

Globalization

The World, 1990 to the Present

■ HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Globalization is a term used by historians, economists, politicians, religious leaders, social reformers, business people, and average citizens to describe large-scale changes and trends in the world today. It is often defined as a complex phenomenon whereby individuals, nations, and regions of the world become increasingly integrated and interdependent, while national and traditional identities are diminished. Although it is a widely used term, *globalization* is also a controversial and widely debated topic. Is globalization really a new phenomenon, or is it a continuation of earlier trends? Is it driven by technological forces or economic forces, or both? Does it enrich or impoverish? Is it democratizing or antidemocratic? Is it generally a positive or negative thing?

Some limit the definition of globalization to the global integration driven by the development of the international market economy in the past twenty to forty years. Worldwide integration dates back much further, however, and has important technological, cultural, and political causes as well. In fact, all of human history can be understood as the story of increased interaction on a limited planet. Ancient empires brought diverse peoples from vast regions of the world together under single administrations. These empires, connected by land or maritime routes, interacted with each other through trade and exploration, exchanging goods as well as ideas. The unification of the Eastern and Western hemispheres after 1492 was a major step in the globalization of crops, peoples, cultures, and diseases. The industrial revolution joined countries and continents in ever vaster and faster transportation and communication networks.

The colonial empires that developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries integrated the populations of far-flung areas of the world. The commercial aspects of these developments cannot be divorced from religious zeal, technological innovations, and political motives, which were often driving factors.

The current era of economic globalization is largely a product of the industrial capitalist world, roughly dating back to the middle of the nineteenth century. We might call the period between 1850 and 1914 the first great age of globalization in the modern sense. It was the age of ocean liners, mass migrations, undersea telegraph cables, transcontinental railroads, refrigeration, and preserved canned foods, when huge European empires dramatically reduced the number of sovereign states in the world. The period ended with World War I, which not only dug trenches between nations and wiped out a generation of future migrants and visitors, but also planted seeds of animosity that festered for decades, strangling the growth of international trade, interaction, and immigration.

Since the conclusion of World War II in 1945, and increasingly since the end of the Cold War in 1989, political and technological developments have enabled economic globalization on a wider scale and at a faster pace than occurred during the previous age of steamships and telegraphs. The collapse of the Soviet Union and international communism unleashed the forces of market capitalism as never before. Jet travel, satellite technology, mobile phones, and the World Wide Web have revived global integration and enabled the global marketplace. The United States, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund led in the creation of regional and international free-trade agreements, the reduction of tariffs, and the removal of national trade barriers, touting these changes as agents of material progress and democratic transformation. Yet these changes have also elicited wide-ranging resistance in peaceful protests, especially against the West's economic dominance, and violent ones against the West's political and cultural domination, such as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

Multinational companies are now able to generate great wealth by moving capital, labor, raw materials, and finished products through international markets at increasing speeds and with lasting impact. This economic globalization has profound cultural ramifications; increasingly the peoples of the world are watching the same films and television programs, speaking the same languages, traveling to the same places, wearing similar clothing, and listening to the same music. Whether free-market capitalism lifts all boats, or only yachts, is a hotly debated issue today.

■ THINKING HISTORICALLY

Understanding Process

Globalization is one of the words most frequently used to describe the major changes that are occurring in our world. All of the readings in this chapter assume or describe some kind of global integration as a dominant driver of the world in which we live. This chapter asks you to think about large-scale historical processes and to examine globalization as one of the most important of these processes. It asks you to reflect on what globalization means and what causes it. As you read the selections, keep the following questions in mind: How does each of these authors use the term *globalization*? Do the authors see this process as primarily commercial and market-driven, or do they view it as a matter of culture or politics? Is globalization linear or unidirectional, or does it have differing, even opposite effects? What do these writers, thinkers, and activists believe about the most important changes transforming our world? What do you think?

1

SHERIF HETATA

Dollarization, 1998

Sherif Hetata (1923–2017) was an Egyptian intellectual, novelist, and activist who was originally trained as a medical doctor. In this presentation given at a conference on globalization, Hetata outlines the global economy's homogenizing effects on culture. As you read the selection, keep the following questions in mind: Through what historic lens does Hetata view globalization? What links does he make between globalization and imperialism? What do you think of his argument?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Keep in mind the following questions as you read the selection: What, according to Hetata, is the main process that is changing the world? Does he think the engine of world change is primarily technological, commercial, or cultural?

As a young medical student, born and brought up in a colony, like many other people in my country, Egypt, I quickly learned to make the link between politics, economics, culture, and religion. Educated in an English school, I discovered that my English teachers looked down on us. We learned Rudyard Kipling by heart, praised the glories of the British Empire, followed the adventures of Kim in India, imbibed the culture of British supremacy, and sang carols on Christmas night.

At the medical school in university, when students demonstrated against occupation by British troops it was the Moslem Brothers who beat them up, using iron chains and long curved knives, and it was the governments supported by the king that shot at them or locked them up.

When I graduated in 1946, the hospital wards taught me how poverty and health are linked. I needed only another step to know that poverty had something to do with colonial rule, with the king who supported it, with class and race, with what was called imperialism at the time, with cotton prices falling on the market, with the seizure of land by foreign banks. These things were common talk in family gatherings, expressed in a simple, colorful language without frills. They were the facts of everyday life. We did not need to read books to make the links: They were there for us to see and grasp. And every time we made a link, someone told us it was time to stop, someone in authority whom we did not like: a ruler or a father, a policeman or a teacher, a landowner, a *maulana* (religious leader or teacher), a Jesuit, or a God.

And if we went on making these links, they locked us up.

For me, therefore, coming from this background, cultural studies and globalization open up a vast horizon, one of global links in a world where things are changing quickly. It is a chance to learn and probe how the economics, the politics, the culture, the philosophical thought of our days connect or disconnect, harmonize or contradict.

Of course, I will not even try to deal with all of that. I just want to raise a few points to discuss under the title of my talk, "Dollarization, Fragmentation, and God." Because I come from Egypt, my vantage point will be that of someone looking at the globe from the part we now call South, rather than "third world" or something else.

A New Economic Order: Gazing North at the Global Few

Never before in the history of the world has there been such a concentration and centralization of capital in so few nations and in the hands of so few people. The countries that form the Group of

Seven,¹ with their 800 million inhabitants, control more technological, economic, informatics, and military power than the rest of the approximately 4.3 billion who live in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.

Five hundred multinational corporations account for 80 percent of world trade and 75 percent of investment. Half of all the multinational corporations are based in the United States, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) group of countries contributes 80 percent of world production. . . .

A Global Culture for a Global Market

To expand the world market, to globalize it, to maintain the New Economic Order, the multinational corporations use economic power and control politics and the armed forces. But this is not so easy. People will always resist being exploited, resist injustice, struggle for their freedom, their needs, security, a better life, peace.

However, it becomes easier if they can be convinced to do what the masters of the global economy want them to do. This is where the issue of culture comes in. Culture can serve in different ways to help the global economy reach out all over the world and expand its markets to the most distant regions. Culture can also serve to reduce or destroy or prevent or divide or outflank the resistance of people who do not like what is happening to them, or have their doubts about it, or want to think. Culture can be like cocaine, which is going global these days: from Cali in Colombia to Texas, to Madrid, to the Italian mafiosi in southern Italy, to Moscow, Burma, and Thailand, a worldwide network uses the methods and the cover of big business, with a total trade of \$5 billion a year, midway between oil and the arms trade.

At the disposal of global culture today are powerful means that function across the whole world: the media, which, like the economy, have made it one world, a bipolar North/South world. If genetic engineering gives scientists the possibility of programming embryos before children are born, children, youth, and adults are now being programmed after they are born in the culture they imbibe mainly through the media, but also in the family, in school, at the university, and elsewhere. Is this an exaggeration? An excessively gloomy picture of the world?

To expand the global market, increase the number of consumers, make sure that they buy what is sold, develop needs that conform to

what is produced, and develop the fever of consumerism, culture must play a role in developing certain values, patterns of behavior, visions of what is happiness and success in the world, attitudes toward sex and love. Culture must model a global consumer.

In some ways, I was a "conservative radical." I went to jail, but I always dressed in a classical, subdued way. When my son started wearing blue jeans and New Balance shoes, I shivered with horror. He's going to become like some of those crazy kids abroad, the disco generation, I thought! Until the age of twenty-five he adamantly refused to smoke. Now he smokes two packs of Marlboros a day (the ones that the macho cowboy smokes). That does not prevent him from being a talented film director. But in the third-world, films, TV, and other media have increased the percentage of smokers. I saw half-starved kids in a marketplace in Mali buying single imported Benson & Hedges cigarettes and smoking.

But worse was still to come. Something happened that to me seemed impossible at one time, more difficult than adhering to a leftwing movement. At the age of seventy-one, I have taken to wearing blue jeans and Nike shoes. I listen to rock and reggae and sometimes rap. I like to go to discos and I sometimes have other cravings, which so far I have successfully fought! And I know these things have crept into our lives through the media, through TV, films, radio, advertisements, newspapers, and even novels, music, and poetry. It's a culture and it's reaching out, becoming global.

In my village, I have a friend. He is a peasant and we are very close. He lives in a big mud hut, and the animals (buffalo, sheep, cows, and donkeys) live in the house with him. Altogether, in the household, with the wife and children of his brother, his uncle, the mother, and his own family, there are thirty people. He wears a long *galabeya* (robe), works in the fields for long hours, and eats food cooked in the mud oven.

But when he married, he rode around the village in a hired Peugeot car with his bride. She wore a white wedding dress, her face was made up like a film star, her hair curled at the hairdresser's of the provincial town, her finger and toe nails manicured and polished, and her body bathed with special soap and perfumed. At the marriage ceremony, they had a wedding cake, which she cut with her husband's hand over hers. Very different from the customary rural marriage ceremony of his father. And all this change in the notion of beauty, of femininity, of celebration, of happiness, of prestige, of progress happened to my peasant friend and his bride in one generation.

The culprit, or the benevolent agent, depending on how you see it, was television.

¹ Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States meet as the G7. [Ed.]

In the past years, television has been the subject of numerous studies. In France, such studies have shown that before the age of twelve a child will have been exposed to an average 100,000 TV advertisements. Through these TV advertisements, the young boy or girl will have assimilated a whole set of values and behavioral patterns, of which he or she is not aware, of course. They become a part of his or her psychological (emotional and mental) makeup. Linked to these values are the norms and ways in which we see good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, truth and falseness, and which are being propagated at the same time. In other words, the fundamental values that form our aesthetic and moral vision of things are being inculcated, even hampered home, at this early stage, and they remain almost unchanged throughout life.

The commercial media no longer worry about the truthfulness or falsity of what they portray. Their role is to sell: beauty products, for example, to propagate the “beauty myth” and a “beauty culture” for both females and males alike and ensure that it reaches the farthest corners of the earth, including my village in the Delta of the Nile. Many of these beauty products are harmful to the health, can cause allergic disorders or skin infections or even worse. They cost money, work on the sex drives, and transform women and men, but especially women, into sex objects. They hide the real person, the natural beauty, the process of time, the stages of life, and instill false values about who we are, can be, or should become.

Advertisements do not depend on verifiable information or even rational thinking. They depend for their effect on images, colors, smart technical production, associations, and hidden drives. For them, attracting the opposite sex or social success or professional achievement and promotion or happiness do not depend on truthfulness or hard work or character, but rather on seduction, having a powerful car, buying things or people. . . .

Thus the media produce and reproduce the culture of consumption, of violence and sex to ensure that the global economic powers, the multinational corporations can promote a global market for themselves and protect it. And when everything is being bought or sold everyday and at all times in this vast supermarket, including culture, art, science, and thought, prostitution can become a way of life, for everything is priced. The search for the immediate need, the fleeting pleasure, the quick enjoyment, the commodity to buy, excess, pornography, drugs keeps this global economy rolling, for to stop is suicide.

PHILIPPE LEGRAIN Cultural Globalization Is Not Americanization, 2003

Philippe Legrain, an economist, journalist, and former advisor to the World Trade Organization, takes aim at what he calls the myths of globalization in the following article. As you read the selection, keep the following questions in mind: What, according to Legrain, are these myths? What are the consequences of globalization according to the author? What evidence does he cite to support his argument? How does his view differ from that of Hetata?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Keep in mind the following questions as you read the selection: Does Legrain believe the driving force of globalization is economic or cultural? How important does he think globalization is? How, according to the author, is globalization changing the world?

Fears that globalization is imposing a deadening cultural uniformity are as ubiquitous as Coca-Cola, McDonald's, and Mickey Mouse. Europeans and Latin Americans, left-wingers and right, rich and poor—all of them dread that local cultures and national identities are dissolving into a crass All-American consumerism. That cultural imperialism is said to impose American values as well as products, promote the commercial at the expense of the authentic, and substitute shallow gratification for deeper satisfaction.

... If critics of globalization were less obsessed with “Cocolonization,” they might notice a rich feast of cultural mixing that belies fears about Americanized uniformity. Algerians in Paris practice Thai boxing; Asian rappers in London snack on Turkish pizza; Salman Rushdie delights readers everywhere with his Anglo-Indian tales. Although—as with any change—there can be downsides to cultural globalization, this cross-fertilization is overwhelmingly a force for good.

The beauty of globalization is that it can free people from the tyranny of geography. Just because someone was born in France does not mean they can only aspire to speak French, eat French food, read French books, visit museums in France, and so on. A Frenchman—or an American, for that matter—can take holidays in Spain or Florida, eat sushi or spaghetti for dinner, drink Coke or Chilean wine, watch

Philippe Legrain. “Cultural Globalization Is Not Americanization” from *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 9, 2003. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

a Hollywood blockbuster or an Almodóvar, listen to bhangra or rap, practice yoga or kickboxing, read *Elle* or *The Economist*, and have friends from around the world. That we are increasingly free to choose our cultural experiences enriches our lives immeasurably. We could not always enjoy the best the world has to offer.

Globalization not only increases individual freedom, but also revitalizes cultures and cultural artifacts through foreign influences, technologies, and markets. Thriving cultures are not set in stone. They are forever changing from within and without. Each generation challenges the previous one; science and technology alter the way we see ourselves and the world; fashions come and go; experience and events influence our beliefs; outsiders affect us for good and ill.

Many of the best things come from cultures mixing: V. S. Naipaul's Anglo-Indo-Caribbean writing, Paul Gauguin painting in Polynesia, or the African rhythms in rock 'n' roll. Behold the great British curry. Admire the many-colored faces of France's World Cup-winning soccer team, the ferment of ideas that came from Eastern Europe's Jewish diaspora, and the cosmopolitan cities of London and New York. Western numbers are actually Arabic; zero comes most recently from India; Icelandic, French, and Sanskrit stem from a common root.

John Stuart Mill was right: "The economical benefits of commerce are surpassed in importance by those of its effects which are intellectual and moral. It is hardly possible to overrate the value, for the improvement of human beings, of things which bring them into contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with which they are familiar. . . . It is indispensable to be perpetually comparing [one's] own notions and customs with the experience and example of persons in different circumstances. . . . There is no nation which does not need to borrow from others."

It is a myth that globalization involves the imposition of Americanized uniformity, rather than an explosion of cultural exchange. For a start, many archetypal "American" products are not as all-American as they seem. Levi Strauss, a German immigrant, invented jeans by combining denim cloth (or "serge de Nîmes," because it was traditionally woven in the French town) with Genes, a style of trousers worn by Genoese sailors. So Levi's jeans are in fact an American twist on a European hybrid. Even quintessentially American exports are often tailored to local tastes. MTV in Asia promotes Thai pop stars and plays rock music sung in Mandarin. CNN en Español offers a Latin American take on world news. McDonald's sells beer in France, lamb in India, and chili in Mexico.

In some ways, America is an outlier, not a global leader. Most of the world has adopted the metric system born from the French Revolution; America persists with antiquated measurements inherited

from its British-colonial past. Most developed countries have become intensely secular, but many Americans burn with fundamentalist fervor—like Muslims in the Middle East. Where else in the developed world could there be a serious debate about teaching kids Bible-inspired "creationism" instead of Darwinist evolution?

America's tastes in sports are often idiosyncratic, too. Baseball and American football have not traveled well, although basketball has fared rather better. Many of the world's most popular sports, notably soccer, came by way of Britain. Asian martial arts—judo, karate, kickboxing—and pastimes like yoga have also swept the world.

People are not only guzzling hamburgers and Coke. Despite Coke's ambition of displacing water as the world's drink of choice, it accounts for less than 2 of the 64 fluid ounces that the typical person drinks a day. Britain's favorite takeaway is a curry, not a burger: Indian restaurants there outnumber McDonald's six to one. For all the concerns about American fast food trashing France's culinary traditions, France imported a mere \$620 million in food from the United States in 2000, while exporting to America three times that. Nor is plonk¹ from America's Gallo displacing Europe's finest: Italy and France together account for three-fifths of global wine exports, the United States for only a twentieth. Worldwide, pizzas are more popular than burgers, Chinese restaurants seem to sprout up everywhere, and sushi is spreading fast. By far the biggest purveyor of alcoholic drinks is Britain's Diageo, which sells the world's best-selling whiskey (Johnnie Walker), gin (Gordon's), vodka (Smirnoff), and liqueur (Baileys).

In fashion, the ne plus ultra is Italian or French. Trendy Americans wear Gucci, Armani, Versace, Chanel, and Hermès. On the high street and in the mall, Sweden's Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) and Spain's Zara vie with America's Gap to dress the global masses. Nike shoes are given a run for their money by Germany's Adidas, Britain's Reebok, and Italy's Fila.

In pop music, American crooners do not have the stage to themselves. The three artists who were featured most widely in national Top Ten album charts in 2000 were America's Britney Spears, closely followed by Mexico's Carlos Santana and the British Beatles. Even tiny Iceland has produced a global star: Björk. Popular opera's biggest singers are Italy's Luciano Pavarotti, Spain's José Carreras, and the Spanish-Mexican Plácido Domingo. Latin American salsa, Brazilian lambada, and African music have all carved out global niches for themselves. In most countries, local artists still top the charts. According to the IFPI, the record-industry bible, local acts accounted for 68 percent of music sales in 2000, up from 58 percent in 1991.

¹ British slang for cheap, low-quality alcohol. [Ed.]

One of the most famous contemporary writers is a Colombian, Gabriel García Márquez, author of *One Hundred Years of Solitude*. Paulo Coelho, another writer who has notched up tens of millions of global sales with *The Alchemist* and other books, is Brazilian. More than 200 million Harlequin romance novels, a Canadian export, were sold in 1990; they account for two-fifths of mass-market paperback sales in the United States. The biggest publisher in the English-speaking world is Germany's Bertelsmann, which gobbled up America's largest, Random House, in 1998.

Local fare glues more eyeballs to TV screens than American programs. Although nearly three-quarters of television drama exported worldwide comes from the United States, most countries' favorite shows are homegrown.

Nor are Americans the only players in the global media industry. Of the seven market leaders that have their fingers in nearly every pie, four are American (AOL Time Warner, Disney, Viacom, and News Corporation), one is German (Bertelsmann), one is French (Vivendi), and one Japanese (Sony). What they distribute comes from all quarters: Bertelsmann publishes books by American writers; News Corporation broadcasts Asian news; Sony sells Brazilian music.

The evidence is overwhelming. Fears about an Americanized uniformity are over-blown: American cultural products are not uniquely dominant; local ones are alive and well.

3

MIRIAM CHING YOON LOUIE

Sweatshop Warriors: Immigrant Women Workers Take On the Global Factory, 2001

Sherif Hetata and Philippe Legrain highlight the impact of globalization on consumers, but it is also important to examine how it affects workers. Free-trade policies have removed barriers to international trade, with global consequences. An example of such change can be witnessed along the border between Mexico and the United States, especially in the export factories, or *maquiladoras*,* that are run by international corporations on both the U.S. and Mexican sides of the border. In the following excerpt, Miriam Ching Yoon Louie, a

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Miriam Ching Yoon Louie. Excerpt from *Sweatshop Warriors: Immigrant Women Workers: Take On the Global Factory*. Copyright © 2001 by Miriam Ching Yoon Louie. Reprinted by permission of South End Press.

writer and activist, interviews Mexican women who work in these factories and explores both the challenges they face and the strength they show in overcoming these challenges. As you read the selection, keep in mind the following questions: What is the impact of liberalized trade laws on women who work in the *maquiladoras*? What is neoliberalism, and how is it tied to globalization? Why are women particularly vulnerable to these policies?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Keep in mind the following questions as you read the selection:

According to Louie, how far back do neoliberalism and economic globalization date? How does Louie's assessment of economic globalization differ from the views expressed by Legrain? How might they both be right?

Many of today's *nuevas revolucionarias*¹ started working on the global assembly line as young women in northern Mexico for foreign transnational corporations. Some women worked on the U.S. side as “commuters” before they moved across the border with their families. Their stories reveal the length, complexity, and interpenetration of the U.S. and Mexican economies, labor markets, histories, cultures, and race relations. The women talk about the devastating impact of globalization, including massive layoffs and the spread of sweatshops on both sides of the border. *Las mujeres*² recount what drove them to join and lead movements for economic, racial, and gender justice, as well as the challenges they faced within their families and communities to assert their basic human rights. . . .

Growing Up Female and Poor

Mexican women and girls were traditionally expected to do all the cooking, cleaning, and serving for their husbands, brothers, and sons. For girls from poor families, shouldering these domestic responsibilities proved doubly difficult because they also performed farm, sweatshop, or domestic service work simultaneously. . . .

Petra Mata, a former seamstress for Levi's whose mother died shortly after childbirth, recalls the heavy housework she did as the only daughter:

Aiyeee, let me tell you! It was very hard. In those times in Mexico, I was raised with the ideal that you have to learn to do everything—cook, make tortillas, wash your clothes, and clean the house—just the

¹ New revolutionaries. [Ed.]

² moo HAIR ace The women. [Ed.]

way they wanted you to. My grandparents were very strict. I always had to ask their permission and then let them tell me what to do. I was not a free woman. Life was hard for me. I didn't have much of a childhood; I started working when I was 12 or 13 years old.

Neoliberalism and Creeping Maquiladorization

These women came of age during a period of major change in the relationship between the Mexican and U.S. economies. Like Puerto Rico, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, northern Mexico served as one of the first stations of the global assembly line tapping young women's labor. In 1965 the Mexican government initiated the Border Industrialization Program (BIP) that set up export plants, called *maquiladoras* or *maquilas*, which were either the direct subsidiaries or subcontractors of transnational corporations. Mexican government incentives to U.S. and other foreign investors included low wages and high productivity; infrastructure; proximity to U.S. markets, facilities, and lifestyles; tariff loopholes; and pliant, pro-government unions. . . .

Describing her quarter-century-long sewing career in Mexico, Celeste Jiménez ticks off the names of famous U.S. manufacturers who hopped over the border to take advantage of cheap wages:

I sewed for twenty-four years when I lived in Chihuahua in big name factories like Billy the Kid, Levi Strauss, and Lee *maquiladoras*. Everyone was down there. Here a company might sell under the brand name of Lee; there in Mexico it would be called Blanca García.

Transnational exploitation of women's labor was part of a broader set of policies that critical opposition movements in the Third World have dubbed "neoliberalism," i.e., the new version of the British Liberal Party's program of *laissez faire* capitalism espoused by the rising European and U.S. colonial powers during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Western powers, Japan, and international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have aggressively promoted neoliberal policies since the 1970s. Mexico served as an early testing ground for such standard neoliberal policies as erection of free trade zones; commercialization of agriculture; currency devaluation; deregulation; privatization; outsourcing; cuts in wages and social programs; suppression of workers', women's, and indigenous people's rights; free trade; militarization; and promotion of neoconservative ideology.

Neoliberalism intersects with gender and national oppression. Third World women constitute the majority of migrants seeking jobs as maids, vendors, *maquila* operatives, and service industry workers.

Women also pay the highest price for cuts in education, health and housing programs, and food and energy subsidies and increases in their unpaid labor. . . .

The deepening of the economic crisis in Mexico, especially under the International Monetary Fund's pressure to devalue the peso in 1976, 1982, and 1994, forced many women to work in both the formal and informal economy to survive and meet their childbearing and household responsibilities. María Antonia Flores was forced to work two jobs after her husband abandoned the family, leaving her with three children to support. She had no choice but to leave her children home alone, *solitos*, to look after themselves. Refugio Arrieta straddled the formal and informal economy because her job in an auto parts assembly *maquiladora* failed to bring in sufficient income. To compensate for the shortfall, she worked longer hours at her *maquila* job and "moonlighted" elsewhere:

We made chassis for cars and for the headlights. I worked lots! I worked 12 hours more or less because they paid us so little that if you worked more, you got more money. I did this because the schools in Mexico don't provide everything. You have to buy the books, notebooks, *todos*, *todos* [everything]. And I had five kids. It's very expensive. I also worked out of my house and sold ceramics. I did many things to get more money for my kids.

In the three decades following its humble beginnings in the mid-1960s, the *maquila* sector swelled to more than 2,000 plants employing an estimated 776,000 people, over 10 percent of Mexico's labor force. In 1985, *maquiladoras* overtook tourism as the largest source of foreign exchange. In 1996, this sector trailed only petroleum-related industries in economic importance and accounted for over U.S. \$29 billion in export earnings annually. The *maquila* system has also penetrated the interior of the country, as in the case of Guadalajara's electronics assembly industry and Tehuacán's jeans production zones. Although the proportion of male *maquila* workers has increased since 1983, especially in auto-transport equipment assembly, almost 70 percent of the workers continue to be women.

As part of a delegation of labor and human rights activists, this author met some of Mexico's newest proletarians³—young indigenous women migrant workers from the Sierra Negra to Tehuacán, a town famous for its refreshing mineral water springs in the state of Puebla, just southeast of Mexico City. Standing packed like cattle in the back of the trucks each morning the women headed for jobs sewing for name brand manufacturers like Guess?, VF Corporation (producing

³ Workers, especially exploited ones (a Marxist term derived from Latin for lower classes). [Ed.]

Lee brand clothing), Gap, Sun Apparel (producing brands such as Polo, Arizona, and Express), Cherokee, Ditto Apparel of California, Levi's, and others. The workers told U.S. delegation members that their wages averaged U.S. \$30 a week for 12-hour work days, six days a week. Some workers reported having to do *veladas* [all-nighters] once or twice a week. Employees often stayed longer without pay if they did not finish high production goals.

Girls as young as 12 and 13 worked in the factories. Workers were searched when they left for lunch and again at the end of the day to check that they weren't stealing materials. Women were routinely given urine tests when hired and those found to be pregnant were promptly fired, in violation of Mexican labor law. Although the workers had organized an independent union several years earlier, Tehuacán's Human Rights Commission members told us that it had collapsed after one of its leaders was assassinated.

Carmen Valadez and Reyna Montero, long-time activists in the women's and social justice movements, helped found Casa de La Mujer Factor X in 1977, a workers' center in Tijuana that organizes around women's workplace, reproductive, and health rights, and against domestic violence. Valadez and Montero say that the low wages and dangerous working conditions characteristic of the *maquiladoras* on the Mexico-U.S. border are being "extended to all areas of the country and to Central America and the Caribbean. NAFTA represents nothing but the '*maquiladorization*' of the region."

Elizabeth "Beti" Robles Ortega, who began working in the *maquilas* at the age of fourteen and was blacklisted after participating in independent union organizing drives on Mexico's northern border, now works as an organizer for the Servicio, Desarrollo y Paz, AC 520 (SEDEPAC) [Service, Development and Peace organization]. Robles described the erosion of workers' rights and women's health under NAFTA:

NAFTA has led to an increase in the workforce, as foreign industry has grown. They are reforming labor laws and our constitution to favor even more foreign investment, which is unfair against our labor rights. For example, they are now trying to take away from us free organization which was guaranteed by Mexican law. Because foreign capital is investing in Mexico and is dominating, we must have guarantees. The government is just there with its hands held out; it's always had them out but now even more shamelessly. . . . Ecological problems are increasing. A majority of women are coming down with cancer—skin and breast cancer, leukemia, and lung and heart problems. There are daily deaths of worker women. You can see and feel the contamination of the water and the air. As soon as you arrive and start breathing the air in Acuña and Piedras Negras [border cities between the states of Coahuila and Texas], you sense the heavy air, making you feel like vomiting.

Joining the Movement

Much of the education and leadership training the women received took place "on the job." The women talked about how much their participation in the movement had changed them. They learned how to analyze working conditions and social problems, who was responsible for these conditions, and what workers could do to get justice. They learned to speak truth to power, whether this was to government representatives, corporate management, the media, unions, or co-ethnic gatekeepers. They built relations with different kinds of sectors and groups and organized a wide variety of educational activities and actions. Their activism expanded their world view beyond that of their immediate families to seeing themselves as part of peoples' movements fighting for justice. . . .

Through her participation in the movement, [María del Carmen Domínguez] developed her skills, leadership, and awareness:

When I stayed at work in the factory, I was only thinking of myself and how am I going to support my family—nothing more, nothing less. And I served my husband and my son, my girl. But when I started working with La Mujer Obrera I thought, "I need more respect for myself. We need more respect for ourselves." (laughs) I learned about the law and I learned how to organize classes with people, whether they were men or women like me.

4

JUSTIN SANDEFUR

Is the Elephant Graph Flattening Out? 2018

In 2013, the World Bank published a graph on global income growth over the twenty years from 1988 to 2008 for lowest to highest percentiles of income. They found that the lowest (i.e. poorest) percentiles enjoyed an income growth rate of 15 to 75 percent while the global upper middle class gained little or nothing. But the top 1 percent did very well. You can see why it was called the elephant graph.

The elephant graph became very famous because it seemed to show how the American and European working class (who were upper middle class globally) lost out while the income of the lower

"Chart of the Week #1: Is the Elephant Graph Flattening Out?," Center for Global Development, January 4, 2018. Copyright © 2018 by Center for Global Development. Used with permission.




Figure 28.1 The original elephant graph.

Source: Lakner and Milanovic, World Bank Economic Review, 2015 with the drawing of elephant introduced by Caroline Freund, The Peterson Institute for International Economics (www.piie.com).

50 percent (the global poor) increased. The graph seemed to show the effect of outsourcing rich country jobs to the more populous poorer countries under globalization.

In this selection, Justin Sandefur updates the elephant graph in two ways. First he uses more and better data to update the graph for the entire period between 1980 and 2016. Then he uses the improved data to revise the image for 1988 to 2008. What conclusions can you draw from these changes?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

One of the current debates about the process of globalization is whether it leads to convergence or divergence—whether it increases or decreases the gap between the rich and the poor. Keep in mind the following questions as you read the selection and view the graphs: How can these graphs help us answer that question? Where do they fall short in answering that question?

The “elephant graph” created by Christoph Lakner and Branko Milanovic in a 2013 World Bank paper has become perhaps the most talked-about chart in international economics over the past few years. The simple graph shows income gains at each point of the global income distribution for the 20 years spanning the fall of the Berlin wall to the 2008 financial crisis. China and India’s rapid growth constitute the bulk of the elephant, driving down global inequality, while the global 1 percent lift the elephant’s trunk, and in between the losers from globalization saw zero income growth—a feature frequently cited by pundits to explain the advent of Trump and Brexit.




Figure 28.2 The elephant curve of global inequality and growth, 1980–2016.

Source: Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018

The elephant graph is almost five years old now, so it’s time for a refresh. Brace yourself. It’s not good news. In December, the team of economists from Berkeley and the Paris School of Economics who have pioneered the study of top incomes—including Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman—launched the first World Inequality Report (WIR). Compiling all existing household survey sources with their own research on top incomes, they were able to extend the time period covered, and found a somewhat different picture:

A few things stand out from this new graph:

1. **The elephant’s trunk is getting really, really long.** As the caption notes, the top 1 percent captured 27 percent of total income growth from 1980 to 2016. The longer neck reflects the use of more and newer data on top incomes from tax records, which is the speciality of the World Inequality Report team. In contrast, the original Lakner and Milanovic graph was based on household survey data compiled by the World Bank, which the authors readily acknowledged are a poor measure of high incomes—simply because sample surveys are unlikely to randomly capture the (very few) super rich. The explosion of top incomes at the far right of the graph now dwarfs the whole picture—leading my colleague Charles Kenny to helpfully suggest this looks more like a brontosaurus, or alternatively “Nessie,” Disney’s version of the Loch Ness monster, than an elephant.

2. **Maybe it’s a Trumpist elephant after all.** The WIR authors explicitly label the trough of low growth with the bottom 90 percent in the United States and Western Europe—a claim that has previously

Replicating the World Inequality Report, Figure E4, limited to 1988–2008




Figure 28.3 The new elephant graph from the World Inequality Report looks more like the Loch Ness monster.

Source: Justin Sandéfur, Center for Global Development

been challenged. Adam Corlett of The Resolution Foundation argued the trough in the Lakner-Milanovic graph was driven more by Japan and Eastern Europe than Trump or Brexit voters. In reply, Lakner and Milanovic noted that the basic ranking of higher growth for the Asian middle class and the global elite, and lower growth for the middle class in the rich world is robust to any version of the calculation—and that seems to remain true in the new WIR version. 3. **The whole elephant is sinking.** In the original graph, the body of the elephant peaked at about the global median income, which saw roughly 75 percent cumulative income growth over 20 years, equivalent to an annual rate of just under 3 percent per annum. In the new Alvaredo et al version, the highest growth rate apart from the super rich comes for people at about the 20th percentile, who saw a 120 percent cumulative increase over 36 years—which is about half a percentage point slower per year.

Is that last discrepancy a function of the different time periods, or something else? It seems to be something else. I downloaded the replication files from the World Inequality Report, made sure I could perfectly reproduce the main elephant curve above, and then simply changed the start and end dates to limit them to 1988 to 2008 a la Lakner and Milanovic (instead of 1980 to 2016 in the new version). The result is still wildly different from the original elephant.

These are very different animals. The elephant has drowned! To be honest, I'm really not sure what's going on. I suspect much of this discrepancy has to do with methodological differences, particularly in how the WIR team has tried to reconcile

survey estimates to economic growth rates from national accounts. But the discrepancies are big and probably demand further explanation, given the inordinate popular attention that the original elephant graph received. A couple basic facts remain robust though:

... After a period of growing global inequality in the mid-20th century, incomes around the world are now converging with the rise of large developing countries, and—lest we feel too complacent—that equalizing force is partially offset by breakaway growth for a tiny global elite.

5

NEIL IRWIN

“Globalization’s Backlash Is Here, at Just the Wrong Time,” 2018

The author, a senior economics correspondent for the *New York Times*, addresses some recent criticisms of globalization. As you read the selection, keep in mind the following questions: Why does he say that this is the wrong time for such a backlash? Why does he think the consequences of globalization will improve? How might you use the previous reading to question this view?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

The period from 2008 to 2018 is too short to indicate a long-term process, but it could mark the end of a long-term process of globalization that began decades ago. Keep in mind the following question as you read the selection: How do you determine if this recent history is a blip in globalization, a significant change, or its end?

No one should be surprised that there has been a backlash to globalization, given the scale of disruption that has resulted from more interconnected economies. What is surprising is that it has arrived now.

That’s because globalization, at least in the form we have known it, leveled off a decade ago. And that shows a crucial risk of the recent push to re-set the terms of the global economy—including tariffs on steel and aluminum and punitive actions against China that President Trump has introduced.

It is coming after the major costs of globalization have already been borne. And it comes just as billions of people who have become

integrated into the global economy over the last three decades are starting to become rich enough to become valuable consumers.

In short, the anti-globalization drive that is spreading across the Western world may be coming at exactly the wrong time—too late to do much to save the working-class jobs that were lost, but early enough to risk damaging the ability of rich nations to sell advanced goods and services to the rapidly expanding global middle class.

It is tempting to think of globalization as a constant process, but historically that's not the case. It moves in fits and starts, and occasional reversals. The 1990s and the first years of the 2000s were one of those extraordinary periods in which economies became more interconnected, according to a range of data.

Now, globalization has entered a new phase, in which cross-border trade in goods and services is steady as a share of the economy, and the international flows of capital are lower than they were before the global financial crisis [in 2008]. It is now the spread of information that is rising, with different implications for workers in rich countries than the earlier phase.

Starting in the 1990s, improvements in communications and shipping technology made global outsourcing more feasible. Trade deals reduced tariffs and other barriers to commerce. And many once-poor nations became more integrated into the global economy, especially China.

This adjustment provided a wave of affordable goods and opened up new markets for rich countries, but it also devastated certain sectors and geographical areas, especially those involved in manufacturing low-tech products. Workers in American and Western European factory towns found themselves in competition with Chinese electronics assemblers, Indian call center employees and auto factory workers in Eastern Europe, Mexico and beyond.

The flow of goods and services across national borders as a share of all economic activity hovered near 16 percent through the 1980s and early 1990s, then from 1993 to 2008 shot up to 31 percent. Then it stopped rising, instead bouncing around that level, according to data from the McKinsey Global Institute.

If you look at the international flow of money instead of goods and services, the results are even more stark. Cross-border financial flows peaked in 2007 at 22 percent of world G.D.P., but were down to 6 percent in 2016, about the same as the 1996 level.

"The interesting thing about tariffs on steel or other goods is that it's fighting the last battle, not the future one," said Susan Lund, a partner at McKinsey who has researched these global flows. "Global manufacturing has already reconfigured itself. That change happened, and the horse is out of the barn. We don't think globalization is over, but it has taken a new form."




Figure 28.4 International Trade Has Levelled Off.

That form consists of greater connectivity and communication, which may not show up in traditional data on trade or capital flows. That includes more people using social media platforms to connect with people in other countries, companies relying on freelance labor located around the globe, and small enterprises doing business with partners around the world through the internet.

In other words, it's not a form of globalization that endangers factory jobs, but one that could have big consequences in other areas—leading to more competition for technologically advanced white-collar jobs, while also creating enormous new opportunities for American and Western European firms. That, in turn, helps explain why much of the trans-Pacific Partnership, the trade deal that the Trump administration withdrew from, focused on intellectual property rights, data security and privacy.

The M.I.T. economist David Autor and colleagues have done extensive work showing that the "China shock" that ensued with that country's entry into the World Trade Organization caused lasting pain to communities in the United States that competed with Chinese companies in making a range of manufactured goods.

Even as those effects linger, he sees the risks involved in commerce with China as shifting elsewhere.

"The China shock on large-scale manufacturing and its mass employment effects, that part is largely behind us," Mr. Autor said. Now, the challenge is Chinese competition on more technologically complex products, like automobiles, airplanes or microprocessors. The manufacturing of more labor-intensive, less technologically complex products like apparel is migrating to lower-wage countries like Bangladesh and Ethiopia.

But a shift in where certain products are made is different from a net increase in the level of global connectivity. The level of economic integration is remaining level, even as the details of exactly what is made in which country are changing.

“I don’t think there’s any turning back the clock,” Mr. Autor said, referring to a return to a world where less technologically complex and more labor-intensive products are again made in the United States. “I think we should be girding ourselves for the real challenge, which is struggles over intellectual property and frontier industries.”

The Trump administration’s efforts to pressure China, if they succeed, would do some of that. But those actions have been paired with tariffs on steel and aluminum that appear more aimed at protecting American manufacturing of the metals. The administration’s approach could backfire if it unleashes a series of escalating tit-for-tat tariffs on all sorts of goods, undermining global commerce without fixing the underlying problems in information-intensive industries.

If the latest trade skirmishes do blow up into a trade war, those new barriers to international commerce might also block a long-predicted reward of globalization: a new world of customers. The rise in global economic integration, for all the disruption it has meant for certain workers in the United States and Western Europe, has also been a story of hundreds of millions of people becoming more connected to the worldwide economy, and achieving higher standards of living in the process.

Homi Kharas, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, studies the rise of the global middle class—which in his calculations includes people with income of at least \$10 per person per day in 2005 dollars. For a family of four, adjusted to 2018 dollars, that works out to around \$19,000 a year.

In 1990, only 23 percent of the world’s population fit that category. Today 45 percent do, meaning an additional 2.3 billion humans are now able to afford the luxuries that the global economy provides: abundant food, motorized transportation, mobile phones and the like.

Mr. Kharas argues that it’s wrong to view these billions of people only as competition for good jobs.

“What we see is that as the middle class emerges, they have a massive demand for all types of services,” he said. “Whether that is Hollywood movies or Bollywood movies or Hong Kong movies, or the ability to eat out in franchises like KFC or McDonald’s, or using internet applications, or taking out insurance, they’re driving massive changes in the structure of the global economy that include consuming goods that the United States is good at producing.”

In other words, globalization shouldn’t be viewed as a perpetual onslaught in which American workers are facing waves of more and more people willing to do the same job for lower wages—even though

it may have seemed that way during the 1990s and early 2000s when trade was soaring faster than the global economy.

Rather, everyone is both a competitor and a customer. With trade battles looming on the near horizon, the open question is whether the United States and Europe, having already borne the costs of competition with the developing world, will stick with open trade long enough to enjoy its benefits.

6

Cartoons on Globalization, 2000s

The following are editorial cartoons. Each addresses economic components of globalization, and each in some way addresses the relationship between those in the most developed part of the world and those in the developing world. This relationship is often characterized as convergence vs. divergence (becoming more similar or equal vs. becoming more dissimilar or unequal). Do these cartoons see globalization as convergence or divergence? Which of the previous selections agree with their view?

Figure 28.5, “Inequality SeeSaw,” comments on the balance (or imbalance) of globalization. What does this cartoon suggest about the causes and consequences of the process of globalization?

Figure 28.6 comments on the unity (or disunity) of the world (with all the water on the one side). How is the message of this cartoon similar to 28.5? How is it different?

Figure 28.7, “Attention Q-Mart Shoppers,” suggests there is a conflict about globalization for people in the more developed world. What is that conflict?

Figure 28.8, “You Undocumented Workers Have to Leave,” reveals another kind of conflict about globalization in the developed world. What point does this cartoon make about immigration?

Figure 28.9, “I Don’t Mean to Hurry You,” asks about the wishes of people in the developing world. What is the point of the cartoon?

THINKING HISTORICALLY

All of these cartoonists explore a process of economic globalization. What are the economic forces that bring about the globalization depicted in these cartoons? To what extent does the humor in these cartoons depend on a realization that globalization is inevitable? To what extent is that attitude shared by the authors of the other selections in this chapter?



Figure 28.9 "I Don't Mean to Hurry You."

Source: J. McGillem/Cartoon Stock

REFLECTIONS

Globalization is not one process, but many. It is as technological as the Internet, smart phones, and the latest flu vaccine. It is as cultural as international film festivals, sushi, and foreign languages. It is as political as the United Nations, time zones, and occupying armies. Perhaps most important, it is economic. People migrate for jobs, factories move for cheaper labor, and few consumers and corporations seem to care about country of origin. Since the end of communism, the entire world has become a single market.

Is this a good thing? It depends on whom you ask. Sherif Hetata sees over-commercialization undermining national traditions. Philippe Legrain applauds the new possibilities. Life is clearly hard for the women working in the sweatshops of international corporations, as Miriam Ching Yoon Louie points out; but is economic globalization responsible for their suffering, or do factory jobs provide women with opportunities they wouldn't have otherwise?

Is the global gap between rich and poor increasing or decreasing? The new "elephant graph" of selection 4 shows global convergence for all but the top 1 percent. For the other 99 percent, it is a convergence that has boosted billions from the developing world into the middle class while slowing the rise of millions in Europe and North America. While it is hard to convince European and American workers who have fallen out of a comfortable middle class that they or their parents enjoyed thanks to a world of haves and have-nots, globalization has brought more justice than pain. If Neil Irwin's argument in selection 5 is right, the efforts by European and American workers to turn back the clock to a pre-globalized world is not only impossible but would be a mistake. For an increasingly globalized world that is also just, convergence cannot be limited to the bottom 99 percent when the top 1 percent own half the world's wealth.

It is the duty of citizens, not historians, to decide what outcomes are good or bad, better or worse. But historians can help us decide by showing us where we are—by deepening the temporal dimension of our awareness.

Understanding the process of change is the most useful "habit of mind" we gain from studying the past. Although the facts are many and the details overwhelming, the historical process appears to us only through the study of the specifics. And we must continually check and revise our interpretations in reaction to new information. But like a storyteller without a plot, we are lost without some overall understanding of how our world is changing.

More important, understanding change does not mean that we have to submit to it. Of the processes of globalization discussed in this

chapter—trade and technological transfers, cultural homogenization and competition, commercialization and market expansion—some may seem inevitable, some strong, some even reversible. Intelligent action requires an appreciation of the possible as well as the identification of the improbable.

History is not an exact science. Fortunately, human beings are creators, as well as subjects, of change. Which way is the world moving? What are we becoming? What can we do to be part of the solution? What kind of world do we want to create? These are questions that can be answered only by studying the past, both distant and recent, and trying to understand the overarching changes that are shaping our lives. Worlds of history converge upon us, but only one world will emerge from our wishes, our wisdom, and our will.

Acknowledgments, Volume Two

Chapter 15

- 1 Mara Hvistendahl, “Rebuilding a Treasure Ship,” *Archaeology*, 00038113, Mar/Apr 2008, Vol. 61, Issue 2. Copyright © 2008 by The Archaeological Institute of America. Reprinted with permission of ARCHAEOLOGY Magazine, www.archaeology.org.
- 2 Ma Huan. From *The Overall Survey of the Ocean Shores*, ed. and trans. Feng Ch’eng Chun, originally published by Hakluyt Society, 1970. Reprinted by permission of David Higham.
- 5 Edmund S. Morgan, “The Conquerors”, from AMERICAN HEROES: PROFILES OF MEN AND WOMEN WHO SHAPED EARLY AMERICA by Edmund S. Morgan. Copyright © 2009 by Edmund S. Morgan. Used by permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Chapter 16

- 1 Bernal Díaz. Excerpt from *The Conquest of New Spain*, trans. J.M. Cohen, Penguin UK, 1963. Reprinted by permission of Penguin UK.
- 2 From “The Broken Spears” by Miguel Leon-Portilla, Copyright © 1962, 1990 by Miguel Leon-Portilla, Expanded and Updated Edition © 1992 by Miguel Leon-Portilla, Reprinted by permission of Beacon Press, Boston.
- 4 Nzinga Mbemba “Appeal to the King of Portugal” from *The African Past*, ed. Basil Davidson. Copyright © 1964 by Basil Davidson. Reproduced with permission of Curtis Brown Group Ltd, London, on behalf of The Beneficiaries of the Estate of Basil Davidson.

Chapter 17

- 3 Pu Songling. “The Lady Knight-Errant” from *Liao-chai chi-i*, translated by Lorraine S. Y. Lieu, Y.W. Ma and Joseph S. M. Lau, from *Traditional Chinese Stories: Themes and Variations*, ed. Y.W. Ma and Joseph S. M. Lau, copyright © 1986 by Cheng & Tsui Company, Inc. Originally published by Columbia University Press in 1978. Used by permission of Cheng & Tsui Company, Inc.
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- 8 Countess de Rochefort. “Diary of the Countess de Rochefort” from *Not in God’s Image*, eds. Julia O’Faolain and Lauro Martines, HarperCollins Publishers. Used by permission of the author.

About the Author

Kevin Reilly is a professor of humanities at Raritan Valley College and has taught at Rutgers, Columbia, and Princeton Universities. Reilly is the cofounder and first president of the World History Association and the author of two world history college texts, *The West and the World* and *The Human Journey*. He has edited two series of titles in world history and numerous works including *The Introductory History Course for the American Historical Association*, *World History: Selected Reading Lists and Course Outlines*, and *Readings in World Civilizations*. As a specialist in immigration history, Reilly incorporated his research in creating the "Modern Global Migrations" globe at Ellis Island. His work on the history of racism led to the editing of *Racism: A Global Reader*. He was a Fulbright scholar in Brazil and Jordan and an NEH fellow in Greece, Oxford (UK), and India. Honors awarded to Reilly include the Community College Humanities Association's Distinguished Educator of the Year and the World History Association's Pioneer Award. He has also served the American Historical Association in various capacities, including on the governing council.

Working with Secondary Sources

Secondary sources offer interpretations or analyses of the past. In other words, primary sources are the subject of historical research, and secondary sources are the results of historical research.

Your textbook, professional journals, scholarly books, and even websites can all serve as useful secondary sources. Beyond such written secondary sources, there are also many different types of visual secondary sources. Maps, tables, charts, graphs, and videos can all be effective tools for presenting historians' analyses of primary sources.

Examples of secondary sources include the following:

- Textbooks
 - Scholarly journals presenting recent work in history
 - Microhistory that explores the significance of a single event
 - Multivolume history that covers many centuries and many places
 - Map showing the routes taken by famous sixteenth-century explorers or a map illustrating eighteenth-century Atlantic trade patterns
 - Chart showing the decline in economic output during the Great Depression
 - Graph showing changes in average per capita income over time
 - Table comparing literacy levels at different places in a given year
 - Video exploring the experiences of real soldiers during the Vietnam War
 - Museum website that links its collection to historical developments
 - Historian's website that includes resources for students and instructors
- As with primary sources, in evaluating a secondary source, you want to identify the author's main argument and ascertain what types of evidence she or he presents to support those points. Identify the work's introduction, main sections, supporting evidence, and conclusion. The introduction is especially important because it contains the author's thesis and lays out, in brief form, the larger argument and conclusions and provides a road map for reading the main body of the piece.

As a student of history, you'll use both primary and secondary sources, often in conjunction with each another. Secondary sources, like your textbook, provide a framework for your analysis, helping you to place primary sources in the context of the events and developments of their time.

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