often (but not always) overlap with cultural distinctions and reinforce the separation of Hispanic Americans from Anglo American society. Even members of the group who are completely acculturated may still experience discrimination based on their physical appearance.

- As is the case with all American minority groups, labels and group names are important. The term *Hispanic American* is widely applied to this group and might seem neutral and inoffensive to non-Hispanics. In fact, a recent survey shows that only about 25% of Hispanic Americans use *Hispanic* or *Latino* to describe themselves. Most (51%) identify themselves by their family's country of origin and 21% think of themselves simply as "American" (Taylor, Lopez, Martinez, & Velasco, 2012, p. 9). Further, the preferred identity varies widely by primary language, generation, and education of the respondent. For example, almost two thirds of Spanish speakers and first-generation (foreign-born) Latinos prefer to identify themselves in terms of their countries of origin, whereas the "American" designation is most popular with the college educated, the third and higher generations, and English speakers (Taylor et al., 2012, pp. 12–13). At any rate, both the *Hispanic* and *Latino* labels are similar to the term *American Indian,* in that they were invented and applied by the dominant group and may reinforce the mistaken perception that all Spanish-speaking peoples are the same. Also, the term *Hispanic* highlights Spanish heritage and language but does not acknowledge the roots of these groups in African and Native American civilizations. On the other hand, the *Latino* label stresses the common origins of these groups in Latin America and the fact that each culture is a unique blend of diverse traditions. Further, both labels are sometimes mistakenly applied to immigrant groups that bring French, Portuguese, or English traditions (e.g., Haitians, Brazilians, and Jamaicans, respectively). In this chapter, we use the terms *Latino* and *Hispanic* interchangeably.

Mexican Americans

In Chapter 3, we applied the Noel and Blauner hypotheses to this group. Mexicans were conquered and colonized in the 19th century and used as a cheap labor force in agriculture, ranching, mining, railroad construction, and other areas of the dominant group economy in the Southwest. In the competition for control of land and labor, they became a minority group, and the contact situation left them with few power resources with which to pursue their self-interests.

By the dawn of the 20th century, the situation of Mexican Americans resembled that of American Indians in some ways. Both groups were small, numbering about 0.5% of the total population (Cortes, 1980, p. 702). Both differed from the dominant group in culture and language, and both were impoverished, relatively powerless, and isolated in rural areas distant from the centers of industrialization and modernization. In other ways, Mexican Americans resembled African Americans in the South: They, too, supplied much of the labor power for the agricultural economy of their region and were limited to low-paying occupations and subordinate status in the social structure. All three groups were colonized by Europeans and, at least in the early decades of the 20th century, lacked the resources to end their exploitation and protect their cultural heritages from continual attack by the dominant society (Mirandé, 1985, p. 32).

Some important differences exist between the historic situation of Mexican Americans and those of the other two colonized minority groups. Perhaps the most crucial difference was the proximity of the sovereign nation of Mexico. Population movement across the border was constant, and Mexican culture and the Spanish language were continually rejuvenated, even as they were attacked and disparaged by Anglo American society.

Cultural Patterns

Besides language differences, Mexican American and Anglo American cultures differ in many ways. Whereas the dominant society is largely Protestant, the overwhelming majority of Mexican Americans are Catholic, and the church remains one of the most important institutions in any Mexican American community. Religious practices also vary: Mexican Americans (especially men) are relatively inactive in church attendance, preferring to express their spiritual concerns in more spontaneous, less-routinized ways.

In the past, everyday life among Mexican Americans was often described in terms of the "culture of poverty" (see Chapter 5), an idea originally based on research in several different Hispanic communities (see Lewis, 1959, 1965, 1966). This perspective asserts that Mexican Americans suffer from an unhealthy value system that includes a weak work ethic, fatalism, and other negative attitudes. Today, this characterization is widely regarded as exaggerated or simply mistaken. More recent research shows that the traits associated with the culture of poverty tend to characterize people who are poor and uneducated, rather than any particular racial or ethnic group. In fact, a number of studies show that there is little difference between the value systems of Mexican Americans and other Americans with similar length of residence in the United States, social class, and educational background (e.g., see Buriel, 1993; Moore & Pinderhughes, 1993; Pew Hispanic Center, 2005, p. 20; Valentine & Mosley, 2000).

A recent survey illustrates the similarity in values systems. The survey found that Hispanic Americans were *more* supportive of "hard work" as a recipe for getting ahead—perhaps the central value in the American creed—than was the population in general. About 75% of Hispanic Americans—versus only 58% of the general population—agreed that most people can "get ahead with hard work" (Taylor et al., 2012, pp. 18–19).

Another area of cultural difference involves **machismo**, a value system that stresses men's dominance, honor, virility, and violence. The stereotypes of the dominant group exaggerate the negative aspects of machismo and often fail to recognize that it can also be expressed through being a good provider and a respected father, as well as in other positive ways. In fact, the concern for men's dignity is not unique to Hispanics and can be found in many cultures, including Anglo American cultures, in varying ways (Moore & Pachon, 1985). Compared with Anglo Americans, Mexican Americans tend to place more value on family relations and obligations. Strong family ties can be the basis for support networks and cooperative efforts but can also conflict with the emphasis on individualism and individual success in the dominant culture. For example, strong family ties may inhibit geographical mobility


and people's willingness to pursue educational and occupational opportunities distant from their home communities (Moore, 1970, p. 127).

These cultural and language differences have inhibited communication with the dominant group and have served as the basis for excluding Mexican Americans from the larger society. However, they have provided a basis for group cohesion and unity that has sustained common action and protest activity.

Immigration

Although Mexican Americans originated as a colonized minority group, their situation since the early 1900s (and especially since the 1960s) has been largely shaped by immigration. The numbers of legal Mexican immigrants to the United States are shown in Figure 7.3. The fluctuations in the rate of immigration can be explained by conditions in Mexico; the varying demand for labor in the low-paying, unskilled sector of the U.S. economy; broad changes in North America and the world; and changing federal immigration policy. As you will see, competition, one of the key variables in

Figure 7.3 Legal Immigration From Mexico, 1905–2013



Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013c).

Notes:

1. The very high number of "immigrants" in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the result of people already in the United States legalizing their status under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
2. Values are averages per year during each decade until 1989.

Noel's hypothesis, has shaped the relationships between Mexican immigrants and the larger American society.

Push and Pull. Like the massive wave of immigrants from Europe that arrived between the 1820s and 1920s (see Chapter 2), Mexicans have been pushed from their homeland and toward the United States by a variety of sweeping changes both domestic and global. European immigration was propelled by industrialization, urbanization, and rapid population growth. Mexican immigrants have been motivated by similar broad forces, including continuing industrialization and globalization.

At the heart of the immigration lies a simple fact: the almost 2,000-mile-long border between Mexico and the United States is the longest continuous point of contact between a less developed nation and a more developed nation in the world. For the past century, the United States has developed faster than Mexico, moving from an industrial to a postindustrial society and sustaining a substantially higher standard of living. The continuing wage gap between the two nations has made even menial work in the North attractive to millions of Mexicans (and other Central and South Americans). Mexico has a large number of people who need work, and the United States offers jobs that pay more—often much more—than the wages available south of the border. Today, roughly 10% of the Mexican population lives in the United States. Just as the air flows from high to low pressure, people move from areas of lower to higher economic opportunities. The flow is not continuous, however, and has been affected by conditions in both the sending and receiving nations.

Conditions in Mexico, Fluctuating Demand for Labor, and Federal Immigration Policy. Generally, for the past 100 years, Mexico has served as a reserve pool of cheap labor for the benefit of U.S. businesses, agricultural interests, and other groups, and the volume of immigration largely reflects changing economic conditions in the United States. Immigration increases with good times in the United States and decreases when times are bad, a pattern reinforced by the policies and actions of the federal government. The most important events in the complex history of Mexican immigration to the United States are presented in Table 7.2, along with some comments regarding the nature of each event and its effects.

Prior to the early 1900s, the volume of immigration was generally low and largely unregulated. People crossed the border—in both directions—as the need arose, informally and without restriction. The volume of immigration and concern over controlling the border began to rise with the increase of political and economic turmoil in Mexico in the early decades of the 20th century, but still remained a comparative trickle.

Immigration increased in the 1920s, when federal legislation curtailed the flow of cheap labor from Europe, and then decreased in the 1930s, when hard times came to the United States (and the world) during the Great Depression. Many Mexicans in the United States returned home during that decade, sometimes voluntarily, often by force. As competition for jobs increased, efforts began to expel Mexican laborers, just as the Noel hypothesis would predict.

Table 7.2 Significant Dates in Mexican Immigration

Dates	*Event*	*Result*	*Effect on Immigration from Mexico*
1910	Mexican Revolution	Political turmoil and unrest in Mexico.	Increased.
Early 20th century	Mexican industrialization	Many groups (especially rural peasants) displaced.	Increased.
1920s	Passage of National Origins Act of 1924	Decreased immigration from Europe.	Increased.
1930s	Great Depression	Decreased demand for labor and increased competition for jobs leads to repatriation campaign.	Decreased, many return to Mexico.
1940s	World War II	Increased demand for labor leads to Bracero Guest Worker Program.	Increased.
1950s	Concern over illegal immigrants	Operation Wetback.	Decreased, many return to Mexico.
1965	Repeal of National Origins Act	New immigration policy gives high priority to close family of citizens.	Increased.
1986	IRCA	Illegal immigrants given opportunity to legalize status.	Many undocumented immigrants gain legal status.
1994	NAFTA	Many groups in Mexico (especially rural peasants) displaced.	Increased.
2007	Recession in the United States	Widespread unemployment in the United States, job supply shrinks.	Decreased.

The federal government instituted a **repatriation** campaign aimed specifically at deporting illegal Mexican immigrants. In many localities, repatriation was pursued with great zeal, and the campaign intimidated many legal immigrants and native-born Mexican Americans into moving to Mexico. The result was that the Mexican American population of the United States declined by an estimated 40% during the 1930s (Cortes, 1980, p. 711).

When the Depression ended and U.S. society began to mobilize for World War II, federal policy about immigrants from Mexico changed once more as employers again turned to Mexico for workers. In 1942, the Bracero Program was initiated to permit contract laborers, usually employed in agriculture and other areas requiring unskilled labor, to work in the United States for a limited time. When their contracts expired, the workers were required to return to Mexico.

The Bracero Program continued for several decades after the war and was a crucial source of labor for the American economy. In 1960 alone, **braceros** supplied 26% of the nation's seasonal farm labor (Cortes, 1980, p. 703). The program generated millions of dollars of profit for growers and other employers, because they were paying braceros much less than they would have paid American workers (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, pp. 79–80).

At the same time that the Bracero Program permitted immigration from Mexico, other programs and agencies worked to deport undocumented (or illegal) immigrants, large numbers of whom entered the United States with the braceros. Government efforts reached a peak in the early 1950s with **Operation Wetback**, a program under which federal authorities deported almost 4 million Mexicans (Grebler, Moore, & Guzman, 1970, p. 521). During Operation Wetback, raids on Mexican American homes and businesses were common, and authorities often ignored their civil and legal rights. In an untold number of cases, U.S. citizens of Mexican descent were deported along with illegal immigrants. These violations of civil and legal rights have been a continuing grievance of Mexican Americans (and other Latinos) for decades (Mirandé, 1985, pp. 70–90).

In 1965, the overtly racist national immigration policy incorporated in the 1924 National Origins Act (see Chapter 2) was replaced by a new policy that gave a high priority to immigrants who were family and kin of U.S. citizens. The immediate family (parents, spouses, and children) of U.S. citizens could enter without numerical restriction. Some numerical restrictions were placed on the number of immigrants from each sending country, but about 80% of these restricted visas were reserved for other close relatives of citizens. The remaining 20% of the visas went to people who had skills needed in the labor force (Bouvier & Gardner, 1986, pp. 13–15, 41; Rumbaut, 1991, p. 215).

Immigrants have always tended to move along chains of kinship and other social relationships, and the new policy reinforced those tendencies. The social networks connecting Latin America with the United States expanded, and the rate of immigration from Mexico increased sharply after 1965 (see Figure 7.3) as immigrants became citizens and sent for family members.

Most of the Mexican immigrants, legal as well as undocumented, who have arrived since 1965 continue the pattern of seeking work in the low-wage, unskilled sectors of the labor market in the cities and fields of the Southwest. For many, work is seasonal or temporary. When the work ends, they often return to Mexico, commuting across the border as they have done for decades.

In 1986, Congress attempted to deal with illegal immigrants, most of whom were thought to be Mexican, by passing the Immigration Reform and Control Act. This legislation allowed illegal immigrants who had been in the country continuously since 1982 to legalize their status. According to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1993, p. 17), about 3 million people—75% of them Mexican—took advantage of this provision, but the program did not slow the volume of illegal immigration. In 1988, at the end of the amnesty application period, there were still almost 3 million undocumented immigrants in the United States. In 2011, the

number of undocumented immigrants was estimated at 11.1 million, down from a high of 12 million in 2007 (Pew Hispanic Center, 2013, p. 2).

Recent Immigration From Mexico. Mexican immigration to the United States continues to reflect the difference in level of development and standard of living between the two societies. Mexico remains a more agricultural nation and continues to have a lower standard of living, as measured by average wages, housing quality, health care, or any number of other criteria. To illustrate, the gross national income per capita for Mexico in 2012 was $9,600, 70% higher than in 2002 but still only about a fifth of the comparable figure for the United States. About half of the Mexican population lives in poverty (World Bank, 2013). Opportunities for work are scarce, and many Mexicans are drawn to the opportunities of their affluent northern neighbor. Since the average length of schooling in their homeland is only about 8.5 years, Mexican immigrants have much lower levels of job skills than U.S. citizens and compete for work in the lower levels of the U.S. job structure (United Nations Development Programme, 2013).

The impetus to immigrate was reinforced by the globalization of the Mexican economy. In the past, the Mexican government insulated its economy from foreign competition with a variety of tariffs and barriers. These protections have been abandoned over the past several decades, and Mexico, like many less developed nations, has opened its doors to the world economy. The result has been a flood into Mexico of foreign agricultural products (cheap corn, in particular), manufactured goods, and capital, which, while helpful in some parts of the economy, has disrupted social life and forced many Mexicans, especially the poor and rural dwellers, out of their traditional way of life.

The most significant changes to Mexican society have probably come from the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA. As discussed in Chapter 1, this policy united the three nations of North America into a single trading zone. U.S. companies began to move their manufacturing operations to Mexico, attracted by lower wages, less-stringent environmental regulations, and weak labor unions. They built factories (called *maquiladoras*) along the border and brought many new jobs to the Mexican economy. However, other jobs—no longer protected from global competition—were lost, more than offsetting these gains. Mexican wages actually declined after the implementation of NAFTA, increasing the already large number of Mexicans living in poverty. One analyst estimates that more than 2.5 million families have been driven out of the rural economy because they cannot compete with U.S. and Canadian agribusinesses (Faux, 2004).

Thus, globalization in general and NAFTA in particular have reinforced the long-term relationship between the two nations. Mexico, like other nations of the less developed "South," continues to produce a supply of unskilled, less educated workers, while the United States, like other nations of the more developed and industrialized "North", provides a seemingly insatiable demand for cheap labor. Compared with what is available at home, the wages in *el Norte* are quite attractive, even when the jobs are at the margins of the mainstream economy or in the irregular, underground economy (e.g., day laborers paid off the books, illegal sweatshops in the garment industry, and sex


work) and even when the journey requires Mexican immigrants to break American laws, pay large sums of money to "coyotes" to guide them across the border, and live in constant fear of raids by *la Migra* (the Border Patrol or other immigration authorities).

The movement of people from Mexico that began in the 1960s and accelerated in the 1990s was the largest immigration from a single nation to the United States in history (Passel, Cohn, & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012, p. 6). Some 12 million people, about 51% unauthorized, crossed the border in this period.

More recently, the historic trend has reversed. As Figure 7.4 shows, immigration from Mexico has declined dramatically since 2005. The decline is due to multiple factors, including enhanced border enforcement efforts, the growing dangers of crossing illegally, and Mexico's declining birthrate (Passel, Cohn, & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013, p. 6). Perhaps most central to the declining numbers is the U.S. economic recession and the weak job market. The pull that attracted immigrants in the past has weakened considerably, particularly after the collapse of the housing market in 2007. This relationship suggests that immigration may resume as the U.S. economy recovers.

The Continuing Debate Over Immigration Policy. Immigration has once again become a hotly debated issue in the United States. How many immigrants should be admitted? From which nations? With what skills? Should the relatives of U.S. citizens continue to receive a high priority? And, perhaps the issue that generates the most

Figure 7.4 Number of Legal and Unauthorized Immigrants Arriving Each Year From Mexico, 1991–2010




Source: "Annual Immigration from Mexico to the U.S., 1991–2010, Fig. 2.5, p. 17 in Passel, Jeffrey, Cohn, D'Vera, and Gonzalez-Barrera, Ana. 2013a. "Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—and Perhaps Less." Pew Hispanic Center.

passion: What should be done about unauthorized immigrants? Virtually all of these questions—even those phrased in general, abstract terms—are mainly about the large volume of immigration from Mexico and the porous U.S. southern border.

The federal government continues its attempt to reduce the flow by extending the wall along the border with Mexico and beefing up the Border Patrol, with both increased personnel and more high-tech surveillance technology. Still, as we have seen, communities across the nation—not just in the southern border states—are feeling the impact of Mexican immigration and wondering how to respond. Many citizens support extreme measures to close the borders—bigger, thicker walls and even the use of deadly force—while others ponder ways to absorb the newcomers without disrupting or bankrupting local school systems, medical facilities, or housing markets.

The nation is divided on many of the issues related to immigration. Public opinion polls over the past decade show that about 40% to 50% of all Americans would like to lower the volume of immigration, but an almost equal percentage (30% to 40%) favor keeping present level (Morales, 2010). Figure 7.5 shows that—perhaps surprisingly—there has been persistent support for immigration over the past decade, and the large majority of Americans believe that immigration is a "good thing."

Figure 7.5 Attitudes of U.S. Adults Toward Immigration, 2001–2014



Source: Saad, Lydia. 2013. "Americans More Pro-Immigration Than in the Past." Gallup Polls.

A variety of immigration reforms have been proposed and continue to be debated. One key issue is the treatment of illegal immigrants: Should undocumented people be immediately deported, or should some provision be made for them to legalize their status, as was done in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986? If the latter, should the opportunity to attain legal status be extended to all or only to immigrants who meet certain criteria (e.g., those with steady jobs and clean criminal records)? Many feel that amnesty is unjust because immigrants who entered illegally have broken the law and should be punished. Others point to the economic contributions of these immigrants and the damage to the economy that would result from summary, mass expulsions. Still others worry about the negative impact illegal immigrants may have on the job prospects for the less skilled members of the larger population, including the urban underclass that is disproportionately populated by minority group members. (We address some of these issues later in Chapters 8 and 9.)

Immigration, Colonization, and Intergroup Competition. We focus on three points about Mexican immigration to the United States. First, the flow of population from Mexico was and is stimulated and sustained by powerful political and economic interests in the United States. Systems of recruitment and networks of communication and transportation have been established to routinize the flow of immigrants and to provide a predictable labor source that benefits U.S. employers such as those in agriculture. This movement of people back and forth across the border was well established long before current efforts to regulate it. Depending on U.S. policy, this immigration is sometimes legal and encouraged and sometimes illegal and discouraged. Regardless of the label, it has been steadily flowing for decades in response to opportunities for work in the North (Portes, 1990, pp. 160–163).

Second, Mexican immigrants enter a social system in which the group's colonized status has already been established. The paternalistic traditions and racist systems that were formed in the 19th century shaped the positions that were open to Mexican immigrants in the 20th century. Mexican Americans continued to be treated as a colonized group despite the streams of new arrivals, and the history of the group in the 20th century closely parallels those of African Americans and American Indians. Thus, Mexican Americans might be thought of as a colonized minority group that happens to have a large number of immigrants or, alternatively, as an immigrant group that incorporates a strong tradition of colonization.

Third, this brief review of the twisting history of U.S. policy on Mexican immigration should remind us that prejudice, racism, and discrimination increases as competition and the sense of threat between groups increases. The qualities that make Mexican labor attractive to employers have caused bitter resentment among segments of the Anglo population that feel that "their" jobs and financial security are threatened. Often caught in the middle, Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans have not had the resources to avoid exploitation by employers or rejection and discrimination by others. The ebb and flow of the efforts to regulate immigration (and sometimes even deport U.S. citizens of Mexican descent) can be understood in terms of competition, differentials in power, and prejudice.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

1. How do Mexican American and Anglo cultures vary? How have these differences shaped relations between the groups?
2. Why has the volume of immigration from Mexico to the United States fluctuated?

Developments in the United States

As the flow of immigration from Mexico fluctuated with the need for labor, Mexican Americans struggled to improve their status. In the early decades of the 20th century, like other colonized minority groups, they faced a system of repression and control in which they were accorded few rights and had little political power.

Continuing Colonization. Early in the 20th century, Mexican Americans were largely limited to less desirable, low-wage jobs. Split labor markets, in which Mexican Americans are paid less than Anglos for the same jobs, have been common. The workforce often has been further split by gender, with Mexican American women assigned to the worst jobs and receiving the lowest wages in urban and rural areas (Takaki, 1993, pp. 318–319).

Men's jobs often took them away from their families to work in the mines and fields. In 1930, 45% of all Mexican American men worked in agriculture and 28% worked in unskilled nonagricultural jobs (Cortes, 1980, p. 708). Economic necessity often forced women to enter the job market. In 1930, they were concentrated in farm work (21%), unskilled manufacturing jobs (25%), and domestic and other service work (37%) (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, pp. 76–77). They were typically paid less than both Mexican American men and Anglo women. In addition to their job responsibilities, Mexican American women had to maintain their households and raise their children, often facing these tasks without a partner (Baca Zinn & Eitzen, 1990, p. 84).

As the United States industrialized and urbanized during the century, employment patterns became more diversified. Mexican Americans found work in manufacturing, construction, transportation, and other sectors of the economy. Some Mexican Americans, especially those of the third generation or later, moved into middle- and upper-level occupations, and some began to move out of the Southwest. Still, Mexican Americans in all regions (especially recent immigrants) tended to be concentrated at the bottom of the occupational ladder. Women increasingly worked outside the home, but their employment was largely limited to agriculture, domestic service, and the garment industry (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, pp. 76–79; Cortes, 1980, p. 708).

Like African Americans in the segregated South, Mexican Americans were excluded by laws and customs from the institutions of the larger society for much of the 20th century. There were separate (and unequal) school systems for Mexican American children, and in many communities Mexican Americans were disenfranchised and accorded few legal or civil rights. There were "whites only" primary elections modeled

after the Jim Crow system, and residential segregation was widespread. The police and the court system generally abetted or ignored the rampant discrimination against the Mexican American community, and discrimination in the criminal justice system and civil rights violations have been continual grievances of Mexican Americans throughout the century.

Protest and Resistance. Like all minority groups, Mexican Americans have attempted to improve their collective position whenever possible. The beginnings of organized resistance and protest stretch back to the original contact period in the 19th century, when protest was usually organized on a local level. Regional and national organizations made their appearance in the 20th century (Cortes, 1980, p. 709).

Like those of African Americans, Mexican Americans' early protest organizations were integrationist and reflected the assimilationist values of the larger society. For example, one of the earlier and more significant groups was the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), founded in Texas in 1929. LULAC promoted Americanization and greater educational opportunities for Mexican Americans and worked to expand civil and political rights for Mexican Americans. LULAC fought numerous court battles against discrimination and racial segregation (Moore, 1970, pp. 143–145).

The workplace has been a particularly conflictual arena for Mexican Americans. Split labor market situations increased anti–Mexican American prejudice; some labor unions tried to exclude Mexican immigrants to the United States, along with immigrants from Asia and southern and eastern Europe (Grebler et al., 1970, pp. 90–93).

At the same time, Mexican Americans played important leadership roles in the labor movement. Since early in the century, Mexican Americans have been involved in union organizing, particularly in agriculture and mining. When excluded by Anglo labor unions, they often formed their own unions to work for the improvement of working conditions. As the 20th century progressed, the number and variety of groups pursuing the Mexican American cause increased. During World War II, Mexican Americans served in the armed forces. As with other minority groups, this experience increased their impatience with the constraints on their freedoms and opportunities in the United States. After the war ended, new Mexican American organizations were founded, including the Community Service Organization in Los Angeles and the American GI Forum in Texas. Compared with older organizations such as LULAC, the new groups were less concerned with assimilation per se, addressed a broad range of community problems, and attempted to increase Mexican American political power (Grebler et al., 1970, pp. 543–545).

Chicanismo. The 1960s were a time of intense activism and militancy for Mexican Americans. A protest movement guided by an ideology called **Chicanismo** began at about the same time as the Black Power and Red Power movements. Chicanismo encompassed a variety of organizations and ideas, united by a heightened militancy and impatience with the racism of the larger society and strongly stated demands for justice, fairness, and equal rights. The movement questioned the value of assimilation

and sought to increase awareness of the continuing exploitation of Mexican Americans; it adapted many of the tactics and strategies (marches, rallies, voter registration drives, etc.) of the civil rights movement of the 1960s.

Chicanismo is somewhat similar to the Black Power ideology (see Chapter 5) in that it is partly a reaction to the failure of U.S. society to fulfill the promises of integration and equality. Chicanismo rejected traditional stereotypes of Mexican Americans, proclaimed a powerful and positive group image and heritage, and analyzed the group's past and present situation in American society in terms of victimization, continuing exploitation, and institutional discrimination. The inequalities that separated Mexican Americans from the larger society were seen as the result of deep-rooted, continuing racism and the cumulative effects of decades of exclusion. According to Chicanismo, the solution to these problems lay in group empowerment, increased militancy, and group pride, not in assimilation to a culture that had rationalized and supported the exploitation of Mexican Americans (Acuña, 1988, pp. 307–358; Grebler et al., 1970, p. 544; Moore, 1970, pp. 149–154).

Some of the central thrusts of the 1960s protest movement are captured in the widespread adoption of the term **Chicanos**, which had been a derogatory term, as a group name for Mexican Americans. Other minority groups underwent similar name changes at about the same time. For example, African Americans shifted from *Negro* to *black* as a group designation. These name changes were not merely cosmetic—they marked fundamental shifts in group goals and desired relationships with the larger society. The new names came from the minority groups themselves, not from the dominant group, and they expressed the pluralistic themes of group pride, self-determination, militancy, and increased resistance to exploitation and discrimination.

Organizations and Leaders. The Chicano movement saw the rise of many new groups and leaders; Reies López Tijerina, who formed the Alianza de Mercedes (Alliance of Land Grants) in 1963, was one of the most important. The goal of this group was to correct what Tijerina saw as the unjust, illegal seizure of land from Mexicans during the 19th century. The Alianza was militant and confrontational, and the group seized and occupied federal lands to bring attention to their cause. Tijerina spent several years in jail as a result of his activities, and the movement eventually lost its strength and faded from view in the 1970s.

Another prominent Chicano leader was Rodolfo González, who founded the Crusade for Justice in 1965. The crusade focused on abuses of Mexican American civil and legal rights and worked against discrimination by police and the criminal courts. In a 1969 presentation at a symposium on Chicano liberation, Gonzalez expressed some of the nationalistic themes of Chicanismo and the importance of creating a power base within the group (as opposed to assimilating or integrating):

> Where [whites] have incorporated themselves to keep us from moving into their neighborhoods, we can also incorporate ourselves to keep them from controlling our neighborhoods. We . . . have to understand economic revolution. . . . We have to understand that liberation comes from self-determination, and to start to use the tools of nationalism to

> win over our barrio brothers. . . . We have to understand that we can take over the institutions within our community. We have to create the community of the Mexicano here in order to have any type of power. (Moquin & Van Doren, 1971, pp. 381–382)

A third important leader was José Angel Gutiérrez, organizer of the party La Raza Unida (The People United). La Raza Unida offered alternative candidates and ideas to those of Democrats and Republicans. Its most notable success was in Crystal City, Texas, where, in 1973, it succeeded in electing its entire slate of candidates to local office (Acuña, 1988, pp. 332–451).

Without a doubt, the best-known Chicano leader of the 1960s and 1970s was the late César Chávez, who organized the United Farm Workers, the first union to successfully represent migrant workers. Chávez was as much a labor leader as a leader of the Mexican American community, and he also organized African Americans, Filipinos, and Anglo Americans. Migrant farm workers have few economic or political resources, and the migratory nature of their work isolates them in rural areas and makes them difficult to contact. In the 1960s (and still today), many were undocumented immigrants who spoke little or no English and returned to the cities or to their countries of origin at the end of the season. As a group, farm workers were nearly invisible in the social landscape of the United States in the 1960s, and organizing this group was a demanding task. Chávez's success in this endeavor is one of the more remarkable studies in group protest.

Like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Chávez was a disciple of Gandhi and a student of nonviolent direct protest (see Chapter 5). His best-known tactic was the boycott; in 1965, he organized a grape-pickers' strike and a national boycott of grapes. The boycott lasted five years and ended when the growers recognized the United Farm Workers as the legitimate representative of farm workers. Chávez and his organization achieved a major victory, and the agreement provided for significant improvements in the situation of the workers. (For a biography of Chávez, see Levy, 1975.)

Gender and the Chicano Protest Movement. Mexican American women were heavily involved in the Chicano protest movement. Jessie Lopez and Dolores Huerta were central figures in the movement to organize farm workers and worked closely with César Chávez. However, like African American women, Chicano women encountered sexism and gender discrimination within the movement, even as they worked for the benefit of the group as a whole. Activist Sylvia Gonzales described their dilemmas:

> Along with her male counterpart, she attended meetings, organized boycotts, did everything asked of her. . . . But, if she [tried to assume leadership roles], she was met with the same questioning of her femininity which the culture dictates when a woman is not self-sacrificing and seeks to fulfill her own needs. . . . The Chicano movement seemed to demand self-actualization for only the male members of the group. (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, p. 83)

Despite these difficulties, Chicano women contributed widely to the movement, for example, by organizing poor communities and working for welfare reform.

Continuing issues include domestic violence, childcare, the criminal victimization of women, and the racial and gender oppression that limits women of all minority groups (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, pp. 82–86; see also Mirandé & Enriquez, 1979, pp. 202–243).

Mexican Americans and Other Minority Groups

Like the Black Power and Red Power movements, Chicanismo began to fade from public view in the 1970s and 1980s. The movement could claim some successes, but perhaps the clearest victory was in raising the awareness of the larger society about the grievances and problems of Mexican Americans. Today, many Chicanos continue to face poverty, powerlessness, and exploitation as a cheap agricultural labor force. The less educated, urbanized segments of the group share the prospect of becoming a permanent urban underclass with other minority groups of color.

Over the course of the 20th century, the ability of Chicanos to pursue their self-interests has been limited by both internal and external forces. Like African Americans, the group has been systematically excluded from the institutions of U.S. society. Continuing immigration from Mexico has increased the size of the group, but these immigrants bring few resources with them that could be directly or immediately translated into economic or political power in the United States.

Unlike immigrants from Europe, who settled in the urban centers of the industrializing East Coast, Mexican Americans tended to work and live in rural areas distant from and marginal to urban centers of industrialization and opportunities for education, skill development, and upward mobility. They were a vitally important source of labor in agriculture and other segments of the economy but only to the extent that they were exploitable and powerless. As Chicanos moved to the cities, they tended to continue their historic role as a colonized, exploited labor force concentrated at the lower end of the stratification system. Thus, the handicaps created by discrimination in the past were reinforced by continuing discrimination and exploitation in the present, perpetuating the cycles of poverty and powerlessness.

At the same time, however, the flow of immigration and the constant movement of people back and forth across the border kept Mexican culture and the Spanish language alive. Unlike African Americans under slavery, Chicanos were not cut off from their homeland and native culture. Mexican American culture was attacked and disparaged, but, unlike African culture, it was not destroyed. Clearly, the traditional model of assimilation—which was based largely on the experiences of European immigrant groups—does not effectively describe the experiences of Mexican Americans. They have experienced less social mobility than European immigrant groups but have maintained their traditional culture and language more completely. Like African Americans, the group is split along lines of social class. Although many Mexican Americans (particularly of the third generation and later) have acculturated and integrated, a large segment of the group continues to fill the same economic role that their ancestors did: an unskilled labor force for the development of the Southwest, augmented with new immigrants at the convenience of U.S. employers. In 2010, more than 16% of employed Mexican Americans—more than double the percentage for

non-Hispanic whites—were in the construction and farm sectors of the labor force (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013a). For the less educated and for recent immigrants, cultural and racial differences combine to increase their social visibility, mark them for exploitation, and rationalize their continuing exclusion from the larger society.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

3. Are Mexican Americans a colonized or immigrant minority group? Both? Neither? Why?
4. Compare Chicanismo with Black Power and Red Power. How and why do these protest movements differ? Describe the key ideas, leaders, and organizations of Mexican American protest.

Puerto Ricans

Puerto Rico became a territory of the United States in 1898 after the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War. The island was small and impoverished, and it was difficult for Puerto Ricans to avoid domination by the United States. Thus, the initial contact between Puerto Ricans and U.S. society was made in an atmosphere of war and conquest. By the time Puerto Ricans began to migrate to the mainland in large numbers, their relationship to U.S. society was largely that of a colonized minority group, and they generally retained that status on the mainland.

Migration (Push and Pull) and Employment

At the time of initial contact, the population of Puerto Rico was overwhelmingly rural and supported itself by subsistence farming and by exporting coffee and sugar. As the century wore on, U.S. firms began to invest in and develop the island economy, especially the sugarcane industry. These agricultural endeavors took more and more of the land. Opportunities for economic survival in the rural areas declined, and many people were forced to move into the cities (Portes, 1990, p. 163).

Movement to the mainland began gradually and increased slowly until the 1940s. In 1900, about 2,000 Puerto Ricans lived on the mainland. By World War II, this number had grown to only 70,000, a tiny fraction of the total population. Then, during the 1940s, the number of Puerto Ricans on the mainland increased more than fourfold, to 300,000. During the 1950s, it nearly tripled, to 887,000 (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976, p. 19).

This massive and sudden population growth was the result of a combination of circumstances. First, Puerto Ricans became citizens of the United States in 1917, so their movements were not impeded by international boundaries or immigration restrictions. Second, unemployment was a major problem on the island. The sugarcane industry continued to displace the rural population, urban unemployment was high, and the population continued to grow. By the 1940s, a considerable number of Puerto

Ricans were available to work off the island and, like Chicanos, could serve as a cheap labor supply for U.S. employers.

Third, Puerto Ricans were pulled to the mainland by the same labor shortages that attracted Mexican immigrants during and after World War II. Whereas the latter responded to job opportunities in the West and Southwest, Puerto Ricans moved to the Northeast. The job profiles of these two groups were similar: both were concentrated in the low-wage, unskilled sector of the job market. However, the Puerto Rican migration began decades after the Mexican migration, at a time when the United States was much more industrialized and urbanized. As a result, Puerto Ricans were more concentrated in urban labor markets than Mexican immigrants (Portes, 1990, p. 164).

In the late 1940s, affordable air travel between San Juan and New York City facilitated movement between the island and the mainland. New York had been the major center of settlement for Puerto Ricans on the mainland even before annexation. A small Puerto Rican community had been established in the city, and, like many other immigrant groups, Puerto Ricans established organizations and networks to ease the transition and help newcomers with housing, jobs, and other issues. Although they eventually dispersed to other regions and cities, Puerto Ricans on the mainland remain centered in New York City. About 53% now reside in the Northeast, with 23% in New York alone (Brown & Patten, 2013d, p. 2).

Economics and jobs were at the heart of the Puerto Rican migration to the mainland that followed the cycle of boom and bust, just as they were for Mexican immigrants. The 1950s, the peak decade for Puerto Rican migration, was a period of rapid U.S. economic growth. Migration was encouraged, and job recruiters traveled to the island to attract workers. By the 1960s, however, the supply of jobs in Puerto Rico expanded appreciably, reducing the average number of migrants from the peak of 41,000 per year in the 1950s to about 20,000 per year. In the 1970s, the U.S. economy faltered, unemployment grew, and the flow of Puerto Rican migration reversed itself, with the number of returnees exceeding the number of migrants in various years (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976, p. 25). However, movement to the mainland has continued, and in 2011 almost 5 million Puerto Ricans, about 57% of all Puerto Ricans, were living on the mainland (Brown & Patten, 2013d, p. 1).

As the U.S. economy expanded and migration accelerated after World War II, Puerto Ricans moved into a broad range of jobs and locations in society, and the group grew more economically diversified and more regionally dispersed. Still, the bulk of Puerto Ricans remain concentrated in lower-status jobs in the larger cities of the Northeast. Puerto Rican men have often found work as unskilled laborers or in service occupations, particularly in areas where English is not necessary (e.g., janitorial work). The women often have been employed as domestics, hotel maids, or seamstresses for the garment industry in New York City (Portes, 1990, p. 164).

Transitions

Although Puerto Ricans are not "immigrants," the move to the mainland involves a change in culture, including language (Fitzpatrick, 1980, p. 858). Despite nearly a century of political affiliation, Puerto Rican and Anglo cultures differ along many dimensions. Puerto Ricans are overwhelmingly Catholic, but their religious practices

and rituals on the mainland are quite different from those on the island. Mainland Catholic parishes often reflect the traditions and practices of other cultures and groups. On the island, "Religious observance reflects the spontaneous and expressive practices of the Spanish and the Italian and not the restrained and well-organized worship of the Irish and Germans" (p. 865). Also, a shortage of Puerto Rican priests and Spanish-speaking clergy exists on the mainland. Although the overwhelming majority of Latinos are Catholic, only about 6% of Catholic priests are Latinos (Olivo & Eldeib, 2013). Thus, members of the group often feel estranged from and poorly served by the Church (Fitzpatrick, 1987, pp. 117–138).

A particularly unsettling cultural difference between the island and the mainland involves skin color and perceptions of race. Puerto Rico has a long history of racial intermarriage. Slavery was less monolithic and total, and the island had no periods of systematic, race-based segregation like the Jim Crow system. Thus, although skin color prejudice still exists in Puerto Rico, it never has been as categorical as on the mainland. On the island, people perceive race as a continuum of possibilities and combinations, not as a simple dichotomy between white and black.

Furthermore, in Puerto Rico, people consider other factors, such as social class, as more important than race as criteria for judging and classifying others. In fact, as we discussed in the Chapter 5 Comparative Focus, social class can affect perceptions of skin color, and people of higher status might be seen as lighter skinned. Coming from this background, Puerto Ricans find the rigid racial thinking of U.S. culture disconcerting and even threatening.

A study of Puerto Rican college students in New York City illustrates this confusion and discomfort. Researchers found dramatic differences between the personal racial identification of the students and their perceptions of how Anglos viewed them. When asked for their racial identification, most students classified themselves as "tan," with one third labeling themselves "white" and only 7% considering themselves "black." When asked how they thought Anglos classified them, none of the students used the "tan" classification. Fifty-eight percent believed they were seen as "white," and 41% believed they were seen as "black" (Rodriguez, 1989, pp. 60–61; see also Rodriguez & Cordero-Guzman, 1992; Vargas-Ramos, 2005).

Another study documented dramatic differences in the terms used by women on the mainland and those in Puerto Rico to express racial identity. The latter identified their racial identities primarily in terms of skin color: black, white, or *trigueña* (a "mixed-race" category with multiple skin tones), while mainland women identified themselves in nonracial terms, such as Hispanic, Latina, Hispanic American, or American. In the view of the researchers, these labels serve to deflect the stigma associated with black racial status on the mainland (Landale & Oropesa, 2002).

In the racially dichotomized U.S. culture, many Puerto Ricans feel they have no clear place. They are genuinely puzzled when they first encounter prejudice and discrimination based on skin color and are uncertain about their own identities and self-image. The racial perceptions of the dominant culture can be threatening to Puerto Ricans to the extent that they are victimized by the same web of discrimination and disadvantage that affects African Americans. There are still clear disadvantages to

being classified as black in U.S. society. Institutionalized racial barriers can be extremely formidable, and in the case of Puerto Ricans, they may combine with cultural and linguistic differences to sharply limit opportunities and mobility.

Puerto Ricans and Other Minority Groups

Puerto Ricans arrived in the cities of the Northeast long after the great wave of European immigrants and several decades after African Americans began migrating from the South. They have often competed with other minority groups for housing, jobs, and other resources. In some neighborhoods and occupational areas, a pattern of ethnic succession can be seen in which Puerto Ricans have replaced other groups that have moved out (and sometimes up).

Because of their more recent arrival, Puerto Ricans on the mainland were not subjected to the more repressive paternalistic or rigid competitive systems of race relations such as slavery or Jim Crow. Instead, the subordinate status of the group is manifested in their occupational, residential, and educational profiles and by the institutionalized barriers to upward mobility that they face. Puerto Ricans share many problems with other urban minority groups of color: poverty, failing educational systems, and crime. Like African Americans, Puerto Ricans find their fate to be dependent on the future of the American city, and a large segment of the group is in danger of becoming part of a permanent urban underclass.

Like Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans on the mainland combine elements of both an immigrant and a colonized minority experience. The movement to the mainland is voluntary in some ways, but in others it is strongly motivated by the transformations in the island economy that resulted from modernization and U.S. domination. Like Chicanos, Puerto Ricans tend to enter the labor force at the bottom of the occupational structure and face similar problems of inequality and marginalization. Also, Puerto Rican culture retains a strong vitality and is continually reinvigorated by the considerable movement back and forth between the island and the mainland.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

5. Would you say that Puerto Ricans are more an immigrant or colonized minority group? Why or why not?
6. What are some of the key differences between Puerto Rican and Anglo cultures? How have these differences shaped relations between the groups?

Cuban Americans

The contact period for Cuban Americans, as for Puerto Ricans, dates back to the Spanish-American War. At that time, Cuba was a Spanish colony, but it became an independent nation as a result of the war. Despite Cuba's nominal independence, the

United States remained heavily involved in Cuban politics and economics for decades, and U.S. troops actually occupied the island on two different occasions.

The development of a Cuban American minority group bears little resemblance to the experience of either Chicanos or Puerto Ricans. As recently as the 1950s, there had not been much immigration from Cuba to the United States, even during times of labor shortages, and Cuban Americans were a very small group, numbering no more than 50,000 (Perez, 1980, p. 256).

Immigration (Push and Pull)

The conditions for a mass immigration were created in the late 1950s, when a revolution brought Fidel Castro to power in Cuba. Castro's government was decidedly anti-American and began to restructure Cuban society along socialist lines. The middle and upper classes lost political and economic power, and the revolution made it impossible for Cuban capitalists to continue business as usual. Thus, the first Cuban immigrants to the United States tended to come from the more elite classes and included affluent and powerful people who controlled many resources. They were perceived as refugees from Communist persecution (the immigration occurred at the height of the Cold War) and were warmly received by the government and the American public.

The United States was a logical destination for those displaced by the revolution. Cuba is only 90 miles from southern Florida, the climates are similar, and the U.S. government, which was as anti-Castro as Castro was anti-American, welcomed the new arrivals as political refugees fleeing from Communist tyranny.

Prior social, cultural, and business ties also pulled the immigrants in the direction of the United States. Since gaining its independence in 1898, Cuba has been heavily influenced by the U.S. government and by U.S. companies that helped develop the Cuban economy. At the time of Castro's revolution, the Cuban political leadership and the more affluent classes were profoundly Americanized in their attitudes and lifestyles (Portes, 1990, p. 165). Furthermore, many Cuban exiles viewed southern Florida as an ideal spot from which to launch a counterrevolution to oust Castro.

Immigration was considerable for several years. More than 215,000 Cubans arrived between the end of the revolution and 1962, when an escalation of hostile relations resulted in the cutoff of all direct contact between Cuba and the United States. In 1965, an air link was reestablished, and an additional 340,000 Cubans made the journey. When the air connection was terminated in 1973, immigration slowed to a trickle once more.

In 1980, the Cuban government permitted another period of open immigration. Using boats of every shape, size, and degree of seaworthiness, about 124,000 Cubans crossed to Florida. These immigrants are often referred to as the **marielitos**, after the port of Mariel from which many of them departed. This wave of immigrants generated a great deal of controversy in the United States, because the Cuban government used the opportunity to rid itself of a variety of convicted criminals and outcasts. The reception for this group was decidedly less favorable than was the

reception for the original wave of Cuban immigrants. Even the established Cuban American community distanced itself from the *marielitos*, who were largely products of the new Cuba, having been born after the revolution, and with whom they lacked kinship or friendship ties (Portes & Shafer, 2006, pp. 16–17).

Regional Concentrations

The overwhelming majority of Cuban immigrants settled in southern Florida, especially in Miami and the surrounding Dade County. Today, Cuban Americans remain one of the most spatially concentrated minority groups in the United States, with 70% of all Cuban Americans residing in Florida (Brown & Patten, 2013b, p. 2). This dense concentration has led to a number of disputes between the Hispanic, Anglo, and African American communities in the area. Issues have centered on language, jobs, and discrimination by the police and other governmental agencies. The conflicts often have been intense, and on more than one occasion have erupted into violence and civil disorder.

Socioeconomic Characteristics

Compared with other streams of immigrants from Latin America, Cubans are, on the average, unusually affluent and well educated. Among the early immigrants of the 1960s were large numbers of professionals, landowners, and businesspeople. In later years, as Cuban society was transformed by the Castro regime, the stream included fewer elites—largely because there were fewer left in Cuba—and more political dissidents and working-class people. Today (as displayed in the figures later in this chapter), Cuban Americans rank higher than other Latino groups on a number of dimensions, a reflection of the educational and economic resources they brought with them from Cuba and the favorable reception they enjoyed in the United States (Portes, 1990, p. 169).

These assets gave Cubans an advantage over Chicanos and Puerto Ricans, but the differences between the three Latino groups run deeper and are more complex than a simple accounting of initial resources would suggest. Cubans adapted to U.S. society in a way that is fundamentally different from the experiences of the other two Latino groups.

The Ethnic Enclave

Most of the minority groups we have discussed to this point have been concentrated in the unskilled, low-wage segments of the economy in which jobs are not secure and not linked to opportunities for upward mobility. Many Cuban Americans have bypassed this sector of the economy and much of the discrimination and limitation associated with it. Like several other groups, such as Jewish Americans, Cuban Americans are an enclave minority (see Chapter 2). An ethnic enclave is a social, economic, and cultural subsociety controlled by the group itself. Located in a specific geographical area or neighborhood inhabited solely or largely by members of the group, the enclave encompasses sufficient economic enterprises and social institutions

to permit the group to function as a self-contained entity, largely independent of the surrounding community.

The first wave of Cuban immigrants brought with them considerable human capital and business expertise. Although much of their energy was focused on ousting Castro and returning to Cuba, they generated enough economic activity to sustain restaurants, shops, and other small businesses that catered to the exile community. As the years passed and the hope of a return to Cuba dimmed, the enclave economy grew. Between 1967 and 1976, the number of Cuban-owned firms in Dade County increased nine-fold, from 919 to about 8,000. Six years later, the number had reached 12,000. Most of these enterprises were small, but some factories employed hundreds of workers (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996, pp. 20–21). By 2001, more than 125,000 Cuban-owned firms existed in the United States and the rate of Cuban-owned firms per 100,000 people was four times greater than the rate for Mexican Americans and 14 times greater than the rate for African Americans (Portes & Shafer, 2006, p. 14).

Cuban-owned firms have become integrated within local economies and increasingly competitive with other firms involved in construction, manufacturing, finance, insurance, real estate, and an array of other activities in the larger society. The growth of economic enterprises has been paralleled by a growth in the number of other types of groups and organizations and in the number and quality of services available (schools, law firms, medical care, funeral parlors, etc.). The enclave has become a largely autonomous community capable of providing for its members from cradle to grave (Logan, Alba, & McNulty, 1994; Peterson, 1995; Portes & Bach, 1985, p. 59).

That the enclave economy is controlled by the group itself is crucial; it separates the ethnic enclave from "the ghetto," or neighborhoods that are impoverished and segregated. In ghettos, members of other groups typically control the local economy; the profits, rents, and other resources flow out of the neighborhood. In the enclave, profits are reinvested in the neighborhood. Group members can avoid the discrimination and limitations imposed by the larger society, and can apply their skills, education, and talents in an atmosphere free from language barriers and prejudice. Those who might wish to venture into business for themselves can use the networks of cooperation and mutual aid for advice, credit, and other forms of assistance. Thus, the ethnic enclave provides a platform from which Cuban Americans can pursue economic success independent of their degree of acculturation or English language ability.


The effectiveness of the ethnic enclave as a pathway for adaptation is illustrated by a study of Cuban and Mexican immigrants, all of whom entered the United States in 1973. At the time of entry, the groups were comparable in levels of skills, education, and English language ability. The groups were interviewed on several different occasions, and although they remained comparable on many variables, there were dramatic differences between the groups that reflected their different positions in the labor market. The majority of the Mexican immigrants were employed in the low-wage job sector. Less than 20% were self-employed or employed by someone of Mexican descent. Conversely, 57% of the Cuban immigrants were self-employed or

employed by other Cubans (i.e., in the enclave economy). Among the subjects in the study, self-employed Cubans reported the highest monthly incomes ($1,495), and Cubans otherwise employed in the enclave earned the second-highest monthly incomes ($1,111). The lowest monthly incomes ($880) were earned by Mexican immigrants employed in small, nonenclave firms; many of them worked as unskilled laborers in seasonal, temporary, or otherwise insecure jobs (Portes, 1990, p. 173; see also Portes & Bach, 1985).

A more recent study confirms the advantages that accrue from forming an enclave. Using 2000 census data, Portes and Shafer (2006) compared the incomes of several groups in the Miami–Fort Lauderdale metropolitan area, including the original Cuban immigrants (who founded the enclave), their children (the second generation), Cuban immigrants who arrived after 1980 (the *marielitos* and others), and several other groups. Some of the results of the study for men are presented in Figure 7.6.

The founders and primary beneficiaries of the Cuban enclave are the self-employed, pre-1980 Cuban immigrants (far-left bar). The income for this group is higher than for all other Cuban groups included in the graph, and only slightly less

Figure 7.6 Family Incomes for Self-Employed and Wage Salaried Men From Three Cuban-American Groups, 2000



Source: Portes & Shafer (2006, p. 42).

than for non-Hispanic whites (not shown). The sons of the founding generation (U.S.-born Cuban Americans) also enjoy a substantial benefit, both directly (through working in the enclave firms started by their fathers) and indirectly (by translating the resources of their families into human capital, including education, for themselves). The incomes of post-1980 Cuban immigrants are the lowest on the graph and, in fact, are comparable to incomes for non-Hispanic blacks (not shown).

The ability of most Hispanic (and other) immigrants to rise in the class system and compete for place and position is constrained by discrimination and their own lack of economic and political power. Cuban immigrants in the enclave do not need to expose themselves to American prejudices or to rely on the job market of the larger society. They constructed networks of mutual assistance and support and linked themselves to opportunities more consistent with their ambitions and their qualifications.

The link between the enclave and economic equality (an aspect of secondary structural integration) challenges the predictions of some traditional assimilation theories and the understandings of many Americans. The pattern long has been recognized by some leaders of other groups, however, and is voiced in many of the themes of Black Power, Red Power, and Chicanismo that emphasize self-help, self-determination, nationalism, and separation.

However, ethnic enclaves cannot be a panacea for all immigrant or other minority groups. They develop only under certain limited conditions—namely, when business and financial expertise and reliable sources of capital are combined with a disciplined labor force willing to work for low wages in exchange for on-the-job training, future assistance and loans, or other delayed benefits. Enclave enterprises usually start on a small scale and cater only to other ethnic people. Thus, the early economic returns are small, and prosperity follows only after years of hard work, if at all. Most important, eventual success and expansion beyond the boundaries of the enclave depend on the persistence of strong ties of loyalty, kinship, and solidarity. The pressure to assimilate might easily weaken these networks and the strength of group cohesion (Portes & Manning, 1986, pp. 61–66).

Cuban Americans and Other Minority Groups

The adaptation of Cuban Americans contrasts sharply with the experiences of colonized minority groups and with the common understanding of how immigrants are "supposed" to acculturate and integrate. Cuban Americans are neither the first nor the only group to develop an ethnic enclave, and their success has generated prejudice and resentment from the dominant group and from other minority groups. Whereas Puerto Ricans and Chicanos have been the victims of stereotypes labeling them "inferior," higher-status Cuban Americans have been stereotyped as "too successful," "too clannish," and "too ambitious." The former stereotype commonly emerges to rationalize exploitative relationships; the latter expresses disparagement and rejection of groups that are more successful in the struggle to acquire resources. Nonetheless, the stereotype of Cubans is an exaggeration and a misperception that obscures the fact that poverty and unemployment are major problems for many members of this group, especially for the post-1980 immigrants (see the figures at the end of this chapter).

Prejudice and Discrimination

The American tradition of prejudice against Latinos was born in the 19th century conflicts that created minority group status for Mexican Americans. The themes of the original anti-Mexican stereotypes and attitudes were consistent with the nature of the contact situation: as Mexicans were conquered and subordinated, they were characterized as inferior, lazy, irresponsible, low in intelligence, and dangerously criminal (McWilliams, 1961, pp. 212–214). Prejudice and racism, supplemented with the echoes of the racist ideas and beliefs brought to the Southwest by many Anglos, helped justify and rationalize the colonized, exploited status of the Chicanos.

These prejudices were incorporated into the dominant culture and transferred to Puerto Ricans when they began to arrive on the mainland. However, this stereotype does not fit the situation of Cuban Americans very well. Instead, their affluence has been exaggerated and perceived as undeserved or achieved by unfair or "un-American" means, a characterization similar to the traditional stereotype of Jews and just as prejudiced as perceptions of Latino inferiority.

Some evidence suggests that the level of prejudice against Latinos has been affected by the decline of explicit American racism discussed in Chapters 1 and 5. For example, social distance scales show a decrease in the scores for Mexicans (not shown in the table), although their relative ranking remains fairly stable.

On the other hand, anti-Latino prejudice and racism tend to increase during times of high immigration. In particular, considerable though largely anecdotal evidence suggests that the surge of immigration that began in the 1990s sparked high levels of anti-Latino prejudice in the "borderlands," or the areas along the U.S.–Mexican border. Extreme, racist rhetoric was common, and media prominently featured hate group activities. Many observers see racism in Arizona's state-mandated ban on ethnic studies programs in public schools and in its widely debated State Bill 1070 which, in part, allows police to check anyone for proof of citizenship. In 2012, the Supreme Court upheld this component of the bill but struck down three other provisions, and in 2014, a federal judge rejected additional provisions. At any rate, the level of immigrant bashing and anti-Latino sentiment along the border and in other parts of the United States demonstrates that American prejudice, although sometimes disguised as a subtle modern racism, is alive and well.

In Chapter 4, we mentioned that audit studies have documented the persistence of discrimination against blacks in the housing and job markets; many of the same studies also demonstrate anti-Hispanic biases (see Quillian, 2006, for a review). Discrimination of all kinds, institutional as well as individual, against Latino groups has been common, but it has not been as rigid or as total as the systems that controlled African American labor under slavery and segregation. However, discrimination against Latinos persists across the United States. Because of their longer tenure in the United States and their original status as a rural labor force, Mexican Americans probably have been more victimized by the institutionalized forms of discrimination than have other Latino groups.

Assimilation and Pluralism


As in previous chapters, we will use the central concepts of this text to review the status of Latinos in the United States. When relevant, we'll make comparisons between the major Latino groups and the minority groups discussed in previous chapters.

Acculturation

Latinos are highly variable in their extent of acculturation but are often seen as "slow" to change, learn English, and adopt Anglo customs. Contrary to this perception, research shows that Hispanics follow many of the same patterns of assimilation as European groups. Their rates of acculturation increase with length of residence and are higher for the native-born (Espinosa & Massey, 1997; Goldstein & Suro, 2000; Valentine & Mosley, 2000).


The dominant trend for Hispanic groups, as for immigrants from Europe in the past (see Chapter 2) is that language acculturation increases over the generations, as the length of residence in the United States increases, and as education increases. A 2007 study of more than 14,000 respondents from six different surveys since 2000 (Hakimzadeh & Cohn, 2007) illustrates these points (see Figures 7.7 and 7.8).

Figure 7.7 Primary Language by Generation for Hispanic Americans, 2007



Source: Taylor, Paul, Lopez, Hugo, Martinez, Jessica, and Velasco, Gabriel, 2012. "When Labels Don't Fit: Hispanics and their Views of Identity" http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/04/when-labels-dont-fit-hispanics-and-their-views-of-identity/.

Figure 7.8 Percentage of Hispanic Americans Who Speak English "Very Well" by Years of Residence and Levels of Education, 2007



Source: Hakimzadeh, Shirin, & Cohn, D'Vera. 2007. "English Language Usage Among Hispanics in the United States." Pew Hispanic Center. http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/82.pdf.

An earlier study (Pew Hispanic Center, 2004) found that Anglo and Latino values become virtually identical as length of residence increases, generations pass, and English language ability increases. It found that most Latinos who speak predominantly Spanish (72%) are first generation. The second generation is most likely to be bilingual. Those who speak predominantly English (78%) are third generation. The values of predominantly Spanish speakers are distinctly different from those of non-Latinos, especially on a survey item that measures support for the statement, "Children should live with their parents until they are married." Virtually all the predominantly Spanish speakers supported the statement, but English-speaking Latinos showed the more individualistic values of Anglos. A similar acculturation to American values occurred for the other three items that researchers studied.

Even while acculturation continues, however, immigration revitalizes Hispanic culture and the Spanish language. By its nature, assimilation is a slow process that can require decades or generations to complete. In contrast, immigration can be fast, often accomplished in less than a day. Thus, even as Hispanic Americans acculturate and integrate, Hispanic culture and language are sustained and strengthened. What is perceived to be slow acculturation for these groups is mostly the result of fast and continuous immigration.

Furthermore, colonized minority groups such as Chicanos and Puerto Ricans were not encouraged to assimilate in the past. Valued primarily for the cheap labor they supplied, they were seen as inferior, undesirable, and unfit for integration. For

much of the 20th century, Latinos were excluded from the institutions and experiences (e.g., school) that could have led to greater equality and higher rates of acculturation. Prejudice, racism, and discrimination combined to keep most Latino groups away from the centers of modernization and change and away from opportunities to improve their situation.

Finally, for Cubans, Dominicans, Salvadorans, and other groups, cultural differences reflect that they are largely recent immigrants. Their first generations are alive and well. As is typical for immigrant groups, they keep their language and traditions alive.

Secondary Structural Assimilation

In this section, we survey the situation of Latinos in the public areas and institutions of American society, following the same format as the previous two chapters. We begin with where people live.

Residence. Figure 7.9 shows the geographic concentrations of Latinos in 2010. The legacies of the varied patterns of entry and settlement for the largest groups are evident. The higher concentrations in the Southwest reflect the presence of Mexican Americans; those in Florida are the result of the Cuban immigration, and those in the Northeast display the settlement patterns of Puerto Ricans.


Figure 7.10 highlights the areas of the nation where the Latino population is growing fastest. A quick glance at the map reveals that many of the high-growth areas are distant from the traditional points of entry for these groups. In particular, the Hispanic American population is growing rapidly in parts of the New England, the South, the upper Midwest, the Northwest, and even Alaska. This population movement is a response to (among many other forces) the availability of jobs in factories, mills, chicken-processing plants and slaughterhouses, farms, construction, and other low-skilled areas of the economy.

Within each of these regions, Latino groups are highly urbanized, as shown in Figure 7.11. With the exception of Mexican Americans, more than 90% of each of the 10 largest Hispanic American groups live in urban areas, and this percentage approaches 100% for some groups. Mexican Americans are more rural than the other groups, but the percentage of the group living in rural areas is tiny today, in sharp contrast to their historical role as an agrarian workforce.

The extent of residential segregation for Hispanic Americans was displayed in Figure 5.9 (see Chapter 5), using the dissimilarity index for each of the last four census years. Residential segregation is much lower for Hispanics than for blacks: None of the scores for Hispanics in Figure 5.9 approach the "extreme" segregation denoted by a dissimilarity index of 60 or more.


Note that, contrary to the decreasing levels of black–white segregation, Hispanic–white residential segregation has held steady, with minor increases or decreases. Among other factors, this is a reflection of high rates of immigration and "chain" patterns of settlement, which concentrate newcomers in ethnic neighborhoods. In other words, levels of residential segregation for Hispanics remain relatively steady because weakening barriers to integration in the larger society are counteracted by the continuing arrival of newcomers, who tend to settle in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods.

Figure 7.10 Percentage Change in Hispanic Population by County, 2000–2010



Source: Ennis, Rios-Vargas, & Albert (2011).

Figure 7.11 Percentage of 10 Largest Hispanic American Groups and Non-Hispanic Whites Living in Urbanized Areas, 2000




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2000b).

Note: An "urbanized area" is defined as an area with a minimal population density of 1,000 people per square mile and a minimum population of 50,000.

Education. Figure 7.12 displays the extent of school segregation for Hispanic Americans using the same format that Figure 5.10 used for African Americans. Five different school years are used, along with three different measures. The top line shows

Figure 7.12 Three Measures of School Segregation for Hispanic Students



Source: Data from Orfield, Gary, Kuesera, John, & Siegel-Hawley, Genevieve. 2012. "E Pluribus . . . Segregation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students." The Civil Rights Project, UCLA. p. 19.


that the overwhelming—and increasing—majority of Hispanic students attended majority-minority schools over this time period. By this measure, Hispanic students are actually more segregated than black students. The middle line shows an increasing percentage of Hispanic students attending schools that are 90% to 100% minority, and the bottom line shows a slight decrease in the percentage attending schools that are virtually all minority. The first two trends reflect recent high rates of immigration and the tendency for newcomers to reside in the same neighborhoods as their co-ethnics.

Levels of education for Hispanic Americans have risen in recent years but are far below national standards (see Figure 7.13). Hispanic Americans in general and all subgroups, except Colombian Americans, fall well below non-Hispanic whites for high school education. In particular, less than 60% of Mexican Americans and only about half of Honduran, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan Americans have completed high school. At the college level, Colombian and Cuban Americans approximate national norms, but the other groups and Hispanic Americans as a whole are far below non-Hispanic whites.

The lower levels of education for Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans are the cumulative results of decades of systematic discrimination and exclusion. These levels have been further reduced by the high percentage of recent immigrants from Mexico, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and other nations that have modest educational backgrounds.

Given the role that education credentials have come to play in the job market, these figures are consistent with the idea that assimilation may be segmented for some Hispanic groups (see Chapters 2 and 9), who may contribute in large numbers, along with African Americans and Native American, to the growth of an urban underclass.

Figure 7.14 Median Household Incomes for Non-Hispanic White and All Hispanic Households, 1972–2012



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

Political Power. The political resources available to Hispanic Americans have increased over the years, but the group is still proportionally underrepresented. Nationally, Hispanic Americans rose from about 6% of those eligible to vote in 1996 to almost 11% in 2012. However, this increase in potential political power was limited by lower rates of registration and lower voter turnout: Less than half (48%) of Hispanic Americans eligible to vote actually cast a ballot in the 2012 presidential election (File, 2013, pp. 3–5). Clearly, the impact of the Latino vote on national politics will increase as the group grows in size, but participation is likely to remain lower than that of other groups for some time because of the large percentage of noncitizens and recent, non-English-speaking immigrants in the group.

At the national level, 37 Hispanic Americans serve in the U.S. Congress; this is more than double the number that served in 1990 and about 7% of the total membership. There are 33 Hispanic members of the House of Representatives (26 of them Democrats) and 4 senators (3 of them Republicans) (Manning, 2013). On the local and state levels, the number of public officials identified as Hispanic increased by more than 65% between 1985 and 2008, from 3,147 to 5,240 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011a, p. 259).

Although Hispanic Americans are still underrepresented, these figures suggest that they will become increasingly important in American political life as their numbers continue to grow and their rates of naturalization rise. Even with a relatively small turnout, Hispanic voters were an important part of the coalition that reelected President Barack Obama, and competition between the Republican and Democratic parties for this growing segment of the electorate will continue.

Jobs and Income. The economic situation of Hispanic Americans is quite mixed. Many Latinos, especially those who have been in the United States for several generations, are doing "just fine. They have, in ever increasing numbers, accessed opportunities in education and employment and have carved out a niche of American prosperity for themselves and their children" (Camarillo & Bonilla, 2001, pp. 130–131). For others, however, the picture is not as promising. They face the possibility of becoming members of an impoverished, powerless, and economically marginalized urban underclass, like African Americans and other minority groups of color.

Occupationally, Hispanic Americans who are recent immigrants with modest levels of education and job skills are concentrated in the less-desirable, lower-paid service and unskilled segments of the job market. Those with higher levels of human capital and education compare more favorably with the dominant group.

Unemployment, low income, and poverty continue to be issues for all Hispanic groups. The official unemployment rates for Hispanic Americans run about 50% higher than the rate for non-Hispanic whites (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).

Figure 7.14 compares median household incomes for non-Hispanic whites and all Hispanic Americans across three decades. The size of the income gap fluctuates, but generally remains in the low to mid-70% range. In the most recent years, however, it has fallen to just below 70%.


As a group, Hispanic Americans historically have been intermediate between blacks and whites in the stratification system; this is reflected by the fact that the Hispanic–white income gap is smaller than the black–white income gap (which was 62% in 2010; see Figure 5.13). This smaller gap also reflects the more favorable economic circumstances of Hispanics (especially those more "racially" similar to the dominant group) who have been in the United States for generations and are thoroughly integrated into the mainstream economy.

Figure 7.15 shows that there is a good deal of income variability from group to group but that Hispanic Americans in general and all subgroups have, on the average, dramatically lower median household incomes than non-Hispanic whites, especially the groups with large numbers of recent immigrants who bring low levels of human capital.

Figure 7.16 supplements the information on median income by displaying the overall distribution of income for Hispanic Americans and non-Hispanic whites for 2012. The figure shows a greater concentration (wider bars) of Hispanics in the lower-income categories and a lower concentration (narrower bars) in the income groups at the top of the figure. There is a noticeable concentration of both groups in the $50,000 to $125,000 categories, but the percentage of whites is greater (40% to 32%) in these income ranges. In the three highest income categories, the percentage of whites is more than double that of Hispanic Americans (16% to 7%).

Recent detailed income information is not available for the separate subgroups, but we can assume that, although all groups have members in all income categories,

Figure 7.16 Distribution of Household Income for White and Hispanic Americans, 2012



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013e).

Mexican Americans, Dominican Americans, and Puerto Ricans would be disproportionately represented in the lowest-income categories, and Cuban Americans—especially, as we have seen, those that benefit from the enclave economy—are disproportionately represented in the higher groups.

Figure 7.17 finishes the socioeconomic profile by displaying the varying levels of poverty for Hispanic Americans, a pattern that is consistent with the information presented previously on income and education. The poverty rate for all Hispanic families is almost three times the rate for non-Hispanic white families but lower than that of African Americans (see Figure 5.15). However, there is considerable diversity across the subgroups, with the rate for Colombians and Cubans closest to that of non-Hispanic whites, and Dominicans and Hondurans the most impoverished. For all groups, children have higher poverty rates than families.

These socioeconomic profiles reflect the economic diversity of Latinos. Some are "doing just fine," but others are concentrated in the low-wage sector of the economy. As a group, Cuban Americans rank higher than Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans—the two other largest groups—on virtually all measures of wealth and prosperity. As we saw previously, this relative prosperity is even more pronounced for the earlier immigrants from Cuba and their children.

We should note, also, that the income gap and the picture of economic distress would be much greater if we focused on recent immigrants and, especially, undocumented immigrants, who are concentrated in the informal, irregular economy. These groups are sometimes paid "off the books" and less than minimum wage. As we have discussed, they tend to be focused on their families and villages back home and live as frugally as possible—5 or even 10 people to a room, for example—to maximize the money they can send home. Since they tend to live "below the radar," they are less likely to be included in the data-gathering efforts that supply the information for the figures in this chapter. If they were included, the results for average wages would be lower (and rates of poverty higher) for virtually all Latino groups in the United States.

Gender and Inequality. There is a split labor market differentiated by gender within the dual market differentiated by race and ethnicity. Hispanic women—like minority group women in general—are among the lowest-paid, least-protected, and, therefore, most-exploitable segments of the U.S. labor force. The impact of poverty is especially severe for Latino women because they often find themselves taking sole responsibility for caring for their children. In 2010, about 20% of all Hispanic American households were headed by women versus about 13% in the total population. This ranged from a low of 15% for Cuban Americans to a high of about 36% for Dominicans (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012a). This pattern is the result of many factors, among them the status of Latino men in the labor force. The jobs available to Latino men often do not pay enough to support a family because many jobs are seasonal, temporary, or otherwise insecure.

Women-headed Latino families face a triple economic handicap: they have only one wage earner whose potential income is limited by discrimination against both women and Latinos. The result of these multiple disadvantages is an especially high

rate of poverty. Whereas 24% of non-Hispanic white, woman-headed households fall below the poverty line, the percentage is about 41% for Hispanic households headed by women (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013a).

Summary. The socioeconomic situation of Latinos is complex, diversified, and segmented. Many Latinos have successfully entered the mainstream economy, but others face poverty and exclusion. Highly concentrated in deteriorated urban areas (or barrios), segments of these groups, like other minority groups of color, face the possibility of permanent poverty and economic marginality.

Primary Structural Assimilation

Overall, the extent of intimate contact between Hispanic Americans and the dominant group probably has been higher than for either African Americans or Native Americans (e.g., see Quillian & Campbell, 2003; Rosenfield, 2002). This pattern may reflect the fact that Latinos are partly ethnic minority groups and partly racial minority groups. Some studies report that contact is greater for the more affluent social classes, in the cities, and for the younger generations (who are presumably more Americanized) (Fitzpatrick, 1976; Grebler et al., 1970, p. 397; Rodriguez, 1989, pp. 70–72). On the other hand, the extent of contact probably has been decreased by the rapid increase in immigration and the tendency of the first generation to socialize more with coethnics.

Rates of intermarriage are higher for Latinos than for African Americans, but neither is a very high percentage of all marriages. Black and white interracial couples make up less than 1% of all marriages, and the comparable figure for Latinos is 4% of all marriages (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012c, p. 54).

Table 7.3 shows that rates of in-marriage for Hispanics are lower than those for whites. This is partly a function of simple arithmetic: The larger group (white Americans) is more likely to find partners within the group. However, note that the rate of Latino in-marriage is also lower than that of blacks (see Table 5.1), a group of

Table 7.3 Percentages of Whites and Latinos Married to a Person of the Same Group, 1980 and 2008

	Whites		*Latinos*			
			Men		*Women*	
Year	*Men*	*Women*	*Foreign-Born*	*U.S.-Born*	*Foreign-Born*	*U.S.-Born*
1980	96%	95%	80%	67%	84%	70%
2008	93%	92%	83%	58%	83%	59%

Source: Qian & Lichter (2011, p. 1072). Copyright © 2011 National Council on Family Relations. Reprinted with permission.

about the same size. This pattern may reflect the tenacity of racial (vs. ethnic) barriers to integration in this institutional area.

Also, note that rates of in-marriage for Latinos are affected by nativity. In both years, the foreign-born were more likely to marry within the group than were the U.S.-born. This pattern, like so many others, reflects the high rates of immigration and the tendency of recent immigrants to socialize within the ethnic subcommunity. For both years, Hispanics who married outside their group were most likely to marry whites.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

11. This section examined a variety of dimensions of acculturation and integration for Hispanic Americans. Which is most important? Why?
12. Which Hispanic groups have been more successful in U.S. society and why? Do you agree with the definitions of *success* used in this section? What other definitions might be useful, and how might these change your ideas about which group is most successful?

Assimilation and Hispanic Americans

As test cases for what we have called the traditional view of American assimilation, Latinos fare poorly. Almost two centuries after the original contact period, Mexican Americans tend to be concentrated in the low-wage sector of the labor market, a source of cheap labor for the dominant group's economy. Puerto Ricans, who are more recent arrivals, occupy a similar profile and position.

The fundamental reality faced by both groups, in their histories and in their present situations, is their colonized status in U.S. society. Even while many Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans have risen in the social class and occupational structure of the larger society, others share many problems with other urban minority groups of color.

Traditional views of the nature of assimilation, likewise, fail to describe the experiences of Cuban Americans. They are more prosperous, on the average, than either Mexican Americans or Puerto Ricans, but they became successful by remaining separate and by developing an enclave in South Florida.

There is no single Hispanic American experience or pattern of adjustment to the larger society. We have focused mainly on three of the many Latino groups in the United States, and the diversity of their experiences suggests the variety and complexity of what it means to be a minority group in U.S. society. Additionally, their experiences illustrate some of the fundamental forces that shape minority group experiences: the split labor market and the U.S. appetite for cheap labor, the impact of industrialization, the dangers of a permanent urban underclass, the relationships between competition and levels of prejudice and rejection, and the persistence of race as a primary dividing line between people and groups.

FOCUS ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES: Hispanic Americans and the Evolution of the American Racial Order[1]

The United States has, virtually since its birth, been organized into two communities: black and white, separate and unequal. This structural relationship has been reinforced and solidified by the traditional perception that there are *only* two races. What will happen to this tradition as groups that are neither black nor white—Latinos, Asian Americans, and others—continue to grow in numbers and significance in the everyday life of U.S. society?

One possibility, which we will call the whitening thesis, hypothesizes that Latinos (and Asian Americans) eventually will be accepted as white, while African Americans remain relegated to the perpetual black. An opposing position, called the browning thesis, predicts that all "peoples of color" will band together and threaten the dominance of whites. We consider each of these views below, as well as a third possible future for the racial order of the United States.

Whitening. In this model, Latinos and Asian Americans will become part of the white American racial group while blacks will remain disproportionately unequal, powerless, and marginalized. The racial identities of Latinos and Asians will become "thinner," declining in salience for them as they increasingly access the privileges of whiteness, much like the Irish and Italians before them. As they assimilate, the "white" racial identity will grow more prominent and their sense of ethnicity will become largely symbolic.

This prediction is consistent with Gordon's assimilation model and the notion that immigrants move through a series of stages and become more incorporated into the dominant society in a relatively linear fashion. Once a group has completed acculturation, integration, and intermarriage, they will begin to racially identify with the dominant group.

George Yancey (2003) has tested the whitening thesis on a nationally representative data set, and his analysis places Latinos and Asian Americans in the middle stages of assimilation, because their residential patterns, marital patterns, and several key political beliefs align more closely with those of white Americans than they do with those of black Americans. If Gordon's model holds true, these groups will come to identify as white over the next several generations.

Another research project (Murguia & Foreman, 2003) focused on Mexican Americans and found that they tend to prefer spouses, neighbors, coworkers, and friends who are either Puerto Rican or white, not black. The researchers also found that Mexican Americans tend to endorse modern racism (see Chapters 1 and 5): the belief that racism is not much of a barrier to success and that people of color are largely responsible for

(Continued)

(Continued)

their own hardships. This consistency with the ideology of the dominant group also positions Mexican Americans on the path to whiteness.

Finally, note that an important part of the whitening process is to distance oneself from the perpetually stigmatized black group. To the extent that a whitening process occurs for Latino and Asian Americans, these groups will tend to use both traditional and modern anti-black racism to emphasize their differences and align themselves more with the attitudinal and cultural perspectives of the dominant group. We discussed this type of dynamic in our coverage of the racial identity of Puerto Ricans who come to the mainland.

Browning. The browning thesis argues that whites will gradually lose their dominant status as Latino and Asian American groups grow in numbers. The balance of power will tip toward the nonwhite groups, who will use their greater numbers to challenge whites for position in the society.

Some theorists see the loss of white dominance as very negative, a threat to the integrity of Anglo American culture. This version of the browning thesis has been presented by political scientist Samuel Huntington (2004), among many others. Some proponents of this perspective argue that Latinos are "unassimilable" due to their alleged unwillingness to learn English and absorb other aspects of U.S. culture, a view based largely on nativism, ethnocentrism, and prejudice, and refuted by much of the evidence presented in this chapter (e.g., see Figures 7.8 and 7.9). Nevertheless, this version of the browning thesis has gained momentum in popular culture and on some talk radio and cable TV shows. It also manifests itself in the political arena in debates over immigration policy and in the movement to make English the "official" language of the nation (see Chapter 2).

A different version of the browning thesis has taken hold among some sociologists. For example, Feagin and O'Brien (2004) put a positive spin on the idea of the declining white numerical majority. They believe that as nonwhite groups grow in size, whites will be forced to share power in a more democratic, egalitarian, and inclusive fashion. This shift will be more likely to the extent that minority groups can forge alliances with one another. These combinations may be foreshadowed by studies of generational differences in the racial attitudes of immigrants, some of which show that native-born or second-generation Latinos and Asian Americans are more likely to express solidarity with African Americans than are the foreign-born and recently arrived members of their group (Murguia & Foreman, 2003). In contrast to the whitening thesis, this view of the browning thesis expects Latinos and Asian Americans to embrace a more color-conscious worldview and find ways to leverage their growing numbers, in alliance with African Americans, to improve their status in American society.

This version of the browning thesis also adopts a more global perspective. It recognizes that the world is occupied by many more "people of color" than by whites of European descent and that the growing numbers of nonwhites in the United States can be an important resource in the global marketplace. For example, people around the world commonly speak several languages on a daily basis, but Americans are almost

entirely monolingual; this places them at a disadvantage in a global marketplace that values linguistic diversity. The United States might improve its position if it encourages the "fluent bilingualism" of its Latino and Asian American citizens, rather than insisting on "English Only" (see Chapter 2).

Something Else? Still another group of scholars challenges both the browning and the whitening theses and foresees a three-way racial dynamic. These scholars focus on the tremendous diversity within the Latino and Asian American communities in the United States in terms of relative wealth, skin color and other "racial" characteristics, religion, and national origins. This diversity leads them to conclude that only some Latino and Asian Americans will "whiten."

For example, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2003) sketches out a future racial trichotomy: whites, honorary whites, and the collective black. In this schema, well-off and light-skinned Latinos and Asians would not "become white" but, rather, would occupy an intermediary "honorary whites" status. This status would afford them much of the privilege and esteem not widely accorded to people of color, but it would still be a conditional status, which potentially could be revoked in times of economic crisis or at any other time when those in power found it necessary. Bonilla-Silva predicts that groups such as Chinese Americans and lighter-skinned Latinos would fit into the honorary white category, while darker-skinned Latinos and Asians would fit into the collective black category, along with, of course, American blacks.

Murguia and Foreman (2003) provide some findings from their study of Mexican Americans that can be used to illustrate this process. They point out that skin color and educational level make a difference in whether or not Latinos ally with blacks. Mexican Americans with darker skin and higher educational levels and those born in the United States are less likely to buy into the anti-black stereotypes of the larger culture and more likely to recognize the significance of racism in their own lives. Attitudes such as these may form the basis of future alliances among some (but not all) Latinos, Asian Americans, and African Americans.

How Will the Racial Order Evolve? Will the United States grow browner or whiter? In the face of high levels of immigration and the growing importance of groups that are in the "racial middle"—those that are neither black nor white—it seems certain that the traditional, dichotomous black–white racial order cannot persist. What will replace it? Whichever thesis proves correct, it seems certain that new understandings of race and new relationships among racial groups will emerge in the coming decades.

Note

1. This section based on O'Brien (2008).

8

Asian Americans: Model Minorities?

I had flown from San Francisco . . . and was riding a taxi to my hotel to attend a conference on multiculturalism. My driver and I chatted about the weather and the tourists. The rearview mirror reflected a white man in his forties. "How long have you been in this country?" he asked. "All my life," I replied, wincing. "I was born in the United States." With a strong Southern drawl, he remarked: "I was wondering because your English is excellent!". . . . I explained: "My grandfather came here from Japan in the 1880s. My family has been here for over a hundred years." He glanced at me in the mirror. Somehow, I did not look "American" to him; my eyes and complexion looked foreign.

—Ronald Takaki (1993, p. 2)

These few seconds of conversation speak deeply to U.S. perceptions of Asian Americans (and other minority groups). The taxi driver certainly meant no insult, but his casual question revealed his view, widely shared, that the United States is a white European society. At the time of the conversation, Professor Takaki was a distinguished professor at a prestigious West Coast university, a highly respected teacher, and an internationally renowned expert in his area. Very possibly, his family had been in the United States longer than the taxi driver's family; yet the driver automatically assumed he was an outsider.

Asian Americans, like other peoples of color, continually find themselves set apart, excluded, and stigmatized—whether during the 19th century anti-Chinese campaign in California, after the 1922 Supreme Court decision (*Takao Ozawa v. United States*) that declared Asians

> ineligible for U.S. citizenship, or by the racist reactions to the crowning of Nina Davulari, an American of Indian descent, as Miss America in September 2013 (Oldenburg, 2013). The stereotypes are sometimes "positive"—as in the view that Asian Americans are "model minorities"—but the "othering" is real, painful, and consequential.

In this chapter, we begin with an overview of Asian American groups and then briefly examine the traditions and customs they bring with them to America. For much of the chapter, we will focus on the two oldest groups, Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans. Throughout, we will be especially concerned with the perception that Asian Americans in general and Chinese and Japanese Americans in particular are "model minorities": successful, affluent, highly educated people who do not suffer from the problems usually associated with minority group status. How accurate is this view? Have Asian Americans forged a pathway to upward mobility that could be followed by other groups? Do the concepts and theories that have guided this text (particularly the Blauner and Noel hypotheses) apply? Does the success of these groups mean that the United States is truly an open, fair, and just society?

Asian American groups vary in their languages, in their cultural and physical characteristics, and in their experiences in the United States. Some of these groups are truly newcomers to America, but others have roots in this country stretching back for more than 150 years. As was the case with American Indians and Hispanic Americans, "Asian American" is a convenient label imposed by the larger society (and by government agencies like the U.S. Census Bureau) that deemphasizes the differences between the groups. Table 8.1 lists some information about the size and growth of all Asian Americans and the 10 largest Asian American groups.

Several features of Table 8.1 are worth noting. First, Asian Americans are a small fraction of the total U.S. population. Even when aggregated, they account for only 5.6%. In contrast, African Americans and Hispanic Americans constitute 13% and 16%, respectively.

Second, most Asian American groups have grown dramatically in recent decades, largely because of high rates of immigration since the 1965 changes in U.S. immigration policy. All the groups listed in Table 8.1 grew faster than the total population between 1990 and 2012. Japanese Americans grew at the slowest rate (largely because immigration from Japan has been low in recent decades), but the number of Asian Indians almost quadrupled, and nearly all of the other groups doubled or tripled their populations.

This rapid growth is projected to continue for decades to come, and the impact of Asian Americans on everyday life and American culture will increase accordingly. As we saw in Figure 1.1, projections suggest that, by midcentury, 1 out of every 10 Americans will be of Asian descent. The relative sizes of the largest Asian American groups are presented in Figure 8.1.

Like Hispanic American groups, most Asian American groups have a high percentage of foreign-born members, as displayed in Figure 8.2, and even Japanese Americans, the lowest-ranked group, has almost double the national norm for

Table 8.1 Size and Growth of All Asian Americans* and 10 Largest Asian American Groups, by Origin, 1990–2012

Group	1990	2000	2012	Growth (Number of Times Larger), 1990–2012	Percentage of Total Population, 2012
Total Asian American	6,908,638	11,070,913	17,817,803	2.6	5.6%
China	1,645,472	2,879,636	4,224,293	2.6	1.3%
Philippines	1,406,770	2,364,815	3,480,437	2.5	1.1%
India	815,447	1,899,599	3,208,387	3.9	1.0%
Vietnam	614,547	1,223,736	1,842,851	3.0	< 1%
Korea	798,849	1,228,427	1,748,287	2.2	< 1%
Japan	847,562	1,148,932	1,320,157	1.6	< 1%
Pakistan	N/A	204,309	401,707	—	< 1%
Cambodia	147,411	206,052	310,964	2.1	< 1%
Hmong**	90,082	186,310	263,072	2.9	< 1%
Laos	149,014	198,203	249,108	1.7	< 1%
Percentage of U.S. Population	2.8%	3.9%	5.6%		
Total U.S. Population	248,710,000	281,422,000	311,609,369	1.2	

Source: For data for 1990, U.S. Census Bureau (1990); 2000, U.S. Census Bureau (2000b); 2012, U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).


*Asian Americans, alone and in combination with other groups.

**The Hmong come from various Southeast Asian nations, including Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand.

foreign-born members. The vast majority of Asian Americans (88%) are either immigrants or their second-generation children (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 23).

We pointed out in Chapter 7 that most Hispanic Americans identify themselves in terms of their family's country of origin, and the same is true of Asian Americans. According to a recent survey, about 62% describe themselves in terms of their country of origin, about 20% describe themselves as "Asian American," and 14% describe themselves as just "American." There are large differences in self-description by nativity: Almost 70% of the foreign-born (vs. 43% of the native-born) describe themselves in terms of the country of their family's origin (Pew Research Center, 2013, pp. 88–89).

Figure 8.1 Ten Largest Asian American Groups, 2012



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).


Origins and Cultures

Asian Americans bring a wealth of traditions to the United States. They speak many different languages and practice religions as diverse as Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity. Asian cultures predate the founding of the United States by centuries. Although no two of these cultures are the same, they share some general similarities. These cultural traits have shaped the behavior of Asian Americans, as well as the perceptions of members of the dominant group, and compose part of the foundation on which Asian American experiences have been built.

Asian cultures tend to stress group membership over individual self-interest. For example, Confucianism, which was the dominant ethical and moral system in traditional China and had a powerful influence on many other Asian cultures, counsels people to see themselves as elements in larger social systems and status hierarchies. Confucianism emphasizes loyalty to the group, conformity to societal expectations, and respect for one's superiors.

In traditional China, as in other Asian societies, the business of everyday life was organized around kinship relations, and most interpersonal relations were with family members and other relatives (Lyman, 1974, p. 9). The family or the clan often owned the

Figure 8.2 Percentage Foreign-Born for Total Population, All Asian Americans, and Ten Largest Asian American Groups, 2012



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

land on which all depended for survival, and kinship ties determined inheritance patterns. The clan also performed a number of crucial social functions, including arranging marriages, settling disputes between individuals, and organizing festivals and holidays.

Asian cultures stress sensitivity to the opinions and judgments of others and the importance of avoiding public embarrassment and not giving offense. Especially when discussing Japanese culture, these cultural tendencies are often contrasted with Western practices in terms of "guilt versus shame" and the nature of personal morality (Benedict, 1946). In Western cultures, individuals are encouraged to develop and abide by a conscience, or an inner moral voice, and behavior is guided by one's personal sense of guilt. In contrast, Asian cultures stress the importance of maintaining the respect and good opinion of others and avoiding shame and public humiliation. Group harmony, or *wa* in Japanese, is a central concern, and displays of individualism are discouraged. These characteristics are reflected in the Japanese proverb, "The nail that sticks up must be hammered down" (Whiting, 1990, p. 70). Asian cultures emphasize proper behavior, conformity to convention and the judgments of others, and avoiding embarrassment and personal confrontations ("saving face").

A possible manifestation of this tendency to seek harmony and avoid confrontation was documented by Chou and Feagin (2008) in interviews with Asian Americans from a variety of groups. They found that their subjects commonly used "compliant conformity" to cope with white racism, discrimination, and rejection (p. 222). Their respondents often expressed the belief that their conformity and hard work would result in recognition and acceptance in the larger society. The parents of the respondents, even those who had experienced substantial discrimination, commonly pressured their children to conform to white expectations and Anglo values in the hope that their success (e.g., in school) would protect them from negative treatment and stereotyping. Chou and Feagin suggest that this strategy has had limited success (at best) and that, ultimately, it sustains white prejudicial values and the conventional racial hierarchy in U.S. society by complying with rather than challenging racism (p. 222).

Traditional Asian cultures were dominated by men, and women were in subordinate roles. A Chinese woman was expected to serve first her father, then her husband, and, if widowed, her eldest son. Confucianism decreed that women should observe the Four Virtues: chastity and obedience, shyness, a pleasing demeanor, and skill in the performance of domestic duties (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, p. 200). Women of high status in traditional China (around the 10th or 11th century) symbolized their subordination by binding their feet. This painful, crippling practice began in early childhood (usually between the ages of 4 and 10) and required girls to wrap their feet tightly to keep them artificially small. The bones in the arch were broken so that the toes could be bent under the foot, further decreasing the size of the foot. Bound feet were considered beautiful, but they were intended to prevent girls and women from "wandering away" from domestic and household duties (Jackson, 2000; Takaki, 1993, pp. 209–210) by immobilizing them.

The experiences of Asian Americans in the United States modified these patriarchal values and traditional traits. For the groups with longer histories in U.S. society, such as Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans, the effects of these values on individual personality may be slight, but for more recently arrived groups, the effects can be more powerful.

The cultural and religious differences among the Asian American groups also reflect the recent histories of each of the sending nations. For example, Vietnam was a Chinese colony for 1,000 years, but for much of the past century it was a French colony. Although Vietnamese culture has been heavily influenced by China, many Vietnamese are Catholic, a result of the efforts of the French to convert them. The Philippines and India were also colonized by Western nations—the former by Spain and then by the United States, and the latter by Great Britain. As a result, many Filipinos are Catholic, and many Asian Indian immigrants speak English and are familiar with Anglo culture.

These examples are the merest suggestion of the diversity of these groups. In fact, Asian Americans, who share little more than a slight physical resemblance and some broad cultural similarities, are much more diverse than Hispanic Americans, who are overwhelmingly Catholic and share a common language and a historical connection with Spain (Min, 1995, p. 25).

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

1. What are some of the key differences between Asian and Anglo cultures? How have these differences shaped relations between the groups?
2. Which group is the most diverse: African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic Americans, or Asian Americans? Explain. Given the levels of diversity, does it make sense to discuss each of these groups as a single entity? Why or why not?

Contact Situations and the Development of the Chinese American and Japanese American Communities

The earliest Asian groups to arrive in substantial numbers were from China and Japan. Their contact situations not only shaped their own histories but also affected the present situation of all Asian Americans in many ways. As we will see, the contact situations for both Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans featured massive rejection and discrimination. Both groups adapted to the racism of the larger society by forming enclaves, a strategy that eventually produced some major benefits for their descendants.

Chinese Americans

Early Immigration and the Anti-Chinese Campaign. Immigrants from China to the United States began to arrive in the early 1800s and were generally motivated by the same kinds of social and economic forces that have inspired immigration everywhere for the past two centuries. Chinese immigrants were "pushed" to leave their homeland by the disruption of traditional social relations caused by the colonization of much of China by more industrialized European nations and by rapid population growth (Chan, 1990; Lyman, 1974; Tsai, 1986). At the same time, these immigrants were "pulled" to the West Coast of the United States by the Gold Rush of 1849 and by other opportunities created by the development of the West.

The Noel hypothesis (see Chapter 3) provides a useful way to analyze the contact situation that developed between Chinese and Anglo Americans in the mid-19th century. As you recall, Noel argues that racial or ethnic stratification will result when a contact situation is characterized by three conditions: ethnocentrism, competition, and a differential in power. Once all three conditions were met on the West Coast, a vigorous campaign against the Chinese began, and the group was pushed into a subordinate, disadvantaged position.

Ethnocentrism based on racial, cultural, and language differences was present from the beginning, but at first, competition for jobs between Chinese immigrants and native-born workers was muted by a robust, rapidly growing economy and an abundance of jobs. At first, politicians, newspaper editorial writers, and business leaders praised the Chinese for their industriousness and tirelessness (Tsai, 1986, p. 17).

Before long, however, the economic boom slowed and the supply of jobs began to dry up. The Gold Rush petered out, and the transcontinental railroad, which thousands of Chinese workers had helped build, was completed in 1869. The migration of Anglo Americans from the East continued, and competition for jobs and other resources increased. An anti-Chinese campaign of harassment, discrimination, and violent attacks began. In 1871, in Los Angeles, a mob of "several hundred whites shot, hanged, and stabbed 19 Chinese to death" (Tsai, 1986, p. 67). Other attacks against the Chinese occurred in Denver, Seattle, Tacoma, and Rock Springs, Wyoming (Lyman, 1974, p. 77).

As the West Coast economy changed, the Chinese came to be seen as a threat, and elements of the dominant group tried to limit competition. The Chinese were a small group—there were only about 100,000 in the entire country in 1870—and by law, they were not permitted to become citizens. Hence, they controlled few power resources with which to withstand these attacks. During the 1870s, Chinese workers were forced out of most sectors of the mainstream economy, and in 1882, the anti-Chinese campaign experienced its ultimate triumph when the U.S. Congress passed the **Chinese Exclusion Act**, banning virtually all immigration from China. The act was one of the first restrictive immigration laws and was aimed solely at the Chinese. It established a rigid competitive relationship between the groups (see Chapter 4) and eliminated the threat presented by Chinese labor by excluding the Chinese people from American society.

Consistent with the predictions of split labor market theory (see Chapter 3), the primary antagonists of Chinese immigrants were native-born workers and organized labor. White owners of small businesses, feeling threatened by Chinese-owned businesses, also supported passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act (Boswell, 1986). Other social classes, such as the capitalists who owned larger factories, might actually have benefited from the continued supply of cheaper labor created by immigration from China. Conflicts such as the anti-Chinese campaign could be especially intense because they confounded racial and ethnic antagonisms with disputes between different social classes.

The ban on immigration from China remained in effect until World War II, when China was awarded a yearly quota of 105 immigrants in recognition of its wartime alliance with the United States. Large-scale immigration from China did not resume until federal policy was revised in 1965.


Population Trends and the "Delayed" Second Generation. Following the Chinese Exclusion Act, the number of Chinese in the United States actually declined (see Figure 8.3), as some immigrants passed away or returned to China and were not replaced by newcomers. The huge majority of Chinese immigrants in the 19th century had been young adult men sojourners who intended to work hard, save money, and return to their home villages in China (Chan, 1990, p. 66). After 1882, it was difficult for anyone from China, men or women, to enter the United States, and the Chinese community in the United States remained dominated by men for many decades. At the end of the 19th century, for example, men outnumbered women by

more than 25 to 1, and the gender ratio did not approach parity for decades (Wong, 1995, p. 64; see also Ling, 2000). The scarcity of Chinese women in the United States delayed the second generation (the first generation born in the United States). It wasn't until the 1920s, 80 years after immigration began, that as many as one third of all Chinese in the United States were native-born (Wong, 1995, p. 64).

The delayed second generation may have reinforced the exclusion of the Chinese American community, which began as a reaction to the overt discrimination of the dominant group (Chan, 1990, p. 66). The children of immigrants are usually much more acculturated, and their language facility and greater familiarity with the larger society often permit them to represent the group and speak for it more effectively. In the case of Chinese Americans (and other Asian groups), members of the second generation were citizens of the United States by birth, a status from which the immigrants were barred, and they had legal and political rights not available to their parents. Thus, the decades-long absence of a more Americanized, English-speaking generation increased the isolation of Chinese Americans.

The Ethnic Enclave. The Chinese became increasingly urbanized as the anti-Chinese campaign and rising racism took their toll. Forced out of towns and smaller cities, they settled in larger urban areas, especially San Francisco, which offered the safety of urban anonymity as well as ethnic neighborhoods where the old ways could be practiced and contact with Anglo society minimized. Chinatowns had existed since the start of the

Figure 8.3 Population Growth for Chinese and Japanese Americans, 1850–2012



Sources: Hoeffel, Rastogi, Kim, & Shahid (2012, p.4); Kitano (1980, p.562); Lee (1998, p.15)

immigration, and they now took on added significance as safe havens from the storm of anti-Chinese venom. The Chinese withdrew to these neighborhoods and became an "invisible minority" (Tsai, 1986, p. 67).

These early Chinatowns were ethnic enclaves like those founded by Jews on the East Coast and the more recently founded Cuban community in Miami, and a similar process formed them. The earliest urban Chinese included merchants and skilled artisans who, like the early wave of Cuban immigrants, were experienced in commerce (Chan, 1990, p. 44). They established businesses and retail stores that were typically small in scope and modest in profits. As the number of urban Chinese increased, the market for these enterprises became larger and more spatially concentrated. New services were required, the size of the cheap labor pool available to Chinese merchants and entrepreneurs increased, and the Chinatowns became the economic, cultural, and social centers of the community.

Within the Chinatowns, elaborate social structures developed that mirrored traditional China in many ways. The enforced segregation of the Chinese in America helped preserve much of the traditional food, dress, language, values, and religions of their homeland from the pressures of Americanization. The social structure was based on a variety of types of organizations, including family and clan groups and ***huiguan***, or associations based on the region or district in China from which the immigrant had come. These organizations performed various, often overlapping, social and welfare services, including settling disputes, aiding new arrivals from their regions, and facilitating the development of mutual aid networks (Lai, 1980, p. 221; Lyman, 1974, pp. 32–37,116–118).

Life was not always peaceful in Chinatown, and there were numerous disputes over control of resources and the organizational infrastructure. In particular, secret societies called ***tongs*** contested the control and leadership of the merchant-led *huiguan* and the clan associations. These sometimes bloody conflicts were sensationalized in the American press as "Tong Wars," and they contributed to the popular stereotypes of Asians as exotic, mysterious, and dangerous (Lai, 1980, p. 222; Lyman, 1974, pp. 37–50).

Despite these internal conflicts, American Chinatowns evolved into highly organized, largely self-contained communities, complete with their own leadership and decision-making structures. The internal "city government" of Chinatown was the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA). Dominated by the larger *huiguan* and clans, the CCBA coordinated and supplemented the activities of the various organizations and represented the interests of the community to the larger society.

The local CCBAs, along with other organizations, also attempted to combat the anti-Chinese campaign, speaking out against racial discrimination and filing numerous lawsuits to contest racist legislation (Lai, 1980, p. 223). The effectiveness of the protest efforts was handicapped by the lack of resources in the Chinese community and the fact that Chinese immigrants could not become citizens. Attempts were made to mobilize international pressure to protest the treatment of the Chinese in the United States. At the time, however, China was itself colonized and dominated by other nations (including the United States). The country was further weakened by

internal turmoil and could mount no effective assistance for its citizens in the United States (Chan, 1990, p. 62).

Survival and Development. The Chinese American community survived despite the widespread poverty, discrimination, and pressures created by the unbalanced sex ratio. Members of the group began to seek opportunities in other regions, and Chinatowns appeared and grew in New York, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, and many other cities.

The patterns of exclusion and discrimination that began during the 19th-century anti-Chinese campaign were common throughout the nation and continued well into the 20th century. Chinese Americans responded by finding economic opportunity in areas where dominant group competition for jobs was weak, continuing their tendency to be an "invisible" minority group. Very often, they started small businesses that either served other members of their own group (e.g., restaurants) or relied on the patronage of the general public (e.g., laundries). The jobs provided by these small businesses were the economic lifeblood of the community but were limited in the amount of income and wealth they could generate. Until recent decades, for example, most restaurants served primarily other Chinese, especially single men. Since their primary clientele was poor, the profit potential of these businesses was sharply limited. Laundries served the more affluent dominant group, but the returns from this enterprise declined as washers and dryers became increasingly present in homes throughout the nation. The population of Chinatown was generally too small to sustain more than these two primary commercial enterprises (Zhou, 1992, pp. 92–94).

As the decades passed, the enclave economy and the complex subsociety of Chinatown evolved. However, discrimination, combined with defensive self-segregation, ensured the continuation of poverty, limited job opportunities, and substandard housing. Relatively hidden from general view, Chinatown became the world in which the second generation grew to adulthood.

The Second Generation. Whereas the immigrant generation generally retained its native language and customs, the second generation was much more influenced by the dominant culture. The institutional and organizational structures of Chinatown were created to serve the older, mostly male immigrant generation, but younger Chinese Americans tended to look beyond the enclave to fill their needs. They came in contact with the larger society through schools, churches, and voluntary organizations such as the YMCA and YWCA.

They abandoned many traditional customs and were less loyal to and interested in the clan and regional associations that the immigrant generation had constructed. They founded organizations of their own that were more compatible with their Americanized lifestyles (Lai, 1980, p. 225).

As it was for other minority groups, World War II was an important watershed for Chinese Americans. During the war, job opportunities outside the enclave increased, and after the war, many of the 8,000 Chinese Americans who had served in the armed forces were able to take advantage of the GI Bill to further their education (Lai, 1980, p. 226). In the 1940s and 1950s, many second-generation Chinese Americans moved

out of the enclave, away from the traditional neighborhoods, and pursued careers in the larger society. This group was mobile and "Americanized," and with educational credentials comparable to those of the general population, they were prepared to seek success outside Chinatown.

In another departure from tradition, the women of the second generation pursued education, also. As early as 1960, median years of schooling for Chinese American women were slightly higher than for Chinese American men (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, p. 48). Additionally, Chinese American women became more diverse in their occupational profile as the century progressed. In 1900, three quarters of all employed Chinese American women worked in manufacturing (usually in garment industry sweatshops or in canning factories) or in domestic work. By 1960, less than 2% were in domestic work, 32% were in clerical occupations, and 18% held professional jobs, often as teachers (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, pp. 209–211).

The men and women of the second generation achieved considerable educational and occupational success, and helped establish the idea that Chinese Americans are a "model minority." A closer examination reveals, however, that the old traditions of anti-Chinese discrimination and prejudice continued to limit the life chances of even the best-educated members of this generation. Second-generation Chinese Americans earned less, on the average, and had less-favorable occupational profiles than did comparably educated white Americans, a gap between qualifications and rewards that reflects persistent discrimination. Kitano and Daniels (1995, p. 50) conclude, for example, that although well-educated Chinese Americans could find good jobs in the mainstream economy, the highest, most lucrative positions—and those that required direct supervision of whites—were still closed to them (see also Hirschman & Wong, 1984).

Furthermore, many Chinese Americans, including many of those who stayed in the Chinatowns to operate the enclave economy and the immigrants who began arriving after 1965, do not fit the image of success at all. A large percentage of these Chinese Americans face many of the same problems as do members of colonized, excluded, exploited minority groups of color. For survival, they rely on low-wage jobs in the garment industry, the service sector, and the small businesses of the enclave economy, and they are beset by poverty and powerlessness, much like the urban underclass segments of other groups.

Thus, Chinese Americans can be found at both ends of the spectrum of success and affluence, and the group is often said to be "bipolar" in its occupational structure (see Barringer, Takeuchi, & Levin, 1995; Min, 2006; Takaki, 1993, pp. 415–416; Wong, 1995, pp. 77–78; Zhou & Logan, 1989). Although a high percentage of Chinese Americans are found in more desirable occupations—sustaining the idea of Asian success—others, less visible, are concentrated at the lowest levels of society. Later in this chapter, we will again consider the socioeconomic status of Chinese Americans and the accuracy of the image of success and affluence.

Japanese Americans

Immigration from Japan began to increase shortly after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 took effect, in part, to fill the gap in the labor supply created by the restrictive

legislation (Kitano, 1980). The 1880 census counted only a few hundred Japanese in the United States, but the group increased rapidly over the next few decades. By 1910, the Japanese in the United States outnumbered the Chinese, and they remained the larger of the two groups until large-scale immigration resumed in the 1960s (see Figure 8.3).

The Anti-Japanese Campaign. The contact situation for Japanese immigrants resembled that of the Chinese. They immigrated to the same West Coast regions as the Chinese, entered the labor force in a similar position, and were a small group with few power resources. Predictably, the feelings and emotions generated by the anti-Chinese campaign transferred to them. By the early 1900s, an anti-Japanese campaign to limit competition was in full swing. Efforts were being made to establish a rigid competitive system of group relations and to exclude Japanese immigrants in the same way the Chinese had been barred (Kitano, 1980, p. 563; Kitano & Daniels, 1995, pp. 59–60; Petersen, 1971, pp. 30–55).

Japanese immigration was partly curtailed in 1907 when a "gentlemen's agreement" was signed between Japan and the United States limiting the number of laborers Japan would allow to immigrate (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, p. 59). This policy remained in effect until the United States changed its immigration policy in the 1920s and barred immigration from Japan completely. The end of Japanese immigration is largely responsible for the slow growth of the Japanese American population displayed in Figure 8.3.

Most Japanese immigrants, like the Chinese, were young men laborers who planned to return eventually to their homeland or bring their wives after they were established in their new country (Duleep, 1988, p. 24). The agreement of 1907 curtailed the immigration of men, but because of a loophole, women were able to continue immigrating until the 1920s. Thus, Japanese Americans were able to maintain a relatively balanced gender ratio, marry, and begin families, and a second generation of Japanese Americans began to appear without much delay. Native-born Japanese Americans numbered about half of the group by 1930 and were a majority of 63% on the eve of World War II (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, p. 59).

The anti-Japanese movement also attempted to dislodge the group from agriculture. Many Japanese immigrants were skilled agriculturists, and farming proved to be their most promising avenue for advancement (Kitano, 1980, p. 563). In 1910, between 30% and 40% of all Japanese in California were engaged in agriculture; from 1900 to 1909, the number of independent Japanese farmers increased from fewer than 50 to about 6,000 (Jibou, 1988, p. 358).

Most of these immigrant farmers owned small plots of land, and they made up only a minuscule percentage of West Coast farmers (Jibou, 1988, pp. 357–358). Nonetheless, their presence and relative success did not go unnoticed and eventually stimulated discriminatory legislation, most notably the **Alien Land Act**, passed by the California legislature in 1913 (Kitano, 1980, p. 563). This bill made aliens who were ineligible for citizenship (essentially only immigrants from Asia) also ineligible to own land. The Act did not achieve its goal of dislodging the Japanese from the rural economy. They were able to dodge the discriminatory legislation through various devices,

mostly by putting titles of land in the names of their American-born children, who were citizens by law (Jibou, 1988, p. 359).

The Alien Land Act was one part of a sustained campaign against the Japanese in the United States. In the early decades of this century, the Japanese were politically disenfranchised and segregated from dominant group institutions in schools and residential areas. They were discriminated against in movie houses, swimming pools, and other public facilities (Kitano & Daniels, 1988, p. 56). The Japanese were excluded from the mainstream economy and confined to a limited range of poorly paid occupations (see Yamato, 1994). Thus, there were strong elements of systematic discrimination, exclusion, and colonization in their overall relationship with the larger society.

The Ethnic Enclave. Spurned and disparaged by the larger society, the Japanese, like the Chinese, constructed a separate subsociety. The immigrant generation, called Issei (from the Japanese word ichi, meaning "one"), established an enclave in agriculture and related enterprises, a rural counterpart of the urban enclaves constructed by other groups we have examined.

By World War II, the Issei had come to dominate a narrow but important segment of agriculture on the West Coast, especially in California. Although the Issei were never more than 2% of the total population of California, Japanese American–owned farms produced as much as 30% to 40% of various fruits and vegetables grown in that state. As late as 1940, more than 40% of the Japanese American population was involved directly in farming, and many more were dependent on the economic activity stimulated by agriculture, including the marketing of their produce (Jibou, 1988, pp. 359–360). Other Issei lived in urban areas, where they were concentrated in a narrow range of businesses and services, such as domestic service and gardening, some of which catered to other Issei and some of which served the dominant group (Jibou, 1988, p. 362).

Japanese Americans in both the rural and urban sectors maximized their economic clout by doing business with other Japanese–owned firms as often as possible. Gardeners and farmers purchased supplies at Japanese–owned firms, farmers used other members of the group to haul their produce to market, and businesspeople relied on one another and mutual credit associations, rather than dominant group banks, for financial services. These networks helped the enclave economy to grow and also permitted the Japanese to avoid the hostility and racism of the larger society. However, these very same patterns helped sustain the stereotypes that depicted the Japanese as clannish and unassimilable. In the years before World War II, the Japanese American community was largely dependent for survival on their networks of cooperation and mutual assistance, not on Americanization and integration.

The Second Generation (Nisei). In the 1920s and 1930s, anti-Asian feelings continued to run high, and Japanese Americans continued to be excluded and discriminated against despite (or perhaps because of) their relative success. Unable to find acceptance in Anglo society, the second generation, called Nisei, established clubs, athletic leagues, churches, and a multitude of other social and recreational organizations within their

own communities (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, p. 63). These organizations reflected the high levels of Americanization of the Nisei and expressed values and interests quite compatible with those of the dominant culture. For example, the most influential Nisei organization was the Japanese American Citizens League, whose creed expressed an ardent patriotism that was to be sorely tested: "I am proud that I am an American citizen. . . . I believe in [American] institutions, ideas and traditions; I glory in her heritage; I boast of her history, I trust in her future" (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, p. 64).

Although the Nisei enjoyed high levels of success in school, the intense discrimination and racism of the 1930s prevented most of them from translating their educational achievements into better jobs and higher salaries. Many occupations in the mainstream economy were closed to even the best-educated Japanese Americans, and anti-Asian prejudice and discrimination did not diminish during the hard times and high unemployment of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Many Nisei were forced to remain within the enclave, and in many cases jobs in the produce stands and retail shops of their parents were all they could find. Their demoralization and anger over their exclusion were eventually swamped by the larger events of World War II.

The Relocation Camps. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, killing almost 2,500 Americans. President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war the next day. The preparations for war stirred up a wide range of fears and anxieties among the American public, including concerns about the loyalty of Japanese Americans. Decades of exclusion and anti-Japanese prejudice had conditioned members of the dominant society to see Japanese Americans as sinister, clannish, cruel, unalterably foreign, and racially inferior. Fueled by the ferocity of the war itself and fears about a Japanese invasion of the mainland, the tradition of anti-Japanese racism laid the groundwork for a massive violation of civil rights.

Two months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which led to the relocation of Japanese Americans living on the West Coast. By the late summer of 1942, more than 110,000 Japanese Americans, young and old, men and women—virtually the entire West Coast population—had been forcibly transported to **relocation camps**, where they were imprisoned behind barbed-wire fences patrolled by armed guards. The majority of these people were American citizens, yet no attempt was made to distinguish between the citizens and the noncitizens. No trials were held, and no one was given the opportunity to refute the implicit charge of disloyalty.

The U.S. government gave families little notice to prepare for evacuation and secure their homes, businesses, and belongings. They were allowed to bring only what they could carry, and had to abandon many of their possessions. Businesspeople sold their establishments and farmers sold their land at panic sale prices. Others locked up their stores and houses and walked away, hoping that the evacuation would be short-lived and their possessions undisturbed.

The internment lasted for nearly three and half years, nearly the entire war. At first, Japanese Americans were not permitted to serve in the armed forces, but eventually more than 25,000 escaped the camps by volunteering for military service. Nearly

all of them served in segregated units or doing intelligence work with combat units in the Pacific Ocean. Two all-Japanese American combat units served in Europe and became the most decorated units in American military history (Kitano, 1980, p. 567). Other Japanese Americans were able to get out of the camps by different means. Some, for example, agreed to move to militarily nonsensitive areas far away from the West Coast (and their former homes). Still, about half of the original internees remained when the camps closed at the end of the war (Kitano & Daniels, 1988, p. 64).

The strain of living in the camps affected Japanese Americans in a variety of ways. Lack of activities and privacy, overcrowding, boredom, and monotony were all common complaints. The camps disrupted the traditional forms of family life, as people had to adapt to living in crowded barracks and dining in mess halls. Conflicts flared between people who counseled caution or temperate reactions to their incarceration and those who wanted to protest in more vigorous ways. Many of those who advised moderation were Nisei intent on proving their loyalty by cooperating with the camp administration.

Despite the injustice and dislocations of the incarceration, the camps did reduce the extent to which women were relegated to a subordinate role. Like Chinese women, Japanese women were expected to devote themselves to the care of the men of their family. In Japan, for example, education for women was not intended to challenge their intellect so much as to make them better wives and mothers. In the camps, however, pay for the few jobs available was the same for both men and women, and the mess halls and small living quarters freed women from some of the burden of housework. Many took advantage of the free time to take classes to learn more English and other skills. The younger women were able to meet young men on their own, weakening the tradition of family controlled, arranged marriages (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, pp. 225–229).

Some Japanese Americans protested the incarceration from the start and brought lawsuits to end the relocation program. Finally, in 1944 the Supreme Court ruled that detention was unconstitutional. As the camps closed, some Japanese American individuals and organizations began to seek compensation and redress for the economic losses the group had suffered. In 1948, Congress passed legislation to authorize compensation to Japanese Americans. About 26,500 people filed claims under this legislation. These claims were eventually settled for a total of about $38 million—less than one-tenth of the actual economic losses. Demand for meaningful redress and compensation continued, and in 1988 Congress passed a bill granting reparations of about $20,000 in cash to each of the 60,000 living survivors of the camps. The law also acknowledged that the relocation program had been a grave injustice to Japanese Americans (Biskupic, 1989, p. 2879).

The World War II relocation devastated the Japanese American community and left it with few material resources. The emotional and psychological damage inflicted by this experience is incalculable. The fact that today, only seven decades later, the performance of Japanese Americans is equal or superior to national averages on measures of educational achievement, occupational prestige, and income is one of the more dramatic transformations in minority group history.

Japanese Americans After World War II. In 1945, Japanese Americans faced a world very different from the one they had left in 1942. To escape the camps, nearly half the group had scattered throughout the country and lived everywhere but on the West Coast. As Japanese Americans attempted to move back to their former homes, they found their fields untended, their stores vandalized, their possessions lost or stolen, and their lives shattered. In some cases, there was simply no Japanese neighborhood to return to; the Little Tokyo area of San Francisco, for example, was now inhabited by African Americans who had moved to the West Coast to take jobs in the defense industry (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, p. 231).

Japanese Americans themselves had changed as well. In the camps, the Issei had lost power to the Nisei. The English-speaking second generation had dealt with the camp administrators and held the leadership positions. Many Nisei had left the camps to serve in the armed forces or to find work in other areas of the country. For virtually every American minority group, the war brought new experiences and a broader sense of themselves, the nation, and the world. A similar transformation occurred for the Nisei. When the war ended, they were unwilling to rebuild the Japanese community as it had been before.

Like second-generation Chinese Americans, the Nisei had a strong record of success in school, and they also took advantage of the GI Bill to further their education. When anti-Asian prejudice began to decline in the 1950s and the job market began to open, the Nisei were educationally prepared to take advantage of the resultant opportunities (Kitano, 1980, p. 567).

The Issei-dominated enclave economy did not reappear after the war. One indicator of the shift away from an enclave economy was the fact that the percentage of Japanese American women in California who worked as unpaid family laborers (i.e., worked in family-run businesses for no salary) declined from 21% in 1940 to 7% in 1950 (Amott & Matthaei, 1991, p. 231). Also, between 1940 and 1990, the percentage of the group employed in agriculture declined from about 50% to 3%, and the percentage employed in personal services fell from 25% to 5% (Nishi, 1995, p. 116).

By 1960, Japanese Americans had an occupational profile very similar to that of whites except that they were actually overrepresented among professionals. Many were employed in the primary economy, not in the ethnic enclave, but there was a tendency to choose "safe" careers (e.g., in engineering, optometry, pharmacy, and accounting) that did not require extensive contact with the public or supervision by whites (Kitano & Daniels, 1988, p. 70).

Within these limitations, the Nisei, their children (**Sansei**), and their grandchildren (**Yonsei**) have enjoyed relatively high status, and their upward mobility and prosperity have contributed to the perception that Asian Americans are a "model minority group." An additional factor contributing to the high status of Japanese Americans (and to the disappearance of Little Tokyos) is that unlike the Chinese American community, the Japanese American community has had few new immigrants, and the community has not had to devote many resources to newcomers. Furthermore, recent immigrants from Japan tend to be highly educated professionals whose socioeconomic characteristics add to the perception of success and affluence.

The Sansei and Yonsei are highly integrated into the occupational structure of the larger society. Compared with their parents, their connections with their ethnic past are more tenuous, and in their values, beliefs, and personal goals, they resemble dominant group members of similar age and social class (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, pp. 79–81; also see Spickard, 1996).

COMPARATIVE FOCUS: Japan's "Invisible" Minority

By the definition stated in Chapter 1, two of the most important characteristics of minority groups are that they (1) are the objects of a pattern of disadvantage and (2) are easily identifiable, either culturally or physically. These two traits work in tandem: Members of the dominant group must be able to determine a person's group membership quickly and easily so the discrimination that is the hallmark of minority-group status can be practiced.

Visibility is such an obvious precondition for discrimination that it almost seems unnecessary to state it. However, every generalization seems to have an exception, and the members of at least one minority group, the Burakumin of Japan, have been victimized by discrimination and prejudice for hundreds of years but are virtually indistinguishable from the general population. How could such an "invisible" minority come into being? How could the disadvantaged status be maintained through time?

The Burakumin were created centuries ago, when Japan was organized into a caste system (see Chapter 3) based on occupation. The ancestors of today's Burakumin did work that brought them into contact with death (e.g., as gravediggers) or required them to handle meat products (e.g., as butchers). These occupations were regarded as very low in status, "unclean," or polluted.

The Burakumin were required to live in separate villages and to wear identifying leather patches (thus raising their social visibility). They were forbidden to marry outside their caste, and any member of the general population who touched a member of the Burakumin had to be ritually purified or cleansed of pollution (Lamont-Brown, 1993, p. 137).

The caste system was officially abolished in the 19th century, at about the time Japan began to industrialize, and most observers today agree that the overall situation of the Burakumin has improved (Ball, 2009). But the Burakumin maintain their minority status, and prejudice against them continues (Neary, 2003, p. 288).

The Burakumin are a small group, about 2% or 3% of Japan's population. About 1 million still live in traditional villages, and another 2 million or so live in non-Burakumin areas, mostly in larger cities. They continue to be seen as "filthy," "not very bright," and "untrustworthy"—stereotypical traits often associated with minority groups mired in

Comparing Minority Groups

What factors account for the differences in the development of Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans and other racial minority groups? First, the dominant group had no desire to control the labor of these groups, as it had desired to control African Americans in the 1600s and Mexican Americans in the 1800s. The contact situation featured economic competition (e.g., for jobs) during an era of rigid competition between groups (see Table 4.2), and Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans were seen as a threat to security that needed to be eliminated, not as a labor pool that needed to be controlled.

Second, unlike American Indians, Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans in the early 20th century presented no military danger to the larger society; so, there was little concern with their activities once the economic threat had been eliminated. Third, Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans had the ingredients and experiences necessary to form enclaves. The groups were allowed to "disappear," but unlike other racial minority groups, the urban location of their enclaves left them with opportunities for starting small businesses and providing an education for the second and later generations. As many scholars argue, the particular mode of incorporation developed by Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans is the key to understanding the present status of these groups.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

6. What forces shaped the immigration of Chinese and Japanese Americans? Compare and contrast these patterns with those of Hispanic immigration and immigration from Europe between 1820 and 1920. What are the key differences and similarities?
7. Compare and contrast the development of the Chinese American community with the development of the Japanese American community. What are the most important differences and similarities? What accounts for these patterns? Did both groups form enclaves? Why and how?
8. Are Japanese and Chinese Americans colonized or immigrant groups? Why or why not?

Contemporary Immigration From Asia


Figure 8.4 displays the volume of immigration from Asia since 1900. The solid line represents the number of immigrants (read these values from the left vertical axis) and shows the decline in rates after the restrictive legislation of the 1920s—almost to zero—and the steep increases following the change in U.S. immigration policy in the mid-1960s. Immigration from Asia has steadily increased in volume since the 1960s and continued to increase even as the flow of immigrants from Hispanic nations has declined. Starting in 2009, Asia became the largest supplier of immigrants to the United States.

The dotted line shows the percentage of all immigrants in each time period that came from Asia. This line (read from the right vertical axis) shows that Asian immigration was rare—less than 5% of all immigrants—until the mid-1960s. The percentage increased until the 1980s and then declined in the 1990s as the volume of immigration from Mexico and Central and South America exploded. The percentage is now almost 40%, a reflection of the continued flow from Asia and the declining flow of Hispanic groups.

Figure 8.5 shows that Asian immigration since the 1950s has been heaviest from China, India, and the Philippines but that Korea and Vietnam have also made sizable contributions. As noted previously, immigration from Japan has been relatively low since the initial influx a century ago (see Figure 8.3).


As is the case with Hispanic immigrants, the sending nations (other than Japan) are less developed than the United States, and the primary motivation for most of these immigrants is economic. However, unlike Hispanic immigration, the Asian immigrant

Figure 8.4 Immigration From Asia, 1900–2013



Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2014).

Figure 8.5 Relative Size of Immigrant Groups From Asia, 1950–2013



Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2014).

stream also includes a large contingent of highly educated professionals seeking opportunities to practice their careers and expand their skills.

These more elite immigrants contribute to the image of "Asian success," but many Asian immigrants are less skilled and educated, and often undocumented. Thus, this stream of immigrants includes a healthy representation of people from both the top and the bottom of the occupational and educational hierarchies.

Of course, other factors besides economics attract these immigrants. The United States has maintained military bases throughout the region (including South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) since the end of World War II, and many Asian immigrants are the spouses of American military personnel.

Also, U.S. involvement in the war in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s created interpersonal ties and governmental programs that drew refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, many of whom lived in camps and relocation centers for years before immigrating to the United States. Because of the conditions of their escape from their homelands, they typically bring little in the way of human or material capital.

Among the refugee groups are the Hmong, hill people from Laos and other Southeast Asian nations who fought with the American forces in the Vietnam War. They are relatively small in number (see Table 8.1) and face some unique challenges in their adjustment to U.S. society. Their culture is very traditional and, in many ways, far removed from the modernized, Western world in which they find themselves.

Prior to the Vietnam War, the Hmong were at the hunter-gatherer level of subsistence technology and brought very little social and cultural capital with them. Anthropologist Anne Fadiman illustrates the complex challenges the Hmong face in acculturating to the United States in her 1998 account of an epileptic Hmong girl, Lia Lee. According to traditional Hmong cultural understandings, illness is caused by spirits and needs to be treated in the time-honored way, by traditional healers or shamans. The girl's loving parents found it difficult to understand and accept the instructions of Lia's Californian doctors that attempted to treat her with medicine and pills, in part because of linguistic barriers but mainly because of cultural differences. The resultant tragedy illustrates the challenges of acculturation for this group (Fadiman, 1998). Contrary to the stereotypical image of Asian American success, the Hmong generally display a socioeconomic profile more consistent with America's colonized minority groups.

Another striking contrast is between immigrants from India, many of whom are highly educated and skilled, and Vietnamese Americans, who have a socioeconomic profile that more resembles those of non-Asian racial minorities in the United States. Part of the difference between these two groups relates to their contact situations and can be illuminated by applying the Blauner hypothesis. Immigrants from India are at the "immigrant" end of Blauner's continuum. They tend to bring strong educational credentials and to be well equipped to compete for favorable positions in the occupational hierarchy.

The Vietnamese, in contrast, began their American experience as a refugee group fleeing the turmoil of war. Although they do not fit Blauner's "conquered or colonized" category, most Vietnamese Americans had to adapt to American society with few resources and few contacts with an established immigrant community. The consequences of these vastly different contact situations are suggested by the data presented in the figures throughout this chapter. We will address some of these groups in more detail in Chapter 9, too.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

9. Identify the major groups of recent immigrants from Asia. How do they differ from Chinese and Japanese Americans?
10. How did the motivation for immigration vary for the different Asian groups? How have these differences affected their relationship with U.S. society?
11. Are these groups colonized or immigrant groups? Why or why not?

Prejudice and Discrimination

American prejudice against Asians first became prominent during the anti-Chinese movement of the 19th century. The Chinese were believed to be racially inferior, docile, and subservient, but also cruel and crafty, despotic, and threatening (Lai, 1980, p. 220; Lyman, 1974, pp. 55–58). The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was justified by the idea that the Chinese could never fully assimilate into U.S. society. The Chinese were seen as a threat to the working class, to American democracy, and to other American institutions. Many of these stereotypes and fears transferred to the Japanese later in the 19th century and then to other groups as they, in turn, arrived in the United States.

The social distance scores presented in Table 1.2 provide the only long-term record of anti-Asian prejudice in the society as a whole. In 1926, the five Asian groups included in the study ranked in the bottom third of the scale, along with other racial and colonized minority groups. Twenty years later, in 1946, the Japanese had fallen to the bottom of the rankings, and the Chinese had risen seven positions, changes that reflect America's World War II conflict with Japan and alliance with China. This suggests that anti-Chinese prejudice may have softened during the war as distinctions were made between "good" and "bad" Asians. For example, an item published in a December 22, 1941, issue of *Time* magazine, "How to Tell Your Friends From the Japs," provided some tips for identifying "good" Asians: "The Chinese expression is likely to be more placid, kindly, open; the Japanese more positive, dogmatic, arrogant. . . . Japanese are nervous in conversation, laugh loudly at the wrong time."

In more recent decades, the average social distance scores of Asian groups have fallen even though the ranking of the groups has remained relatively stable. The falling scores probably reflect the society-wide increase in tolerance and the shift from blatant prejudice to modern racism that we have discussed previously. However, the relative position of Asians in the American hierarchy of group preferences has remained remarkably consistent since the 1920s. This stability may reflect the cultural or traditional nature of much of the anti-Asian prejudice in America.

Numerous reports document violent attacks and other forms of harassment against Asian Americans, especially recent immigrants. High school and middle school students of Asian descent report that they are stereotyped as "high achieving students who rarely fight back," making them excellent candidates for bullying and scapegoating by other groups (Associated Press, 2005). Harassment at one high school in New York rose to such severe levels that the U.S. Department of Justice intervened at the request of school officials (Associated Press, 2005). Incidents such as these suggest that the tradition of anti-Asian prejudice is close to the surface and could be reactivated under the right combination of competition and threat.

On the other hand, a recent survey suggests that discrimination and prejudice are not perceived as major problems by most Asian Americans. According to the survey, which was administered to a representative sample, only 13% of the Asian Americans interviewed said that discrimination was a "major problem," with results ranging from 24% for Korean Americans to only 8% for Japanese Americans (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 110). Also, only about 20% said they had personally experienced discrimination

because of their Asian origin, and only 10% said they had been called offensive names (p. 114). These levels are far below those of African Americans and Hispanic Americans when asked similar questions. For example, 43% of a representative sample of African Americans said there was "a lot" of discrimination against their group, and 61% of Hispanic Americans said discrimination was a "major problem" for them (p. 115).

What might account for these differences? One possibility is that Asian Americans are downplaying the extent of their negative experiences, in conformity with the cultural tendency to avoid confrontation and stress harmony.

Another possibility is that these reports are accurate and Asian Americans truly experience less discrimination than do other racial minorities. As we discussed in Chapter 7, some analysts argue that Asian Americans (along with lighter-skinned, more affluent Latinos) will become "honorary whites," positioned between whites and blacks (and darker-skinned, less affluent Latinos) in the American racial order. If society is actually evolving in this direction, we would expect Asian Americans to feel somewhat less victimized than blacks and some Hispanic Americans.

A final possibility, closely related to the second, is that Asian Americans benefit from "positive" stereotypes and are seen in a more favorable light than other racial minorities. The perception of Asian Americans as a "model minority"—polite, successful, and deferential—could explain their lower levels of discrimination. As we shall see, the "model minority" image is a stereotype, exaggerated and overstated. For some Asian American groups, the image is simply false. The label has been applied to these groups by the media, politicians, and others. It is not an identity the Asian American groups themselves have developed or advocated—in fact, many virulently oppose it because it obscures many of the problems that exist in Asian American communities. As you might suspect, people who apply this label to Asian Americans have a variety of hidden moral and political agendas, and we will explore these dynamics later in this chapter.

Assimilation and Pluralism

In this section, we continue to assess the situation of Asian Americans today using the same conceptual framework used in the previous three chapters.

Acculturation

The extent of acculturation of Asian Americans is highly variable from group to group. Japanese Americans represent one extreme. They have been a part of American society for more than a century, and the current generations are highly acculturated. Immigration from Japan has been low and has not revitalized the traditional culture or language. As a result, Japanese Americans are the most acculturated of the Asian American groups, as illustrated in Figure 8.6, and have the lowest percentage of members who speak English "less than very well."

Filipino and Indian Americans also have low percentages of members who are not competent English speakers, but for different reasons. The Philippines has had a strong American presence since the Spanish-American War of 1898, whereas India is


a former British colony in which English remains an important language for higher education and of the educated elite.

Chinese Americans, in contrast, are highly variable in their extent of acculturation. Many are members of families who have been American for generations and are highly acculturated. Others, including many recent undocumented immigrants, are newcomers who have little knowledge of English or of Anglo culture. On this dimension, as in occupations, Chinese Americans are "bipolar." This great variability within the group makes it difficult to characterize their overall degree of acculturation.

Also, note that the groups who are refugees from the 1960s and 1970s wars in Southeast Asia (Vietnamese, Cambodians, Hmong, and Laotians) are less acculturated. They, along with the Chinese and Koreans, have many foreign-born members (see Figure 8.2) and are still largely in their first generation.

Gender and Physical Acculturation: The Anglo Ideal. Anglo-conformity can happen on levels other than the cultural. A number of studies document the feelings of inadequacy and negative self-images that often result when minority group members—especially women—compare themselves with the Anglo standards of attractiveness and beauty that dominate U.S. culture.

Figure 8.6 Percentage Who Speak English Less Than "Very Well" for Total Population, All Asian Americans, and Ten Largest Asian American Groups, 2012



Source: U. S. Census Bureau, 2013g.

Some of the studies in this tradition are classics of the social science literature, including the "doll studies" conducted by social psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark in the 1930s and 1940s (Clark & Clark, 1940, 1950). The Clarks showed pairs of white and black dolls to a sample of young African American children and asked them a series of questions, including "Which doll is pretty?" "Which doll is nice?" "Which doll would you like to play with?" and "Which doll is ugly?"

They documented a preference for the white doll, which they interpreted as evidence that the children had internalized white standards of beauty and developed negative self-images as a consequence. Contemporary projects inspired by the Clark doll study include a YouTube video entitled "A Girl Like Me" (2005) by then 17-year-old Kiri Davis[1], and a documentary by comedian Chris Rock entitled *Good Hair* (2009).

Asian American women, like most women in modern U.S. society, are pressured by the cultural message that physical beauty should be among their most important concerns. As racial minorities, they are also subjected to the additional message that they are inadequate by Anglo standards and that some of their most characteristic physical traits (e.g., "slanted" eyes and flat noses) are devalued—indeed ridiculed—in the larger society (Kaw, 1997).

These messages generate pressures for minority women to conform not only culturally but also physically. For example, African Americans spend millions of dollars on hair straightening and skin bleaching. For Asian American women, the attempt to comply with Anglo standards of beauty may include cosmetic surgery to sculpt their noses or to "open" their eyes.


Eugenia Kaw (1997) studied these issues by conducting in-depth interviews with medical practitioners and with a small sample of Asian American women, most of whom had had surgery on their eyelids or noses. The women tended to see their surgeries as simply their personal choice, not unlike putting on make-up. However, Kaw found that they consistently described their presurgical features in negative terms. They uniformly said "that 'small, slanty' eyes and a 'flat' nose" suggest a person who is dull and passive "and a mind that is 'closed.'" For example, one subject said that she considered eyelid surgery while in high school to "'avoid the stereotype of the Oriental bookworm' who is 'dull and doesn't know how to have fun.'" Kaw concludes that the decision of Asian American women to change the shape of their eyes and noses is greatly influenced by racist stereotypes and patriarchal norms: an attempt—common among all racial minority groups—to acculturate on a physical as well as a cultural level.

Secondary Structural Assimilation

We will cover this topic in the order followed in previous chapters.

Residence. Figure 8.7 shows the regional concentrations of all Asian Americans in 2010. The tendency to reside on either coast and around Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York City stands out clearly. Note also the sizable concentrations in a variety of metropolitan areas, including Chicago, Atlanta, Miami, Denver, and Houston.

Figure 8.7 Distribution of Asian Americans, 2010 (Percentage of County Population)



Source: Hoeffel et al. (2012, p.10).

The various Asian American groups are concentrated in different regions, with the huge majority of Filipino and Japanese Americans residing in the West, along with about half of Chinese and Vietnamese Americans. Asian Indians have the highest percentage living in the Northeast (30%), and Vietnamese Americans have the highest percentage in the South (32%), mostly concentrated in the fishing industry on the Texas and Louisiana coasts. The Hmong, alone among Asian American groups, are concentrated in the upper Midwest, especially in Wisconsin and Minnesota (Hoeffel et al., 2012, pp. 18–20).

Figure 8.8 shows that Asian Americans, like Hispanic Americans, are moving away from their "traditional" places of residence into new regions. Between 2000 and 2010, the Asian American population increased especially rapidly along the East and West Coasts, in Arizona, and in some areas of the upper Midwest.

Between 2000 and 2010, the Asian population increased more than 50% in 30 of the 50 states, with 8 more closely approaching the 50% mark. In seven states (including Arizona, Nevada, Delaware, and North Carolina) the Asian population increased by more than 75% (Hoeffel et al., 2012, p. 7).


Asian Americans in general are highly urbanized, a reflection of the entry conditions of recent immigrants as well as the appeal of ethnic neighborhoods, such as Chinatowns, with long histories and continuing vitality. As Figure 8.9 shows, all but 2 of the 10 largest Asian American groups were more than 90% urbanized in 2000, and several approach the 100% mark.

As we saw in Figure 5.9 in Chapter 5, Asian Americans are much less residentially segregated than either African Americans or Hispanic Americans. The levels of residential segregation for Asian Americans have been well below "high" (dissimilarity scores greater than 60) but tend to be slightly higher in cities with more concentrated Asian populations. The level of residential segregation is holding steady, a reflection of high rates of immigration and the tendency of newcomers to settle close to other members of their group. Also, these lower scores may reflect the more favored position for Asian Americans—as opposed to blacks and darker-skinned Hispanic Americans—which we noted earlier when discussing their lower levels of reported discrimination.

Asian Americans are also moving away from their traditional neighborhoods and enclaves and into the suburbs of metropolitan areas, most notably in the areas surrounding Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and other cities where the groups are highly concentrated. For example, Asian Americans have been moving in large numbers to the San Gabriel Valley, just east of downtown Los Angeles. Once a bastion of white, middle-class suburbanites, these areas have taken on a distinctly Asian flavor in recent years. Monterey Park, once virtually all white, is now majority Chinese American and is often referred to as "America's first suburban Chinatown" or the "Chinese Beverly Hills" (Fong, 2002, p. 49; see also Chowkwanyun & Segall, 2012).

Education. Asian American children experience less school segregation than Hispanic and Black American children (Fry, 2007), although the extent of segregation for this population may have increased in recent years because of high rates of immigration and residential concentration, particularly in larger cities.

Figure 8.9 Urbanization of Ten Largest Asian American Groups, All Asian Americans, and Total Population, 2000




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2000a).

The extent of schooling for Asian Americans is very different from that for other U.S. racial minority groups, at least at first glance. Asian Americans as a whole compare favorably with society-wide standards for educational achievement, and they perform above those standards on many measures. Figure 8.10 shows that 3 of the 10 Asian American groups rank higher than non-Hispanic whites in completing high school, and 6 of 10 rank higher in completing college degrees, a pattern that has been reinforced by the high levels of education of many recent Asian immigrants.

A quick glance at Figure 8.10 might sustain the image of Asian American success, but note that several groups are relatively low in educational attainment. Asian Americans display a full range of achievement: While it is true that some groups (or at least some elements of some groups) are quite successful, others have profiles that are closer to those of colonized racial minority groups.

This more balanced view of Asian Americans is further explored in Figures 8.11 and 8.12. The former shows the percentage of each group with *less than* a high school education and includes Hispanic Americans, African Americans, American Indians, and non-Hispanic whites for comparison. As we saw in Chapter 7, recent Hispanic immigrants tend to bring modest educational credentials, and the same point can be

Figure 8.10 Educational Attainment for All Asian Americans, Ten Largest Asian American Groups, and Non-Hispanic Whites, 2012




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

made for several of the Asian American groups, all of which have a high percentage of foreign-born members and include many refugees from the wars in Southeast Asia. On this measure of educational attainment, the Southeast Asian groups actually fare worse than African Americans and American Indians, both colonized racial minorities. Information such as this presents a serious challenge to glib characterizations of Asian Americans as successful "model minorities."

Figure 8.12 further challenges the "model-minority" image by comparing the educational attainment of Chinese Americans and non-Hispanic whites. More than 50% of Chinese Americans hold college and graduate degrees, far outnumbering whites (31%) at this level. Note, however, that Chinese Americans are also disproportionately concentrated at the lowest level of educational achievement. About 18% of the group has less than a high school diploma, as opposed to a little less than 10% of non-Hispanic whites. Many of these less educated Chinese Americans are recent immigrants (many undocumented), and they supply the unskilled labor force—in retail shops, restaurants, and garment industry "sweatshops"—that staffs the lowest levels of the Chinatown economy.

Assessments of Asian American success must also differentiate between the native-born and the foreign-born members of the groups. The native-born are generally better

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
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

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Figure 8.11 Percentage With Less Than a High School Education




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

educated, and the foreign-born are split between highly educated professionals and those who bring lower levels of human capital. For example, according to a recent survey, almost all (98%) native-born Chinese Americans were high school graduates and 73% had college degrees. In contrast, only 77% of foreign-born Chinese Americans had finished high school and only 41% had earned a college degree (computed from Pew Research Center, 2013).

As illustrated by these examples, the image of success for Asian Americans needs to be balanced with the recognition that there is a full range of achievement in the group and average levels of educational attainment are inflated for some groups by recent immigrants who are highly educated, skilled professionals.

Political Power. The ability of Asian Americans to pursue their group interests has been sharply limited by a number of factors, including the relatively small size of the population, institutionalized discrimination, and the same kinds of racist practices that have limited the power resources of other minority groups of color. However, and contrary to the perception that Asian Americans are a "quiet" minority, the group has

Figure 8.12 Educational Levels for Non-Hispanic Whites and Chinese Americans, 2012



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

a long history of political action, including a civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s (Fong, 2002, pp. 273–281).

The political power of Asian Americans today is also limited by their high percentage of foreign-born members and, for some groups, lack of facility in English. Rates of political participation for the group (e.g., voting in presidential elections) are considerably lower than national norms. For example, as was the case with Hispanic Americans, less than half (47%) of Asian Americans voted in the 2012 presidential election (vs. about two thirds of non-Hispanic whites and blacks). This level of participation was about the same as in the 2008 presidential election, although slightly higher than in earlier presidential elections (File, 2013, pp. 3–5). Like Hispanic Americans, the impact of this group on national politics will likely increase as more members Americanize, learn English, and become citizens.

There are signs of the group's growing power, especially in areas where they are most residentially concentrated. Of course, Asian Americans have been prominent in Hawaiian politics for decades, but they are increasingly involved in West Coast political life as well. At present, 12 Asian and Pacific Islanders serve in the U.S. House of Representatives (about 2% of the membership) and one in the Senate, Senator Mazie


Hirono of Hawaii, the first Asian American woman to serve in the Senate (Manning, 2013, p. 8).

Jobs and Income. The economic situation of Asian Americans is mixed and complex, as it is for Hispanic Americans. On some measures, Asian Americans as a whole exceed national norms, a reflection of the high levels of academic achievement combined with the impressive educational credentials of many new arrivals. However, overall comparisons can be misleading, and we must also recognize the economic diversity within the group "Asian Americans."

Starting with occupational profiles, the image of success is again sustained. Both men and women are overrepresented in the highest occupational categories, a reflection of the high levels of educational attainment for the group. Asian American men are underrepresented among manual laborers, but, otherwise, the group's occupational profiles are in rough proportion to the society as a whole (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013a).

Figure 8.13 shows median household incomes for Asian Americans and non-Hispanic whites for the past 25 years and reveals that Asian Americans have *higher*

Figure 8.13 Median Household Income for Non-Hispanic Whites and All Asian Americans, 1987–2012




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013c).

median household incomes, a picture of general affluence that is in dramatic contrast to the other racial minority groups we have examined in this text. The gap fluctuates, but Asian Americans' median household income is generally 115% of whites'.

This image of success, glittering at first glance, becomes more complicated and nuanced when we look at the separate subgroups within the Asian American community. Figure 8.14 displays median household incomes for all non-Hispanic whites, all Asian Americans, and the 10 largest subgroups. We can see immediately that economic success is not universally shared: half of the Asian American groups are below the average income for non-Hispanic whites.

A still more telling picture emerges when we consider income per capita (or per person) as opposed to median incomes for entire households. This is an important comparison because the apparent prosperity of so many Asian American families is linked to their ownership of small businesses in the enclave. These enterprises typically employ the entire family for many long hours each day, with children adding their labor after school and on weekends and other relatives (many of them new immigrants, a percentage of which are undocumented) contributing as well. The household unit may post a high income as a result of these collective efforts, but, when spread across many family members, the glow of "success" is muted.

Figure 8.14 Median Household Incomes for All Asian Americans, Ten Largest Asian Americans Groups, and Non-Hispanic Whites, 2012




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

Figure 8.15 shows that, on per capita income, only two Asian American groups exceed non-Hispanic whites. The other eight groups (including Chinese and Korean Americans, the groups most dependent on small business ownership) enjoy much lower levels of relative prosperity. In particular, the Southeast Asian groups with high percentages of refugees from the Vietnam War (especially the Hmong) are below national norms on this measure.

Figure 8.16 provides additional evidence that the image of a "model minority"—uniformly prosperous and successful—is greatly exaggerated. Asian Americans, unlike other racial minority groups, are overrepresented in the three highest income categories: 24% of all Asian Americans are in these categories compared with only 16% of non-Hispanic whites. However, note that Asian Americans are also overrepresented in the lowest income category, a reflection of the "bipolar" distribution of Chinese Americans and some other groups.


Figures 8.17 and 8.18 finish the economic portrait of Asian Americans and reinforce the picture of complexity and diversity. While the poverty levels of all Asian Americans, considered as a single group, are comparable to those of non-Hispanic whites, several of the groups have much higher rates of poverty, especially for children. As we have seen in other figures, Japanese Americans, Filipino Americans, and Asian

Figure 8.15 Per Capita Income for All Asian Americans, Ten Largest Asian American Groups, and Non-Hispanic Whites, 2012




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

Figure 8.16 Distribution of Household Income for Non-Hispanic Whites and Asian Americans, 2013




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013e).

Figure 8.17 Percentage of Families and Children in Poverty for All Asian Americans, Ten Largest Asian American Groups, and Non-Hispanic Whites, 2012



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

Figure 8.18 Percentage of Selected Native-Born and Foreign-Born Asian American Groups and Non-Hispanic Whites With Incomes Less Than $30,000



Source: Compiled from Pew Research Center (2013c).

Indian Americans are "successful" on this indicator, but other groups have poverty levels comparable to those of colonized racial minority groups.

Figure 8.18 examines the situation of several Asian Americans in terms of their nativity. Once again, we see the great diversity from group to group, with foreign-born Vietnamese Americans (largely refugees) and Korean Americans exhibiting the highest percentage of members earning less than $30,000. For all six groups, in fact, the native-born have much lower percentages of members with low incomes, and in some cases (e.g., for Chinese Americans) the difference is quite dramatic.

These socioeconomic profiles reflect the diversity of Asian American groups. Some are indeed prosperous and successful, and their financial wealth exceeds national norms, sometimes by a considerable margin. Other groups resemble other American racial minority groups. Japanese and Chinese Americans have the longest histories in the United States and generally rank at the top in measures of wealth and prosperity. Other groups—particularly those that include large numbers of refugees from Southeast Asia—have not fared as well and present pictures of poverty and economic distress. Some "bipolar" groups, such as Chinese Americans, fit in both categories. Additionally, we should note that the picture of economic distress for these groups would be much greater if we focused on undocumented immigrants, who are numerous in the community and concentrated in the informal, irregular economy.

Primary Structural Assimilation

Levels of integration at the primary level for Asian Americans, are, once again, highly variable from group to group. Japanese Americans tend to be the most integrated on this dimension. One study found that, of the six Asian American groups studied, Japanese Americans were the most likely to have friends outside their group and to marry across group lines (Pew Research Center, 2013, pp. 32, 98). The same study found that, as would be expected, integration at the primary level was lower for the foreign-born and those with less English language ability.

Generally, rates of primary integration tend to be higher than for other groups but are declining as the number of Asian Americans grows and the percentage of foreign-born increases (Passel, Wang, & Taylor, 2010, p. 17). This pattern reflects the tendency of newcomers to marry within their group.

Table 8.2 compares in-marriage trends in 1980 and 2008 following the same format used in previous chapters. Asian Americans have much lower rates of in-marriage than do African Americans and Hispanic Americans, although they have somewhat higher rates than Native Americans. Again, this is partly a function of the relative sizes of these groups but also reflects the more favored position of Asian Americans in the dominant group's perceptions.

Also note that the percentage of foreign-born Asian Americans marrying within the group increased for both men and women. This is consistent with high rates of immigration in recent years and the idea that the first generation tends to socialize more with coethnics.

Table 8.2 Percentage of Whites and Asian Americans Married to a Person of the Same Group, 1980 and 2008

Year	*Whites*		*Asian Americans*			
			Men		*Women*	
	Men	*Women*	*Foreign-Born*	*U.S.-Born*	*Foreign-Born*	*U.S.-Born*
1980	96%	95%	58%	57%	45%	51%
2008	93%	92%	77%	53%	55%	52%

Source: Qian and Lichter (2011, p. 1072). Copyright © 2011 National Council on Family Relations. Reprinted with permission.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

12. In this section, we examined a variety of dimensions of acculturation and integration for Asian Americans. Which is most important? Why?

13. What evidence is presented to support the idea that Asian Americans are a "model minority"? What evidence is presented against this characterization? Which argument is more convincing? Why?

FOCUS ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES: How Successful Are Asian Americans? At What Price?

The materials presented in this chapter should make it clear that the view of Asian Americans as "model minorities" is exaggerated and stereotypical. It is true that, as a whole, the group compares favorably to national statistical norms in terms of education and income. However, when we look closer and especially when we take account of the separate subgroups, we find that some Asian American groups are "bipolar" and that others have profiles that closely resemble those of colonized racial minority groups.

Some further qualifications on the stereotypical view of Asian American success should be noted. First, the group is concentrated in cities where the cost of living is very high. For example, the cities with the largest Asian American populations (e.g., New York, Honolulu, Los Angeles, and San Francisco) are commonly ranked as the most expensive places to live (e.g., see Browne, 2011). Thus, the higher average incomes buy less in the way of housing, food, and other necessities.

Second, as illustrated in Figure 8.15, per capita income for Asian Americans is *lower* than the national average, so the higher average incomes have to be shared across a larger number of people.

Third, researchers commonly find that Asian Americans—especially the foreign-born—get lower income returns for their years of schooling and earn less than whites of the same educational level (see Min, 2006, pp. 82–84 for a review). Also, like other racial minority groups, Asian Americans face a glass ceiling that limits their access to the highest and most lucrative positions in the U.S. status hierarchy, and the group is underrepresented on the boards of Fortune 500 companies (Chou & Feagin, 2008, p. 13).

Finally, while it might seem that the "model minority" stereotype is benign and positive, it can have serious negative consequences. The image can create pressure for members of the group, especially children and students, and the resultant stress can impact mental health and result in depression and even suicide. Chou and Feagin (2008) point out the "lose-lose" dilemma faced by many Asian Americans: if they live up to the "model minority" stereotype, they are labeled as "geeks" and

(Continued)

(Continued)

"nerds," and if they fail—or enjoy only moderate success in school or work—they can be seen as inferior.

The "model minority" stereotype not only distorts the situation of Asian American groups, but it also can lead to oversimplified and negative views of other minority groups. So-called modern racists sometimes attribute the success of Asian Americans solely to their cultural values, such as a strong work ethic or a traditional respect for education, an argument that implies that other minority groups are less successful because they lack these values, deemphasizing or ignoring the role of structural barriers and past-in-present discrimination. Thus, in the ever-evolving interplay of American group relations, the supposed success of Asian Americans can be used as a way of scolding other minority groups of color, particularly black Americans.

Comparing Minority Groups: Explaining Asian American Success

To conclude this chapter, let's return to a question raised in the opening pages: How can we explain the apparent success of some Asian American groups? Relative affluence and high status are not characteristic of the other racial minority groups we have examined, and, at least at first glance, there seems to be little in our theories and concepts to help us understand the situation of Asian Americans. Of course, as we have noted on several occasions, we need to recognize that the "success" label is simplistic and even incorrect for some groups, especially for Southeast Asian groups with a high percentage of refugees, who have profiles that resemble those of colonized racial minority groups. To better focus this discussion, we will concentrate on the groups with the longest histories in the United States: Chinese and Japanese Americans. We present several different views on the nature and causes of "success" for these groups. In this section, we compare Chinese and Japanese Americans with European immigrant groups and colonized minority groups. What crucial factors differentiate the experiences of these groups? Can we understand these differences in terms of the framework provided by the Blauner and Noel hypotheses and the other concepts developed in this text?

The debate over the causes of Asian American success often breaks down into two different viewpoints. One view offers a cultural explanation, which accepts the evidence of Asian American success at face value and attributes it to the "good values" of traditional Asian cultures that we briefly explored at the beginning of this chapter. These values—including respect for elders and for authority figures, hard work and thriftiness, and conformity and politeness—are highly compatible with U.S. middle-class Protestant value systems and consistent with traditional assimilation theory and human capital theory.

The second point of view stresses the ways in which Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans entered American society and their reactions to the barriers of racism and exclusion they faced. This approach could be called a "structural explanation," and it emphasizes contact situations, modes of incorporation, enclave economies, group cohesion, position in the labor market, and institutionalized discrimination, rather than cultural values.

Also, this approach questions the notion that Asian Americans are "successful" and stresses the realities of Asian American poverty and the continuing patterns of racism and exclusion. The structural approach is more compatible with the theories and concepts used throughout this text, and it identifies several of the important pieces needed to solve the puzzle of Asian "success" and put it in perspective. However, this is not to suggest that the cultural approach is wrong or irrelevant. The issues we raise are complex and will probably require many approaches and perspectives before they are fully resolved.

Asian Americans and White Ethnics

Chinese and Japanese immigrants arrived in America at about the same time as immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe (see Chapter 2). Both groups consisted mainly of sojourning young men who were largely unskilled, from rural backgrounds, and not highly educated. Immigrants from Europe, like those from Asia, encountered massive discrimination and rejection and were also victims of restrictive legislation. Yet the barriers to upward mobility for European immigrants (or at least for their descendants) fell away more rapidly than the barriers for immigrants from Asia. Why?

Some important differences between the two immigrant experiences are clear, the most obvious being the greater racial visibility of Asian Americans. Whereas the cultural and linguistic markers that identified Eastern and Southern Europeans faded with each passing generation, the racial characteristics of the Asian groups continued to separate them from the larger society.

Thus, Asian Americans are not "pure immigrant" groups (see Blauner, 1972, p. 55). For most of the 20th century, Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans remained in a less favorable position than did European immigrants and their descendants, excluded by their physical appearance from the mainstream economy until the decades following World War II.

Another important difference relates to position in the labor market. Immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe entered the industrializing East Coast economy, where they took industrial and manufacturing jobs. Although such jobs were poorly paid and insecure, this location in the labor force gave European immigrants and their descendants the potential for upward mobility in the mainstream economy. At the very least, these urban industrial and manufacturing jobs put the children and grandchildren of European immigrants in positions from which skilled, well-paid, unionized jobs were reachable, as were managerial and professional careers.

In contrast, Chinese and Japanese immigrants on the West Coast were forced into ethnic enclaves and came to rely on jobs in the small business and service sector, and,

in the case of the Japanese, in the rural economy. By their nature, these jobs did not link Chinese and Japanese immigrants or their descendants to the industrial sector or to better-paid, more secure, unionized jobs. Furthermore, their exclusion from the mainstream economy was reinforced by overt, racially based discrimination from both employers and labor unions (see Fong & Markham, 1991).

Asian Americans and Colonized Racial Minority Groups

Comparisons between Asian Americans and African Americans, American Indians, and Hispanic Americans have generated a level of controversy and a degree of heat and passion that may be surprising at first. An examination of the issues and their implications, however, reveals that the debate involves some thinly disguised political and moral agendas and evokes sharply clashing views on the nature of U.S. society. What might appear on the surface to be merely an academic comparison of different minority groups turns out to be an argument about the quality of American justice and fairness and the very essence of the U.S. value system.

What is not in dispute in this debate is that some Asian groups (e.g., Japanese Americans) rank far above other racial minority groups on all the commonly used measures of secondary structural integration and equality. What is disputed is how to interpret these comparisons and assess their meanings. Of course, gross comparisons between entire groups can be misleading. If we confine our attention to averages (mean levels of education or median income), the picture of Asian American success is sustained. However, if we also observe the full range of differences within each group (e.g., the "bipolar" nature of occupations among Chinese Americans), we see that the images of success have been exaggerated and need to be placed in a proper context.

Even with these qualifications, however, discussion often slides on to more ideological ground, and political and moral issues begin to cloud the debate. Asian American success is often taken as proof that American society is truly the land of opportunity and that people who work hard and obey the rules will get ahead: in America, all people can be anything they want as long as they work hard enough.

When we discussed modern racism in Chapters 1 and 5, we pointed out that a belief in the openness and fairness of the United States can be a way of blaming the victim and placing the responsibility for change on the minority groups rather than on the structure of society or on past-in-present or institutionalized discrimination. Asian success is sometimes taken as a "proof" of the validity of this ideology. The none-too-subtle implication is that other groups (African Americans, Hispanic Americans, American Indians) could achieve the same success as Asian Americans but, for various reasons, "choose" not to. Thus, the relative success of Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans has become a device for criticizing other minority groups. A more structural approach to investigating Asian American success begins with a comparison of the history of the various racial minority groups and their modes of incorporation into the larger society. When Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans were building their enclave economies in the early part of the 20th century, African Americans and Mexican Americans were concentrated in unskilled agricultural occupations.

American Indians were isolated from the larger society on their reservations, and Puerto Ricans had not yet begun to arrive on the mainland. It follows, then, that social class differences between these groups today flow from their respective situations in the past.

Many of the occupational and financial advances made by Chinese and Japanese Americans have been due to the high levels of education achieved by the second generations. Although education is traditionally valued in Asian cultures, the decision to invest limited resources in schooling is also quite consistent with the economic niche occupied by these immigrants. Education is one obvious, relatively low-cost strategy to upgrade the productivity and profit of a small-business economy and improve the economic status of the group as a whole. Educated, English-speaking second-generation Chinese and Japanese Americans could act as intermediaries with the larger society and bring expertise and business acumen to the family enterprises and lead them to higher levels of performance. Education might also be the means by which the second generation could enter professional careers. This strategy may have been especially attractive to an immigrant generation that was itself relatively uneducated and barred from citizenship (Hirschman & Wong, 1986, p. 23; see also Bonacich & Modell, 1980, p. 152; Sanchirico, 1991).

The efforts to educate the next generation were largely successful. Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans achieved educational parity with the larger society as early as the 1920s. One study found that for men and women born after 1915, the median years of schooling completed were actually higher for Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans than they were for whites (Hirschman & Wong, 1986, p. 11).

Before World War II, both Asian groups were barred from the mainstream economy and from better jobs. When anti-Asian prejudice and discrimination declined in the 1950s, however, the Chinese and Japanese second generations had the educational background necessary to take advantage of the increased opportunities.

Thus, there was a crucial divergence in the development of Chinese and Japanese Americans and the colonized minority groups. At the time when native-born Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans reached educational parity with whites, the vast majority of African Americans, American Indians, and Mexican Americans were still victimized by Jim Crow laws and legalized segregation and excluded from opportunities for anything but rudimentary education. The Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (1954) was decades in the future, and most American Indian schoolchildren were still being subjected to intense Americanization in the guise of a legitimate curriculum.

Today, these other racial minority groups have not completely escaped from the disadvantages imposed by centuries of institutionalized discrimination. African Americans have approached educational parity with white Americans only in recent years (see Chapter 5), and the educational achievements of American Indians and Mexican Americans remain far below national averages (see Chapters 6 and 7, respectively).

The structural explanation argues that the recent upward mobility of Chinese and Japanese Americans is the result of the methods by which they incorporated themselves into American society, not so much their values and traditions. The logic of their

9

New Americans, Assimilation, and Old Challenges

Sade and four of his twenty-something friends are at a hookah cafe almost underneath the Verrazano Narrows Bridge in Brooklyn. It's late, but the summer heat is strong and hangs in the air. They sit on the sidewalk in a circle, water pipes bubbling between their white plastic chairs.

Sade is upset. He recently found out that his close friend of almost four years was an undercover police detective sent to spy on him, his friends, and his community. Even the guy's name. . . was fake, which particularly irked the 24-year-old Palestinian American. . . .

"I was very hurt," he says. "Was it friendship, or was he doing his job?" He takes a puff from his water pipe. "I felt betrayed." The smoke comes out thick and smells like apples. . . .He shakes his head. . . .

Informants and spies are regular conversation topics [among Arab Americans] in the age of terror, a time when friendships are tested, trust disappears, and tragedy becomes comedy. If questioning friendship isn't enough, Sade has also had other problems to deal with. Sacked from his Wall Street job, he is convinced that the termination stemmed from his Jerusalem birthplace. Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim invectives were routinely slung at him there, and he's happier now in a technology firm owned and staffed by other hyphenated Americans. But the last several years have taken their toll. I ask him about life after September 11 for Arab Americans. "We're the new blacks," he says. "You know that, right?"

—Moustafa Bayoumi (2008, pp. 1–2)

Sade's comparison between Arab Americans and blacks may be overstated, but there is no question that America finds itself in a new era of group relations today. The "traditional" minority groups—black Americans, Mexican Americans, and others—have been joined by new groups from places that most Americans could not find on a map: Armenia, Zimbabwe, Bhutan, Guyana, and Indonesia to name but a few.

What do these newcomers bring? What do they contribute, and what do they cost? How are they changing the United States? What will the country look like in 50 years? We asked at the beginning of this text: "What does it mean to be an American?" How will that question be answered in the future?

The world is on the move as never before, and migration connects even the remotest villages of every continent in a global network of population ebb and flow. As we have seen, people are moving everywhere, but the United States remains the single most popular destination. Migrants will pay huge amounts of money—thousands of dollars—veritable fortunes in economies where people survive on dollars a day—and undergo considerable hardship for the chance to work in the United States.

What motivates this population movement? How does it differ from migrations of the past? What impact will the newcomers have on U.S. society? Will they absorb American culture? What parts? Will they integrate into American society? Which segments?

We have been asking questions like these throughout the text. In this chapter, we focus specifically on current immigrants and the myriad issues stimulated by their presence. We mentioned some groups of new Americans in Chapters 7 and 8. In this chapter, we begin by addressing recent immigration in general terms and then consider some additional groups of new Americans, including Hispanic, Caribbean, and Asian groups; Arabs and Middle Easterners, and immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. A consideration of these groups will broaden your understanding of the wide cultural variations, motivations, and human capital of the current immigration stream to the United States.

We will next address the most important and controversial immigration issues facing U. S. society and conclude with a brief return to the "traditional" minority groups: African Americans, Native American, and other peoples of color who continue to face issues of equality and full integration and must now pursue their long-standing grievances in an atmosphere where public attention and political energy are focused on other groups and newer issues.

Current Immigration

As you know, the United States has experienced three different waves of mass immigration. In Chapter 2, we discussed the first two waves (see Figure 2.2). As you recall, the first wave lasted from the 1820s to the 1880s and consisted of mostly Northern and


Western European immigrants. The second, from the 1880s to the 1920s, brought primarily Southern and Eastern European immigrants. During these two periods, more than 37 million people immigrated to the United States, an average rate of about 370,000 per year. These waves of newcomers transformed American society on every level: its cities, its neighborhoods and parishes, its popular culture, its accents and dialects, its religion, its cuisine, and so much more.

The third wave of mass immigration promises to be equally transformative. This wave began after the 1965 change in U.S. immigration policy and includes people from every corner of the globe. Since the mid-1960s, over 30 million newcomers have arrived (not counting undocumented immigrants). This rate of more than 600,000 people per year is much higher than the earlier period although the rate is lower as a percentage of the total population. Figure 9.1 shows that the number of legal immigrants per year has generally increased over this period, at least until the U.S. economy turned sour in recent years.

The official record for most immigrants in a year was set in 1907, when almost 1.3 million people arrived in the United States. That number was almost equaled in 2006 and, if undocumented immigrants had been included in the count, the 1907 record would have been eclipsed several times since the 1960s.

The more recent wave of immigration is much more diverse than the first two. In 2012 alone, immigrants arrived from more than 200 separate nations—from

Figure 9.1 Number of Legal Immigrants to the United States, 1960–2013




Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013b).

Afghanistan and Albania to Zambia and Zimbabwe. Only about 8% of the newcomers were from Europe, about a third were from North America (mostly Mexico), and 40% were from Asia. Figure 9.2 lists the numbers for the top 25 sending nations for 2012. Note that the number of Mexican immigrants is almost double the number from China, the next-highest sending nation. Also, note the variety of nations and regions of origin. Immigration to the United States is truly a global phenomenon!

How will this new wave of immigration transform the United States? How will these new immigrants be transformed by the United States? What do they contribute? What do they cost? Will they adopt the ways of the dominant society? What are the implications if they don't?

We begin by reviewing several case studies of new Americans, focusing on information and statistics comparable to those used in Chapters 5 through 8. Each of the groups covered in this chapter has had some members in the United States for decades, some for more than a century. However, in all cases the groups were quite small until the latter part of the 20th century. Although they are growing rapidly now, all remain relatively small, and none composes more than 1% of the population. Nonetheless, some will have a greater impact on American culture and society in the future, and

Figure 9.2 Number of Legal Immigrants for the Top 25 Sending Nations, 2013



Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013d).

some groups—Muslims and Arab and Middle Easterner Americans—have already become a focus of concern and controversy because of the events of September 11 and the ensuing war on terrorism.

QUESTIONS FOR REFLECTION

1. What are some of the key differences between the first two waves of mass immigration from the 1820s to the 1920s and the current, post-1965 wave?
2. Why is the current wave of immigration so diverse? What are the implications of this diversity for the future of American society?

New Hispanic Groups: Immigrants From the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Colombia

Immigration from Latin America, the Caribbean, and South America has been considerable, even excluding Mexico. As with other sending nations, the volume of immigration from these regions increased after 1965 and has averaged about 200,000 per year. Generally, Latino immigrants—not counting those from Mexico—have composed about 25% of all immigrants since the 1960s (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012).

The sending nations for these immigrants are economically less developed, and most have long-standing relations with the United States. In Chapter 7, we discussed the roles that Mexico and Puerto Rico have played as sources of cheap labor and the ties that led Cubans to immigrate to the United States. Each of the other sending nations has been similarly linked to the United States, the dominant economic and political power in the region.

Although the majority of these immigrants bring educational and occupational qualifications that are modest by U.S. standards, they tend to be more educated, more urbanized, and more skilled than the average citizens of the nations from which they come. Contrary to widely held beliefs, these immigrants do not represent the poorest of the poor, the "wretched refuse" of their homelands. They tend to be rather ambitious, as evidenced by their willingness to attempt to succeed in a society that has not been notably hospitable to Latinos or people of color in the past. Most of these immigrants are not only fleeing poverty or joblessness but also are attempting to pursue their ambitions and seek opportunities for advancement that are generally not available in their countries of origin (Feliciano, 2006; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996, pp. 10–11).

This characterization applies to legal and unauthorized immigrants alike. In fact, the latter may illustrate the point more dramatically, because the cost of illegally entering the United States can be considerable, much higher than the cost of a legal entry. The venture may require years of saving or the combined resources of a large kinship

group. Forged papers and other costs of being smuggled into the country can easily amount to many thousands of dollars, a considerable sum in nations in which the usual wage is a tiny fraction of the U.S. average. Also, the passage can be extremely dangerous and can require a level of courage (or desperation) that many Americans do not often associate with undocumented immigrants.

Rather than attempting to cover all South and Central American groups, we have selected three of the largest to serve as case studies: those from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Colombia. In recent years, these three groups have made up 7% to 8% of all immigrants and about 30% of the immigrants from Central and South America and the Caribbean. These groups had few members in the United States before the 1960s, and all have had high rates of immigration over the past four decades. However, the motivation of the immigrants and the immigration experience has varied from group to group, as we shall see.

Three Case Studies

Table 9.1 presents some basic information about these three groups that we explored in Chapter 7. We're reviewing it here to provide a common frame of reference for the groups covered in this chapter.

Each of these groups has a high percentage of foreign-born members, and, predictably with so many members in the first generation, proficiency in English is an important issue. Although Colombian Americans approach national norms in education, the other two groups have relatively low levels of human capital (education). They are well below national norms for income; thus, they have higher rates of poverty.

Although these groups share some characteristics, there exhibit important differences. They differ in their "racial" characteristics, with Dominicans being more

Table 9.1 Selected Characteristics of Three Hispanic American Groups and Non-Hispanic Whites, 2012

Group	Size	*Percentage With Less Than High School Diploma*	*Percentage With College Degree or More*	*Percentage Foreign-Born*	*Percentage Who Speak English Less Than "Very Well"*	*Median Household Income*	*Percentage of Families in Poverty*
Non-Hispanic whites	—	8.9	31.9	3.9	1.7	$56,525	7.4
Dominicans	1,568,168	34.0	15.5	46.6	44.0	$33,900	27.3
Salvadorans	1,937,369	51.4	7.7	60.9	52.3	$43,487	20.6
Colombians	1,000,125	14.2	31.5	63.9	39.0	$50,102	11.9

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

African in appearance, Colombians more European, and Salvadorans more Indian. The groups tend to settle in different places. Colombians are clustered in the South (49%), particularly in Florida, and the Northeast (33%), mostly in New York and New Jersey (Brown & Patten, 2013a, p. 2). Dominicans are concentrated in the Northeast (78%), with almost half living in New York alone (Brown & Patten, 2013c, p. 2). In contrast, Salvadorans tend to reside in the West (40%), mostly in California, and the South, mostly in Texas (Brown & Patten, 2013e, p. 2).

Finally, the groups differ in the conditions of their entry or contact situations—a difference that, as we have seen, is consequential. Salvadorans are more likely to be political refugees who fled a brutal civil war and political repression, while Dominicans and Colombians are more likely to be motivated by economics and the employment possibilities offered in the United States. Let's consider each of these groups briefly and further explore some of their differences.

Dominicans. The Dominican Republic shares the Caribbean island of Hispaniola with Haiti. The island economy is still largely agricultural, although the tourist industry has grown in recent years. Unemployment and poverty are major problems, and Dominicans average about five years of education (NationMaster, 2014). Dominican immigrants, like those from Mexico, are motivated largely by economics, and they compete for jobs with Puerto Ricans, other immigrant groups, and native-born workers with lower levels of education and jobs skills.

Although Dominicans are limited in their job options by the language barrier, they are somewhat advantaged by their willingness to work for lower wages. They are concentrated in the service sector, as day laborers (men) or domestics (women). Dominican immigrants maintain strong ties with home and are a major source of income and support for the families left behind.

In terms of acculturation and integration, Dominicans are roughly similar to Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, although some studies suggest that they are possibly the most impoverished immigrant group (e.g., Table 9.1 and Figures 7.15 and 7.17). A high percentage of Dominicans are undocumented, and many spend a great deal of money and take considerable risks to get to the United States. If these less visible members of the community were included in the official, government-generated statistics used in the figures presented later in this chapter, the portrait of poverty and low levels of education and jobs skills likely would be even more dramatic.

Salvadorans. El Salvador, like the Dominican Republic, is a relatively poor nation, with a high percentage of the population relying on subsistence agriculture for survival. Approximately 36% of the population lives below the poverty level (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013) due to major problems with unemployment and underemployment. About 80% of the population is literate, and the average number of years of school completed is a little more than five (NationMaster, 2014).

El Salvador, like many sending nations, has a difficult time providing sufficient employment opportunities for its population, and much of the pressure to migrate is economic. However, El Salvador also suffered through a brutal civil war in the 1980s,

and many of the Salvadorans in the United States today are actually political refugees. The United States, under the administration of President Ronald Reagan, refused to grant political refugee status to Salvadorans, and returned many of them to El Salvador. This federal policy resulted in high numbers of undocumented immigrants and also stimulated a sanctuary movement, led by American clergy, to help Salvadoran immigrants, both undocumented and legal, stay in the United States. As is the case with Dominicans, if the undocumented immigrants from El Salvador were included in official government statistics, the picture of poverty would become more extreme.

Colombians. Colombia is somewhat more developed than most other Central and South American nations but has suffered from more than 40 years of internal turmoil, civil war, and government corruption. It is a major center for the production and distribution of drugs to the world in general and the United States in particular, and the drug industry and profits are complexly intertwined with domestic strife.

Colombian Americans are closer to U.S. norms of education and income than are other Latino groups (see Table 9.1, as well as Figures 7.13, 7.15, and 7.17). Recent immigrants are a mixture of less-skilled laborers and well-educated professionals seeking to further their careers. Colombians are residentially concentrated in urban areas, especially in Florida and the Northeast, and often settle in areas close to other Latino neighborhoods. Of course, the huge majority of Colombian Americans are law abiding and not connected with the drug trade, but still they must deal with the pervasive stereotype that portrays Colombians as gangsters and drug smugglers (not unlike the Mafia stereotype about Italian Americans).

Non-Hispanic Immigrants From the Caribbean

Immigrants from the western hemisphere bring a variety of traditions to the United States other than Hispanic ones. Two of the largest non-Latino groups come from Haiti and Jamaica in the Caribbean. Both nations are much less developed than the United States, and this is reflected in the educational and occupational characteristics of their immigrants. A statistical profile of both groups is presented in Table 9.2, along with statistics for non-Hispanic whites for purposes of comparison.

Two Case Studies

Haitians. Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere, and most of the population relies on small-scale subsistence agriculture for survival. An estimated 80% of the population lives below the poverty line, and less than one third of adults hold formal jobs (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). Less than half the population is literate, and Haitians average less than three years of formal education (NationMaster, 2014). A massive earthquake in January 2010 intensified the difficult conditions in Haiti; it will take years for the tiny nation to recover fully.

Haitian migration was virtually nonexistent until the 1970s and 1980s, when thousands began to flee the brutal repression of the Duvalier dictatorship, which—counting

Table 9.2 Selected Characteristics of Two Non-Hispanic Caribbean Groups and Non-Hispanic Whites, 2012

Group	*Size*	*Percentage With Less Than High School Diploma*	*Percentage With College Degree or More*	*Percentage Foreign-Born*	*Percentage Who Speak English Less Than "Very Well"*	*Median Household Income*	*Percentage of Families in Poverty*
Non-Hispanic whites	—	8.9	31.9	3.9	1.7	$56,525	7.4
Haitians	898,484	22.8	19.0	59.2	37.2	$42,275	19.5
Jamaicans	1,016,037	15.5	25.0	59.3	1.2	$49,310	12.5

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

both father ("Papa Doc") and son ("Baby Doc")—lasted until the mid-1980s. In stark contrast to its treatment of Cuban immigrants (see Chapter 7), the U.S. government defined Haitians as economic refugees ineligible for asylum, and began an intense campaign to keep Haitians out of the United States. The U.S. government returned thousands of people to Haiti, some to face political persecution, prison, and even death. Others were incarcerated in the United States. In the view of some, "During the 1970s and 1980s, no other immigrant group suffered more U.S. government prejudice and discrimination than Haitians" (Stepick, Stepick, Eugene, Teed, & Labissiere, 2001, p. 236).

What accounts for this cold, negative reception? Some reasons are not hard to identify. Haitian immigrants brought low levels of human capital and education. This created concerns about their ability to support themselves in the United States and also meant that they had relatively few resources with which to defend their self-interests. In addition, although French is the language of the educated elite, most Haitians speak a version of Creole that is spoken only by Haitians, and a high percentage of Haitian immigrants speak English poorly or not at all. Perhaps the most important reason for their rejection is that Haitians are black and must cope with the centuries-old traditions of rejection, racism, and prejudice that are such an integral part of American culture (Stepick et al., 2001).

Haitian Americans today are still mostly first-generation, recent immigrants. Overall, they are comparable to Hispanic Americans in terms of measures of equality such as income and poverty. Still, research shows that some Haitians continue to face the exclusion and discrimination long associated with nonwhite ancestry.

One important study of Haitians in South Florida found that a combination of factors—their hostile reception, their poverty and lack of education, and their racial background—combined to lead the Haitian second generation (the children of the immigrants) to a relatively low level of academic achievement and

a tendency to identify with the African American community. "Haitians are becoming American but in a specifically black ethnic fashion" (Stepick et al., 2001, p. 261).The ultimate path of Haitian assimilation will unfold in the future, but these tendencies suggest that some members of the second generation are unlikely to move into the middle class and that their assimilation will be segmented (Stepick et al., 2001, p. 261).

Jamaicans. The Jamaican economy is more developed than Haiti's, and this is reflected in the higher levels of education of Jamaican immigrants (see Table 9.2). However, like other economies throughout the less-developed world, the Jamaican economy has faltered in recent decades, and the island nation has been unable to provide full employment opportunities to its population. Jamaica is a former British colony, and its emigrants have journeyed to the United Kingdom in addition to the United States. In both cases, the immigrant stream tends to be more skilled and educated, and represents something of a "brain drain" on its home country. We have seen this phenomenon with other groups, including Asian Indians (Feliciano, 2006). Needless to say, the loss of the more educated Jamaicans to other nations exacerbates problems of development and growth on the island.

Jamaicans typically settle on the East Coast, particularly in the New York City area. Because they come from a former British colony, they have the advantage of speaking English as their native language. On the other hand, they are black, and like Haitians, they must face the barriers of discrimination and racism faced by nonwhite groups in the United States. On the average, they possess significantly higher socioeconomic standing than Haitians (and native-born African Americans), but poverty and institutionalized discrimination limit upward mobility for a segment of the group. Some, like all other groups of color in the United States, face the possibility of segmented assimilation and permanent exclusion from the economic mainstream. On the other hand, at least one study shows that many second-generation Jamaicans are moving into the mainstream economy and taking jobs comparable to those of others with their level of education, at least in New York City, where many of them live (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, & Holdaway, 2008).

Contemporary Immigration From Asia

Immigration from Asia has been considerable since the 1960s, averaging close to 300,000 people per year and running about 30% to 40% of all immigrants (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). Like the sending nations for Hispanic immigrants, the sending nations for Asians are considerably less developed than the United States, and the primary motivation for most of these immigrants is economic. As we pointed out in Chapter 8, however, the Asian immigrant stream is "bipolar" and includes many highly educated professionals along with the less skilled and less educated. Also, many Asian immigrants are refugees from the Vietnam War in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s and others are spouses of U.S. military personnel who had been stationed throughout the region.

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As before, rather than attempting to cover all Asian immigrant groups, we will concentrate on four case studies and consider immigrants from India, Vietnam, Korea, and the Philippines. Together, these four groups make up about half of all immigrants from Asia (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012).

Four Case Studies

The four groups considered here are small, and include a high percentage of foreign-born members. They vary in their backgrounds, occupational profiles, levels of education, and incomes. In contrast to Hispanic immigrants, they tend to have higher percentages of members who are fluent in English, members with higher levels of education, and relatively more members prepared to compete for good jobs in the American economy. A statistical profile of the groups is presented in Table 9.3, along with that of non-Hispanic whites for purposes of comparison.

The four groups vary in their settlement patterns. Most are concentrated along the West Coast, but Asian Indians are roughly equally distributed on the East and West Coasts, and Vietnamese have a sizable presence in Texas, in part related to the fishing industry along the Gulf Coast.

Asian Indians. India, home to more than 1.2 billion people, is the second most populous nation in the world. India has a wide variety of religions, ethnic groups, and languages (including 19 official languages). Overall, the level of education is fairly low: about 63% of the population is literate (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013) with an

Table 9.3 Selected Characteristics of Four Asian American Groups and Non-Hispanic Whites, 2012

Group	*Size*	*Percentage With Less Than High School Diploma*	*Percentage With College Degree or More*	*Percentage Foreign-Born*	*Percentage Who Speak English Less Than "Very Well"*	*Median Household Income*	*Percentage of Families in Poverty*
Non-Hispanic whites	—	8.9	31.9	3.9	1.7	$56,525	7.4
Asian Indians	3,208,387	9.3	69.6	68.7	21.1	$92,592	5.8
Koreans	1,748,287	7.6	52.0	62.6	38.8	$53,750	11.9
Filipinos	3,480,437	7.4	46.0	51.6	18.1	$77,619	5.7
Vietnamese	1,842,851	29.7	25.9	63.5	50.2	$53,367	13.7

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

average of about five years of formal schooling (NationMaster, 2014) However, about 20% of the college-age Indian population is enrolled in some form of higher education ("College Enrollment," 2012). This means millions of educated Indians are looking for careers commensurate with their credentials. Because of the relative lack of development in the Indian economy, many college-educated Indians must search for career opportunities abroad, and not just in the United States.

Additionally, it is important to note that as a legacy of India's long colonization by the British, English is the language of the educated. Thus, Indian immigrants tend to be not only well educated, but English speaking, also (see Table 9.3).

Immigration from India to the United States was low until the mid-1960s, and the group was quite small at that time. The group almost quadrupled in size between 1990 and 2012 (see Table 8.1), and Indians are now the third-largest Asian American group (behind Chinese and Filipinos).

Immigrants from India tend to be a select, highly educated, and skilled group, as shown in Table 9.3 and Figures 8.10 and 8.14. According to the 2000 Census, Indians are overrepresented in some of the most prestigious occupations, including computer engineering, medicine, and college teaching (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000b). Indian immigrants are part of a worldwide movement of educated peoples from less-developed countries to more-developed countries. One need not ponder the differences in career opportunities, technology, and compensation for long to get some insight into the reasons for this movement. Other immigrants from India are more oriented to commerce and small business, and there is a sizable Indian ethnic enclave in many cities (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, pp. 96–111; Sheth, 1995).

Koreans. Immigration from *South* Korea to the United States began early in the 20th century, when laborers were recruited to help fill the void in the job market left by the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. This group was extremely small until the 1950s, when the rate of immigration rose because of refugees and "war brides" after the Korean War. Immigration did not become substantial, however, until the 1960s, and the number of immigrants from Korea peaked in the late 1980s (Min, 2006, p. 232). The size of the group increased fivefold in the 1970s and more than doubled between 1990 and 2012 (see Table 9.1), although it is still much less than 1% of the total population.

Like the immigrant stream from India, South Korean immigrants include many middle-class, more educated, professional people, many of whom were "pushed" from their homeland by a repressive military government. Korea transitioned to a more Western-style democracy in the late 1980s, and immigration declined as a direct result (see Figure 8.5).

Although differences in culture, language, and race make Koreans visible targets of discrimination, the high percentage of Christians among them (about 70%) may help them appear more "acceptable" to the dominant group. Certainly, Christian church parishes play a number of important roles for the Korean American community, offering assistance to newcomers and the less fortunate, serving as a focal point for networks of mutual assistance, and generally assisting in the completion of the myriad chores to which immigrant communities must attend (e.g., government paperwork, registering to vote, etc.; Kitano & Daniels, 2001, p. 123).

Korean American immigrants have formed an enclave, and the group is heavily involved in small businesses and retail stores—particularly fruit and vegetable retail stores or greengroceries. According to one study, Koreans had the second-highest percentage of self-employment among immigrant groups (Greeks were the highest), with about 23% of the group in this occupational category (Min, 2006, pp. 238–239). However, Korean Americans are typically more visible than many other entrepreneurial groups because of their size and concentration in the largest metropolitan areas.

As is the case for other groups that have pursued this course, the enclave allows Korean Americans to avoid the discrimination and racism of the larger society and survive in an economic niche in which lack of English fluency is not a particular problem. However, the enclave has its perils and its costs. For one thing, the success of Korean enterprises depends heavily on the mutual assistance and financial support of other Koreans and the willingness of family members to work long hours for little or no pay. These resources would be weakened or destroyed by acculturation, integration, and the resultant decline in ethnic solidarity. Only by maintaining a distance from the dominant culture can the infrastructure survive.

Furthermore, the economic niches in which mom-and-pop groceries and other small businesses can survive are often in deteriorated neighborhoods populated largely by other minority groups. There has been a good deal of hostility and resentment expressed against Korean shop owners by African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other urbanized minority groups. For example, anti-Korean sentiments were widely apparent in the 1992 Los Angeles riots that followed the acquittal of the policemen charged in the beating of Rodney King. Korean-owned businesses were some of the first to be looted and burned. When asked why, one looter said simply, "Because we hate 'em. Everybody hates them" (Cho, 1993, p. 199). Thus, part of the price of survival for many Korean merchants is to place themselves in positions in which antagonism and conflict with other minority groups is common (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, pp. 112–129; Light & Bonacich, 1988; Min, 2006; see also Hurh, 1998).

Filipino Americans. Ties between the United States and the Philippines were established in 1898 when Spain ceded the territory after its defeat in the Spanish-American War. The Philippines achieved independence following World War II, but the United States has maintained a strong military presence there for much of the past 60 years. The nation has been heavily influenced by American culture, and English remains one of two official languages. Thus, Filipino immigrants are often familiar with English, at least as a second language (see Table 9.3).

Today, Filipinos are the second-largest Asian American group, but their numbers became sizable only in the past few decades. In 1920, fewer than 1,000 Filipinos lived in the United States; by 1960, the group still numbered fewer than 200,000. Most of the recent growth has come from increased post-1965 immigration. The group more than doubled in size over the past several decades (see Table 8.1).

Many of the earliest immigrants were agricultural workers recruited for the sugar plantations of Hawaii and the fields of the West Coast. Because the Philippines was a

U.S. territory, Filipinos could enter without regard to immigration quotas until 1935, when the nation became a self-governing commonwealth.

The most recent wave of immigrants is diversified, and, like Chinese Americans, Filipino Americans are "bipolar" in their educational and occupational profiles. Many recent immigrants have entered under the family preference provisions of the U.S. immigration policy. These immigrants are often poor and compete for jobs in the low-wage secondary labor market (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, p. 94).

Since 1965, more than half of Filipino immigrants have been professionals, many working in the health and medical fields. Many women immigrants were nurses actively recruited by U.S. hospitals to fill gaps in the labor force. In fact, nurses have become something of an export commodity in the Philippines. Thousands of trained nurses leave the Philippines every year to work all over the world. About a third of the world's registered nurses are Filipino; the United States currently employs more than 50,000 of them (Kaye, 2010, pp. 30–34). Thus, the Filipino American community includes some members in the higher-wage primary labor market while others compete for work in the low-wage secondary sector (Agbayani-Siewart & Revilla, 1995; Espiritu, 1996; Kitano & Daniels, 1995, pp. 83–94; Min, 2006; Posadas, 1999).

Vietnamese. A flow of refugees from Vietnam began in the 1960s as a direct result of the war in Southeast Asia. The war began in Vietnam but expanded when the United States attacked communist forces in Cambodia and Laos. Social life was disrupted, and people were displaced throughout the region. In 1975, when Saigon (the South Vietnamese capital) fell and the U.S. military withdrew, many Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians who had collaborated with the United States and its allies fled in fear for their lives. This group included high-ranking officials and members of the region's educational and occupational elite.

Later groups of refugees tended to be less well educated and more impoverished. Many Vietnamese waited in refugee camps for months or years before being admitted to the United States, and they often arrived with few resources or social networks to ease their transition to the new society (Kitano & Daniels, 1995, pp. 151–152). The Vietnamese are the largest of the Asian refugee groups, and, contrary to Asian American success stories and notions of model minorities, they have incomes and educational levels that are somewhat comparable to those of colonized minority groups (see Table 9.3 and Figures 8.10, 8.11, 8.14, 8.15, and 8.17).

Middle Eastern and Arab Americans

Immigration from the Middle East and the Arab world began in the 19th century but has never been particularly large. The earliest immigrants tended to be merchants and traders, and the Middle Eastern community in the United States has been constructed around an ethnic, small-business enclave. The number of Arab and Middle Eastern Americans has grown rapidly over the past several decades but still remains a tiny percentage of the total population. Table 9.4 displays some statistical information on the group, broken down by the ancestry subgroup with which individuals identify. The

Table 9.4 Selected Characteristics of Arab American and Middle Eastern American Groups, and Non-Hispanic Whites, 2012

Group	*Size*	*Percentage With Less Than High School Diploma*	*Percentage With College Degree or More*	*Percentage Foreign-Born*	*Percentage Who Speak English Less Than "Very Well"*	*Median Household Income*	*Percentage of Families in Poverty*
Non-Hispanic whites	—	8.9	31.9	3.9	1.7	$56,525	7.4
Arab Americans	1,740,266	11.4	46.1	43.0	21.1	$52,447	18.3
Lebanese	496,599	7.4	47.5	21.9	8.1	$66,779	9.7
Egyptians	215,511	4.1	66.4	60.6	24.4	$60,606	16.0
Syrians	159,558	10.1	41.3	24.6	12.4	$59,579	10.3
Iranians	470,227	7.7	59.4	64.9	29.4	$63,059	10.8
Turks	197,550	9.4	53.9	55.5	24.1	$59,023	9.2

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013a).

"Arab American" category is a general one and includes Lebanese, Egyptian, and Syrian Americans, along with many smaller groups.

Table 9.4 shows that these groups tend to rank relatively high in income and education. All groups rank higher than non-Hispanic whites in terms of college graduates, and some (Egyptians and Iranians) are far more educated. Although poverty is a problem (especially for the general "Arab American" category), most of these groups compare quite favorably to other U.S. residents in terms of median household income.

Many recent Middle Eastern immigrants are, like Asian immigrants, highly educated people who take jobs in the highest levels of the American job structure. Consistent with the heritage of being an enclave minority, the groups are overrepresented in sales and underrepresented in occupations involving manual labor. One study, using 1990 census data and a survey mailed to a national sample of Arab American women in 2000, found that immigrant Arab American women have a very low rate of employment, the lowest of any immigrant group. The author's analysis of these data strongly suggests that this pattern is due to traditional gender roles and family norms regarding the proper role of women (Read, 2004).

Arab and Middle Eastern Americans are diverse and vary along a number of dimensions. For example, not all Middle Easterners are Arabic; Iranians, for example, are Persian. They bring different national traditions and cultures and also vary in religion. Most are Muslim but many are Christian. Also, about two thirds of all Muslims

in the United States are immigrants, and about 23% are African American (Pew Research Center, 2011, pp. 13, 16; see also Muslim West Facts Project, 2009).

Residentially, Arab and Middle Eastern Americans are highly urbanized, and almost 50% live in just five states (California, New Jersey, New York, Florida, and Michigan). This settlement pattern is not too different from that of other recent immigrant groups except for the heavy concentration in Michigan, especially in the Detroit area. These settlement patterns reflect chains of migration, some set up decades ago. Figure 9.3 shows the regional distribution of the group in 2000 and clearly displays the clusters in Michigan, Florida, and Southern California.

9/11 and Arab Americans


A faint strain of prejudice directed at Middle Easterners has always existed in American culture (e.g., see the low position of Turks in the 1926 social distance scales presented in Chapter 1). These feelings have intensified in recent decades as relations with various Middle Eastern nations and groups have worsened. For example, in 1979, the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, was attacked and occupied, and more than 50 Americans were held hostage for more than a year. The attack stimulated a massive reaction in the United States, in which anti-Arab and anti-Muslim feelings figured prominently. Continuing anti-American activities across the Middle East in the 1980s and 1990s stimulated a backlash of resentment and growing intolerance in the United States.

These earlier events pale in comparison to the events of September 11, 2001. Americans responded to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Arab terrorists with an array of emotions that included bewilderment, shock, anger, patriotism, and deep sorrow for the victims and their families. Though the 19 attackers were from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Lebanon, research shows increased prejudicial rejection of Middle Easterners, Arabs, Muslims, and any group even vaguely associated with the perpetrators of the attacks. Specifically, in the nine weeks following September 11, more than 700 violent attacks were reported to the Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee, followed by another 165 violent incidents in the first nine months of 2002 (Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee, 2002). In this same time period, there were more than 80 incidents in which Arab Americans were removed from aircraft after boarding because of their ethnicity, more than 800 cases of employment discrimination, and "numerous instances of denial of service, discriminatory service, and housing discrimination" (Ibish, 2003, p. 7).

Anti-Arab passions may have cooled somewhat since 9/11, but the Arab American community still faces a number of issues and problems, including profiling at airport security checks and greater restrictions on entering the country. Also, the USA Patriot Act, passed in 2001, allows for long-term detention of suspects, a wider scope for searches and surveillance, and other policies that many (not just Arab Americans) are concerned will encourage violations of due process and suspension of basic civil liberties.

Thus, although the Arab American and Middle Eastern communities are small in size, they have assumed a prominent place in the attention of the nation. The majority of these groups denounce and reject terrorism and violence, but, like Colombians and

Figure 9.3 Regional Distribution of Arab Americans, 2000



Source: Andria D. Timmer.

Italians, they are victimized by a strong stereotype that is often applied uncritically. A recent survey of Muslim Americans, a category that includes the huge majority of Arab and Middle Eastern Americans, finds them to be "middle class and mostly mainstream." They have a positive view of U.S. society and espouse distinctly American values. At the same time, they are very concerned about becoming scapegoats in the war on terror, and a majority (53%) say that it became more difficult to be a Muslim in the United States after 9/11 (Pew Research Center, 2007).

Relations between Arab Americans and the larger society are certainly among the most tense and problematic of any minority group, and given the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the threat of further terrorist attacks, they will not ease anytime soon.

FOCUS ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES: Detroit's Arab American Community

Dr. Steven Gold

The greater Detroit area has long been a center of Arab American life. It continues to display vitality, with growing numbers of businesses, continued arrivals from the Middle East, and the creation of communal institutions such as the Arab American National Museum and the Islamic Center of America, the nation's largest Muslim house of worship. The population, which traces its local presence back 100 years, is large and continues to grow. However, due to recent arrivals, difficulties in enumeration, and the effects of intermarriage, estimates of the population are subject to debate. While the 2000 U.S. Census counted some 130,000 people of Arab origin in the tri-county Detroit area, the Zogby Worldwide polling firm pegs the community at more than 400,000.

Major nationality groups making up the Arab American population include Lebanese, Iraqi, Palestinian, and Yemeni. In addition, these groups reflect considerable religious diversity associated with several traditions, including Chaldean, Melkite, Maronite, and Roman Catholics; Protestants and Orthodox Christians; as well as Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. Local enclaves based on nationality and religion can be found throughout Metro Detroit's three counties, revealing significant diversity in housing, class membership, and way of life.

Detroit's Arab Americans have created a broad array of organizations that address the population's social service, cultural, religious, health, educational, political, and economic needs. Among the most well-known is ACCESS (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services). Established in the early 1970s, ACCESS is the largest Arab American human services nonprofit in the United States. With eight locations and more than 100 programs, it caters to a diverse population. Ismael Ahamed, the organization's founder,

(Continued)