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Challengers from the Sidelines Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right

Arie Perliger

‘Field of Empty Chairs’ is part of the Oklahoma City National Memorial which commemorates the victims killed in the 1995 attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building

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Challengers from the Sidelines

Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right

Arie Perliger

THE COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT

www.ctc.usma.edu

November 2012

The views expressed in this report are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Combating

Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, Department of Defense or U.S. government.

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AUTHOR’S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is a pleasure to thank those with whom I have had the privilege to discuss the nature

of the violent American far-right, and learn from their feedback. Most importantly, this

project could not have been completed without the support of the Combating Terrorism

Center and Department of Social Sciences at West Point.

I owe a great debt to those colleagues who spent considerable time and efforts reading

and commenting on drafts of this study, their critical assessment was invaluable. My

gratitude to the external readers Eitan Alimi and Leonard Weinberg who provided

constructive feedback. I am also grateful to the internal reviews provided by my

colleagues Liam Collins, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick and Nelly Lahoud. My immense

gratitude also to my research assistant, Limor Yungman, whose help with building the

Far-Right attacks dataset was critical to this project.

I have also benefited from my conversations with Jon Brickey, Ami Pedahzur, Bruce

Hoffman, Cindy Jebb, Michael Meese, Assaf Moghadam, Reid Sawyer and Bryan Price.

Last, but not least, I’m thankful to Andrew Watts for his meticulous copyediting.

Arie Perliger

West Point, New York

November 2012

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Executive Summary

Introduction

In the last few years, and especially since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the

number of attacks and violent plots originating from individuals and groups who self-

identify with the far-right of American politics. These incidents cause many to wonder

whether these are isolated attacks, an increasing trend, part of increasing societal

violence, or attributable to some other condition. To date, however, there has been

limited systematic documentation and analysis of incidents of American domestic

violence.

This study provides a conceptual foundation for understanding different far-right

groups and then presents the empirical analysis of violent incidents to identify those

perpetrating attacks and their associated trends. Through a comprehensive look at the

data, this study addresses three core questions:

(1) What are the main current characteristics of the violence produced by the far

right?

(2) What type of far-right groups are more prone than others to engage in

violence? How are characteristics of particular far-right groups correlated with their

tendency to engage in violence?

(3) What are the social and political factors associated with the level of far-right

violence? Are there political or social conditions that foster or discourage violence?

It is important to note that this study concentrates on those individuals and groups who

have actually perpetuated violence and is not a comprehensive analysis of the political

causes with which some far-right extremists identify. While the ability to hold and

appropriately articulate diverse political views is an American strength, extremists

committing acts of violence in the name of those causes undermine the freedoms that

they purport to espouse.

The Landscape of the American Violent Far Right

There are three major ideological movements within the American violent far right: a

racist/white supremacy movement, an anti-federalist movement and a fundamentalist

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movement. The ideological characteristics of the different movements affect their

operations in terms of tactics used, targets selected, and operations conducted.

The racist movement is comprised of white supremacy groups such as the KKK, neo-

Nazi groups such as the National Alliance and Skinheads groups such as the Hammerskin

Nation. The groups comprising this movement are interested in preserving or restoring

what they perceive as the appropriate and natural racial and cultural hierarchy, by

enforcing social and political control over non-Aryans/nonwhites such as African

Americans, Jews, and various immigrant communities. Therefore, their ideological

foundations are based mainly on ideas of racism, segregation, xenophobia, and

nativism (rejection of foreign norms and practices). In line with the movement’s

ideology, the great majority of attacks perpetrated by the racist groups are aimed

against individuals or groups affiliated with a specific minority ethnic group, or

identifiable facilities (mosques, synagogues, or schools affiliated with minority

communities). However, while the KKK extremists are heavily involved in acts of

vandalism, extremists from Skinheads and Neo-Nazi groups are more likely to engage

in attacks against people, including mass casualty attacks.

Violence derived from the modern anti-federalist movement appeared in full force only

in the early to mid-1990s and is interested in undermining the influence, legitimacy and

effective sovereignty of the federal government and its proxy organizations. The anti-

federalist rationale is multifaceted, and includes the beliefs that the American political

system and its proxies were hijacked by external forces interested in promoting a “New

World Order” (NWO) in which the United States will be absorbed into the United

Nations or another version of global government. They also espouse strong convictions

regarding the federal government, believing it to be corrupt and tyrannical, with a

natural tendency to intrude on individuals’ civil and constitutional rights. Finally, they

support civil activism, individual freedoms, and self government. Extremists in the anti-

federalist movement direct most their violence against the federal government and its

proxies in law enforcement.

Lastly, the fundamentalist stream, which includes mainly Christian Identity groups

such as the Aryan Nations, fuse religious fundamentalism with traditional white

supremacy and racial tendencies, thus promoting ideas of nativism, exclusionism, and

racial superiority through a unique interpretation of religious texts that focuses on

division of humanity according to primordial attributes. More specifically, these groups

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maintain that a correct interpretation of the holy texts reveals that it is not the people of

Israel but the Anglo-Saxons who are the chosen people and therefore assert their

natural superior status. Moreover, the war between the forces of light and darkness, as

portrayed in the Bible, will be (or has already been) manifested through a racial war

between the white Anglo-Saxon nation and various non-Anglo-Saxon ethnic groups.

Operationally, violence carried out by extremists associated with Identity groups

focuses on minorities and Identity members have a higher tendency to engage in mass

casualty attacks in comparison to other movements.

The typology illustrates that extremists link their behavior with their underlying

ideology and reinforce each other in the organizational frameworks of the American

violent far right. From a theoretical perspective, this constitutes a further indication of

the perception among some parts of the academic community that terrorism is an

instrument of symbolic discourse which is shared by violent groups and their

adversaries. Target selection is thus not based just on operational considerations, but is

one component, among others, that allows extremist groups to shape their message

using violent practices. Timing, weapons used, and target locations are only part of all

possible components that shape the symbolic message conveyed by any specific attack.

In this context, the policy implications are clear. If the different far right extremist

groups are driven by different ideological sentiments, and are thus also engaged in

distinguishable tactics, then the counterterrorism response must be tailored

appropriately for the movement involved.

Trends of Violence

This study also seeks to explain how both exogenous and endogenous factors may

shape the characteristics of American far right violence, including political,

demographic, and economic factors. Findings indicate that contentious and

conservative political environments as well as the political empowerment are positively

associated with the volume of violence; thus, it is not only feelings of deprivation that

motivate those involved in far right violence, but also the sense of empowerment that

emerges when the political system is perceived to be increasingly permissive to far right

ideas. These trends contradict predominant perceptions which associate motivational

forces that facilitate political violence with the unbalanced allocation of goods, and

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provide support for explanations which focus on correlations between violence and

perceived changes in the sociopolitical structure.

While the findings are not particularly strong with regard to the relationship between

the level of violence and economic factors, when looking at the trends in violence not

only in relation to time, but also across space, and considering demographic indicators,

it is clear that the violence is concentrated in heterogeneous areas, thus supporting

theoretical assumptions associating intra-community violence with community

cohesiveness and its members’ perceptions regarding community boundaries. It is

therefore clear from a policy perspective that more effort is needed to create effective

integration mechanisms in areas in which we see growing ethnic, religious and cultural

diversity.

Finally, the study provides additional insights that raise new questions for further

research, such as the perceived limited correlation between the level of violence and the

proportion and size of certain minority groups; changing trends in cooperation between

various ideological streams; the shift of the violence from the South to other parts of the

country; changes in the balance of power within the movements; and the clear decline

of some of the groups, such as anti-abortionist extremists. This study is intended to

represent a point of departure for further exploration of the American far right in

addition to informing current research and policy discussions.

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Table of Contents

Part 1- Conceptual Foundations and Historical Review 8

1. Introduction 9

2. Conceptualizing the Far Right 13

3. Conceptualizing the American Far Right 19

Part 2 – Empirical and Theoretical Foundations: Explaining American Far-Right Violence 84

4. Empirical Picture: General overview of the American Violent Far Right 85

5. Empirical Picture: The Perpetrators and Trends among Specific Movements 120

6. Concluding Remarks 146

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Part 1 – Conceptual Foundations and Historical Review

This operation took some long-term planning and, throughout the entire time, these soldiers were

aware that their lives would be sacrificed for their cause. If an Aryan wants an example of

‘Victory or Valhalla’, look no further (Thomas Metzger, Leader of the White Aryan Resistance,

in response to 9/11 attacks)1

…We should be blowing up NYC and DC, not waiting for a bunch of camel Jockeys to do it for

us (Victor Gerhard, Vanguard News Network)2

1 Martin Durham, White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics (New York: Routledge, 2007), 112. 2 Victor Gerhard, “Payback's A Bitch,” Vanguard News Network,

http://www.vanguardnewsnetwork.com/v1/index117.htm (accessed 24 May 2012).

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1. Introduction

Oklahoma state trooper Charles J. Hanger was patrolling interstate highway I-35 in the

morning hours of 19 April 1995 when he suddenly observed an old yellow Mercury

Marquis with no license plates.3 After signaling the driver to park the car on the

sideway, Hanger approached the car, and his suspicions were instantly raised. Not only

were the plates missing, but the driver also reacted in an unusual manner. Instead of

waiting within the car as most people would do, he stepped out and started calmly

engaging the state trooper in conversation, admitting he had neither insurance nor

license plates. The driver also admitted that he had a knife and a loaded handgun in his

possession, the latter without an appropriate license. In the state of Oklahoma, these

infractions result in immediate detention. To complete the unusual picture, the driver

was wearing a shirt printed with provocative phrases. The front of the shirt quoted the

words shouted by John Wilkes Booth after shooting Abraham Lincoln: “Thus, always,

to tyrants,” and on the back was Thomas Jefferson’s statement: “The tree of liberty must

be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.”4 As expected,

the driver, Timothy James McVeigh, was arrested and taken to the Perry District

Detention Center to await trial for illegal possession of a firearm. However, three days

later, the FBI concluded that this was the least of his crimes. Apparently, McVeigh was

responsible for the most devastating terrorist attack on US soil until then.

Little more than an hour before he had been arrested, McVeigh had driven a Ryder

truck loaded with over 6500 pounds of explosives and parked it near the Alfred P.

Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City. The subsequent explosion, two minutes

after 9am, had almost completely destroyed the northeast side of the building, although

failing to raze the building as McVeigh had hoped. One hundred and sixty-eight

people, including 19 children, were killed. Hundreds were injured. The city of

Oklahoma, and large parts of the country, were in a state of shock and disbelief.5

3 Michel Lue and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist (New York: Regan Books–HarperCollins, 2002), 239–40. 4 Ibid., 240–46. 5 For more details on the attack see Andrew Gumbel and Roger G. Charles, Oklahoma City: What the

Investigation Missed and Why it Still Matters (New York: William Morrow, 2012); Lue and Herbeck, 223–32;

Emily M. Bernstein, “Terror in Oklahoma: The overview; evidence linking suspect to blast offered in

court,” NY Times, 28 April, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/28/us/terror-oklahoma-overview-

evidence-linking-suspect-blast-offered-court.html?ref=timothyjamesmcveigh (accessed 2 November

2012); Robert D. McFadden, “Terror in Oklahoma: John Doe No. 1 -- A special report.; A Life of Solitude

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The FBI investigation revealed that the attack was not the act of a single fanatic, but an

operation planned by a small network consisting of four people,6 all with ties to the

American far-right subculture.7 Motivated by their rage, frustration and resentment

towards the federal government, they decided to take matters into their own hands. For

them, the only way to raise the awareness of the American public of what they

perceived as the growing corruption and incompetence of the federal government, as

well as its increasing tendency to violate civil and constitutional rights, was by

conducting a dramatic mass-casualty attack, killing as many representatives of the

Federal government as possible.8

Although unique in its impact and in the level of destruction it caused, the case of

McVeigh’s network is not exceptional in terms of the social, political, economic, and

contextual conditions that fostered its members’ radicalization. As in many other

violent political groups, the background and the radicalization process of the network’s

members appear to be associated with a supportive social enclave, sentiments of

alienation from the mainstream culture and political system, personal financial and

mental crises, and previous experience with exercising extreme violence.9 Hence,

evidence suggests that the use of theory deriving from the political violence and

terrorism literature is valuable in deciphering violent manifestations of the American

and Obsessions,” NY Times, 4 May, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/04/us/terror-oklahoma-john-

doe-no-1-special-report-life-solitude-obsessions.html?ref=timothyjamesmcveigh (accessed 2 November

2012); Joe Swickard, “The Life of Terry Nichols,”

Detroit Free Press: Seattle Times News Services, 11 May, 1995, http://www.webcitation.org/5wovr8qZG

(accessed 2 November 2012); “After Action Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing," (The

Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management: archived 25 August, 2003), available per request

from the Author/CTC. 6 McVeigh’s trial proceedings suggest that as many as six people were involved in the operation on some

level, including Terry Nichols and Michael and Lori Fortier; in other words, it was not a “lone-wolf”

operation. See - http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mcveigh/mcveightranscript.html, for more

details. 7 For detailed discussion on how far right ideology is being defined and conceptualized see chapter two

of this study; see also John Kifner, “Oklahoma Blast: A Tale in 2 Books?” (NY Times: 21 August 1995),

http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/21/us/oklahoma-blast-a-tale-in-2-books.html?ref=timothyjamesmcveigh

(accessed 2 November 2012). It was also found that McVeigh’s network was associated with the Aryan

Republican Army (ARA), a white supremacy group that waged a shadow war against the federal

government through the mid-1990s, striking at least 22 banks across the Midwest in an attempt to finance

an all-out race war, see Max McCoy, “Timothy McVeigh and the Neo-Nazi Bankrobbers,” (Fortean Times:

November 2004), http://www.webcitation.org/5woxP0H7c (accessed 2 November 2012). 8 Lue and Herbeck, 117–58. 9 Ibid.

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far-right.10 However, does the scale of the phenomenon justify a closer and more

rigorous examination? Or are we dealing with a marginal phenomenon? Looking at

recent trends of far-right violence in the United States could facilitate the formulation of

an answer.

Until the attack in Oklahoma, very few people noticed that the previous years (1994–5)

had been characterized by a striking rise in the number of violent attacks by American

far-right groups. After a relatively quiet 1993 in which the American far-right was

almost non-active (only nine attacks), no less than 75 attacks were perpetrated in the

following year, with another 30 attacks in the first three months of 1995.11 What

occurred in Oklahoma was not a random, isolated attack but part of a wave of far-right

violence which was fueled by specific political and social conditions. Although

following “OKBOMB,”12 the US government significantly augmented the resources and

measures employed to detect and dismantle violent and potentially dangerous far-right

associations, far-right groups did not cease to exist. Some of them adapted to the

growing governmental scrutiny by shifting to milder, less militant activities; others

formed new organizational entities in place of the old ones, hoping to deter suspicion.

Combined with the emergence of the Jihadi threat, this facilitated a prevailing sense

that the far right was in decline. However, this apparent interlude is over. In the last

few years, especially since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of attacks

and violent plots originating in the far-right of American politics. Does this reflect the

return of far-right violence? And if so, should we expect, as in previous waves, the

emergence of groups which will be willing to initiate mass casualty attacks, similar to

the one perpetrated by McVeigh and his associates? The current study will assess the

current and future threat from the far right by providing answers to three core

questions:

10 It should be noted that domestic political violence in the US is not restricted to the right side of the

political spectrum, although it seems that recent left wing terrorism is more related to Environmental

Animal Rights policies (see groups such as ELF and ALF), Paul Joosse, “Leaderless Resistance and

Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation Front,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 19(3) (2007),

351–68; Stefan H. Leader and Peter Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,”

Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(4) (2003), 37–8. 11 The data is based on the CTC’s Far-Right violence dataset. Detailed description of the dataset is

provided at part two of this study. 12 The name given to the federal investigation following the attack: see Richard A. Serano, One of Ours:

Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 139–41.

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1) What are the main current characteristics of the violence produced by the far

right?

2) What type of far-right groups are more prone than others to become involved in

violence? How are the characteristics of those particular far-right groups

correlated with their tendency to engage in violence?

3) What are the social and political factors associated with the level of far-right

violence? Are there political or social conditions that foster or discourage

violence?

The first part of the study provides a contextual foundation by conceptualizing the

American far right and then depicting its ideological and organizational/operational

development. The second part analyzes the violence and radicalization processes in the

different streams of the violent American far right using a comprehensive dataset that

documents American far-right violence in the last 22 years.13 The last part of the study is

an assessment of the future trajectory of American far right violence.

13 The primary resources are used extensively in the first part of the study, with quantitative data used

prevailingly in the second part.

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2. Conceptualizing the Far Right

2.1 - Conceptual Chaos

The study of far-right movements and parties has for years suffered from

terminological chaos and the absence of a clear and conceptual framework. Hence, it is

not merely that different scholars have used different terms to describe these political

groups, such as far right,14 extreme right,15 right wing populism,16 and radical right,17

but that there are also disagreements regarding the kind of ideological foundations that

constitute the far-right paradigm.18 Moreover, the particularities of different political

systems also facilitate confusion. For example, in the case of Israel, far right designation

is strongly linked to views which justify extreme means for preserving Israel’s control

over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the promotion of the idea of “the Greater Land

of Israel.”19 In both Israel and the United States the far right encompasses strong

religious dimensions, since in both countries religious ideology and fundamentalist

interpretation of holy texts are frequently suborned as justification for far right

extremism. However, in Europe it appears that the role of religion is more marginal,

and immigration and integration policies are the hallmark of far-right rhetoric.20

Although in the European and Israeli arenas we find a relatively cohesive far-right

universe in terms of its historical origins, ideological tenets and organizational

manifestations, including presence within the legitimate political system, in the

American case we can identify greater ideological and organizational diversity coupled

with a more marginal presence in political institutions.

14 Jonathan Marcus, “Exorcising Europe’s Demons: a Far Right Resurgence?” The Washington Quarterly,

23(4) (2000), 31–40; Angus Roxburgh, Preachers of Hate: The Rise of the Far Right (London: Gibson Square,

2002). 15 Paul Hainsworth, “Introduction to the Extreme Right,” in Paul Hainsworth ed. The Politics of the Extreme

Right: From The Margins to the Mainstream (London: Pinter, 2000) 1–17. 16 Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994). 17 Sabrina Ramet, “Defining the Radical Right: Values and Behaviors of Organized Intolerance in Post

Communist Central and Eastern Europe,”in Sabrina Ramet ed. Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe

since 1989 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) 3–27; Pedahzur Ami and Brichta

Avarham, “The Institutionalization of Extreme Right Wing Charismatic Parties: A Paradox?” Party

Politics 8(1) (2002), 31–49. 18 Cass Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11–14. 19 See e.g., Ehud Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 20 See e.g., Danny Rubinstein, Gush Emunim (Tel Aviv: Hkibutz Hameuchad, 1982); Ehud Sprinzak,

Fundamentalism, Terrorism, and Democracy: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground (Washington D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution, 1987).

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Similar to the attempts of terrorism scholars to confront the absence of an agreed

definition of terrorism, two complementing conceptual approaches have evolved to

describe the far right. The first approach aims at a minimal definition based on the

“lowest common denominator” principle, looking for the maximum number of

elements that have characterized all manifestations of far-right political activism. The

second approach attempts to achieve an inclusive definition based on the “most similar

system design,” seeking the greatest number of possible similarities among at least

some parts of the research population.21 In essence, the second approach has reflected

an effort to expand the boundaries of the far-right “family” and decrease the extent of

gray areas between the mainstream right and the far right. While most of the

abovementioned literature was written in the context of far-right parties, and not

violent groups per se, this body of literature is still useful for constructing the

ideological boundaries of the current study research population. Hence, the following

paragraphs briefly portray the basic and expanded conceptual frameworks of far-right

ideology. This will be followed by adaptation of these conceptual frameworks to the

case of the American far-right and the formulation of a typology of American far-right

groups.

2.2 - The Ideology of the Far Right

Before conceptualizing far-right ideology, it is important to note that the following

paragraphs, while using concepts which may be perceived as pejorative, are not

intended to provide moral judgment of the groups which comprise the far right, but to

point out their shared ideas and norms by using concepts which are accepted and well

defined within the academic literature. These norms and ideas will be further

exemplified and brought to life in later parts of this study, which will provide high-

resolution analysis of the ideology of the violent American far right.

If there is one ideological doctrine about which there is almost full consensus regarding

its importance for understanding the far-right worldview, it is that of nationalism.

Historically, the literature on nationalism has taken diverse directions and is extremely

rich, but in its varying guises it usually refers to the association between ethnic, cultural

21 For further debate on the two approaches see Mudde (2007), 13–15.

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and/or linguistic identity and political expression, or more simply put, the convergence

of a cultural framework with a political entity.22

In the context of the far-right worldview, nationalism takes an extreme form of full

convergence between one polity or territory and one ethnic or national collective.23 Two

elements are required for the fulfillment of this version of the nationalist doctrine. The

first is that of internal homogenization, i.e., the aspiration that all residents or citizens of

the polity will share the same national origin and ethnic characteristics.24 The second is

the element of external exclusiveness, the aspiration that all individuals belonging to a

specific national or ethnic group will reside in the homeland.25 As will be demonstrated

later, in the context of the American far-right the tendency is to emphasize the first

element. Several explanations can be provided for that inclination. First, in the context

of liberal democracies the limited control on the movement of population departing the

country in comparison with the greater capacity to control incoming population makes

policies promoting internal homogenization more attainable than those dealing with

external exclusiveness. Second, since the homeland is perhaps the most essential

element in ensuring the ongoing existence of the nation, there is more emphasis on

protecting the ethnic homogeneity of the population residing in the homeland than on

the need to consolidate the entire collective within one territory. Finally, the various

dimensions and implications of internal homogenization make it attractive to far-right

groups in terms of political mobilization.26 In simple terms, people tend to care more

about the homogeneity of their surroundings than the need to reduce the size of their

nation’s Diaspora.

22 Ernest Gellner, Nation and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blakwell, 1983); E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and

Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); For

works which provide a relevant overview of literature on Nationalism, see Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism

and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1998);

Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1994); Daniele Conversi, “Reassessing Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance

and Creation,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 1(1) (1995), 73–85; and Umut Ozkirimli, Theories of

Nationalism: A Critical Overview (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 23 See further discussion, see Betz (1994). 24 Koen Koch, “Back to Sarajevo or Beyond Trianon? Some Thoughts on the Problem of Nationalism

in Eastern Europe,” Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences 27(1) (1991), 29–42. 25 Ibid.; Mudde, Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 169. 26 Pedahzur and Perliger illustrate this in their analysis of the Israeli Far-Right, see Ami Pedahzur and

Arie Perliger, “An Alternative Approach for Defining the Boundaries of ‘Party Families’: Examples from

the Israeli Extreme Right-Wing Party Scene,” Australian Journal of Political Science, 39(2) (2004), 285–305.

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The idea of nativism represents a wider implementation of the internal homogenization

concept. Internal homogenization rejects the incorporation and recognition of those

embodying different ethnic and national traits as part of the nation. In addition,

nativism adds opposition to external influence, whether on a cultural, religious, or

normative basis. Foreign influence is perceived as a threat to the entirety and

homogeneity of the nation and, as a result, to its resiliency, its ability to counter external

threats and to preserve its essential traits.27 The concept of nativism explains why in

many cases the activities of far-right groups do not only oppose foreigners, but also

those citizens who promote what is perceived as non-native norms, practices or values.

By extending the idea of internal homogenization as it is reflected in the concept of

nativism, proponents of far-right ideology establish comfortable ground—and a moral

justification—for actions against the nation’s enemies from within.28

While ideas corresponding to internal homogenization and nativism are to be found in

all far-right groups, thereby constituting a minimal definition of far-right ideology,

there are other ideological elements which are considered almost consensual, and are

present in the majority of far-right groups or parties, although not in all of them, and

not always as core principles. These can be divided into two groups. The first includes

concepts that complement the rationale of internal homogenization through

xenophobia, racism and exclusionism. Xenophobia involves behaviors and sentiments

derived from fear, hate and hostility towards groups which are perceived as alien or

strange, including people with alternative sexual preferences, styles of living and

behavior;29 racism refers to the same sentiments, but based on racial grounds, such as

belief in the national and moral significance of natural and hereditary differences

between races, and the conviction that certain races are superior to others.30 Finally,

27 John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick: Rutgers

University Press, 1955); Mudde (2007), 18; Niambi M. Carter and Efren O. Perez, “If it’s White, is it Right?

National Attachments, African Americans, and Hostility to Immigrants.” Paper presented at the

American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA (2008). 28 Mudde (2007), 19. 29 Hainsworth (2000), 11; Mudde, “Right-wing Extremism Analyzed: a Comparative Analysis of the

Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP. CP'86),”European Journal of Political

Research, 27 (1995), 203–24. 30 Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea, “Some Introductory Observations on Race and Politics in

Britain,” in ed. Robert Mies and Annie Phizacklea, Racism and Political Action in Britain (London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 1–27; on different approaches for the conceptualization of racism see

Kevin Reilly; Stephen Kaufman; Angela Bodino, Racism: a global reader (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).

17

exclusionism is the practical manifestation of these sentiments on the communal or state

level. Practically, outsiders are excluded from specific spheres of the social, economic

and political arena, such as the labor market, the educational system and residential

areas.31

However, the intellectual property of the far right is not limited to defining the

boundaries between insiders and outsiders, but also strives to shape the political culture

and relations between the political system and society. These elements, which constitute

the second group as almost consensual, include an enduring affinity towards traditional

values, what is referred to as a “strong state,” and anti-democratic sentiment.

Regarding affinity towards traditional values, a common perception is that liberal/left-

wing and conservative worldviews are different in their time orientation. While liberal

worldviews are future- or progressive -oriented, conservative perspectives are more

past-oriented, and in general, are interested in preserving the status quo.32 The far right

represents a more extreme version of conservatism, as its political vision is usually

justified by the aspiration to restore or preserve values and practices that are part of the

idealized historical heritage of the nation or ethnic community.33 In many cases these

past-oriented perspectives help to formulate a nostalgic and romantic ideological aura

which makes these groups attractive for many who aspire to restore the halcyon days of

a clear hierarchy of values and norms.34 While traditional values provide an important

distinction between the far right and other political streams, it should be noted that it

does not typify the ideology of all extremist organizations; Closer inspection reveals

that specific parts of the new waves of far-right groups, especially those occurring since

the 1980s, do not always adhere to traditional values or tend to emphasize them.35

As part of the nostalgic sentiments promoted by far-right groups, there is an emphasis

on the clear and natural order that is regarded by its proponents as characterizing the

idealized past. Hence many of these groups advance policies related to strengthening 31 Pedahzur and Perliger (2004). 32 An effective summary of current and traditional perspectives regarding the nature of conservatism (in

comparison to liberal ideological frameworks) can be found in Vincent Andrew, Modern Political Ideologies

(Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1995), 55–8. 33 Hans-Georg Betz, “Politics of Resentment: Right-wing Radicalism in West Germany,” Comparative

Politics, 23 (1990), 15–60. 34 Hainsworth (2000), 12. 35 This will be exemplified later in the ideological analysis of the far-right groups.

18

state authorities (the “strong state” position) and “law and order,” as part of their

attempts to restore past glory and prevent further societal deterioration.36 Far-right

parties in Europe, for example, have traditionally demanded more resources for law

enforcement, and for releasing the judicial system from the liberal constraints

preventing the delivery of appropriate, usually harsher verdicts.37 In the American case,

this tendency is reflected in classic vigilantism, i.e., activities aimed at assisting

governmental authorities in “restoring order to society.”38

Finally, many recognize antidemocratic dispositions among various far-right groups.39

There are conceptual and practical dimensions to this tendency. On the conceptual

level, there are irreconcilable tensions between core nationalist elements, internal

homogenization and nativism of far right groups, on the one hand, and the liberal-

democratic value system, on the other hand. Such tensions tend to push far-right

groups to adopt an “anti-system” stance and revisionist views of the democratic system.

These tensions translate on the practical level: while far-right groups’ ideology is

designed to exclude minorities and foreigners, the liberal-democratic system is

designed to emphasize civil rights, minority rights and the balance of power.

To conclude, historically the far-right literature has provided numerous definitions and

conceptual and analytical frameworks for understanding the ideological paradigm of

these groups. As indicated by Mudde, by the mid-1990s no less than 28 different

definitions were introduced, including close to 60 different elements.40 However, it

seems that in the last few years there has been growing consensus regarding the

importance and the central role of the concepts discussed above in far-right ideology,

and for the need to establish core definitional elements such as these. The above

elements will be used in this study to sketch the boundaries of the American far-right.

Ideological components which have been excluded from the above discussion are those

which overlap with more specialized ideological concepts e.g., anti-parliamentarianism,

or which are less ideological per se and refer more to the practice of mobilization, such

as populism, or to the internal structure and organizational culture of far-right groups,

e.g., authoritarianism.

36 Mudde (1995), 216–17; see also discussion at Mudde (2007), 21–2. 37 Ibid. 38 For further discussion on the different types of vigilantism, see Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, “The

Causes of Vigilant Political Violence: The Case of Jewish Settlers,” Civil Wars, 6(3) (2003), 9–30. 39 Ibid, 214–15; Pedahzur and Perliger (2004). 40 Mudde (2007), 11–13.

19

3. Conceptualizing the American Far Right

In order to understand the dynamics and the impact of racism, we must view it as a faith—

and, for the American society, a permanent belief system rather than a transient apparition.

Its longevity has been tried and tested. It now occupies a place in the American value

pantheon alongside such concepts as democracy and liberty, though one would ordinarily

view this combination as contradictory.

Rutledge M. Dennis “Socialization and Racism”41

The American far-right was for many years associated with the militant activism of the

Ku Klux Klan (KKK). While the KKK and its modern white supremacist offspring are

still active, in recent decades other types of ideological groups have begun to populate

the American far-right universe. Among these are militias, Christian Identity groups,

Skinheads and neo-Nazis. From an analytical point of view, this development has had

two major implications. First, the far right has become more vibrant and more

ideologically and structurally diverse than ever before. Second, the boundaries of the

far right have grown less distinct as many of the new groups have occasionally become

inspired by ideas and practices which originated from outside conventional far-right

discourse. Both these implications reflect the need to develop an effective typology in

order to portray a more accurate and nuanced picture of the American far-right, as well

as for understanding its ideological development. A useful analytical instrument for the

construction of such a typology is the standard classification proposed originally by

McCarthy and Zald42 which differentiates between Social Movement (SM), Social

Movement Organization (SMO) and Social Movement Industry (SMI). The first element

is defined as a set of opinions and beliefs of a segment of the population, and represents

preferences for changing some aspects of social or political construction; the second,

SMO, is the formal organizational manifestation of the social movement. The Social

Movement Industry is a collection of SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the

broadest preferences of a social movement.

41 Rutledge M. Dennis, “Socialization and Racism: The White Experience,” in ed. Benjamin P. Bowser and

Raymond G. Hunt Impacts of Racism on White Americans (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications,

1981). 42 D. John McCarty and N. Mayer Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial

Theory,” American Journal of Sociology, 82(6) (1977), 1212–41.

20

As will be explained in the following sections, in the case of the American far right we

were able to identify three separate SMIs, each comprising various SMOs that represent

the ideological tenets of a distinct social movement (see Figure 1). This was done by

applying a domestic group dataset constructed specifically for the current study and

which documents different characteristics of all American far-right groups that have

been involved in violent activities. Based on the dataset, two levels of analysis have

been used to distinguish between different types of far-right groups: (a) ideological

analysis; (b) organizational and operational analysis. The following two sections will

investigate the different ideological frameworks which constitute the three SMs, and the

organizational and operational patterns of the respective SMOs and SMIs.

3.1 - The Ideological Universe of the American Far Right, 1865–2000s

Ideologies are dynamic and fairly coherent sets of symbols, concepts and values which

provide a framework for organizing and determining different dimensions of human

activities and interactions, social institutions, and the way new events and political,

social and cultural developments are interpreted.43 The dynamic nature of ideologies is

conspicuous in the history of the American far-right, as ideas, concepts, and values have

consistently been re-shaped, integrated with one another and re-evaluated. In order to

identify the main ideological concepts populating the American far-right, the

ideological platform of each group in the group dataset has been analyzed, and each of

the ideological components identified has been graded on a scale based on its

prominence in the group’s ideological platform according to the following categories: 1)

non-appearance; 2) indication; 3) present; and 4) core.44 Based on this analysis, as

already mentioned above, three main schools of thought have been identified, each

representing a distinct social movement.

43 For comprehensive discussion on the definition of ideology (including in historical context) see

Kathleen Knight, “Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century,” American

Political Science Review, 100(4) (2006), 619–26; Malcolm B. Hamilton, “The Elements of the Concept of

Ideology,” Political Studies, 35(1) (2006), 18–38. 44 “Non-appearance” means that the ideological components are absent from the group’s ideological

platform or terminology; “indication” means that the ideological components are implied or mentioned

briefly, but definitely are not emphasized or part of the group’s core ideological tenets; “present”

indicates that the ideological components are being mentioned frequently and used to support the

group’s core ideological principles. Finally, “core” indicates that the ideological components are part of

the basic raison d’être of the group.

21

3.1.1 - Racist/White Supremacy Movement: Ideological Foundations

The groups comprising the racist movement are interested in preserving or restoring

what they perceive as the natural racial and cultural hierarchy by enforcing social and

political control over non-Aryans45/nonwhites, such as African Americans, Jews and the

members of various immigrant communities. Their ideological foundations are based

mainly on ideas of nativism, internal homogeneity, racism, exclusionism and

xenophobia. Although other popular components of far-right ideology—a strong

affinity for law and order; traditional values; and anti-democratic dispositions—are

exhibited by some of these groups, they are clearly secondary.

The birth of the racist movement is usually associated with the emergence of the

original KKK in Tennessee in 1865. At its peak this association included half a million

members.46 Although in the aftermath of the Civil War it quickly declined and was

officially disbanded in 1869, it still provided the ideological foundation for the white

supremacy paradigm as exemplified in the declared goal of the first KKK convention

(1867) in Nashville: “To maintain the supremacy of the White race in the republic,”47

and similarly in the words of the KKK historian William Pierce Randel in describing the

motivation of the first KKK founders: “America was founded by the White race and for

the white race…any effort to transfer control to the black race was an obvious violation

of the constitution….”48 At that time, the main effort of the KKK in this regard was to

thwart attempts to impose changes to the social, economic and political order and

culture in the Southern states, and especially to maintain the asymmetric relations

between the white majority and African Americans.49 As explained by Horn, “The Klan

was doing only what the regional majority wanted—preserving the American way of

life as white Southerners defined it.”50 This was done by targeting “carpetbaggers

45 The term Aryan today usually refers to Anglo-Saxon Protestants, whose ethnic origin is from the central

and northern regions of Europe. 46 Michael Newton and Judy Ann Newton, Ku Klux Klan: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland

Publication, 1991). 47 A Betty Dobratz and Stephanie Shanks-Meile, “White Power, White Pride!” The White Separatist Movement

in the Unites States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997), 36. 48 Chester Quarles, Ku Klux Klan and related American Racialist and Antisemitic Organizations : a History and

Analysis (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1999), 40. 49 Ibid., 37.

50 Stanley Fitzgerald Horn, Invisible Empire; The Story of the Ku Klux Klan, 1866-1871 (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Co., 1939), 3–4.

22

[northern entrepreneurs], scalawags, and upwardly mobile Negros in a terroristic

way.”51

The early decades of the twentieth century witnessed the rise to prominence of far-right

ideologies in Central and Eastern Europe. Similar trends, on a smaller scale, were to be

found in the United States as well with the re-establishment of the KKK (the “Second

Klan”) by “Colonel” William Simmons in 1915, and the appearance of the American

version of National Socialism in the early 1930s. As for the KKK, Simmons and his

associates’ success in creating a relatively romantic, non-violent and anti-corporatist

image for the new KKK, facilitated the mobilization of significant support not just from

the traditional blue collar classes in the South, but also from no small segment of the

middle and upper classes of urban Protestants.52 Nonetheless, despite the mass nature

the KKK assumed in the late 1920s, it is still important to note that the Klan leadership

and the overall organizational ideology remained loyal to its original ideas of internal

homogeneity, nativism and traditional ethics, which were reflected by its white

supremacist, racist, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic rhetoric. The “Klan

Line” publication beginning in 1923 illustrates this: “The Anglo-Saxon is the type man

of History. To him must yield the self-centered Hebrew, the cultured Greek, the virile

Roman and Mystic Oriental…The KKK desires that its ruling members shall be of this

all-conquering blood…the KKK was planned for the White Americans…”53

During the mid-1930s, the KKK was joined on the white supremacy scene by the

German-American Bund, which was perhaps the predominant reflection of the growing

sympathy among some German-Americans for National Socialism and its racist

tendencies. In its 1938 convention, for example, the organization advocated a white,

gentile-ruled US, gentile-controlled unions, and cleansing of the Hollywood film

51 Quarles (1999), 31. 52 Rory McVeigh, Rise of the Ku Klux Klan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2009), chapter 1;

Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 39; Arnold Rice, Ku Klux Klan in American Politics (New York: Haskell House

Publishers LTD, 1972) 8; for other estimates regarding the size of the KKK at that time see also John

Zerzan, “Rank and File Radicalism within the Ku Klux Klan,” Anarchy: Journal of Desire Armed, (Summer

1993), 48–53; Robert Goldberg, Hooded Empire: The Ku Klux Klan in Colorado (Urbana: University of Illinois

Press, 1981), viii. 53 An unambiguous illustration of the strong racist foundation of the movement was provided by

Simmons himself in a speech he delivered in Dallas in 1923, when he argued regarding African

Americans that “They Have not, they cannot, attain the Anglo-Saxon level…the low mentality of savage

ancestors, of Jungle environment, is inherent in the blood stream of the colored race…” see Rice, 20.

23

industry of all alien, subversive doctrines.54 Hence, the Bund imported not just the

nativist and racist ideology of Nazism, but also the perception that the nation was being

manipulated and controlled by aliens and needed to be purified.55 The concept of the

hijacked government would be one of the ideological pillars of the militia movement

which would emerge 60 years later.

The Second World War did not result in the eradication of American National

Socialism. The dispersion of intense anti-German and anti-fascist sentiments among the

American population prevented expansion or effective mobilization by neo-Nazi

groups immediately after World War II. Nevertheless, since the late 1950s, and

especially in the 1970s, there has been a reemergence of neo-Nazi ideology with the

growth of groups such as the American Nazi Party (ANP)56, the Nationalist Socialist Party

of America (NSPA), and the National Alliance (NA), which, since the 1990s, has become

the largest and most influential neo-Nazi group in the United States.57 These groups did

not merely adopt Nazi heritage, symbols, rituals and ideological foundations to justify

and promote anti-Semitic, racist and nativist ideas, but also, endorsed full exclusionism,

in line with the National Socialist tradition. More specifically, since they believed that

territorial and racial purity was a condition for the survival of the white race, they

developed the idea of enforced segregation, including programs to eliminate inferior

races, i.e., Jews,58 to expel others, i.e., African Americans,59 or to divide the union into

racially homogeneous geographical areas.60

Ideas of geographical segregation were also gradually adopted by different KKK

branches in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These normally envisioned the creation of a

white national government (or confederacy), which would facilitate cooperation

54 Susan Canedy, America’s Nazis: A Democratic Dilemma (Menlo Park, CA: Markgraf Publication Group,

1990), 191–2. 55 See also Joachim Remak, “Friends of the New Germany: the Bund and German-American Relations,”

Journal of American History 29 (1) (1957), 38–41; Sander Diamond, Nazi Movement in the United States: 1924–

1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1974). 56 Which was later named the National Socialist White People’s Party (NSWPP). 57 Southern Poverty Law Center report, “National Alliance: North America Largest Neo Nazi Group

Flourishing,“ Klanwatch Intelligence Report , 82: 5-8 (1996); SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER report,

“Active Hate Groups,” Klanwatch Intelligence Report , 85: 19-22 (1997). 58 H. William Schmaltz, Hate: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party (Washington: Brassey’s,

1999), 2, 49–50, 100–101, 134; FBI file on ANP, 17. 59 FBI file on ANP, pg. 17. 60 Ibid.

24

between the “White States” in the face of the threats presented by other races. In 1984,

for example, David Duke, who in the mid-1970s became one of the prominent figures in

the KKK leadership, published a detailed program for concentrating different

minorities in regional ghettos, while 80% of the country would be reserved for “pure,”

“white” Christian states.61

Duke was a strong advocate for mainstreaming the Klan’s ideology and practices in

order to move the organization from the “cow pastures” to the “hotel meeting rooms.”62

This plan involved the inclusion of Catholics in the organization, up-scaling the

organization’s propaganda to attract a more educated audience, especially students, as

well as introducing policies for the induction of women into the organization.63

Eventually, to facilitate his vision of a more socially and nationally acceptable white

supremacy organization, he left the Klan and founded the National Association for the

Advancement of the White People (NAAWP).64 For the framework of the new organization

Duke adopted the rhetorical practices of the Civil Rights Movement. He framed his

nativist ideas defensively, usually presenting himself as a leader of the movement for

the promotion and protection of the rights of white people interested in preserving their

heritage and culture.65 This is not unexpected, as the sociological literature

acknowledged that movements and counter-movements—i.e. The White supremacy

and civil right movements—react and adapt to each other’s actions, in what Zald and

Useem describe as “a sometimes loosely coupled tango of mobilization and

demobilization.”66

This less militant framing of the classic KKK nativist and segregationist ideas

contributed to Duke’s popularity and convinced him to engage in mainstream politics.

However, he was never able to translate his extremist popularity into significant

61 James Ridgeway, Blood in the Face: The Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, Nazi Skinheads, and the Rise of a New

White Culture (London: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1995), 150–51. 62 Wyn Craig Wade, Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 368. 63 ADL report, Extremism on the Right (New York: ADL, 1988), 84. 64 Although it is not completely clear, it may be the case that the name was chosen to the ridicule or

leverage the better-known NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People). 65 See, e.g., NAAWP, “Why is the NAAWP Necessary?,” NAAWP News, July 66 (1992), 6. 66 Mayer N. Zald and Bert Useem, “Movements and Counter Movements Interactions: Mobilization,

Tactics and State Development,” in ed. Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy Social Movements in and

Organizational Society, New Brunswick (New Jersey: Transaction, 1987), 247.

25

political gains, at least not on the national level.67 Other KKK leaders experienced

similar failures. Tom Metzger, for example, ran for a Senate seat in California in 1983

but was unable to garner more than three percent of the votes.68 Frustrated by his

inability to popularize his ideas via the conventional political mechanisms, he

transformed his relatively mild White American Political Association (WAPA) into the

White Aryan Resistance (WAR), which in its heyday introduced the most extreme racist

rhetoric to the far right landscape and encouraged its members to engage in militant,

and sometimes violent, activities.69 Hence, while in the 1920s the relatively mild posture

of the KKK enabled it to ignite temporary mass support for the movement, these

ideological maneuvers where much less effective in the 1970s and 1980s, or at least were

not translated into formal political power.

In the early 1980s a new element joined the Klan and the neo-Nazi groups in populating

the white supremacy landscape. The Skinhead subculture had initially developed in the

UK in the late 1960s as an amalgam of delinquent white working class, anti-

establishment activists protesting against the bourgeois influences in British culture,

and ska/reggae/punk rock music and soccer fans;70 all seeking to express their

frustration at the harsh economic conditions and social marginalization of the British

working class. Skinheads adopted a strident territorial and neighborhood identity,

aggressive, often violent demeanor, and hostile views of consumer capital.71

British Skinheads of the early 1970s were influenced by working class concerns about

the economic impact of the growing waves of immigrants to the United Kingdom and

by the Conservative Party’s anti-immigrant rhetoric regarding the threat of alien

influence on British culture and lifestyle. They began to absorb white power ideology

67 However, he was a short-term member of the Louisiana House after winning a special election by

garnering 8459 votes in the 89th district. 68 Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 50. 69 This is reflected very effectively in the words of Metzger himself: “with WAR…rather than trying to

work with the System, as I had done with the WAPA, I shifted my stance and become more anti-system

then ever…” Published originally in Tom Metzger, Biography of Tom Metzger (Fallbrook, California: WAR

publication, 1996); see also Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 50. 70 Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project, Skinheads in America: racists on the rampage (Southern

Poverty Law Center publications: 2009?), 3. 71 For the Stylistic dimensions of the skinheads subculture, see the following ethnographic study: Susan

Willis, “Hardcore: Subculture American Style,” Critical Inquiry, 19(2) (1993), 365–83.

26

and behavior, targeting immigrants, homosexuals and hippies.72 The gradual shift of

Skinhead groups to white power ideology further intensified in the late 1970s and early

1980s, and was reflected by two overlapping developments. First, references to Nazi

heritage, symbols and memorabilia began to proliferate within the Skinhead subculture,

in part due to influence of the punk music scene, which adopted Nazi symbols as a

means of illustrating its anti-social, taboo-breaking nature.73 Hence, the swastika, SS

captions and other Nazi symbols became inherent aspects of Skinhead aesthetics.

Second, ties were initiated between Skinhead groups and National Socialist

organizations, in particular the British neo-Fascist Movement known as the British

National Front (NF), which saw the Skinheads as a convenient recruitment source and

was willing to provide them with financial and organizational assistance.74 It is

therefore not surprising that Skinhead violence assumed an anti-Semitic, anti-gay, anti-

Communist and anti-immigrant outlook. In the mid and later parts of the 1980s

Skinhead aesthetics spread across Europe, further enhancing its connections with the

institutionalized European far right and further developing and nourishing a

supportive cultural, mainly music, scene.75

The first seeds of the movement in the United States emerged in 1984–1985 with the

appearance of extremist associations such as the Chicago-based Romantic Violence and

the San Francisco-based American Front.76 These associations perceived themselves as

part of an American working class Aryan youth movement, opposing communist and

capitalist elements, which they believed were aimed at undermining the superior status

of the Aryan race in the United States.77 Ideologically, the Skinheads held much in

common with National Socialism, including intensive use of Nazi symbols and rhetoric.

They also adopted most of the common rhetorical and ideological elements of veteran

white supremacy groups, including radical nativism, support for ethnic internal

72 Mark S. Hamm, American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime (New York: Praeger,

1993), 23–5. 73 Bruce Dancis, “Safety Pins and Class Struggle: Punk Rock and the Left,” Socialist Review 8(39) (1978),

58–83; Dave Laing, One Chord Wonders. Power and Meaning in Punk Rock (New York: Open University

Press, 1985); Hamm, 28–9. 74 Jeff Coplon, “Skinheads Reich,” Utne Reader, May/June (1989), 80–89. 75 For what is likely to be the most comprehensive description of the movement, see Hamm. 76 Southern Poverty Law Center report, Skinheads in America (unknown date), 3; ADL, Hate Groups in

America: A Record of Bigotry and Violence, 2nd ed. (New York: ADL Publication, 1988); Coplon. 77 Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 64–7.

27

homogeneity and racist and exclusionary tendencies.78 Hammerskin Nation is the largest

Skinhead organization in the United States, and it serves as an umbrella organization

for various Skinhead chapters spread all over the country. Its slogan—“We must secure

the existence of our people and a future for White Children”79—embodies these

ideological tendencies. It also reflects the youth-oriented nature of the movement,

manifested in the Skinheads’ strong emphasis on white power music as a cultural

medium, fulfilling roles of recruitment, of formulating and influencing discourse, as

well as functioning as a source of identification and solidarity.

To conclude, all three segments of SMOs of the racist movement are committed to the

enhancement of internal homogeneity and to limiting foreign influence by engaging in

practices based on exclusion, segregation, discriminatory policies and the spread of

racist and discriminatory norms and values. Thus, what differentiates SMOs is not their

aspirations, but their unique framing, target audience and historical references. This

may explain why there is a relatively high level of cooperation between the SMOs of the

racist movement, especially when compared with the relations between SMOs of other

movements.

3.1.2 - Anti-Federalist Movement: Ideological Foundations

In contrast to the relatively long tradition of the white supremacy racist movement, the

anti-federalist movement appeared in full force only in the early to mid-1990s, with the

emergence of groups such as the Militia of Montana and the Michigan Militia. Anti-

federalism is normally identified in the literature as the “Militia” or “Patriot”

movement. Anti-federalist and anti-government sentiments were present in American

society before the 1990s in diverse movements and ideological associations promoting

anti-taxation, gun rights, survivalist practices,80 and libertarian ideas. However, most

scholars concur that the 1980s “farm crises,” combined with the implications of rapid

economic, cultural and technological changes in American society, growing political

78 Southern Poverty Law Center report, Skinheads in America (Unknown Date): Hamm, 50–60. 79 See, e.g., Hammerskin Nation, http://www.hammerskins.net/ (accessed 2 November 2012). The fourteen

words were originally articulated by David Lane, a member of The Order who was involved with the

assassination of Denver talk-radio celebrity Alan Berg and is now serving a life sentence. It should be

mentioned also that the “Fourteen Words” also constitute an important part of the radical right’s agenda

for activists in Europe: see Jeffrey Kaplan ed. Encyclopedia of White Power (Walnut Creek CA: Altamira

Press, 2000), p. 167. 80 For compressive documentation of these groups see Daniel Levitas, Terrorist Next Door, The Militia

Movement and the Radical Right (New York: St. Martin’s press, 2003).

28

influences of minority groups, and attempts to revise gun control and environmental

legislation, facilitated the rapid emergence of a cohesive movement in the mid to late

1990s.81 In other words, the militia movement was a reactive social movement which

mobilized in response to specific perceived threats.82

The anti-federalist movement’s ideology is based on the idea that there is an urgent

need to undermine the influence, legitimacy and practical sovereignty of the federal

government and its proxy organizations.83 The groups comprising the movement

suggest several rationales that seek to legitimize anti-federal sentiments. Some groups

are driven by a strong conviction that the American political system and its proxies

were hijacked by external forces interested in promoting a “New World Order,” (NWO)

in which the United States will be embedded in the UN or another version of global

government.84 The NWO will be advanced, they believe, via steady transition of powers

from local to federal law-enforcement agencies, i.e., the transformation of local police

and law-enforcement agencies into a federally controlled “National Police” agency85

that will in turn merge with a “Multi-National Peace Keeping Force.”86 The latter

deployment on US soil will be justified via a domestic campaign implemented by

interested parties that will emphasize American society’s deficiencies and US

government incompetency. This will convince the American people that restoring

stability and order inevitably demands the use of international forces. The last stage,

according to most NWO narratives, involves the transformation of the United States

government into an international/world government and the execution and oppression

81 See e.g., Richard Abanes, American Militias. Downers Grove (Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 1996), 7–20; Joel

Dyer, Harvest of Rage (Bolder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 24–44; Kathlyn Gay, Militias: Armed and

Dangerous (Springfield, New Jersey: Enslow Publishers INC., 1997), 36–52; Nella Van Dyke and A. Sarah

Soule, “Structural Social Changes and the Mobilizing Effect of Threat: Explaining Levels of Patriot and

Militia Organizing in the United States,” Social Problems, 49(4) (2002), 497–520.

82 See Van Dyke and Soule, 497–520; for an example of strain theories see also Daniel Bell, “The Disposed-

1962,” in Daniel Bell ed. The Radical Right (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962), 1–38;

Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade and the American Temperance Movement (Urbana and Chicago, Illinois:

University of Illinois Press, 1963). 83 Abanes; Dyer; Gay, 36–52. 84 Martin Durham, “American Far Right and 9/11,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15(2) (2003), 96–111. 85 Some use the term “Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force” or MJTF: see e.g., Mark Koernke, “America in

Peril,” Liveleak (Real World Publication, 1993),

http://www.liveleak.com/view?comments=1&i=be2_1269967024 (accessed 2 November 2012). 86 See e.g., George Eaton, “America is Lost Because the People are Lost,” Patriot Report, 2 October (1994);

Jack Mclamb, Operation Vampire Killer 2000 (Phoenix: PATNWO, 2000), 3.

29

of those opposing this process.87 Linda Thompson, the head of the Unorganized Militia of

the United States88 details the consequence of this global coup: ”This is the coming of the

New World Order. A one-world government, where, in order to put the new

government in place, we must all be disarmed first. To do that, the government is

deliberately creating schisms in our society, funding both the anti-abortion/pro-choice

sides, the antigun/pro-gun issues…trying to provoke a riot that will allow martial law

to be implemented and all weapons seized, while ‘dissidents’ are put safely away”.89

The fear of the materialization of the NWO makes most militias not merely hostile

towards the federal government but also hostile towards international organizations,

whether non-profitable NGOs, international corporations, or political institutions of the

international community, such as the UN.90

The militias’ anti-federalist sentiments are also rationalized by their perception of the

corrupted and tyrannical nature of the federal government and its apparent tendency to

violate individuals’ civilian liberties and constitutional rights.91 That is why they are

concerned about the transformation of the United States into a police state in which

87 Richard Abens, American Militias (Downers Grove, Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 1996), 75–86. 88 It should be noted that Thompson, who regards herself as “Adjunct General of the Unorganized Militia of

the United States” is one of more prolific ideologists of the Patriot movement: see Neil A. Hamilton,

Militias in America (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO Inc., 1996), 35–7. 89 Linda Thompson, “Waco, Another Perspective,” American Justice Foundation Publications (unknown

date), http://www.skeptictank.org/files/waco/ltstory2.htm (accessed 2 November 2012). Other less

popular versions crowd the far right landscape, e.g., (unknown author), “Conspiracy? What

Concipiracy?” New Jersey Newsletter, 1 September (1995) : “The New World Order (NWO) is simply this:

all nations that have nuclear weapons will turn them over to UN control, thus making the UN Supreme

Military Power on earth; and no nation, including the US, would have the military might to wage war.

United States sovereignty, along with the sovereignty of other nations, will come to an end.” 90 As an example, in December 1994 during the “Patriot Alert Rally” in Brevard county in Florida, Militia

members protested against flying the UN flag at the city hall; another example can be found in Operation

Vampire Killer 2000, one of the most popular texts among Militia members, which was produced by the

American Citizens and Lawmen Association in Arizona, and focuses on uncovering elements interested in

ending US independency. Honorable place among the Vampires is kept for the UN: see American

Citizens and Lawmen Association in Arizona, Operation Vampire Killer 2000, (Phoenix: Police against the

New World Order, 1992). 91 See e.g., regarding the Second Amendment, Militia of Montana, Militia of Montana Information and

Networking Manual, (1994), 2: “False is the idea of utility…that would take fire from men because it burns

and water because one may drown in it; that has no remedy for evils except destruction (of liberty). The

laws that forbid the carrying of arms are laws of such nature. They disarm only those who are neither

inclined nor determined to commit crimes…”

30

power is used arbitrarily and without accountability.92 In the words of a Missouri Militia

member, “One of the things that people really fear from the government is the idea that

the government can ruin your life; totally destroy your life….split your family up, do

the whole thing and walk off like you're a discarded banana peel, and with a ho-hum

attitude.”93

In the context of violation of constitutional rights, militia members in particular tend to

point out the steady increase in gun control and environmental legislation and the

overregulation of the economic and social realms, especially in regard to immigration

and education issues. The opposition to gun control legislation has been driven mainly

by the perception of many that this represents a breach of the Second Amendment and

a direct violation of a constitutional right, having direct impact on the ability of many to

preserve their common practices and way of life. In contrast, the opposition to

environmental legislation has been driven by the economic consequences of this

legislation, as perceived by the militia members, in particular the decline of industries

which are not environmentally friendly but crucial for the economy in rural areas. The

Testimony of Susan Schock reveals the resulting frustration, clearly expressed in the

words of Charles Shumway, Arizona Militia member: “Unless the ‘curse’ of the

Endangered Species Act was repealed, there would be ‘rioting, bloodshed, rebellion and

conflict that will make the Serbian-Bosnia affair look like a Sunday picnic.’”94

Finally, many of the militias also legitimize their ideological tendencies by referring to

the strong role of civilian activism, civilian paramilitary groups, individual freedoms,

and self-governing and frontier culture in America’s history and ethos, especially

during the Revolutionary War and the expansion to the West.95 Hence, members of

these groups see themselves as the successors of the nation’s founding fathers, and as

92 Stephen Vertigans, “Beyond the Fringe? Radicalization within the American Far Right,” Totalitarian

Movements and Political Religions, 8(3–4) (2007), 641–59. 93 Robert L. Snow, Terrorists Among Us: The Militia Threat (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing,

1999), 27. 94 Testimony of Susan Schock, Director of Gila Watch, in front of the Montana House of representatives,

11 July, 1995, http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/_previous/KAGAN%20COUNSEL/Counsel%20-

%20Box%20032%20-%20Folder%20009.pdf (accessed 2 November 2012). 95 For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between US early history and the contemporary militia

movement, see Darren Mulloy, American Extremism: History, Politics and Militia Movement (New York:

Routledge, 2004).

31

part of a struggle to restore or preserve what they regard as America’s true identity,

values and way of life.96

To conclude, it should be noted that historically some of the anti-federalist groups have

absorbed racist and Christian Identity sentiments; nonetheless, the glue binding their

membership and driving their activism has been and remains hostility, fear and the

need to challenge or restrict the sovereignty of the federal government.

3.1.3 - Christian Fundamentalist Movement: Ideological Foundations

The Christian fundamentalist violent far right emerged from two ideological platforms.

The more influential and popular one is that of the Christian Identity school of thought.

The second is the anti-abortion/pro-life paradigm. Hence, the ideological pillars of both

are the main theme of the current section.

3.1.3.1 – Ideological Tenets of the Christian Identity Movement

Christian Identity groups combine religious fundamentalism with traditional white

supremacy racist ideology. With the promotion of ideas of nativism, exclusionism, and

internal homogeneity, these groups advocate racial superiority via idiosyncratic

interpretations of religious texts that focus on the division of humanity according to

primordial attributes.97 More specifically, they maintain an interpretation of holy texts

which is meant to support the notion that it is not the people of Israel but Anglo-Saxons

who are the chosen people.98 Moreover, they maintain that a Manichaean war between

evil and good is central to the Bible and will be manifested in racial war between the

white Anglo-Saxon nation and various non-Anglo-Saxon ethnic groups such as the

“Children of Satan” (Jews) and “mud-people” (non-whites).99 The Identity groups tend

to rely on spurious religious heritage, symbols, rituals and norms in order to instill and

spread these ideas. They also use such symbols and rituals to provide encouragement

96 Ibid. 97 For a comprehensive review of the movement’s ideological framework, see Michael Barkun, Religion

and the Racist Right (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Robert Charles,

Race over Grace: The Racialist Religion of the Christian Identity Movement (Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse,

2003); Walter Jerome, One Aryan Nation Under God: Exposing the New Racial Extremists (Cleveland, Ohio:

Pilgrim Press, 2000). 98 See e.g., Dan Gayman, Do all Races Share in Salvation? For Whom Did Jesus Christ Die? (Schell City,

Missouri: The Church of Israel, 1995). 99 Sheldon Emry, Hairs of Promise (Phoenix: Lord’s Covenant Church, unknown date), 25; Jerome; 34–5.

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and moral justification for political activism against perceived threats to their preferred

socio-political order.100

The ideological roots of the American Christian Identity movement can be traced to

mid-nineteenth century England and the writings and lectures of a radical Scottish

weaver by the name of John Wilson. Wilson advocated the idea that the lost biblical

Israeli tribes migrated from the Middle East and settled in northern Europe, eventually

constituting the current Anglo-Saxon nations.101 Since the implication is that the Anglo-

Saxons are the chosen people, the “British Israelites” (or “Anglo-Israelism”) believe that

Anglo-Saxons are charged with a divine duty to conquer, dominate and colonize the

earth in the spirit of the biblical prophesies believed to have been given originally to the

people of Israel.102 In the late 1860s and 1870s, bank clerk Edward Hine was influenced

by Wilson’s writings and became a major force in spreading these ideas throughout the

British Isles and ultimately the United States with an effective network of publications

and associations which promoted the principles of the British Israelites. Hine refined

these writings to express the growing Anglo-American anti-German sentiment.103

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries several branches of this theological

movement were established on the East Coast of the United States, mainly under the

umbrella of the British-Israelite World Federation. This American wing expanded steadily

before the Second World War while gradually embracing anti-Semitic and racial

rhetoric.104 These developments are generally attributed to the early leaders of the

movement’s American wing, William J. Cameron and Howard Rand, who

100 In most cases the ideologists of the identity movement will supplement the 66 canonical books of the

New and Old Testament with readings from apocryphal books. Their approach to the Bible is typified by

the following statement of the Kingdom Identity ministers: “We believe the entire bible, both Old and

New Testaments, as originally inspired, to be inerrant, supreme, revealed word of God…all scripture is

written as doctrinal standard for our exhortation, admonition, correction, instruction, and example, the

whole counsel to be believed, taught, and followed.” See Jerome, 49; and “Doctrinal Statement of Belief”

(Merrimac, Masschusetts: Destiny Publishers), 3.

101 His most important work was published in 1840: see John Wilson, Lectures on Our Israelitish Origin

(London: James Nisbet, 1840). 102 John Wilson, “British Idealism: The ideological Restraints on Sect Organization,” in Bryan R. Wilson

ed. Patterns of Sectarianism: Organization and Ideology in Social and Religious Movements (London:

Heinemann, 1967). 103 Barkun, 6–15. 104 David A. Gerber, “Anti-Semitism and Jewish-Gentile Relations in American Historiography and the

American Past,” in David. A. Gerber (Ed) Anti-Semitism in American History (Urbana: University of Illinois

Press, 1986), 20–22.

33

systematically identified the Zionist movement and Jews as the main enemies of the

British-Israelite movement and engaged in anti-Semitic activities and propaganda.

Cameron and Rand’s followers after WWII, especially the preachers Gerald K. Smith,

Wesley Swift, Richard Butler and William Potter Gale, continued to develop the British-

Israelite ideological paradigm in their respective Identity churches and groups (such as

Church of Jesus Christ Christian, and The US Christian Posse Association), consistently

employing theological analysis to further proselytize extreme anti-Semitism, notions of

white supremacy and racial segregation, and to exult in apocalyptic visions,

transforming the British Israelites into the current day Identity movement.

The Identity movement’s anti-Semitic tendencies were not merely a result of its

identification of the Jews as the direct biological offspring of Satan (the rationale for

which will be explained later in this section), but also a reflection of several

representations and perceptions of the Jews, which appeared systematically in the

writing and preaching of the movement’s leaders. The first is the idea of Jewish world

conspiracy. Citing the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” as symbolic proof, Identity

leaders today promote the belief that Jewish dominance of financial arenas all over the

world is a means of instigating the destruction of Aryan civilizations.105 Secondly,

Identity thinkers criticize Jewish claims to be the chosen race by averring that the Jewish

peoples are actually the descendants of Judah, the least advanced and the most

primitive of the ancient biblical tribes, and not one of the ten lost tribes of Israel.106

Finally, Identity ideology tends to describe Judaism as the prevailing threat to the

Anglo-Saxon race and the Identity movement, as illustrated in the following statement

of an Identity thinker:

The wicked of the earth, the enemies of Christ, have grown strong and

arrogant in our land. They have infiltrated our schools, news media,

churches and government in their attempts to keep you in ignorance of your

105 See e.g., (unknown author), “Gentile Fall Involved in Hope of Jewish Rule,” Dearborn Independent: 8–9.

Many similar examples exist in the written universe of the movement. For further analysis see also

Barkun, 34–9. 106 Some of them even go further, arguing that the Jews are the descendants of a mix of ethnic groups,;

this is evident in the words of an identity thinker: “A Vast majority of Those calling themselves Jews

Today are descendants from the Canaanites, Edomites, Mongolians…while these people call themselves

Jews, The Bible Makes clear that they are of the Synagogue of Satan”. See Dan Gyman, Two Seeds of

Genesis, 3:15 rev (Schell City, Missouri: Church of Israel, 1994), 7; see also the same argument in William

Potter Gale’s “The Fate of our Fathers,” Identity 7(1974), 1.

34

identity as Israelites. They are attempting to steal your heritage. The heritage

their father Esau despised and sold; that they might conquer America and

take rule over the whole earth, and destroy, if they can, the very name of

Christ, Christians and Christianity. But God Almighty has decreed the

destruction of those who hate Jesus Christ and His True Israel People

[Obadiah 18].107

Historically, other anti-Semitic characteristics have emerged in the movement,

including Holocaust denial and the linking of Jews to practices and beliefs which their

members perceive to be socially injurious, such as abortion and socialism.108

While anti-Semitism is the most recognized ideological feature of the Identity

movement, an apocalyptic belief that the world/history is in its last days is at least as

important a component in the Identity paradigm. Already in the late 1890s and early

decades of the twentieth century, millenarian perceptions dominated the British-

Israelite movement. Hine indicated several stages which would lead to the “second

coming of the Lord,” including restoration of the Jews, i.e. their adoption of

Christianity; the universal acceptance of the gospel; and the resurrection of the

faithful.109 In later decades, other Identity scholars promoted different visions and

historical narratives regarding the path which would eventually end with the second

coming and the restoration of the dominance of the true people of Israel. Most of them

emphasized that the superior and unique status of the Aryan race is a directive of God,

and that the war between the children of light and of darkness (non Aryans) has

already begun and will cease with divine intervention and the establishment of Christ’s

Kingdom. Many of these supernatural forecasts also incorporate topical historical

conflicts such as the Cold War, the Israeli-Arab conflict, or other events which have

signaled the coming collapse of the existing world order.

107 Willie Martin, “The Assyrians Who Took The Israelites Captive Did Not Call Them By That Name!”

Part 7 of 32 (Chapter Five), In Search of Isaac's Children, see

http://www.fathersmanifesto.net/wm/wm0170/wm0170g.html (accessed 2 November 2012). 108 These tendencies apparently could also be identified in the broader pro-Life movement, as the words

of Father Paul Marx, founder of “Human Life International,” illustrate: “it is a strange thing how many

leaders of the abortion movement are Jewish.” See Aryeh Dean Cohen, “ADL: Anti-abortion attacks

tainted with anti-Semitism”, Jerusalem Post Service, (1998), see

http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/9450/adl-anti-abortion-attacks-tainted-with-anti-semitism/ (accessed

2 November 2012). 109 Barkun, 79–81.

35

The third ideological pillar of the Identity movement is the endorsement of racial

segregation and the notion of the superiority of the Aryan race. The origins of these

perceptions are embedded in the Identity movement’s interpretation of the biblical

story of Genesis. According to this version, Adam was not the first man, but the first

white man. Before him, pre-Adamic people of color were created by God who

possessed lesser spiritual attributes and qualities.110 Furthermore, the white people

could be divided into two competing “seed-lines”: those who are descendants of Adam

and Eve (Aryans), and all others (non-Aryans), who are descendants of Eve and the

serpent.111 Based on this interpretation, the Identity thinkers concluded that race mixing,

as in the case of Eve and the serpent, was the original sin that led to the expulsion of the

white man from the Garden of Eden.112 The narrative identifies Cain, the first murderer,

as the son of Satan and the first Jew.113

The exploitation of biblical texts to promulgate racial and other ideological notions is a

common practice in the ideological construction of the Identity movement. Another

example is the Identity movement’s interpretation of God’s revelations to Abraham and

his sons of the transformation of Israel into a dominant, flourishing and powerful

nation as an indication of the destiny of the Aryan people. Two further related trends

are worth mentioning. The first is the use of apocryphal historical revisionism to

associate each architectural achievement of ancient times to the white race, i.e., Egypt’s

110 See e.g., from the Kingdom Identity Ministry’s “Doctrinal Statement of Belief”: “We believe that the man

Adam (a Hebrew word meaning: ruddy, to show blood, flush, turn rosy, is father of the White race only.

As son of God, made in his likeness, Adam and his descendants, who are also the children of God, can

know YHVH god as their creator…”; Dan Gyman, and by proxy, the Church of Israel, provides a detailed

analysis of the Biblical text in order to rationalize this perspective: “without being dogmatic, if the Bible

includes the record of how the Non-Adamic were created, it is found in Genesis 1:25, where the Chay

Neffesh or living creatures are named. The living creatures here could have been biped or

quadruped…the Chai Neffesh creation, if it does include the other races, means they were created by

Yahweh…” and “Adam is the particularized creation. While Yahweh obviously created other races

separately, the bible makes no efforts to detail this creation because it was not intended to be the family

history of any other race than Adam kind”. See Gyman (1955), 150. 111 Charles, 31–7. 112 Since all races were created as different “functions”, it is a sin to promote in race mixing. M’Causland,

for example, who had significant influence on identity thinkers, argues that the flood was punishment as

a direct consequence of racial mixing: “it is plain that the moving cause of the destruction of the

Adamites, with the exception of Noah’s family was that their race had become corrupted by the

admixture of non-adamite blood.” See Dominick M’causland, Adam and the Adamite (London: Richard

Bently and Son, 1872), 70; for a more systematic analysis see also Chester L. Quarles, Christian Identity: The

Aryan American Bloodline Religion (Jefferson: North Carolina, McFarland and Company, 2004), 89–91. 113 Barkun, 162–3.

36

Middle Kingdom pyramids, Wiltshire’s Neolithic post-and-lintel structure of

Stonehenge, or the 17th century Mughal mausoleum, the Taj Mahal. The second is the

inclination to associate the non-Aryan seed-line with anti-Christian historical events, in

particular the persecution and murder of Jesus.114

To conclude, the ideological landscape of the Identity movement is continuing to

develop as prominent Christian Identity associations have continued to emerge in

recent decades. Worth noting were Robert Miles’ Mountain Church of Jesus Christ, which

introduced the concept of Dualism115 and further integrated ideas of racial purity and

genetic cleansing into the familiar Christian Identity narrative; James K. Warner’s New

Christian Crusade Church, which expanded the Identity racial rhetoric to target

immigrant groups; and the The LaPorta Church of Christ, which made an effort to present

a milder, less militant version of Christian Identity under the leadership of Pete

Peters.116

3.1.3.2 – Ideological Tenets: Violent Anti-Abortionist Groups

As mentioned, the Identity movement was not the only source of far-right violence

based on religious fundamentalism; since the late 1970s Americans have witnessed an

increase in the number of violent attacks against the abortion industry, which have been

initiated by groups and individuals demonstrating strong religious and fundamentalist

sentiments.

While the current study cannot cover the many different facets of the struggle between

the American pro-life and pro-choice movements, it should nonetheless be noted that

almost from its early days, and definitely after the 1973 Supreme Court ruling in Roe v.

Wade, religious views have been significant, if not a major part, of pro-life ideological

construction. It is no coincidence that the pro-life leadership has been dominated by

religious leaders and associations. For example, the American Catholic leadership

invested significant efforts in thwarting the growing impact of the Roe v. Wade Supreme

114 See for example “White Camelia Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,” http://www.wckkkk.org/identity.html

(accessed 2 November 2012); for further examples see also Jerome, 82–5; Barkun, 121–98. 115 Dualism existed before the Christian era and is manifested in a struggle between God and his Angels,

and Satan. It presents minor differences to the story of how Eve was seduced in Eden in order to create

the children of Satan, and that the Anglo-Saxons descended to earth in Europe rather than being the

descendants of the lost Israeli tribes. 116 See also Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 80–81.

37

Court decision and in 1974 the United States Catholic Conference sent four cardinals to

Washington, DC in order to convince Congress to legislate a national prohibition on

abortion.117 At the same time, other associations with orthodox orientations, such as Life

Amendment Political Action Committee, Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress and

Committee for Pro-Life Affairs promoted a pro-life agenda via engagement in electoral

processes, usually by focusing on thwarting the election of pro-choice candidates.118

Gradually, some pro-life leaders stretched the religious pro-life rationale into the realms

of Manichaean dualism119 and fundamentalist militancy, which are familiar from the

ideological rhetoric of the Identity movement. During 1979, for example, two well-

known speakers of the evangelical movement at that time, Dr. C. Everett Koop and

Francis Schaeffer, consistently claimed during a speaking tour that Roe v. Wade

“symbolize[d] the triumph of evil over good.”120 The implications were not late in

appearing, when a number of individuals engaged in militant activism to promote this

view. For instance, on 15 February 1979 twenty-one year old Peter Burkin ignited a

gasoline can in a nonprofit abortion clinic in Hempstead, New York. In the following

years, similar attacks were perpetrated, mostly by individuals affiliated with the Army

of God (AOG), the organization which would become the public face of the violent

campaign against abortion clinics and their staffs during the 1980s and 1990s.121

While the operational characteristics of AOG will be discussed later in this study, its

manual, which was uncovered in 1993 in the backyard of one of its activists, Shelly

Shannon, allows a unique glimpse into the ideological principles of pro-life violence.

First, those who support abortion are representatives of the devil and evil; hence, pro-

life forces must acknowledge that their struggle is part of an ongoing war between

Satan and God’s children.122 Second, the abortion industry is perceived as no less than a

mechanism for the systematic killing of innocent and pure human beings, or as it is

117 Connie Paige, Right to Lifers (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 60. 118 Patricia Baird-Windle and Eleanor J. Bader, Targets of Hatred: Anti Abortion Terrorism (New York:

Palgrave, 2001), 41. 119 Charles, 31–7. 120 Frank Schaeffer, “We Who Sowed Hate Share Blame In Killing Of Abortion Doctor,” Baltimore Sun, (2

June 2009), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-06-02/news/0906010039_1_abortion-late-term-roe-v

(accessed 2 November 2012); Baird-Windle and Bader, 61–62. 121 Joni Scott, “From Hate Rhetoric to Hate Crimes: A Link Acknowledged Too Late,” Humanist,

January/February (1999), 3. 122 “The Army of God: Dedication,” Army of God Manual (author unknown), Third Edition, chapter 1,

http://www.armyofgod.com/AOGsel1.html (accessed 2 November 2012).

38

described, a “new Holocaust.”123 Third, since every human being is created in the image

of God, it is by definition a sin to end their lives before they have been able to “enjoy

love and life of this planet.”124 Fourth, those who participate actively in the pro-life war

are members of a clandestine avant-garde, regarded as a remnant, a small minority

among the communities of believers. The reason for that is that the fragmentation of the

Christian religious establishment prevents any likelihood of unity behind the cause of

preventing abortion. Finally, the use of violence in this cause has several objectives: (a)

demolishing the murder weapons, i.e., destroying the structure within which abortions

are being committed; (b) disarming the individuals responsible for or participating in

the crimes by inflicting severe physical harm on them; (c) to deter those who continue to

engage in and to be part of the abortion industry by advocating the view that “the only

rational way to respond to the knowledge of an imminent and brutal murder is direct

action.”125 Hence, the violence is an act of rescue or defensive action rather than of

murder;126 (d) lastly, the violence aims to ignite the public discourse regarding the

morality of abortion. As explained in the AOG Manual:

It is easy at this time for the media as a whole to hold the position that they

do: they can comfortably be for death. Not so when the honorable citizens of

any given community begin to rise up in righteous indignation and destroy

these miniature Dachaus. All of a sudden, apathy is gone. The average

reporter says to himself, ‘Wow! Maybe there are a few people that really

believe all this jargon about abortion being murder.’127

To conclude, pro-life violence is driven by several ideological building blocks that are

enhanced by religious-based convictions, i.e., fetuses are human beings created in God’s

image, and as such should be accorded the rights of humans from the moment of

conception; any violent acts to end their lives are immoral and should be prevented.

Prevention includes damaging the physical tools of the crime, as well as shaping a

123 Operation B.R.I.C.K.: Babies Rescued Through Increased Cost Of Killing,” Army of God Manual. Third

edition, chapter 1: http://www.armyofgod.com/AOGsel3.html (accessed 2 November 2012). 124 Ibid. 125 Danny W. Davis, The Phinehas Priesthood: Violent Vanguard of the Christian Identity Movement

(Greenwood Publishing Group, Praeger: Santa Barbara, California, 2010), 111. 126 “An interview with an underground leader of the American

Holocaust Resistance Movement,” Army of God Manual. Third edition,

http://www.armyofgod.com/AOGsel7.html (accessed 2 November 2012). 127 Ibid.

39

moral and political environment which will convince people of the immorality of the

abortion industry and deter people from becoming part of it.

3.2 - Structural and Operational Patterns within the American Far Right, 1865–2000s

In order to provide an overview of the organizational and operational characteristics of

the violent far right, there is a need to differentiate between two distinct levels of

analysis. The first refers to the structural-operational patterns within the broad Social

Movements comprising the far-right arena (i.e., Racist/White Supremacy, Anti-

federalist, Christian-fundamentalist), while the second relates to structural-operational

patterns within the specific SMOs (organizations comprising the different far-right

movements). The following sections will address both levels of analysis.

3.2.1 - Racist/White Supremacy Movement: Organizational and Operational Evolution

Initial analysis of more than 150 years of political activism reveals several cyclical trends

within the white supremacy movement. In terms of their popularity, the groups

comprising this movement have enjoyed several peaks in their lifespan which were

usually followed by relatively quick and dramatic declines. Thus, mobilization and

growth was almost never a continuous long-term gradual process, but rather a response

to specific historical processes or events and social-political conditions which were used

by capable political entrepreneurs.128 The latter rarely were able to maintain the

attractiveness or significance of their organization and ideology in the face of changing

political conditions. So, for example, while the KKK was able to exploit economic and

social conditions several times in order to enhance its relevancy, it was almost never

able to adapt when the environment became less favorable. While this corresponds with

existing organizational and political violence literature, which tends to distinguish

between a group’s adaptability and its durability, it still raises the question of the

specific factors which prevented the white supremacy movement groups from

developing effective mechanisms of adaptation, especially since some of the groups

affiliated with other movements were more successful in this regard. While these kinds

of questions will be discussed further in the theoretical-empirical section of this study, it

should be noted that trends in popularity have also been reflected in the level of

violence produced by the different groups, as a rise in numbers of members has

128 This corresponds with some aspects of Political Opportunity Structure and mobilization theories,

which will be further discussed in the empirical section of this study.

40

consistently been reflected by a rise in the level of violence, even in cases when the

leadership objected to violent practices. This increase in violence despite leadership

proscription confirms the inherently violent and militant nature of the movement, but it

also implies an incapacity in maintaining operational discipline in times of

organizational growth. Furthermore, it affirms the validity of theoretical frameworks

linking growth in the level of social interactions within groups with escalation in the

militancy of organizational practices.

Finally, it appears that in many of the groups, repeated attempts by the organizational

leadership to enforce a rigid hierarchical structure have been relatively unsuccessful,

and have eventually led to the opposite result, i.e., increased fragmentation of the group

or movement. The following sections, examining the various groups which were active

within the racist movement, further discuss these tendencies and provide an

explanatory theoretical basis which will be developed in the theoretical-empirical

section of this study.

3.2.1.1 – Ku Klux Klan (KKK)

One of the earliest manifestations of far-right political activism in the United States was

the first generation KKK, which emerged in the American south during the second half

of the 1860s and early 1870s. Structurally and organizationally, its short history can be

divided into two distinct eras, before and after the first KKK convention. Between

December 1865 and April 1867 the movement spread across the South, growing quickly

with chapters established in Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia,

South Carolina and Georgia. A limited level of coordination and cooperation was

maintained between the different regional Klans, and a central leadership was

nonexistent.129 The first attempt to institutionalize the movement was made during the

first convention of the KKK in Nashville, Tennessee during April 1867, when Ret.

General Nathan Bedford Forrest was appointed as the first national leader of the

movement: the “Grand Wizard.” It was decided that the imperial headquarters would

be based in Memphis. Under his leadership, what was referred to as the “Invisible

Empire” was divided into realms (under the leadership of “Grand Dragons”),

129 Quarles (1999), 43.

41

dominions (under the leadership of “Grand Titans”), provinces (under the leadership of

“Grand Giants”) and Dens (under the leadership of “Grand Cyclops”).130

Despite attempts to consolidate an established hierarchy, evidence shows that this had a

limited effect on the operational characteristics of the movement, with the different

regional branches remaining highly independent, both in terms of the freedom to

choose the type of activities they preferred to undertake and their selection of targets for

attack. Most groups had a very flat internal structure, with each rank-and-file member

of the movement (a “Ghoul”) usually given a title based on his specific role.131 The

fragmented nature seems to have been a result of the limited logistical capacity of the

leadership to monitor the operations of the different regional branches effectively; the

zealous local sentiment of the activists, who usually believed they knew best how to

enforce their values in their town or province; and the tendency of Bedford himself to

empower the local associations of the KKK.132

Violent manifestations of the KKK at that time were directed mainly against African

Americans, representatives of northern-based organizations, and local individuals

involved in social interracial activities.133 While some of the Klan chapters claimed to

focus on regulation rather than punishment, violence was a recurring component in

most regional Klan activities.134 To illustrate, the Tennessee Klan alone was involved in

the early fall and summer of 1867 in 140 violent incidents; 25 of them ended with

fatalities and 35 included extreme assaults.135 Many of the latter involved branding of

their victims or mutilation with acid, flogging and physical beating. While these kinds

of activities encouraged the perception in the North that the KKK was a violent

subversive group, in the South many still viewed these activities as patriotic

retribution.136 This was also reflected in the growing popularity of the movement in that

region. While there is no clear evidence regarding the size of the overall movement at

130 David Chalmers, Hooded Americanism (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 181. 131 Chalmers, 13–19. 132 Quarles (1999), 43. 133 As an example, Randel mentions that 74 people were killed at that time in Georgia, and 109 in

Alabama: see William Pierce Randel, Ku Klux Klan: A Century of Infamy (Philadelphia, PA: Chilton, 1965),

114. 134 Susan Lawrence Davis, Authentic History, 1865-1877 (New York: American Library Service, 1924), 15–

16. 135 Martin Gitlin, Ku Klux Klan (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 5. 136 Quarles (1999), 39.

42

that time, Forrest claimed in an 1868 interview that the Tennessee Klan included more

than 40,000 members and that the overall number of KKK members in the South was

over half a million.137 It is unclear how reliable these numbers are, but there is broad

consensus that at that time much of the white population in the South felt empathy

towards the KKK.138

Ironically, the rapid expansion and the fragmented structure of the first KKK were the

primary causes for its ultimate collapse. While the cellular structure of the movement

provided flexibility and helped to overcome ideological and operational disagreements

between different regional Klans, it also crippled the leadership's ability to enforce

movement-wide practices and policies when necessary. Hence, despite the fact that in

late 1869 and early 1870 the federal authorities intensified their pressure against KKK

violence, small cells of the movement all over the South continued to engage in brutal

attacks against African Americans and white supporters of African-American rights.139

This in turn further legitimized federal scrutiny and legal actions against the Klan.

Eventually, after acknowledging the limited authorization and control he had over the

different chapters of the KKK, and facing federal chargers, Forrest announced the

disbandment of the KKK in January 1869.140 The violence continued until the end of

1871 when a combination of military, administrative and legal measures led to the

gradual decomposition of most regional Klans.141

Growing anti-immigrant sentiment following the extensive waves of immigration to

urban America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, combined with the

immense impact of the influential film the Birth of a Nation, led several Atlanta based

entrepreneurs, headed by Colonel William Simons, to reestablish the KKK in 1915.142

137 “Interview with Nathan Bedford Forrest,” Wikisource, The Free Library,

http://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=Interview_with_Nathan_Bedford_Forrest&oldid=3853811

(accessed November 2, 2012). 138 For further details concerning first generation KKK see also Chalmers, 1–22; Horn; William Loren Katz,

The Invisible Empire: The Ku Klux Klan Impact on History (Washington, DC: Open Hand, 1986); J. C. Lester

and D. L. Wilson, Ku Klux Klan, Its Origin, Growth, and Disbandonment (Nashville, Tennessee: Walter

Lynwood Fleming, 1884). 139 As described by the Grand Dragon Forrest himself “The South has become a veritable hell through

misrule”: see Quarles (1999), 45.

140 Gitlin, 7. 141 To illustrate, between July and December 1871 around 1,700 KKK klansmen were arrested in the states

of South Carolina, North Carolina, Mississippi and Georgia. See Newton and Newton, 335. 142 For more on the circumstances that led to the reestablishment of the KKK see Rice, iii; Randel, 181.

43

The Birth of a Nation depicted the heroic role of the KKK during the Reconstruction era

as the protector of white people from African-American violence. In a similar vein, the

KKK exploited the growing popularity of the printed media for publication and

distribution of its propaganda via the services of the public relations firm Southern

Publicity Association (SPA), which helped to promulgate the message using a variety of

media platforms.143 Also relying on a pyramid recruiting system,144 Simons and his

associates were able to mobilize support from the breadth of the South, increasing the

number of members from several hundred in 1915 to several million in the mid-1920s—

estimations range from 1.1 million to close to 5 million members.145

Following WWI, the KKK gradually succeeded in establishing chapters in the North.

Several factors were responsible for its growing popularity in this region of the country,

including returning African-American soldiers’ dissatisfaction with their

marginalization in American society and massive immigration of African Americans to

the North. Both of these trends added to the tensions in class and racial relations in

many urban centers, especially in the Northeast.146 Increasing discontent caused by

postwar immigration and its effect on the labor market and other structural economic

changes were to the KKK’s advantage as well.147 Added to this, the relatively mild

image of the KKK, perceived by many at that time as an “American Movement”

focused on national issues, helped in this regard.148 Each of these aspects created a

convenient environment for the transformation of the new KKK into a mass movement.

Organizationally, Simmons adopted the hybrid structure of the original KKK for the

revised movement which, while including a rigid formal hierarchy, also provided

143 It became eventually the propaganda Department of the KKK. 144 Henry P. Fry, Modern Ku Klux Klan (New York: Negro University Press, 1922), 16. 145 Stanley Frost, Challenges of the Klan (New York: Negro University Press, 1924), 238: Frost argued that

the KKK included more than 4 million members, even though the PSLC documentation indicates 5

million: Southern Poverty Law Center Klanwatch Staff, Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and Violence ed.

Susan Ballard, (Montgomery, Alabama: SPLC Publication, 1988), 46. McVeigh also provides strong

evidence of the growing dominance of the Klan in many Midwest and northern regions of the United

States, emphasizing strong empathy towards the organization, even by non-members. For example, he

mentions that more than two thirds of the cities in the US with a population above 50,000 experienced

KKK activities: see Rory McVeigh, 3, 12–13. 146 Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great Migration (New York:

Vintage, 2011). 147 Quarles (1999), 43–53. 148 Rory McVeigh, 5–7.

44

significant freedom to the regional Klans. The Imperial Wizard was assisted by 15

imperial officers (“Kloncilium”) and a legislative body (“Klonvokation”) consisting of

the imperial officers, special elected delegates and Grand Dragons.149 The latter were

appointed to lead particular realms (states); the realms in turn were divided into

provinces where several regional Klans could potentially operate, each in its own

“Klanton.”

Simmons also introduced an effective financial model which helped to sustain and

expand the new organization. It consisted of two main elements: the first was the

pyramid-like recruiting model. It was based on a network of recruiters (mainly

“Kleagles” and Protestant ministers) who were paid a fixed percentage of the initiation

fee ($10) for each recruit they brought into the movement.150 The new recruits were able

in turn to earn money by introducing individuals from their own social network with

their original recruiters. The movement’s second source of income was the large

quantity of KKK clothing and accessories which were offered to members and non-

members, including flags, knives, swords and even “Klan waters.”151 The growing

financial success allowed the network of recruiters to expand, providing luxury

lifestyles to the KKK leadership. The KKK purchased what was referred to as an

Imperial Mansion for Simmons for $200,000; other Grand Dragons were also heavily

compensated.152

However, the lifestyle of Simmons and his closest companions ultimately met with

growing criticism within the movement, eventually leading to leadership transition and

to the appointment of Hiram Evans153 as Simmons’ successor in 1922. But the damage

had already been done: a combination of popular disdain regarding the corrupt and

immoral nature and exploitative behavior of the KKK leadership, internal conflicts,

federal investigations, public criticism towards Klan relations with neo-Nazi groups and

149 Ku Klux Klan, Constitution and Laws of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (Inc.), (Atlanta Georgia: Knights of

the Ku Klux Klan, 1921) Article VI, http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/AmRad/constitutionlawsknights.pdf

(accessed 3 November 2012). 150 Quarles (1999), 57. 151 For example, the standard uniform cost approximately $5, and a robe $12: see Rice, 19. 152 Katz, 79. 153 Evans was a dentist from Dallas, Texas; his charismatic personality and educational background

facilitated his rise through the organizational ranks of the KKK since joining in 1920. Even more than

Forrest, he promoted the militant nature of the KKK: see e.g., his speech shortly after becoming Grand

Dragon: “We are armed and equipped; we are ready for any duty…it is true we have already fought

some battles, and won some, but we know that the real war is just starting…” (from Frost, 113).

45

finally the outbreak of the Great Depression—which made the business model of the

movement untenable—culminated in mass departure from the movement, especially its

middle class members.154 The latter development left the organization with only core

supporters from the relatively poor Southern agricultural areas. The financial

implications were severe and the KKK was forced to liquidate assets, including its

Imperial Mansion properties.155 When in spring 1944 the IRS presented a bill of more

than half a million dollars to the KKK, which was on the verge of bankruptcy and

claiming fewer than 10,000 paying members, the current Imperial Wizard James

Colescott announced his decision to disband the organization. It should be noted,

however, that while the incorporated KKK became almost totally dysfunctional, the

movement’s regional Klans, especially in Georgia, remained active, although they

assumed a less public, even secretive, stance.156

Notwithstanding its less antagonistic image, since its reestablishment in 1915 few KKK

branches excluded violence from their agenda. While there are no reliable sources

documenting KKK violent activities between its second birth in 1915 until the end of

WWII, different estimations and anecdotal evidence enable a reliable approximation of

at least several hundred attacks.157 The violence was aimed at enhancing the

organization’s social control over communities by a process of violent retribution,

intimidation and consolidation, thereby establishing all-white elections, in which

African Americans would be prevented from participating; segregation, by attacking

individuals, governmental institutions and commercial bodies that did not ban African

Americans from public establishments; and by maintaining anti-communist, anti-

Catholic sentiment.158 Hence, it is not surprising that in 1947 the US Attorney General's

Office included the KKK on its list of subversive, totalitarian, fascist and communist

organizations.159

At the same time, KKK’s social control was also achieved by legitimate political means.

This was evident especially in the South, where many of the communities’ religious,

154 Chalmers, 4. 155 Quarles (1999), 74. 156 Ibid., 79–92. 157 For example, New York World reported no less than 152 KKK crimes between 1920 and 1921. See Gitlin,

14–15. 158 Chalmers, 32–3.

159 Robert P. Ingalls, Hoods: The Story of the Ku Klux Klan (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1979), 81.

46

political and social leadership consisted of KKK members or individuals closely

affiliated with the organization.160 Klan members achieved success at a state level, as the

examples of David Bibb Graves (Alabama’s governor in the 1920s and 1930s) and

Walter M. Pierce (Oregon’s governor in the 1920s) illustrate.161

During the late 1940s there were attempts to rebuild the national framework of the KKK

under the charismatic leadership of Samuel Green, Georgia’s Grand Dragon.162

However, this ceased with his sudden death in 1949, and in the first years of the 1950s

the movement continued its gradual decline into irrelevancy. Except for a few active

cells, the organization was completely dormant until the mid-1950s, when the delicate

status quo in the South was challenged by the US Supreme Court rulings in 1954

(against “separate but equal” policies in education) and in 1955 (the requirement of

racial integration at the district level of schools). Leveraging feelings of resentment and

frustration among much of the Southern population, and later the growing negative

sentiment towards the civil rights movement, the KKK reemerged as a significant force

focusing on the prevention of integration.163 Thus, towards the end of the 1950s, the

surviving chapters included close to 100,000 members.164 This led to the renewal of

attempts to create organizational frameworks nationwide, among them the Americans

for the Preservation of the White Race and United Klan of America (UKA). The latter became

increasingly influential in the mid-1960s and eventually comprised a Klan-like

hierarchical structure with branches in different states, led by its own imperial wizard,

Robert Shelton.165

Nevertheless, the acknowledged national leadership with power over regional Klans

which existed in the first and second instances of the movement was not re-established.

This did not prevent the regional Klans from maintaining shared norms, routines and

protocols. In most Southern states there was a statewide organizational framework

160 Gitlin, 28. 161 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (London and

New York: Routledge, 2008) (second edition), 70–71. 162 Quarles (1999), 81–2. 163 See relevant theoretical discussion on the dynamic between social movements and counter movements

in David S. Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of

Political Opportunity,” The American Journal of Sociology, 101(6) (1996), 1628–60. 164 Rice, 118. 165 Some have indicated that in its heyday the United Klan of America (UKA) comprised almost 97% of the

Klan members in the United States; the North Carolina Klan alone included almost 200 Klaverns and

close to 7500 members: see Gitlin, 86.

47

divided into Klaverns which included between ten and forty members.166 Transferring

between Klaverns was only permitted with permission from both Klavern, and

attending other Klaverns’ meetings was not allowed without special authorization.

Rules and protocols existed for most aspects of the Klaverns’ activities including

clothing stipulations, admission requirements, Klan ceremony rituals and in-group

hierarchy; most Klans continued to use the same terminology for designated ranks, e.g.,

Imperial Wizard, Dragon, etc.167

During the 1950s and 1960s most of the KKK chapters were involved in innumerable

violent activities against African Americans and integration supporters, civil rights

activists and Jews. These included murder, arson, and the bombing of public facilities

and Jewish and Catholic churches.168 The violence increased between 1956 and 1958,

and again between 1963 and 1966, with hundreds of attacks per year and close to 50

complex annual operations, such as bombings and coordinated shooting attacks.169

There is substantial evidence regarding close cooperation between the KKK and local

law enforcement agencies, ranging from turning a blind eye to taking an active role in

Klan crimes.170 Hence, federal agencies, particularly the FBI, were forced to intensify

their efforts to contain KKK violence. The FBI was aided by exposure and criticism of

the brutal violence of many Klansmen in the burgeoning new media of television, and

in the success of the Civil Rights Movement and the growing involvement of the United

States in foreign conflicts, which shifted the public mindset from local issues to external

threats. Such national changes in technology and in foreign and domestic policy led to a

gradual decline in the KKK’s violence and membership towards the end of the 1960s.

Most estimations indicate that by the early 1970s the KKK consisted of no more than a

few thousand members.171

But the cyclical nature of the organization’s popularity was manifested again in the

second half of the 1970s and in the early 1980s as the movement experienced another

166 Quarles (1999), 99–101. 167 Ibid. 168 Christopher Hewitt, Political Violence and Terrorism in Modern America: a Chronology (Westport,

Connecticut: Praeger, 2005). 169 Ibid. 170 US Congress, House Un-American Activities Committee Report on the Activities of the Ku Klux Klan

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), 73. 171 An ADL report from 1973 argues that the number of KKK members was as low as 5000: see ADL

(1973), 12, 87.

48

upsurge in membership with the appearance of what some scholars designated as the

“New Klan” (or the “Klean Klan”).172 The organization now exhibited several new

characteristics, among them:173 (1) the emergence of a new cadre of leaders, more

charismatic and communications-savvy than in the past, including college graduates

interested in mainstreaming the KKK into legitimate politics (some of them also ran for

political positions such as Metzger and Duke); (2) the attempt to attract educated,

urban-based activists from the mid and high level socio-demographic echelons; (3) a

move toward engaging in publicly visible events and to reducing the level of secrecy

(including extensive use of the mainstream media and the newly evolved internet); and

lastly, (4) the tendency of a significant minority of KKK leaders to adopt liberal rhetoric

which focuses on the need to protect the rights of white people, rather than on

assuming social control over other ethnic and religious groups.174 Many of these leaders,

such as David Duke, Louis Beam, Thomas Metzger, Donald Black and Bill Wilkinson

were able to expand their Klan significantly, and became familiar figures nationwide.

Some also exploited their substantial popularity and publicity in order to establish their

own independent white supremacy groups, free from the shadows and constraints of

the KKK’s traditions and problematic violent image: for example, Tom Metzger

established the WAR and David Duke the NAAWP.175 These new organizations were

also a symptom of the growing fragmentation of the movement, and of the attempt to

break its boundaries to increase mobilization and cooperation with other far-right

groups outside the KKK realm. In the mid to late 1980s, for example, neo-Nazi Skinhead

groups in California cooperated with, and were guided by, Metzger’s California Knights

and later WAR.176 During this period KKK leaders forged close ties with Christian

Identity groups such as the Criminal Extremist Coalition (CEC) and the Aryan Nations.177

These changes indicate that the KKK was not only experiencing an ideological face-lift,

but had also adopted cooperative practices that helped it to gain access to ideologically

related movements distinct from the KKK.

The leaders of the new Klan held different perspectives regarding the importance and

effectiveness of violence for enhancing the popularity and influence of the movement

172 Gitlin, 36. 173 Southern Poverty Law Center Klanwatch Staff, 45. 174 Wyn Craig Wade, 368; NAAWP, 6. 175 Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 48–9. 176 Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project, 17–18. 177 Quarles (1999), 118–122.

49

and its values. Whereas David Duke usually rejected the use of violence, others, such as

Thomas Metzger, Bill Wilkinson and Louis Beam, continue to support and to emphasize

the importance of militant activism. Thus, Metzger established the Border Watch, a

militia group which patrolled the Mexican border with California and other southern

states,178 and Wilkinson and Beam founded military camps in their Klan territories.179

Beam was also one of the first to introduce the concept of “leaderless resistance,” based

on the idea of abandoning the attempts to create a nation-wide hierarchal KKK

organization and instead form a leaderless organization consisting of small cells of 6-8

individuals which would operate independently and thus maintain relative immunity

to external infiltration and to legislative and administrative counter-terrorism

measures.180 While it is not completely clear whether this was more an intellectual

reflection of the then current fragmentation of the KKK and the emergence of groups

such as The Order, or an attempt to further encourage and strengthen the increasingly

cellular nature of the KKK, it is clear that Beam, the Texas Klan leader, believed that this

was the most efficient structure in response to the strategies employed by the FBI

against American far-right groups.181 Other leaders joined him in advocating leaderless

resistance, especially following successful operations against their own organizations,

like Thomas Metzger did after the WAR collapsed in the early 1990s.182

These different approaches to violent activities reflect a tension between two

mobilization tactics. While Duke believed that the future survival of the movement

depended on its ability to mobilize support from the more centralized conservative

audience, emphasizing the clean and new intellectual nature of the Klan, other leaders

such as Beam and Wilkinson believed that the mobilization potential of the movement

existed among those who were looking for channels to actively manifest their

frustration and resentment towards minorities and the government: their investment in

the creation of military-like recruiting and training camps served exactly that aim. This

also explains their recruitment efforts among military veterans.

178 Hamm, 44.179 Lisa Klobuchar, Birmingham Church Bombing: The Ku Klux Klan's History of Terror

(Mankato, MN: Compass, 1963), 80. 179 Lisa Klobuchar, Birmingham Church Bombing: The Ku Klux Klan's History of Terror (Mankato, MN:

Compass, 1963), 80. 180 Southern Poverty Law Center Klanwatch Staff, 45. 181 Stephen E. Atkins, Encyclopedia of Right-Wing Extremism in Modern American History (New York: ABC-

CLIO, 2011), 222–3. 182 Gitlin, 100.

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In the late 1980s and early 1990s the political and public environment again became

hostile to the KKK. Several factors contributed to this change in the social and political

climate. First was the flourishing of the conservative right under the Reagan

Administration and its transformation into a powerful political force, when

“mainstream culture [became] anchored with conservatism and family values…that

were at the heart of a growing religious revival waged by the fundamentalist Christian

right.”183 Thus, the number of conservative Americans who felt disenfranchised and

sought radical political alternatives had decreased. Second was the effective use of

civilian law suits by civil rights organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League

(ADL), the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), and others. Wilkinson’s Louisiana

Knights, for example, eventually collapsed after they were unable to deal with the

growing torrent of civil lawsuits; the same process led to the collapse of Robert

Shelton’s UKA.184 Third, the growing competition with other groups with similar

extremist ideological tenets and fewer image problems, such as the militias, the

Christian Identity groups, and the Skinheads, added to the difficulty of maintaining the

organization’s relevance. Finally, while the 1995 Oklahoma CIty bombing directed most

of the attention of law enforcement authorities to the militia movement, the KKK also

suffered from official scrutiny and public backlash. Hence, in the mid-1990s most

assessments indicated that KKK membership was less than 10,000 members

nationwide.185 There are no significant indications that, since then, the KKK has been

able to return to its former peak membership numbers, and in many ways it has

continued to be overshadowed by its competition.

3.2.1.2 – The American National Socialist Movement and Neo-Nazi Groups

National Socialism has maintained a presence in the American political and social arena

since the early 1930s. But unlike other components of the far right, it was never able to

transform into a mass movement or gain any access, even limited, to legitimate politics.

While some of the theoretical approaches in the political violence literature predict that

this leads to further radicalization and provides greater incentive to engage in violence,

neo-Nazi organizations’ involvement in violence was mostly marginal, at least until the

183 Hamm, 46. 184 Gitlin, 89. 185 See for example KKK profile at the SPLC website –

http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan.

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late 1970s and early 1980s, when new and more militant neo-Nazi groups began to

emerge and to cooperate with other far-right groups.

Probably the first significant organized manifestation of support for Nazi ideology in

the United States was the Chicago-based Friends of the New Germany (FOTNG) which

was formed in 1930 as a social organization linking Americans of German origin who

identified with the new rising German National-Socialist party.186 As the latter gained

political dominance in Germany, FOTNG's popularity increased, and in the mid-1930s

consisted of between 10,000 and 20,000 members, most of them first or second

generation German immigrants from Chicago or New York City.187 In 1936, the FOTNG

transformed officially into the German-American Bund, and under the leadership of Fritz

Kuhn (WWI German Army veteran and member of the Nazi Party) focused mainly on

spreading anti-Semitic, anti-Communist and anti-Liberal propaganda. This was

conducted mainly at rallies and demonstrations, as well as at recreational-

indoctrination camps in New York and New Jersey for members and supporters.188 The

Bund also created its own version of Hitler Youth, aimed at preserving and enhancing

the familiarity of future generations of German-Americans with German heritage and

culture.189

However, despite these attempts to expand the organization’s size and influence, the

Bund never gained momentum. Several causative factors are relevant. To begin with, it

failed to convince the Third Reich’s leadership to support it financially or ideologically.

Moreover, the Nazi regime, understanding that the Bund's actions intensified anti-

German sentiments in the United States, consistently refused to allow German citizens

to join the Bund and condemned the use of Nazi emblems and symbols by its

members.190 The German ambassador described Bund activities as “stupid and noisy

activities.”191 Second, Kuhn himself, with his poor English and limited understanding of

American culture, was rarely able to relate to German-Americans and was a major

burden for an organization looking to gain sympathy within the American-German

186 Remak, 38–41. 187 Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 55–7. 188 Canedy, 190–91.

189 For more on the Bund see Leland Bell, “The Failure of Nazism in America,” Political Science Quarterly,

85(4) (1970), 585-599; Gene Smith, “Bundesfuehrer Kuhn,” American Heritage 46(5) (1995), 102.

190 Bell.

191 Ibid.

52

public. Finally, as the United States became more involved in the war, there was a

growing perception in the law enforcement community that the Bund harbored

subversive potential. This led to a series of federal and local investigations against the

organization, and to its eventual dissolution in December 1941.192

While the Second World War witnessed the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Nazi ideology

never entirely disappeared from the political realms in the West, nor did it do so in

Europe, which experienced the emergence of far-right fascist parties shortly after the

end of the war. Nor did it vanish in the United States, where several highly centralized

neo-Nazi groups raised their heads in the 1950s and 1960s. The first among these was

the National Renaissance Party (NRP), established in 1949 by James Madole. This cult-like

organization, which ceased to exist after the death of Madole in 1978, focused

principally on conducting public rallies and demonstrations and producing National-

Socialist propaganda via the “National Renaissance Bulletin.” It promoted ideas

regarding the need to free the entertainment and media industries from Jewish

control.193 Although the NRP formed its own elite guard, which was mostly used for

protecting Madole from angry protesters during NRP rallies, there are no indications of

the involvement of the party in violent activities, or that it was able to garner support

beyond its core of several dozen supporters in New York State.194

A decade after the NRP was formed it was joined by The American Nazi Party (ANP),195

an organization that would become not just the face of American neo-Nazism in the

1960s, but also a breeding ground for the leaders of American neo-Nazism in the

following decades. The ANP was founded by George Lincoln Rockwell, former WWII

Navy veteran, and a charismatic and skilled speaker who understood the power of the

rising mass media in drawing attention to his ideas and to ANP activities.196 As in the

NRP, ANP activities were mainly comprised of rallies, demonstrations, public speaking

events and the publication of ANP propaganda. The propaganda was disseminated via

two bulletins: “The Stormtrooper” and the “Rockwell Report,” which were aimed at

192 Canedy, 224–5.

193 John George and Laird Wilcox, Nazis, Communists, Klansman and others on the Fringe (Buffalo, New

York: Prometheus Books, 1992), 352–4. 194 Hewitt. 195 Initially the organization was named the “World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists”

(WUFENS), but Rockwell and the media quickly started to refer to it as the ANP: see FBI file, 11. 196 For comprehensive documentation of ANP activities, see Schmaltz.

53

exposing the cooperation between American Jewry and communists, and advancing

ideas of racial segregation.197 The NRP and ANP also shared a similar organizational

structure. The ANP had a highly centralized structure, in which “Commander”

Rockwell was the only meaningful authority. Understandably, the NRP headquarters in

Arlington, Virginia—the base of the “Stormtrooper” rank-and-file members, which was

also known as “Hatemonger Hill”—was managed as a military base under the

leadership of Rockwell.198 The members were divided by rank, wore uniforms, and

subjected to strict discipline. Moreover, all new members participated in three days of

ideological training, which concluded with a commencement ceremony.199

Rockwell was able to attract significant attention via the ANP’s endless inflammatory

events and initiatives.200 He publicized its legal struggles against those who tried to

prevent him from disseminating ANP materials and conducting party events in public

areas. The ANP was able to establish several branches outside Virginia (Fighting

American Nationalists groups were formed in Chicago, New York City, Pennsylvania,

Ohio, Maryland, California, Dallas and Illinois; and some branches of the ANP youth

movement, White Youth Corps, were established in California, Chicago, Washington DC

and New York City).201 However, most indications are that the party was never able to

grow beyond a few hundred members.202 This was also reflected in the complete failure

of Rockwell’s campaign for the governorship of Virginia during 1965 in which he

garnered less than one percent of the vote.203 The campaign nonetheless displayed the

conviction of Rockwell and his followers that the party’s road to power would be

through non-violent political means, a path that was also articulated in the ANP

political program.204

The ANP failed to generate stable sources of income, most of the time relying on

membership fees of $5 per month, and a onetime $10 initiation fee, and small donations

197 FBI file on ANP, 18–30. 198 FBI file on ANP, 37–45. 199 FBI file on ANP, 44. 200 See e.g., Rockwell’s “hate bus” initiative. During 1961, as a response to CORE’s (Congress of National

Equality) “Freedom Ride,” Rockwell organized a cross-country trip for 12 ANP members from DC to New

Orleans, on a Volkswagen bus, to protest against “Race Mixing”: see also Schmaltz, 116-117. 201 Schmaltz, 39, 57. 202 According to the relevant FBI files, the number never exceeded 100. 203 Schmaltz, 247–9. 204 Ibid.

54

from relatively affluent sympathizers.205 This is not surprising, since most indications

suggest that the majority of ANP members and supporters were usually from low

socio-economic echelons, and a relatively large number had criminal records.206

In view of the mobilization and funding challenges presented above, Rockwell

concluded that the association with Nazi Germany was the main obstacle in mobilizing

support for the ANP. More specifically, even though many white Americans identified

with the principles of National Socialism, the foreign, Nazi image of the party deterred

them from seriously considering joining or supporting it. Thus, in January 1967

Rockwell changed the party name to National Socialist White People’s Party (NSWPP) and

changed its slogan from “Sieg Heil” to “White Power.” He issued the party’s ten point

program, which emphasized the need to fight for all-white America and to eradicate the

control of American Jewry over American culture, finance and politics.207 Nonetheless,

organizationally and operationally the ANP did not experience any significant changes.

Such drastic organizational change only occurred with the assassination of Rockwell in

August 1967 by John Palter, a former ANP member who had been expelled from the

party by Rockwell several months earlier.208

The death of Rockwell, particularly the absence of a natural and consensual successor,

led many prominent members of the ANP to depart and form their own organizations,

among them the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA), led by Frank Colin, the White

Party of America, led by Karl Helen, the National White People, led by Charles White, and

perhaps most importantly, the National Alliance, founded by William Pierce in 1970.209

The ANP, suffering from the exodus of prominent members, and without its

charismatic leader, experienced a long decline in terms of membership and public

influence. Branches in many major cities were shut down, such as in Los Angeles and

Chicago, the barracks were abandoned and the headquarters were eventually relocated

to Milwaukee.210 In 1984 Matt Koehl, Rockwell’s successor, decided to restructure the

party ideology by adding religious and Christian Identity components and adopting

structures and norms similar to those of a cult. He claimed that Hitler was the gift of an

205 FBI file on ANP, 49–50. 206 FBI file on the ANP, 33. 207 Schmaltz, 304–5. 208 Ibid., 320–23. 209 George and Wilcox, 363–5. 210 In 1983 they moved to a suburb of Milwaukee (New Berlin). See George and Wilcox, 359.

55

inscrutable divine providence, sent to rescue the white race from decadence and

extinction.211 In this context, he announced that the party would be renamed New

Order.212 These changes had limited effect, however, as the party found it difficult to

expand beyond its several dozen members and close to a hundred supporters. Today,

the name American Nazi Party has been adopted by a group run by Rocky J. Suhayda, a

former member of Rockwell’s original ANP. Based in Westland, Michigan, Suhayda’s

ANP website sells nostalgic reprints of Rockwell’s 1960s-era magazine “The

Stormtrooper,” and holds semi-private annual meetings in Laurens, South Carolina.213

To conclude, the inability of the ANP to mobilize significant support was a result of

several factors, including its reliance for many years on foreign National Socialist

heritage and jargon; a rigid ideological framework which made the party less

competitive in the far-right universe; the military culture of the party, which

intimidated many potential supporters; the avoidance of violent/action-oriented

initiatives, which alienated those seeking a militant framework; and finally, the limited

funds available to sustain party operations.

As mentioned above, the vacuum left by the decline of the ANP was filled by

organizations led by Rockwell’s former followers, and by groups such as the National

Socialist Movement, National Socialist Vanguard, Nationalist Socialist White American Party,

National Socialist League, and Euro-American Alliance.214 Hence, the decline of the ANP

facilitated the breakdown of American national socialism from a relatively cohesive

framework in the late 1950s and early 1960s into an accumulation of smaller fragments,

many of these consisting of only a handful of members and with no operational or

political capabilities. As a consequence, these small groups focused mainly on the

distribution of neo-Nazi literature.215 The limited capabilities of the groups were also a

result of their reluctance to engage cooperatively with each other. Considering the

limited cadre each one of these groups possessed, the leaders of the different groups

were careful when engaging in joint operations, fearing that this would enhance

211 For more information on the ideological tenets of the New Order see - http://theneworder.org/reading/ 212 In 1988 the ADL estimated the New Order’s number of members to be approximately 100: see ADL

(1988) Hate Groups, 49. 213 http://www.americannaziparty.com/ 214 George and Wilcox, 364–8. 215 Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 59–63.

56

defections.216 Defections were a common feature within the movement during the 1970s

and 1980s. Moreover, it seems that the strong competitive nature of most of the leaders

further discouraged cooperation.

Perhaps the most important effect of the fragmentation process, especially in the context

of this study, is the growing tendency of neo-Nazis to engage in violence, something

which was very rare if not absent under Rockwell’s leadership. For example, NSPA

members were involved in a shootout with members of the Communist Workers Party

in 1979 during an event the media titled “The Greensboro Massacre.”217 In another

incident in 1980, National Socialist Liberation Front members were involved in a shooting

of African Americans at Metairie, Louisiana.218 Similarly, SS Action Group (SSAG)

members were frequently involved in violent confrontations with members of different

liberal and left-wing organizations.219 The growing competition within the far-right

National Socialist arena, as well as the gradual fading of Rockwell’s legacy of

nonviolent practices, contributed to this trend.

Finally, another recent trend among neo-Nazi groups is the growing cooperation with

groups outside the realm of neo-Nazism. In the post-Rockwell era, many groups

increasingly assumed a more pluralistic nature, avoiding restriction of their ideology to

National Socialism and willingly merging it with similar neighboring ideological

creeds. For example, both the Social Nationalist Aryan Peoples’ Party and the National

Socialist Liberation Front were highly populated by, and cooperated with local KKK

members and associations.220 The opposite was also the case, as some of the new and

existing white supremacy and Christian Identity groups started to adopt National

Socialist concepts. Perhaps the most glaring example is the Aryan Nations: although it

216 George and Wilcox, 360–8. 217 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, Executive Summary (25 May 2006),

http://www.greensborotrc.org/exec_summary.pdf (accessed 3 November 2012). 218 George and Wilcox, 364–5. 219 Ibid., 367–8. 220 See e.g., Matt Koehl, NS Bulletin (November, 1982), “In the past, the New Order/NSWPP has been very

hesitant to hold joint activities with other racialist organizations. But, as part of our new outreach, we felt

that this occasion would be the perfect one in which not merely to give lip-service to White Unity, but

rather to give a practical demonstration of it”.

57

was formed as a Christian Identity organization, it increasingly absorbed significant

National Socialist elements.221

The two trends, of increasing propensity toward violence and cooperation with other

far-right organizations have further intensified in the past two decades, and will be

discussed more fully in the empirical section of this study.

3.2.1.3 – Skinheads

While for analytical reasons the Skinheads have been analyzed in this study as a

separate far-right stream, many researchers tend to frame them as a modern, younger

extension of American National Socialism.222 Indeed, Skinhead groups share several

similarities with American neo-Nazi groups. Its members display a fascination with

Nazi symbols, regalia and terminology, and like the neo-Nazi groups, they are also an

American extension of a socio-political phenomenon which emerged initially in Europe

(in this case, the UK). The first reports of the appearance of Skinheads in the streets of

urban America occurred in the early 1980s in the Midwest and Texas.223 There is no

evidence, however, of any significant organizational framework or of systematic

violence produced by the early Skinhead associations, which mostly could be described

as small and relatively unorganized social networks of youths who embraced European

Skinhead subculture and punk music.224 White supremacy ideology still exerted a

relatively marginal influence on the American Skinhead subculture at that time. It is

therefore not surprising that in some areas nonracist Skinhead groups included

members of minority groups, often African American and Hispanic.225

A division within the American Skinhead scene occurred towards the mid to late 1980s,

as some of the Skinhead groups began to absorb white supremacy ideology, engaging

in violent activities with racist characteristics and forging relations with other far-right

organizations. In the Chicago area in late 1984, for example, influenced by Hitler’s Mein

Kampf and exposed to British white power punk music, Clark Reid Martell and twelve

221 See relevant sections of this study, and FBI file Aryan Nation, Parts 1 and 2,

http://vault.fbi.gov/Aryan%20Nation (accessed 3 November 2012). 222 While most academics and practitioners acknowledge the differences between the traditional

American neo-Nazi movement and the Skinheads subculture, my impression is that the sub-text in many

publications depicts the latter as a youthful extension of the first. 223 Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project, 4. 224 Hamm, 37. 225 Ibid.

58

of his close friends established a group called Romantic Violence, which would later be

named CASH: Chicago Area Skinheads.226 In the following months, Romantic Violence

became involved in a series of violent incidents perpetrated against Hispanic and

Jewish victims, and it worked with the local cell of the ANP in spreading racist

propaganda and white power music.227

On the West Coast, similar dynamics could be observed. In 1985 the American Front was

established in the San Francisco area by Robert Heick who, with several companions,

distributed white power punk music and propaganda and engaged in severe attacks

against interracial couples, Jews and other minorities.228 While the local police took

action against American Front, the new propaganda force White Aryan Resistance

expanded the presence of neo-Nazi Skinheads on the West Coast and eventually helped

to develop the new movement in other parts of the country.

Starting in 1986, hundreds of Skinheads were mobilized to adopt white-supremacy

ideology via organized outreach propaganda operations of the White Aryan Resistance

(WAR), which was founded and led by Thomas Metzger after he left the KKK.229 The

outreach operations included: forging connections with dominant figures from the

European Skinheads and white power music scene and introducing them via WAR to

American Skinhead groups;230 the production and distribution of a youth magazine

named the WAR Zine, which combined National Socialist and white supremacy

messages with reports and news from the white power music scene;231 the broadcasting

and distribution of “Race and Reason” white supremacy propaganda videotapes which

featured speeches by Metzger and other prominent WAR members;232 frequent

appearances on nationally syndicated television shows presenting the fundamentals of

the Skinhead culture; the creation and management of an electronic bulletin board

known as the WAR board, and hotline services with information about WAR and

226 John Leo, “A Chilling Wave of Racism,” Time, January (25) (1988), 57; ADL, (1988), Hate Groups; ADL,

Young and Violent: The Growing Menace of America’s Neo Nazi Skinheads (New York: ADL, 1988). 227 See ADL, Shaved for Battle: Skinheads Target America’s Youth (New York: ADL publications, 1987), 3. 228 ADL, (1988) Young and Violent; Coplon, 87. 229 Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project, 17–18. 230 Ibid. 231 Hamm, 52. 232 Owen Brown, “Know your Enemy…Tom Metzger and the American Fascist,” No KKK! No Facist USA!

Spring/Summer (1989), 5–6; Bill Wallace, “Racist Group Using Computers and TV to Recruit in Bay

Area,” SF Chronicle, 5 March (1985), 1–2.

59

Skinhead activities.233 Finally, Metzger intensified WAR presence in colleges via

collaboration with the Aryan Youth Movement (AYM), which had roots in a number of

academic institutions, and through nationwide tours which also helped to establish ties

with local Skinheads in other parts of the country.234

The implications of the Skinhead shift towards the fringes of the American far right

were quickly visible. During the late 1980s, Skinheads were involved in several

hundred violent attacks and acts of vandalism against non-Aryan facilities such as

Jewish stores and synagogues, and against homosexuals and other minorities.235 While a

large part of the Skinhead ideology focused on the need to defeat what they believed to

be Jewish-controlled governmental institutions, Skinheads’ attacks were usually aimed

at different representations of out-groups, such as minorities and people with

alternative lifestyles, and were rarely if ever directed against governmental targets.236

Moreover, while many of the Skinhead groups’ social activities enjoyed a high level of

coordination and preplanning, their violent attacks were typically opportunistic.

Skinheads would typically refer to their assaults as fights, implying spontaneous

incidents, and framed them in the context of self-defense. For example, in his study of

the Skinheads subculture of the 1980s and early 1990s, Hamm (1993) was unable to

identify one Skinhead interviewee who admitted that he was involved in a preplanned

violent incident.237 In any case, the massive wave of violence which accompanied the

growth of the American Skinhead subculture—available reports estimate that the

number of racist Skinheads grew between 1987 and 1990 from several hundred to

between four and five thousand—led the US Attorney General in 1989 to emphasize the

American government commitment to spare no effort in order to counter the

“…shocking reemergence of hate group violence.”238 Indeed, the late 1980s and early

1990s witnessed growing efforts by federal law enforcement agencies and the political

arena to counter the Skinhead subculture, including implementation of the “Hate Crime

Statistics Act.”239 In addition, nonracist Skinheads contributed to this struggle, as in

233 Peter Stills, “Dark Contagion: Bigotry and Violence Online,” PC Computing, December (1989), 144–9. 234 Hamm, 57. 235 William Tafoya, Rioting in the Street: Déjà vu, Address before the Office of International Criminal

Justice, Chicago (1990). 236 Hamm, 74. 237 Hamm, 154. 238 Paul M. Barrett, “Hate Crimes Increase and Become More Violent: US Prosecutors Focus on Skinheads

Movement,” Wall Street Journal (1989), A12. 239 Mary H. Cooper, “The Growing Danger of Hate Groups,” Editorial Research Report, 18 (1989), 262–75.

60

many cities they made a significant effort to limit the expansion and recruitment efforts

of neo-Nazi Skinheads.240

Organizationally, anthropological and sociological studies of the neo-Nazi Skinhead

subculture suggest that while some of the early neo-Nazi Skinhead groups exhibited a

flat network structure with limited hierarchy and institutionalization, several of the

WAR-associated Skinhead groups (WAR Skin) did assume a paramilitary structure.

These groups employed military ranks, held roster sheets and a report/activities card on

each of their members. Apparently, these were used for assessing suitability for

advancement. Some of the groups possessed tangible assets such as headquarters and

living quarters for their members.241 It is also important to note that despite WAR

propaganda efforts, recruitment remained mainly based on secondary social ties and

differential association.242

WAR attempts to create a nationwide organization of neo-Nazi Skinheads stumbled,

mainly as a result of the collapse of WAR in the late 1980s.243 An alternative emerged

from the South which would eventually succeed in forming a nationwide white

supremacist Skinhead organizational framework; the Hammerskin Nations (also known

as the Hammerskins or HSN) arose from the Confederate Hammerskins (CHS) which had

begun to consolidate in Dallas between 1985 and 1987.244 This group was not merely one

of the more violent Skinhead groups at that time, but was also highly efficient at

publicizing its activities, engaging in successful recruitment from among the developed

nonracist Skinhead scene in the Dallas area, as well as being relatively well funded.245

While these factors facilitated the quick expansion of the group in the Dallas area, how

240 Jack B. Moore, Skinheads Shaved For Battle: A Cultural History of American Skinheads (Madison,

Wisconsin: Bowling Green University Press, 1993), 138 241 Floyd Clarke, “Hate Violence in the United States,” FBI Bulletin, January (1991), 14–17. 242 T. J. Leyden and Bridget M. Cook, Skinhead Confessions: From Hate to Hope (Springville, Utah:

Sweetwater, 2008), 91–8. The concept of differential association, originally developed by Edwin

Sutherland to explain engagement in criminal activity, emphasizes the role of social interactions in the

learning and internalization of values, attitudes and motives. 243 Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project, 18. 244 ADL, “Extremism in America: the Hammerskin Nation,” Anti-Defamation League,

http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/hammerskin.asp (accessed 3 November 2012); HSN, “Who We Are…/

Our History…,” Hammerskin Nation, http://www.hammerskins.net/ (accessed 3 November 2012). 245 Pete Simi and Barbara Brents, “An Extreme Response to Globalization: The Case of Racist Skinheads,”

in ed. Michael Flynn and David C. Brotherton, Globalizing the Streets (New York: Columbia University

Press, 2008), 195–6.

61

can we explain its nationwide expansion? Several factors may help explain the

transformation of the group into a nation-wide organization.

First, already at the early stages of the consolidation of the CHS, its leaders were

conscious of their aspiration to find a way to unite the regional manifestations of neo-

Nazi Skinheads. Thus, prominent members of CHS actively began to attend events of

similar groups all over the country and to promote cooperation; indeed, many of these

groups would eventually become HSN branches during 1988 and 1989, especially in

Oklahoma, Tennessee and in other Texas cities.246 Secondly, the CHS was effective in

using large-scale regional cultural events organized by far-right associations to attract

new groups to join the HSN organizational umbrella. In 1988, for example, SKINFEST

in Milwaukie led to several major Skinhead groups from Wisconsin joining the

emerging HSN.247 Similarly, the Aryan Fest in Oklahoma the same year provided

significant momentum for the recruitment of Southern-based groups; and the Aryan

Woodstock in California planted the seeds for the emergence of HSN teams in Southern

California.248 Finally, interpersonal relations and the migration of CHS members to

other parts of the country also assisted in forging ties with new groups and persuading

them to join the organizational umbrella of the HSN: cases in point are groups in Maine,

Northern California and Chicago, which joined the HSN during 1989.249

During the late 1980s and early 1990s the HSN continued to grow at a fast pace. After

the formal establishment in 1988 of the Northern chapter of the HSN (NHS), similar

regional branches formed in the following years in other areas, and in the mid-1990s the

HSN already included more than 30 branches throughout the United States, which were

organized in several regional groupings including the Western Hammerskin (WSN),

Rocky Mountain Hammerskin (RHS) and Eastern Hammerskin (EHS).250 In 1994, when the

Hammerskin Nations was formally established, the organization also looked outside the

United States, forming relations with European Skinheads, initially with groups in

Switzerland and Northern Ireland, but later also with groups from other European

countries, mostly in Western Europe, e.g., Germany, Spain, Italy.251

246 Ibid; see also HSN, “Who We Are…/ Our History…” 247 Ibid. 248 Ibid. 249 Ibid and ADL, “Extremism in America: the Hammerskin Nation”. 250 Simi and Brents, 195–6; see also HSN, “Who We Are…/ Our History…” 251 Ibid.

62

While the mid to late 1990s saw further HSN international branches formed in Canada,

Australia and New Zealand, these years were also characterized by the emergence of

internal conflicts within the organization. These were associated with two main issues.

The first was the balance of power between the local branches and the national

leadership. While the formal establishment of the HSN in 1994 represented an attempt

to create a national leadership, based in Dallas, with significant power over the local

branches, the counter-response of those opposing the elitist tendencies of the HSN top

rank officers led to defections of several regional branches, mainly in Indiana and Ohio:

these included the Outlaw Hammerskins and Hoosier State Skinheads.252 More specifically,

the HSN leadership, interested in transforming the Skinheads into the elite force of the

White Supremacy American movement, introduced a strict recruitment procedure for

those interested in joining the organization, and codes of conduct, including restrictions

on violent behavior.253 A growing number of members manifested their frustration at

the institutionalization of the Skinhead subculture by deserting and forming new kinds

of Skinhead groups, even more violent, less reluctant to engage in criminal activities

and with the tendency to absorb elements of the African-American street gang

subculture (in many Skinheads circles they were designated simply as Outlaw

Hammerskin).254

The emergence of these new Skinhead groups also reflected a generational gap within

the movement. As the original HSN leadership entered mid-life, their ability to relate to

the new generation of Skinheads dwindled and a growing ideological and mental gap

became evident. This led to a decline in the number of members and new recruits, and

an increase in doubts about the commitment of the HSN leadership to militant

activism.255 An attempt to downgrade the severity of these concerns led the HSN

leadership in 1999 and 2000 to provide more freedom and flexibility to the local

chapters as well as reshaping the borders between the different regional organizations,

including the creation of a new branch, the Midlands Hammerskins (MHS).256 The

effectiveness of these steps was limited, as the Skinhead scene continued its

fragmentation, and rising numbers of groups distanced themselves from the HSN.

252 Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project, 12–13. 253 Ibid. 254 Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project, 5. 255 Ibid. 256 HSN, “Who We Are…/ Our History…”

63

Current trends within the Skinhead scene, including the current role of the HMS and its

involvement in contemporary Skinhead violence, will be analyzed further in the

empirical section of the study. Analysis of the development of the Skinhead movement

in America would not be complete without addressing its cultural dimension, and in

particular the role of white power music. It is not a coincidence that the first Skinhead

event on a national level was a white power music festival, organized with the

assistance of WAR in 1988.257 As mentioned in the ideological overview of the Skinhead

subculture, the original Skinhead scene emerged from ska, reggae and punk music

clubs. The racist Skinheads eventually separated from the mainstream by following a

specific branch of punk music dedicated to white supremacy and neo-Nazi messages.258

The first and the most prominent of the bands comprising this style of punk-rock music

was “Skrewdriver.” Led by one of the most prominent figures of the European

Skinhead movement, Ian Stuart Donaldson, it inspired the formation of similar bands

and became in many ways the ideological beacon of the movement. To illustrate,

Hamm’s study of American Skinheads mentioned earlier could not locate any

Skinheads who did not frequently listen to Skrewdriver albums.259

In summary, white power music filled three key social roles in the expansion of

Skinhead subculture. The first was its function as a tool of mobilization and, more

specifically, in inspiring potential recruits with Skinhead attitudes and language. For

many would-be Skinheads, white power music was their first encounter with the

ideological and cultural foundations of the Skinheads’ way of life. Hence, the music

served as a catalyst for their further familiarization with the subculture.260 However, the

white power music was much more than a mere mobilization tool; it also became a

main instrument for the consolidation of white supremacy ideology as an inherent part

of the neo-Nazi Skinhead subculture. In a subculture which for many years was

comprised of isolated, informal, and unstable cells, white power music was the unifying

medium which enabled the formation of a cohesive ideological framework, including

identification of the movement's main adversaries, its fundamental values, norms and

practices.261 In this context, the music also facilitated the emergence of what can be

described as the Skinhead “language,” which includes shared concepts, terms and 257 Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project, 11. 258 Simi and Brents, 196–9. 259 Hamm, 32–5. 260 Simi and Brents, 196–9. 261 Ibid.

64

framing of political and social reality. Moreover, in many cases the music provided

operational blueprints for the Skinhead group, especially in terms of legitimizing

violent tendencies.262 Finally, the music was also an instrument used by the movement’s

elites—and by far-right organizations interested in linking themselves with the

Skinheads—to enhance their influence and their control within the Skinhead scene, and

to shape its ideological development. Hence, it is no coincidence that HSN, WAR and

other associations were engaged in organizing hate rock festivals and concerts, and in

forming white power record labels.263

3.2.2 – The Militia Movement: Organizational and Operational Evolution

For many years the “militia” concept had enduring and positive roots in the American

collective mindset. This was a reflection of the significant role played by civilian

paramilitary groups in the American violent struggle for independence, and later in

providing security at times of territorial expansion. However, whereas Americans

continue to remember and admire the role of militias in the Revolutionary War, i.e., the

Minutemen in the battles of Lexington and Concord, growing numbers of scholars,

policy makers and practitioners express concern at the modern manifestations of

American militias and the threat they represent.

While the social, economic and political conditions served as a basis for the rapid

growth of the militia movement during the late 1980s and early 1990s, attempts by the

far-right scene to promote paramilitary subcultures could already be witnessed in the

1960s.264 Catalysts for the formation of the militia movement was Ruby Ridge and Waco

incidents, which set off a dynamic which transformed an existing subculture into a

262 Ibid. 263 Ibid. 264 The most famous of those is probably the “Minutemen,” a Missouri-based group founded by Robert

DePugh in 1960 in order to protect America from the Communist threat. For a decade it engaged in

paramilitary training and stockpiling of ammunition. While the number of active members reached

approximately two thousand at its peak, the group was eventually dissolved in 1970 after DePugh was

convicted of violation of gun control legislation. During the 1980s (as mentioned in the section analyzing

the KKK operational evolution), several KKK branches engaged in paramilitary activities and in the

formation of military-styled camps, e.g., in 1981, a KKK “military camp” was established near

Birmingham Alabama. Around the same time the Posse Comitatus, closely linked with the Christian

Identity group, started to organize militia training exercises in Kansas. It appears that the idea of forming

militia groups was not new within far-right extremist organizations prior to the emergence of the anti-

federalist militia movement in the early to mid-1990s.

65

violent counterculture. 265 Both events were not just responsible for an escalation in the

hostile perceptions towards the federal government among people from rural and mid-

America, but they also engraved in the minds of the public the understanding that self-

defense of their way of life and values, inevitability meant acting against, or vigilantly

protecting themselves from, the federal authorities.266

The immediate impact of the Ruby Ridge incident was reflected in a meeting that was

held at Estes Park, Colorado, when between 23 and 25 October around 160 members

and leaders of various American far-right groups convened in order to discuss the

appropriate response to, and the implications of what they perceived to be an

increasing tendency of the American government to invade segments of the civilian

sphere which are supposed to be constitutionally protected.267 Some resources maintain

that at this meeting a consensus was reached that public concern regarding the threat to

constitutional rights should be exploited for mobilization and recruitment to the far-

right scene.268 Another consensus consolidated around the need to encourage formation

of a loose network of mostly independent militias in accordance with Louis Beam’s

leaderless resistance doctrine. Beam had participated in the event and that year

published his famous manifesto regarding the need of the American far-right to shift to

an organizational structure and strategy of leaderless resistance/phantom cells.269 Also

attending the meeting was Larry Pratt, the head of Gun Owners of America (GOA). Pratt

recommended the creation of units of freedom fighter militias which would fight

265 Movements and groups advocating for the protection of Constitutional rights and diminution of the

federal government power were part of the American cultural and political scene long before the

emergence of the modern militias in the 1990s: see discussion in this work, see for example Daniel

Levitas, Terrorist Next Door, The Militia Movement and the Radical Right (New York: St. Martin’s press,

2003). 266 Most texts on the militia movement provide comprehensive descriptions of these events; see e.g., Lane

Crothers, Race on the Right: The American Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Homeland Security (Lanham,

Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 75–86. 267 Snow, 13–14. 268 Morris Dees, and James Corcoran, Gathering Storms: The Story of America’s Militia Network (New York:

HarperCollins, 1996), 49–67. As with the case of the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents, the Estes Park meeting

also became a mythical event in the history of the American far right, analyzed in numerous texts: see

Leonard Zeskind, “Armed and Dangerous,” Rolling Stone Magazine, (November 1995),

http://www.rickross.com/reference/militia/militia7.html (accessed 3 November 2012). 269 The Leaderless Resistance program was published originally by Beam in the 1992 issue of the

Seditionist: see ADL, “Extremists in America: Louis Beam,” Anti-Defamation League,

http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/beam.asp?xpicked=2&item=beam (accessed 3 November 2012); see also

Quarles (1999), 147.

66

against “…communist death squads.”270 In any case, both decisions reflected the

understanding of many within the American far right that the Ruby Ridge incident was

not an isolated occurrence, but rather a reflection of a growing tension between some

parts of the American society and their government, and that the anti-institutional

tendencies of most of the potential recruits lent itself to a flat movement with limited

hierarchy.

One of the byproducts of the Estes Park meeting was the formation of United Citizens for

Justice (UCJ), a white supremacy organization which exploited civil rights rhetoric to

persuade the government to “return…to a position of service to the people, and the

defender of individual rights as our forefathers had intended.”271 Although most of its

leaders were members of organizations such as KKK and AN, the organization avoided

sliding into the usual racist and nativist agenda and focused mainly on anti-federalist

rhetoric. And although the UCJ was in decline by 1994, the idea had taken hold and

three of its members founded what is considered the first modern American militia.272

The Montana Militia (MOM) was established by members of the Trochmann family—the

brothers John and David, and David’s son, Randy—in early 1994. In contrast to many of

the militias that followed, it was engaged mainly in propaganda and public relations

initiatives, and much less, if at all, in violent or paramilitary activities.273 The effective

manner in which MOM leadership was able to attract media attention and publicize

and disseminate its ideological vision made it an ideological beacon for people with

similar views throughout the country. MOM’s output included: the journal Taking Aim

and other highly popular publications such as the Blue Book, which was comprised of a

binder with media excerpts supposedly confirming New World Order conspiracy

theories; special guides for military activities and newsletters; militia accessories and

videotapes; and endless public appearances at gun shows, in gun clubs, at survivalist

workshops and expos. Some within the militia movement criticized the Trochmanns’

avoidance of militant activism. However, they were able to provide a voice, and more

270 See Southern Poverty Law Center, “False Patriots: Profiles of 40 antigovernment leaders: Church as

State—Howard Phillips, 60,” Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report, Summer, 102 (2001),

http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2001/summer/false-

patriots?page=0,8 (accessed 3 November 2012). 271 See ADL, “Extremists in America: Militia of Montana,” Anti-Defamation League,

http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/mom.asp?xpicked=3&item=mom (accessed 3 November 2012). 272 Snow, 14. 273 Neil Hamilton, 30–34.

67

importantly, an inspiration to the many Americans sharing the same frustrations

regarding what they perceived as the changing nature of America, and especially the

expanding influence and powers of federal authorities.274

New militias continued to form during 1994 and 1995. Most of the groups emerged as

local initiatives in rural areas, characterized by small and isolated communities and

based on dense and relatively small extended family and social networks of white men

from the lower and middle levels of society.275 As in many cases of social networks

based on close and long-term social ties and which operate on the fringes of the legal

sphere, recruitment was invariably based on previous acquaintanceship rather than on

an institutionalized recruitment process which would involve stages of identifying

potential recruits, indoctrination and operational training.276 This facilitated trust

between the militia members, ideological cohesion, and made the group more

challenging for authorities to infiltrate. When attempts were made to expand the militia

beyond the core network of founders, a variety of mechanisms were used to garner

recruits, including the introduction of NWO theories and the exploitation of recruits’

sentiments concerning topical issues such as the expansion of gun control,

environmental legislation, government promotion of liberal social policies, e.g.,

Clinton’s health reform initiative, and the changing demography of American society,

particularly through ostensibly xenophilic immigration policies.277

Although there are varied estimations of the overall scope of the militia movement at

that time, the prevailing view is that in late 1995 the movement was comprised of

militias in at least 30 states and included several hundreds of thousands of supporters

and active members: some estimations put the number at several million.278 While there

were attempts to create an umbrella organization to unify the movement or at least to

create a means of coordination, such as the Third National Congress, which convened in

274 See ADL, “Extremists in America: Militia of Montana,”; Dees and Corcoran; Beth Hawkins, “Patriot

Games,” in ed. Dani Hazan, L. Smith, C. Triano, Militias In America (San Francisco, California: Institute for

Alternative Journalism, 1994), 7–12. 275 For the most up-to-date analysis on geographic distribution of the Militias, see Joshua D. Freilich, State

Level Variations in Militia Activities (New York: LFB, 2003). 276 See e.g., Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks - a Social Network

Perspective,” Social Forces, 84(4) (2006), 1983–2004. 277 See also analysis of the militia movement earlier in this study. 278 Note, however, that some estimations are much lower: Berlet and Lyons provide an assessment of

between 15,000 and 40,000: see Chip Berlet and Matthew N. Lyons, “Militia Nation,” The Progressive 59(6)

(1995), 22.

68

Kansas during October 1996, none of these were successful and the militia movement

remained decentralized, with no identifiable national leaders or organizational

framework. 279

While many of the new militias, such as MOM, were careful to stay within legal

boundaries and focused mainly on ideological propaganda, e.g., Linda Thompson’s

Unorganized Militia of the United States, other militias assumed a different path. The most

well-known of these groups was the Michigan Militia. Established by firearm store-

owner Norm Olson a few months after the formation of MOM, it assumed a

paramilitary organizational structure subordinate to the Militia Corps, headed by MG.

Four divisions were created that were administered by COL, and these in turn were

divided into brigades commanded by LTC. They conducted military-style training and

stockpiled military equipment; raids on militias’ compounds in the mid-1990s

frequently located dozens to hundreds of firearms and thousands of rounds of

ammunition.280 Stockpiling of equipment was aided by a legal loophole which

permitted hobbyists—namely those people convening gun shows—to sell personal

firearms without paperwork or waiting periods. This enabled militia members to

acquire multiple firearms with minimal bureaucratic obstacles.

Assessment of the ideological and operational typologies developed by academics and

practitioners demonstrates that the Michigan Militia and MOM represented the two

faces of the militia movement as it developed during the 1990s. On the one hand, they

have identified defensive and non-violent militias which leverage legitimate means in

order to protect their members’ civil liberties, and in general do not directly challenge

the sovereignty of the federal government. On the other hand, they have identified

offensive, violent, and underground militias which encourage their members to engage

in direct attacks and actions against the federal government, including illegal initiatives

and retaliatory attacks.281

The second type of militias, not surprisingly, were those which attracted most of the

attention of local and national law enforcement because they used their military

279 There were inspirational figures within the movement who gained significant influence, such as Linda

Thompson, Samuel Sherwood, James (Bo) Gritz and others; most of them specialized in producing

ideological and operational publications: see Neil, 76–90. 280 Snow, 14. 281 For discussion of this typology see Freilich, 14.

69

training in order to engage in illegal and violent activities. While an extensive analysis

of the militias’ violence is presented in the empirical section of this study, an initial

overview makes clear that during the 1990s most of the violent militias were exposed

while in their planning and operational preparation stage, such as: the Arizona-based

Viper Militia, which was uncovered after its members had trained for two years and in

the midst of advance planning to bomb the IRS, ATF, Police and National Guard Center

facilities in Phoenix; the Oklahoma Constitutional Militia, whose members were arrested

while preparing explosive devices to destroy the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC)

offices and abortion clinics; the Mountaineer Militia, which plotted to blow up the FBI

national fingerprint records center; and a cell which emerged from the Third Continental

Congress (see above) and plotted an attack on various US Army facilities in Texas which

they maintained incorporated UN facilities.282 Successful plots were relatively rare and

usually perpetrated by individuals or small cells associated with the fringe of the militia

subculture, e.g., the OKBOMB; and the Atlanta Olympic Games attack perpetrated by

Eric R. Rudolph.283

The public, media, and law enforcement associated the OKBOMB attack with the militia

movement almost immediately, since McVeigh was linked to the Michigan Militia and

similar groups in Arizona, and expressed the views advocated in militia propaganda.

This association had a multilayer impact on the militia movement. The movement

leaders were placed on the defensive; many of them were quick to claim that the attack

was a government-sponsored ploy perpetrated in order to justify increasing scrutiny of

the movement by authorities.284 Others were critical of the media and government use

of the event in order to de-legitimize the movement and to color it as racist, anti-Semitic

and inherently violent.285 On the other hand, the event greatly magnified the

movement’s public exposure, facilitating recruitment and expansion. Reports by SPLC

and the ADL concluded that in late 1995 and early 1996 the movement consisted of

more than 200 militias in more than 35 states.286 Nonetheless, and despite the short-term

282 See ADL, “Extremism in America: The Militia Movement,”

http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/militia_m.asp?xpicked=4&item=19 (accessed 3 November 2012). 283 This issue will receive further discussion in chapter 5 of this study. 284 For example, Linda Thompson asserted that “I definitely believe the government did the bombing. I

mean who’s got a track record of killing children?” ADL, Beyond the Bombing: The Militia Menace Grows

(New York: ADL, 1995), 15.

285 Neil Hamilton, 43–4. 286 ADL (1995), Beyond the Bombing.

70

boost to its numbers, the overall trajectory of the movement was downward during the

second half of the 1990s. The attack in Oklahoma led law enforcement organizations to

increase their efforts to infiltrate and thwart militia group operations. Hundreds of

militia members were arrested; many of them were prosecuted for the illegal

manufacture and distribution of firearms, explosives and ammunition.287 Dozens of

violent plots were uncovered, and in general the authorities grew much less tolerant of

paramilitary activities conducted by civilian associations. A growing number of states

in the 1990s also enacted anti-paramilitary training statutes, which restrict unauthorized

military-style training.288

Several other developments intensified the decline of the movement towards the 2000s.

In the second half of the 1990s, the movement was swamped by millenarian conspiracy

theories. Most of these theories included a variation of the following narrative: the

collapse of the country’s infrastructure during the first weeks of the year 2000 as a result

of the Y2K software bug; the social and economic havoc which will follow will be

exploited by the government to declare martial law and perpetrate mass violations of

constitutional rights, ultimately resulting in the restoration of law and order with the

assistance of international forces and their connivance in creating the NWO.289 Many

also argued that this scheme was supported by collaborators from among the major

parties and from within the U.S. Armed Forces.

It is evident that the economic boom of the late 1990s, which was followed by the

passage to 2000 without any catastrophe and the election of a conservative president,

led to a dramatic decrease in the credibility of the movement and its leaders. The militia

members who expected a watershed event that would substantiate their ideological

foundations instead witnessed a rise in the standard of living and the election of a

president identifying with small government, and strong and independent local

authorities. For many militia members, America was on the right track; thus, the

incentive to prepare for war against NWO forces evaporated. This is almost exactly the

287 ADL, “Extremism in America: The Militia Movement”. 288 See e.g., Florida, Stat. ch. 870.06 (1994); Georgia, Code ann. § 38-2-277 (Harrison 1995); Iowa, Code §

29A.31 (1995); Kansas, Stat. Ann. § 48-203 (1994); Maine, Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 37-B, § 342.2 (West 1996);

Maryland, Ann. Code, Militia § 35 (1995); Nevada, Rev. Stat. § 203.080 (1995); North Carolina, Gen. Stat. §

127A-151 (1986 and Supp. 1996); West Virginia, Code § 15-1F-7 (1995); Wyoming, Stat. Ann. § 19-1-106

(Michie 1996). 289 For further consideration of preparations of the Militias for the Millennium, see Norman Olson, “The

Militia and Y2K”(1999) and Virginian Citizens Militia. Y2K Policy Statement, 6 March.

71

opposite of the developments which occurred in 2008—the election of a Democratic

president with a liberal background; the economic recession; and the introduction of

policies and reforms threatening the independence of local political authorities—which

have led to what some claim is the revival of the militia movement. The scope and

characteristics of this revival are analyzed in the empirical section of this study.

3.2.3 – The Christian Fundamentalist Movements: Organizational and Operational

Development

Unlike the movements discussed previously, the fundamentalist movement’s militant

and violent nature was relatively late to develop. For many years the SMOs of the

fundamentalist movement did not produce violent sub-groups, but rather functioned as

a source of intellectual inspiration and a moral justification for the violent activities and

operations of ideologically related movements. Hence, it is not surprising that many of

the prominent ideologues of the white supremacist and anti-federalist movements

intensively cooperated with—and at times saw themselves as part of—the

fundamentalist movement. This dynamic allowed the penetration of non-identity ideas

into the movement, and in many ways facilitated the narrowing of the gaps between the

fundamentalist movement and other streams of the American far right. As with the

anti-federalist movement, however, the fundamentalist movement was never able to

develop an effective nation-wide organizational framework. This could be attributed to

the inherent inability of highly charismatic and authoritarian pastors to share power

with others, or to the tendency of each pastor to engage in the development of his creed,

a dynamic which created difficulty in forming a consensual ideological paradigm. This

corresponds with theoretical frameworks which emphasize the process whereby

isolated constituencies—as is typical of the various Christian Identity churches—which

have limited face-to-face interactions with other constituencies encourage non-federated

SMOs.290

3.2.3.1 – The Operational and Organizational Development of the Christian Identity Movement

By the mid-nineteenth century the British-Israelite ideology had already crossed the

Atlantic; the writings of John Wilson and Edward Hine had attracted the attention of a

small but devoted group of adherents. Nonetheless, most of them—such as Pastor

Joseph Wild from Brooklyn, or the Kansas-based novelist M. M Eshelman—were local

290 McCarty and Zald.

72

figures who lacked the resources or the aspirations to found a nationwide theological

movement.291

This dynamic began to change in late 1884 with the arrival of Hine to the Northeast and

the Great Lakes areas on a five-year lecture tour he conducted among his American

followers.292 The tour, from which Hine produced published materials aimed

specifically at his American audience, was a fillip for the emerging movement and

spurred the further expansion of British-Israelite ideas in the United States.293 Thus, in

the late 1890s, British-Israelite congregations could be found in most of the major cities

of the Northeast, as well as in the Midwest where the ideology attracted a significant

number of evangelical Protestants. When Protestants moved in great numbers to the Far

West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, California also became an

important stronghold of the movement.

While absent a centralized organizational framework, several popular publications

facilitated the crystallization of the movement’s ideological principles, which in later

years would become the ideological building blocks of the Identity movement. These

publications, such as C. A. L Totten’s Our Race, or A. A. Beauchamp’s Watchman of

Israel,294 were also effective tools in the early 1920s for the expansion of the movement,

and provided a platform for the rise of nationwide leaders. An instance of this is one of

the more prolific contributors to the Watchmen of Israel, Reuben H. Sawyer, who became

a prominent speaker for the movement throughout the West and Midwest, and one of

the founders of the British-Israelite World Federation, the umbrella organization of the

movement, which was established in London in 1920.295 In the late 1920s Sawyer was

joined by prolific writer and publisher Howard Rand, who was not only devoted to

spreading British-Israelite ideas, but was also convinced of the need to form an

organizational structure which would coordinate the activities of the movement’s

291 Barkun, 17–18. 292 Alexander B. Grimaldy, Memoirs, and a Selection of Letters from the Correspondence of Eduard Hine

(London: Robert Banks and Son, 1909), 20–50. 293 Barkun, 18–19. 294 Charles A. Totten, Our Race: Its Origins and Destiny, A series of Studies on the Saxon Riddle (New Haven:

Our Race Publishing Company, 1891); Frank F. Gosset, Race: The History of an Idea in America (New York:

Schocken, 1987), 191–2. 295 Sawyer was also a KKK member during the early 1920s: this is of little surprise considering that these

were the heydays of the second Klan. For his articles see e.g., Reuben H. Sawyer, “The American Idea,”

Watchman of Israel, 3 (April 1921), 114–15; Reuben H. Sawyer, “Who are the Americans?” Watchman of

Israel, 3 (August 1921), 182–5.

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different branches, as well as linking its ideological principles with modern-day

political agendas.296

Rand’s efforts bore fruit in 1930 when the first convention of the Anglo-Saxon Federation

of America was held in Detroit, as well as in following years when branches of the

federation were established in California, Illinois, Florida, Oregon, Washington, Idaho,

Nevada, Utah, Michigan and in most states of the Northeast.297 The rapid expansion was

aided by the production of an immense amount of published material: close to fifty

thousand pieces of relevant literature were produced in the early 1930s alone.298 Use of

print media and radio, during this period of extreme hopelessness and at the height of

the Great Depression, increased the mobilization potential of millenarian and religious

movements at that time. The rise of William J. Cameron to the presidency of the

movement in the mid-1930s, with his excellent organizational and public relations skills

and political and financial connections to Henry Ford and the Detroit business

community, also provided the movement with significant momentum.299

Along with Rand, Cameron was responsible for the growing anti-Semitic tendencies in

the movement and its sympathy and cooperation with the American right. He was

highly active in producing anti-Semitic publications reliant on British-Israelite ideas,

and formed a mechanism for the distribution of the Federation’s material to prominent

political operatives within the American political right.300 There are various views, and

contradicting evidence, regarding the way other members of the movement felt about

these ideological and political shifts; it seems, however, that the growing dissatisfaction

by some ultimately led to the replacement of Cameron in 1937 and the decision to

relocate the federation’s headquarters from Detroit—Cameron’s power base—to

Haverhill, Massachusetts. In any case, the federation as an effective organization

deteriorated during WWII and the following decade. The departure of Cameron, the

aging of its leadership, and the dramatic improvement of the economy in the 1950s

made it difficult for the federation to recruit a new generation of followers.301

296 Quarles, (2004), 54–5. 297 Barkun, 30. 298 Ibid. 299 Barkun, 30–32. 300 Probably the most popular platform for the dissemination of Anti-Semitic ideas was the Independent,

which achieved infamy when it was sued for its International Jew series of publications: see Gerber, 20–22,

29–30. 301 Barkun, 40–41.

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Nonetheless, in terms of the massive amount of published material, organizational

structure, and conceptual articulation between far-right and religious notions, the

ideological and organizational foundation was secured for the emergence of Christian

Identity.

The first Christian Identity groups emerged on the West Coast in the late 1940s. Their

origins can be traced to a series of conventions that were organized between 1937 and

1947 in the northern Pacific by a British-Israelite association from Vancouver. These

conferences led to the formation of a network of groups on the Pacific coast that was

relatively isolated from the British Israelite World Federation, as well as its American

branch. The isolation was not only a reflection of the geographical distance between the

Pacific groups and the center of the federation in the East, but also of an ongoing political

struggle and hostility between the Pacific branches of the movement and some of the East

Coast associations, especially between the Vancouver and Toronto branches.302 In any

case, this isolation allowed the Pacific groups to depart from the traditional British-

Israelite ideological tradition and to develop unique ideological notions focusing on

extreme anti-Semitism, racial conspiracy theories and apocalyptic visions.

This new coalition of groups moved further from the British-Israelite ideological

tradition with the rise of Gerald K. Smith to a leadership position within the movement.

Smith was a Southern political operative who was the main aide to Louisiana Senator

Huey P. Long during the Great Depression.303 He moved to Los Angeles in the early

1950s and quickly became the major organizational force behind the emerging Identity

movement via its own organization, The Christian Nationalist Crusade. Smith magnified

the importance of anti-Semitic ideas in the movement’s ideology and worked

intensively to tighten its ties with the American political far-right by recruiting the

movement for campaigns against the Civil Rights Movement and the perceived

communist threat.304 He was also able to mentor and nurture a new cadre of political

and religious leaders such as Conrad Gaard, Jonathan Perkins, Bertrand Comparet and

Wesley Swift.305

302 Alma M. Hertherington, 70 Years Old!: An Outline History of Our Work Since 1909 (Burnaby, BC:

Association of Covenant People, 1979), 1–10, 20. 303 Quarles, (2004), 54–5. 304 Barkun, 54–5. 305 Glen Jeanstone, Gerald K. Smith: Minister of Hate (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University, 1988), 99–

100, 105–6.

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Swift became the most influential ideologue of the Identity movement in its early days.

He founded his church around 1948 under the name Anglo-Saxon Christian

Congregation—which was quickly replaced by the name The Church of Jesus Christ

Christian—in Lancaster, California. Very quickly it became clear that he was one of the

more charismatic and talented speakers of the Identity movement as well as being a

highly capable organizer who formed ties with other Identity associations.306 These

relations enabled him to engage in frequent lectures tours all over the West Coast and

the Midwest, as well as to broaden the exposure of his ideas dramatically. This was also

facilitated by Swift’s popular weekly radio show and distribution of audio tapes of his

lectures.307 In his lectures he did not rely only on biblical texts to justify the racial

superiority of the Aryan people; he also elevated the anti-Semitic rhetoric of the

movement to new heights, as typified by a statement he made in the early 1950s in one

of his lectures: “All Jews must be destroyed. I prophesy that before November 1953

there will not be a Jew in the United States, and by that I mean a Jew that will be able to

walk or talk.”308

Swift’s blunt anti-Semitism also made him a popular figure among members of the

KKK and other white supremacy groups, many of whom had found their way into the

different organizations Swift helped to establish and to sponsor in the 1950s and the

1960s. These organizations incorporated radical ideological ideas and also were

involved in radical political activism and violence. The Christian Defense League (CDL),

for example, was involved in paramilitary activities, with unsubstantiated accusations

of the involvement of CDL members in violent attacks against minorities, and a plan to

assassinated Rev. Martin Luther King.309 While the CDL declined in the late 1960s, two

of its main leaders, Colonel William Potter Gale, and Richard Butler, would become the

face of the movement from the late 1960s to the late 1980s via their respective

organizations: Gale’s Posse Comitatus and its militant offshoots, and Butler’s Church of

Jesus Christ Christian and its political wing, the Aryan Nations.

From an ideological and operational perspective, the Posse Comitatus shared some

similarities with the 1990s militias and set the stage for the more contemporary Sovereign

306 Barkun, 54–5. 307 Jeanstone, 99–100, 24–5. 308 Levitas, 25. 309 Kaplan, 49.

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Citizens Movement. Its origins could be traced to Colonel William Potter Gale’s Ministry

of Christ Church and its journal “Identity.”310 During 1967 Gale used the journal’s pages

to endorse an emerging tax rebellion movement and its leader, a Kansas based building

constructor by the name of Arthur Julius Porth.311 After the latter was arrested in 1970,

Gale organized rallies, seminars and a public campaign for his release. This campaign

triggered a momentum in terms of public support, which, along with the vacuum

created by the death of Swift and the arrest of the Minuteman’s leader Robert Depugh

that year, seems to have driven Gale to establish a new organization which would

continue the struggle against what he saw as the attempt by governmental authorities

to impose inappropriate practices, values and norms on the American people, or in his

own words, to (prevent the Congress from) subverting the Constitution of the United

States and violating the Laws of its Christian Constitutional Republic.312

What emerged was a network of Posse associations which combined racist and anti-

Semitic Identity ideas and practices with active hostility and militancy towards the

federal authorities and especially the IRS. Between the years 1972-1974, the organization

spread significantly and chapters were formed in Oregon, Idaho, Michigan, Alaska,

Washington (state), Virginia and Arkansas. Many of them however were relatively

small and founded by individuals who believed this would help them fight their own

personal struggle with the authorities.313 While some members in these chapters did not

just engage in publicizing their beliefs and ideas, but were also willing to practice them

and “protect” their rights with deeds, a fact which triggered several violent incidents

involving representatives of the federal authorities and workers unions, overall it is

difficult to claim that Posse activities escalated into an organized violent campaign.

Hence, while the organization gained considerable attention from the authorities and

media exposure until its decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was never more

than a loose network of frustrated entrepreneurs and farmers who found a common

“enemy” and usually engaged in active protest. The picture was fundamentally

different however in the case of the Aryan Nations and its offshoots.

When Swift died in 1970, Richard Butler established his own Church of Jesus Christ

Christian in a deserted compound near Hayden Lake, Idaho after his attempt to be

310 Levitas, 97–8. 311 See, e.g., William Potter Gale, “Enemy Within,” Identity, 5(1) (1969), 6. 312 Levitas, 108–10. 313 Levitas, 139–53.

77

recognized as Swift’s successor was rejected. His goal was to “[e]xpand the Kingdom

Identity program and form the foundation for a call to the nation or Aryan Nations.”314

Shortly after the move to Idaho, Butler and his close associate Robert Miles, who headed

the Mountain Church of Jesus, agreed to form an organization that would promote the

idea of transforming the “white bastion”—most of the states of Washington, Oregon,

Montana and Wyoming—into the base of a future Aryan polity. This organization

became known as the Aryan Nations Church of Jesus Christ Christian, shortened to Aryan

Nations (AN).315

Under Butler’s charismatic leadership in the 1970s and early 1980s, the AN quickly

expanded its wings by establishing chapters in other states and promoting various

mobilization initiatives. Maybe the best known initiative was the “World Congresses of

Aryan Nations,” which were basically summer festivals focusing on white supremacy

themes, and which also included paramilitary and weapons training and attracted

several hundred members.316 The annual youth conventions were another initiative that

was eventually followed by the formation of the “Aryan Nations Academy” which

included several dozen full-time students from pre-school to eighth grade.317 Relying on

the growing number of AN members serving long prison sentences during the 1980s,

the AN was also highly active in recruiting support from the inmate populations in

correctional facilities.318

While all of the above strategies expedited the spread of Identity ideas and elevated

public awareness of the organization, the most important element that transformed the

AN and its Idaho compound into the organizational, ideological and operational center

of the Identity and the broader American far right—or as Butler termed it: “The

International Headquarters of the White Race”—was the fact that the Idaho compound

became a safe haven for many of the leaders of the various far right associations in the

314 Quarles, (2004), 133. 315 See ADL, “Extremism in America: Aryan Nations/Church of Jesus Christ Christian,” Anti-Defamation

League, http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/aryan_nations.asp?xpicked=3&item=an (accessed 3 November

2012). 316 Evelyn Schlatter, Aryan Cowboys: White Supremacists and the Search for a New Frontier, 1970–2000

(Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2006), 66. 317 G. Gordon Liddy, CDR James G. Liddy, J. Michael Barrett, Joel Selanikio, Fight Back: Tackling Terrorism,

Liddy Style (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2006), 75.

318 Schlatter, 67.

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country.319 It was a place which was isolated and distant enough to discourage the

intrusion of law enforcement, media and the general public, and which also offered the

freedom and intellectual stimulation of a wilderness environment. Thus, major

ideologues of the American far right, figures such as KKK’s Louis Beam, WAR’s Tom

Metzger, and even the founder of the Montana Militia, Jon Trochmann, felt free to

develop their ideological visions, to improve coordination and cooperation, and to

mobilize new recruits while spending significant time at the AN compound in Idaho.320

Ideologically the AN promoted what could be termed radical localism. In many ways

similar to the visions promoted by the militias in the 1990s, these ideas centered around

the desire to create a network of Aryan farm communities that would be run according

to “Biblical/Aryan” laws independent of federal authorities.321 However, unlike the case

of the militias, the idea behind this vision was driven less by hostility towards the

authorities, and more by the desire to promote racial segregation. The latter was a

reflection of the AN's militant and activist version of Identity’s traditional anti-Semitic

and racial principles which, while still based on a revisionist interpretation of biblical

texts, was also facilitated by the incorporation of national socialist elements and

symbols.322 The following statement by Pastor August Kreis, the current formal leader

of AN, explains this situation: “We, as your elect, will carry out your wrath against your

enemies on this, the great battlefield, called earth…We look forward to the destruction

of your enemies on this earth and to the establishment of your kingdom.”323 In another

statement, he was more explicit: “We firmly believe that until every last Jew Yehudi-

Shataan is dead, there will be no peace in earth. There is no room for negotiation; we

want no peace with them; there is no living with them. We will accept nothing less for

Edo/Esau Jewry than explained in Matthew 13.”324

Some AN members who were exposed to these statements and texts engaged in violent

and illegal activities. Some acted alone and without organizational assistance, such as

Buford Furrow. A former AN security guard, Furrow fired more than 70 rounds from a

submachine gun at children and teenagers at the North Valley Jewish Community

319 Quarles, (2004), 133–4. 320 George Michael, Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA (New York: Routledge,

2003), 46; Kaplan, 18. 321 Barkun, 231–2. 322 Barkun, 233–4. 323 Quarles, (2004), 134. 324 Ibid.

79

Center in Los Angeles, California on August 10, 1998; he injured three boys and a

teenage girl.325 Others exercised violence with organizational support. A famous

example of such an organization was The Order, the revolutionary group which Earl

Turner joined, as described in the Turner Diaries.326 It was founded in 1983 by Robert

Mathews, an Identity activist from Idaho with the aim of forming a small cell in Arizona

which would first require financial resources, and would then engage in guerrilla

warfare against the federal government. Specifically, it would target what it called the

ZOG: the Zionist Occupation Government, which in turn would ignite a mass uprising.

After recruiting several dozen members, mostly from the AN but also from other far-

right groups including the NA and the KKK, The Order initiated a campaign of

counterfeiting, armed robberies and violent attacks carried out between 1983 and

1986.327 The most successful robbery was of a Brinks armored vehicle near Ukiah,

California which netted $3.8 million. Other violent attacks conducted by The Order

were: the assassination of Alan Berg, a Jewish liberal radio host at KOA radio, as a

response to Berg’s tendency to ridicule the far right; the bombing of a pornographic

theater in Seattle, Washington, and of a synagogue in Boise, Idaho in April 1984; and

the bombing of the house of a Catholic priest in August 1986 in Coeur D’alene, Idaho.328

While some members of The Order had criminal backgrounds, they had limited

operational experience regarding the different challenges concerned with operating a

clandestine group. It is therefore not surprising that the FBI succeeded in penetrating

the group and detaining most of its members in less than a year after it was formed.

Mathews was located in December 1984 at Whidbey Island in Washington State, and

was killed during a shootout with FBI agents. No less than 75 people, including 48 who

325 CNN Justice, “Furrow pleads guilty to shootings, will avoid death penalty, get life without parole,” 24

January (2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-01-24/justice/furrow.plea.crim_1_furrow-shooting-rampage-

ileto?_s=PM:LAW (accessed 3 November 2012). 326 The Turner Diaries, a text initially published in a serial form by the NA’s Attack magazine, and in 1978

as a book, was authored by William Pierce, the founder of the National Alliance. It tells the story of Earl

Turner, an American who joins a revolutionary group fighting against the flood of racial integration and

gun control legislation. The book, one of the most popular texts within the far right scene in the US,

describes the group’s violent attacks against symbols of the federal government and concludes with

Turner crashing an airplane armed with a nuclear warhead into the Pentagon. See - Andrew Macdonald,

Turner Diaries (New York: Barricade, 2003). The novel is also available online: SolarGeneral.com, White

Nationalist News Portal, Turner Diaries. 327 Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 192. 328 Ibid.

80

were active members of the group, were convicted on numerous charges related to The

Order activities.329

Another well-known and violent group which arose from the Identity movement at that

time and had close relations with AN and New Order was the Covenant, The Sword and

the Arm of the Lord (CSA). In the early 1980s members of the group were mainly

involved in a series of insurance fraud, arson attacks and robberies in order to garner

resources for what it saw as the inevitable “Armageddon.”330 In late 1983 the group

escalated its attacks with a series of bombings of civilian infrastructure, including water

supplies and electric facilities. In mid-1985 the FBI and other agencies took control of

the group’s compound, located close to Bull Shoal Lake in Arkansas. Following the

trials of the group’s members it was revealed that they were planning a mass-scale

poisoning operation of the country’s main water supplies.331

Since the early 1990s, the AN’s prominent position within the Identity movement

eroded. While Butler’s age and declining health played a role in this, the main cause

was Butler’s success in nurturing a skilled cadre of potential future leaders and

operatives. Many of them preferred to leave the AN and to establish their own churches

and organizations. For instance, Butler’s Chief of Staff, Carl Franklin, and AN’s security

chief Wayne Jones established the Church of Jesus Christ Christian of Montana; and

Charles and Betty Tate—chiefs of AN’s printing operations—left to promote a new

group in North Carolina.332 Furthermore, several successful civilian law suits against

AN members in the late 1990s and early 2000s—including a verdict which forced the

organization to pay a sum of $6.3 million to Victoria and Jason Keenan, a mother and

son who were attacked by AN members—crippled the organization financially.333

329 Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood: Inside America’s Racist Underground (New

York: Free Press, 1995), 442–6. 330 Jessica Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord,” in Jonathan Tucker ed. Toxic Terror

(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 139–57; Quarles, (2004), 135–8. 331 Ibid. 332 See ADL, “Extremisim in America: Richard Butler,” Anti-Defamation League,

http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/butler.asp?xpicked=2&item=butler (accessed 3 November 2012). 333 For the verdict summary see Southern Poverty Law Center, “Case Docket: Keenan v. Aryan Nations,”

Southern Poverty Law Center 9 July (2000),

http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/keenan-v-aryan-nations (accessed 3 November

2012).

81

The emergence of competing organizations also facilitated organizational and

ideological fragmentation within the Identity movement and challenged the status of

AN and Butler (Butler died in 2004, leaving the organization under the leadership of

August Kries III, with smaller factions still operating in Texas and New York). The most

prominent of these competing organizations was established by Pastor Pete Peters, who

via his Colorado based La Porta Church of Christ, and its outreach arm Scriptures for

America became one of the most notable speakers and leaders of the Identity

movement.334

Although La Porta Church of Christ had been founded earlier in 1977, only in the late

1980s and early 1990s did Peters begin to expand his influence within the Identity

movement. He became highly effective in promoting the Identity arsenal of extreme

anti-Semitic, apocalyptic conceptions and white supremacy ideology via the mass

media, including the Scriptures for America short-wave radio program and website,

dissemination of audiocassette tapes of his sermons and those of other Identity

preachers.335 Nonetheless, he was usually perceived as more moderate and less militant

than his AN counterparts. By hosting Scriptures for America Bible retreats, family Bible

Camp conferences, seminars and other activities, Peters, like Butler before him, was able

to transform his Colorado compound into an organizational and ideological hub for the

movement, attracting prominent Identity and other far-right figures.

A reflection of Peters’s rising status was illustrated in his ability to gather more than 160

far right leaders in Estes Park, Colorado following the Ruby Ridge crisis. Here he

escalated his criticism of the federal authorities and was able to position himself as one

of the prominent leaders of the American far right and the Identity movement. For

many years the authorities in Colorado sought means to narrow Peters’s influence,

including charging him with violation of election law after he purchased $1,040 worth

of radio and newspaper ads to help to defeat a ballot initiative extending civil rights

protection to gays and lesbians in Fort Collins, Colorado. Such measures served to

elevate his status within the movement as a martyr persecuted by the government.336

334 Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 80; ADL, “Extremism in America: Peter J. "Pete" Peters,” Anti-Defamation

League, http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/peters.asp?learn_cat=extremism&learn_subcat=extremism_

in_america&xpicked=2&item=8 (accessed 3 November 2012). 335 See examples at Dragon Slayer Newsletter 2005, vol.2; Dragon Slayer Newsletter 2005, vol.3. 336 See ADL report on Peters: ADL, “Extremism in America: Peter J. "Pete" Peters”.

82

While further examination of the current status of the movement is provided in the

empirical section of this study, it should be noted that the movement continued to

maintain its relatively fragmented nature, with more than 60 ministries and around 50

thousand supporters.

3.2.3.2 – Army of God and Anti-Abortion Violence

A review of the history of domestic political violence in the United States identifies 1977

as the year in which anti-abortion violence made itself apparent, with several arson

attacks against abortion clinics in St. Paul; Burlington, Vermont; and Omaha.337 The

level of violence intensified dramatically in the early 1980s when Army of God

members adopted extreme tactics which included kidnappings of abortion clinic

owners and employees, incendiary and pipe bombing of abortion clinics, and the

assassination of prominent medical personnel in Florida, Washington DC, Virginia,

Maryland, and other states on the East Coast. Overall, during the years 1977–2000, anti-

abortionists perpetrated more than 80 successful arson attacks, 31 attacks with various

explosive devices, almost 30 incidents of chemical vandalism, and approximately 10

assassination attempts.338

In most cases the violence was initiated by individuals or small cells of 2–3 people,

indicating that pro-life violence was a product of a violent subculture comprised of

isolated cells of anti-abortionists and, in many cases, individual perpetrators.339 Until

recently there has been no evidence of the existence of nation-wide organizational

infrastructure other than the Army of God. While there are still different accounts

regarding the organizational structure of AOG, it is likely that the group was

constituted by a loose association of anti-abortion activists which formed in the early

1980s.340 The name was probably used for the first time by Don Benny in 1982 when he

and two partners kidnapped an Illinois abortion provider and his wife. After the couple

was released and Benny and his associates were arrested, it was determined that they

had also been involved in several cases of arson attacks against abortion clinics.341 Other

famous members of the group were Michael Bray, Kenneth Shields and Thomas Spinks:

337 Baird-Windle and Bader, 47–53. 338 Hewitt. 339 Jennifer L. Jefferis, Armed for Life (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2011), 23–35. 340 For a comprehensive analysis of AOG structure, see Jefferis. 341 Baird-Windle and Bader, 47–53.

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the three were responsible for the firebombing of at least ten abortion clinics in DC,

Maryland and Virginia. After his arrest, Bray continued publicly to support violent

attacks against the abortion industry. Erich Robert Rudolph—known for hiding a bomb

at the Centennial Olympic Park during the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games—was

involved in several bombings of abortion clinics; and Shelly Shannon was arrested in

1993 for attempted murder of an abortion physician.342

In the mid to late 1980s, the group distributed a text to its members which would

enhance its visibility dramatically among anti-abortionists and would become their

ideological and operational bible. Besides clarifying the ideological tenets of a violent

anti-abortionist avant-garde, the AOG Manual also includes detailed operational

instructions for how to conduct attacks against the abortion industry and its supporters,

including: methods for disrupting the operation of clinics, such as gluing locks and

damaging clinical equipment with butyric acid; how to prepare different types of

explosive devices, including plastic explosives, and deploy them to maximize damage;

and operational knowledge useful for the murder of individuals involved in the

abortion industry.343 To summarize, the manual justified and provided comprehensive

instructions for the use of extreme violence in order to “disarm the murder weapons.”344

What has happened to the violent anti-abortionist stream in the last decade? Is it still a

threat? How can we explain its rise during the 1980s and 1990s? These questions are

discussed in the following part of the study, which focuses on an empirical analysis of

the violent American far right.

342 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley, California:

University of California Press, 2000), 30–31. 343 Jefferis, 54–5. 344 Ibid.

84

Part 2 – Empirical and Theoretical Foundations: Explaining American

Far-Right Violence

85

4. Empirical Picture: General Overview of the American Violent Far

Right

4.1 – Methodological Aspects and Data Gathering

To decipher the current landscape of the violent American far-right, a dataset was

constructed specifically for this study. The dataset documents all violent attacks that: (1)

were perpetrated by groups or individuals affiliated with far-right associations; and/or

(2) were intended to promote ideas compatible with far-right ideology, based on the

ideological analysis presented in the first part of this study. Many scholars treat these

acts as terrorism.345 However, in the current study the more generalized designation of

political violence is used to describe far-right violent activities, as this term is broader

than terrorism. While there is no consensual definition of terrorism among academics or

practitioners, most agree that it consists of violent acts perpetrated to promote specific

collective national, religious, or communal ideas in a political context and in civilian

settings.346 Most scholars also emphasize the psychological and symbolic nature of

terrorism and its ability to exploit violence in order to shape political discourse. Many

of the attacks in the dataset are compatible with all of these criteria. However, some of

them, while exhibiting a clear political context, lack the instrumental use of violence. In

other words, while the political motivation of the act is detectable, how it is supposed to

impact the broader political discourse is much less clear; for this reason the symbolic

element identifiable in the majority of terrorist campaigns is absent from a significant

number of far-right violent attacks.

The dataset includes violence against human targets as well as property, and contains

details regarding: (1) the date of the attack; (2) perpetrator(s) characteristics and their

organizational and ideological affiliation; (3) target characteristics; (4) implications of

the attack (number of fatalities and injured, and whether it was completed successfully);

(5) geographical aspects; (6) tactical details; and (7) a concise description of the attack.

Data gathering was based on a variety of resources including relevant information

345 For example, Blee presents a conceptualization of “racial terrorism.” See Kathleen M. Blee, “Women

and Organized Racial Terrorism in the United States,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:5 (2005), 421–33. 346 A useful review of the relevant literature can be found in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (Revised

and Expanded Edition), (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 1–41; Leonard Weinberg, Ami

Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political

Violence 17(1) (2004), 1–17; Peter A. Schmid, and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism (Amsterdam: North

Holland Publishing, 1988), 1–38.

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drawn from the Global Terrorism Dataset;347 the SPLC hate crime dataset;348 informative

reports by various relevant organizations such as SPLC, ADL, RSCAR;349 relevant

academic texts; and various media source datasets, e.g., Lexis-Nexis. The consolidated

dataset includes information on 4420 violent incidents that occurred between 1990 and

2012 within US borders, and which caused 670 fatalities and injured 3053 people.350

While our dataset is probably one of the most comprehensive accumulations of data on

far-right violence in the United States, several limitations of the data should be noted.

First, the quality of, and accessibility to, data on hate crimes and far right violence has

improved during the last two decades: we need to take this into consideration when

interpreting findings relating to fluctuations in levels of violence. Second, we need to

take into account the differences between states pertaining to cultural norms and legal

practices which impact upon the level of visibility of crimes: this can be understood as a

ratio of criminal acts to reported crimes, which is often extremely difficult or impossible

to determine. Such factors can distort findings relating to the geographical dispersion of

violence. Finally, discrepancies exist between the dataset used by this study and other

existing hate crimes datasets. This may be a result of differential or failed

categorization, whereby violent incidents involving parties with different racial/ethnic

affiliation but lacking clear evidence of far-right ideological motivation or association

were not included.

The following section comprises an overview of the violence produced by the American

far-right, pointing out major trends and initial conclusions. Following this is an

assessment of the implications of the findings from a theoretical and analytical

perspective.

347 The GTD is being managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to

Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. For more information, see Global Terrorism Databse,

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (accessed 3 November 2012). 348 For more information about the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Hate Crime dataset, see Hate Incidents,

http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-incidents (accessed 3 November 2012). 349 The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism explains that it

“is a resource for information, provides a forum for academic discussion, and fosters continuing research

on issues related to Anti-Semitic and racist theories and manifestations”: “About the Institute: Mission

Statement,” http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/default.htm (accessed 3 November 2012). 350 The decision to choose 1990 as the starting point for the dataset is because the existing literature

provides relatively good coverage of the trends within the American violent far right up until the early

1990s; however, since then, the coverage is much more limited.

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4.2.1 – The Development of American Far-Right Violence: Political Context

Figure 1 presents the number of attacks initiated by far-right groups/individuals per

year since 1990.

Figure 1 - Attacks Initiated by Far-Right Groups/Individuals per Year

As can be seen, while there are variations over the years, the overall trend is very clear:

from the early 1990s until 2008 there has been a clear increase in the number of attacks.

Fourteen of the 21 years covered in this analysis witnessed more attacks than the

previous year. Although in the 1990s the average number of attacks per year was 70.1,

the average number of attacks per year in the first 11 years of the twenty-first century

was 307.5, a rise of more than 400%.

Other initial insights can be extracted from the data. To begin with, presidential election

years and the preceding year are characterized by an increase of far-right violence. For

example, the years 1999 and 2000 saw an increase of almost 70% of the number of

attacks recorded in 1998. The years 2003 and 2004 witnessed an increase of over 300% of

the number of attacks in 2002. And the years 2007 and 2008 saw an increase of more

than 100% of those for 2006. In regard to the 1992 elections, the increase occurred only

in the election year. The trend appears to repeat itself in 2011, although it would be wise

to wait until the end of 2012 before confirming this. A decline in the number of attacks

can be detected only after elections. In 1993 there was a more than 700% decline from

the 1992 figures; in 2005, a more than an 80% decline from 2004 occurred, and in 2009

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there was a decrease of almost 30% from 2008 numbers. After the 2000 elections, the

decline was visible only in 2002.351

These findings suggest that, in general, far-right groups and individuals are more

inclined to engage in violence in a contentious political climate. This helps to explain

the lack of increase in the level of violence during 1996, the least-competitive elections

of the last 22 years. Several possible explanations may be offered: (1) Far-right groups

assume that during election years the public is more receptive to political messages,

including those conveyed via violent activism; (2) The competitive nature of the

political environment during election years encourages engagement in political activism

(see also Chenoweth, 2010) and provides more resources and opportunities; (3) The

inability of far-right groups to penetrate the political system via legitimate means, as

well as the marginality of their ideas, is even more sharply emphasized during electoral

years. This further encourages the use of alternative means to promote their ideological

agenda. The relatively informal, opportunity based and unorganized nature of far-right

violence in the last two decades may make the third explanation more credible. In any

case, the findings represent a contrasting perspective to prevalent perceptions regarding

the association between political violence and democratic practices. Within the policy

and academic realms there is a tendency to assume that democratic processes are an

effective mechanism to discourage groups from engaging in violent political activism,

since the democratic process provides non-violent alternatives for advancing political

agendas.352 However, the case of the American far-right indicates that under particular

conditions the democratic process encourages violence.353

Looking at the impact of other political indicators helps in further deciphering the

political context of far-right violence. Figure 2 illustrates the congruence between the

composition of the legislative branch and the level of violence produced by the far right.

The figure and analysis in this context also include data on attacks before the 1990s,

351 Christopher Hewitt’s chronology, which also documents far-right terrorism prior to the time captured

by the dataset of this study, appears to demonstrate that the trend of increased violence during election

years holds for most of the 1980s, as both 1980 and 1984 saw an approximate 100% rise in the number of

attacks. In 1988 such a trend is not visible: see Hewitt. 352 See e.g., Leonard Weinberg, “Terrorism and Democracy: Illness and Cure?” Global Dialogue, 8(3-4)

(2006), http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=383 (accessed 3 November 2012). 353 This conclusion accords with a number of relevant studies published recently: see Erica Chenoweth,

“Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity,” The Journal of Politics, 72(1) (2010), 16–30.

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based on Hewitt’s chronology.354 At first glimpse it appears as if the partisan

composition of the Senate and the House has limited effect on trends in violence. For

example, under a Democratic-controlled House in the first half of the 1960s and in the

second half of the 2000s, we can see relatively high levels violence; while many years

under Democratic-control also saw a dramatic decline in violence: see, e.g., the 1970s

and 2009–2010.

Figure 2 – Far-Right Violence and the Composition of the Legislative Branch

Nevertheless, statistical analysis of correlations, rather than only levels of violence

under each administration, provides significant results which are not immediately

apparent. The number of Democratic senators (α=-.271*)355 and congressmen/women

(α=-.411**) is negatively correlated with the number of attacks per year, whereas

positive correlation of the latter exists with the number of Republican senators (α=.222*)

and representatives (α=.413**).356 An additional multivariate (stepwise) regression

analysis reveals that the single most significant factor is the number of Republicans in

the House (β=.41**, R2=.17**).

354 See Hewitt. 355 In this and in the presentations of findings the level of statistical significance is represented as follow -

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 356 The level of significance here was .096, but since the gaps in the Senate between the two parties are

traditionally relatively small, it still appears to indicate a significant correlation.

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The correlation between increased conservative political power and far right violent

activism need not imply causality. It is possible that far-right groups may feel that

conservative political authorities are more tolerant of their activities, or believe that

their actions have the potential to embolden their representatives to pursue an extreme

right agenda. It is equally possible that increased levels of violence might be caused by

relative deprivation, which occurs when the high expectations of far-right activists

during a conservative legislature are not fulfilled. The deprivation explanation is less

likely to occur under Democratic-controlled legislature since the expectations are low.

The correlation between the level of far-right violence and the identity of the party

controlling the executive branch is weaker than the linkage between far-right violence

and the composition of the legislature, although it is in the same direction. During the

period 1990–2011, two Republican presidents and two Democratic presidents held

office; the former for 10 years and the latter for 12 years. The average number of

incidents per year during the terms of Republican presidents was 243.6, in comparison

to 163 during the terms of Democrat presidents. Although they are much smaller, the

gaps in the sample remain when using Hewitt’s chronology to include the years 1954–

1989. However, these are not statistically significant in any of the cases. While the

limited quantity of data may contribute to the absence of statistical significance, overall

the findings are in line with the conclusion that the level of violence is positively

correlated with a conservative political environment.

So far the political context of far right violence has been examined in relation to the

characteristics of formal political institutions. However, can we also attribute the

increase in the level of violence during particular timeframes to specific policy

initiatives or other developments in the political arena? This question is relevant for two

reasons. First, some studies on radicalization of counterculture communities, i.e., their

tendency to slide to violent activism, found significant correlation between the

occurrence of political events or the initiation of governmental policies which had the

potential to pose a threat to the counterculture way of life, and the tendency of

community members to engage in violent activism.357 Second, many of the texts that

analyzed the history of the American far right tended to refer to such linkages. For

357 Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in

Walter Reich ed. The Origins of Terrorism (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), 33;

Juergensmeyer; Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 81–2.

91

example, the US Supreme Court rulings in 1954 against “separate but equal” policies in

the education system, and in 1955, ordering district-level racial integration in the school

system, are usually used to explain the recovery of the KKK in the mid-1950s.358

The main problem with many of these contentions is that they lack a comparative,

systematic perspective and devolve to a tautological argument, drawing a bull’s eye

around the arrow, so-to-speak. To avoid anecdotal evidence and provide a methodical

assessment of possible correlations, the linkages between civil rights on the one hand

with abortion legislation and Supreme Court decisions on the other, will be assessed in

a systematic way.

Table 1 includes a list of all relevant federal legislation, Supreme Court decisions and

executive orders related to minority civil rights, abortion policies and federal gun

control legislation. In each case the table attempts to provide information on the visible

impact on the level of far right violence. Cases in which an effect was visible are marked

in gray.

Table 1 - Far-Right Violence and Civil-right legislation/SC decisions/Executive Orders

Year Details Far-right violence

1954-55 Brown v. Board of Education: Chief Justice Earl Warren,

reading his first major opinion from the bench, said: “We

conclude, unanimously, that in the field of public education

the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate

educational facilities are inherently unequal.”

Brown v. Board II: the Supreme Court held that school

systems must abolish their racially dual systems, and should

do so “with all deliberate speed.”

Significant rise in far-right

violence in the following years

(1956–57), when the decisions

were formally implemented.

Reemergence of the KKK.

1956 The Supreme Court, without comment, affirmed a lower

court ruling declaring segregation of the Montgomery bus

system illegal, giving a major victory to Rosa Parks, Martin

Luther King, Jr., and the thousands of anonymous African

Americans who had sustained the bus boycott in the face of

violence and intimidation.

Significant rise in far-right

violence in the following years

(1956-57), when the decisions

were formally implemented.

Reemergence of the KKK.

1963 Equal Pay Act - prohibits sex-based pay differentials in jobs. No effect expected, no effect

found.

358 Quarles, (1999), 40.

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1964 Civil Rights Act - Title VII prohibits employment

discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, or religion.

Title VI prohibits public access discrimination, leading to

school desegregation. Title VIII is the original “federal fair

housing law,” amended in 1988.

Significant rise in the level of

violence.

1965 Executive Order 11246 - Affirmative action requirements of

government contractors and subcontractors.

Significant rise in the level of

violence.

1967 ADEA prohibits age discrimination for 40–65 year olds,

amended in 1986 to remove the 65 year-old age cap.

No effect expected, no effect

found.

1968 Architectural Barriers Act - requires accessibility for disabled

in buildings and facilities financed with federal funds.

No effect expected, no effect

found.

1968 Gun Control Legislation in 1968 - prohibits transfers to

minors and mail order sales, requires that guns carry serial

numbers; implemented a tracking system to determine the

purchaser of a gun whose make, model, and serial number

are known. It also prohibited gun ownership by convicted

felons.

No effect found.

1968 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court held that

the Civil Rights Act of 1866 bans racial discrimination in

housing by private, as well as governmental, housing

providers.

No effect found.

1971 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court ruled that

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits not only

intentional job discrimination, but also employer practices

that have a discriminatory effect on minorities and women.

The Court held that tests and other employment practices

that disproportionately screened out African American job

applicants at the Duke Power Company were prohibited

when the tests were not shown to be job-related.

No effect found.

1973 In Roe v. Wade, the Court ruled that a right to privacy under

the due process clause of the 14th Amendment extended to a

woman’s decision to have an abortion, but that the right

must be balanced against the state’s two legitimate interests

in regulating abortions: protecting prenatal life and

protecting women’s health. Arguing that these state interests

became stronger over the course of a pregnancy, the Court

resolved this balancing test by tying state regulation of

abortion to the trimester of pregnancy, so that a person has a

right to abortion until viability. The Roe decision defined

“viable” as being “potentially able to live outside the

mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid”, adding that

viability “is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks)

but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks”.

No effect found.

1973 §504 of the Rehab Act - bars federal contractors or

subcontractors from employment discrimination on the basis

of disability.

No effect found.

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1976 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the

court struck down state laws requiring the consent of

spouses and parents of patients under the age of 18 before an

abortion procedure. It ruled the Missouri laws

unconstitutional because they “delegated to third parties an

absolute veto power which the state does not itself possess.”

No effect found.

1978 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the

Supreme Court ruled that the medical school’s special

admission program setting aside a fixed number of seats for

minorities violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. At

the same time, however, in an opinion written by Justice

Powell, it ruled that race could lawfully be considered as one

of several factors in making admissions decisions. Justice

Powell noted that lawful affirmative action programs may be

based on reasons other than redressing past discrimination,

in particular, a university’s educational interest in attaining a

diverse student body could justify appropriate affirmative

action programs.

No effect found.

1987 In United States v. Paradise, the Supreme Court upheld a

one-for-one promotion requirement—i.e., for every white

candidate promoted, a qualified African American would

also be promoted—in the Alabama Department of Public

Safety.

No effect found.

1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act - disabled access required

for multi-family housing intended for first occupancy after 13

March 1991.

No effect expected, no effect

found.

1989 Air Carriers Access Act - disabled access required in

construction of terminal facilities owned or operated by an

air carrier.

No effect expected, no effect

found.

1990 Americans with Disabilities Act - Title I prohibits disability

discrimination by employers. Titles II and III require

disability access in all places of public accommodation and

business for first occupancy after 26 January 1993 or for

occupancy for new alterations, and in all state and local

government facilities, after 26 January 1992.

No effect expected: mild

increase from previous year.

1989-

1992

Series of Pro-Life Supreme Court Decisions (Webster v.

Reproductive Health Services, Rust v. Sullivan, and Planned

Parenthood v. Casey) in which state laws regarding

provision of increased state supervision of abortion

procedures were upheld.

Increase in number of attacks,

especially abortion-related

attacks.

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1991 Civil Rights Act - adds provisions to Title VII protections,

including right to jury trial.

No effect expected, no effect

found.

1993-4 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act – institutes a

federal background check on firearms purchases in the

United States

Increase in the level of violence

starting in 1994; rise of the

militia movement

1993-4 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act –

prevented purchases of specific firearms with specific

characteristics

Increase in the level of violence

starting in 1994; rise of the

militia movement

2010 In McDonald v. Chicago the Court held that the right of an

individual to “keep and bear arms” protected by the Second

Amendment is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and applies to the states. This

resolved the uncertainty left in the wake of District of

Columbia v. Heller as to the scope of gun rights in regard to

the states.

No effect expected, decrease in

the level of violence.

Table 1 provides several insights into the dynamic of far-right violence. First, three

clusters of events facilitated its rise: the Supreme Court decisions against segregation in

the education system; the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the anti-gun legislation of

1993—1994. Most of the other pieces of legislation focused mainly on disability rights

and affirmative action, and therefore had a limited impact on trends of far-right

violence. It appears that when legislation directly impacts on individual daily practices,

some groups from within the affected communities will tend to react, resorting to

violent measures. Second, in all cases there was a vociferous local leadership which

framed the legislation as almost an “existential threat” to the community’s way of life.

Both aspects—catastrophic framing by leadership and challenging policies—correspond

with findings of previous studies which analyzed political violence within

counterculture communities.

Another interesting insight is the linkage between the level of violence and Supreme

Court decisions on abortion issues. The initial Supreme Court decisions which set the

legal foundations for the legality of abortion procedures in the United States during the

1970s met with a limited response from the far right, i.e., no abortion-related attacks

could be identified during 1973–1976, and in general these years were characterized by

limited violence. However, a series of pro-life decisions in 1989 and the early 1990s

facilitated a significant rise in far-right violence, in particular in abortion-related attacks.

To illustrate, while in 1988/89 there were seven and eight abortion-related attacks

respectively, during 1990–1992 no less than 75 attacks on abortion-related targets were

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documented. These findings generally correspond with the results presented earlier,

i.e., far right groups and individuals appear to be empowered by what could be

perceived as growing support for their values within the political and judicial systems.

While the theoretical implications of these findings will be considered later, we can

summarize by stating that far right violence usually increases in a contentious political

environment when this environment tends to conservatism. However, sparks of

violence can also be triggered regardless, in times of direct or perceived threat to a

distinct ideological grouping’s normative practices. But are these processes more

prevalent in specific geographical areas? The next section addresses this question.

4.2.2 – The Evolution of the American Far-Right Violence: Geographical Context

The significant social and demographic differences between regions in the United States

make the country a convenient laboratory for evaluating how geographic and

demographic characteristics articulate with the level and nature of far-right violence.

Table 2 reflects the distribution of attacks since 1990 among the different US states and

other theoretically relevant state characteristics.359 These include: population size and

population density—which serve mainly as control variables, as it may be assumed that

the greater the population, the higher the chances for the existence of social outliers or

radicals willing to engage in violent action, or that the more dense the population is,

interaction between social outliers or radicals and potential target communities is more

likely; and the size and portion of the overall population of three major minority groups

which are targeted by far-right groups. Finally, the overall proportion of the entire

minorities population is also included.

359 While state level analyses are not rare within the realm of American far right studies: see e.g., Van

Dyke and Soule, 497–520; Freilich. The findings require further evaluation with county-level analyses to

negate the possibility of ecological fallacy.

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Table 2 – Far-Right Violence and Demographic Variables by State123

State Attacks Population AM (African

American)

Population

Proportion

of AM

population

(%)

Hispanic

Population

Proportion

of

Hispanic

population

(%)

Jewish

Population

Proportion

of Jewish

population

(%)

Population

density

Proportion

of

Minorities

1. California 782 37,691,912 2,299,072 6.67 13,434,896 36.6 1,219,740 3.3 241.7 59.9

2. New York 494 19,465,197 3,073,800 15.18 3,232,360 16.6 1,635,020 8.4 412.3 41.7

3. Florida 245 19,057,542 2,999,862 15.91 3,846,267 21 638,635 3.4 353.4 42.1

4. Texas 186 25,674,681 2,979,598 11.91 8,815,582 36.2 139,565 0.6 98.07 44.7

5. Illinois 172 12,869,257 1,866,414 14.88 1,961,843 15.2 297,935 2.3 231.5 36.3

6. Massachusetts 157 6,587,536 434,398 7.02 556,573 8.6 277,980 4.2 840.2 23.9

7. Pennsylvania 157 12,742,886 1,377,689 10.79 588,950 4.7 294,925 2.3 284.3 20.5

8. Washington 144 6,830,038 240,042 3.74 642,959 9.8 45,885 0.7 102.6 27.5

9. New Jersey 138 8,821,155 1,204,826 14.46 1,424,069 16.4 504,450 5.7 1189 40.7

10. Oregon 126 3,871,859 69,206 2.01 417,152 11 40,650 1.1 40.33 21.5

11. Maryland 98 5,828,289 1,700,298 29.44 372,650 6.6 238,000 4.1 596.3 45.3

12. Arizona 93 6,482,505 259,008 4.16 1,964,625 30.2 106,400 1.7 57 42.23

13. North Carolina 85 9,656,401 2,048,628 21.6 678,023 7.4 30,675 0.3 198.2 34.7

14. Wisconsin 79 5,711,767 359,148 6.07 286,382 5.1 28,255 0.5 105.2 16.7

15. Indiana 76 6,516,922 591,397 9.07 322,148 5.1 17,470 0.3 181.7 18.5

16. Ohio 73 11,544,951 1,407,681 12.04 296,059 2.6 148,380 1.3 281.9 18.9

17. Virginia 71 8,096,604 1,551,399 19.91 528,002 6.8 97,290 1.2 204.5 35.2

18. Michigan 70 9,876,187 1,400,362 14.24 408,695 4.1 82,270 0.8 173.9 23.4

19. Connecticut 69 3,580,709 362,296 10.34 424,191 12.1 116,050 3.2 739.1 18.8

20. Colorado 68 5,116,769 201,737 4.28 993,198 20.1 91,070 1.8 49.33 30

21. Missouri 67 6,010,688 704,043 11.49 182,059 3.1 59,175 1 87.26 19

22. Louisiana 65 4,574,836 1,452,396 31.98 152,781 3.5 10,675 0.2 105 39.7

23. Georgia 63 9,815,210 2,950,435 30.02 780,408 8.1 127,670 1.3 169.5 44.1

24. Minnesota 63 5,344,861 274,412 4.57 217,551 4.2 45,635 0.9 67.14 16.9

25. Tennessee 59 6,403,353 1,055,689 16.78 234,868 3.8 19,600 0.3 155.4 24.4

26. Iowa 45 3,062,309 89,148 2.68 124,030 4.1 6,240 0.2 54.81 11.3

27. DC 43 617,996 313,000 50.7 51,260 8.7 28,000 4.7 10065 65.2

28. South Carolina 43 4,679,230 1,290,684 28.48 177,999 4 12,545 0.3 155.4 35.9

29. Kentucky 41 4,369,356 337,520 7.71 100,366 2.4 11,300 0.3 110 13.7

30. Nevada 41 2,723,322 218,626 8.1 672,393 25.9 74,400 2.8 24.8 45.9

31. Maine 35 1,328,188 15,707 1.03 12,700 1 13,890 1 43.04 5.6

32. Utah 35 2,817,222 29,287 1.27 323,938 11.8 5,650 0.2 34.3 19.6

33. Alabama 32 4,802,740 1,251,311 26.38 128,586 2.8 8,850 0.2 94.65 33

34. Idaho 32 1,584,985 9,810 0.95 159,257 10.5 1,525 0.1 19.15 16

35. Oklahoma 30 3,791,508 277,644 7.96 278,676 7.7 4,700 0.1 55.02 21.3

36. New Hampshire 29 1,318,194 15,035 1.22 39,123 3 10,120 0.8 147 7.7

37. New Mexico 29 2,082,224 42,550 2.97 895,150 45.1 12,175 0.6 17.16 59.5

38. Arkansas 26 2,937,979 449,895 15.76 155,309 5.4 1,725 0.1 56.43 25.5

39. Kansas 23 2,871,238 167,864 6.15 268,964 9.6 17,775 0.6 35.09 21.8

40. West Virginia 21 1,855,364 63,124 3.58 21,400 1.2 2,335 0.1 77.06 6.8

41. Mississippi 20 2,978,512 1,098,385 37.18 56,632 1.9 1,575 0.1 63.5 42

42. Montana 20 998,199 4,027 0.67 31,093 3.2 1,350 0.1 6.8 12.2

43. Nebraska 19 1,842,641 82,885 4.5 147,968 8.3 6,100 0.3 23.97 17.9

44. Rhode Island 16 1,051,302 60,189 6.36 120,662 11.5 18,750 1.8 1006 23.6

45. Vermont 15 626,431 6,277 0.87 6,651 1.1 5,385 0.9 67.73 5.7

46. Delaware 13 907,135 191,814 20.95 62,506 7.2 15,100 1.7 464.3 34.7

47. South Dakota 9 824,082 10,207 1.14 22,420 2.8 395 0 10.86 15.3

48. Alaska 8 722,718 23,263 4.27 37,420 5.5 6,150 0.9 1.2 35.9

49. North Dakota 8 683,932 7,960 1.08 13,634 2.1 400 0.1 9.9 11.1

50. Wyoming 6 568,158 4,748 1.29 43,385 8.1 950 0.2 5.8 14.1

51. Hawaii 3 1,374,810 21,424 3.08 108,663 8.4 7,280 0.5 214.1 77.3

1 State’s data is based on 2010 general census. 2 While demographic changes occur over time, several factors limit the impact of these in the current analysis. First, the relatively short time-frame

analyzed; second, the majority of the violence occurring in the last decade, thus limiting further possible distortion in the findings; finally, the growth

of a number of minority groups, which accords with overall population growth (African American, Jewish).

The findings provide several important insights regarding the dynamics and

geographical dispersion of far-right violence and challenge conventional wisdom. To

97

begin with, the area which was the birthplace of groups such as the KKK and the major

concentration of far right violence during the 1960s, is no longer the natural habitat of

the violent American far right. North Carolina, the southern state with the highest level

of far-right violence, is ranked only thirteenth among all states. If we include Texas, we

can only find two southern states in the top 15. Furthermore, the states which were

mostly associated with the American far-right in the past are mostly ranked in the

middle or the lower third in terms of number of attacks, including Mississippi (ranked

41), West Virginia (40), Kansas (39), Alabama (33), Kentucky (29), South Carolina (28),

Tennessee (25), Georgia (23), Louisiana (22) and Missouri (21). This clearly represents a

different situation than forty or fifty years ago, when the Deep South was engraved in

the American collective mindset as a hotbed of racial, anti-abortion and religiously

driven violence.

If the South is no longer the hub of far right violence, which regions are? It appears that

the exact opposite is the case. In terms of the number of attacks, the two states at the top

of the list are California and New York, which are considered liberal—or blue—in terms

of their ideological and political orientation. To illustrate, both states have voted for

Democratic presidential candidates in the last 24 years. When looking at the rest of the

states that occupy the top ten spots, the blue trend is consistent: we can find Illinois

(ranked 5th), Massachusetts (6th), Pennsylvania (7th), Washington (8th), New Jersey (9th)

and Oregon (10th). Thus, it can be determined that during the last twenty years the

violence has shifted from the center/South to the coasts and the North (with the

exception of Texas).

The existence of significant minority groups in the different states appears linked with

the level of far-right violence they experience. The table indicates that the top four states

in terms of number of attacks also have the highest number of combined African

American and Hispanic residents. Moreover, eight of the top ten states in terms of the

number of Jewish residents are also in the top ten in terms of number of attacks.

Nevertheless, despite these initial findings, more systematic and rigorous procedures

are needed in order to evaluate the relationship between the trends in far-right violence

and geographical and demographic characteristics. Basic analysis shows strong and

statistically significant correlation between the number of attacks per state and African

American population size (α=.598***); Hispanic population size (α=.849***) and

proportion (α=.492***); and size (α=.900***) and proportion (α=.575***) of Jewish

98

population. Finally, the overall number of minorities in general is also positively

correlated with the number of attacks (α=.344*).

While these findings may be persuasive, the strong correlation between the level of

violence and state population size (α=.888**) requires us to resort to a procedure which

will evaluate the above findings when controlling for potential intervening variables.

Two-stage hierarchical regression analysis—intended for controlling both state

population size and density—was performed (the change in R2 was .179***). The

analysis exposes a nuanced picture regarding the relations between the level of violence

and in-state size and proportion of minority groups. While both the size and proportion

of the African American population (β=.47*** and β=.16** respectively) and the size

(β=.69***) and proportion (β=.11)360 of Jewish population remained statistically

significantly congruent with the level of violence, this is not the case with the size or

proportion of the Hispanic population. While the meaning of these findings will be

discussed later in this study, it appears that anti-Semitic and anti-African American

sentiments and narratives are still emphasized and dominant within the ideological

frameworks of most far-right streams; and a potential identification problem exists, i.e.,

African American and Jewish organizational frameworks are more visible, hence there

is a delay in the identification of the Hispanic minority as a threat by far-right groups.

4.2.3 – The Development of American Far-Right Violence: Socio-Economic Context

The political violence literature is rich in theoretical frameworks associating political

violence with economic conditions: many scholars have assumed that most individuals

who join violent sub-state groups are suffering from frustration and desperation which,

in most cases, is a result of humiliation and perceived economic deprivation.361 In the

case of the American far-right, the emergence of at least some of its streams has

traditionally been seen as a result of socio-economic crisis, e.g., the rise of the militia

movement following the 1980s farm crisis and the rise of the Skinheads following the

decline of inner-cities regions in the mid to late 1980s. While these linkages may be

valid, at least when looking at the overall extent of American far right violence,

economic indicators have limited capacity to explain trends in the violence. 360 In this specific finding, P<.063.

361 See - Piazza. A. James, “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social

Cleavages,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18 (2006), 159–177.

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Figure 3 – Domestic Economic Indicators between 1954-2011

Several pro-cyclic indicators are commonly used in order to measure the economic

health of a polity; among them are the unemployment rate, gross domestic product

(GDP) and inflation rate. These three indicators’ yearly values between 1954 and 2011

are represented in Figure 3. When compared with yearly numbers of attacks, two

negative correlations are found to be statistically significant: inflation rate (α=-.277*) and

nominal GDP growth (α=-.486***). While the former corresponds with the

abovementioned deprivation thesis, the latter does not. When multivariate analysis was

performed, only nominal GDP growth remained significant. The insignificance of the

factors which normally more directly impact individuals’ quality of life, the lack of

supporting evidence—e.g., it seems that the more economically developed states are

more vulnerable to far-right violence—and the lack of individual-level data, demand

caution when trying to explain far-right violence by means of socio-economic causes.

4. 3 – The Evolution of American Far-Right Violence: Operational Context

Before considering the theoretical and analytical implications of the findings presented

above, an overview of the operational characteristics of the violence produced by the

American far right is required. This will help to evaluate aspects related to its

productivity, effectiveness and overall operational capabilities, and to how these are

related to its ability to impact social and political processes. Hence, the following

section will cover aspects of far-right violence related to the level of violence, in terms of

casualties, tactical tendencies and target selection.

100

Figure 4 – Number of Victims per Year, 1990–2011

Figure 4A – Number of Victims per Year, 1990–2011(Higher Resolution)

One of the popular parameters employed by students of terrorism for assessing the

effectiveness and the impact of terrorist campaigns are the number of victims they

generate.362 The rationale is that the psychological and symbolic impact of terrorist

362 See e.g., James A. Piazza, “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social

Cleavages,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18 (2006), 159–77.

101

attacks—the main factors by which terrorism seeks to facilitate political change—are

closely linked to the number of individuals who were victimized. In the context of the

American far-right, the relevant numbers are presented in Figures 4 and 4A.

With the exception of 1995’s OKBOMB casualties, it can be seen that the last decade has

been more lethal than the 1990s, a trend that corresponds with the increase in the

number of attacks during the 2000s. A more nuanced interpretation allows us to

identify four distinct phases. The first, between 1990 and 1998, is characterized by a

relatively low number of fatalities and injuries, subject again to the exception of 1995.

Between 1999 and 2002 we can see a significant rise in the casualty rates attributable to

far-right violence as the number of injured rose to over 100, and except for 2002, over

150. The number of fatalities was usually a few dozen. Between 2003 and 2006 there is a

decline in casualties, as in those years the number of victims declines below 100 injured

and 20 fatalities. Finally, between 2007 and 2011 there is again a rise in the number of

victims, to the highest levels documented so far.

Although providing some idea regarding the highs and lows of far-right violence in

terms of the number of victims it has generated, the above numbers still cannot enable

an accurate assessment of its productivity in this regard. This term refers to the ability

to maximize the number of victims for each violent operation. Thus, in order to assess

productivity we need to calculate the average number of victims per attack while

controlling for attacks which initially were not intended to result in human casualties or

were not capable of doing so, i.e., attacks against property, or attacks that were not

completed.

Figure 5 – Average Number of Victims per Event on Yearly Basis, 1990–2012

102

Figure 5 provides the results of these procedures by illustrating the average number of

victims per attack on an annual basis. As can be seen, the picture is significantly

different from the one presented in Figure 4. Whereas during the 2000s there is an

increase in the number of victims as a result of the rise in the number of attacks, in

terms of productivity of the attacks, there are no significant changes in the last 15 years.

In other words, we cannot argue that far-right violence has become more sophisticated

or effective in increasing the number of victims caused by its violent activities.

This is an intriguing finding, especially when considering that what is termed the “new

terrorism” of the last 30 years is characterized by significant operational advances.363

Hence, in periods during which many streams of terrorism have shown improvement

in their operational capabilities and, as a result, an increase in their tendency to engage

in mass casualty attacks, the violent American far right shows stagnation, at least in

terms of its ability to enhance the harm it generates.

In order to further our understanding of the American far-right lack of operational

development, a more in-depth look at its operational characteristics is needed. Figure 6

presents the distribution of far right attacks based on types of attacks.

Figure 6 – American Far Right Violence by Type of Attack,1990–2012

As can be seen, the great majority of attacks are directed against property (43%) and

specific human targets (42%). Just three percent of the attacks were intended to cause—

363 David Tucker, “What is new about the new terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 13 (2001), 1–14.

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or were successful in generating—mass casualty incidents,364 further emphasizing the

difficulty of far right violence to make the leap from small-scale attacks against specific

human targets to large-scale activities of indiscriminate violence that have the potential

to generate a high number of casualties.

The findings presented in Figure 6 may also imply that the operational-social

framework of the violent American far right could be better understood—with some

modifications—via the framework of the iceberg theory “…of political extremism of

social/political movements,” originally developed by Sprinzak almost 40 years ago.365 In

the context of the American far right, it seems that we have a large base of supporters—

the base of the iceberg—who are usually engaged in low-level violence such as minor

incidents of vandalism or low-sophistication attacks against individuals.366 The tip of

the iceberg includes a relatively small number of people who are responsible for

producing mass-casualty attacks. Further developing the analogy, we can say that most

of the low-level attacks have received relatively little attention from the media, political

authorities and law enforcement: this is the submerged part of the iceberg which cannot

be seen. The few mass-casualty attacks, represented by the visible tip of the iceberg,

attract most of the attention.

Nevertheless, the common wisdom is that the most damaging and dangerous mass of

the iceberg is the proportionally larger submerged segment, hence the high volume of

violence which is reflected in vandalism and specific attacks against individuals. This

model offers a more precise indication of the growing threat from the far right than the

small number of mass-casualty attacks. This is particularly true when considering that

rarely will a group or individual engage in mass-casualty attacks without engaging first

364 Indiscriminate attacks which includes tactics aiming to maximize the number of casualties (i.e. car-

bomb, shooting with automatic rifle into crowded area etc.). 365 In the early 1980s the Israeli political scientist Ehud Sprinzak published a paper on the irredentist

Israeli religio-political movement Gush Emunim (“The Bloc of the Faithful”) entitled “The Iceberg Model

of Political Extremism.” In it he argued that the Gush is best understood not as a classical protest

movement, but as the extremist tip of a large social and cultural “iceberg,” in effect a religious subculture,

which supports and nurtures the Gush. Pyramidal in structure, this iceberg—Gush's social and political

basis of support—broadens as one moves from the politically extremist tip to the non-extremist base. See

Ehud Sprinzak, “Gush Emunim, the Iceberg Model of Political Extremism,” Medina, Mimshal Veyahasim

Beinleumiim, 17 (1981) (Hebrew). 366 Blee uses the concept of “narrative racial terrorism” to describe these types of attacks. She explains that

these attacks are “somewhat spontaneous, in which victims are chosen impulsively and without clear

purpose, and whose consequences are rarely calculated by the perpetrators in advance.” See Blee.

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in low profile attacks.367 Therefore, it is possible that growth of the base of the iceberg

will eventually also be reflected in an increase in the stability and extent of the visible

tip, indicative of greater numbers of mass-casualty attacks.

Figure 7 – American Far Right Violence by Type of Targets, 1990–2012

To conclude, if this perspective is a reflection of the movement’s structure and

dynamics, then we may be facing a continuous rise in the level of violence since—as can

be seen in Figure 7—the last six years have been characterized by an overall increase in

the base of the iceberg, which is followed by a concomitant increase in the number of

mass-casualty attacks; this trend is also visible during 1999–2000, with a rise in the

number of low-level attacks being followed by an increase in mass-casualty attacks.

The applicability of the iceberg model to American far-right violence is also supported

by the specific weapons and tactics used.

367 For example, in their research on Jewish terrorist groups, Pedahzur and Perliger showed that most

members of the terrorist groups were involved in minor incidents prior to engagement in more

systematic campaigns of violence. See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New

York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

105

Figure 8 – American Far Right Violence by Type of Weapon,1990–2012

As shown in Figure 8, a clear hierarchy of sophistication exists, with beating and cold

weapons constituting the majority of the attacks (57%), while more sophisticated

weapons such as firearms and explosives constitute a second degree of sophistication,

i.e., 24% of the attacks, while arson is a unique category since, in many cases, it is aimed

against property and not people. On a side note, notwithstanding their limited level of

sophistication, far right elements have been using chemical and biological weapons in a

considerable number of cases. While most of these attacks were not sophisticated in

their execution, such as contaminating the medical equipment of abortion clinics with

chemical materials, they still indicate a degree of innovation.

The last operational dimension which will be analyzed is target selection (see Figure 9),

which could be explained by re-addressing the conceptualization of the far right as it

was presented in the first part of this study. As can be seen in Figure 9, 65% of the

attacks were directed against various minorities, including attacks against educational

and religious institutions affiliated with minority groups. This could be explained both

on an ideological-symbolic level and by more practical-operational considerations.

From an ideological-symbolic perspective, the core components of the far right

ideology—internal homogeneity and nativism—and other commonly shared

ideological components—xenophobia, racism and exclusionism—refer to practices that

aim to shape the boundaries between, and more precisely define, the ostracized and the

elect. Therefore it is not surprising that outsiders are the main targets of far-right groups

and individuals.

106

Figure 9 – American Far Right Violence by Type of Targets, 1990–2012

Moreover, attacking outsiders also serves a symbolic signaling purpose. The literature

regards terrorist attacks as symbolic violence that is used to communicate a political

message aiming at challenging the hegemonic construction of political reality.368 A

symbol is “an object or a phenomenon used to provide a meaning not inherent in the

object itself.”369 In the case of terrorism, we are dealing with a violent act whose

different components, i.e., the characteristics of the act, such as targets selected, tactics

used, and timing, are used to convey a message to different audiences in order to

impact the perception of reality and one’s place in it.370 In the case of the American far

right, violence is practiced in order to prevent the further blurring of the boundaries

between “Americans” and “non-Americans” by communicating a clear message of who

constitutes legitimate members of the collective and the nation. This rationale also helps

to explain the positive correlation between the size and proportion of minority

populations in a specific state, and the level of violence in that state, since it is precisely

in these types of states—with high proportions of minorities—that higher chances exist

for ambiguity regarding the definition of “outsiders” and “insiders,” and concomitantly

a broader pool of available targets.

From a practical-operational perspective, some immigrant and minority communities,

with a recent history in the United States, typically constitute a more vulnerable part of

368 Martha Crenshaw, “Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13(4) (1981), 379–99. 369 R. W. Cobb and M. H. Ross,“Agenda Setting and the Denial of Agenda Access: Key Concepts” in ed. R.

W. Cobb and M. H. Ross, Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997). 370 See e.g., Schmid and Jongman, 7.

107

society: they have limited access to political power and economic resources and, as a

result, are unable to secure severe sanctions against those threatening them; they are

easy to identify and are likely to have contentious relations with law enforcement

agencies. Thus, it is easy to understand why far-right elements might assume that

attacking minorities will have limited potential costs in comparison to the costs of

attacking other types of targets.

Several further insights regarding target selection are worth mentioning. To begin with,

some of the targets appear to be related to specific ideological movements. For instance,

attacks against law enforcement and government institutions correlate with the anti-

federalist movement, while abortion-related targets are associated with the

fundamentalist movement. This probable link between specific ideological tendencies

and operational characteristics will be examined more closely in later sections of this

study. Second, individuals and groups related to alternative sexual orientations

surprisingly constitute a large proportion of the targets chosen by far right elements.

The fact that the proclivity to attack these kinds of targets is a recent trend—more than

50% of the attacks have occurred in the last five years and more than two thirds in the

last decade—may imply that we are seeing a counter-response to the growing political

and legal success of groups from the left of the political spectrum promoting civil rights

in the context of sexual preference, e.g., the expansion of legislation allowing same-sex

marriage, while DC, Hawaii and California were the only states/districts which allowed

same sex partnerships before 2000. Since 2000, 13 other states have passed such

legislation.

Finally, attacks against perceived enemies from within—i.e., political competitors such

as left-wing or liberal political elements—is a trend which is visible in other similar

arenas of far-right violence, but which is not discernible in the American case. How can

this be explained? Is it merely because attacking such targets is more problematic or less

effective in framing the message far right groups are interested in conveying? Or is it a

result of identification problems and limited operational accessibility? These targets are

naturally not highly visible, nor are they accessible or identifiable as viable targets: are

the costs involved in acquiring the comprehension regarding the nature of the specific

organization, and of the process of framing it as a viable target, higher than those

related to obvious targets such as minority facilities? The next section, which is devoted

to placing the empirical findings presented above in a theoretical and analytical context,

108

will help to answer these questions, and provide a better understanding of the trends

within the American far right.

4.4 – Theoretical and Analytical Implications

In order to comprehend how the findings presented above promote our understanding

of the causes and characteristics of far-right violence, we must first delve into—and

provide a basic introduction to—two spheres of literature. The first deals with the

causes of political violence; the second focuses on the factors which facilitate popular

support for, and political activism in, far-right groups/movements. While in both cases

the scope of this study does not allow for a full literature review, it is still important to

provide a basic overview of the major theoretical approaches.

4.4.1 – Theories of Political Violence

The first academic investigations of political violence, especially of terrorist/sub-state

groups, appeared in the early 1960s. Since then, great efforts have been made by

scholars from different branches of the social sciences to decipher the processes and

motives that impel individuals to take part in acts of political violence. The different

approaches can be classified in accordance with their sphere of research and its relation

to the perpetrator of violence. Thus, alongside studies which focus on the individual,

we can find studies which focus on their interaction/socialization with family members,

peers and a close social environment, as well as studies which analyze the

characteristics of the individual’s cultural or political community.

The first scholars to study sub-state political violence were perplexed by the willingness

of individuals to sacrifice personal resources and partake in risky and life-threatening

activities for the sake of what they perceived as altruistic goals.371 This perspective,

combined with the observation that terrorists are inclined to engage in especially cruel

manifestations of violence, fostered the popularity of two perceptions regarding the

nature of terrorists/perpetrators. The first was partially based on Freudian theories,

which link frustration and violence,372 and it assumed that terrorists are individuals

suffering from frustration and desperation, which in most cases is a result of past

371 D. G. Hubbard, The skyjacker: His flights of fantasy (New York: Macmillan, 1971); F. J. Hacker, Crusaders,

criminals, crazies: Terror and terrorism in our time (New York: Norton, 1976). 372 J. Dollard, L. W. Doob, N. E. Miller, W. Mowrer, and R. R. Sears, Frustration and Aggression (New

Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1939); Schmid and Jongman, 7.

109

humiliation and perceived economic deprivation; hence frustration, and the view that

terrorism was the only alternative to achieve meaningful lives, drove these individuals

to engage in political violence. This perspective gradually met growing criticism as

studies showed that the linkage between frustration and violence is doubtful.373

Furthermore, studies demonstrated that in reality a large majority of the terrorists

originate from affluent classes of society.374 The second perspective was that terrorists

share some common psychopathologies. Whereas some scholars expected to find that

terrorists suffer from major mental clinical illnesses, others assumed that terrorists

suffer from personality disorders, especially sociopathic personalities.375 Among the

popular traits mentioned in this body of literature were narcissistic tendencies,

unconsolidated personality, low self-esteem and unformed self-identity. A branch of

this psychological-individual approach also sought to understand the mental conditions

of the terrorists by looking at their childhood socialization. While some of them

emphasized a combination of non-functioning and underachieving parents with

problematic personality traits,376 others claimed that individuals whose parents had

high political awareness and/or who were oppressed by the state because of their

political activism, would be highly motivated to engage in terrorism to avenge the

oppression of his/her parents and to continue their political struggle.377

Notwithstanding, from the mid-1980s, a growing number of scholars have suggested

that the most common trait among terrorists is normalcy. Indeed, the pathological

theoretical approach has never received substantial empirical support.378

373 R. J. Rummel, Field Theory Evolving (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1977).

374 See for example Alan B. Kruger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism,” Journal of

Economic Perspectives (17), 4 (2003), 119–44.

375 Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” Journal

of Conflict Resolution, 49(1) (2005), 3–42.

376 Hubbard.

377 V. D. Volkan, Blood Lines: Fromethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (New York : Farrar, Straus,&Giroux,

1997); Jessica Stern, Terror in the name of God: Why religious militants kill (New York: Ecco, 2003); K. Kellen,

“Ideology and Rebellion: Terrorism in West Germany,” in Walter Reich ed. The Origins of Terrorism

(Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), 43–58. 378 Walter Reich, “Understanding Terrorist Behavior: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological

Inquiry,” in Walter Reich ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of mind,

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 261–79; Andrew P. Silke, “Cheshire-cat Logic:

The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research,” Psychology, Crime and Law 4

(1998), 51–69; John Horgan, “The Search for the Terrorist Personality,” in ed. Andrew Silke Terrorists,

Victims and Society (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2003) 3–27.

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Studies which emphasized social learning processes paved the way for scholars who

claimed that the dynamic within the terrorist’s social networks are sometimes more

responsible for the inclination to engage in violence than ideological affinities or

personality traits.379 By analyzing the social ties of the terrorists, and the structure and

characteristics of the social network of terrorist groups, these studies aim to portray the

paths of how groups and individuals slide into violence. Generally, they have argued

that most terrorist incidents are a product of a social network which operates within

social enclaves alienated from society and from mainstream culture and which

radicalize in times of external threats to their values. The members’ conformity with the

social network’s values is expressed by participating in political violence.380

The “social network studies” did not simply undermine the importance of

psychological explanations but were also a counter-response, in some degree, to the

influx of studies focusing on communal preconditions for the appearance of terrorism.

The latter approach has almost become mainstream in the field in the last two decades

and has tested several communal conditions/dynamics which increase inclinations of

communities to implement political violence: economic deprivation—relative or

absolute; political and social oppression; collapse of social structure, accompanied by

rapid social and economic changes which leave some segments of society behind, also

known as the “collective behavior school”;381 the existence of resources, cost-reducing

mechanisms or constraints—such as societal support, formal political support, existence

of mobilization potential— that impact mobilization of deprived groups or anti-system

groups and the abilities of such groups to overcome these constraints or to aggregate

resources, known also as “resources mobilization theory”; for example, the emergence

of the Skinhead movement could be attributed to the resources provided by veteran

organizations such as WAR; and finally the Political Opportunity Structure theory

emphasizes the existence of a convenient political-social structure by highlighting that

movements and groups’ developments and tactics are significantly “…affected by a

379 The following studies confirmed this assertion in the American far right arena. See R. Blazak, “White

Boys to Terrorist Men: Target Recruitment of Nazi Skinheads,” American Behavioral Science 44 (2001), 982–

1000; Kathrin M. Blee, Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement (Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press,

2002); Hamm. 380 Pedahzur and Perliger (2006). 381 For an effective summary of this approach, see Freilich, 31–3.

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shifting constellation of factors exogenous to the movement itself.”382 Some of these

factors, such as traditions and institutions, are relatively stable and others are more

volatile, such as elite alignment, political discourse, and the security situation.383

Overall, these studies departed from the attempt to explain individual behavior and

turned to explaining communal tendencies. While there are many variations and

nuances to these communal theories, many suffer from basic methodological-

conceptual shortcomings which are also prevalent in the socialization and social

networks studies. They cannot detect what characterizes or differentiates those who join

violent groups from the rest of the population that is exposed to the same social

conditions.

4.4.2 – Theories Explaining Far-Right Activism

Some of the theories focusing on explaining far-right activism are closely related—or

are more specific versions—of the above-mentioned political violence theories. This is

not a complete surprise, especially since far-right politics in many instances has been

characterized by violent practices. Another similarity between the two bodies of

literature is related to their evolution; as in the case of the study of far-right activism,

scholars initially focused on the personal/psychological traits which characterize those

who joined militant far right groups. Adorno’s “authoritarian personality” is probably

the most renowned study in this context and, like the ones that followed it, argued that

those who tend to support far-right ideology have unique mental and personal traits.384

The mixed empirical support for Adorno’s approach, and the dramatic rise in the power

of the European far-right during the 1980s and 1990s, led to the emergence of a long list

of theories and explanations that departed from the individual-psychological approach:

these are summarized in Table 3.

382 David S. Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of

Political Opportunity,” The American Journal of Sociology, 101(6) (1996), 1628–60. 383 Ibid. 384 Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sanford, Authoritarian

Personality (Oxford, England: Harpers, 1950).

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Table 3 – Theories Explaining the Rise/Popularity of Far Right Groups

Theory Rationale

Single Issue

Thesis

The narrow nature of the political message and its relevancy explains success. Main

examples which are usually mentioned are the success of far-right groups/parties

which have focused on anti-immigration, law and order and unemployment policies.

Hence, far-right groups will be successful when one of these issues is at the center of

public or political discourse.385

The Protest

Thesis

Popularity of far-right groups is related to the level of societal discontent with the

mainstream established political actors. Thus, support is less ideological but more an

expression of temporary frustration with established politics.386

Social

Breakdown

Thesis (Mass

Society Theory)

Breakdown of traditional social structure (class, religion) has weakened the sense of

social integration, belonging and solidarity: hence, people tend to be attracted to ethnic

nationalism. This leads to escalation of group relations and increases anomie which

leads to the loss of the foundations for standards of judgment and behavior.387

Post Material

Thesis

Stresses the importance of traditional values over economic interests. An individual

who feels strongly attached to traditional values, when the latter are—according to

their perceptions—in decline, are more inclined to join far-right groups. A counter-

response to post-material politics which focus on issues such as environment, gender

relations, e.g., politics of feminism, etc.388

385 For a summary of this approach see Roger Eatwell, Ten Theories of the Extreme Right, in ed. Peter H.

Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, Right Wing Extremism in the Twenty First Century (Portland, Oregon: Frank

Cass, 2003), 47–71. 386 P. Knigge, “The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe,”European Journal of

Political Research, 34(2) (1998); Hans Georg Betz, “Conditions Favoring the Success (and Failure) of Radical

Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies,” in ed. Y. Meny and Y. Surel, Democracies and

the Populist Challenge (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 387 William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959); S. Halebsky, Mass Society

and Political Conflict: Towards a Reconstruction of Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976);

Eatwell, 52–4. 388 Paul Ignazi, “The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypothesis on the Emergence of Extreme- Right Wing

Parties in Europe,” European Journal of Political Research, 26(3) (1992), 3–34.

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Status Theories

and Economic

Interests

Far-right groups emerge in order to maintain narrowing lines of power and privileges.

Far-right activism intensifies when specific segments of the population feel that they

are losing status and power as a result of economic/normative changes. Some theories

directly link economic interests—or a sense of economic insecurity—with support for

far-right ideology. 389

Political

Opportunity

Structure (POS)

Combination of all or some of the following components can facilitate the emergence

and growth of far right groups: weak political structure or turmoil in the political

system, external pressure, existence of mobilization resources (when mainstream

politics neglect central issues) and legitimization of far-right ideas by mainstream

politics.390

Growing

Heterogeneity

of Society

Rapid population growth which results from a high proportion of newcomers

facilitates the rise of far-right groups as a result of a decline in community

cohesiveness, an increase in social stress and competition over resources. 391

Mediatization

Thesis

The tendency of the media to portray the negative dimensions/aspects of foreign

communities, combined with the tendency of far-right groups to nurture highly

charismatic leaders explains the success of far-right groups. The narrow and

sometimes simplistic nature of far-right ideology is better adapted to the contemporary

nature of the political discourse and mass media.392

National

Tradition

Thesis

The success of far right groups depends on their ability to portray themselves as part of

the region/country’s tradition and heritage. This way they can legitimize their

discourse and penetrate the political and social spheres more easily. People are more

reluctant to be excluded from political discourse groups which position themselves as

part of the community’s historical identity.393

While some of the ideas presented in Table 3 deserve the designation of theories (POS),

as they are based on a clear and developed set of concepts and hypotheses which were

389 S. M. Lipset and E. Rabb, The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1970 (New

York: HarperCollins, 1970). 390 For theoretical considerations, see H. Kitschelt, “Political opportunity structures and political protest:

anti-nuclear movements in four democracies,” British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), 57–85; on its

application in the case of the American far right, see Freilich, 34–7. 391 Lipset and Rabb; J. A. Aho, Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism (Seattle: University of

Washington Press, 1990); W. B. Hixson, Jr., Search for the American Right Wing: An Analysis of the Social

Science Record, 1955–1987 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 392 T. A. Van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism (London, UK: Sage, 1993). 393 Eatwell, 62–3.

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tested empirically, others are simplistic descriptions of the conditions under which far

right groups may be more successful. Regardless, they provide basic familiarity with

the main direction taken by students of far right groups regarding the factors which

explain the rise of their success.

4.4.3 – The American Far-Right in Theoretical Context

It should be clarified from the outset that while some of the theories presented above

appear highly applicable for explaining the rise, or trends, of specific movements of the

American far right, at this stage the goal remains that of establishing an overarching

perspective; the subsequent sections of the study will focus on explaining the trends of

the specific streams of the American far right.

The findings presented in the empirical sections earlier indicate a sustained association

between the characteristics of the political environment and the level of far right

violence. To iterate briefly, times of increasing political competition, i.e., election years,

as well as an increase in the power of conservative political forces, are normally

accompanied by increased levels of far right violence. Thus, we can carefully argue that

this corresponds with some aspects of the POS and Protest theses. Having gained

prominence in the study of social movements, POS reflects the tendency to see political

activism—particularly in the context of broad social movements—as a result of

perceived changes in the political power structure. In the eyes of the movement’s

members, such activism presents an opportunity to promote significant political

change, or in the words of McAdam, “Any event or broad social process that serves to

undermine the calculations on which the political establishment is structured occasions

a shift in political opportunities.”394 Some students of this approach specifically

emphasize the importance of the openness of political institutions to ideas of the

movement as a factor that facilitates the rise of the movement. And while most scholars

do not tend to see elections as an opportunity, it seems that this is the case in the eyes of

far right elements in the United States. The reason for this anomaly may be the relative

uniqueness of the American political system.

394 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1982).

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In most parliamentary systems the results of elections are reflected in the restructure of

divisions of political power between existing sets of actors and their respective parties;

thus in many cases the same actors may serve in various constellations of governmental

coalitions. Therefore, results of elections in many instances will lead to marginal

changes in major policy issues, especially those related to society’s core moral

foundations. This is also a result of the fact that coalitions by definition demand

compromises, which usually prevent dramatic changes in core policies after elections.

There are significant caveats to these generalizations, and sometimes we will witness

revolutionary electoral results. Nonetheless, general elections in most parliamentary

systems can be described as more incremental in the ways they impact public policies.

The United States in this sense is a different breed. Both the two-party system, which

creates the political dynamic and perception of a zero sum game, and the predominant

nature of the executive branch, which channels the political game into one major

electoral process—the presidential election—may shape a mindset which will perceive

every presidential election as an opportunity to promote significant change. This also

may explain why the only genuinely non-competitive election in the previous two

decades was the only one not accompanied by an increase in the level of far right

violence: the 1996 elections were won by a landslide as President Clinton gathered 200

more electoral votes than the Republican candidate, Robert Dole. In such highly non-

competitive elections, the electoral processes could not seriously be perceived as an

opportunity.

Continuing this line of analysis, the positive correlation between a conservative political

environment and high levels of far right violence could indicate that in the eyes of far

right elements, periods of conservative political dominance are times of opportunity in

which the political system is more accessible and open to pressure from groups on the

right side of the political spectrum. Indeed, social movement studies have emphasized

the role of perceived success in increasing mobilization and activism.395 Similarly,

studies conducted in the European arena have identified correlations between an

increase of support for the far right and legitimization of its ideas by mainstream

political actors.396

395 Meyer and Staggenborg. 396 Eatwell, 59.

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Finally, this perception is also partially supported by the findings which reflect higher

levels of violence following Supreme Court decisions that are more supportive of

conservative social values. These decisions may generate the sense of a shift—or a

potential shift—in the division of political power among far right activists, and thereby

function as a call for seizing the opportunity by further engaging in political activism.

POS theories have attracted significant criticism, mainly because of the subjective and

unclear usage of the concept of opportunity, the mixed results of empirical attempts to

confirm the theory, and their sometimes limited utility for comparative analysis.397 On

the other hand, the protest thesis is usually easier to use in comparative frameworks,

since its main argument is that support and activism in the context of the far right is, in

many cases, a result of frustration and distrust of mainstream established political

actors. These are feelings that are generally easy to measure. In the American context it

has been mentioned that one possible explanation for the higher levels of violence

during elections is the inability of far-right groups to penetrate the political system via

legitimate means, as well as the marginality of their ideas. Both are even more salient in

times of electoral processes: hence, they further encourage radicalization. Simply put,

the growing frustration and distrust with the established political parties tend to be

more intense during election periods, when it is clear to far right elements that they

have no viable platforms for promoting their goals.

However, whereas strong feelings of hostility towards the government and the

established parties are to be found to an extent in most far right groups, several factors

make application of the protest thesis in the American context problematic. First, as

indicated by Eatwell, this thesis assumes that support for the far right is transient and

unstructured.398 However, this is not the case with the American far right, which depicts

clear trends over time; moreover, most ethnographical evidence reflects that far right

activists are not temporary in the sense assumed in the protest thesis: for extended

periods of time many of them remain supporters of specific ideological principles, e.g.,

anti-abortion, anti-gun legislation. Finally, one should ask why following events which

are supposed to lessen levels of frustration—positive electoral results or a more

397 C. A. Rootes, “Political Opportunity Structures: Promise, Problems and Prospects

Centre for the Study of Social and Political Movements,” Darwin College, University of Kent at

Canterbury, http://www.kent.ac.uk/sspssr/staff/academic/rootes/pos.pdf (accessed 4 November 2012). 398 Eatwell.

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supportive composition of the legislative branch—we see an increase in the level of

violence rather than a decrease.

The findings related to the geographical characteristics of far right violence are also

helpful in assessing the applicability of far right theories to the American case. The

national/regional tradition thesis is highly deficient in predicting trends in the

American case, as the regions which were the hotbed of the American far right violence

for many years have in the last two decades become the periphery of the phenomenon.

The fact that this process of transition of violence from the Deep South to other parts of

the country has gone hand-in-hand with what appears to be the increasing

fragmentation of the movements, may imply that the national/regional tradition thesis

is applicable only when there is an existing effective organizational framework. In other

words, it is useful only when the tradition is reflected—and on some level preserved

by—an existing organizational framework such as an active SMO. The disappearance or

weakening of the far right organizational framework in the South may serve to reduce

the importance of existing traditions and practices related to far right ideology. This

explanation also corresponds with the findings that the great majority of far right

violence in the last two decades has been perpetrated by unaffiliated groups and

individuals—this issue will be discussed at length in the next section. When collective

action is characterized by lack of formality and organizational norms, tradition and

heritage, which are usually crucial tools for maintaining the organizational framework,

become less important.

In contrast, Lipset and Rab’s ideas regarding the association between the level of

heterogeneity of the community/region and the level of far right activism are confirmed

by the empirical analyses. Nevertheless, understanding the meaning of these findings

demands a more careful and nuanced examination. Focusing mainly on

newcomers/minorities, Lipset and Rab argue that their arrival in high numbers creates

social stress within the affected society and community and weakens communal

solidarity, since there are fewer shared norms between members of the community.

These are processes that eventually facilitate violence against outsiders. Thus, an

important factor in this process is not merely the arrival or presence of

minorities/immigrants, but their growing proportion within the particular communities

that exhibit far right violence. Indeed, analyses demonstrate correlation between the

level of violence and the proportion of certain minority groups. However, here we are

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facing an interesting contradiction; in the case of the fastest-growing minority group in

the United States, the Hispanic population, the findings were not significant. How can

this be explained? One not entirely convincing explanation is that we must be more

patient: far right groups will eventually adapt operationally and ideologically, so that in

the future we will see more attacks in states with higher concentrations of Hispanics.

Another explanation cites the identification problem: Hispanic targets/individuals are

not as visible as other, more obvious minority groups. Finally, there may be a

methodological bias, as it may be assumed that violence against Hispanics usually has

less chance of being reported as a hate crime, because many of the victims may be

illegal immigrants and because hate crimes are usually associated with hostilities

against Jews or African Americans.

The other far right theories appear to be less relevant to the American case; the

relatively high ideological diversity of the American far-right—as depicted in the

ideological analysis of this study—makes it difficult to see the relevance of the single-

issue thesis. As for the mediatization thesis, in the United States the mainstream media

is extremely careful about providing access for far right elements. And with regard to

theories which focus on changes in social values, social structure, and on the division of

political and economic power—Social Breakdown Thesis, Post Material Thesis, Status

Theories—these are, in many ways, offspring of the relative deprivation framework,

each focusing on different resources and values whose accessibility to the deprived

community is in decline. While the current study did not use methodological tools

which will allow measurement perceptions of the relevant communities over time in a

systematic way, there are some indications which shed doubt on the relevancy of these

theories for the American case; their inapplicability is at least evident when trying to

develop generalizations which are relevant to the entire American far right. As shown

earlier, the association between economic indicators and far right violence is in doubt.

Second, how can we explain the decline of violence during eras which experienced

dramatic changes in societal values, i.e., the late 1960s and early 1970s? Third, this

seems to contradict the association identified earlier between a conservative political

environment and an increase in far-right violence. Fourth, the more conservative states

are the ones less affected by violence. Finally, while growth in representation of

minority or previously deprived groups in political institutions is usually considered to

be one of the direct indications of changes in political and economic power divisions, in

the case of the American far right it is not easy to find a clear correlation between the

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two. For example, Figure 11 illustrates that the breakthrough in terms of representation

of minority groups in the Congress for African Americans and Hispanics occurred in

the early 1990s; however, these periods were characterized by relatively low levels of

violence. More specifically, the period after the 1992 elections—which saw the most

dramatic increase in the number of minority members in Congress, from 73 to 97, or

from 32 to 55 excluding Jewish members of Congress—was followed by a significant

decrease in the level of violence.

Figure 11 –Members of Congress Belonging to Minority Groups by Year

How do these findings hold when examining the distinct components of the American

far-right? The following section will provide insights regarding specific

movements/groups which will help answer this key question.

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5. Empirical Picture: The Perpetrators and Trends among Specific

Movements

While so far this study has focused on macro-level trends, the current chapter will

adopt a higher resolution. Following a basic introduction to the nature of the

perpetrators, subsequent sections will try to provide an improved understanding of the

operational and demographic characteristics of the different movements comprising the

American far-right. A comparative analysis which will focus mainly on the level of

threat posed by the various groups will conclude the chapter.

5.1 - The Perpetrators

While the desire to devise a consensual sociological profile of terrorists is still a major

goal for many students of terrorism, a growing number of scholars acknowledge that

this task may be out of reach; this is less because of data limitations—in recent years the

number of available datasets detailing terrorists’ demographic characteristics has been

increasing rapidly—and more because a growing amount of empirical evidence implies

that such a universal profile may not exist.399 These scholars argue that the profile is

both dependent on the role, status and seniority of the member of the group, and on the

cultural and political context in which the group operates. Moreover, they criticize the

tendency to ignore the impact of the time variable and, in particular, the inclination to

ignore the fact that the demographics of group members may change over time and that

individuals’ biographies also change and evolve.400

Whereas the current study does not aim to provide a sociological profile of perpetrators

of far-right violence, it attempts to address two related issues which for many years

were perceived as almost paradigmatic in the field of terrorism studies. The first is the

assertion that political violence in general and terrorism specifically constitute collective

action. Ariel Merari, to illustrate, has argued that 95 percent of all suicide terrorist

attacks are perpetrated by groups.401 Historically this perception has been echoed in the

writings of most scholars of terrorism, as many have analyzed terrorism using various

organizational and social theories. It is therefore interesting to note that in the context of

399 See e.g., Horgan; Victoroff. 400 Ibid. 401 Ariel Merari, Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2010).

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the violent American far right some of the more notable perpetrators have been viewed

as what is referred to as lone wolves: autonomous individuals not reliant upon far-right

organizations. Sometimes this designation has been justified, as in the case of Eric R.

Rudolph, while at other times it has been the result of a popular misconception, as in

the case of Timothy McVeigh. But are such infamous cases any indication of a

recognizable trend, or they should be regarded as outliers?

The percentages cited in Figure 12—which classifies far right attacks based on the

number of perpetrators—reflect a surprising reality. The great majority of attacks were

perpetrated by a single individual or two perpetrators at most. Less than one third of

the attacks were carried out by what we can call a group, i.e., three or more

perpetrators. How can this discrepancy between the American far-right and other types

of terrorism be explained?

Figure 12 – Far Right Attacks by Number of Perpetrators

First, words of caution are necessary. The perpetrators of 40% of the attacks in the

dataset were never caught or identified; it is therefore impossible to know exactly how

many perpetrators were involved. While this is not surprising, considering the nature of

the phenomenon; and despite the fact that the sample size of the attacks with identified

perpetrators is extremely large (2,649 attacks) in comparison to similar datasets, care is

still demanded regarding any possible conclusions. Second, the findings may reflect a

further, more extreme implementation of the leaderless resistance doctrine, which has

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been promoted by various leaders of the American far right during the last two

decades. Thus, it seems that their words have not fallen on deaf ears. The findings may

also indicate an interesting operational path which, on the one hand, ensures the

survival of the organization, and on the other hand, allows it to engage indirectly in

violent activities. In other words, while the organization as a whole cannot afford to be

directly involved in sponsoring and perpetrating a violent campaign, since the legal and

organizational implications may be costly, especially in the American/Western context

of highly qualified and efficient law enforcement, it encourages individual members to

engage in violent activities which are not directly part of the organizational operational

framework. This strategy may not work in cases of extreme manifestations of violence—

e.g., the loose and previous affiliation of McVeigh with the Michigan Militia, which

eventually led to a harsh response against the militia movement after the attack in

Oklahoma—but may be effective in cases of minor attacks. Moreover, considering that

one of the most efficient countermeasures against far right groups during the 1980s and

the 1990s was civilian law suits, the importance in distancing a given group from a

direct link to attacks is further evident.

Finally, the findings also help to explain the limited level of sophistication and

development of the American far right. ANOVA model402 has found that there are

significant gaps in terms of the number of casualties produced by attacks initiated by 1–

2 members and attacks which are the production of groups (F=3.895*; see also Figure

13). Thus, notwithstanding the advantages of the leaderless resistance doctrine, it seems

to incur costs in terms of the productivity of the violence.

Figure 13 – Average Number of Casualties by Number of Perpetrators

402 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) is a collection of statistical models which helps to test whether the gaps

in the means of several groups are statistically significant.

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A second perception which enjoys consensus within the academic community is related

to the terrorists’ young age. This is usually explained by the concept of biographical

availability; simply put, people with limited commitments—individuals who are single,

with no permanent jobs or career path, and with limited social ties—are more prone to

risky activities such as terrorism than people with limited biographical availability.403

And since biographical availability usually becomes increasingly limited as the

individual matures, the dominant perception is that young people are far more likely to

be inclined to join violent groups. Is this perception also true in the case of the American

far right?

In order to answer this question, data regarding the age of 2,221 perpetrators of attacks

documented in the far-right attack dataset were analyzed. As expected, the average age

of the perpetrators was relatively low (25.61). A closer look however, reveals a more

interesting picture (see Figure 14). As expected, most perpetrators were in their 20s

(39.6%); nevertheless, a high number of attacks—close to half—were conducted by the

very young (below 20: 35%) or by relatively mature individuals (above 40: 12.3%). This

exemplifies the diversity of actors involved in far right violence, as well as providing

probable further confirmation of the perception presented above regarding the limited

current institutionalization of far right violence. In an environment in which violence is

a product of independent individuals and small networks, the conventional gatekeepers

who limit the involvement of members who are too young or too old in operations are

less effective.

403 Gregory Wiltfang and Doug McAdam, “Distinguishing Cost and Risk in Sanctuary Activism,” Social

Forces 69 (1991), 987–1010

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Figure 14 – Perpetrators of Far Right Violence by Age

5.2 – The Racist/White Supremacy Movement

5.2.1 – Analyzing KKK (and affiliates’) Violence

The dataset documents 593 attacks perpetrated by groups which are part of the racist

movement. Almost a third of these attacks (264) were perpetrated by the KKK and close

affiliates.

As mentioned in the first part of this study, since the 1980s the KKK has suffered a

continuous decline in terms of affiliated members, influence and importance. This was

partly a result of the financial drain from civilian law suits against chapters of the

organization.404 It is partially due to the rise of more attractive alternatives.405 Also,

internal clashes and disagreements led many prominent leaders to desert the movement

and join other far right groups. Moreover, while a number of Klans had aspired to

develop into nationwide organizations and were able to establish branches in several

states—such as the United Klans of America, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Federation of

404 For example, in 1987 the United Klans of America ended its operation in the wake of an Alabama jury

award of $7 million against the organization once its members were found guilty of lynching a young

African American man. In another case in 1998 a jury in South Carolina ordered two Ku Klux Klan

chapters (Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and Invisible Empire, Inc.) to pay $37.8 million to the

Macedonia Baptist Church after members of the groups were found to be involved in a series of arson

attacks against the church. 405 The growth of the militia movement and the Christian Identity groups were mainly responsible for the

difficulties of the KKK mobilization efforts: Southern Poverty Law Center Klanwatch Staff, 45, 48–51.

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Klans: Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the Church of the National Knights of the Ku Klux

Klan—they all met with limited success in reviving the movement. Thus, the KKK today

should be understood more as a collection of independent small groups which shares

similar terminology, ideological tendencies and historical references, but lacks

meaningful cooperation and coordination.

In order to overcome the above mentioned recruitment challenges, some of the

relatively new Klans have chosen to adopt ideological components and recruitment

mechanisms that were traditionally used by other far-right groups, and to address

contemporary issues in their propaganda. For instance, The Imperial Klans of America—

founded in 1996 by Ron Edwards and one of the more prominent KKK groups in the

late 1990s and early 2000s—adopted ideological elements from the Christian Identity

movement, including its own version of the story of Genesis and conspiracy theories

about Jewish control of global media and local governments. They organized an Annual

racist Nordic-Fest music festival, and in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s

began to emphasize the necessity to fight illegal immigration in its published

propaganda.406 Thus, IKA employed the classic recruitment mechanism of the

Skinheads movement music festival, borrowed fundamentalist ideas from the Christian

Identity movement, and exploited a contemporary controversial political issue to

maintain its relevancy and expand its ranks. Notwithstanding this, and despite short-

term success, the IKA suffered the same fate as other KKK groups when in 2008 it lost a

$2.5 million civil suit following a group member’s violent attack against an individual

in Kentucky who he suspected was Latino. Consequently, while still active the group

lost most of its members and assets.407

406 See IKA profile, Southern Poverty Law Centre, “Intelligence Files: Imperial Klans of America— Ron

Edwards,” http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/groups/imperial-klans-of-america

(accessed 4 November 2012). 407 Ibid.

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Figure 15 – Number of Attacks by KKK and Affiliates by Year

To summarize, the KKK currently includes between 5,000 and 10,000 members who are

spread across 150 independent chapters located mostly in the South (mainly in the

states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,

Tennessee and Texas). However, can we identify more empirical and systematic signs

of the KKK’s decline and of its concentration in the South? The answer is not definitive.

As can be observed in Figure 15, most of the KKK attacks occurred in the last decade,

corresponding with the general trend of American far right violence; while the numbers

are low, we can definitely say that in the last decade there has been an increase in the

number of attacks initiated by individuals and groups affiliated with the KKK.

Nonetheless, precisely because this is compatible with the general far right trend, it is

problematic to see it as a clear indication of the group’s impact within the far right

arena, and thus of its decline.

In order to assess this issue there is a need to consider the proportion of KKK attacks as

a component of overall acts of far right violence. Figure 16, which reflects this, describes

a more complicated reality. To begin with, over the years KKK violence has consistently

constituted a small part of overall far right violence: a dramatic change from the

situation in the 1950s and the 1960s, when the organization held a monopoly on the

American far right violent struggle. Moreover, instead of a continuous decline of the

KKK’s role within the far right, we can observe flashes of significant activism in some

years during the 1990s and a substantial presence between 2003 and 2008. Lastly, it is

important to wait for the availability of more data points before concluding whether the

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decline in the proportion of KKK violence, which began in 2008, is temporary or is an

indication of further accelerated decline.

Figure 16 – Proportion of KKK Attacks of Overall Far Right Violence by Year

As mentioned earlier in this study, KKK violence is no longer concentrated in the Deep

South. Nonetheless, most indications are that the majority of active KKK branches

operate in this region; according to SPLC documentation, 107 out of the existing 152

branches are located in southern states. This may be another indication of the declining

relevance of the movement, or simply a reflection of the fact that while other

movements of the American far right moved out of the South, for historical and cultural

reasons the KKK is still mostly important to people in these regions. The numbers tell

us that the answer is somewhere in between. While the majority of KKK attacks did not

take place in the South (119 out of 264: 45%—this includes Florida but excludes

Maryland), a significant proportion of the violence is still concentrated in this region.

Moreover, closer scrutiny reveals that most of the attacks occur in the South or in one of

the three following states: Maryland, Pennsylvania and California; all of the other states

experienced a one-digit number of attacks in the previous 22 years, except for New

York, with 10 attacks. To conclude, the operational base of the KKK is also beginning to

shift to other regions of the country. However, it is doing so at a much slower rate than

that of other groups of the American far right.408

408 Another possibility is that the overall transition of far right violence from the south to other regions is a

reflection of the decline of the KKK. The findings in graphs 15 and 16 tend to mitigate against this

explanation.

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One of the goals of this study was to garner more information concerning the relative

threat posed by the various American far right groups. Hence, in this and the following

sections, the unique operational characteristic of each one of the groups will be

discussed. In the summary section of this chapter, a comparison between the groups

will be presented in order to rank them in accordance with the level of threat that they

represent. In line with the movement’s ideology, the great majority of KKK attacks are

directed against minority groups or related targets (90.2%). In this context the three

most popular targets are people (75%: in many cases, the individual’s property),

religious institutions (7.6%) and educational facilities (4.5%) belonging to a specific

minority group. Other types of targets usually associated with far right violence, such

as law enforcement representatives, government officials, individuals with alternative

sexual orientation and abortion-related facilities, make up only a marginal proportion of

KKK attacks. This not only emphasizes the one-dimensional nature of the KKK but also

suggests that in the case of the American far right, ideological tendencies have the

potential to shape the nature of group violence. Hence, the ideological typology that has

been presented in the first part of this study also has an operational manifestation.

KKK perpetrators have focused on relatively vulnerable targets, in contrast to groups

which attack law enforcement, financial institutions, etc. Despite this, the results of the

violence do not compare with the halcyon days of mass lynching during the mid-1950s

and 1960s: in the last 22 years the organization has been responsible for the deaths of 20

individuals and the injuries of another 100, averaging 0.39 injured and 0.07 fatalities per

attack. When combining this with the findings that more than two thirds of the attacks

were directed against property and just three percent could be described as mass-

casualty attacks, it is clear that the contemporary KKK has limited involvement in

sophisticated violence. Indeed, even a cursory look at the list of attacks will reveal that

many of them have been spontaneous acts of violence against passersby from minority

groups, minor vandalism against religious and educational facilities, and similar

unsophisticated acts.

To conclude, it is difficult to see any tendency on the part of the current branches of the

KKK to engage in systematic campaigns of violence as we have seen in the past, and

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even when some of their members are involved in violence it is usually opportunity

based or spontaneous, and lacks sophistication.

5.2.2 – Analyzing Neo-Nazi and Skinhead Violence

The neo-Nazi and Skinhead groups comprise the younger components of the

racist/white Supremacy movement. Neo-Nazis garnered momentum in the late 1950s

and Skinheads in the late 1980s. Besides youth, the similarities between these streams

are also reflected in the adoption by both groups of European ideologies emphasizing

Nazi concepts and cultural practices, and which have gone through processes of

fragmentation. In the case of the neo-Nazi groups this happened following the decline

of the ANP in the late 1960s, and in the case of the Skinheads, following the decline of

the Hammerskins Nation in the mid-1990s. Thus, in many ways their overall

organizational structure resembles that of the KKK. In both cases we are dealing with

ideological frameworks without clear national leadership comprised of numerous

independent local branches.

This is not to say that we cannot identify prominent groups that have dominated the

ideological streams. There is little doubt among students of the American far-right as to

the importance of the National Alliance (NA) for the growth and consolidation of the Neo

Nazi stream during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The NA was founded in 1970 by William

Pierce, author of Turner Diaries and probably the most important ideologue among

American neo-Nazis. While during most of the 1970s the group was unable to expand

and remained a small cultish organization serving Pierce, this changed as Turner Diaries

began to gain popularity during the 1980s and 1990s. Pierce was able to exploit the

growing popularity of his novel to construct an effective business model based on

members’ fees, income from the distribution and sales of NA propaganda, as well as

from the popular white power music label Resistance Records, purchased from former

Skinheads by Pierce in 1999. Thus, in the early 2000s the 1,400 paying members of the

organization enjoyed more than a million-dollar annual income, which allowed it to

expand its influence throughout the country, and forge collaborations with similar

organizations across the Atlantic, eventually creating chapters in several European

countries.409

409 ADL, “Extremism in America: National Alliance,” Anti-Defamation League,

http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/n_alliance.asp (accessed 4 November 2012).

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However, the sudden death of Pierce in 2002 initiated a number of factors that reversed

the ascendant course of the group and caused its swift decline in size and influence:

internal rivalries; growing resentment towards Pierce’s successors from the neo-Nazi

and Skinhead community—Erice Gliebe, who replaced Pierce as the NA leader and his

second in command, Shaun Walker, showed limited competence in handling NA

relations with other neo-Nazi groups; and the declining popularity of the NA music

label and publications, which was a byproduct of growing consumer resentment

towards the organization. Today most estimates are that the organization includes less

than 100 paying members.410

The vacuum left by the decline of NA was filled mainly by the National Socialist

Movement (NSM), which in many ways became the heir of the ANP. This was not

merely because of its tendency to engage mainly in public and provocative non-violent

initiatives that attracted significant media coverage, following the ANP tradition

perfected by Gorge Rockwell and focusing on theatrical parades and demonstrations in

sensitive locations and dates; it was also because of its propensity to imitate the

practices and protocols of the ANP meticulously, including requiring members to wear

full Nazi attire during its events, and the extensive use of Nazi terminology.411 Several

factors facilitated the expansion of the NSM during this period including: a focus on

public protests—which limited risk to its members; a willingness to acknowledge dual

membership, whereby members of other organizations were permitted to join the group

without the need to revoke previous associations; substantial media coverage; and the

extremely young age of its leadership - which led to collaboration with Skinhead

groups, and helped in attracting young members.412 Currently the organization includes

more than 55 branches in 39 states. In contrast to the KKK, the South is not where most

of them or other neo-Nazi groups are concentrated: only 38.5% of the 171 neo-Nazi

groups and branches currently active in the United States are located in the historic hub

of the American far right.

410 Ibid. 411 See National Socialist Movement, http://www.nsm88.org/ (accessed 4 November 2012). 412 Although the group was originally established after the murder of Rockwell by former ANP members

under the name Socialist American Workers Freedom Movement, its modern version was constituted in 1994

under its current name by Jeff Schoep, who was 21 years old at the time. See - ADL, “Extremism in

America: National Socialist Movement,” Anti-Defamation League.

http://www.adl.org/Learn/Ext_US/nsm/default.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremis

m_in_America&xpicked=3&item=nsm (accessed 4 November 2012).

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The Skinheads also witnessed the rise of distinct dominant groups. The rise and decline

of the Hammerskins Nation—the most successful organizational manifestation of the

American Skinhead scene—has already been discussed in the first part of this study.

Several other organizational frameworks have achieved success within the Skinhead

scene in the last decade, filling the vacuum left by the HSN: some reports argue that

today HSN does not include more than several hundred members. The most notable

organizational frameworks among the non-Hammerskin federation are probably

Volksfront and The Vinlanders, also known as Vinlander Social Club (VSC).

Established formally in 2003 by Eric “The Butcher” Fairburn and Brian James in an

attempt to instill order into the anti-HSN/Outlaw-Hammerskins scene, VSC can be

described as a loose organizational network that bonds various Skinhead groups,

mainly from the Western Northeast, the Midwest (Pennsylvania’s Keystone State

Skinheads, Hoosier State Skinheads, Ohio State Skinheads, New Jersey Skinheads, Arizona’s

Canyon State Skinheads) and the South. It is coordinated by an annual meeting of the

leaders of the various groups, termed Council 28.413 VSC practiced extreme violence

against its competition within the Skinheads counterculture: mainly the Hammerskin

Nation. Ideologically, it emphasized a combination of neo-Nazi/racist ideas and Nordic,

Odinist pagan rituals.414 There are some indications of moderation in the organization

since 2007, following the arrest of a number of its major leaders and the announcement

of a truce with HSN, but considering its loose structure and boundaries, as well as its

lack of hierarchy, this trend may not persist. Estimates are that currently the

organization includes several hundred members spread throughout several dozen

independent teams across the country.

Volksfront is less influential in comparison to HSN and VSC. It was officially formed in

1994 by Randal Lee Krager in Portland, Oregon, and in most years has expanded

quickly, establishing an impressive line of publications including the Folk Tribune, the

official e-zine of the movement. It has affiliated branches in other cities in the United

States, especially on the West coast, and in other English speaking countries including

Canada, UK and Australia, and engages in various mass social activities such as

conferences, music festivals and internet radio. It also purchases land with the long-

413 The first meeting was conducted in 2005: the second in 2006 ended with what is known today as the

“Memorial Day Beatdown” for the violence which erupted during the meeting between several rival

groups: see also Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project. 414 Odinism is a Germanic Neo-Pagan religion.

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term aspiration to establish an all-white territory. In contrast to VSC, it seems that

Volksfront’s relations with other Skinhead groups including with the HSN have been

less contentious and more elitist in terms of its members. While VSC was highly

inclusive, in particular to the more violent elements of the Skinhead counterculture, the

Volksfront was far stricter in filtering members who did not comply with the

organizational honor code: in principle, sex offenders, those lacking high school

diplomas and substance abusers were not permitted to join Volksfront. Notwithstanding

these differences, Volksfront followed VSC steps, and several times during the last few

years it has renounced the use of violent practices. These statements have usually met

with skepticism by most experts of the American far right. The following empirical

analysis, among other things, may help to determine whether this skepticism is well-

placed.

According to the far right attacks dataset, 329 attacks have been conducted by

Skinheads and neo-Nazi groups in the last 22 years. Of these, 205 attacks were

perpetrated by Skinheads, and 124 by neo-Nazis. At least in the case of Skinheads it

appears that there is compatibility between the public profile and reputation of groups

and their involvement in violence: VSC and affiliates (18 attacks), HSN (13) and

Volksfront (9 attacks) are also prominent in the stream in terms of the number of attacks

in which they were involved. Nonetheless, their proportion of the overall attacks is not

as significant as we would expect. Moreover, other Skinheads groups which usually

receive less attention appear to be no less violent. These include groups such as Public

Enemy No. 1 (PENI) and Connecticut White Wolves. To conclude, from an organizational

perspective, the current Skinhead violent landscape appears extremely fragmented.

From a geographical perspective, the most prominent trend in Skinhead violence is its

concentration in the Western part of the country: 106 attacks (51.7% of all documented

Skinhead attacks) occurred in the 3 states of California, Oregon and Arizona. Moreover,

except for Connecticut (10 attacks, mostly by the Connecticut White Wolves), Florida (9

attacks), Pennsylvania (8 attacks), Nevada (8 attacks) and Texas (7 attacks) no other

state suffered more than 5 attacks. Thus, we may carefully claim that the Skinhead

violence is a regional rather than a national phenomenon.

The examination of the level of violence of the Skinhead counterculture over time also

reveals surprising trends. Whereas during the years 2008–2010 the level of far-right

violence was at its highest volume at least since 1990, Skinhead violence declined in

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those years in comparison to previous years: 55 attacks between 2005 and 2007 in

comparison to 21 during 2008–2010. To illustrate, in 2008, which was the most violent

year in terms of far right violence, the Skinheads perpetrated their lowest number of

attacks per year since 1998. This may imply that there is a need to take seriously the

alleged transformation that was declared by groups such as VSC and Volksfront, which

in the late 2000s announced their transformation into a fraternity/social movement and

distanced themselves from violent practices. The VSC announced on its official website

that “we left what we considered to be the organized White Nationalist movement in

2007 and have since then concentrated on promoting a combination of more moderate

political pursuits as well as our own unique Nordic-based Warrior lifestyle and

culture…”415 Volksfront’s website, which in 2001 announced its intention to abandon

violence, describes itself today in similar terms, using the designation of “Secular

Fraternal Organization” which

…does not tolerate illegal activity as a group, nor will we accept the lies and

slander leveled at our brotherhood by police, the cowards of media, hysteric

Zionist fund-raising groups and anarcho-communist terrorist sympathizers.

It is a fact that Volksfront members are far less likely per capita to commit any

crime than members of the United States Congress or radical Leftist

organizations.416

The decline of Skinhead violence may be a positive development not just for the

obvious law and order-related reasons, but also because numbers demonstrate that

their attacks tend to be more lethal and sophisticated in comparison to the violence of

their older counterparts in the racialist movement, i.e., the KKK. They generate 0.73

injured and 0.24 fatalities per attack, which is 150% more lethal than the KKK. When

looking at their target selection, and especially at their tactics, it is easy to understand

why. The Skinheads almost never engaged in vandalism (4%) and the great majority of

their attacks have been aimed against specific individuals/groups of foreign origin (over

70%: mostly minorities). This is far different from what we found in the case of the

KKK, in which more than two thirds of the attacks were against property.

415 See Vinlanders Social Club, http://vinlanders.com/ (accessed 4 November 2012). 416 This was taken originally from the Volksfront website. However, in August 2012 the organization

announced its complete dissolution, thus the organization’s website, blog and face book page were

eliminated. It is unclear if the organization will be replaced with other organizational frameworks, less

venerable from a legal perspective; apparently the decision was a result of what the Volksfront leadership

termed “harassment” and investigations by the U.S. government.

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Finally, the social dimension of the violence also seems to distinguish between the KKK

and Skinhead violence, although in this case the gaps are less substantial. While just

28% of KKK attacks were perpetrated by groups, 39% of Skinhead attacks were

perpetrated by groups, thus confirming the perception that Skinhead teams enjoyed

higher levels of social density than any other far right group. This assumption is also

reinforced to an extent by the relatively high level of in-group violence within the

movement (9% of attacks), which is the highest among all components of the American

far right.

The same operational trends which were observed and described in the case of

Skinheads were also manifested in the case of the neo-Nazi groups’ violence. This

further confirms the close relations between the two streams, as well as the relations

between ideological tendencies and operational characteristics. Simply put, since both

countercultures share similar norms and practices, this is translated into similar violent

trends. In summary of the similarities, neo-Nazi violence is concentrated on the West

Coast: 43.5% of the incidents occurred in California and almost half if we include

Arizona. It appears to be in decline since 2008: 34 incidents occurred between 2006 and

2008, in comparison with 16 in the three following years. It also focuses mainly on

attacks against individuals and groups of people from foreign origin (65.3% of attacks)

or alternative sexual orientation (7.4%). Despite the fact that the proportion of attacks

against property (16.9%) is higher than what we find in the case of the Skinheads, it is

still much lower than in the KKK. That explains why neo-Nazi violence is significantly

more lethal than that of the KKK (1.65 injured and 0.35 fatalities per attack). Finally, two

specific groups appear to be more active than the others in the neo-Nazi realm. The first

is the National Alliance (10.5% of attacks), a finding which corresponds with its

dominance within the movement in the last 30 years; the second group is the Nazi Low

Riders (29%), a criminal network based mainly in California. Its high level of violence

partially explains the West Coast predominance of the neo-Nazi violent scene.

5.2.3 – Analyzing Militia Violence

The first part of this study analyzed the relatively short history of the modern militia

movement, ending with the assertion that the mid-1990s repetition of political, social

and economic developments of the last few years—recession; a democratic

administration; expansion of federal involvement in local policies; and growing

prominence of immigration and environmental issues—may provide a convenient

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foundation for the revival of the movement. Indeed, in 2009 the SPLC published a

report that argued that the Militias had returned, designating the phenomenon as the

“Second Wave.” And while the report is careful not to argue that the current level of

Militia activities and violence is similar to that of the mid-1990s, and also does not

provide any concrete numbers, it does provide a collection of testimonies by local and

federal law enforcement agents who argue that there is a definite increase in the

number of active militia groups and in their size.417 In subsequent publications, the

SPLC confirm these assessments with numerical data, indicating that while in 2008 less

than 50 militia groups were active in the United States, in 2012 the number had risen by

over 600% to more than 330, in addition to another almost 1000 associations which

promote anti-taxation and anti-federal ideology.

Another development that may be responsible for the growing concerns and awareness

of a revival of the militia movement is the growing popularity of the Sovereign Citizens

(SC). Simply put, the SC opposes formal governmental regulation of their “rights”

which they define in highly expansive terms. For example, SC members refuse to apply

for a driver’s license and car registration— because they believe the Federal government

should not regulate their right to drive. SC members also refuse to pay income tax

because they view this as an infringement on their right to work for a living. One of the

movement’s prominent ideologues, Richard McDonald, established State Citizen

Service Centers around the country and provides one of the more popular rationales for

these practices:

By metaphysical refinement, in examining our form of government, it might

be correctly said that there is no such thing as a citizen of the United States.

But constant usage—arising from convenience, and perhaps necessity, and

dating from the formation of the Confederacy—has given substantial

existence to the idea which the term conveys. A citizen of any one of the

States of the Union, is held to be, and called a citizen of the United States,

although technically and abstractly there is no such thing. To conceive a

citizen of the United States who is not a citizen of some one of the states, is

totally foreign to the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and

common understanding of the expression as used in the constitution, which

must be deduced from its various other provisions…therefore, prior to the

alleged ratification of the 14th Amendment, there was no legal definition of a

417 Southern Poverty Law Center, Second Wave: Return of the Militias, August (2009).

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“citizen of the United States”, as everyone had primary citizenship in one of

the several states. The Constitution referred to the sovereign state citizen,

and no one else…. In other words, you do not have to be a citizen of the

United States in order to be a state citizen. This was held to be true by the

Maryland Supreme Court in 1966 wherein the state:

Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution,

it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the United States in

order to be a citizen of his state (Crosse v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 221

A.2d. 431 (1966)).

…The federal government was never given any authority to encroach upon

the private affairs of the citizens in the several states of the union, unless they

were involved in import or export activity, neither were they given authority

to reach a citizen of Germany living in Germany. In fact, the states could

refuse to enforce any act of congress that they felt was outside the intent of

the granting of limited powers to the federal government. This is called

interposition or nullification. Several state supreme courts have in the past

refused to uphold federal laws within their states.418

Several violent incidents involving SC members, including the killing of two West

Memphis, Arkansas police officers during a traffic stop in May 2010, indicated that

some members of the group were willing to use violence in support of their ideology.

But does a recognizable trend within the anti-federalist movement exist? The

subsequent empirical examination of the movement’s violence may provide an answer.

Our dataset documented 87 cases of violent attacks that were initiated by militias or

other anti-federal associations between 1990 and 2011. As expected, almost half of the

attacks were perpetrated during the movement’s popular period, the second half of the

1990s (48.2%). Since then we have witnessed limited violent activities by the militias,

except for a sharp rise during 2010 of 13 attacks. Nonetheless, in 2011 the number

returns to the level observed in previous years (between 1–4 attacks per year; 2 attacks

in 2011). Thus, while there may be a rise in the number of active militia groups, except

for 2010 we still do not see this systematically manifested in the level of violence. As for

the geographical dispersion of the attacks, California again is highly prominent (18.4%)

alongside Texas (10.3%). The rest of the attacks are distributed more or less equally

418 Richard McDonald, “Citizen or citizen?” http://freedom-school.com/citizenship/citizen-or-citizen.html

(accessed 4 November 2012).

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among 28 other states. The areas that are excluded are parts of the northeast: no attacks

were reported in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Vermont,

Rhode Island, and there was only one attack each in Massachusetts and New

Hampshire; the northern Midwest: there were no attacks in Illinois, Iowa, North and

South Dakota; and some Southern states: Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi and

Missouri. Thus, it is difficult to find a geographic rationale for the violence.

When analyzing the violence of the groups comprising the racist movement, we find a

consistent association between ideological characteristics and operational tendencies.

The same trend is observable when looking into the target selection of the militias, as

two-thirds of the attacks were directed against the government and its proxies/law

enforcement (66.2%); while attacks against minorities (8.4%) and infrastructure (6%,

which could also be seen as an attacks against the government) comprised most of the

rest. Thus, despite growing indications that the militias are influenced by the racist and

xenophobic rhetoric of neighboring organizations in the far right universe, this is not

reflected in the militias’ violence, a point that is also confirmed by analysis which

demonstrates that attacks against minorities have not risen in recent years.

The emphasis of militias on attacks against physical targets associated with the

collective’s unifying ethos and existing dominant values and practices may provide

another explanation for the growing concerns regarding their activity, despite their

relatively limited violence. Inflicting damage on symbolic targets enhances the sense of

vulnerability of the existing political order but, more importantly, it is perceived by

policymakers as a threat to their ability to maintain government dominance in shaping

the political and social discourse. As a side note, attacks against symbolic targets have

the potential to increase hostility toward terrorists, as well as expanding the social and

emotional distance between terrorists and the collective and, as a result, legitimizing or

encouraging a harsher response. 419

Another element that may be related to the concerns regarding Militia activities is the

perception that they are typically engaged in high-casualty attacks. Before testing this 419 Arie Perliger, “How Democracies Respond to Terrorism: Regime Characteristics, Symbolic Power and

Counterterrorism,” Security Studies 21, no. 3 (2012), 490-528; Schmid and Jongman, 83; Bruce Hoffman,

“Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities,” Terrorism and Political Violence 5, no. 2 (1993), 12–

29; C. J. M. Drake, “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,” Terrorism and Political Violence 10,

no. 2 (1998), 53–85.

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assertion however, it should be noted that when looking into the lethality of the anti-

federalist movement, as in many other analyses of terrorism, a question emerges as to

how to treat a significant outlier. On the one hand, the inclusion of the outlier may

negatively impact our understanding the nature of the phenomenon under

investigation. On the other hand, the outlier is an inherent part of the phenomenon,

despite its unique nature; thus, its exclusion may also be perceived as a distortion of the

data. In the current analysis, results pertaining to casualties will be presented with and

without the inclusion of the 1995 attack in Oklahoma.

To begin with, almost 15% of the Militias’ attacks caused, or were intended to cause,

mass casualties. This is the highest proportion among all components of the American

far right. Second, the average number of fatalities and injuries is considerably higher

than that found among the groups comprising the racist movement (14.04 injured and

3.97 fatalities); when omitting the attack in Oklahoma, the average goes down

considerably (0.77 and 0.55 respectively). Nonetheless, the average is still higher than

what we find in some of the other movements. Thus, it may be concluded that while the

number of attacks produced by the Militias is still not necessarily on the rise, the

destructive potential of their attacks is relatively high.

5.2.4 – Analyzing Violence of the Fundamentalist Block

As described in the first part of this study, the ongoing decline of the Aryan Nations, the

most powerful Identity group in the 1980s and 1990s, culminated in 2004 with the death

of its founder and idolized Pastor Richard Butler. Shortly thereafter, while officially still

led by successor August Kries III, the organization began to lose cohesiveness. Some of

the more well-known splinter groups of the AN were Alabama’s Aryan Nations-United

Church of Yahweh, which later entirely omitted the term Aryan Nations from the its name,

led by Jonathan Williams and Clark Patterson, and Jay Faber’s group, Aryan Nations

Revival, based in New York. But probably the most successful of the AN’s descendants

is Paul Mullet’s Crusaders of Yahweh, with branches in no less than 17 states. Just recently

the organization was able to garner further publicity when Mullet filed paperwork to be

a lobbyist on Capitol Hill, explaining that “[t]he white race is being targeted as a hate

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group. Everywhere we turn, we are being depicted as a bunch of inbreeds. … It is time

we take a stand…”420

Besides the AN’s splinter groups, the current influential Identity organizations include

Pete Peter’s Scriptures for America/La Porte Church of Christ, Dan Gayman’s Church of

Israel, and Chuck Kuhler’s Virginia Christian Israelites. Assessments indicate that the

overall movements include between 25,000 and 50,000 members and approximately 60–

70 active ministers.421

The historical review of the Identity groups’ operational development already indicated

that in comparison to their counterparts on the far right scene, they were the least

violent, or at least the least likely to engage in militant activities. And while in the 1980s

groups such as The Order and Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord gave the

impression that the movement might change course for a more militant path, since then

it is difficult to identify clearly violent campaigns whose origin could be traced to the

Identity movement. An empirical examination supports this perception, as only 66

attacks were clearly linked to Identity groups, the smallest number among all streams; a

significant proportion of these were perpetrated by members of AN (around half),

demonstrating that the dominant status of AN was not limited to the

ideological/organizational arena.

Probably one of the more interesting trends of the Identity’s violence is that, unlike the

overall far-right universe, or the other movements within it, the number of their acts of

violence declined during the last decade. They were more active in the 1990s than in the 420 Lauren Victoria Burke, “White Nationalist Neo-Nazi Group Registers to Lobby on Capitol Hill,”

Politic365, (20 June 2012), http://politic365.com/2012/06/20/white-nationalist-neo-nazi-group-registers-to-

lobby-on-capitol-hill/ (accessed 4 November 2012). 421 One of the more interesting groups to emerge from within the Christian identity movement was

Phineas Priesthood; while information regarding the nature of the group is limited, the best description is

of a generally leaderless social framework based mainly around Spokane, Idaho. The group promulgates

the notion that murdering people who disobey God's laws by performing abortions, consorting

romantically with someone from different race, or being a homosexual, is justified. They rely on the

biblical story of Phineas to invoke God's blessing for their violent actions. While in our dataset we were

able to identify two attacks which were perpetrated or planned by members of the movement, other

accounts argue that the group was involved in additional attacks on mixed-race couples and abortion

facilities. Probably one of the reasons for confusion regarding the level of operation of the groups is that

membership in the group is not exclusive; thus, members of The Priesthood were also apparently involved

in the violent campaign of The Order as well as other Christian Identity and anti-abortionist groups. This

is mainly because the process of joining the group requires only the decision to engage in Priesthood

activities.

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2000s: two-thirds of the attacks were perpetrated before 2001. So it seems that Identity-

related violence did not merely erupt late, but also declined quicker than any other

stream, and overall never reached the intensity of the other far right movements. To

illustrate, only in one year—1994—did Identity groups produce a double-digit number

of attacks.

In terms of geographical dispersion, two trends can be very carefully identified. The

first is that half of the states never experienced attacks by Identity groups. Second, a

significant proportion of Identity movement violence was perpetrated in what is known

as the “White Bastion” of the Mid-Northwest: almost a quarter of the attacks were in

Idaho, Washington State, and Iowa. This statistic is not completely surprising

considering the location of the AN headquarters in Idaho and its influence in the region.

Operationally, Identity violence focuses on two types of targets: minorities and financial

institutions. The first is easy to explain and is clearly related to the movement’s

ideological tenets. The latter is unusual, especially in comparison to the target selection

of the other far right movements - albeit not completely surprising to find within the

Identity realm, considering that both The Order and the CSA were involved in such

practices. Most robberies were conducted by one group, the Aryan Republican Army,

which was comprised mainly of former AN members and other Identity followers who

were active mainly between 1994 and 1995, stockpiling ammunition and money,

allegedly for funding and for implementing future operations. Other clear trends are

the avoidance of attacks against property (6%) and relatively higher levels of mass-

casualty attacks (13.6%), which are also related to the relatively high levels of lethality

(0.34 fatalities and 2.49 injured per attack).

In contrast to the Identity movements, the anti-abortionists have been extremely

productive during the last two decades, amassing 227 attacks, many of them

perpetrated without the responsible perpetrators identified or caught. And while, in

both cases, the 1990s were more violent than the last decade, in the case of anti-abortion,

the trend is much more extreme, as 90% of attacks were perpetrated before 2001. Other

differences are reflected in the geographical dispersion of anti-abortion violence, which

exists across the country, with California and Florida experiencing the highest number

of attacks. This includes an emphasis on damage to property rather than to human

beings, as the great majority of the attacks (more than 70%) were intended to cause

damage to abortion clinics rather than cause direct harm to people. For that reason, the

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average number of victims is also the lowest among all streams of the far right (0.03

fatalities, and 0.27 injured).

5.3 – Comparative Perspective and Unidentified Perpetrators

After reviewing the characteristics of the violence manifested by the different far right

groups, the current section will emphasize a comparative perspective which will help to

devise a hierarchy based on the level of threat posed by the different groups. In

addition, it will examine the relatively large number of attacks in which the

perpetrators where not identified, in order to understand if these share some similar

traits, and how these are different from the attacks in which perpetrators were

identified.

Historically, the academic and professional literature has been inconsistent in

conceptualizing the terrorist threat. While some have evaluated the threat based on the

number of attacks perpetrated by the terrorist groups, others have focused more on

their durability and tangible assets. Some scholars, however, have preferred to ignore

both and focus on the number of casualties produced by the attacks of the group, often

discounting both the frequency of the group’s attacks and its overall operational

capabilities. Thus, for example, although Al-Qaeda’s only successful attack on US soil

was almost 12 years ago, it is still considered the most significant terrorist threat, mainly

as a result of the magnitude of casualties its attacks produced, and its perceived

tendency to continue to produce mass-casualty attacks.

In the current study several components have been included in order to estimate the

relative threat posed by different groups, including the number of attacks and their

proportion in recent years; the number of attacks, successful or attempted, which resulted

in mass casualties; tactics; target selection; and average number of victims. The overall

findings are presented in Table 4 and provide several important insights. The most

important is the applicability of the iceberg model to describe American far right violence.

As can be observed, the number of violent acts that are produced by unaffiliated

individuals is extremely high; moreover, these attacks are usually unsophisticated—only

1% of the attacks included the use of firearms or explosives, well below what could be

observed in any other group or stream. Thus, in most cases we are concerned with

spontaneous beatings of minorities or vandalism of facilities. It is possible to assume that

the perpetrators of these attacks are the future recruitment potential of the more

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institutionalized and formal violent streams. In other words, after crossing the line and

performing minor attacks on their own initiative, at some point such individuals may seek

more organized, systematic mechanisms to express their convictions, and thus will join

more formal streams of the American far right. It also appears that the KKK, with its

current informal and fragmented structure and low level of operational sophistication is

the formal movement that is closest to the base of the iceberg, and may be the first station

for those joining the conventional American far right.

Table 4 – Comparative evaluation of Far right violence

Group/movement Number

of

attacks*

1990s

vs.

2000s

ratio

Proportion

of mass

casualty

attacks

Proportion

of attacks

with Fire

arms

Proportion

of attacks

with

explosives

Proportion

of attacks

against

human

targets

Avg.

number

of

injured

Avg.

number

of

fatalities

Avg. number

of casualties

KKK 264 0.123 3% 10.9% 7.1% 28.5% 0.39 0.07 0.46

Neo-Nazi 124 0.362 3.2% 31.4% 10.4% 83.1% 1.65 0.35 2.00

Skinheads 205 0.265 2.4% 21.4% 0.04% 96% .73 0.24 0.97

Militias 87 1.23 14.9% 63.2% 67.8% 90.8% 14.04

0.77**

3.97

0.55**

18.01

1.32**

Christian

Identity

66 1.64 13.6% 65.1% 19.6% 94% 2.49 0.34 2.83

Anti-Abortion

227 8.08 7% 10.1% 23.3% 26.2% 0.27 0.03 0.30

Unaffiliated

3354 0.09 1.8% 0.07% 0.05% 52.1% 0.49 0.08 0.57

* The lower the number, the more active the group is during the 2000s in comparison to its level of

activity during the 1990s. ** Excluding the 1995 Oklahoma attack

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Abiding by the same logic, the higher we climb to the top of the iceberg, the more lethal

the group’s attacks, and the smaller they are in the number of attacks. Thus, while the

Christian Identity groups were involved in the least number of attacks, on average these

have generated the highest number of victims (injured + fatalities). The Skinheads are

ranked fourth in terms of number of attacks, and in terms of the likelihood of causing

mortal harm. Lastly, the Militias and neo-Nazis are ranked second and third in terms of

number of attacks and casualties—not taking the 1995 attack in Oklahoma into account.

While the unaffiliated have a slightly higher level of lethality in comparison to the KKK

and anti-abortionists, overall the iceberg model fits the findings, as there is a clear base

which is wider in terms of the number of attacks, while the narrower parts of the

iceberg are indeed sharper (more lethal).

However, lethality is not the entire story when seeking to evaluate current threats, as

trends over time are no less important. As the findings in the 1990s/2000s ratio column

illustrate, some groups have become much less active during the last decade, while

others have intensified their violence. First, it is clear that the number of spontaneous

unaffiliated attacks has been on the rise in the last decade, which is a source of concern

if this is the future recruitment potential of the more established far right groups.

Second, in general violence perpetrated by the anti-abortionists and, on a smaller scale,

the Christian Identity and Militia groups, is in decline, at least in comparison to the last

decade of the twentieth century. Combining the anti-abortionist focus in the last two

decades on vandalism, and their relatively declining volume of violence, probably

makes them a less salient threat. And while the Christian Identity groups and the

Militias are more effective in their attacks, the discourse about their return or growing

threat seems somewhat exaggerated. That leaves us with the Skinheads and the neo-

Nazi groups, both of which were more active in the last decade than in the 1990s, as

well as in the top ranks in terms of lethality. Maybe it is no coincidence that the most

recent mass-casualty attack by far right elements in the United States was perpetrated

by an individual affiliated with the HMS.422

422 In the morning hours of 5 August, 2012, at around 10am, Wade Michael Page, a 40 year-old from

Cudahy Wisconsin, arrived at a parking lot at Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin and began firing at

the temple’s inhabitants using a Springfield XD(M) 9-millimeter automatic pistol which he had purchased

several days earlier. He then entered the temple and continued killing parishioners until eventually he

was shot by members of the local police force. He killed six worshipers and a police officer.

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Other conclusions which can be extracted from the findings presented in Table 4 raise

interesting questions. First, the two groups most involved in mass-casualty attacks—

Christian Identity and Militias—are the most lethal. Nonetheless, overall the great

majority of attacks are perpetrated against specific individuals or facilities, and the far

right has limited tendencies or capabilities to engage in mass-casualty attacks. This may

be the result of limited capabilities, an attempt to avoid further de-legitimization—

important mainly for groups operating in the domestic arena—or because they are not

deprived groups which feel hopeless. The latter assumption is compatible with some of

the more popular explanations for extreme violence, such as suicide terrorism. For

instance, Pape emphasized that groups who adopt this tactic are mostly those whose

constituency is suffering long-term occupation.423

The Militias and the Christian Identity groups are also more prominent in terms of their

use of firearms and explosives. Whereas this is understandable in the case of the

Militias as they are striving to employ paramilitary characteristics, it is not initially clear

why this is the case with the Identity groups. Two explanations may be suggested. First,

as posited by some scholars, the stronger the group’s agenda is framed in religious and

totalistic ideas, the more it will be willing or determined to use exceptionally lethal

tactics. The growing literature on the new terrorism is particularly supportive of the

notion that the last three decades have witnessed not just the rise of religious terrorism,

but of more spectacular tactics which aim to maximize the number of casualties, and

that these two trends are causally linked.424 The second explanation may stem from the

isolated nature of many of the Identity groups. While the Skinheads and the KKK

members are in many cases a part of the social fabric of a specific community, this is not

the case with many members of Identity groups. Thus, this isolation, which creates a

social distance between the members of the group and mainstream society, may serve

not just as a foundation for radicalization, but may facilitate a stronger sense of

alienation towards the mainstream culture and willingness to engage in harmful

activities.

423 Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review, 97(3)

(2003), 1–19.

424 Laqueur; Ian O. Lesser, et al., Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation,

1999). On the subject of religious terrorism, see Juergensmeyer.

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Finally, it is possible to identify a clear separation between the groups that are human-

target oriented, and groups that are vandalism-oriented. The neo-Nazi, Skinhead,

Militias and Christian Identity groups fall into the category of groups which direct their

violence against human targets, which constitute at least three-quarters of their attacks;

the KKK, anti-abortionists and unaffiliated groups comprise the second category, as

attacks against property constitute around half of their attacks. Overall, this further

supports the conclusions of the threat analysis provided earlier in this section.

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6. Concluding Remarks

The current study has striven to provide academics and practitioners with a better

understanding of the past and current landscape of the violent American far right. The

compilation and analysis of a comprehensive dataset of far right violence and

complementary ideological typology allowed for the identification of systematic

structural and behavioral trends, as well as the investigation of related theoretical and

conceptual questions.

While many still tend to ignore the fact that the American far right is an accumulation

of different actors, and place most of its components in the same analytical category, the

current study has illustrated that these different components are not merely driven by

competing ideological tenets, but are also significantly idiosyncratic in the ways they

manifest their ideology in the operational, often violent, realm. This illustrates that

ideology and behavior are linked and nurture each other in the organizational

frameworks of the American violent far right. From a theoretical perspective, this

constitutes a further indication of the perception among some parts of the academic

community that terrorism is an instrument of symbolic discourse which is shared by

violent groups and their adversaries. Target selection is thus not based just on

operational considerations, but is one component, among others, which allows violent

groups to shape their message using violent practices—timing, weapons used and

target locations, are only a small measure of the other components which contribute to

the shape of the symbolic message conveyed via the attack. In this context, policy

implications are clear. If the numerous far right groups are driven by different

ideological sentiments, and are thus also engaged in distinguishing tactics, then the

response in terms of counterterrorism policies must be flexible and group/movement

oriented. Particularly relevant in this sense are the findings presented in chapter 5,

which provide a roadmap regarding target selection and tactics which have

characterized each of the far right movements.

This study also sought to explain how both exogenous and endogenous factors may

shape the characteristics of American far right violence, including political,

demographic and economic factors. For example, a contentious political climate and

ideological political empowerment play important roles in increasing the volume of

violence; thus, it is not only feelings of deprivation which motivate those involved in far

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right violence, but also the sense of empowerment which emerges when the political

system is perceived to be increasingly open to far right ideas. And while the theoretical

implications of these findings have already been discussed in length in chapter 4, it is

worth mentioning that these trends contradict predominant perceptions in the field

which associate motivational forces that facilitate political violence with the unbalanced

allocation of goods, and provide support for explanations which focus on correlations

between violence and perceived changes in the sociopolitical structure.

While the findings are not particularly strong with regard to the relationship between

the level of violence and the economic factors, when looking at the trends in violence

not only in relation to the time vector, but also across space, and considering

demographic indicators, it is clear that the violence is concentrated in heterogeneous

areas, thus supporting theoretical assumptions associating intra-community violence

with community cohesiveness and its members’ perceptions regarding the collective’s

boundaries. It is therefore clear from a policy perspective that more effort is needed to

create effective integration mechanisms in areas in which we see growing ethnic,

religious and cultural diversity.

Besides the above, the study includes numerous additional insights which raise new

questions for further research, such as the perceived limited correlation between the

level of violence and the proportion and size of certain minority groups, i.e., Hispanic

groups; changing trends in cooperation between various ideological streams; the shift of

the violence from the South to other parts of the country; changes in the balance of

power within the movements; and the clear decline of some of the groups, such as the

anti-abortionists. These issues indicate that this study represents a point of departure

for further exploration of the American far right, rather than strictly an additional

source of knowledge.