF �UIF�EPTF�JT�OPU�MPX�

��� *G�p �UIFO�q. ��� /PU�q. ��� 5IFSFGPSF �OPU�p.

Modus tollens is also a valid form, and any argument using this form must also be valid.

!ere are also common argument forms that are invalid. Here are two of them:

A!rming the Consequent Argument 7

��� *G�UIF�NJOE�JT�BO�JNNBUFSJBM�TVCTUBODF �UIFO�&41�JT�SFBM� ��� &41�JT�SFBM� ��� 5IFSFGPSF �UIF�NJOE�JT�BO�JNNBUFSJBM�TVCTUBODF�

��� *G�p �UIFO�q. 2. q. ��� 5IFSFGPSF �p.

Denying the Antecedent Argument 8

��� *G�NPSBMJUZ�JT�SFMBUJWF�UP�QFSTPOT� UIBU�JT �JG�NPSBM�SJHIUOFTT�PS�XSPOH- OFTT�EFQFOET�PO�XIBU�QFPQMF�CFMJFWF �UIFO�NPSBM�EJTBHSFFNFOU� CFUXFFO�QFSTPOT�XPVME�CF�OFBSMZ�JNQPTTJCMF�

��� .PSBMJUZ�JT�OPU�SFMBUJWF�UP�QFSTPOT� ��� 5IFSFGPSF � NPSBM� EJTBHSFFNFOU� CFUXFFO� QFSTPOT� JT� OPU� OFBSMZ�

JNQPTTJCMF�

Invalidity occursonly whenthere aremorethan one

antecedent

matching oneconsequence Ai

C D C

16 CHAPTER 1 8IZ�1IJMPTPQIZ

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��� *G�p �UIFO�q. ��� /PU�p. ��� 5IFSFGPSF �OPU�q.

!e advantage of being able to recognize these and other common argument forms is that you can use that skill to readily determine the validity of many deduc- tive arguments. You know, for example, that any argument having the same form as modus ponens or modus tollens must be valid, and any argument in one of the common invalid forms must be invalid.

Inductive arguments also have distinctive forms. In enumerative induction, for example, we arrive at a generalization about an entire group of things after observing just some members of the group. Consider these:

Argument 9

&WFSZ�MJHIU�öYUVSF�*�IBWF�CPVHIU�GSPN�UIF�IBSEXBSF�TUPSF�IBT�CFFO� EFGFDUJWF�

5IFSFGPSF �BMM�MJHIU�öYUVSFT�TPME�BU�UIF�IBSEXBSF�TUPSF�BSF�QSPCBCMZ� EFGFDUJWF�

Argument 10

"MM�UIF�IBXLT�UIBU�*�IBWF�PCTFSWFE�JO�UIJT�XJMEMJGF�TBODUVBSZ�IBWF�IBE� SFE�UBJMT�

5IFSFGPSF �BMM�UIF�IBXLT�JO�UIJT�TBODUVBSZ�QSPCBCMZ�IBWF�SFE�UBJMT�

Argument 11

4JYUZ�QFSDFOU�PG�UIF�#PTUPOJBOT�*�IBWF�JOUFSWJFXFE�JO�WBSJPVT�QBSUT�PG� UIF�DJUZ�BSF�QSP�DIPJDF�

5IFSFGPSF ����QFSDFOU�PG�BMM�#PTUPOJBOT�BSF�QSPCBCMZ�QSP�DIPJDF�

As you can see, enumerative induction has this form:

X percent of the observed members of group A have property P.

Therefore, X percent of all members of group A probably have property P.

!e observed members of the group are simply a sample of the entire group. So based on what we know about this sample, we can generalize to all the members. But how do we know whether such an argument is strong? Everything depends on the sample. If the sample is large enough and representative enough, we can safely assume that our generalization drawn from the sample is probably an accurate reflec- tion of the whole group of members. A sample is representative of an entire group only if each member of the group has an equal chance of being included in the sample. In general, the larger the sample, the greater the probability that it accurately reflects the nature of the group as a whole. Often common sense tells us when a sample is too small.

7.�#FGPSF�SFBEJOH�UIJT� DIBQUFS �XPVME�ZPV� IBWF�GPVOE�BOZ�PG�UIF� JOWBMJE�BSHVNFOU�GPSNT� QFSTVBTJWF �8IZ�PS� XIZ�OPU �

“!e essence of philosophy is that a man should so live that his happiness shall depend as little as possible on external things.”

—Epictetus

y one oseq na ya t

5IJOLJOH�1IJMPTPQIJDBMMZ� 17

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We do not know how many light fixtures from the hardware store are in the sample mentioned in Argument 9. But if the number is several dozen and the fixtures were bought over a period of weeks or months, the sample is probably su#ciently large and representative. If so, the argument is strong. Likewise, in Argument 10 we don’t know the size of the sample or how it was obtained. But if the sample was taken from all the likely spots in the sanctuary where hawks live, and if several hawks were observed in each location, the sample is probably adequate—and the argument is strong. In Argument 11, if the sample consists of a handful of Bostonians inter- viewed on a few street corners, the sample is definitely inadequate and the argument is weak. But if the sample consists of several hundred people, and if every member of the whole group has an equal chance of being included in the sample, then the sample would be good enough to allow us to accurately generalize about the whole population. Typically, selecting such a sample of a large population is done by profes- sional polling organizations.

Valid and Invalid Argument Forms

Valid Argument Forms A!rming the Antecedent Denying the Consequent (Modus Ponens) (Modus Tollens) If p, then q. If p, then q. p. Not q. !erefore, q. !erefore, not p.

Example: Example: If Spot barks, a burglar is in the house. If it’s raining, the park is closed. Spot is barking. !e park is not closed. !erefore, a burglar is in the house. !erefore, it’s not raining.

Invalid Argument Forms A!rming the Consequent Denying the Antecedent If p, then q. If p, then q. q. Not p. !erefore, p. !erefore, not q.

Example: Example: If the cat is on the mat, she is asleep. If the cat is on the mat, she is asleep. She is asleep. She is not on the mat. !erefore, she is on the mat. !erefore, she is not asleep.

DETAILS

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Reading Philosophy Unfortunately, arguments in philosophical essays rarely come neatly la- beled so you can find and evaluate them. You have to do that work your- self, a task that requires careful reading and thinking. !e process can be challenging because, in the real world, arguments can be simple or complex, clearly stated or perplexing, and apparent or hidden. !is is true for philosophical essays as well as for any other kind of writing that con- tains arguments. In some philosophical prose, the relationship between the conclusion (or conclusions) and the premises can be complicated, and even good arguments can be surrounded by material irrelevant to the ar- guments at hand. !e remedy for these di#culties is instructive examples and plenty of practice, some of which you can get in this chapter.

Let’s begin by identifying and analyzing the argument in the follow- ing passage. !e issue is whether humans have free will or are compelled by forces beyond their control to act as they do. !e statements are num- bered for ease of reference.

� �5IF� GBNPVT� USJBM� MBXZFS� $MBSFODF� %BSSPX� ����o���� � NBEF� B� OBNF� GPS� IJNTFMG� CZ� VTJOH� UIF�iEFUFSNJOJTN� EF- GFOTFw�UP�HFU�IJT�DMJFOUT�BDRVJUUFE�PG�TFSJPVT�DSJNFT�� � �5IF� DSVY�PG�UIJT�BQQSPBDI�JT�UIF�JEFB�UIBU�IVNBOT�BSF�OPU�SFBMMZ� SFTQPOTJCMF� GPS� BOZUIJOH� UIFZ� EP� CFDBVTF� UIFZ� DBOOPU� DIPPTF� GSFFMZ�UIFZ� BSF�iEFUFSNJOFE w� QSFEFTUJOFE � JG� ZPV� XJMM �CZ�OBUVSF� PS�(PE �UP�CF�UIF�XBZ�UIFZ�BSF�� � ̓4P�JO�B� TFOTF �%BSSPX�TBZT �IVNBOT�BSF�MJLF�XJOEVQ�UPZT�XJUI�OP� DPOUSPM�PWFS�BOZ�BDUJPO�PS�EFDJTJPO�� � �5IFZ�IBWF�OP�GSFF�XJMM�� � ̓3FNFNCFS�UIBU�%BSSPX�XBT�B�SFOPXOFE�BHOPTUJD�XIP� XBT�TLFQUJDBM�PG�BMM�SFMJHJPVT�DMBJNT�� � �#VU�%BSSPX�JT�XSPOH� BCPVU�IVNBO�GSFF�XJMM�GPS�UXP�SFBTPOT�� � �'JSTU �JO�PVS�FWFSZ- EBZ�NPSBM�MJGF �PVS�PXO�DPNNPOTFOTF�FYQFSJFODF�TVHHFTUT� UIBU�TPNFUJNFT�QFPQMF�BSF�GSFF�UP�NBLF�NPSBM�EFDJTJPOT�� � �8F�TIPVME�OPU�BCBOEPO�XIBU�PVS�DPNNPOTFOTF�FYQF- SJFODF�UFMMT�VT�XJUIPVU�HPPE�SFBTPO�BOE� � �%BSSPX�IBT� HJWFO�VT�OP�HPPE�SFBTPO�� �� �4FDPOE �%BSSPX�T�EFUFSNJO- JTN�JT�OPU�DPOöSNFE�CZ�TDJFODF �BT�IF�DMBJNT�CVU��BDUVBMMZ� DPOøJDUT�XJUI�TDJFODF�� �� �.PEFSO�TDJFODF�TBZT�UIBU�UIFSF� BSF�NBOZ�UIJOHT� BU�UIF�TVCBUPNJD�MFWFM�PG�NBUUFS �UIBU�BSF� OPU�EFUFSNJOFE�BU�BMM�� �� �5IFZ�KVTU�IBQQFO��

Indicator words are scarce in this argument, unless you count the words “first” and “second” as signifying premises. But the conclusion is not hard to find; it’s sentence 6: “Darrow is wrong about human free will for two

reasons.” Locating the conclusion enables us to see that some statements (statements 1 through 4) are neither conclusion nor premises; they are just background information on Darrow’s views. Most argumentative essays contain some supplemental informa- tion like this. Statement 5 is irrelevant to the argument; Darrow’s agnosticism has no logical connection to the premises or conclusion. Statement 12 is just a rewording of

Figure 1.5 )PX�NVDI�JT�B�XBUDI�MJLF�UIF� VOJWFSTF �&WFSZUIJOH�EFQFOET�PO�UIF�SFM- FWBOU�TJNJMBSJUJFT�BOE�EJòFSFODFT�

Figure 1.6 $MBSFODF�%BSSPX� ����o���� �

“!e object of studying philosophy is to know one’s own mind, not other people’s.”

—Dean Inge

5IJOLJOH�1IJMPTPQIJDBMMZ� 19

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statement 11. After this elimination process, only the following premises and conclu- sion (statement 6) remain:

� �#VU�%BSSPX�JT�XSPOH�BCPVU�IVNBO�GSFF�XJMM�GPS�UXP�SFBTPOT�

� �'JSTU �JO�PVS�NPSBM�MJGF �PVS�DPNNPOTFOTF�FYQFSJFODF�TVHHFTUT�UIBU� TPNFUJNFT�QFPQMF�BSF�GSFF�UP�NBLF�NPSBM�EFDJTJPOT�

� �8F�TIPVME�OPU�BCBOEPO�XIBU�PVS�DPNNPOTFOTF�FYQFSJFODF�UFMMT� VT�XJUIPVU�HPPE�SFBTPO�

� �%BSSPX�IBT�HJWFO�VT�OP�HPPE�SFBTPO�

�� �%BSSPX�T�EFUFSNJOJTN�JT�OPU�DPOöSNFE�CZ�TDJFODF �BT�IF�DMBJNT� CVU�BDUVBMMZ�DPOøJDUT�XJUI�TDJFODF�

�� �.PEFSO�TDJFODF�TBZT�UIBU�UIFSF�BSF�NBOZ�UIJOHT� NPTUMZ�BU�UIF� TVCBUPNJD�MFWFM �UIBU�BSF�OPU�EFUFSNJOFE�BU�BMM��

Statements 7 through 11 are the premises. !ey are all meant to provide support to statement 6, but their support is of unequal weight. Statement 10 gives independent

“!e true function of philosophy is to educate us in the principles of reasoning and not to put an end to further reasoning by the introduction of fixed conclusions.”

—George Henry Lewes

PORTR AIT

Figure 1.7 )ZQBUJB� D�����o��� �

Hypatia Hypatia (c. 370–415) was the greatest philosopher of her day. She lived in the Greek city of Alexandria, which in the fourth century was the intellectual epicenter of the world, excelling in scientific and philosophical learning. It also was the home of the famed Library, which contained thousands of scholarly manu- scripts drawn from the best thinkers of ancient times, including the works of Plato and Aristotle. In this rich environment, Hypatia achieved fame as a Neoplatonist philosophy teacher, an astrono- mer, and a mathematician. At around age twenty-five or thirty, she became the director of the school of the renowned philoso- pher Plotinus—a very high honor since women were tradition- ally not appointed to such o#ces. Another indication of her sterling reputation was that she was appointed by a Christian government even though she was known to be a pagan.

She taught the works of the “pagan” philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, and stu- dents came from far-flung places for the privilege of being her students. She also is thought to have written three commentaries on noted mathematical treatises.

In 415, Cyril, the bishop of Alexandria, arranged for Hypatia’s murder at the hands of a Christian mob: she was pulled from her chariot, hauled to a church, stripped naked, and skinned alive with oyster shells. Cyril, on the other hand, was later canonized.

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support to the conclusion without the help of any other premises, so it is an indepen- dent premise. We can say the same thing about statement 11; it too is an independent premise. But notice that statements 7, 8, and 9 are dependent premises supporting the conclusion. !at is, taken separately, they are weak, but together they constitute a plausible reason for accepting statement 6. Statement 10 directly supports the con- clusion, and in turn is supported by premise 11.

Now take a look at this passage:

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!e conclusion is statement 3, and the premises are statements 4 through 9. !e first two statements are extraneous. Statements 4 and 5 are dependent premises and so are statements 6 and 7. Statements 8 and 9 constitute an argument that gives sup- port to the passage’s main conclusion (statement 3). Statement 8 is the conclusion; statement 9, the premise. Notice also that the sentence “Why do I say this?” is not a statement.

So remember: When you read a philosophical essay, you are not simply trying to glean some facts from it as you might if you were reading a science text or tech- nical report. Neither are you following a storyline as if you were reading a mystery novel (though philosophy papers sometimes contain their share of mysteries). In most cases, you are tracing the steps in an argument, trying to see what conclusion the writer wants to prove and whether she succeeds in proving it. Along the way, you may encounter several premises with their accompanying analyses, clarifications, explanations, and examples. You may even run into a whole chain of arguments. In the end, if you have read well and the writer has written well, you are left not with a new set of data or a story ending, but a realization—maybe even a revelation—that a conclusion is, or is not, worthy of belief.

!e best way to learn how to read philosophy well is to read philosophy often. You will probably get plenty of chances to do that in your current philosophy course. Having a few rules to guide you in your reading, however, may help shorten the learning curve. As you read, keep the following in mind.

“Philosophy is a kind of journey, ever learning yet never arriving at the ideal perfection of truth.”

—Albert Pike

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1. Approach the text with an open mind. If you are studying philosophy for the first time, you are likely—at least at first—to find a good bit of the material di#- cult, strange, or exasperating, sometimes all three at once. !at’s normal. Philosophy is an exploration of the rugged frontiers of our knowledge of fundamental things, so much of this new territory is likely to seem daunting or unfamiliar. !ere’s also an excellent chance that your first visits to this terrain will be vexing, perhaps even infuriating, because you may sometimes disagree with what you read.

!ere is no shame in experiencing any of these reactions. !ey come with the territory. But if you are to make any headway in philosophy, you need to try your best to counteract these attitudes and feelings. Remember, philosophy at its best is a fair-minded, fearless search for truth. Anything that interferes with this noble quest must be overcome and cast aside.

Avoid making a judgment about an essay’s ideas or arguments until you fully un- derstand them and have fairly considered them. Make sure you are not reading with the intent to prove the conclusions false (or true). Be open to the possibility that the essay could give you good reasons to change your mind about something.

Try to maintain a neutral attitude toward the writer, presuming that she is neither right nor wrong, neither sinner nor saint. Don’t assume that everything a renowned philosopher says must be true, and don’t presuppose that everything a philosopher you dislike says must be false. Give the writer the same attention and respect that you would give a friend who is discussing a serious issue with you.

If you are reading the work of a famous philosopher and you find yourself think- ing that his or her ideas are obviously silly or ridiculous, think again. !e odds are good that you are misunderstanding what you read. It is wiser to assume that the text o"ers something of value (even if you disagree with it) and that you need to read more carefully.

2. Read actively and critically. Philosophical reading is intense. It cannot be rushed. It cannot be crammed. It cannot be done while your mind is on automatic pilot.

Philosophical reading is active reading. Instead of reading just to get through a piece of writing, you must take your time and ask yourself what key terms and passages mean, how the argument is structured, what the central thesis is, where the premises are, how certain key ideas are related, whether the main conclusion conflicts with propositions you know are true, even how the material compares with other philosophical writing on the same subject.

Philosophical reading is also critical reading. In critical reading, you ask not just what something means but also whether a statement is true and if the reason- ing is solid. You ask if the conclusion really follows from the premises, whether the premises are true, if the analysis of a term really makes sense, if an argument has been overlooked, if an analogy is weak, whether there are counterexamples to key claims, and whether the claims agree with other things you have good reason to believe.

3. Identify the conclusion first, then the premises. When you first begin read- ing philosophical texts, they may seem to you like dark thickets of propositions into which you may not enter without losing your way. But your situation is really

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“Small amounts of philosophy lead to atheism, but larger amounts bring us back to God.”

—Francis Bacon

betolerantofdifferent thoughts

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not that bad. In argumentative writing (the kind you are most likely to encounter in philosophy), you can depend on there being, well, an argument, a conclusion backed by premises. !ere could, of course, be several arguments that support the main argument, and the arguments could be complex, but these sets of conclusion- plus-premises will all serve as recognizable guideposts. If you want to penetrate the thicket, then, you must first identify the argument (or arguments). And the key to doing that is to find the conclusion first, then look for the premises.

When you find the main conclusion, you thereby identify the main point of the essay, and you then have the number-one clue to the function of all the rest of the text. Once you uncover the point that the writer is trying to prove, finding the sup- porting premises becomes much easier. And when you isolate the premises, locating the text that explains and amplifies the premises gets easier too. !erefore, the first— and most important—question you can ask about a philosophical essay is, “What claim is the writer trying to prove?”

4. Outline, paraphrase, or summarize the argument. Understanding an es- say’s argument is so important that testing whether you really “get it” is crucial. You can test your grasp of the argument by outlining, paraphrasing, or summarizing it. If you can lay out an argument’s premises and conclusion in an outline, or if you can accurately paraphrase or summarize the argument, you probably have a pretty good understanding of it. Very often students who think they comprehend an argument are surprised to find that they cannot devise an adequate outline or summary of it. Such failures suggest that, although outlining, paraphrasing, or summarizing may seem to some to be unnecessary, it is not—at least not to those new to philosophy.

5. Evaluate the argument and formulate a tentative judgment. When you read philosophy, understanding it is just the first step. You also must do something that many beginners find both di#cult and alien: you must make an informed judgment about what you read. Simply reiterating what the writer has said will not do. Your judgment is what matters here. Mainly, this judgment is your evalu- ation of the argument presented by the writer—an assessment of (1) whether the conclusion follows from the premises and (2) whether the premises are true. Only when the answer is yes to both these questions can you say that the conclusion of the argument is worthy of acceptance. !is kind of evaluation is precisely what your instructor expects when she asks you to critique an argumentative essay in philosophy.

Fallacious Reasoning You can become more proficient in reading and writing philosophy if you know how to identify fallacies when you see them. Fallacies are common but bad arguments. !ey are defective arguments that appear so often in writing and speech that phi- losophers have given them names and o"ered instructions on how to recognize and avoid them.

Many fallacies are not just failed arguments—they are also deceptively plausible appeals. !ey can easily appear sound or cogent, misleading the reader. !eir poten- tial for slipperiness is another good reason to study fallacies. !e best way to avoid

fallacy A common but bad argument.

uabletoexpressSth inyourownway andapply it

truly understandsth

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being taken in by them is to study them until you can consistently pick them out of any random selection of prose. Here are some of the more prevalent ones:

Straw Man. !e straw man fallacy is the misrepresentation of a person’s views so they can be more easily attacked or dismissed. Let’s say you argue that the war in Afghanistan is too costly in lives and money, and your opponent replies this way:

My adversary argues that the war in Afghanistan is much too di!cult for the United States and that we ought to, in e"ect, cut and run while we can. But why must we take the coward’s way out?

!us, your point has been distorted, made to look more extreme or radical than it really is; it is now an easy target. !e notion that we ought to “cut and run” or “take the coward’s way out” does not follow from the statement that the war in Iraq is too costly.

!e straw man kind of distortion, of course, proves nothing, though many people fall for it every day. !is fallacy is probably the most common type of fallacious reasoning used in politics. It is also popular in many other kinds of argumentation— including student philosophy papers.

Appeal to the Person. Closely related to the straw man fallacy is appeal to the person (also known as the ad hominem fallacy). Appeal to the person is the rejecting of a

straw man !e fallacy of misrepresenting a person’s views so they can be more easily attacked or dismissed.

appeal to the person (ad hominem fallacy) !e fallacy of rejecting a statement on the grounds that it comes from a particular person, not because the statement itself is false or dubious.

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statement on the grounds that it comes from a particular person, not because the statement, or claim, itself is false or dubious. For example:

You can safely discard anything that Susan has to say about govern- ment. She’s a dyed-in-the-wool socialist.

Johnson argues that our current welfare system is defective. But don’t listen to him—he’s a conservative.

Ad hominem arguments often creep into student philosophy papers. Part of the reason is that some appeals to the person are not so obvious. For example:

Swinburne’s cosmological argument is a serious attempt to show that God is the best explanation for the existence of the universe. However, he is a well-known theist, and this fact raises some doubts about the strength of his case.

Dennett argues from the materialist standpoint, so he begins with a bias that we need to take into account.

Some of the strongest arguments against the death penalty come from a few people who are actually on death row. They obviously have a vested interest in showing that capital punishment is morally wrong. We there- fore are forced to take their arguments—however convincing—with a grain of salt.

Each of these arguments is defective because it asks us to reject or resist a claim solely because of a person’s character, background, or circumstances—things that are generally irrelevant to the truth of claims. A statement must stand or fall on its own merits. !e personal characteristics of the person espousing the view do not necessarily have a bearing on its truth. Only if we can show that someone’s dubious traits somehow make the claim dubious are we justified in rejecting the claim be- cause of a person’s personal characteristics. Such a circumstance is rare.

Appeal to Popularity. !e appeal to popularity (or appeal to the masses) is another extremely common fallacy. It is arguing that a claim must be true not because it is backed by good reasons but simply because many people believe it. !e idea is that, somehow, there is truth in numbers. For example:

Of course there’s a God. Everyone believes that.

Seventy percent of Americans believe that the president’s tax cuts are good for the economy. So don’t try to tell me the tax cuts aren’t good for the economy.

Most people believe that Jones is guilty, so he’s guilty.

In each of these arguments, the conclusion is thought to be true merely because it is believed by an impressive number of people. !e number of people who believe a claim, however, is irrelevant to the claim’s truth. What really matters is how much support the claim has from good reasons. Large groups of people have been—and are—wrong about many things. Many people once believed that Earth is flat, mer- maids are real, and human sacrifices help crops grow. !ey were wrong.

appeal to popularity !e fallacy of arguing that a claim must be true not because it is backed by good reasons but simply because many people believe it.

“!is is patently absurd; but whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities.”

—Bertrand Russell

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Remember, however, that the number of people who accept a claim can be rele- vant to its truth if the people happen to be experts. Twenty professional astronomers who predict an eclipse are more reliable than one hundred nonexperts who swear that no eclipse will occur.

Genetic Fallacy. A ploy like the appeal to the person is the genetic fallacy—arguing that a statement can be judged true or false based on its source. In an appeal to the person, someone’s character or circumstances is thought to tell the tale. In the genetic fallacy, the truth of a statement is supposed to depend on origins other than an individual—organizations, political platforms, groups, schools of thought, even exceptional states of mind (like dreams and intuitions). Look:

That new military reform idea has gotta be bunk. It comes from a liberal think tank.

At the city council meeting Hernando said that he had a plan to curb the number of car crashes on Highway 19. But you can bet that whatever it is, it’s half-baked—he said the plan came to him when he was stoned on marijuana.

The U.S. Senate is considering a proposal to reform a!rmative action, but you know their ideas must be ridiculous. What do they know about the rights of the disadvantaged? They’re a bunch of rich white guys.

Equivocation. !e fallacy of equivocation is assigning two di"erent meanings to the same significant word in an argument. !e word is used in one sense in a premise and in a di"erent sense in another place in the argument. !e switch in meaning can deceive the reader and disrupt the argument, rendering it invalid or weaker than it would be otherwise. Here’s a classic example:

Only man is rational.

No woman is a man.

Therefore, no woman is rational.

And one other:

You are a bad writer.

If you are a bad writer, then you are a bad boy.

Therefore, you are a bad boy.

!e first argument equivocates on the word man. In the first premise, man means humankind; in the second, male. !us, the argument seems to prove that women are not rational. You can see the trick better if you assign the same meaning to both instances of man. Like this:

Only humans are rational.

No woman is a human.

Therefore, no woman is rational.

genetic fallacy Arguing that a statement can be judged true or false based on its source.

equivocation !e fallacy of assigning two di"erent meanings to the same significant word in an argument.

“!ere are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”

—William Shakespeare

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In the second argument, the equivocal term is bad. In the first premise, bad means incompetent; in the second, immoral.

Appeal to Ignorance. As its name implies, this fallacy tries to prove something by appealing to what we don’t know. !e appeal to ignorance is arguing either that (1) a claim is true because it hasn’t been proven false or (2) a claim is false because it hasn’t been proven true. For example:

Try as they may, scientists have never been able to disprove the existence of an afterlife. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that there is in fact an afterlife.

Super Green Algae can cure cancer. No scienti#c study has ever shown that it does not work.

No one has ever shown that ESP (extrasensory perception) is real. There- fore, it does not exist.

There is no evidence that people on welfare are hardworking and re- sponsible. Therefore, they are not hardworking and responsible.

!e first two arguments try to prove a claim by pointing out that it hasn’t been proven false. !e second two try to prove that a claim is false because it hasn’t been proven true. Both kinds of arguments are bogus because they assume that a lack of evidence proves something. A lack of evidence, however, can prove nothing. Being ignorant of the facts does not enlighten us.

Notice that if a lack of evidence could prove something, then you could prove just about anything you wanted. You could reason, for instance, that since no one can prove that horses can’t fly, horses must be able to fly. Since no one can disprove that you possess supernatural powers, you must possess supernatural powers.

False Dilemma. In a dilemma, you are forced to choose between two unattractive possibilities. !e fallacy of false dilemma is arguing erroneously that since there are only two alternatives to choose from, and one of them is unacceptable, the other one must be true. Consider these:

You have to listen to reason. Either you must sell your car to pay your rent, or your landlord will throw you out on the street. You obviously aren’t going to sell your car, so you will be evicted.

You have to face the hard facts about the war on drugs. Either we must spend billions of dollars to increase military and law enforcement opera- tions against drug cartels, or we must legalize all drugs. We obviously are not going to legalize all drugs, so we have to spend billions on anticartel operations.

!e first argument says that there are only two choices to consider: either sell your car or get evicted, and since you will not sell your car, you will get evicted. !is argument is fallacious because (presumably) the first premise is false—there seem to be more than just two alternatives here. You could get a job, borrow money from

appeal to ignorance !e fallacy of trying to prove something by appealing to what we don’t know. It is arguing that either (1) a claim is true because it hasn’t been proven false or (2) a claim is false because it hasn’t been proven true.

false dilemma !e fallacy of arguing erroneously that since there are only two alternatives to choose from, and one of them is unacceptable, the other one must be true.

5IJOLJOH�1IJMPTPQIJDBMMZ� 27

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a friend, or sell your DVD player and TV. If the argument seems convincing, it is because other possibilities are excluded.

!e second argument asserts that there are only two ways to go: spend billions to attack drug cartels or legalize all drugs. Since we won’t legalize all drugs, we must therefore spend billions to assault the cartels. !e first (either/or) premise, however, is false; there are at least three other options. !e billions could be spent to reduce and prevent drug use; drug producers could be given monetary incentives to switch to nondrug businesses; or only some drugs could be legalized.

Begging the Question. !e fallacy of begging the question is trying to prove a con- clusion by using that very same conclusion as support. It is arguing in a circle. !is way of trying to prove something says, in e"ect, “X is true because X is true.” Few people would fall for this fallacy in such a simple form, but more subtle kinds can be beguiling. For example, here’s the classic instance of begging the question:

The Bible says that God exists.

The Bible is true because God wrote it.

Therefore, God exists.

!e conclusion here (God exists) is supported by premises that assume that very conclusion.

Here’s another one:

All citizens have the right to a fair trial because those whom the state is obliged to protect and give consideration are automatically due judicial criminal proceedings that are equitable by any reasonable standard.

!is passage may at first seem like a good argument, but it isn’t. It reduces to this unimpressive assertion: “All citizens have the right to a fair trial because all citizens have the right to a fair trial.” !e conclusion is “all citizens have the right to a fair trial,” but that’s more or less what the premise says. !e premise—“those whom the state is obliged to protect and give consideration are automatically due judicial crimi- nal proceedings that are equitable by any reasonable standard”—is equivalent to “all citizens have the right to a fair trial.”

When circular reasoning is subtle, it can ensnare even its creators. !e fallacy can easily sneak into an argument if the premise and conclusion say the same thing but say it in di"erent, complicated ways.

Slippery Slope. !e metaphor behind this fallacy suggests the danger of stepping on a dicey incline, losing your footing, and sliding to disaster. !e fallacy of slippery slope, then, is arguing erroneously that a particular action should not be taken be- cause it will lead inevitably to other actions resulting in some dire outcome. !e key word here is erroneously. A slippery slope scenario becomes fallacious when there is no reason to believe that the chain of events predicted will ever happen. For example:

This trend toward gay marriage must be stopped. If gay marriage is permitted, then traditional marriage between a man and a woman will

“Philosophy is at once the most sublime and the most trivial of human pursuits.”

—William James

begging the question !e fallacy of trying to prove a conclusion by using that very same conclusion as support.

slippery slope !e fallacy of arguing erroneously that a particular action should not be taken because it will lead inevitably to other actions resulting in some dire outcome.

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be debased and devalued, which will lead to an increase in divorces. And higher divorce rates can only harm our children.

!is argument is fallacious because there are no reasons for believing that gay marriage will ultimately result in the chain of events described. If good reasons could be given, the argument might be salvaged.

Composition. Sometimes what is true about the parts of a thing is also true of the whole—and sometimes not. !e fallacy of composition is arguing erroneously that what can be said of the parts can also be said of the whole. Consider:

Each piece of wood that makes up this house is lightweight. Therefore, the whole house is lightweight.

Each soldier in the platoon is pro#cient. Therefore the platoon as a whole is pro#cient.

The monthly payments on this car are low. Hence, the cost of the car is$low.

Just remember, sometimes the whole does have the same properties as the parts. If each part of the rocket is made of steel, the whole rocket is made of steel.

Division. If you turn the fallacy of composition upside down, you get the fallacy of division—arguing erroneously that what can be said of the whole can be said of the parts:

The house is heavy. Therefore, every part of the house is heavy.

The platoon is very e"ective. Therefore, every member of the platoon is e"ective.

That herd of elephants eats an enormous amount of food each day. Therefore, each elephant in the herd eats an enormous amount of food each day.

composition !e fallacy of arguing erroneously that what can be said of the parts can also be said of the whole.

“Philosophy should quicken life, not deaden it.”

—Susan Glaspell

division !e fallacy of arguing erroneously that what can be said of the whole can be said of the parts.

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WRITING AND REASONING CHAPTER 1

1. What is the di"erence between an argument and an explanation? What is the di"erence between an argument and a set of accusations? or expressions of outrage?

2. How is reading philosophy di"erent from, say, reading a physics text? or reading a novel?

3. What is philosophy’s greatest practical benefit? Do you think studying philosophy could change your life goals or your fundamental beliefs? Why or why not?

4. What is the philosophical method? Who can make use of this approach to important questions? Can only philosophers use it? Have you used it? How?

5. Devise an argument in favor of the proposition that people should (or should not) be punished as Socrates was for speaking their minds.

6. Write a Socratic dialogue between yourself and a friend. Imagine that your friend declares: “Everyone lies. No one ever tells the truth.” Show that those statements are false.

7. Choose one of your fundamental beliefs that you have not thought much about and write an argument defending it or rejecting it.

8. !e straw man fallacy is rampant in political debates. Give an example of this tactic being used by commentators or politicians, or make up an example of your own.

9. !ink about the political commentators you’ve read or listened to. What fallacies have they been guilty of using?

10. Socrates died for his principles. What ideas in your life would you be willing to die for?

REVIEW NOTES

1.1 PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING t� 4UVEZJOH�QIJMPTPQIZ�IBT�CPUI�QSBDUJDBM�BOE�UIFPSFUJDBM�CFOFmUT��5P�TPNF �UIF�QVS-

suit of knowledge through philosophy is a spiritual quest. t� 5BLJOH�BO�JOWFOUPSZ�PG�ZPVS�QIJMPTPQIJDBM�CFMJFGT�BU�UIF�CFHJOOJOH�PG�UIJT�DPVSTF�

will help you gauge your progress as you study. t� ɨF�GPVS�NBJO�EJWJTJPOT�PG�QIJMPTPQIZ�BSF�NFUBQIZTJDT �FQJTUFNPMPHZ �BYJPMPHZ �BOE�

logic. !ere are also subdivisions of philosophy that examine basic issues found in other fields.

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1.2 SOCRATES AND THE EXAMINED LIFE t� 'PS�4PDSBUFT �BO�VOFYBNJOFE�MJGF�JT�B�USBHFEZ�CFDBVTF�JU�SFTVMUT�JO�HSJFWPVT�IBSN�UP�

the soul, a person’s true self or essence. !e soul is harmed by lack of knowledge— ignorance of one’s self and of the most important values in life (the good).

t� ɨF�4PDSBUJD�NFUIPE�JT�B�RVFTUJPO�BOE�BOTXFS�EJBMPHVF�JO�XIJDI�QSPQPTJUJPOT�BSF� methodically scrutinized to uncover the truth. Usually when Socrates used it in conversations with his fellow Athenians, their views would be exposed as false or confused. !e main point of the exercise for Socrates, however, was not to win arguments but to get closer to the truth.

1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPHICALLY t� "O�BSHVNFOU�JT�B�HSPVQ�PG�TUBUFNFOUT�JO�XIJDI�POF�PG�UIFN�JT�NFBOU�UP�CF�TVQ-

ported by the others. A statement (or claim) is an assertion that something is or is not the case and is therefore the kind of utterance that is either true or false. In an argument, the statement being supported is the conclusion, and the statements supporting the conclusion are the premises.

t� "�HPPE�BSHVNFOU� NVTU�IBWF� � �TPMJE�MPHJD� BOE� � �USVF�QSFNJTFT�� 3FRVJSFNFOU� (1) means that the conclusion should follow logically from the premises. Require- ment (2) says that what the premises assert must in fact be the case.

t� "�EFEVDUJWF�BSHVNFOU�JT�JOUFOEFE�UP�HJWF�MPHJDBMMZ�DPODMVTJWF�TVQQPSU�UP�JUT�DPODMV- sion. An inductive argument is intended to give probable support to its conclusion. A deductive argument with the proper structure is said to be valid; a deductive argument that fails to have this structure is said to be invalid. If inductive argu- ments succeed in lending probable support to their conclusions, they are said to be strong. If they fail to provide this probable support, they are termed weak. When a valid (deductive) argument has true premises, it is said to be sound. When a strong (inductive) argument has true premises, it is said to be cogent. In inference to the best explanation, we begin with premises about a phenomenon or state of a"airs to be explained. !en we reason from those premises to an explanation for that state of a"airs. We try to produce not just any explanation but the best explanation among several possibilities. !e best explanation is the one most likely to be true.

t� ɨF� HVJEFMJOFT� GPS� SFBEJOH� QIJMPTPQIZ� BSF�� � � "QQSPBDI� UIF� UFYU� XJUI� BO� PQFO� mind; (2) read actively and critically; (3) identify the conclusion first, then the premises; (4) outline, paraphrase, or summarize the argument; and (5) evaluate the argument and formulate a tentative judgment.

,&:�5&3.4 appeal to ignorance appeal to popularity appeal to the person argument axiology begging the question

composition conclusion deductive argument division epistemology equivocation ethics

fallacy false dilemma genetic fallacy inductive argument logic metaphysics

philosophical method premise slippery slope Socratic method statement straw man

'PS�'VSUIFS�3FBEJOH� 31

vau28703_ch01_001-031.indd 31 05/09/17 05:58 PM

'PS�'VSUIFS�3FBEJOH Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 2005). A concise guide to hundreds of philosophy topics; many entries are of substantial length.

Ted Honderich, ed., !e Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). A good one-volume philosophy reference featuring many excellent articles on philosophical issues.

Norman Melchert, !e Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). An excellent introduction to the major philosophers and their works with in-depth annotations of readings.

Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn, ed., Classics of Philosophy, 3rd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). !e most comprehensive anthology of Western philosophy available.

Bertrand Russell, !e Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). A very readable classic work by an eminent philosopher. Focuses mostly on issues in epistemology.

Lewis Vaughn, Great Philosophical Arguments: An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). A text with readings organized by topic and by the standard arguments that have occupied thinkers throughout the centuries.

Lewis Vaughn, !e Power of Critical !inking, 5th edition (New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2015). A student-friendly introduction to logic, critical thinking, and philosophical writing.

vau28703_ch02_032-052.indd 32 05/09/17 05:58 PM

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES

!e Pre-Socratics and the Sophists

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CHAPTER 2

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5IF�1SF�4PDSBUJDT�BOE�UIF�4PQIJTUT� 33

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Philosophy began in ancient Greece in the sixth century BCE among thinkers who broke with age-old tradition to ponder important matters in an entirely novel way. Humans had for centuries been devising answers to fundamental questions: What is the nature of the world? What is it made of—one kind of stu" or many kinds? Does the world have an origin or has it always existed? Why is the world the way it is? What makes things happen—gods, magic, or something else? What is the reality behind the appearances of reality? !eir answers were generally drawn from mythol- ogy and tradition, from old stories about the gods, or from hand-me-down lore and law. But the first philosophers—called pre-Socratics because most of them came before Socrates (fifth century BCE)—refused to take this path. It is mostly their way of seeking answers about the world, rather than the answers themselves, that dis- tinguished them and made them the first philosophers. Once this philosophical fire was lit, it spread to later thinkers in the ancient world, a period of about a thousand years, from approximately 600 BCE to around 500 CE. It was in this era that Western philosophy first established itself, defined almost all its main areas of study, and gave us philosophical heroes (most notably, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle) who continue to influence our thinking on important ideas and issues.

Other civilizations—Egypt, Babylon, Persia, China, and Assyria—wondered about the world and its mysteries. But only the ancient Greeks, beginning with the pre-Socratics, sidestepped the old ways of thinking and tried to let reason and experience guide them to the truth. !ey sought to justify their theories rather than swallow them whole. From our modern perspective, some of their answers may, at first glance, seem incredible. But thinkers were working from a knowledge base that was two and a half millennia behind ours and at the dawn of philosophical investiga- tions. !ey nevertheless managed some impressive reasoning and even some conclu- sions that foreshadowed ideas in modern times, and the fundamental questions they asked are still being asked today.

pre-Socratics !e first philosophers, most of whom flourished before Socrates (fifth century BCE).

“Science gives us knowl- edge, but only philosophy can give us wisdom.”

—Will Durant

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2.1 THALES AND ANAXIMANDER

According to tradition, !ales (c. 625–547 BCE) was the first philosopher. He hailed from the city-state of Mi- letus, a seaport on the coast of Ionia (now Turkey). He is therefore sometimes referred to as a Milesian, as are two other like-minded philosophers (Anaximander and Anaximenes) who came from the same place. In ancient Greece he and his new way of thinking garnered a great deal of respect for an odd reason: he was said to have predicted the solar eclipse of 585 BCE and to have de- rived his prediction without appeals to divine or other- worldly forces. On this account he has also been called the first scientist, for in those times there was no clear distinction between philosophy and science.

Only tiny fragments of !ales’ writings survive, so scholars have had to rely on reports of his views writ- ten by ancient authorities (by Aristotle, for instance). !ales’ greatest contribution to both philosophy and science is his method. He set out to look for natural— not mythic—explanations for natural phenomena, and he insisted that such accounts be as simple as possible, preferably accounting for everything by positing a single substance or element. !is, as it turns out, is also the preferred approach of modern science.

!ales thought the best candidate for the ultimate stu" of the world was water. (!e traditional Greek view was that the universe is composed of earth, air, fire, and water.) He has been interpreted as holding that water is the source of all that exists and in some way is what everything consists of. Aristotle gives this summary of !ales’ view:

“!e most di#cult thing in life is to know yourself.”

—!ales

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Why would !ales think water is so elemental? He might have been convinced by water’s capacity to convert into di"erent forms—into a liquid, solid (ice), or gas (steam or vapor). Perhaps he reasoned that since water can change into these forms, it might change into other states of matter as well. Maybe behind material objects that

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seem to have nothing to do with water (like stones, for example), there is an essential substance that arises from water. Or he might have noticed, as Aristotle suggested, that water is essential to nourishment, to growth, to life itself (after all, the human body is more than two-thirds water). If water is important to so many natural pro- cesses, perhaps somehow it is the basis of all material processes.

!e Milesian philosopher Anaximander (c. 610–546 BCE) was said to be the pupil and successor of !ales. He is credited with drawing a map of the world, providing naturalistic accounts of the weather, and devising a model of the universe consistent with geometric principles. Like !ales, he sought natural explanations for the origin and composition of the universe, and his views on the subject were an improvement over !ales’ water theory.

As Anaximander saw it, !ales erred when he asserted that everything came from water. Anaximander assumed, as many Greeks did, that things exist in op- position to one another. Darkness and light, wet and dry, hot and cold—these are in conflict, and each member of an opposing pair alternates between overpowering the other member and being overpowered. !us we see day turn into night, then night yield to day in a never-ending cycle. As Anaximander puts it, the opposing fac- tors “make reparation to one another for their injustice according to the ordinance of time.”2 But if everything started out as water, how could its opposite (fire) ever arise? To exist, a thing must be pitted against an opposing thing. But if there were no opposites to contend with one another (because there was only water), how could anything appear?

Anaximander’s answer is that everything came from a formless, imperishable substance called apeiron (the boundless or indefinite). It is the beginning of all that now exists, but it has no beginning itself.

Anaximander’s ideas about the Earth constitute another departure from tradi- tional opinion. !ales thought the Earth was floating on water like a raft, but this view raises a question that Aristotle posed: What supports the water? Anaximander’s answer is that the Earth is a flat cylinder or flat disk suspended in space at the center of the universe. It doesn’t need to be supported by matter of any kind; it is held in place by virtue of its being in the center of everything and equidistant from all points. Anaximander believes that for any action or state, there must be a reason for it, and the Earth has no reason to move in any particular direction—no reason why it should move up, down, or sideways. So it must rest in the middle. Aristotle restates the theory like this:

“Philosophy asks the simple question, what is it all about?”

—Alfred North Whitehead

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2.2 HERACLITUS

Heraclitus flourished around 500 BCE in Ionia, living and working in the city of Ephesus. He wrote a book, but only about a hundred sentences of it have survived, and those are presented in the form of epigrams, concise statements meant to cleverly express a truth or insight. He thus earned a reputation as a philosopher of obscure assertions and sly riddles. He derived his views from introspection and experience and sorted things out through reason. About this approach he says

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“I went in search of myself.” —Heraclitus

“Whatever comes from sight, hearing, learning from experience: this I prefer.”

—Heraclitus

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vau28703_ch02_032-052.indd 37 05/09/17 05:58 PM

that his primary aim was to go “in search of myself.” Taken as a whole, his writings reveal a coherent and comprehensive worldview encompassing both humanity and the cosmos.

Heraclitus’ central idea is the logos—the principle, formula, or law of the world order. To understand the logos is to under- stand reality, to grasp the divine, eternal pattern underlying all of nature and all of humankind.

A fundamental aspect of the logos is summed up by Hera- clitus’ famous maxim: “all are in flux, like a river”4 or, as others have phrased it, “you cannot step twice into the same river.” A river’s water is continually changing so that when you step into the river a second time, the water is entirely di"erent from what it was the first time. For Heraclitus, everything flows; every part of the universe is in flux. But behind the changing appear- ances, there is an unchanging pattern. Underlying the flux of things, there is a sameness, something that unifies the changes, something that enables us to identify a river as a river despite its dynamic, ever-changing composition, something that uni- fies the many into the one. Heraclitus seems to imply that this something is the logos itself.

At its core, says Heraclitus, the logos is a harmony of oppo- sites. Everything exists and changes through a process of con- flict between opposite elements. He declares that “all things come into being through opposition”5 and that “all things take place in accordance with strife and necessity.”6 Without “strife” and “war” of op- posites, the things of this world would not be. Music depends on an opposition between low and high notes. Hot would not exist without cold. Day occurs because night does. And a bow can fling an arrow because the two are held in tension through the string. !e logos ensures that a balance of opposing powers is preserved and that they are all part of the same divine reality. !us Heraclitus asserts that “all things are one.”

Heraclitus’ world order is more nuanced than that of most of the other pre- Socratics. He thinks the cosmos is eternal—it had no beginning but has always existed. Moreover, it is a rational force. !e logos, he says, “steers all things,” for it is a divine “thought” operating according to its own logic. From this picture of reality, Heraclitus derives moral guidance for humankind. We should strive to maintain balance and moderation in our lives, just as the logos does:

logos Heraclitus’ central idea—the principle, formula, or law of the world order.

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“[T]he lover of wisdom as- sociating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine.”

—Plato

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THEN AND NOW

The (Ancient) Theory of Evolution

In the nineteenth century Charles Darwin propounded the theory of biological evo- lution, explaining that evolution operates through what he called “natural selection.” !e basic idea (which is now a matter of scientific consensus) is that o"spring of or- ganisms di"er physically from their parents in various ways, and these di"erences can be passed on genetically to their o"spring. If an o"spring has an inherited trait (such as sharper vision or a larger brain) that in- creases its chances of surviving long enough to reproduce, the individual is more likely to survive and pass the trait on to the next generation. After several generations, this useful trait, or adaptation, spreads throughout a whole population of individu- als, di"erentiating the population from its ancestors.

!e basic outlines of natural selection, however, didn’t originate with Darwin. It was first articulated in rough form twenty-five centuries ago by a pre-Socratic philosopher named Empedocles.

Using observation and imagination, Empedocles (c. 495–c. 435 BCE) main- tained that animals were not created whole by a deity and placed on the Earth. !ey evolved. In the beginning, he says, there existed a hodgepodge of weird creatures with mismatched parts and deformities. “[!ere were] many neckless heads,” says Empedocles, “Naked arms wandered, devoid of shoulders, and eyes strayed alone, begging for foreheads.” !e creatures that were ill formed for survival in their envi- ronment died out, but those with characteristics that gave them a survival advantage lived and reproduced their kind for generations.

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Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans Among all the pre-Socratics, Pythagoras (c. 550–500 BCE) is the most famous yet the most obscure. His name is, of course, attached to the Pythagorean theorem, a geometry-class staple, and the phrase “music of the spheres” can be traced to him. (!e phrase refers to the notion that as the heavenly bodies whir about in space, they make a harmonious noise.) We know he came from Samos o" the coast of Ionia (Asia Minor) to settle in southern Italy, where he established a religious-philosophical society that practiced asceticism. But we know little else. In most cases it’s di#cult to tell whether ideas or doctrines came from Pythago- ras himself or from his many followers, the Pythagoreans. Part of the problem is that he wrote nothing down, and neither did the early Pythagoreans (conflicting schools of his followers were active for at least eight hundred years). All the schools claimed to trace their philosophical and religious roots back to the man himself, although they di"ered substantially in their views.

!e Pythagoreans, claiming the authority of the master, taught the doctrines of an im- mortal soul and reincarnation (metempsychosis) in which the soul travels through cycles of death and rebirth, being born again and again into the form of humans, gods, or animals. Pythagoras is supposed to have remembered his former lives and once scolded someone for beating a dog that Pythagoras claimed was a dear friend in animal form. It is no surprise, then, that Pythagoreans insisted on a vegetarian diet. !ey didn’t want to risk eating some- one they knew. Some of them also devised strange dietary restrictions—for example, the absolute prohibition against eating beans.

!e heart of the Pythagoreans’ worldview was their profound, even mystical, reverence for numbers. !ey discovered the concepts of the square of numbers and of odd and even numbers. Most importantly, they realized that numerical ratios could exactly describe the steps on a musical scale. !is led to the metaphysical view that the universe has a mathemati- cal structure, that the orderliness of the cosmos is based on numbers, that the mysteries of the world could be uncovered through mathematics. (Modern science, of course, also uses numbers to describe and explore natural phenomena.) In a departure from other pre-Socratic doctrines, this view focused the Pythagoreans on the form of the universe instead of the matter or stu" it was made of.

!e obsession with mathematics led many Pythagoreans to mystical excesses. !ey as- signed numbers to abstract ideas—mind was equivalent to 1; maleness to 2; femaleness to 3; and justice to 4. Ten, being the sum of these four numbers, had special mystical significance.

!ey also thought the soul can be purified and united with the divine through con- templation of pure ideas—especially numbers. So a course of study for the devout follow- ers of Pythagoras included geometry, astronomy, and music. Faith was not required, but intellect was.

PORTR AIT

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2.3 PARMENIDES

Parmenides (c. 515–450 BCE) was the most ground- breaking and influential philosopher of the pre- Socratics. We know little about his life—not much more than that he lived in Elea (a Greek colony on the southern coast of Italy) and taught the famous master of paradoxes Zeno. We also know that through the centuries he won the attention and ad- miration of several eminent thinkers, from Plato to Plutarch to Hegel. Like the other pre-Socratics, he contributed more to the shape of philosophical in- quiry than to its content.

Parmenides’ claim to fame rests mostly on his systematic employment of deductive argument. He seems to have been the first thinker outside the field of mathematics to reason deductively and consistently from basic premises to interesting conclusions. In the process, he cemented basic distinctions that have been essential to philosophical inquiry to this day. For one thing, he contrasted reason and the senses. He contended that knowledge of the world could be acquired only through reason, only through a deduc- tive chain of reasoning such as he himself used. !e senses, however, were unreliable. In philosophy these

two approaches to knowledge are known as rationalism and empiricism. (Both are discussed in later chapters.) Rationalism is the view that some or all of our knowl- edge about the world is gained independently of sense experience. Empiricism says that our knowledge of the world comes solely from sense experience. In the coming centuries, many great minds would choose sides in this debate and o"er further ar- guments for and against them. Parmenides takes the path of reason and thus earns the title of the first rationalist philosopher. At stake in this controversy—which continues in our own century—is whether knowledge is possible, how (if at all) knowledge is acquired, and what the extent of our knowledge is (whether we know what we assume we know).

Parmenides also brought out a distinction that philosophers have pondered ever since !ales: the contrast between reality and appearances—between what is real and what only appears to be real. He holds that almost all of the things we think exist in the world—movement, change, multiplicity, diversity, sensory qualities—are il- lusions. We may believe that all these are actual, but we would be mistaken. Only reason can reveal the truth.

Parmenides’ reasoning on this point goes like this: “What is not” (what is noth- ing) cannot possibly exist. You cannot sensibly think or talk about “what is not” (what cannot possibly exist). To think or talk of “what is not” is to think or talk of nothing—and that’s not possible.

Figure 2.6 1BSNFOJEFT� D�����o����#$&).

rationalism !e view that through unaided reason we can come to know what the world is like.

empiricism !e view that our knowledge of the em- pirical world comes solely from sense experience.

“You must learn all things, both the unwaver- ing heart of well-rounded truth and the opinions of mortals in which there is no true warranty.”

—Parmenides

“[What exists] is now, all at once, one and continuous.”

—Parmenides

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?Zeno’s Paradoxes Zeno of Elea (not to be confused with Zeno of Citium, the Stoic) was a fifth- century BCE philosopher and ardent supporter of his distinguished teacher Parmenides. He hoped to defend Par- menides’ One—the single, motionless, changeless, eternal world—against critics who thought the idea was non- sensical. Zeno’s strategy was to dem- onstrate the absurdity of the critics’ views—specifically to show that com- monsense propositions such as “more than one thing exists” and “motion is possible” are false. He does this by establishing that each seemingly obvious proposition implies other propositions that contradict each another. !e resulting contradiction proves that the origi- nal proposition cannot be true. !at is, the proposition yields a paradox.

Here, for example, is one of Zeno’s arguments against the possibility of motion. (1) Sup- pose you intend to walk from where you are now to your next class. (2) Before you get to your destination, you must go half the distance. But before you get half the distance, you must go half the distance to that point (one-quarter of the distance). And before you get half the distance to that point, you must go half the distance again (one-eighth of the distance). And so on forever, for an infinite number of halfway points. (3) So you will never get to your next class; you cannot even begin the trip. (4) Our commonsense view of motion leads to a paradox—common sense says you can get to class, but logic says you never will. !erefore our commonsense view of motion must be mistaken.

In devising his arguments, Zeno created something else—his distinctive form of argument in which he states the proposition to be examined and draws out its implications, revealing the proposition’s weaknesses. Aristotle labeled this kind of argument dialectic and called Zeno the “inventor of dialectic.” Much later, as you will see, dialectic would be perfected by Socrates.

Most people would dismiss these arguments out of hand because the reasoning is in such obvious conflict with the full range of our perceptions. Nevertheless, for over two millennia, thinkers have pondered Zeno’s paradoxes, sometimes o"ering possible solutions, sometimes gaining important insights into the concepts of infinity, space, and motion. Scientists and philosophers have always taken a special interest in them, and that alone suggests that they are far more than logical curiosities.

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e isimpossible topassinfinite numberofpoints inlimitedamount

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42 CHAPTER 2 5IF�1SF�4PDSBUJDT�BOE�UIF�4PQIJTUT

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What follows from this? Parmenides maintains that because we cannot sensibly speak of “what is not,” we cannot sensibly speak of things changing. To say that some- thing changes is to suggest that it varies from what it was to what it is not—and that’s impos- sible. Likewise we cannot speak of something moving. !at would mean that it changed its location from where it was to where it was not, and that we cannot say. Further, there can be no coming into existence or passing out of existence:

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1BSNFOJEFT��On Nature

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Parmenides doesn’t stop there. He also reasons that whatever exists now must be as it always was. To contend that a property has been added or subtracted implies that something is not the way it used to be. In addition, he says, the universe (“what is”) is uniform throughout. !ere is no emptiness in the cosmos: every part is filled, every part is the same; there is no empty space. !e universe does not consist of a multiplicity of objects and forces; it is one thing—solid, uniform, and perfect. It is the One. !us one thing must be uncreated, imperishable, and eternal. As Par- menides says:

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1BSNFOJEFT�� On Nature

All these implications conflict with common sense. We are quite sure we can think and talk about what does not exist. We can coherently think about invis- ible rabbits, hypothetical planets, our long-dead ancestors, zero gravity, and angels

“No one ever touched Zeno without refuting him, and every century thinks it worthwhile to refute him.”

—Alfred North Whitehead

� %FNPDSJUVT� 43

vau28703_ch02_032-052.indd 43 05/09/17 05:58 PM

dancing on the head of a pin. !e idea that virtually everything we believe about the world is an illusion seems preposterous. But Parmenides’ conclusions are not the truly valuable part of his views. What is of immeasurable worth is his method—his fearlessly letting reason guide him where it may. Parmenides is credited with being the first to go down this royal road, and philosophers who came after him have had to take it into account.

2.4 DEMOCRITUS

Parmenides confronted ancient philosophers with a disturbing challenge to common sense: the universe is one solid eternal object without empty space and therefore without motion or plurality, a world inaccessible by sensory means but known well through reason. !e task was not merely to reject Parmenides’ theory but also to come up with a reasonable alternative, one that did justice to the evidence of the senses. !e strongest answer came from the ancient Greek atomists Leucippus and his student Democritus (c. 460–370 BCE).

Ancient atomism is the theory that reality consists of an infinite number of minute, indivisible bits called atoms moving rapidly in an infinite void, or empty space. Leucippus first proposed the idea, and Democritus developed it in his writ- ings, which were wide-ranging and voluminous. (Most of Democritus’ work has been lost, but many later commentators have provided the missing details.) Of all the early Greek notions about the nature of the universe, Democritus’ theory comes closest to that of modern scientists. !e views of the atomists were influential (and controversial) for centuries after those thinkers were long gone. !e Christian church condemned ancient atomism, and the doctrine seemed to lie dormant for centuries, but since the scientific revolution, it has been held in high esteem as a surprisingly modern (and generally accurate) view of the cosmos.

Parmenides had claimed that motion was im- possible because there is no empty space (no “what is not,” no nothingness), and without empty space there can be no unfilled area to move into. For the same reason, he says, there can be only one thing, the One—the solid, indivisible “what is.” Multiple things require empty space, for there must be space between things to render them separate; otherwise, once again, there would be only one solid mass without gaps or holes. Democritus, however, slightly qualified Parmenides’s no-space principle and thus showed how both motion and pluralism were possi- ble. He posited the void—space that does not contain objects or things but is nevertheless not the same as nothing (“what is not”). !e void is a kind of “what is.”

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“No-thing exists just as much as thing.”

—Democritus

ancient atomism !e theory that reality consists of an infinite number of minute, indivisible bits called atoms moving randomly in an infinite void, or empty space.

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So the world need not be one solid, uniform thing; it can be broken up by the void so there is room for movement and room to accommodate the many.

Democritus says of atoms what Parmenides says of the One: each one is indivis- ible (the root of atom means “uncuttable”), indestructible, solid through and through (containing no empty space), changeless, and eternal. Yet Democritus’ atomic theory can explain change, destruction, creation, and variation better than Parmenides’ oneness view. Although atoms have most of the properties of the One, they can also vary in shape (some are sharp, some are round, for example), size, and their organi- zation in the void (some are grouped together, some are far apart, and some are ar- ranged in other configurations). As they whirl around, they collide with one another, allowing atoms with the same shape to clump together. If the clumping is extensive enough, it can form objects that we can detect with our senses. Depending on the size, shape, and arrangement of the clumps, they can coalesce into water, grains of salt, fish, trees, chairs, stars, and human bodies. New objects come into being by grouping together, and existing objects are destroyed when the clumps disperse. Life arises from combinations of atoms; death comes with atomic dispersal.

!rough his atomic theory, Democritus tried to account for many other phenomena— for example, sense experience, weather, mind, and the creation of the universe. Even souls are conglomerations of atoms (very fine spherical atoms, Dem- ocritus thinks). Like everything else in the cosmos, souls exist for a while and then disintegrate, dispersing their atoms back into the void.

In Democritus’ view, the world is mechanistic. !ings happen in a particular way because the blind machinery of nature makes them happen that way. !ere is no need to invoke deities or other agents of purpose or design to explain the state of the universe.

Democritus and modern physics both refer to things called atoms, but they un- derstand the term in di"erent ways. Unlike Democritus’ atoms, the atoms of twenty- first-century science are known to be destructible, divisible (into other particles such as quarks and electrons), mostly hollow (because of the empty space in them), and impermanent. Yet Democritus’ basic insight—that matter is made up of fundamen- tal indivisible units—has yet to be refuted. For all modern physicists know, matter may indeed consist of indivisible, elemental entities—units of matter that are smaller (and stranger) than modern atoms.

2.5 PROTAGORAS AND THE SOPHISTS

In fifth-century BCE, Athens was not merely a city, but a city-state evolving into an empire. It was a$uent, influential, and powerful—a burgeoning democracy led by Pericles, the renowned statesman and general who helped usher in Athens’ Golden Age. Under his leadership, literature and the arts flourished, democracy blossomed, and the city gleamed with breathtaking monuments and buildings, including the Parthenon, which stands to this day.

Like any prosperous city, Athens bustled with commerce and the usual routines of social life, but it also buzzed with claims, issues, and disputations in the legislature

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“Sweet exists by conven- tion, bitter by convention, color by convention; but in reality atoms and the void alone exist.”

—Democritus

“Nothing occurs at random, but everything occurs for a reason and by necessity.”

—Democritus

� 1SPUBHPSBT�BOE�UIF�4PQIJTUT� 45

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(the assembly), the courts, and the marketplace. From these activities arose the need among Athe- nians to learn the skills that could increase their chances of success. !e Athenian education system was too rudimentary to help much, and the first col- lege (Plato’s Academy) was yet to be founded and, in any case, was attended by only a lucky few. Into this setting stepped the Sophists, itinerant profes- sors who, for a fee, would teach a range of subjects that could be of practical or intellectual benefit: rhetoric (the art of verbal persuasion), argument, law, ethics, politics, history, mathematics, literary criticism, grammar, religion, music, and more.

Historically, the Sophists have gotten mixed reviews for their brand of teaching. On one hand, they drew many eager students (generally the “best men,” the aristocrats and their children). !e demand for the blessings of higher education that the Sophists promised was high, and their empha- sis on practical applications and self-improvement made their lectures even more attractive. Some scholars give the Sophists credit for helping shift the focus of philosophy away from the metaphysical speculations of early thinkers like !ales and Par- menides toward more humanistic inquiries such as ethics, rhetoric, and politics. Socrates himself made this shift, and some think the Sophists helped pave the way for him.

On the other hand, these popular professors alarmed the moral and religious conservatives of Athens. !e Sophists were mostly naturalists like the pre-Socratics, preferring naturalistic explanations for phenomena and downplaying conventional accounts that attributed causes to the gods. !ey also taught that moral beliefs and legal codes were determined neither by the gods nor nature. Morality and the law were human inventions, varying from society to society depending on local cir- cumstances. Even the Sophists’ instruction in argument became suspect because it provided the means to question tradition and inquire into the basis of morality. Argument fostered critical thinking or intellectual cleverness, either of which could subvert the established order.

Plato, Aristotle, and other thinkers had concerns about the Sophists too. Plato contrasted the intellectual honesty of Socrates with the motives and rhetorical slipperiness of the Sophists. Socrates sought understanding for its own sake; the Sophists sought money for their services. Socrates searched for real knowledge; the Sophists wanted only the appearance of knowledge. Socrates engaged in argument to get at the truth; the Sophists were interested only in ways to win arguments. As one Sophist proclaimed, I can “make the weaker argument the stronger.” (!ese

Sophists Itinerant profes- sors who, for a fee, would teach a range of subjects that could be of practical or intellectual benefit.

rhetoric !e art of verbal persuasion.

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“!e art of the sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the reality, and the sophist is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom.”

—Aristotle

46 CHAPTER 2 5IF�1SF�4PDSBUJDT�BOE�UIF�4PQIJTUT

WBV�����@DI��@��������JOEE� �� 05/09/17 05:58 PM

charges are reflected in terms de- rived from “Sophist”: sophistry and sophistic, both referring to specious reasoning.)

Probably Plato’s most serious al- legation against the Sophists is that they espoused relativism, the view that the truth about something de- pends on what persons or cultures believe. !at is, a statement is true if some person or society believes it to be true: truth is relative to per- sons or cultures. Truth depends on what people accept as true, not on the way things are; there is no ob- jective truth. When the believer in question is a person, the doctrine is known as subjective relativism; when a whole society believes, it’s cultural relativism. In either case, most philosophers—beginning with Plato—have been skeptical of this notion of truth.

In Plato’s time, the leading pro- ponent of subjective relativism was

the famed Sophist Protagoras (c. 490–420 BCE). He is renowned for his relativistic adage, “Man is the measure of all things, of existing things that they exist, and of nonexisting things that they do not exist.”10 In other words, reality is what you be- lieve it to be. But Plato rejected subjective relativism, accusing Protagoras of unwit- tingly refuting himself:

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“!e recipe for perpetual ignorance is: be satis- fied with your opinions and content with your knowledge.”

—Elbert Hubbard

relativism !e doctrine that the truth about something depends on what persons or cultures believe.

subjective relativ- ism !e notion that truth depends on what a person believes.

cultural relativism !e idea that truth depends on what a culture believes.

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Plato’s point is that if, according to subjective relativism, all sincerely held be- liefs are equally true, then someone’s assertion that relativism is true is just as true as someone else’s assertion that relativism is false. So if subjective relativism is true, then it’s false. !e doctrine undermines itself and is therefore unfounded.

“Custom is the law of fools.”

—Sir John Vanbrugh

� 1SPUBHPSBT�BOE�UIF�4PQIJTUT� 47

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In general, modern philosophers are as skeptical of relativism as Plato was. !ey are aware that relativism has some very odd implications that render it implau- sible. For example, if we could make a statement true just by believing it to be true, we would be infallible. We could not possibly be in error about anything that we sincerely believed. We could never be mistaken about where we parked the car or what we said about jelly- beans or what some general said about carpet bombing. Personal infallibility is, of course, absurd, and this pos- sibility weighs heavily against subjective relativism.

!e same criticism can be launched against cultural relativism. According to this view, individuals aren’t in- fallible, but societies are. !e beliefs of whole societies cannot be mistaken. But this notion of societal infal- libility is no more plausible than the idea of individual infallibility. Is it plausible that no society has ever been wrong about anything? Never been wrong about the causes of disease, the best form of government, the owning of slaves, the burning of witches?

Applying relativism to morality (called moral rela- tivism) can yield results that are even more unpalatable. Subjective relativism, for instance, implies an implau- sible moral equivalence. It says that the sincere moral views of any individual are as good or as true as those of any other. If the serial killer and cannibal Je"rey Dahmer approved of his slaughtering seventeen people, then it is morally right. If you disap- prove of the slaughter, then it is morally wrong. By the lights of moral subjectivism, Dahmer’s view is no better or worse than yours.

Equally troubling, cultural relativism implies that other cultures are beyond moral criticism; we cannot legitimately criticize them because each culture is the maker of its own moral truth. We cannot accuse another culture of immoral behav- ior because whatever behavior that culture genuinely endorses is moral. To accept this implication of cultural relativism is to say that if the people of Germany ap- proved of the extermination of millions of Jews in World War II, then the exter- mination was morally right. But this is implausible. Our moral experience suggests that we can and do condemn other societies for morally heinous acts.

Cultural relativism also has a di#cult time explaining the moral status of social reformers. We tend to believe they are at least sometimes right and society is wrong. When we contemplate social reform, we think of such moral exemplars as Martin Luther King, Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, and Susan B. Anthony, all of whom agitated for justice and moral progress. But one of the consequences of cultural relativism is that social reformers could never be morally right. By definition, what society judges to be morally right is morally right, and since social reformers disagree with society, they could not be right—ever. But surely on occasion it’s the reformers who are right and society is wrong.

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“If Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to anyone, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?”

—Socrates

48 CHAPTER 2 5IF�1SF�4PDSBUJDT�BOE�UIF�4PQIJTUT

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THEN AND NOW

Moral Relativism and Tolerance

Protagoras may or may not have thought much about whether his relativism encouraged tolerance toward other cultures, but plenty of people today think moral relativism and tol- erance go hand in hand. !eir thinking might go something like this: If the values of one culture are no better or worse than those of another, then there is no basis for hatred or hostility toward any culture anywhere.

Tolerance is, of course, both morally praiseworthy and beneficial to our fractured planet of conflicting values. But in promoting tolerance, cultural relativism has no advantage over moral objectivism (the view that some moral norms are valid or true for everyone).

First note that moral objectivism does not entail intolerance. It says only that some moral beliefs are better than others; it does not imply anything about how objectivists should behave toward those they think are in moral error. Some objectivists are intolerant; many are not. But cultural relativism can easily justify intolerance and cannot consistently advocate tolerance. If there are intolerant cultures (and there surely are), then since cultures make rightness, intolerance in those cultures is morally right. For sincerely intolerant societies, the persecution of minorities and the killing of dissidents may be the height of moral rectitude.

In addition, cultural relativists who insist that everyone should embrace tolerance are con- tradicting themselves. To say that tolerant behavior is right for everyone is to assert an objec- tive moral norm—but cultural relativism says there are no objective moral norms. !e moral objectivist, however, can plausibly claim that the moral requirement of tolerance is universal.

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Socrates (as portrayed by Plato) seems to have noticed a more mundane objec- tion to Protagoras’ relativism. If relativism were true, Socrates says, Protagoras might quickly become unemployed. Relativism says that whatever anyone believes is just as true as what anyone else believes. If so, then no one can claim to be wiser than others—and there is no reason to think Protagoras is any wiser than the dullest man in Athens. So how can he legitimately claim to impart wisdom?

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WRITING AND REASONING CHAPTER 2

1. What was the pre-Socratics’ greatest contribution to the development of philosophical inquiry? What was !ales’ contribution? Parmenides’?

2. In what ways did Parmenides’ and Democritus’ views conflict? Which view seems most reasonable to you?

3. What prescient theory did Empedocles develop? What modern-day theory does it resemble? What are the di"erences between them?

4. What is Zeno’s paradox of motion? Sometimes the best way to attack a paradox is to dissolve it—that is, to show that one of the premises in the supporting argument is unfounded. Try your hand at detecting such an error.

5. Is subjective relativism true? Why or why not?

3&7*&8�/05&4

2.1 THALES AND ANAXIMANDER t� *O�UIF�QSF�4PDSBUJD�FSB �8FTUFSO�QIJMPTPQIZ�mSTU�FTUBCMJTIFE�JUTFMG �EFmOFE�BMNPTU�

all its main areas of study, and gave us philosophical heroes. t� ɨF�BODJFOU�(SFFLT �CFHJOOJOH�XJUI�UIF�QSF�4PDSBUJDT �SFGVTFE�UP�GPMMPX�UIF�USBEJ-

tional ways of thinking and tried to let reason and experience guide them to the truth.

t� ɨBMFT��HSFBUFTU�DPOUSJCVUJPO�UP�CPUI�QIJMPTPQIZ�BOE�TDJFODF�JT�IJT�NFUIPE��)F�TFU� out to look for natural—not mythic—explanations for natural phenomena, and he insisted that such accounts be as simple as possible.

t� ɨBMFT�IBT�CFFO�JOUFSQSFUFE�BT�IPMEJOH�UIBU�XBUFS�JT�UIF�TPVSDF�PG�BMM�UIBU�FYJTUT�BOE� in some way is what everything consists of.

t� "OBYJNBOEFS�DPOUFOEFE�UIBU�FWFSZUIJOH�DBNF�GSPN�B�GPSNMFTT �JNQFSJTIBCMF�TVC- stance called apeiron (the boundless or indefinite). It is the beginning of all that now exists, but it has no beginning itself.

50 CHAPTER 2 5IF�1SF�4PDSBUJDT�BOE�UIF�4PQIJTUT

vau28703_ch02_032-052.indd 50 05/09/17 05:58 PM

2.2 HERACLITUS t� )FSBDMJUVT��DFOUSBM�JEFB�JT�UIF�logos—the principle, formula, or law of the world

order. To understand the logos is to understand reality, to grasp the divine, eternal pattern underlying all of nature and all of humankind.

t� 'PS�)FSBDMJUVT �FWFSZUIJOH�nPXT��FWFSZ�QBSU�PG�UIF�VOJWFSTF�JT�JO�nVY��#VU�CFIJOE� the changing appearances, there is an unchanging pattern—the logos.

t� )FSBDMJUVT�UIJOLT�PG�UIF�DPTNPT�BT�FUFSOBM�JU�IBE�OP�CFHJOOJOH�BOE�IBT�BMXBZT� existed. It is also a rational force. !e logos, he says, “steers all things,” for it is a divine “thought” operating according to its own logic.

2.3 PARMENIDES t� 1BSNFOJEFT��GBNF�SFTUT�NPTUMZ�PO�IJT�TZTUFNBUJD�FNQMPZNFOU�PG�EFEVDUJWF�BSHV-

ment. He seems to have been the first thinker outside the field of mathematics to reason deductively and consistently from basic premises to interesting conclusions.

t� )F�BMTP�NBEF�UXP�EJTUJODUJPOT�UIBU�CFDBNF�PG�QSJNF�JNQPSUBODF�JO�QIJMPTPQIZ�� reason and the senses, and appearance and reality.

t� 1BSNFOJEFT�TBZT�SFBMJUZ�DPOTJTUT�PG�UIF�0OF �XIJDI�JT�FUFSOBM �VOJGPSN �TPMJE �QFS- fect, and uncreated.

2.4 DEMOCRITUS t� %FNPDSJUVT�QVU�GPSUI�UIF�UIFPSZ�LOPXO�BT�ancient atomism—the view that real-

ity consists of an infinite number of minute, indivisible bits called atoms moving rapidly in an infinite void, or empty space.

t� $POUSBSZ�UP�1BSNFOJEFT �%FNPDSJUVT�QPTJUFE�UIF�void—space that does not con- tain objects or things but is nevertheless not the same as nothing.

t� *O�%FNPDSJUVT��WJFX �UIF�XPSME�JT�NFDIBOJTUJD��ɨJOHT�IBQQFO�JO�B�QBSUJDVMBS�XBZ� because the blind machinery of nature makes them happen that way. !ere is no need to invoke deities or other agents of purpose or design to explain the state of the universe.

t� %FNPDSJUVT�BOE�NPEFSO�QIZTJDT�CPUI�SFGFS�UP�UIJOHT�DBMMFE�atoms, yet they under- stand the term in di"erent ways. But Democritus’ basic insight—that matter is made up of fundamental indivisible units—has yet to be refuted.

2.5 PROTAGORAS AND THE SOPHISTS t� 4PQIJTUT�XFSF�JUJOFSBOU�QSPGFTTPST�XIP �GPS�B�GFF �XPVME�UFBDI�B�SBOHF�PG�TVCKFDUT�

that could be of practical or intellectual benefit, including rhetoric, argument, law, ethics, and politics.

t� ɨF�4PQIJTUT�XFSF�NPTUMZ�OBUVSBMJTUT�MJLF�UIF�QSF�4PDSBUJDT �QSFGFSSJOH�OBUVSBMJTUJD� explanations for phenomena and downplaying conventional accounts that attrib- uted causes to the gods.

'PS�'VSUIFS�3FBEJOH� 51

vau28703_ch02_032-052.indd 51 05/09/17 05:58 PM

t� ɨFZ�BMTP�UBVHIU�UIBU�NPSBM�CFMJFGT�BOE�MFHBM�DPEFT�XFSF�EFUFSNJOFE�OFJUIFS�CZ� the gods nor nature. Morality and the law were human inventions, varying from society to society depending on local circumstances.

t� ɨF�MFBEJOH�QSPQPOFOU�PG�TVCKFDUJWF�SFMBUJWJTN�XBT�UIF�GBNFE�4PQIJTU�1SPUBHPSBT�� He is renowned for his relativistic adage, “Man is the measure of all things, of existing things that they exist, and of nonexisting things that they do not exist.”12 In other words, reality is what you believe it to be.

t� 1MBUP�SFKFDUFE�TVCKFDUJWF�SFMBUJWJTN��ɨF�DPODMVTJPO�PG�IJT�BSHVNFOU�JT�UIBU�JG�TVC- jective relativism is true, then it’s false; the doctrine undermines itself and is there- fore unfounded.

t� #PUI�TVCKFDUJWF�BOE�DVMUVSBM�SFMBUJWJTN�IBWF�JNQMBVTJCMF�JNQMJDBUJPOT�

ancient atomism cultural relativism empiricism

logos pre-Socratics rationalism

relativism rhetoric Sophists

subjective relativism

,&:�5&3.4

/PUFT 1. Aristotle, Metaphysics (1.3, 983 b18–27), in !e Pre-Socratic Philosophers, ed.

G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 80.

2. Anaximander, in An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, trans. John Manly Robinson (Boston: Houghton Mi$in, 1968), 34.

3. Aristotle, in Early Greek Philosophy, trans. Jonathan Barnes (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 74.

4. Heraclitus, in Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, 89. 5. Heraclitus, in Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, 89. 6. Heraclitus, in Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, 93. 7. Heraclitus, in Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, 101. 8. Parmenides, in Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, 113. 9. Parmenides, in Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, 113–114. 10. Plato, “!eaetetus,” in !e Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton, trans. F. M.

Cornford (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 856. 11. Plato, “!eaetetus,” in Hamilton, !e Collected Dialogues, 876. 12. Plato, “!eaetetus,” in Hamilton, !e Collected Dialogues, 856.

'PS�'VSUIFS�3FBEJOH Jonathan Barnes, trans., Early Greek Philosophy (London: Penguin Books, 1987).

Anthony Gottlieb, !e Dream of Reason: A History of Philosophy from the Greeks to the Renaissance (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000).

Stephen Greenblat, !e Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).

52 CHAPTER 2 5IF�1SF�4PDSBUJDT�BOE�UIF�4PQIJTUT

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Ted Honderich, ed., !e Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1995).

Edward Hussey, !e Pre-Socratics (New York: Hackett, 1995).

Christopher Janaway, “Ancient Greek Philosophy I: !e Pre-Socratics and Plato,” in Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject, A. C. Grayling, ed. (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1995), 336–397.

G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, !e Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Mary Ellen Waithe, ed., A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 1, 600 BC–500 AD (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijho", 1987).