Discussion
READ THESE GUIDELINES!
Completion: Students ore responsible for completing oll fourteen of these primory source exercises ond for onswering oll questions in o given exercise. Posts will be graded for guolity ond length. No lote posts will beoccepled.
Format: Complel e sen! ences ond occurote grommor ore reguired.If you do use direct guototions, you must provide proper in-text cifotions - see our oddendum for detoils.
Originolity: Do not repeot the some informotion onother student has olreody posted - odd something new to secure os mony points os possible! Breaking ground eorly moy be odvontageous. Eleventh hour posts thot simply restote moferiol olreody discussed will not secure the highest scores. Cutting and posting from on internet source does not guolify os completing an exercise.
Student Replies: Replying to, or oddressing,onother student's post is encouroged ond is o gneot woy to moke certoinyou're not simply repeoting informotion ond losing points for redundoncy. Respectful debate is welcomed.
Word Count: Posts must meet the 2oo-word minimum to eorn o possing scone ("C"). Quolity posts thot exceed this minimum length will secure points thot proportionolity exceed the minimum possing grode. For instonce, guolity posts of 300 words or more eorn "B's" while guolity posts of 400 words or more secure "A's." But guolity is better thon guontity! 5o o gneot post with 200 words will do well. This is not on occosion for lersereplies. Contextuolize the guestions inyour chopter neodings.
The Atomic Bomb and lts Irnplications
ln July 1945, scientists associated with the Manhattan Project became involved in debates about how the atomic bomb should be deployed. Members of the Scientit'ic Panel of the secretary of war's lnterim Advisory Committee
agreed that a bomb could be used for military purposes but disagreed about whether it could be used without prior warning and demonstration. Other groups of scientists secretly began circulating petitions, such as the one reprinted here, in which they set out their views. The petitions never reached the president, but they raised issues
that emerged in the postwar period. ln the section of his memoirs reprinted here, President Harry S. Truman sets out the views of other scientists
on the secretary of war's Advisory Committee, and explains the logic of his decision to use the atomic bomb on Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945) and the events as they unt'olded.
A Petition to the President of the United States
uly 17,1945
A Perrrroru ro rur Pnesr- DENT oF rne Ururrro Srerrs
We, the undersigned scientists, have
been working in the field of atomic power. Until recently we have had to fear that the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs during this war and that her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means. Today, with the defeat of Germany, this danger is averted and we feel impelled
to say what follows:
The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion and attacks by
atomic bombs may very well be an effec- -
tive method of warfare. We feel, how- ever, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail
and Japan were given an opportunity to surrender. . . .
[]f Japan still refused to surrender our nation might then, in certain cir- cumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step,
however, ought not to be made at any time without seriously considering the moral responsibilities which are involved.
The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step
in this direction, and there is almost no
limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which
sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the respon-
sibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.
lf after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled posses- sion of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in con- tinuous danger of sudden annihilation. . . .
The added material strength which this lead [in the field of atomic power] gives to the United States brings with it the obligation of restraint and if we
were to violate this obligation our position would be weakened in
of the world and in our own would then be more difficult for live up to our responsibility of brir the unloosened forces of under control.
ln view of the foregoing, undersigned, respecifully first, that you exercise your Commander-in-Chief, to rule United States shall not resort use of atomic bombs in this the terms which will be im Japan have been made public i
and 'Japan knowing these ter refused to surrender; second, such an event the question of or not to use atomic bombs be by you in the light of the presented in this petition as the other moral responsibilities are involved.
Source: Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F and R. Hal Williams, eds.,The Manhattan A Documentary lntroduction to the Atomic (New York:2000), p. 173.
930 CHAPTER 26 The SecondWorldWar
I
I
i
Competing Viewpoints
I
P r e si dent Tr um an\ M emo ir s
ll}ll;'fi#Y:'::r.# beyond imagination. On the other hand, the scientific advisers of the committee reported, "We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alterna- tive to drrect military use." lt was their conclusion that no technical demonstra- tion they might propose, such as over a deserted island, would be likely to bring the war to an end. lt had to be used against an enemy target.
The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to
e. Let there be no mistake about it. I the bomb as a military weapon
never had any doubt that it should used. The top military advisers to the
its use, and I he unhesitat-
told me that he favored the use of atomic bomb if it might aid to end war.
ln deciding to use this bomb I wanted make sure that it would be used as a
on of war in the manner prescribed
the laws of war. That meant that d it dropped on a military target
ad told Stimson that the bomb should dropped as nearly as possibly upon a production center of prime military
rortance.
Stimson's staff had prepared a of cities in Japan that might serve
as targets. Kyoto, though favored by General Arnold as a center of military activity, was eliminated when Secretary Stimson pointed out that it was a cultural and religious shrine of the Japanese.
Four cities were finally recom- mended as targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki. They were listed in that order as targets for the first attack. The order of selection was in accordance with the military importance of these cities, but allowance would be given for weather conditions at the time of the bombing. Before the selected targets were approved as proper for military purposes/ I personally went over them in detail with Stimson, lvlarshall, and Arnold, and we discussed the mat- ter of timing and the final choice of the firsttarget....
On August 6, the fourth day of the journey home from Potsdam, came the historic news that shook the world. I was.eating lunch with members of the Augusta's crew when Captain Frank Graham, White House Ar1"p Room watch officer, handed me the following message:
To rur PResroEur FRoM THE SecnrreRy or WRn
Big bomb dropped on Hiroshima August 5 al 7:15 e.u. Washington time. First reports indicate complete success which was even more conspic-
uous than earlier test.
I was greatly moved. I telephoned Byrnes aboard ship to give him the news and then said to the group of sailors around me, "This is the greatest thing in history. lt's time for us to get home."
Source: Harry S. f r uman, Memoirs, v ol. 1, Year of Decrslons (Garden City, NY: 1955),pp.a19-21.
Questions for Analysis 7. Scientists circulated petitions to
express their fears about how the atomic bomb would be used. Examine the outcomes the scientists proposed,
Which came closest to subsequent events? Which was the most prudent? The mosl honest?
2. ls it appropriate for scientists to pro- pose how new weapons should be used? Are they overreaching in trying to give advice in foreign affairs and military strategy, or are they obligated
to voice moral qualms?
Conclusion 931