aviation Security 9
Tomm.
chapter_06.pptChapter 6
Introduction to Screening
*
Introduction
Screening has the highest visibility and is the most scrutinized component of the aviation security system. Of all the layers within the system, screening is the most personally intrusive but also one of the most effective at deterring attacks.
Screening passengers and baggage started in the early 1970s as a way to deter the numerous hijackings occurring at the time. Through legislation, airlines were assigned the responsibility for ensuring the screening of passenger and carry-on baggage until shortly after 9-11, when it was transferred to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
*
Four major screening areas:
Passengers
Carry-on baggage
Checked (or hold) baggage
Cargo
There are four major screening areas:
Passengers
Carry-on baggage
Checked (or hold) baggage
Cargo
Passenger and carry-on baggage screening has been standard practice since the early 1970s. Checked baggage screening did not start until the mid-1980s. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) holds checked bag screening as a fundamental part of any security program.
Until recently, the primary air cargo security program has been the “known-shipper program.” The passage of ATSA 2001 brought the industry’s attention to the issue of cargo screening.
*
Evolution of Screening in the United States
Initial passenger and carry-on baggage screening programs were designed to detect items commonly used by hijackers. In the early 1970s, airline bombings were so infrequent they were not considered a significant threat, and thus, no programs were implemented to prevent or deter such attacks.
*
1973
Walk-through metal detectors
(WTMDs)
1973 - walk-through metal detectors (WTMDs) were installed at airports to detect whether an individual was carrying a gun or hand grenade.
WTMDs sounded an alarm when metal was detected within its magnetic field. Often, screeners would use metal-detecting hand wands to conduct a “secondary screening” to investigate what object had caused the alarm to sound.
Security screening was an airline responsibility. Airlines usually subcontracted screening to an approved vendor, often by selecting the lowest bid. Before 9-11, contract-screening companies were notorious for high turnover rates of staff and for hiring individuals who were less than qualified for the task
.
1973 - 1980s, airlines contracted screening companies using WTMDs and conventional X-ray Machines. During this period several aircraft were bombed using checked baggage as the means of introducing the bomb; undetectable plastic explosives were becoming more available and being used.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Evolution of Screening in the United States
1990 – Aviation Security Improvement Act
Better screening technology by November 1993
Airline lobbyists opposed new security measures
No minimum training standard
The challenges of passenger and carry-on baggage screening are not new. In a 1987 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the agency pointed out glaring inadequacies including a lack of performance standards set by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and a lack of FAA enforcement authority related to aviation security screening.
In 1990, Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act (ASIA 1990), briefly addressing aviation security screening and requiring deployment of better screening technology by November 1993.
By 1997 the FAA still had not deployed such technology.
Throughout the 1990s, airline lobbyists opposed new security measures or polices that could have increased security but also slowed passenger flow. Failure of the screening process was not entirely the fault of the airlines. The system was regulated and overseen by the FAA, which had the power to fine airlines for failing to pass screening system tests but did not.
In the 1990s, the FAA did not have a minimum training standard for screening personnel or performance or qualification guidelines for screening companies. As a result, screener training was inconsistent from one company to the next.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Evolution of Screening in the United States
In 1996, Gore Commission recommended
Professionalism
Uniform performance standards
Deployment and use of EDS technology
In 1996, the Gore Commission recommended:
Raising the professionalism of screening personnel.
The development of uniform performance standards for the selection, training, certification, and recertification of screening companies and their employees.
The deployment and use of explosive detection system (EDS) technology, using computerized tomography, and explosive trace detection (ETD) technology, capable of detecting trace amounts of explosives on people or their belongings.
intent was to use EDS and ETD for travelers selected under the Computer-Assisted Passenger Profiling Program (CAPPS) or selected for secondary screening.
*
Aviation Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1996
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 2000
The Aviation Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1996 required that security screeners, and all other aviation employees with security identification display area (SIDA) access, undergo a 10-year employment history check.
The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 2000 (ASIA 2000) finally mandated screener training standards. These required at least 40 hours of classroom instruction and 40 hours of on-the-job training for screening personnel.
Despite 14 years and three major legislative actions (ASIA 1990, ASAT 1996, and ASIA 2000), the performance of screeners was no better than 1987 levels. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 transferred screening to the TSA and added checked bag screening to the process.
*
Screening under the Transportation Security Administration
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Evolution of Screening in the United States
ATSA 2001 set deadline for TSA to complete:
Complete takeover by November 19, 2002
Basic screener training minimums
Annual proficiency reviews and testing
EDS technology by December 31, 2002
In addition to passenger and baggage screening, ATSA 2001 also set deadlines for the TSA to complete key benchmarks including the following:
The complete takeover of the screening by November 19, 2002. This included more than 400 commercial service airports.
Establishing the basic screener training minimums at 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training.
Annual proficiency reviews and testing of screeners, including remedial training of any screener who fails a security test.
The screening of all checked bags using explosive detection system (EDS) technology by December 31, 2002.
The TSA met the first deadline, but the hiring of so many workers so quickly created an imbalance across the nation; some airports had too many screeners, and others had too few. Since 2004, the TSA has proffered several staffing models in an attempt to fix workforce imbalances, yet these inequities remain.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Evolution of Screening in the United States
TSA Challenges
15% - 20% attrition rate
Ability of screener to detect weapons and explosives
Retention of government security screeners
Job title change Transportation Security Officers (TSOs)
In an attempt to compensate for screener shortages, the TSA established a mobile National Screening Force consisting of 700+ screeners who can be reassigned to understaffed airports.
Although staffing and training issues are important and contribute to the ability of the screener to detect prohibited items, the most important issue in screening is the ability of the screener or the technology to detect weapons and explosives.
Another challenge affecting effective and efficient airport security is the retention of government security screeners. The overall lack of promotional opportunities and career advancement for screeners has resulted in an attrition rate unacceptable to the TSA.
TSA administrator Kip Hawley announced in December 2005 that he was changing the job title of screeners to transportation security officers (TSOs) in an effort to expand the identity and job duties of screening personnel
*
Reinforcement
- There are four major screening areas: Passengers, Carry-on baggage, Checked baggage, Cargo
- 1973 - walk-through metal detectors (WTMDs) installed
- 1990 – Aviation Security Improvement Act
- Better screening November 1993, not implemented in 1997
- Gore commission recommended, 1996
- ATSA 2001 set deadlines for TSA
- TSA faced challenges
Sterile Area
Sterile areas are those areas within the terminal where passengers wait after screening. Access to these areas is the responsibility of the aircraft operator and the airport operator.
For aviation personnel entering a sterile area through a Part 1542.207-regulated airport access controlled door, their criminal history record check is considered the required “screening.”
Almost without exception, any aviation employee that boards an aircraft must be screened at the security-screening checkpoint, even if the individual has approved access.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Sterile Area
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Sterile Area
Sterile Area Breaches
Sterile area - high threat level to airport operator
Screening alone will not protect sterile areas from unauthorized personnel and items
The sterile area represents a high threat level to the airport operator, as it enables direct access to aircraft and the airfield.
A breach of a sterile area often causes an entire concourse, or sometimes an entire airport, to shut down all flight operations until the affected areas can be evacuated and searched for prohibited items.
Screening alone will not protect sterile areas from unauthorized personnel and items. Airline and airport personnel authorized to carry prohibited items in sterile areas must be trained in the proper security of such items, and the airport operator must maintain a database that includes their names or job titles.
*
Screening Checkpoint Operations and Design
The security-screening checkpoint (SSCP) is a dynamic and busy environment and one of the most important components of the aviation security system. Many SSCP-related factors affect security and ultimately reduce or increase risk in the airport security system.
In the early 2010’s, the implementation of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines into the SSCP created additional complications for airport managers, who had to find room to accommodate the larger machines.
Inadequately designed checkpoints can result in:
More passengers waiting in public areas, which can be potential targets for terrorists.
Longer passenger lines often resulting in low levels of customer service and can cause passengers to miss their flights.
More breaches of screening if passengers become disoriented in the SSCP area.
Inadequate staffing of a checkpoint can reduce the effectiveness of detecting prohibited items.
*
Design
Sterile concourse station
Holding area station
Boarding gate station
According to the TSA, SSCPs should:
Prevent persons with prohibited items from boarding a commercial aircraft;
Prevent exit lane breaches;
Secure exit lanes for arriving passengers during both operational and non-operational hours of the SSCP;
Accommodate persons with disabilities requiring wheelchair accessibility or allowances for other assistive devices;
Provide for minimal interruption or delay to the flow of passengers and others being screened;
Provide effective and secure handling of tenant goods that cross from the non-sterile area to the sterile area (i.e vendor deliveries);
Allow adequate equipment maintenance and interference spacing requirements;
Provide for operational flexibility in response to changes in passenger loads, equipment, operational processes, and security levels;
Be flexible enough to accommodate new technology and processes;
Efficiently and effectively use of terminal space;
Provide acceptable and comfortable environmental factors, such as air temperature, humidity, air quality, lighting, and noise;
Be of safe and ergonomic design; and
Ensure adequate power, data, and CCTV equipment requirements
A security screening checkpoint should be designed to use automation whenever possible. Checkpoints should have explosive and weapons detecting technologies that do not pose a threat to passengers or screening personnel, minimize the footprint and construction costs, maintain revenue-generating areas within the terminal wherever possible, increase throughput rates, and preserve passenger privacy.
Concessionaires represent a particular challenge to airport security as deliveries occur throughout the day and delivery personnel change frequently. It is best if delivery personnel can use their access/ID in nonpublic area loading docks to deliver their products in or out of the sterile area.
Entry into sterile areas is through SSCPs, of which there are three types:
Sterile concourse station - placed at points between public use terminal areas and sterile areas within the airport.
This configuration is the most desirable as it provides the highest level of passenger security at the best cost.
Holding area station - passengers are screened and then moved to secured rooms or areas with boundaries while they await transport to aircraft.
Screening breaches of Holding Area Stations do not affect the airport as much as other SSCPs, as only the holding area must be shut down subsequent to the discovery of a breach.
Boarding gate station - a design typically in use at small commercial service airports that do not have sterile areas.
Serves as the screening checkpoint and boundary between the public area and the airfield security areas
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Screening Checkpoint Operations and Design
Boarding gate station
Boarding gate station - a design typically in use at small commercial service airports that do not have sterile areas.
Serves as the screening checkpoint and boundary between the public area and the airfield security areas
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Screening Checkpoint Operations and Design
August 2001 Post 9-11
Denver International Airport
Some airports use a combination for the design elements for sterile concourse, holding area, and boarding gate stations.
Queue area - where passengers wait and line up for screening process at the SSCP.
The space allotted to passenger queuing is based on the airport’s peak hour enplanements
*
Operations
Entry Lane Protection
The TSA, airport tenants, law enforcement, and local building inspectors and fire inspectors should be consulted as part of the SSCP design.
*
Prescreening preparation and instruction area
Queue lines
The prescreening preparation and instruction area is the primary area where airport personnel often serve as instructional guides, helping to inform passengers of standard security requirements, such as reminding them to remove their laptops and not to attempt to take prohibited items through the checkpoint. Videos may also be shown in these areas to provide the same types of instruction.
Queue lines are designed to increase the speed at which passengers move through the lines. Passenger document checks are performed to ensure that each individual has a boarding pass and government-issued photo identification.
*
Holding station
Wanding station
A holding station to detain passengers requiring secondary screening should be located immediately beyond the WTMD.
The wanding station is the location used for secondary screening. If a passenger sets off the WMTD alarm, a security screener must pass a metal detecting hand wand passed over the individual’s body. The screener may also conduct a pat-down search and may ask the passenger to step into a private area to remove clothing if warranted. These searches are conducted under supervision by screeners of the same sex as the passenger.
Explosive trace detection equipment (ETD) may also be located at the SSCP. ETD is used when the X-ray operator notes a suspicious item within a bag.
*
Exit Lane Protection
Move from sterile area to public area
Passengers and others use exit lanes within sterile areas to move back to the public areas.
Specific concerns related to exit lanes include breach alarms, physical barriers, personnel coverage, CCTV coverage, and the implementation of response corridors. A breach occurs when an individual enters a sterile area without being successfully screened.
Typically, exit lanes are protected by security personnel physically monitoring the exit areas. When individuals attempt to enter the sterile area through the exit lane, security personnel redirect them to the screening entry lanes.
*
Revolving doors or turnstiles
Some airports have incorporated revolving doors or turnstiles, capable of blocking entry from public areas while permitting egress for those departing sterile areas. Such designs must also allow sufficient space for the passage of the person with baggage and accommodate the disabled.
New exit lane designs should incorporate a long response corridor to enhance detection of anyone attempting to breach the exit lane. Located just beyond the SSCP, a response corridor can give security time to catch and detain individuals who have not been screened.
*
Reinforcement
- Security-screening checkpoint (SSCP)
- Sterile area - high threat level to airport operator
- Design: Sterile concourse station, holding area station, boarding gate station
- SSCP design considerations
- Entry lane protection – prescreening preparation
- Exit lane protection - turnstiles
Screening:
Terminal Operations and Profiling
In addition to the passenger and carry-on baggage screening at the SSCP, other screening methods are used before entering SSCPs and during screening. Document verification and passenger profiling are two such additional layers of security. Both require special training before security agents can be effective and efficient at either.
*
Travel Document Verification
Ensure ticketed passenger is same passenger who boards aircraft
Document verification is an important component of screening to ensure the ticketed passenger is the same passenger who boards the aircraft. At some foreign airports, the document check is conducted at the ticket counter, at the beginning of the screening queue line, again at the WTMD, and once more before boarding.
It is important to have individuals properly trained in the verification of authorized identification. New technology is being developed that will assist in the process of detecting fraudulently created identification, but so far it is not in widespread use at U.S. airports.
Passengers with diplomatic privileges and their protective personnel, law enforcement officers, deportees, and prisoners and their law enforcement escorts must also be processed at the screening checkpoints.
Diplomats with protected document holders and their armed law enforcement escorts are considerations for the screening operator. The proper handling of such individuals and their armed escorts must be precoordinated through the U.S. Department of State before travel. Diplomatic pouches are exempt from screening provided the proper procedures as set forth from the U.S. Department of State are followed.
Armed law enforcement officers who must show identification to supervisory screening personnel must be able to do so out of sight of the public. It may also be advantageous to screen prisoners separately from the public screening areas for the protection of the public and the anonymity of the armed law enforcement escorts.
*
Profiling
Absence of normal,
presence of abnormal
Passenger profiling is a rapid risk analysis based on suspicious signs in a passenger’s documentation, itinerary, appearance, or behavior.
The first objective in profiling is to determine the absence of the normal and the presence of the abnormal
Profiling is a sensitive topic, particularly in the United States, where the term is often interpreted to imply “racial profiling.” Racial profiling has been largely dismissed as being ineffective and, in fact, can increase risk when it causes security personnel to focus on only certain individuals, possibly overlooking the real threat.
There is a tendency to focus on a particular demographic, primarily when an individual of a specific demographic was responsible for a recent terrorist attack. This is not so much an issue of race as of nationality.
Profiling can help a security or law enforcement officer better predict criminal strategies and intent and obtain useful information during interviews.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Screening: Terminal Operations and Profiling
Establish a baseline, “read”:
How a person behaves under normal circumstances
Body language
Lying
Security questions
The first step in profiling, establishing a baseline, is referred to as a “read” described as:
Reading people is a natural reaction that none of us can avoid. We all spend time reading and interpreting people’s actions, trying to predict how they will act in the future. Each time an observation of an individual’s behavior is made, it is called a read. When several reads are compiled together, we identify a profile which provides a more complete picture of a person.
Profiling focuses on a variety of factors, but body language is central.
Albert Mehrabian, one of the original body language researchers, found that the impact of a message is about 7% verbal (words), 38% vocal (tone, inflections), and 55% nonverbal.
When an individual lies, the body tends to give away clues, often called “tells,” that the person intends to deceive—for instance, raising the pitch of the voice, looking away from the person one is talking to, or flying into a tirade when questioned.
Although many emotional responses are not absolute evidence of deception, they are worthy of additional attention while the person conducting the profile seeks more information to make a threat assessment.
Security questioning is considered more effective than passively observing behaviors.
Questioning can also cause an emotion to appear suddenly, rather than gradually. When emotions gradually appear, it is harder to detect the deceit as the behavioral changes are less noticeable. Strong emotions brought on quickly are harder to control.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Screening: Terminal Operations and Profiling
Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT)
Specially trained security officers scrutinizing people in security lines and elsewhere in the airport
In 2004, the TSA began implementing a program known as SPOT (Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques). SPOT involves specially trained security officers scrutinizing people in security lines and elsewhere in the airport.
By assessing a person’s body language and travel details, screeners can make a quick judgment on the threat level. Suspicious individuals can then be questioned and referred for either secondary screening or to law enforcement personnel.
Questions are raised, such as how will a police officer prioritize two conflicting security issues, such as a TSA behavioral officer spotting a suspicious individual at the same time the airport needs that same police officer to respond to an issue that he or she is required to respond to under the Airport Security Program?
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Screening: Terminal Operations and Profiling
Aviation Watch and See Something, Say Something
Teaches airport workers how to spot suspicious activities, actions to watch for, and how to respond when they notice something odd
Focuses on other suspicious behavior
Aviation Watch is a program developed at Boston/Logan International Airport. It is based on the Neighborhood Watch Program used in residential communities throughout the United States. Aviation Watch was adopted and formalized into a training video distributed by the American Association of Airport Executives.
See Something, Say Something is a program similar to Aviation Watch and is promoted by the TSA. Initially developed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the program has spread even beyond the aviation community to other transportation industries and even American society in general.
Aviation Watch teaches airport workers how to spot suspicious activities, actions to watch for, and how to respond when they notice something odd. Aviation Watch focuses less on questioning and more on observation in an airport environment.
The Aviation Watch program focuses on other suspicious behavior, such as individuals photographing or videotaping security procedures, emergency exit doors, and other areas not normally the subject of photography at an airport. Aviation Watch is not affected by civil liberties issues, as it does not involve active security questioning, just observation of activity and law enforcement notification.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Screening: Terminal Operations and Profiling
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Airport/Coastal Watch
Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association (AOPA)
Airport Watch
There are many examples of this sort of program in the United States and Canada. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have Airport/Coastal Watch whereby citizens can report suspicious vessels and aircraft. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) has Airport Watch, featuring airport signage, a toll-free number (1-866-GASECURE), and an instructional video.
*
Secure Flight
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Screening: Terminal Operations and Profiling
1996
Computer-Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS)
No-fly list
Selectee list
Secure Flight Program
Computer-Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS) – started in 1996, CAPPS was one of the first passenger profiling programs in the United States.
Several of the 9-11 hijackers were flagged under CAPPS. However, the only requirement was additional scrutiny going through the screening checkpoint, and that the individual’s bags would not be loaded onto the plane until it was confirmed that the individual had already boarded.
CAPPS remains in place and is controlled by the airline that checks the passenger’s reservation information contained in the air carrier’s passenger name record (PNR) against a set of established system rules, referred to as the CAPPS I rules.
Added to screening are checks of passenger names against the:
No-fly list - contains the names of individuals who are not allowed to fly on U.S. carriers or must first be cleared by law enforcement officers
Selectee list - contains the names of individuals who require additional scrutiny such as secondary screening or law enforcement officer notification.
Secure Flight is a behind-the-scenes program that enhances the security of domestic and international commercial air travel through the use of improved watch list matching.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Screening: Terminal Operations and Profiling
Secure Flight
The Secure Flight database is being tied into the Transportation Vetting Platform (TVP), which TSA is developing. The TSA does not currently plan for Secure Flight to include checking for criminals, performing intelligence-based searches, or using alert lists, but it may expand the TVP to include those enrolled in the Registered Traveler Pprogram.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 6
Screening: Terminal Operations and Profiling
Intelligence-Driven Risk-Based Screening (RBS)
Passengers present little to no risk
TSA Pre✓™
US Military
12 and under, 75 and older
Risk based security with behavior detection program
RBS is based on the fact that the majority of airline passengers present little to no risk. RBS takes into account that the TSA may have more information about some travelers, that screening detection technology continues to improve and that certain types of people naturally present a lower risk than others.
TSA Pre✓™ is an expedited screening initiative places more focus on pre-screening individuals who volunteer to participate to expedite the travel experience and provides them their own screening lane at the SSCP.
According to TSA they will always incorporate random and unpredictable security measures throughout the airport and no individual will be guaranteed expedited screening, in order to retain a certain element of randomness to prevent terrorists from gaming the system.
Screening for Active Duty U.S. Service Members is another RBS program that allows U.S. service members who possess a valid Common Access Card (CAC) at participating airports, to receive expedited screening and no longer have to remove the following: Shoes, 3-1-1 compliant bag from carry-on, laptop from bag, light outerwear/jacket, belt.
TSA has enacted risk-based checkpoint screening procedures for passengers 12 and under that include: allowing children 12 and under to leave their shoes on, allowing multiple passes through the walk through metal detector and advanced imaging technology to clear any alarms on children, and using explosives trace detection technology on a wider basis (rather than immediately resorting to a pat-down) to resolve alarms on children.
Similar processes now exist for individuals older than 75 years of age as TSA has determined that individuals in this age range, present a lower risk.
Another RBS initiative is a combination of risk based security with the behavior detection program. At certain Travel Document Check locations, specialized behavioral analysis techniques are used to determine if a traveler should be referred for additional screening at the checkpoint.
*
Reinforcement
- Travel Document Verification: Ensure ticketed passenger is same passenger who boards aircraft
- Profiling: Absence of normal, presence of abnormal
- First step in profiling, establishing a baseline
- SPOT: Specially trained security officers scrutinizing people in security lines and elsewhere in airport
- Aviation Watch: focuses on other suspicious behavior
- Secure Flight, passenger prescreening from airline to TSA
- Intelligence-Driven Risk-Based Screening (RBS)
Conclusion
The discussion of airport screening is continued in the next chapter, Passenger and Baggage Screening. Please see the Chapter 7 Conclusion for a summary of the topics presented in both chapters on screening.
*
