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Arkansas has personal jurisdiction over Keating. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state is authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is served with a summons while the defendant is voluntarily inside the state. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). That is true even if service of the summons is the only connection between the state and the plaintiff, the defendant, or the plaintiff's claim. It is true where the defendant does not reside in the state, is only traveling through the state, and has no connection to the state except for the trip during which the defendant was served. Id. It is also true where none of the events or circumstances alleged in the plaintiff's complaint happened in the state. Id.

The defendant in Burnham was a New Jersey resident who had traveled on business to southern California and then to northern California to visit his children. The plaintiff was the defendant's wife, who had him served in a divorce action while he was in northern California. Four justices of the Supreme Court joined in an opinion by Justice Scalia and held that, under precedent going back two centuries, a state has “the power to hale before its courts any individual who could be found within its borders.” Id. at 610. Another four justices joined in an opinion by Justice Brennan and held that the defendant's presence in the state at the time of service was a purposeful availment that satisfies the minimum contacts requirements of International Shoe, 326

U.S. 310 (1945). The ninth justice (Stevens) concurred separately on the ground that both rationales are correct. Because there was no majority opinion, it is not settled which rationale supports the rule, although the rule had the unanimous support of all nine justices.

Regardless of the rationale, the effect here is that service on Keating in the Little Rock airport created personal jurisdiction in Arkansas. Keating was present in Arkansas at the moment of service. The process server's affidavit is evidence of that, and Keating concedes it. Moreover, she does not claim that she did not know she was in Arkansas or that she was in the state under duress. She bought her airline ticket knowing she would have to change planes in Little Rock, and her presence was therefore voluntary.

Keating argues, however, that she was not in Arkansas long enough to be subject to the state's jurisdiction, even if she was served in Arkansas. She points out that the Burnham defendant had traveled to California to conduct business there and visit his children, spending nights in hotels and purposely availing himself of the benefits of the state. Keating contends that this case is distinguishable from Burnham because her destination was Louisiana rather than Arkansas, and because she was on the ground in Arkansas for less than an hour and only for the purpose of getting to Louisiana.

This case cannot be distinguished from Burnham. The Scalia opinion stressed that the state's

jurisdiction extends to any visitor, “no matter how fleeting his visit.” Id. at 610. And the Brennan rationale would treat using the Little Rock airport for a connecting flight as purposeful availment supporting minimum contacts because Keating gained a benefit from Arkansas. Any other result would represent unsupportable policy in an era of modern travel. There is no practical way to craft a rule that would clearly distinguish between a presence in the state that is too short for jurisdiction and a presence that is long enough, which is why the Supreme Court held in Burnham that any presence is enough, if the defendant is served while present.

Moreover, Keating's presence in Arkansas was not limited to her 45 minutes inside the airport. She could have been validly served while either of the airplanes on which she flew was on the tarmac or even in the air over Arkansas. Service of process on a passenger in an airplane that flew over Arkansas but never landed in the state has been sustained because at the moment of service the passenger was inside Arkansas, even though the passenger was not on the ground. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). The Grace court reasoned that there is no real difference between a passenger on an airplane that passes through Arkansas airspace and a passenger who travels through the state by train or bus without disembarking. Id. at 447.Thus, Arkansas has jurisdiction over Keating, and her motion to dismiss should be denied.