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Toward the First World War: Dtplomacy in the Summer oJ 1914

The assassination of Franz Ferdtnand in Sarai'evo on June 28, 1914, set ot'f an increasingly desperate round ot'

negot iations. As the following exchanges show, dipl om ats and p oliti cal leaders on both sides vacillated from trying

pr0vo ke war to attempting to avert or at least contain it. A week after his nephew, the heir to the throne, was

Franz Josep h set out his interpretation of the long-stan ding conflict with Serbia and its larger implications (repri

The second selectton comes f rom an account of a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Austro'Hungarian

on July 7, 1914. The ministers disagreed sharply about diplomatic strategies and how crucial decisions should be

Austro-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia included the demands give n in the Jinal extract here. The British foreign

Sir Edward Grey, for one/ wQs shoched by Austria's demands, especta

Serbian judicial proceedings. The Serbian government's response was

diplomatic et't'orts to avert war still failed.

lly its insistencethat Austrian officials more conciliatory than most diplomats

Emperor FranzJoseph of Austria-Hungary to Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, July 5, 1914

Austr o -Hungdr ian D isagr eements ov er Strategy

be enhanced. lf Serbia rejected

tl::'*:rTLlrmiis Russian and Serb Pan-Slavs, an agitation

whose sole object is the weakening of

the Triple Alliance and the destruction

of my realm.

So far, all investigations have shown

that the Sarajevo murder was not Per- petrated by one individual, but grew out of a well-organized conspiracy, the threads of which can be traced to

Belgrade. Even though it will probably

be impossible to Prove the complic- ity of the Serb government, there can

be no doubt that its policy, aiming as it

does at the unification of all Southern Slavs under the Serb banner, encour- ages such crimes, and that the continu-

ation of such conditions constitutes a permanent threat to my-dynasty and my lands.. ..

This will only be possible if Serbia, which is at present the pivot of Pan-Slav

Ke i"i#"''it'frJ"#l* Wilhelm and fchancellor] Bethmann Hollweg had assured us emphatically of

Germany's unconditional support in the

event of military complications with Ser-

bia. . . . lt was clear to him that a military conflict with Serbia might bring about war with Russia. . . .

[Count lstvan Tisza, Prime min- ister of Hungary:] We should decide what our demands on Serbia will be

[but] should only present an ultima- tum if Serbia rejected them. These demands must be hard but not so that they cannot be complied with. lf Serbia accepted them, we could reg- ister a noteworthy diplomatic success and our prestige in the Balkans would

demands, then he too would

itary action. But he would alre

go on record that we could aim

down sizing but not the comPlete

hilation of Serbia because, would provoke Russia to fight death and, second, he-as Hun premier-could never consent monarchy's annexation of a

Source: Ralph lv'len ning, The Art of the Possible: Documents on Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914 (New York: 1996), pp. 400, 402-3, 414-15

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820 I cHnerrn z+ The FirstworldWar

Serbia. Whether or not we ought to go to war with Serbia was not a matter for Germany to decide. . . .

[Count Berchtold] remarked that the history of the past years showed that diplomatic successes against Serbia mlght enhance the prestige of the mon- archy temporarily, but that in reality the

tension in our relations with Serbia had only increased.

[Count Karl Stiirgkh, prime minister of Austria] . . . agreed with the Royal Hun- garian Prime Minister that we and not the German government had to determine whether a war was necessary or not . . .

Ibut] Count Tisza should take into account

that in pursuing a hesitant and weak pol- icy, we run the risk of not being so sure of Germany's unconditional support. .. .

[Leo von Bilinsky, Austro-Hungarian finance ministerl . . . The Serb understands only force, a diplomatic success would make no impression at all in Bosnia and would be harmful rather than beneficial.

Austr o -Ilungar y's Ultimatum to S erbia

il::rf,1#;:r;:r#*#: cialjournal of 26/13 )uly:

"The Royal Serb Government con- demns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, and regrets sincerely the horrible consequences of these criminal ambitions.

"The Royal Serb Government regrets that Serb officers and officials have taken part in the propaganda above-mentioned and thereby imperiled

friendly and neighbourly relations. "The Royal Government. . . consid-

ers it a duty to warn officers, officials and indeed all the inhabitants of the kingdom [of Serbia], that it will in future use great severity against such persons who may be guilty of similar doings.

The Royal Serb Government will moreover pledge itself to the following.

1. to suppress every publication likely to inspire hatred and contempt against the Monarchy;

2. to begin immediately dissolving the society called Narodn a Odbrana,* to seize all its means of propaganda and to act in the same way against all the societies and associations rn Serbia, which are busy with the propaganda against Austria-H ungary;

3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction everything that serves or might serve the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, both where teachers or books are concerned;

4. to remove from military ser- vice and from the administration all officers and officials who are guilty of having taken part in the propa- ganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names and proof of whose guilt the l. and R. Government Ilmperial ind Royal, that is, the Austro-Hungarian Empire] will communicate to the Royal Government;

5. to consent to the cooperation of l. and R. officials in Serbia in suppress- ing the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the lvlonarchy;

6. to open a judicial inquest lenquAte judiciaire) against all those who took part in the plot of 28 June, if they are to be found on Serbian territory; the l. and R. Government will delegate officials who will take an active part in these and associated inquiries;

The l. and R. Government expects the answer of the Royal government to reach it not later than Saturday, the 25th, at six in the afternoon.

* Narodna Odbrana, or Natronal Defense, was pro-Serbian and anti-Austrian but nonviolent. The Society of the Black Hand, to which Franz Ferdinand's assassin belonged, considered Narodna Odbrana too moderate.

Questions for Analysis 1. Emperor Franz Joseph's letter to

Kaiser Wilhelm ll iells of the Austrian investigation into the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. What did Franz Joseph seek from his German ally? What did the emperors under- stand by the phrase "if Serbia . . . is put out of action as a factor of political power in the Balkans"? Why might the Germans support a war against Serb- sponsored terrorism?

2. Could the Serbians have accepted the Austrian ultimatum without total loss of face and sacrifice of their inde- pendence? British and Russian for- eign ministers were shocked by the demands on Serbia. Others thought that the Austrians were justified and that Britain would act similarly if threatened by terrorism. lf, as Leo von Bilinsky said, "The Serb understands only force," why didn't Austria declare war without an ultimatum?

1914: Mobitizatton and the Early OfJensives I 821