Review Article (500 words)

Unrest in the Arab World Will the Arab Spring lead to more change?

T he wave of popular uprisings that toppled dictators

in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya is still roiling the Arab

world, but other governments have held on by crack-

ing down on protests or instituting modest reforms.

Meanwhile, Syria is engulfed in a bloody civil war that many ex-

perts predict will force President Bashar Assad from office but leave

the country devastated and politically unstable. Some experts say

the events have transformed political attitudes in Arab nations. Others

stress that a majority of those countries still have authoritarian regimes.

The political dramas are playing out against the backdrop of pressing

economic problems, including high unemployment among Arab

youths. In addition, the growing power of Islamist parties and groups

is raising concerns among advocates of secular government and

creating risks of sectarian disputes among different Muslim sects.

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THE ISSUES ....................107

CHRONOLOGY ................115

BACKGROUND ................116

CURRENT SITUATION ........122

AT ISSUE........................123

OUTLOOK......................126

BIBLIOGRAPHY................129

THE NEXT STEP ..............130

THISREPORT

Rebel fighters prepare to battle Syrian forces near Aleppo on Aug. 2, 2012. The country’s brutal civil war

grew out of the peaceful anti-government protests known as the Arab Spring movement,

which began in Tunisia in 2010.

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CQ Researcher • Feb. 1, 2013 • www.cqresearcher.com Volume 23, Number 5 • Pages 105-132

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106 CQ Researcher

THE ISSUES

107 • Has the Arab Springstalled? • Do Islamic groups pose a threat to political reform in the Arab world? • Can a stable political solution be found in Syria?

BACKGROUND

116 Strangers to DemocracyThe Arab world knew little of freedom or democracy through most of the 20th century.

118 ‘Freedom Deficit’A 2002 study blamed the Arab world’s lack of free- dom for its lagging social and economic indicators.

119 Warming Trends?Popular uprisings in 2011 toppled regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

CURRENT SITUATION

122 Transition TroublesEgypt’s new government is trying to consolidate power while grappling with a poor economy and continuing opposition.

125 Battle FatigueSyria’s civil war continues, but neither side appears near a decisive victory.

OUTLOOK

126 Unfinished SpringThe course of future events in the Arab world remains uncertain.

SIDEBARS AND GRAPHICS

108 Freedom Continues To Elude Arab World None of the Arab Spring countries is rated “free” by Freedom House.

110 Timeline: The Syrian CivilWar Events since March 15, 2011.

112 Syria at a GlanceA variety of opposition groups are battling the 280,000-strong Syrian Army.

115 ChronologyKey events since Dec. 17, 2010.

116 Syrian Civil War Has Region’s Highest Death Toll More than 60,000 are dead, and millions are homeless.

120 Egypt’s New ConstitutionGets Mixed Reviews Some say the document creates “prospects of a religious state.”

123 At Issue:Should the U.S. and its allies intervene militarily in Syria?

FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

128 For More InformationOrganizations to contact.

129 BibliographySelected sources used.

130 The Next StepAdditional articles.

131 Citing CQ ResearcherSample bibliography formats.

UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

Cover: AFP/Getty Images/Ahmad Gharabli

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Unrest in the Arab World

THE ISSUES W

ith a brutal civil war raging, Syrian President Bashar

Assad emerged into public view for the first time in sev- eral months on Jan. 6 to de- liver a defiant speech blam- ing the conflict on criminals, terrorists and foreign influ- ences. Assad, whose strong- man father ruled Syria for 30 years before the son’s suc- cession in 2000, outlined a plan for a negotiated politi- cal solution but rejected any notion of stepping aside. “This is a fight between

the country and its enemies, between the people and the criminals,” Assad said in a 50- minute oration before a cheer- ing audience assembled in the Opera House in Damas- cus, Syria’s capital city. “I would like to reassure everyone we will not stop the fight against terrorism as long as there is one single terrorist left in the land of Syria,” he added. 1

Assad spoke only four days after a United Nations- commissioned study said nearly 60,000 people had been killed in the conflict, which began with peaceful protests against the Assad regime in March 2011 as the so-called Arab Spring movement was hitting its stride elsewhere in the Arab World. 2Three days earlier, Lakhdar Brahimi, the Algerian diplomat desig- nated as a mediator by the U.N. and the 22-member League of Arab States, had warned that the conflict could claim another 100,000 lives over the next year. Without a peace agreement, Brahimi said at the league’s headquarters in Cairo, Syria could be “transformed into hell.” 3 (See “Syria Timeline,” p. 110; “Syria: Mounting Casualties,” p. 116.)

The grim news from Syria contrasts sharply with the ebullient reaction to the Arab Spring, a succession of anti- government protests and demonstra- tions in North Africa and the Middle East that began in Tunisia in Decem- ber 2010. Within a two-month span, the “Arab street” — the oft-used metaphor for disaffected Arabs shut out of the political process — forced Tunisia’s longtime president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country and Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak to step down after 30 years as presi- dent. By August 2011, a popular up- rising in Libya, aided by military sup- port from the United States and some

NATO allies, had toppled the longtime dictator Moammar Gadhafi. The protests spread to

other countries, from monar- chical Morocco in the west to the Gulf state monarchies and emirates in the east. Two years later, the political at- mosphere has shifted in much of the Arab world, but the pace of change has slowed. “Things aren’t as exciting as they were two years ago, but there are changes that are tak- ing place,” says James Gelvin, a professor of history at UCLA and author of a com- pact overview, The Arab Up- risings. 4

Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon, part of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ac- knowledges the country-by- country variations in the de- gree of political reform. “It’s spring in many places, win- ter in many places,” he says. Even so, he says events will have a lasting impact on the political climate throughout the Arab world.*

“What has happened is a transfor- mation of public consciousness and public political values,” says Salem, a Harvard-educated dual citizen of Lebanon and the United States. Arabs throughout the region are now dis- avowing dictatorships and committing to political accountability and competi- tive elections, Salem says. “This para- digm shift is throughout the region,” he

BY KENNETH JOST

G e tt y I m a g e s/ D a n ie l B e re h u la k

Holding a copy of the Koran, a supporter of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi rallies with members of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo on Dec. 14, 2012,

in support of the country’s draft constitution. The controversial document, which was approved later in December, guarantees freedom of worship to Jews, Christians and Muslims — but not to others — and

reaffirms Islam as the state religion.

* This report does not detail events and con- ditions in Iraq, which will be covered in a forth- coming report in March. It also does not en- compass these six members of the League of Arab States: Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Pales- tinian National Authority, Somalia and Sudan.

108 CQ Researcher

adds, “and will be with us for the next generation.” Other experts are less convinced that

the Arab world, long resistant to de- mocratization and human rights, is now

firmly on a different path. “We have seen a little bit of movement in a few countries,” says Seth Jones, associate di- rector for the RAND Corp.’s International Security and Defense Policy Center in

Washington. “But for the most part we are not seeing the broad democratiza- tion that most people had hoped for.” For now, none of the 16 Arab coun-

tries stretching from Morocco to Iraq

UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

Freedom Continues to Elude Arab World Revolutions and popular unrest across much of the Arab world have yet to lead to full democracy and individual rights in any of the region’s countries. No country is rated as “free,” and only six are rated “partly free,” by the international human-rights group Freedom House. Furthermore, only Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have achieved even a middling score on political corruption by Transparency International, a Berlin-based anti-corruption advocacy group.

Arab Countries With Recent Pro-Democracy Protests

Country Population GDP per Freedom House Transparency International Type; head of capita freedom rating, corruption score, 2012 government 2013 (0 to 100, with 0 being the most corrupt)

Algeria 37.4 million $7,300 Not free 34 Republic; independent from France since 1962. Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal in power since September 2012.

Bahrain 1.2 million $27,700 Not free 51 Constitutional monarchy; independent from U.K. since 1971. King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa in power since 1999.

Egypt 83.7 million $6,500 Partly free 32 Republic; British protectorate until 1922. Mohammed Morsi elected president in June 2012, more than a year after former President Hosni Mubarak was deposed in a revolution.

Iraq 31.1 million $4,200 Not free 18 Parliamentary democracy; independent from British administration since 1932 as part of a League of Nations mandate. Prime Minister: Nouri al-Maliki, elected in 2006.

Jordan 6.5 million $5,900 Not free 48 Constitutional monarchy; independent from British mandate since 1946. King Abdullah II in power since 1999.

E G Y P T L I B Y A

A L G E R I A

MAURITANIA

M A L I

BURKINA FASO

N I G E R

N I G E R I A

C H A D S U D A N

E T H I O P I A

Y E M E N

O M A N

S A U D I A R A B I A

I R A Q

I R A N

JORDAN ISRAEL

ERITREA

QATAR

PORTUGAL S P A I N

LEBANON

T U R K E YG R E E C E

MALTA

N i l e

N i l e

N i

g e

r

Sicily

Crete

Socotra

G u l f o f S i r t e

R

E

D

S

E

A

G u l f

o f

A d e n

CASPIAN

SEA M

E D

I

T

E R

R A N E A N S E A

P ersian G u l f

Rabat

Algiers Tunis

Cairo

Tripoli

Baghdad Damascus

Beirut

Amman

Kuwait

Doha MuscatRiyadh

Dubai

Sanaa

BAHRAIN

M O R O C C O TUNISIA

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Tropic of Cancer

KUWAIT

Minor protests Serious protests Government toppled Violent government crackdowns

S Y R I A

Feb. 1, 2013 109www.cqresearcher.com

are rated as free, according to the an- nual survey “Freedom in the World 2013” by the international human rights group Freedom House. The report, re- leased on Jan. 16, raises Egypt’s and Libya’s rating to “partly free,” bringing the total in that category to six along

with Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. The 10 other countries are all listed as “not free.” In seven countries, according to the survey, the status of political rights or civil liberties wors- ened over the past year. 5 (See map, p. 108.)

The uprisings caught most analysts by surprise, U.S. scholars Mark Haas and David Lesch write in The Arab Spring, published in November. The waves of democratization that swept across Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia during the late 20th

Sources: “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” Transparency International, 2012, cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results; “Freedom in the World 2013,” Freedom House, January 2013, pp. 14-18, www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20 Booklet.pdf; The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, January 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-factbook.

Country Population GDP per Freedom House Transparency International Type; head of capita freedom rating, corruption score, 2012 government 2013 (0 to 100, with 0 being the most corrupt)

Kuwait 2.6 million $41,700 Partly free 44 Constitutional emirate; independent from U.K. since 1961. The emir, Sheik Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah, has been in power since 2006.

Lebanon 4.1 million $15,500 Partly free 30 Republic; independent from French administration since 1943 as part of a League of Nations mandate. President Michel Suleiman, in power since 2008.

Libya 5.6 million $6,000 Partly free 21 Operates under a transitional government following the deposition and death of ruler Moammar Gadhafi. Prime Minister Ali Zaidan took office in October 2012.

Morocco 32.3 million $5,100 Partly free 37 Constitutional monarchy; independent from France since 1956. King Mohammed VI in power since 1999.

Oman 3.1 million $27,600 Not free 47 Monarchy; independent since mid-1700s following Portuguese and Persian rule. Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said in power since 1970.

Qatar 2 million $98,900 Not free 68 Emirate; independent from U.K. since 1971. Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani in power since 1995.

Saudi Arabia 26.5 million $24,400 Not free 44 Monarchy; founded in 1932 after several attempts to unify the Arabian Peninsula. King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud in power since 2005.

Syria 22.5 million $5,100 Not free 26 Authoritarian regime; French mandate until 1946. President Bashar Assad’s family has been in power for 42 years.

Tunisia 10.7 million $9,400 Partly free 41 Republic; independent from France since 1956. Moncef Marzouki elected in December 2011 as president of interim government, which will remain in power until a new constitution is drafted.

United Arab Emirates 5.3 million $47,700 Not free 68 Federation with some powers reserved for member emirates; independent from U.K. since 1971. President: Sheik Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, in power since 2004.

Yemen 24.8 million $2,300 Not free 23 Republic; independent from Ottoman Empire since 1918. South Yemen unified with North Yemen in 1990. President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi took power on Feb. 27, 2012 after Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down after 22 years as president.

110 CQ Researcher

century were unfelt in the Arab world except for a short-lived and largely abortive “Arab spring” of 2005. 6 Yet Haas, a political scientist at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, and Lesch, a historian at Trinity University in San Antonio, say conditions were ripe for revolutionary uprisings in the Middle East. They note in particular the anger and frustration felt by the Arab world’s disproportionately young populations as the global economic crisis of 2008 raised prices and drove up unem- ployment in much of the region. 7

The 2010-2011 uprisings have re- sulted in “some grudging but nonethe- less impressive gains,” according to the Freedom House report, despite wide- spread predictions that the push for political reform would fall victim to what it calls the region’s “perennial an- tidemocratic currents.” The report sees “generally positive” gains in Libya and Tunisia, but it voiced concern about events in Egypt. The Freedom House report lightly

faults the “flawed but competitive” pres- idential campaign that resulted in the election of Mohammed Morsi, a leader of the once-banned Muslim Brother- hood, the Islamist group behind the now-dominant Freedom and Justice Party. It then criticizes a number of Morsi’s actions in office, including what it calls the hasty process to draft a new constitution and hold a refer- endum that resulted in its approval with 64 percent of the low-turnout vote in December. (See sidebar, p. 120.) Freedom House says political rights

had diminished in several other Arab countries, including Lebanon, Jordan and four Gulf states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia retained its status in the survey as one of the “worst of the worst” coun- tries in terms of political and civil rights. But Syria is singled out as having suf- fered “by far” the worst of the reper- cussions from the Arab Spring. Assad responded to the popular

uprisings in 2011, the report says, “by

UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

Source: Compiled by Ethan McLeod from various news sources

2011 March Demonstrators demand release of political prisoners; at least 15-16 20 protesters die as demonstrations widen in following weeks. April 21 President Bashar Assad lifts state of emergency, releases political prisoners; security forces kill 72 protesters. July 29 Some security forces refuse to fire on protesters; defectors form Free Syrian Army. Aug. 3 Syrian tanks move into Hama, killing at least 45 protesters. Aug. 23 U.N. Human Rights Council condemns Syrian government’s response to protests; opposition forms National Council of Syria, demands Assad’s removal from office. Nov. 12 Arab League suspends Syria’s membership. Dec. 19-20 Security forces execute 110 protesters in Jabal al-Zawiya region; two suicide bombings in Damascus kill 44 people.

2012 February- Syrian forces begin shelling of Homs; hundreds killed. March March 21 Peace plan presented to U.N. Security Council by Arab League is championed by special envoy Kofi Annan and accepted by Russia, China; Assad accepts plan, then reneges. April U.N. observers enter Syria to monitor progress of Annan plan; U.N. suspends monitoring after deaths of women, children. May 10 Two car bombs kill 55 people outside military intelligence building in Damascus; ceasefire nullified as government continues shelling cities; death toll reaches 9,000. June 22 Syrian forces shoot down Turkish fighter jet; fighting later crosses Turkish border. Aug. 2 Annan resigns as special envoy amid escalating violence. Oct. 2 U.N. reports that 300,000 refugees have fled Syria. Nov. 29 Syrian government shuts down Internet, telephone service; launches major offensive surrounding Damascus; U.S. delivers 2,000 communication kits to rebel forces. Dec. 11 Obama says U.S. will recognize Syrian rebels as legitimate government; U.S. designates Jabhat al-Nusra, an Islamist militia backing Syrian rebels, as terrorist organization. Dec. 22 Syrian military forces begin using Scud missiles against rebels.

2013 Jan. 1 U.N. puts death toll at 60,000; says it could reach 100,000 in coming year. Jan. 6 Assad, in Damascus, vows to remain in office, continue fight against “criminals,” “terrorists” and “foreign influences.” Jan. 17 Homs massacre kills 106 people; U.K.-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights blames pro-Assad forces. Jan. 21 Syrian National Coalition (SNC) fails to agree on transitional government; new plan promised for governing rebel-held areas.

Timeline: The Syrian Civil War

Feb. 1, 2013 111www.cqresearcher.com

waging war against his own people.” Over the next year, “amid inaction by the international community,” the con- flict developed what the report calls “starker sectarian overtones” as it drew in fighters affiliated with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Today, many ex- perts foresee only more bloodshed in Syria’s future. “By every measure, it’s getting worse,” says Andrew Tabler, a senior fellow with the Washington In- stitute for Near East Policy. The Freedom House report stresses

the importance of the stance that Is- lamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood take as they gain power or influence. Fears of the Islamists’ in- fluence led Christian and liberal secu- larists to boycott the drafting of Egypt’s new constitution. In other countries, political reforms are complicated by sectarian conflicts within Islam’s two major branches: Sunnis, the worldwide majority, and Shiites, who comprise about one-third of the Muslim popu- lation in the Middle East. Syria’s os- tensibly secularist regime is tightly linked to the country’s Alawites, a small mi- nority branch of Islam viewed as hereti- cal by both Sunnis and Shiites. 8

The U.S. role in the events has been limited. “I don’t think these events have been driven by the United States,” says Jeremy Pressman, an associate professor of political science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. “I don’t think the way they turn out will be primarily driven by what the Unit- ed States does.” President Obama called for Mubarak

to step aside in Egypt but only after the longtime U.S. ally’s fate had been sealed by weeks of demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and the military’s decision to side with the revolt. In Libya, the United States helped doom Gadhafi’s rule, but only after Britain and France took the lead in estab- lishing a no-fly zone to help protect the popular uprising. And in Syria, de- spite calls for stronger action, the ad- ministration has limited the U.S. role

to economic sanctions, covert assis- tance, humanitarian aid and public calls for Assad to step down. (See “At Issue,” p. 123.) With the unrest now in its third

year, many experts caution that the situation will not be resolved quickly. “We’re at the beginning of a long process,” says UCLA’s Gelvin. Gawdat Bahgat, an Egyptian-born

professor of political science at the Na- tional Defense University in Washing- ton, agrees. “The process of moving away from authoritarianism to democ- racy is very unsettled,” he says. As the events play out, here are some of the questions being debated:

Has the Arab Spring stalled? New York Times op-ed columnist

Nicholas Kristof was in Bahrain in Feb- ruary 2011 as government troops fired for several days on unarmed protest- ers, killing seven and wounding at least 200 others. Two years and at least 50 deaths later, Bahrain’s Sunni monar- chy still holds tight power over the country’s Shiite majority, thanks in part to military help from its Sunni-ruled neighbor Saudi Arabia. And when Kristof tried to return late in 2012, he found that he had been blacklisted and was not allowed back in to re- port on the continuing repression in the Gulf state, home to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet. 9

Despite U.S. ties, Bahraini authorities have spurned the Obama administra- tion’s urgings to negotiate a political solution with the simmering opposi- tion. And in January Bahrain’s highest courts upheld prison terms ranging from five years to life for 20 leaders of the revolt, following their convictions by a military tribunal. “The uprising was basically snuffed out,” says the Carnegie Endowment’s Salem. 10

Bahrain provides the most dramat- ic example of what the Freedom House report labels the “intransigence” ex- hibited by many Arab nations toward popular uprisings. The report tags

neighboring Oman and the United Arab Emirates with downward arrows based on increased arrests of activists call- ing for political reform and a crack- down on online activism. In other countries, including Jordan and Kuwait, governments have successfully tamped down discontent with modest politi- cal reforms that have left the under- lying power structures unchanged. And in Egypt, the report cites continuing controversies over Morsi’s actions, in- cluding his dismissal of the lower house of parliament in June and his claim of broad executive powers in No- vember, to warn that the fate of democracy in the Arab world’s most populous nation “remains very much an open question.” The moves to repress or stifle pop-

ular movements lead some experts to predict little democratization for the foreseeable future. “That’s likely to be the case for the next couple of years,” says Jones, the RAND expert. Jones’ col- leagues, writing in a book-length study, say the government security apparatus- es in the region pose formidable ob- stacles to popular political movements. In addition, oil-endowed countries have used their economic wealth to buy off potential opposition with what Jones calls “staggering benefits” in the form of government jobs and subsidies for food and other necessities. 11

In Egypt, Jones says, the early signs pointed to a model of democratiza- tion, but Morsi’s power-grabs now temper the early optimism. “There’s se- rious reason to be concerned about the use of his position to establish broad executive, legislative and, to some degree, judicial power,” Jones says. Other experts, however, say it is

too early to write off the Arab Spring as spent. “There have been continu- ous protests and uprisings” since the initial months in 2010 and 2011, ac- cording to Gelvin, the UCLA profes- sor. “We see them taking place all the time. They just don’t get covered.”

Continued on p. 113

112 CQ Researcher

UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

Sources: “Guide to the Syrian opposition,” BBC, Nov. 12, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15798218; “Structure of SNC,” Syrian National Council, www.syriancouncil.org/en/structure/structure.html; Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Middle East Security Report 6: Jihad in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2012, www.understandingwar.org/report/jihad-syria; Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria’s army weakened by growing desertions,” Reuters, Jan. 13, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/us- syria-defections-idUSTRE80C2IV20120113; Samia Nakhoul and Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “World Powers Recognise Syrian Opposition Coalition,” Reuters, December 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/us-syria-crisis-draft-idUSBRE8BB0DC2012 1212; Yelena Suponina, “Free Syrian Army’s Riad al-Asaad: Political resolution of the crisis in Syria is impossible,” Voice of Russia, Aug. 9, 2012, english.ruvr.ru/2012_08_09/Political-resolution-on-the-crisis-in-Syria-is-impossible/.

— Compiled by Ethan McLeod and Darrell Dela Rosa

Syria at a Glance Government

President Bashar Assad — Leader of Syria and regional secretary of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. Elected in 2000 in unopposed referendum and initially seen as a potential reformer. Heavily criticized for human-rights violations and political corruption. Minister of Defense General Fahd Jassem al-Freij — Appointed in July 2012 after assassination of prede- cessor; Assad has divided al-Freij’s power among various commanders. Syrian army — Estimated 280,000-member land force, responsible for suppressing rebels. Suffered up to 60,000 defections to the opposition in the past year.

Opposition

Free Syrian Army (FSA) — Formed in July 2011 by Syrian Army defectors. Estimated force of 100,000 soldiers with basic military training; has grown from a select group of defectors along the Turkish border to a broader group of insurgent civilians and military groups. Many rebels have adopted the FSA name. Colonel Riad al-Asaad — Former commander of the FSA. Established the FSA in late July 2011 after defecting from the Syrian army earlier that month. Brigadier General Salim Idris — Syrian Army defector appointed to replace Riad al-Asaad as chief of staff of the FSA in December 2012. National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Syrian National Coalition) — Formed in November 2012 as an inclusive leadership council of 63 (now 70) members. Aims to replace Assad’s regime and become the international representative for Syria, but internal divisions have presented problems in forming a government. Supports the FSA. Recognized by more than 140 countries as representative of Syrian people. Coalition President Moaz al-Khatib — Former Sunni imam of the Ummayad Mosque in Damascus; impris- oned several times for speaking out against Assad and forced to flee Syria in July 2012. Syrian National Council (SNC) — Coalition of several opposition groups dominated by Sunni Muslim majority. Military bureau coordinates activity for the Damascus Declaration for Democratic Change, the Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian Revolution General Commission and Kurdish and tribal factions. President George Sabra — Elected chairman of the left-wing Syrian Democratic People’s Party, banned by the country’s government, in November 2012. National Co-ordination Committee for Democratic Change — Comprises 13 leftist and three additional Kurdish political parties, plus an assortment of independent and youth activists. Calls for a withdrawal of military from streets, an end to military attacks against nonviolent protests and the release of all political prisoners. Favors economic sanctions on Assad as a means of applying international pressure. Rejects foreign military intervention. Jabhat al-Nusra — Salafi Jihadist rebel group with links to al Qaeda; has gained popular support in recent months. Worked with FSA factions to carry out attacks and large-scale bombings in the past year. The United States designated it a terrorist organization in December. Ahrar al-Sham battalion — Rebel group composed of conservative Salafist and Islamist groups; has close ties to Jabhat al-Nusra. Has drawn attention from other, more radical rebel groups in Syrian rebel front.

Feb. 1, 2013 113www.cqresearcher.com

Bahgat, at the National Defense University, agrees that the first few months of the uprisings resulted in unrealistic expectations about the fu- ture pace of change. “It makes sense that there will be ups and downs,” says Bahgat. “It is not one straight line. The setbacks make sense. People should expect them.” As for his native Egypt, Bahgat finds

the controversial moves by Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood unsurprising and less than alarming. “It makes sense to me that they are trying to grab as much power as they can,” Bahgat says. “That reflects the balance of power that is in Egypt now. But maybe in 10 years or so, it may be different.” “I don’t think things have stalled,” says

the University of Connecticut’s Pressman. “We should not come to these summa- ry judgments after two years.” Still, Press- man cautions that further democratiza- tion is not assured. “I’m in no way saying things are guaranteed.” Economics, more than politics, may

determine the future course of events, according to many of the experts. “The Middle East is not doing well,” says Gelvin. “That’s the elephant in the room that no one’s talking about.” The ini- tial wave of uprisings, he notes, “was not only social-networking youth. It was also workers.” The uprisings have hurt tourism

in Egypt and elsewhere and slowed foreign investment, according to Joshua Landis, director of the Cen- ter for Middle East Studies at the Uni- versity of Oklahoma in Norman. “We’re caught in this race of whether the new governments can see their countries through these very dangerous and dif- ficult times,” says Landis. The RAND researchers say economic

failures do not necessarily doom ef- forts at democratization, but they warn that transitions in the Arab world may be “especially fragile” and “more vul- nerable to economic strains than many past cases.” 12

Do Islamic groups pose a threat to political reform in the Arab world? Egyptians were getting ready to

vote on a new constitution that promises freedom of religion when an Egyptian court on Dec. 12 sentenced Alber Saber, an avowed atheist, to three years in prison for blasphemy. Saber, 27, born into a Christian fam-

ily, had been arrested in September based on never-confirmed reports that he had posted the controversial anti- Islam film “The Innocence of Muslims” on his blog. Authorities found enough evidence, however, to charge him with blasphemy for insulting both Islam and Christianity. “Egypt is a religious state,” Saber said after appealing the sentence. “If you disobey the norms, you get judged and sentenced.” 13

The new constitution, approved in two rounds of balloting on Dec. 15 and Dec. 22, guarantees freedom of worship to believers in the three “monotheist” religions — Judaism, Christianity and Islam — but not to others. It also carries over a provision from the 1971 constitution designating Islam as the state religion and Islamic law, known as Sharia, as the source of legislation. Under Mubarak, the government

had banned the Muslim Brotherhood but protected the country’s Christians, who comprise only 1 percent of the population. With the Muslim Brother- hood’s Freedom and Justice Party dominating the new government, Chris- tians and non-believers worry about possible repression. “Expect to see many more blasphemy prosecutions in the future,” says Heba Morayef, a Cairo-based researcher with Human Rights Watch, the New York City- headquartered advocacy and monitor- ing organization. 14

Whatever happens in Egypt, ex- perts agree that Islamic parties will play an increasingly important role in Arab countries. Political Islam “is the one ideology that has roots with the people,” says University of Oklahoma

professor Landis. “Secularists are a dis- tinct minority. We’re going to see Is- lamic governments from one end of the Middle East to another.” For much of the 20th century, Is-

lamist organizations such as the Mus- lim Brotherhood — which was found- ed in Egypt in 1928 and later spawned branches in other countries — advo- cated violence as a political tactic, leading to bans and crackdowns from established regimes. UCLA’s Gelvin now sees “a paradigm shift” as the groups, well organized despite a history of government repression, see opportu- nities in the new political openings. “It doesn’t mean that Islamist organi- zations are going to be completely pro-democracy and human rights,” Gelvin says. “But opportunities have opened for them to participate in de- mocratic government.” With their superior political organi-

zation, Islamist parties are bound to be “the most powerful actors in the new regimes, at least in the short run,” scholars Lesch and Haas write in their overview. 15

Bahgat, the National Defense Uni- versity professor, agrees. “It makes sense that they are winning many elections,” he says, citing the voting in Tunisia and his native Egypt as examples. “They are winning because they are better orga- nized than all other political groups.” Salem, the Carnegie expert in Beirut,

acknowledges the disagreements in Egypt and Tunisia between Islamists and what he calls “non-Islamists” and “old regime forces.” But he professes to be unconcerned. “Issues are being contested,” he says, “but the good thing is they’re being contested through political processes.” The sectarian division within Islam

between Sunnis and Shiites is also an important factor in the ongoing po- litical developments, according to Toby Jones, an associate professor of his- tory at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, N.J. “Religious and ethnic differences have crept into politics in

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UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

ways that we haven’t seen before,” says Jones, who specializes in the modern Middle East. “It’s relatively new. It’s very dangerous.” Sunni rulers in the Gulf states as

well as Assad in Syria depict the pop- ular protests as sectarian-motivated as a stratagem to stay in power, Jones says. “They all have an interest in claiming that sectarianism is the force that is at work,” Jones explains. “It gives them legitimacy.” The Freedom House report gives

Tunisia good marks on political re- forms so far but takes a wait-and-see attitude toward Egypt. “The moderate Islamists in Tunisia who constitute the government have said mostly the rights things and have done mostly things that advance democracy,” says Arch Puddington, vice president for research and editor of the annual vol- ume. But he calls Egypt “another case.” Morsi’s tendency “is to address his message to his fellow brothers,” Pud- dington says, referring to Muslim Broth- erhood members, “and to the entire population second.” Other experts are also cautious

about prospects in Egypt. “We’re going to have to see how it plays out,” says Landis. But Bahgat expects the Muslim Brotherhood to face more serious political competition as time goes on. “The Islamists will not be able to solve the economic problems,” Bahgat explains. “In the next round of elections, other groups, most like- ly liberals, will get better organized, and the people will have less confi- dence in the Islamists.”

Can a stable political solution be found in Syria? The capture of a key Syrian mili-

tary air base by rebels on Jan. 11 fur- ther weakens the Assad regime’s hold on the country, but the victory is a mixed blessing for the United States and others hoping for democratic change in post-Assad Syria. The rebels who seized the Taftanaz military base

in the northwestern province of Idlib were primarily from Jabhat al-Nusra, a jihadist group designated by the United States as a terrorist organiza- tion and thought to have ties to al Qaeda in Iraq. By gaining weapons and credit from the victory, analysts said, the jihadists strengthened their position and stoked fears among Syria’s minority Alawite community of a sectarian bloodbath if Assad falls. 16

At the outset, the uprising in Syria caught outside observers, not to men- tion the Assad regime itself, totally by surprise. 17 Assad, a Western-educated ophthalmologist, had been viewed as a reformer when elected president at age 37 in 2000 after his father’s death. He remained well-liked in Syria despite the regime’s crackdown on protests be- fore 2011, according to Lesch, the Trinity University professor who came to know Assad well while writing a biography. 18

The regime seemed to satisfy the coun- try’s Sunni majority while also protect- ing the interests of the Shia minority and the Alawite community that was the elder Assad’s home and the regime’s political base. In addition, the initial protests in Damascus and elsewhere in early 2011 drew small numbers and were easily put down. The unrest became more serious

and the crackdown turned deadly when security forces killed at least five peo- ple in the southern provincial town of Daraa on March 18, 2011, as they were protesting the arrest of schoolchildren for anti-government graffiti. In the near- ly two years since, the unrest has turned into a bloody civil war. Rebel forces now control parts of the country, but the government counters with lethal force, including missile attacks in civil- ian neighborhoods. Tabler is one of many experts who

believes Assad must either step aside or resign himself eventually to being deposed. RAND expert Jones agrees. “The prognosis for the Assad regime is bleak,” Jones says. “It’s likely to fall, but it’s hard to put a time frame on

that.” Some Syria-watchers think Assad could fall from power any day, but many others expect him to hold on for a while. “Syria is looking forward to a long,

hard-fought struggle that’s going to dev- astate the country,” says University of Oklahoma professor Landis, who hosts an up-to-date blog, Syria Comment. 19

The experts are equally bleak in their predictions for a post-Assad Syria. The Syrian opposition is loosely orga- nized —“fragmented,” as University of Connecticut professor Pressman puts it. “There is no clear leadership,” says Bahgat, at the National Defense Uni- versity. Gelvin at UCLA says Muslim Brotherhood groups “claim to be for democracy and human rights,” but “we don’t know much about them.” The ji- hadist groups, he says, are better known. “They are very sectarian,” Gelvin says. “For the most part, they are not inter- ested in ruling Syria. They want to use Syria as a jumping-off point for a larger uprising in the Islamic world.” The opposition’s support among

the Syrian people is difficult to gauge but at the least subject to doubt. The nationalist Free Syrian Army, formed in summer 2011 by defectors from Assad’s security forces, is said to be losing support as individual comman- ders turn into local warlords. Jihadist groups are gaining good will, in part because they are helping to provide food and supplies to beleaguered towns such as Aleppo in the northwest. Peter Harling, an analyst with the Interna- tional Crisis Group, says the opposi- tion has failed to woo Alawites with- in the regime or to reach out to other disaffected communities. 20

Many Alawites fear a bloodbath if the rebels force Assad from power. “If I were Alawi, I would fight to the end,” says Bahgat. “If Assad falls, the Alawi will pay a price.” Salem, with the Carnegie Endow-

ment, agrees. “There’s a lot of people who want to take revenge,” he says.

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Feb. 1, 2013 115www.cqresearcher.com

Chronology 2010-2011 Arab Spring begins; autocrats ousted in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya; Syria in civil war.

December 2010 Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi sets fire to himself to protest treatment by police (Dec. 17); incident sparks nationwide riots; President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali vows to punish protesters; Bouazizi dies on Jan. 4.

January 2011 Protests break out in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen. . . . Ben Ali flees Tunisia (Jan. 14). . . . Demonstra- tions in Cairo’s Tahrir Square call for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to resign (Jan. 25).

February 2011 Mubarak resigns; military council forms interim government (Feb. 11). . . . Libyans protest arrest of activist in Benghazi (Feb. 15); protests spread; leader Moammar Gadhafi vows to stay in office. . . . Protests erupt in Bahrain (Feb. 14), Morocco (Feb. 20).

March 2011 Protests banned nationwide in Saudi Arabia (March 5). . . . U.N. Security Council authorizes no-fly zone over Libya (March 17); rebels begin to capture territory, form transitional government. . . . Syrian security forces kill several people in provincial city of Daraa protest- ing arrest of political prisoners (March 18); protests spread to Damascus, other cities; tanks used to quell protests. . . . President Bashar Assad orders release of political prisoners (March 25-26).

April-June 2011 Protests in Egypt demand quick transfer of power by military. . . . Assad lifts state of emergency in

Syria (April 21); security forces con- tinue crackdowns. . . . Death toll in Egypt uprising: at least 846, ac- cording to judicial panel (April 19). . . . Four protesters sentenced to death in Bahrain (April 28). . . . Death toll in Tunisia uprising: at least 300, according to U.N. investigator (May 21). . . . Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh injured in rocket at- tack, flown to Saudi Arabia (June 4).

July-September 2011 Free Syrian Army formed by de- fectors (July 29). . . . Battle of Tripoli: rebels capture city; Gadhafi overthrown (Aug. 20-28). . . . Saudi King Abdullah grants women right to vote, run in municipal elections (Sept. 25).

October-December 2011 Gadhafi captured, killed (Oct. 20). . . . Moderate Islamist party Ennhada leads in elections for Tunisian parliament (Oct. 23). . . . Sunni groups form National Salva- tion Council in Syria; Islamist groups refuse to join (November). . . . Saleh agrees to yield power in Yemen (Nov. 23). . . . Parlia- mentary elections begin in Egypt (Nov. 28); Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party leads after balloting concludes (Jan. 3).

•

2012-Present Protests ebb; new governments take shape; Syrian civil war continues.

January-March 2012 Syrian conflict intensifies; Russia, China block U.N. Security Council action (Feb. 4). . . . Abed Rabo Mansour Hadi elected Yemeni president in single-candidate vote (Feb. 21). . . . Egyptian parliament creates Islamist-dominated Con-

stituent Assembly to draft new constitution; liberal lawmakers protest (March 24).

April-June 2012 Egyptian Constituent Assembly dis- solved by court order (April 10). . . . Mubarak receives life sentence for role in killings of protesters (June 2); wins retrial (Jan. 13, 2013). . . . New Constituent Assembly created; critics still dissatisfied (June 12). . . . Ben Ali convicted in absentia for role in killings of protesters in Tunisia; sentenced to life (June 19). . . . Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi elected president in Egypt (June 24).

July-September 2012 Liberal National Front Alliance leads in Libyan parliamentary elections; Islamists distant second (July 7). . . . U.S. ambassador, three others killed in attack on consulate in Benghazi (Sept. 11).

October-December 2012 Egyptian court skirts challenge to Constituent Assembly (Oct. 23). . . . Bahrain bans all protests (Oct. 30). . . . Morsi curbs judiciary’s powers (Nov. 22); withdraws move under pressure (Dec. 8). . . . Draft con- stitution approved by Constituent Assembly (Nov. 29-30); approved by voters (Dec. 15, 22).

January 2013 Death toll in Syria put at 60,000 (Jan. 2); Assad vows to remain in office (Jan. 6). . . . Libyan govern- ment sharply reduces death toll estimate in civil war: 4,700 rebels killed, 2,100 missing; government losses thought comparable (Jan. 8). . . . Women named to Saudi advi- sory council for first time (Jan. 11). . . . New violence in Egypt marks second anniversary of revolution; military chief fears “collapse” of state (Jan. 25-29).

116 CQ Researcher

The government is responding to its weakened position with “a scorched- earth policy,” according to Salem. “Rather than cede power to another party, it prefers to destroy what is left and leave nothing standing to who- ever comes after,” he says. The rem- nants of Assad’s government can con- tinue the fight by retiring to the Alawite community’s northwest coastal home, he notes. “I see no signs that this conflict will

do anything but worsen,” Tabler con- cludes. Landis is just as pessimistic about

the political dynamic. Syria “is not going to be a democracy for a long time,” he says.

BACKGROUND Strangers to Democracy

T he Arab world knew little of free-dom or democracy before or dur- ing most of the 20th century. The de- feat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I left Arab lands from Morocco to Iraq under European rule as colonies or protectorates. As Arab nations gained independence after World War II, they emerged not as democ- racies but as autocracies ruled by long-serving monarchs or by strong- men from the ranks of the military.

The leaders used nationalist and pan- Arabist rhetoric to hold popular sup- port even as social and economic problems festered. 21

An Arab empire once stretched from Spain in the west to the Asian subcontinent in the east, but the Ot- toman Empire displaced it by conquest in the 15th century. European colonial powers gained footholds in North Africa in the 1800s. Britain and France took over parts of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East after their victory in World War I. Britain controlled Pales- tine, Transjordan and Iraq and exer- cised strong influence over Egypt after unilaterally granting it nominal inde- pendence in 1922. France got the ter- ritory that became Syria and Lebanon

UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

Continued from p. 114

S tudents at Aleppo University in Syria were busy with exams on Jan. 15 when at least two massive bomb blasts shattered the campus. Dozens were killed and scores

were wounded in carnage remarkable even for a country dev- astated by nearly two years of civil war. “The most painful scene was a chopped hand with a pen and

notebook right next to it,” one student told The New York Times over Skype. “I saw blood [and] flesh littered all around.” 1

Tens of thousands of Syrians have witnessed similar scenes as strongman Bashar Assad tries to retain his presidency in the face of potent resistance by a confederation of rebel groups, some controlled by Western-oriented reformers and others by Islamist extremists. Syria’s civil war has killed more than 60,000, according to

a United Nations-commissioned estimate released Jan. 2. The conflict has also laid waste to vast portions of the country stretching along the western border from Aleppo to Damascus. At the same time, the war has led to a humanitarian crisis, with more than 2 million refugees displaced inside Syria and possibly 1 million requiring humanitarian aid within the next six months in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and elsewhere. 2

Without a quick resolution to the conflict — a scenario widely viewed by international observers as unlikely — “thousands more will die or suffer terrible injuries as a result of those who harbor the obstinate belief that something can be achieved by more bloodshed, more torture and more mind- less destruction,” according to Navi Pillay, the U.N. High Com- missioner for Human Rights. 3

The Syrian conflict is by far the deadliest of a string of up- risings that have rocked the Arab world in the past two years, but the death count is in the thousands in at least two other countries. Libya’s new government released new, sharply re- duced estimates on Jan. 8 that the civil war there claimed at least 4,700 lives on the rebels’ side, with 2,100 missing; gov- ernment losses were thought to be similar. The Yemeni gov- ernment estimated in March 2012 that more than 2,000 had died in the political unrest there. The death toll was in the hundreds in two other countries: Egypt

and Tunisia. A judicial panel in Egypt in April 2011 said 846 peo- ple died in the revolution there. An investigative panel in Tunisia reported in May 2011 that 300 people had died in the Tunisian uprising. In Bahrain, a reform group counts 91 deaths, but news organizations put the death toll less exactly at more than 50. 4

The International Rescue Committee’s Commission on Syri- an Refugees has been responsible for supplying medical aid and humanitarian assistance to women affected by sexual vio- lence and to refugees displaced by the conflict. The IRC com- mission says sexual violence and child kidnappings by Syrian army troops have been primary causes for many families’ de- cisions to flee the country. Aleppo, Syria’s largest city with more than 2 million peo-

ple, bristles with military checkpoints. Vast tracts of homes and businesses have been damaged or destroyed. Pedestrians risk being shot in crossfires on bombed-out streets. 5

Aleppo became a prime target in late July 2012 as Syrian army forces began shelling the city in a thus-far unsuccessful at-

Syrian Civil War Has Region’s Highest Death Toll More than 60,000 are dead and millions homeless.

Feb. 1, 2013 117www.cqresearcher.com

and maintained colonial rule over Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Italy con- trolled what was to become Libya. The Ottoman Empire had been decentral- ized and religiously tolerant but with no tradition of political rights. Britain and France were granted mandates by the League of Nations in order to guide the Arab nations to self-governance, but they instituted only limited reforms and installed compliant rulers who pro- tected the Europeans’ interests even as nationalism was emerging as a force. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia was formed in 1932 as an Islamic kingdom on the Arabian peninsula, an area viewed as worthless desert until the discovery of oil later in the decade. The end of World War II brought independence

for Jordan and Syria and, in 1948, the creation of the Jewish state of Is- rael — with unsettling consequences for the politics of the region. The defeat of the then-seven mem-

ber Arab League in the first Arab-Israeli War (1948-49) stoked nationalist and pan-Arabist sentiment in many of the now-independent Arab nations. In Egypt, a military coup ousted the pro- British monarchy in 1952 and created a republic that was transformed over the next four years into a one-party state led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nass- er translated his pan-Arabist views into an agreement with Syria in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic, but the union lasted only until 1961 as Syria chafed under the domination of

its larger partner. Nasser ruled Egypt until his death in 1970; his successor, Anwar Sadat, reinstituted a multiparty system and moved away from Nasser’s Arab socialism during 11 years in of- fice until his 1981 assassination by op- ponents of Sadat’s landmark 1979 peace agreement with Israel. Syria, meanwhile, experienced two

decades of extreme political instabili- ty after gaining independence from the French after World War II. Politics came to be dominated by the Arab Ba’ath Party (translation: “resurrection” or “re- naissance”), founded by pan-Arabist Syrians in 1947. Power lay, however, not with political institutions but with the military and security establishment. Baathists divided in the 1960s into

tempt to drive out the rebels. The attack on the public university, the country’s flag- ship educational institution, was unprecedented. The responsibility for the

Aleppo University bomb blasts is disputed. Pro-rebel factions contend that Assad directed the Syrian air force to bomb the university; Syria’s state-run news service said an unnamed terrorist orga- nization was responsible. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said the ex- plosions could have resulted from government airstrikes or from car bombs, which have been used by rebel groups. What students saw, however, remains undeniable and clear:

“Two big holes, caused by two missiles,” in what had been the campus square, student Abu Tayem said. “I could not see it any more, it’s vanished.” 6

— Ethan McLeod

1 Hwaida Saad and Rick Gladstone, “Dozens Killed as Explosions Hit Syrian University,” The New York Times, Jan. 15, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/ 01/16/world/middleeast/syria-violence.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0.

2 See “Syria: A Regional Crisis: The IRC Commission on Syrian Refugees,” In- ternational Rescue Committee, January 2013, www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/ resource-file/IRCReportMidEast201301 14.pdf. For coverage, see Ashish Kumar Sen, “Refugees flood Syria’s neighbors,” The Washington Times, Jan. 17, 2013, www.washingtontimes. com/news/2013/jan/17/syrian-war- creating-historic-refugee-crisis/. 3 “Data Suggests Syria Death Toll Could be More than 60,000, Says UN Human Rights Office,” United Nations News Centre, Jan. 2, 2013, www.un. org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43 866. 4 Information drawn from, Ian Black, “Libyan revolution casualties lower than expected, says new government,” The Guardian, Jan. 8, 2013, www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/08/libyan-revolution-casualties-lower-expected- government; Ahmed al-Haj, “Yemen Death Toll: Over 2,000 Killed In Up- rising,” The Associated Press, March 18, 2012, www.huffingtonpost. com/2012/03/19/yemen-death-toll_n_1361840.html; Almasry Ahmed, “At least 846 killed in Egypt’s revolution,” Egypt Independent, April 19, 2011, www.egypt independent.com/news/least-846-killed-egypt%E2%80%99s-revolution; “Tunisia: High death toll challenges claims of smooth transition,” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 2011, latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/05/tunisia- uprising-violence-repression-human-rights-torture-.html; “91 Killed Since 14th February 2011,” Bahrain Justice and Development Movement, www.bahrain- jdm.org/78-killed-since-14th-february-2011/. 5 See C. J. Chivers, “Rubble and Despair Redefine Syria Jewel,” The New York Times, Dec. 18, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/world/middleeast/aleppo- residents-battered-by-war-struggle-to-survive.html?pagewanted=all. 6 Saad and Gladstone, op. cit.

Bombs devastated Aleppo University on Jan. 15, 2013, killing at least 87 people. More than 60,000 people have died in Syria’s civil war, and some experts say

the toll could reach 100,000 or more.

A F P /G e tt y I m a g e s/ S T R

118 CQ Researcher

civilian- and military-oriented wings, with Air Force officer Hafez Assad — the father of Bashar — emerging as a major figure in successive coups in 1963 and 1966. As minister of defense after 1966, Assad maneuvered against the de facto leader, Salah Jadid, and then gained unchallenged power after mounting successive military coups in 1969 and 1970. Strongman rulers came to the fore

in several other countries, generally stifling any significant moves toward democracy. In Tunisia, the anti-colo- nialist leader Habib Bourguiba became president in 1957 of what would be- come a single-party state; he held of- fice until 1987 when Ben Ali en- gineered his re- moval on grounds of mental incom- petency. In neigh- boring Libya, Gad- hafi led a bloodless military coup in 1969, ousting a corruption-tainted monarchy while es- pousing reformist and nationalist views; he wielded power, often ruth- lessly, until his death in the Libyan Revolution of 2011. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein rose through the ranks of the Ba’ath Party to become presi- dent in 1979, the beginning of a sometimes brutal, 24-year rule that ended with his ouster in the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. In Yemen, Ali Ab- dullah Saleh began a 33-year tenure as president in 1978 — first as pres- ident of North Yemen and after 1990 as president of the Yemeni Arab Re- public following the unification with formerly Marxist South Yemen.

Saudi Arabia gained influence in the region through its oil wealth, but political power remained consolidat- ed in the royal family through a suc- cession of long-serving successors to the kingdom’s founder, Ibn Saud (1932-1953). Among the Gulf states, the island

sheikhdom of Bahrain took a stab at parliamentary democracy after declar- ing independence from Britain in 1971, but Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa clamped down on dissent after leftists and Shiites won nearly half the seats in parliamentary elections in 1973. Elsewhere, constitutional monarchs —

Jordan’s King Hussein (1953-1999) and Morocco’s King Hassan II (1961-1999) — dominated the political scene while instituting reforms: modest in Morocco, more extensive in Jordan. Overall, Freedom House’s survey of

the 16 Arab lands from Morocco to Iraq in 1979 rated none of them as free, nine as partly free and seven as not free. 22

‘Freedom Deficit’

A rab and Muslim countries re-mained impervious to the ad- vances for political rights and civil lib- erties in much of the world as the 20th century ended. Repression was the order of the day in many coun- tries — with Egypt and Syria among the worst. In Egypt, an emergency de- cree ordered by Mubarak after Sadat’s 1981 assassination by Muslim funda- mentalists remained in effect until Mubarak was forced out of office in February 2011. In Syria, Assad put

down Sunni opposition to his regime with a ruthlessness best exem- plified by the 1982 massacre in the city of Hama that claimed at least 10,000 lives. By 2001, Mali in West Africa was alone among the 47majority-Muslim coun- tries to be rated by Free- dom House as free. 23

Mubarak rose from Air Force ranks to be- come Sadat’s vice pres- ident and then to suc- ceed to the presidency unopposed in a refer- endum held a week after the slaying. He won three additional six-year terms in suc- cessive referendums, also unopposed. Mubarak called the assassination part of a plot to over-

throw the government. The emergency decree adopted after

Sadat’s slaying sharply limited political activity and allowed detention and im- prisonment of political dissidents. As many as 30,000 people may have been held as political prisoners during the period. Parliamentary elections were held under rules favoring Mubarak’s governing National Democratic Party.

UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

Refugees fleeing Syria’s civil war face harsh conditions, including supply shortages, freezing temperatures and snow, in a camp in Turkey on Jan. 9, 2013. The war has created what Human Rights Watch calls

“a dire humanitarian situation.” More than 2 million Syrians have been displaced internally, and possibly 1 million more may require

humanitarian aid within the next six months in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and elsewhere.

A F P /G e tt y I m a g e s/ S T R

Feb. 1, 2013 119www.cqresearcher.com

The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest opposition group, remained under a ban imposed in 1954. Throughout the period, Mubarak remained an impor- tant U.S. ally, even as political condi- tions failed to improve and evidence of personal and government-wide cor- ruption grew. Assad ruled Syria through a com-

bination of guile and ruthlessness for nearly 30 years until his death in June 2000. His secularist policies — including equal rights for women — drew op- position from the Muslim Brotherhood beginning in the mid-1970s. Assad re- sponded to the Brotherhood’s attempt to take control of the west central city of Hama in February 1982 by ordering the city shelled and having its civilian population pay the price in lives lost. Assad’s military-security apparatus

crushed any incipient opposition with similar ruthlessness, including torture. But Assad also won loyalty through fi- nancial ties with Syria’s business com- munity, patronage in a bloated state sector and tough anti-Israeli rhetoric. The United States designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism from 1979 on but also worked to win Assad’s sup- port for, or at least acquiescence in, Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. Hussein in Iraq and Gadhafi in

Libya earned reputations as the re- gion’s other two worst dictators and biggest problems for U.S. policy. Both countries were designated as state sponsors of terrorism, though Iraq was removed from the list during the 1980s when the United States sup- ported Baghdad in its war with Iran. Both men ruled through a combina- tion of cult-of-personality adulation and coldblooded repression of polit- ical dissent. Hussein survived Iraq’s defeat by a U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War in 1991, his stature within Iraq seemingly enhanced; he won show elections in 1995 and 2002 with 99.9 percent and 100 percent, re- spectively, of the vote. Gadhafi sur- vived a retaliatory U.S. air strike on

his home in April 1986 and, like Hus- sein later, appeared only to gain po- litical stature at home from his suc- cessful defiance of Washington. The rise of Islamist parties unset-

tled politics in several countries, re- sulting in repressive crackdowns — most notably, in Algeria. The Algerian government’s decision to cancel par- liamentary elections in 1991 to thwart a potential victory by the newly formed Islamic Salvation Front touched off a decade-long civil war that may have claimed as many as 200,000 lives. In neighboring Tunisia, Ben Ali followed suit by cracking down on Islamist groups, abandoning the political lib- eralization of his first years in office. In Bahrain, the Shiite majority, chafing under Sunni rule and adverse eco- nomic conditions, clamored for restora- tion of the post-independence consti- tution, but the government responded by jailing dissidents. Meanwhile, Yemeni president Saleh held on to power de- spite secessionist sentiment in the south that continued after the north’s victo- ry in a brief civil war in 1994. Freedom House contrasted political

developments in the Muslim world with changes in other regions in its 2001 annual report. Despite “significant gains for democracy and freedom” in Latin America, Africa, Eastern and Central Europe and South and East Asia, the report stated, the Muslim world “ex- perienced a significant increase in re- pression.” 24

A year later, a group of Arab in- tellectuals convened by a United Na- tions agency cited what they called the Arab world’s “freedom deficit” as a major factor in the region’s lagging social and economic indicators. 25 The 180-page report, sponsored by the U.N. Development Programme’s regional bu- reau for Arab states, concluded that despite supposed acceptance of democ- racy and human rights in constitutions and legal codes, representative democ- racy was “not always genuine and sometimes absent.”

Freedoms of expression and asso- ciation were “frequently curtailed,” the report continued, and political partic- ipation was “less advanced” than in other developing regions. The report tied political conditions to “deep and complex economic and social prob- lems,” including “high illiteracy rates,” “rampant poverty” and “mounting un- employment rates.” But it closed on the hopeful note that the problems could be eased with political reforms.

Warming Trends?

T he Arab world felt stirrings of po-litical change during the early years of the 21st century, but only in 2011 did popular discontent succeed in top- pling regimes. Political developments unfolded against the backdrop of in- creased global attention on the Muslim world as the United States waged war first against the anti-American Islamist terrorist group al Qaeda in Afghanistan and then against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Sectarian politics complicated de- mocratization in Iraq and figured in un- folding events elsewhere, including Syria. The ouster of leaders in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011 encouraged democ- ratization advocates, but Syria’s civil war defied resolution, and only limited re- forms were instituted elsewhere. Midway through the century’s first

decade, Freedom House in 2006 re- ported a “positive regional trajectory” for political and civil rights in the Mid- dle East and North Africa. Among the gains cited was Lebanon’s popular “Cedar Revolution,” which set the stage for free elections after forcing the with- drawal of Syria’s occupying troops. The report also noted competitive elections in Egypt, Iraq and Palestine. The gains were easy to exaggerate, however. In Egypt, Mubarak won his first competitive presidential election in September 2005 with 89 percent of the vote, and the ruling National Demo- cratic Party still commanded a two-

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thirds majority in parliament after December balloting despite 87 seats won by Muslim Brotherhood candi- dates running as independents. Par- liamentary elections in Iraq the same month resulted in a fragile coalition government still riven by sectarian disputes. And in balloting a month later, the hard-line organization Hamas

won a majority in the Palestinian par- liament. Five years later, the Arab street

wrought more significant changes, starting in Tunisia. 26 The uprising — dubbed the Jasmine Revolution in the West but not in Tunisia itself — began with the Dec. 17, 2010, self- immolation of unlicensed street ven-

dor Mohamed Bouazizi to protest his alleged mistreatment by police. Protests driven by unemployment and inflation as well as political repression spread through the country quickly and picked up more steam after Bouazizi’s death on Jan. 4. With a nationwide strike called and the military backing the revolution, Ben Ali fled on Jan. 14 for

UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

E gypt’s new constitution includes a host of provisions that appear to strengthen protections for individual rights. But human rights advocates in Egypt and in the United States

say it is deeply flawed because it vests too much power in the president, creates significant exceptions for some rights and opens the door to instituting Islamic law at the potential ex- pense of religious freedom. “From a liberal democratic perspective, there is much to like

in the document,” writes Nathan Brown, a professor of politi- cal science and international affairs at George Washington Uni- versity in Washington, D.C. But, Brown adds, “the document includes just as much that causes concern.” 1

Egyptian voters approved the new, 234-article constitution with about 64 percent of the vote in a low-turnout, two-stage refer- endum on Dec. 15 and 22 that drew only one-third of the elec- torate to the polls. Opponents complained the referendum was hastily called after a drafting process by the Islamist-dominat- ed Constituent Assembly that was itself too rushed and too con- tentious. President Mohammed Morsi made a nationally televised address on Dec. 26, the day after the results were announced, to acknowledge unspecified “mistakes” in the process while promis- ing “to respect the law and constitution.” 2

The new constitution, replacing one that was adopted in 1971, shortens the president’s term from six years to four and imposes a two-term limit instead of allowing unlimited terms. But Brown says the constitution “is more presidential than might have been expected.” And Hafez Abu Saeda, head of the Egypt- ian Organization for Human Rights, complained in advance of the referendum about provisions allowing the president to ap- point the prime minister, dissolve parliament and name mem- bers of the Supreme Constitutional Court. 3

In another analysis before the referendum, the U.S.-head- quartered Human Rights Watch praised the charter for its “strong protection” against arbitrary detention, torture and inhumane treat- ment and for freedom of movement, privacy of communication and freedom of assembly and association. But it noted that other provisions imposed significant qualifications on those rights — such as provisions against “insulting” individuals or “the prophets.” The group noted that criminal prosecutions for insulting the pres- ident or the judiciary have increased since Morsi took office. 4

The new constitution carries over a provision from the 1971 charter — Article 2 in both documents — that declares Islam to be the state religion and Islamic law, or Sharia, the princi- pal source of legislation. The new constitution adds a new pro- vision, Article 219, that defines Sharia broadly to include what is translated into English as “general evidence and foundations, rules and jurisprudence as well as sources accepted by doc- trines of Sunni Islam and the majority of Muslim scholars.” In a separate provision, the constitution specifies that scholars at the Islamic Al-Azhar University shall be consulted on all matters of Sharia law. Magdi Khalil, an Egyptian who serves as executive director

of the Belin-based Mideast Freedom Forum, calls the provisions “catastrophic” because they “create prospects of a religious state.” 5

But Brown and coauthor Clark Lombardi, an associate profes- sor at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, say the meaning of the new provisions remains to be seen. “There will continue to be fierce argument,” they write, “about what types of law are permissible in a self-styled Islamic state and, of course, about which are wise.” 6

— Kenneth Jost

1 Nathan J. Brown, “Egypt’s Constitution Conundrum,” Foreign Affairs, Dec. 9, 2012, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138495/nathan-j-brown/egypts-constitution- conundrum. 2 See David D. Kirkpatrick, “Despite ‘Mistakes,’ Morsi Says Constitution Fight Was Democracy in Action,” The New York Times, Dec. 27, 2012, p. A8. See also Sarah el Deeb, “Egypt’s Morsi: constitution dawn of new republic,” The Associated Press, Dec. 26, 2012. A video of the speech, delivered in Arabic, is posted on an Egyptian news site: http://nilesports.com/news/2012/12/ 26/video-president-mohamed-morsi-speech-december-26-2012/. For other back- ground, see Ingy Hassieb and Abigal Hauslohner, “Egyptian voters adopt faith-based constitution,” The Washington Post, Dec. 24, 2012, p. A8; David D. Kirkpatrick and Mayy el Sheikh, “As Constitution Nears Approval, Egypt’s Factions Face New Fights,” The New York Times, Dec. 23, 2012, p. A1. 3 “Egyptian Human Rights Experts Analyze Draft Constitution,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Nov. 15, 2012, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/egyptian-human-rights-experts-analyze-the-draft-constitution. 4 “Egypt: New Constitution Mixed on Support of Rights,” Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/29/egypt-new-constitution-mixed-support-rights. 5 See “Egyptian Human Rights Experts,” op. cit. 6 Clark Lombardi and Nathan J. Brown, “Islam in Egypt’s New Constitu- tion,” Foreign Policy, Dec. 13, 2012, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/ 2012/12/13/islam_in_egypts_new_constitution.

Egypt’s New Constitution Gets Mixed Reviews Some say the document creates “prospects of a religious state.”

Feb. 1, 2013 121www.cqresearcher.com

exile in Saudi Arabia. After false starts, a transitional government with no holdovers from Ben Ali’s regime scheduled elections in October. The once-banned Islamist party Ennahda won a 41 percent plu- rality of the vote, but the party’s leader, the once exiled Rachid Gannouchi, pledged to support democracy and human rights. Meanwhile, Ben Ali was convicted in absentia in June of em- bezzlement and sentenced along with his wife to 35 years’ imprisonment; the next summer, a military court convict- ed him, again in absentia, of his role in the deaths of protesters and sentenced him to life in prison. Saudi Arabia has refused to extradite him. Events in Egypt proceeded even more

rapidly than in Tunisia, especially after “Day of Revolt” protests in Cairo and several other cities on Jan. 25, 2011. Six days later, hundreds of thousands massed in Cairo’s Tahrir Square — al Jazeera estimated the crowd at 2 million — to protest Mubarak’s continued rule. Mubarak tried to quiet the unrest the next day by promising reforms and pledging not to seek re-election in Sep- tember, but the protests continued with military leaders significantly pledging neutrality. Mubarak tried again on Feb. 10 by

delegating powers to his vice presi- dent, but the next day — prodded by a phone call from U.S. President Obama — Mubarak formally resigned. In par- liamentary elections held between No- vember 2011 and January 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Jus- tice Party won 47 percent of the seats; Morsi’s election as president in June made him the first Islamist elected leader of an Arab state. Meanwhile, Mubarak had been convicted in June of failing to stop the killing of protesters and sentenced to life imprisonment. The ouster of Gadhafi in the Libyan

civil war took longer and required out- side military assistance. Gadhafi’s in- telligence chief responded to infor- mation about a planned anti-government demonstration in February 2011 by

On the Hot Seat

Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi (top) has been criticized by Freedom House for his dismissal of the lower house of parliament in June and his claim of broad executive powers in November. The democracy advocacy group warns that the survival of democracy in the Arab world’s most populous nation “remains very much an open question.” President Bashar Assad of Syria (bottom) blames the country’s ongoing civil war on criminals, terrorists and foreign influences. Assad, whose strongman father ruled Syria for nearly 30 years before his succession in June 2000, responded to the popular uprisings in 2011 “by waging war against his own people,” says Freedom House.

A P P h o to /S A N A

A F P /G e tt y I m a g e s/ K h a le d D e so u k i

122 CQ Researcher

UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

arresting one of the leaders, Fathi Tar- bel. Despite Tarbel’s release shortly af- terwards, the Feb. 15 arrest ignited protests that spread from the eastern city of Benghazi through much of the country. Gadhafi responded with brute force, calling in foreign mercenaries to aid his own troops and air force. In March, the U.N. Security Council authorized a no- fly zone to protect civilians; NATO set up the protective zone with U.S. help. Gadhafi’s fate was sealed when rebels took over the capital city of Tripoli in late August; the fallen dictator was found on Oct. 20 hiding in a culvert west of the central coastal city of Sirte and killed on the spot. The liberal National Front Alliance won 48 percent of the seats in parliamentary elections in July 2012, with the Islamic Justice and Construc- tion Party a distant second with 10 per- cent of the seats. The uprising in Syria grew from

protests over the March 2011 arrest of graffiti-writing school boys in Daraa into full-fledged civil war. Assad responded on March 30 with promises of politi- cal reform and some economic con- cessions, but then with force as the unrest continued. By summer, the death toll had exceeded 1,000. Military defectors formed the Syrian Free Army in July; the next month, opponents es- tablished the National Council of Syria, which demands Assad’s resignation and democratic elections. The fighting con- tinued even as former U.N. Secretary- General Kofi Annan attempted media- tion; he abandoned the effort by August 2012 in the face of mounting casualties and a flood of refugees. With high-level defections from the regime, more and more observers concluded that Assad’s days were numbered, but he defied opponents by pledging on Jan. 6 to stay in office. Protests in the two lesser conflict zones

—Yemen and Bahrain — achieved no substantial change. In Yemen, Saleh replied to protests beginning in January 2011 with a pledge not to seek re-elec-

tion in 2013. With the protests continu- ing, Saleh was injured in a rocket attack in June and flown to Saudi Arabia for treatment. He returned in September and two months later handed over power to his deputy, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who won an uncontested presidential election in February 2012. In Bahrain, the government responded quickly to protests that began in the capital city of Manama in February 2011 by calling in help from Saudi troops the next month. The government clamped down by de- stroying the Pearl Monument, the focal point of the demonstrations; banning po- litical parties; and arresting and prose- cuting leading dissidents. New protests in October 2012 prompted an indefinite ban on all political gatherings.

CURRENT SITUATION

Transition Troubles

E gypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-domi-nated government is working to consolidate power while grappling with economic difficulties and continuing opposition from liberal and secularist groups, many of whom protested in Cairo and elsewhere on Jan. 25 to mark the second anniversary of the begin- ning of the Egyptian revolution. 27

Tens of thousands joined the oppo- sition-organized protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Alexandria and Suez on Jan. 25, two years to the day after the first of the 2011 protests that culminated in Mubarak’s resignation. Protesters complain that the new government, led by Morsi and dom- inated by the Muslim Brotherhood- founded Freedom and Justice Party, has betrayed the revolution’s democratic as- pirations and failed to reverse an eco- nomic slide blamed largely on declining foreign investment and tourism.

To avoid confrontations with the op- position, Islamist parties — which have prevailed so far in six elections for pres- ident, parliament and a new constitu- tion — marked the anniversary in pub- lic gatherings elsewhere. Protesters clashed with police, however, resulting in more than 200 injuries to demon- strators or security forces. More than 40 deaths were reported in Suez. 28

The disorder widened over the weekend of Jan. 26-27 after a court in Port Said sentenced 21 local soccer fans to death for their role in a brawl at a match between Port Said and Cairo teams on Feb. 1, 2012, that resulted in 74 deaths. Protests over the verdicts in several cities led Morsi to impose mar- tial law. By Jan. 28, more than 50 peo- ple had been killed in demonstrations that fused anger over the verdicts with disapproval of Morsi’s leadership. “The government is trying to assure

everybody that we are on the right track,” says Bahgat, the Egyptian-born professor at National Defense Univer- sity in Washington. “On the other side, the opposition and a good number of people are not happy.” Despite the protests, the Islamist

parties have the advantages of better organization and greater unity than the opposition groups in the run-up to elections in April for the lower house of parliament. The opposition groups reportedly are divided over previously announced plans to run as a single ticket in April. 29

The governing Freedom and Jus- tice Party has officially designated it- self as a “civil” party to counteract Christian and secularist fears that it in- tends to establish a theocracy. But the constitution that Morsi pushed toward voter approval in December reaffirms Islam as the state religion. Other Is- lamist parties now form the Islamist Alliance, which differs with the Free- dom and Justice Party in taking a stricter approach on some issues of Islamic law and a harder line toward Israel.

Continued on p. 124

Continued from p. 42

no

Feb. 1, 2013 123www.cqresearcher.com

At Issue: Should the U.S. and its allies intervene militarily in Syria?yes

yes ANDREW TABLER SENIOR FELLOW, PROGRAM ON ARAB POLITICS, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY; AUTHOR, IN THE LION’S DEN: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF WASHINGTON’S BATTLE WITH SYRIA

WRITTEN FOR CQ RESEARCHER, FEBRUARY 2013

“y ou break it, you buy it” may have proven true forthe United States in Iraq, but great powers areoften forced to help clean up conflicts they did not cause but that threaten their interests. If Washington contin- ues its “light footprint” policy of non-intervention in Syria, the American people will likely have to foot the bill for a more ex- pensive cleanup of the spillover of the Syria conflict into neigh- boring states and the overall battle against international terrorism. Every indicator of the conflict between the Alawite-dominated

Assad regime and the largely Sunni opposition has taken a dramatic turn for the worse, with upwards of 65,000 killed, 30,000 missing and up to 3 million Syrians internally displaced during one of the worst Syrian winters in two decades. The Assad regime shows no sign of ending the slaughter anytime soon, increasingly deploying artillery, combat aircraft and most recently surface-to-surface missiles against the opposition. Re- ports quoting high-ranking U.S. government officials say the Assad regime has already loaded chemical weapons into bombs near or on regime airfields for possible deployment. Signs are growing of a sectarian proxy war as well, with

the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah backing their fellow Shia at the Assad regime’s core and Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey backing their Sunni brethren in the opposi- tion. Al Qaeda affiliates, as well as jihadists, are now among the opposition’s best-armed factions. The Obama administration has refrained from directly inter-

vening or supporting Syria’s increasingly armed opposition, based on an argument that neither would make the situation better. But allowing the conflict to continue and simply offer- ing humanitarian and project assistance treats merely the symptoms while failing to shape a political settlement that would help cure the disease: a brutal Assad regime that was unable to reform trying to shoot one of the youngest popula- tions in the Middle East into submission. The Obama administration spent its first two years encour-

aging a treaty between the Assad regime and Israel that would take Damascus out of Iran’s orbit and isolate its ally Hezbollah. While the method proved wrong, the strategic goals of containing Iranian influence in the region and keep- ing it from obtaining a nuclear weapon remain as valid as ever. Helping the Syrian opposition push Assad and his regime aside more quickly would help the United States and its allies achieve those objectives.no

BRIAN FISHMAN COUNTERTERRORISM RESEARCH FELLOW, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION

WRITTEN FOR CQ RESEARCHER, FEBRUARY 2013

i f we learn nothing else from more than a decade of warin Iraq and Afghanistan, it must be that high hopes andgood intentions help begin wars but do not help end them. Limited war in Syria is a recipe for mission creep and another long-term U.S. commitment to war in the Middle East. That is why proposals for increased American military inter-

vention in Syria are unconvincing. Broad-based American mili- tary action could tip the scales against the dictatorial Syrian regime but would not resolve the deep political conflicts in Syria. And more constrained proposals for military intervention would be unlikely to resolve the conflict. The United States has many laudable goals in Syria that could

plausibly justify military force: undermining an Iranian ally, elimi- nating a dictator, safeguarding civilians. Indeed, the United States should never hesitate to use military force when it is necessary to protect U.S. interests, but it must use military force only when the killing and dying that it implies are likely to achieve American political goals. That is not the case in Syria. Public discussions about Syria were hyper-optimistic after

the outbreak of peaceful protests against Bashar al-Assad in early 2011. Bolstered by the successes of the Arab Spring, many hoped the protests would not turn violent; they did. Observers ignored the presence of jihadis in the insurgency for months after it became clear that groups linked to al Qaeda were a major force driving the fighting. Still, today the clear split between Arab and Kurdish elements of the rebel coalition is poorly reported in the American press. And many observers have underestimated the cohesion of the Syrian regime, even as the country collapsed around it. The situation in Syria is undoubtedly terrible. Assad’s regime

limps on with backing from Iran, and al Qaeda has emerged as one of the most powerful militant networks in the country. But the idea that limited military action — a no-fly zone coupled with increased military aid to rebels — will resolve these challenges is more hyper-optimism from well-intentioned people. One example: The threat will increase that Syria’s chemical weapons will be used or proliferate as the regime’s hold on power weakens. Limited military force will redefine but not end the civil war

in Syria and it will commit the United States to “solving” Syria politically. During the 1990s in Iraq, no-fly zones failed to de- stroy Saddam Hussein’s regime, and military action to depose him in 2003 heralded chaos that empowered al Qaeda and Iran. Advocates of force in Syria have not offered a plausible argument for why we would do better this time.

124 CQ Researcher

Opposition groups formed the um- brella National Salvation Front in De- cember in an unsuccessful effort to re- ject the proposed constitution. The groups range from the Wafd Party, successor to an elite-dominated party banned by Nass- er in the 1950s, to the April 6 Youth Movement, the social media-based group- ing that figured prominently in the Jan- uary 25 Revolution. Apart from elec-

tion-related ma- neuverings, Morsi is working to put his stamp on the ma- chinery of govern- ment even as his government faces two high-profile challenges: negoti- ations with the In- ternational Mone- tary Fund (IMF) over a $4.8 billion loan and the court- ordered retrial of Mubarak for failing to prevent blood- shed during the 2011 uprising. The IMF loan is

needed to offset the loss of foreign cur- rency from invest- ment and tourism and the resulting sharp decline in the value of the Egyptian pound. To ap- prove the loan, the IMF is likely to require politically difficult reductions in subsidies for food and fuel. Bahgat expects an eventual agreement. “The IMF recognizes that Egypt is too big to fail,” he says. Meanwhile, Mubarak, 84 and in ill

health, remains in a military hospital after his arrest and his conviction and life sen- tence in June 2012 for failing to stop the killings of protesters. An Egyptian appeals court reversed the conviction and sentence on Jan. 13, sending the case back to a lower court for a new

trial and possibly further investigation. Mubarak and his security chief, Habib el-Adly, whose conviction also was re- versed, were the only security officials found guilty in trials stemming from the more than 800 deaths in the uprisings. Post-revolutionary transitions in

neighboring countries to Egypt’s west are proceeding on significantly differ- ent paths, with generally successful de-

mocratization in Tunisia but violence- and abuse-riddled chaos in Libya. Tunisia conducted “relatively free and

fair elections” for the National Con- stituent Assembly in October 2011, ac- cording to Human Rights Watch, re- sulting in an interim coalition headed by the moderate Islamist party Ennah- da in partnership with two secularist parties. 30 The government has now scheduled voting for parliament and di- rect election of president for June 23, with a runoff for the presidency if needed on July 7. A draft constitution, as revised by the Constituent Assem- bly in December, includes some fa-

vorable rights-protecting provisions but needs additional measures to safeguard the judiciary’s independence, according to Human Rights Watch. The country, accustomed to relative

internal peace before the revolution, is experiencing sporadic violence at- tributed to radical religious groups viewed as aligned with the govern- ment. The groups are trying to “im-

pose their political and ideological model on society through a vari- ety of means,” Slahhe- dine Jourchi, an analyst of Islamist movements in Tunisia, told The As- sociated Press. 31

Libya also held a rel- atively successful par- liamentary election in July 2012, eight months after the end of the civil war, according to Free- dom House’s report, but violence by regional militias, Islamist groups and others delayed the balloting and remains a major problem. The leading party in the voting was the Nation- al Forces Alliance, a coalition headed by the relatively liberal politi- cian Mahmoud Jibril,

with 39 seats, followed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party with 17 seats. Plans and time- line for drafting a new constitution were uncertain as 2012 ended. 32

In the most serious episode of vi- olence, an armed assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi killed U.S. Am- bassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. The attack became a major political issue in the United States as Republicans criticized the Obama administration for initially terming as spontaneous an attack that later intelligence indicated was planned by a branch of al Qaeda.

UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

Continued from p. 122

Shiite Muslims in Malikiya, Bahrain, demonstrate against the government and in support of political prisoners on Dec. 4, 2012. Government action against protesters in Bahrain has led to an

estimated 50-100 deaths. Besides Syria, Bahrain provides the most dramatic example of what Freedom House labels the “intransigence”

exhibited by many Arab nations toward popular uprisings.

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Meanwhile, Jordanians voted in higher-than-expected numbers in par- liamentary elections on Jan. 23, despite calls for a boycott by a protest group that views the parliament as weak, un- representative and corrupt. Loyalists to King Abdullah II appear to dominate the new, 150-member body, but leftists and Islamists increased the number of seats won. Under reforms announced by Abdullah, the new parliament is to choose the prime minister, but the king still has the power to dismiss govern- ments and dissolve parliament. 33

Battle Fatigue

S yrians are continuing to sufferunder a brutal civil war as rebels consolidate territorial gains, the gov- ernment steps up attacks in civilian areas and neither side nears a deci- sive victory. Human-rights groups say the Assad

regime is countering rebel forces’ gains on the ground by increasing what they call indiscriminate aerial assaults in civilian areas, including deliberate tar- geting of bakeries and bread lines and, in at least one instance, a hospital. Gov- ernment forces also frequently detain humanitarian workers and human-rights monitors, according to Lama Fakih, a researcher with the U.S.-based Human Rights Watch who regularly crosses into Syria from her native Lebanon. 34

Rebel forces have also been linked to such abuses as kidnapping, torture and extrajudicial executions as well as use of child soldiers and destruction of Christian and Shiite religious sites, Fakih says. 35 The government also has used “numerous torture techniques” on prisoners, she says. With its supe- rior firepower and more extensive se- curity apparatus, the government’s abus- es are far greater than those of the rebels, Fakih adds. The civil war, now near the end of

its second year, has created what Human Rights Watch calls “a dire humanitarian

situation.” More than 2 million Syrians have been displaced internally, and an- other 600,000 have registered as refugees in neighboring countries — chiefly Turkey and Jordan. In conflict zones, “Syria does not

resemble anything like normalcy,” Fakih says. In opposition-controlled territo- ry, entire villages may be emptied as residents seek safe havens. There is less disruption elsewhere, including in Damascus, according to Fakih. But throughout the country the mood is “one of fatigue,” she says. Neither side shows any interest, how-

ever, in the recurrent calls for a cease- fire, such as the most recent appeal by the Arab League’s general secretary, Nabil El-Araby, at the league’s Jan. 21 meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Mili- tarily, Fakih agrees with the many ex- perts who say that neither side can achieve a decisive victory over the other for the foreseeable future. Assad, out of public sight since his

Jan. 6 speech in Damascus, is widely re- ported to be determined not to step aside. “I can win the war even if Damascus is destroyed,” Assad is reported to have told U.N. and Arab League envoy Brahimi when they met in December. 36

The anti-government forces remain far from unified, however. Meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, the Syrian National Coalition failed on Jan. 21 in its sec- ond attempt to agree on a transitional government. The 70-member coalition had been formed in Qatar in Novem- ber with Gulf and Western backing. The coalition said in a statement that a five- person committee would try again to come forward with a proposal within 10 days, according to Reuters’ account. 37

The disunity among seemingly main- stream Sunni Muslims in the anti- government camp appears to be ben- efiting Jabhat al-Nusra, the avowedly jihadist group designated by the Unit- ed States as a terrorist offshoot of al Qaeda. Some Free Syrian Army com- manders have been criticized for war- lordism, according to news accounts,

while al-Nusra forces have built up good will by helping to deliver food and supplies to opposition-controlled areas cut off by government forces. 38

Among other countries in the region to confront popular pro-democracy un- rest in the past two years, Bahrain ap- pears to be taking the toughest line. After declaring martial law early in 2012, the Sunni-led government clamped down further on the Shiite opposition movement Oct. 30 by banning all protest gatherings. 39 In Washington, a State Department spokesman condemned the action. Two people were killed in bomb blasts in the capital of Manama the next week (Nov. 5). Protests have continued in the tiny Gulf kingdom. Security forces used tear gas and stun grenades in Man- ama on Jan. 18 to disperse protesters who numbered in the hundreds. Other Gulf countries are also resist-

ing political change. In Kuwait, police used tear gas and stun grenades on Jan. 6 to disperse a crowd estimated at 1,000 or more who had defied a ban on public demonstrations and contin- ued protesting changes in voting laws. The United Arab Emirates has drawn fire from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood- dominated government by arresting 11 Egyptian nationals accused of trying to form a Brotherhood cell despite the emirate’s ban on political parties. All of the Gulf countries have moved

to limit political dissent, including on social media. 40 Human Rights Watch blasted a Qatari court for its decision on Dec. 4 to sentence poet Muhammad Ibn al-Dheeb al-Ajami to life imprison- ment, apparently for poems criticizing the ruling family and one in January 2011 praising the Tunisian revolution. In July 2012 the group had urged Oman to drop cases against online activists for postings the government viewed as crit- ical of the sultan. 41

Meanwhile, al Qaeda continues to pose a threat to security in some coun- tries in the region. The assassination of a deputy police chief in a city near the Yemeni capital of Sanaa on Jan. 16

126 CQ Researcher

marked the third slaying of a security official in Yemen since October. The killing was apparently in retaliation for the government’s moves against al Qaeda. And in Algeria, the West Africa branch of al Qaeda seized a natural gas plant on Jan. 16 in retaliation for France’s decision, with Algeria’s sup- port, to send troops to Mali to com- bat Islamists there. At least 29 militants were killed when Algerian troops re- took the plant after a four-day siege; at least 38 of the plant’s personnel were killed, including three Americans.

OUTLOOK Unfinished Spring

“I t’s not easy being Arab these days,”the Lebanese journalist and histo- rian Samir Kassir wrote in an evocative dissection of the Arab peoples and their political and cultural plight in 2004. He found “a deep sense of malaise” through- out the Arab world that he said would persist unless Arabs freed themselves from “a sense of powerlessness” in order to create an Arab “renaissance.” 42

Kassir lived long enough to see Syria end its occupation of his country dur- ing the earlier Arab Spring of 2005 but not long enough to enjoy his country’s freedom from Syrian suzerainty. He was killed by a car bomb on June 2, 2005, a still unsolved assassination that was surely carried out by Syrian agents or Lebanese surrogates. Some five-and-a-half years later, a

Tunisian fruit peddler frustrated by the petty arbitrariness of a local police woman threw off his sense of power- lessness in a fashion so dramatic — he set himself on fire — as to inspire fel- low Arabs throughout North Africa and the Middle East. This time, the Arab Spring toppled three dictators, helped ease a fourth out of office, shook

strongman rulers in other countries and helped prompt modest reforms even in countries with only minimal agitation in the Arab street. In Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah granted women the right to vote and run in municipal elections in September 2011; he followed up on Jan. 11 by naming 30 women to serve on the advisory Shura Council for the first time in the kingdom’s history. 43

After two years, however, the Arab Spring must be seen as unfinished busi- ness, as Robert Malley, regional direc- tor for North Africa and the Middle East for the conflict-mediating International Crisis Group, put it in a presentation midway through the unrest’s second year. Even in countries with changes of government —Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen — Malley saw “the same fights, the same unfinished, unconcluded fights, between military and civilian, between Islamist and secular, among Islamists, among tribes, between regions.” Else- where, Malley saw “uprisings that have not begun” and the likelihood of an “ever descending” civil war in Syria. 44

Today, as the Arab unrest contin- ues, experts agree that the course of future events remains uncertain. “We still don’t know what the final politi- cal outcome of the Arab Spring will be,” says Toby Jones, the Rutgers pro- fessor. Gelvin, at UCLA, agrees. “We shouldn’t make predictions,” he says. “Nobody foresaw any of this happen- ing, and nobody saw the paths that these rebellions were going to take.” The United States has multiple and

sometimes conflicting interests in the events, including continuing coun- terterrorism initiatives and maintaining oil supplies. “It’s mixed for the United States,” says Pressman, the University of Connecticut professor. Moves toward democracy undermine what he calls the “narrative” of U.S. adversaries, such as Iran and al Qaeda, but changes in leadership can be “unsettling” for rela- tions. RAND expert Seth Jones notes that the United States inevitably has to work with both democratic and non-

democratic countries in the region. Egypt looms as the most important

test of the political openings in the Arab world, but two years after Mubarak’s fall, many Egyptians are disappointed. “The expectations were very high,” says the National Defense University’s Bah- gat. “Progress, if any, is very slow. This is why there is frustration.” Bahgat sees frustration in the West

as well. The new constitution “falls short of what we in the West would like to see,” he says. Syria’s civil war is widely expected to

lead eventually to the fall of a fifth Arab dictator, Assad, but the path for a post- Assad Syria is hard to predict. “It’s like looking into a crystal ball,” says Tabler, the Washington Institute expert, “but it’s increasingly cloudy.” No one predicts an easy transition for a country riven by conflict with no experience in self-rule. The chance of successful democra-

tization in Syria is “very slight,” says the University of Oklahoma’s Landis. For many experts, the Arab glass

is not even close to half full. The Arab Spring has produced only “a slight in- crease” in democratization —“far short of a fourth wave,” says Seth Jones, the RAND expert. “The vast majority of countries remain authoritarian.” From his Beirut watching post, how-

ever, Salem, the Carnegie expert, sees more reason for democracy advocates to cheer. “If you look at the arc of his- tory,” Salem says, “in 24 months we’ve seen an amazing leap forward in the Arab world in the direction of democ- ratization.”

Notes

1 For coverage, see Anne Barnard, “Syria Pres- ident’s Defiant Words Are Another Roadblock to Peace,” The New York Times, Jan.7, 2013, p. A1; Liz Sly, “In Syria, a Defiant Speech by Assad,” The Washington Post, Jan. 7, 2013, p. A1. For the full text, see “President al-Assad: Out of Womb of Pain, Hope Should Be Begotten, From Suffering Important Solutions Rise,” SANA

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(Syrian Arab News Agency), Jan. 6, 2013, http:// sana-syria.com/eng/21/2013/01/06/460536.htm. Assad had not spoken in public since June 3, 2012. See Neil MacFarquhar, “Assad Denies Gov- ernment Role in Massacre, Blaming Terrorism,” The New York Times, June 4, 2012, p. A4. 2 For background, see Roland Flamini, “Tur- moil in the Arab World,” CQ Global Researcher, May 3, 2011, pp. 209-236. 3 See Megan Price, Jeff Klingner, and Patrick Ball, “Preliminary Statistical Analysis of Doc- umentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab Re- public,” 2 January 2013, www.un.org/apps/ news/story.asp?NewsID=43866. The analysis was commissioned by the United Nations Of- fice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. For coverage, see Ben Hubbard and Frank Jordans, “UN says more than 60,000 dead in Syrian civil war,” The Associated Press, Jan. 2, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ syrian-rebels-attack-air-base-north. Brahimi spoke in a news conference at the head- quarters of the Arab League in Cairo, Egypt. For coverage, see Kareem Fahim and Hwaida Saad, “Envoy to Syria Warns of Slide to Hell- ish Fiefs With Huge Toll,” The New York Times, Dec. 31, 2012, p. A9, www.aina.org/news/2012 1231004313.htm; Carol Morello, “Surge in Syr- ian death toll predicted,” The Washington Post, Dec. 31, 2012, p. A7. 4 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (2012). 5 “Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance,” Freedom House, Jan. 16, 2013, www.freedomhouse.org/sites/ default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet.pdf. 6 For background, see these CQ Global Re- searcher reports: Brian Beary, “The Troubled Balkans,” Aug. 21, 2012, pp. 377-400; Brian Beary, “Emerging Central Asia,” Jan. 17, 2012, pp. 29-56; and Roland Flamini, “The New Latin America,” March 2008, pp. 57-84, 29-

56. See also these CQ Researcher reports by Kenneth Jost: “Russia and the Former Soviet Republics,” June 17, 2005, pp. 541-564; “Democ- racy in Latin America,” Nov. 3, 2000, pp. 881- 904; “Democracy in Eastern Europe,” Oct. 8, 1999; pp. 865-888; and “Democracy in Asia,” July 24, 1998, pp. 625-648. 7 See Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch (eds.), The Arab Spring: Change and Resis- tance in the Middle East (2012), pp. 3-4. For previous coverage, see Flamini, “Turmoil,” op. cit., pp. 209-236; Kenneth Jost and Benton Ives-Halperin, “Democracy in the Arab World,” CQ Researcher, Jan. 30, 2004, pp. 73-100. 8 For background, see Leda Hartman, “Is- lamic Sectarianism,” CQ Global Researcher, Aug. 7, 2012, pp. 353-376. 9 See Nicholas D. Kristof, “When Bahrain Said: Get Lost,” The New York Times, Dec. 23, 2012, p. A11, www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/ opinion/sunday/kristof-when-bahrain-said-get- lost.html. 10 Reem Khalifa, “Bahrain court upholds life sentences on opposition,” The Associated Press, Jan. 7, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/bah rain-court-upholds-life-sentences-opposition; Kareen Fahim, “Court in Bahrain Confirms Jail Terms for 13 Dissidents,” Jan. 8, 2013, p. A4. Seven of the dissidents were tried in absentia. 11 See Laurel E. Miller, et al., Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons From Around the Globe (2012), pp. 35-53, www.rand. org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/ RAND_MG1192.pdf. 12 Ibid., p. 325. 13 Quoted in Maggie Fick, “AP interview: Egypt atheist blasts Islamist regime,” The As- sociated Press, Dec. 19, 2012, http://news. yahoo.com/ap-interview-egypt-atheist-blasts- islamist-regime-173344116.html. Other back- ground drawn from article. 14 Quoted in David D. Kirkpatrick, “Cairo

Court Sentences Man to 3 Years for Insult- ing Religion,” The New York Times on the Web, Dec. 12, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/ 12/13/world/middleeast/cairo-court-orders-3- year-term-for-insulting-religion.html. 15 Lesch and Haas, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 16 See Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Syrian rebels, led by Islamists, capture key military air base,” The Washington Post, Jan. 12, 2013, p. A7, http:// articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-11/world/ 36272269_1_base-in-idlib-province-air-base- taftanaz-airport; Anne Barnard, “Syrian Rebels Say They Seized Helicopter Base in North,” The New York Times, p. A5, www.nytimes.com/ 2012/11/26/world/middleeast/syrian-rebels- said-to-have-seized-military-airport.html?gwh= 2F79954EB2025D2A5374630DBD41370E. 17 See David W. Lesch, “The Uprising That Wasn’t Supposed to Happen: Syria and the Arab Spring,” in Haas and Lesch (eds.), op. cit., pp. 79-96; Gelvin, op. cit., pp. 100-118. 18 David W. Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and the Modern Syria (2005). 19 Syria Comment, http://joshualandis.com. In an unscientific poll on the blog, 39 percent of respondents predict Assad will have lost Damascus by June 1, 61 percent disagree. 20 Harling quoted in Anne Barnard, “Rebels Find Hearts and Minds Elusive,” The New York Times, Jan. 16, 2013, p. A4. See also David Ignatius, “Anarchy in Syria,” The Washington Post, Jan. 13, 2013, p. A21. 21 Background on the six nations most af- fected by the recent unrest in the Arab world (Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen) drawn in part from individual chap- ters in Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter- Revolution and the Making of a New Era (2012). See also Gelvin, op. cit.; Haas and Lesch (eds.), op. cit. 22 Raymond D. Gastil, Freedom in the World 1980: Political Rights and Civil Liberties (1980), p. 26, http://books.google.com/books?id=LIv HFydpgBgC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. 23 Adrian Karatnycky (ed.), Freedom in the World 2000-2001, www.freedomhouse.org/ article/new-study-details-islamic-worlds-demo cracy-deficit. For coverage, see Verena Dobnik, “Annual study shows freedom gap between Islamic countries and rest of world,” The As- sociated Press, Dec. 18, 2001. 24 Quoted in Dobnik, op. cit. 25 “Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations,” United Nations Development Programme/Arab

About the Author Associate Editor Kenneth Jost graduated from Harvard College and Georgetown University Law Center. He is the author of the Supreme Court Yearbook and The Supreme Court from A to Z (both CQ Press). He was a member of the CQ Researcher team that won the American Bar Association’s 2002 Silver Gavel Award. His previous reports include “Un- derstanding Islam” (2006) and a series of regional re- ports on democratization, including “Democracy and the Arab World” (2004). He also writes the blog Jost on Justice (http://jostonjustice.blogspot.com).

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UNREST IN THE ARAB WORLD

Fund for Social and Economic Development, www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ ahdr2002e.pdf. For coverage, see Barbara Cros- sette, “Study Warns of Stagnation in Arab So- cieties,” The New York Times, July 2, 2002, p. A11; Karen DeYoung, “Arab Report Cites De- velopment Obstacles,” The Washington Post, July 2, 2002, p. A10. 26 For timelines in the following summaries, see www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/ world/egypt-protest-timeline/index.html. See also individual chapters in Noueihed and Warren, op. cit. 27 For a well-organized, updated guide to events and issues in Egypt, see Carnegie En- dowment for International Peace, “Guide to Egypt’s Transition, http://egyptelections.carnegie endowment.org/. Background on political par- ties drawn from this source. 28 See David D. Kirkpatrick, “Deadly Riots Erupt on Anniversary of Egypt Revolt,” The New York Times, Jan. 26, 2013, p. A1, www.nytimes. com/2013/01/26/world/middleeast/tens-of- thousands-fill-tahrir-square-on-anniversary-of- egyptian-revolt.html. 29 See Abigail Hauslohner, “Egypt’s anti-Islamists lack cohesion,” The Washington Post, Jan. 22, 2013, p. A4, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 2013-01-21/world/36472981_1_islamists-parlia mentary-elections-liberal-al-wafd-party. 30 “Human Rights Watch: Tunisia,” www.hrw. org/middle-eastn-africa/tunisia (visited Jan. 25, 2013). See also Tarek Amara, “Tunisia’s ruling coalition agrees to hold elections next June,” Reuters, Oct. 14, 2012, www.itv.com/news/ update/2012-10-14/tunisias-ruling-coalition- agrees-to-hold-elections-next-june/. 31 Bouazza Ben Bouazza and Paul Schemm, “Violence plagues Tunisia’s politics 2 years later,” The Associated Press, Jan. 14, 2013, http://big story.ap.org/article/violence-plagues-tunisias- politics-2-years-later. 32“Libya,” www.freedomhouse.org/report/free dom-world/2013/libya. See also “Human Rights in Libya,” Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/ middle-eastn-africa/libya. 33 See two articles by Kareem Fahim in The New York Times: “Loyalist to Dominate Jor- dan’s New Parliament,” Jan. 25, 2013, p. A11; “Despite Boycott, More Than Half of Voters Are Said to Turn Out in Jordan Election,” Jan. 24, 2013, p. A6; and Taylor Luck, “Jor- danian officials claim vote turnout as a victo- ry,” The Washington Post, Jan. 24, 2013, p. A6. 34 For ongoing coverage, see these sites: Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/middle- eastn-africa/syria; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, http://syriahr.com/en/.

35 For background, see John Felton, “Child Soldiers,” CQ Global Researcher, July 2008, pp. 183-211. 36 “Assad will stay in power ‘even if Damascus is destroyed,’ ” Middle East Monitor, Jan. 23, 2013, www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle- east/5060-assad-says-he-will-stay-in-power-q even-if-damascus-is-destroyedq. 37 See “Syrian opposition fails to form tran- sitional government,” Reuters, Jan. 21, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/21/us-syria- crisis-opposition-idUSBRE90J0EW20130121. 38 See, e.g., Kelly McEvers, “Jihadi Fighters Win Hearts and Mind by Easing Bread Crisis,” NPR, Jan. 16, 2013, www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/ 01/18/169516308/as-syrian-rebels-reopen-baker ies-bread-crisis-starts-to-ease. 39 See Reem Khalifa, “Bahrain bans all protest gatherings amid violence,” The Associated Press, Oct. 30, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ bahrain-bans-all-protest-gatherings-amid-vio lence; and subsequent AP dispatches. 40 See Brian Murphy, “Gulf rulers take sharp- er aim at Web dissent,” The Associated Press, Jan. 9, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/gulf-

rulers-take-sharper-aim-web-dissent. For back- ground, see Jennifer Koons, “Future of the Gulf States,” CQ Global Researcher, Nov. 1, 2011, pp. 525-548. 41 www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/04/qatar-poet-s- conviction-violates-free-expression; www.hrw. org/news/2012/07/21/oman-drop-cases-against- online-activists. 42 Samir Kassir, Being Arab (English translation, 2004), published same year in French as Con- siderations sur le malheur arabe. The open- ing sentence, quoted in text, uses the French word facile (easy); the translator substituted the English word “pleasant.” 43 See Rashid Abul-Samh, “Saudi women on Shura Council,” Al-Ahram Weekly, Jan. 16, 2013; Neil MacFarquhar, “Saudi Monarch Grants Women Right to Vote,” The New York Times, Sept. 26, 2011, p. A1. For background, see Sarah Glazer, “Women’s Rights,” CQ Global Researcher, April 3, 2012, pp. 153-180. 44 “The Arab Spring: Unfinished Business,” Carnegie Council on International Ethics, June 27, 2012, www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/ multimedia/20120627/index.html.

FOR MORE INFORMATION Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20036; 202-483-7600; www.ceip.org. Foreign-policy think tank promoting active international engagement by the United States and increased cooperation among nations.

Council on Foreign Relations, 58 E. 68th St., New York, NY 10065; 212-434-9400; www.cfr.org. Nonprofit think tank specializing in U.S. foreign policy and interna- tional affairs.

Freedom House, 1301 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036; 202-296-5101; www.freedomhouse.org. Publishes annual report on the status of freedom, political rights and civil liberties worldwide.

Human Rights Watch, 350 Fifth Ave., 34th Floor, New York, NY 10118; 212-290- 4700; www.hrw.org. Conducts research and advocates for human rights in the Middle East and other regions.

International Crisis Group, 149 Avenue Louise, Level 24, B-1050 Brussels, Bel- gium; +32-2-502-90-38; www.crisisgroup.org. Non-governmental organization com- mitted to preventing and resolving conflict worldwide.

Middle East Institute, 1761 N St., N.W., Washington, DC 20036; 202-785-1141; www.mei.edu. Promotes a greater understanding of Middle East issues among the American public.

Project on Middle East Democracy, 1611 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20009; 202-828-9660; www.pomed.org. Examines how democra- cies can develop in the Middle East and how the United States can best support the democratic process.

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L St., N.W., Suite 1050, Wash- ington, DC 20036; 202-452-0650; www.washingtoninstitute.org. Promotes policies that advance American interests in the Middle East.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Feb. 1, 2013 129www.cqresearcher.com

Selected Sources

Bibliography Books

Ajami, Fouad, The Syrian Rebellion, Hoover Institution Press, 2012. A senior fellow at the Hoover Institution traces Syria’s his- tory from the rise of the Assad family through the current civil war. Includes source notes.

Cook, Steven A., The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, Council on Foreign Relations/Oxford University Press, 2011. A senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations chron- icles modern Egypt’s major historical episodes, from the de- cline of British rule and Nasser’s rise as a pan-Arab leader to the Sadat and Mubarak eras and the demonstrations at Tahrir Square that overthrew an entrenched regime. Includes detailed notes, 40-page bibliography.

Gelvin, James L., The Arab Uprising: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press, 2012. A professor of Middle East history uses a convenient question- and-answer format to explain the origins of and prospects for the current uprisings in Arab countries. Includes source notes, further readings, websites. Gelvin is also author of The Modern Middle East: A History (3d. ed., Oxford University Press, 2011).

Haas, Mark L., and David W. Lesch (eds.), The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East, Westview Press, 2012. A collection of 12 essays explores the course of events in major countries affected or unaffected by the Arab uprisings and the regional and international implications of the events. Haas is an associate professor of political science at Duquesne University, Lesch a professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in Texas.

Lesch, David W., Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad, Yale University Press, 2012. A professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in Texas details the gradual shift in the popular view of Presi- dent Bashar Assad from hopeful reformer at the start of his tenure to repressive tyrant. Includes detailed notes.

Miller, Laurel E., et al., Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe, RAND Corp., 2012. Researchers from RAND Corp., a global policy think tank, compare the most recent uprisings in the Arab world with past revolutions in Europe and the Americas. Includes notes, detailed list of references.

Noueihed, Lin, and Alex Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making

of a New Era, Yale University Press, 2012. The book explores the origins of the current Arab upris- ings; the course of events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria; and the likely nature of future Arab poli- tics. Includes detailed notes, brief bibliography and source list. Noueihed is a Reuters editor based in London; Warren is a director of Frontier, a Middle East and North Africa con- sultancy, also based in London.

Osman, Tarek, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak, Yale University Press, 2011. An analysis of the past five decades of Egyptian politics explains the growth of Arab nationalism in the country amid deep religious and economic divisions in the Egyptian popu- lation. Osman, whose work has appeared in numerous in- ternational news outlets, attended American University in Cairo and Bocconi University in Italy.

Articles

Berman, Sheri, “The Promise of the Arab Spring,” For- eign Affairs, 2013, www.foreignaffairs.com/print/135730. An associate professor of political science at Columbia Uni- versity’s Barnard College compares Western countries’ past re- sponses to transitioning from autocracy to democracy to the cur- rent problems faced by Arab countries with authoritarian regimes.

Jones, Seth, “The Mirage of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs, 2013, www.foreignaffairs.com/print/135731. A senior political scientist at the RAND Corp. warns that it remains difficult for Arab countries overthrowing unpopular governments to establish political stability and therefore should not be burdened by Western pressure to form democracies.

Reports and Studies

“Freedom in the World 2013,” Freedom House, Jan. 16, 2013, www.freedomhouse.org/event/upcoming-event- freedom-world-2013-launch. This annual report by a non-government organization that advocates for democracy, political freedom and human rights ranks the status of political freedom in countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

On the Web A compilation of “the best of the Arab blogs” can be

found here, www.al-bab.com/arab/blogs.htm, on a web- site, al-Bab, founded in 1998 by Brian Whitaker, a free- lance journalist who formerly served as Middle East edi- tor for the British newspaper The Guardian. Whitaker says his site is intended to introduce non-Arabs to the Arab world. The site includes individual pages on the 22 members of the League of Arab States and a compilation of general, topical and individual country blogs.

130 CQ Researcher

Syria

Adams, Simon, “The World’s Next Genocide,” The New York Times, Nov. 16, 2012, p. A35, www.nytimes.com/ 2012/11/16/opinion/the-worlds-next-genocide.html?_r=0. A backlash aimed at Syria’s Alawite community by the country’s sectarian rebels could result in the world’s next genocide, says a former U.S. diplomat.

Ganley, Elaine, “Paris Urges Syrian Opposition to Stop Extremists,” The Associated Press, Jan. 28, 2013, www. huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20130128/syria-diplomacy/ ?utm_hp_ref=homepage&ir=homepage. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius has urged 50 countries to support Syria through humanitarian aid and political goodwill.

Krull, John, “From Heartland Comes Wish for Peace in Syria,” The Herald-Times (Ind.), Dec. 23, 2012, www.herald timesonline.com/stories/2012/12/23/digitalcity.from-heart land-comes-wish-for-peace-in-syria.sto. A woman whose parents fled Syria describes the violent, daily struggles her family faced before leaving.

LaFranchi, Howard, “War Crimes in Syria: Time to Ap- peal to International Criminal Court?” The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 14, 2013, www.csmonitor.com/USA/ Foreign-Policy/2013/0114/War-crimes-in-Syria-Time-to- appeal-to-International-Criminal-Court. Fifty-seven countries have signed a letter urging the Unit- ed Nations to ask the International Criminal Court to in- vestigate war crimes and crimes against humanity after re- ports of escalating sexual violence by Syrian military leaders and rebels in the past year.

Laurence, Norman, “Turkey: No-Fly Zone Not Only Op- tion in Syria,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 23, 2013, online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732353980457 8259462086004542.html?mod=googlenews_wsj. There are several alternatives to a no-fly zone over Syria to stop the Assad regime’s aerial attacks on Syrian cities, says Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

Morello, Carol, “Surge in Syrian Death Toll Predicted,” The Washington Post, Dec. 31, 2012, p. A7, articles.wash ingtonpost.com/2012-12-30/world/36071168_1_syria- peace-envoy-free-syrian-army-homs. The death toll from the Syrian conflict could reach 100,000 if a peace agreement is not reached, says U.N. special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi.

Mourtada, Hania, and Hwaida Saad, “Syrian North Sees Increase In Violence,” The New York Times, Jan. 12, 2013, p. A8, www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/world/middle east/syrian-violence.html.

Violence in northern Syria is escalating as the country’s army has begun a new offensive against rebels in Idlib and Aleppo.

Parker, Ned, “Syrian Journalists Caught in the Middle of Conflict,” Los Angeles Times, Jan. 6, 2013, p. A3, articles. latimes.com/2013/jan/05/world/la-fg-syria-journalists- 20130106. Escalating violence in Syria is increasingly targeting jour- nalists because they can easily spread propaganda to the in- ternational community.

U.S. Military Intervention

Bellinger, John B., “Aiding Syria: Easier Said Than Done,” The Washington Post, Jan. 18, 2013, p. A19, articles.wash ingtonpost.com/2013-01-17/opinions/36410395_1_syrian- opposition-assad-regime-intervention. U.S. military intervention in Syria will require both moral and international legal justification for providing military aid to the country’s rebels, says a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Fryer-Biggs, Zachary, “NATO Allies Might Be Unprepared for Syria,” Defense News (Va.), Dec. 17, 2012, www.de fensenews.com/article/20121217/DEFREG01/312170002/ NATO-Allies-Might-Unprepared-Syria. Military supplies for NATO troops provided by Western countries may not be sufficient to fight against the Syrian military’s array of weapons staged in densely populated areas.

Halaby, Jamal, “Jordan: US Forces Plan Shield Against Syria,” The Associated Press, Oct. 11, 2012, www.huffing tonpost.com/huff-wires/20121011/ml-jordan-us/. U.S. special operations forces have been sent to Jordan to help protect civilians from a possible attack from Syria.

Kayyem, Juliette, “Syria Intervention Would be U.S.- Owned,” The Boston Globe, Aug. 13, 2012, p. A11, www. bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/08/16/ekayyem/Cw5fAe FsrpkAtRc37GLu2M/story.html. The United States would lead the way for a Syrian regime change if President Obama opts to intervene in the coun- try’s civil war, says a foreign policy columnist and Harvard professor.

Rubin, Trudy, “Worldview: U.S. Still Refusing to Aid Rebels,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 9, 2012, p. D1, articles.philly.com/2012-12-10/news/35707591_1_syrian- support-group-aid-rebels-muslim-rebels. Syrian rebels are recruiting from Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar because the United States is reluctant to provide direct military aid, says a columnist.

Tilghman, Andrew, “Panetta: Syria Too Risky for U.S.

The Next Step: Additional Articles from Current Periodicals

Feb. 1, 2013 131www.cqresearcher.com

Military,” Army Times, April 30, 2012, p. 12. Military intervention in Syria is too risky for the U.S. mili- tary because little is known about the country’s opposition forces, says Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.

Islamist Groups

Alami, Mona, “Islamist Groups Gain Prominence in Syria,” USA Today, Dec. 14, 2012, p. A21, www.usatoday.com/story/ news/world/2012/12/13/syria-bombing-assad/1766029/. The Free Syrian Army is joining forces with jihadist groups to fight government forces.

Dehghanpisheh, Babak, “Syrian Rebels, Led by Islamists, Capture Key Military Air Base,” The Washington Post, Jan. 12, 2013, p. A7, articles.washingtonpost.com/2013- 01-11/world/36272269_1_base-in-idlib-province-air-base- taftanaz-airport. The jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra helped rebels capture a strategic Syrian air base in Idlib province.

Ghanem, Mohammed A., “Taking Syria from the ex- tremists,” The Washington Post, Dec. 28, 2012, p.A21, articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-27/opinions/3603 0658_1_aleppo-syrian-security-forces-free-syrian-army. Jabhat al-Nusra, a jihadist group with links to al-Qaeda, has been expanding by recruiting Free Syrian Army troops.

Hauslohner, Abigail, “Weapons, Fighters from Libyan War May Be at Root of Regional Unrest,” The Washington Post, Jan. 19, 2013, p. A8, articles.washingtonpost.com/ 2013-01-18/world/36474835_1_libyan-weapons-libyan- rebels-libyan-conflict. Insurgencies by armed Islamist groups in Mali and Algeria high- light NATO’s mishandling of weapons from the Libyan civil war.

Kennedy, Elizabeth A., “Syrian Islamists Reject Western- Backed Opposition,” The Associated Press, Nov. 19, 2012, bigstory.ap.org/article/syrian-islamist-groups-reject- opposition-coalition. Islamist factions within Syria’s rebel groups have declared an intention to establish an Islamic state within Syria.

Egypt

Gordon, J.D., “Egypt Will Set Course for Middle East,” The Washington Times, Nov. 29, 2012, p. B1, www.wash ingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/29/egypt-will-set-course- for-middle-east/?page=all. The United States must cease financial support to President Morsi’s new government until he provides full freedom to Egypt’s religious minorities, says a retired U.S. Navy commander.

Hendawi, Hamza, “Egypt: Opposition Rejects President’s Dialogue,” The Associated Press, Jan. 27, 2013, news. yahoo.com/egypt-opposition-rejects-presidents-dialogue- 133139215.html.

Egypt’s main opposition group, the National Salvation Front, won’t meet with Morsi until its demands are acknowledged.

Hiel, Betsy, “Pledge of U.S. Funds Unsettles Egyptians,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Jan. 7, 2013, triblive.com/us- world/2733794-74/brotherhood-egypt-egyptian-aid-ameri can-political-liberals-democracy-funding-obama#axzz2IM TO1wvz. Liberal Egyptians are concerned about threats to democra- tization as the United States continues to provide military funding to the regime of President Mohammed Morsi.

Lynch, Sarah, “Copts Seek a Voice in Egypt’s Unrest,” USA Today, April 12, 2012, p. A8, usatoday30.usatoday.com/ NEWS/usaedition/2012-04-12-Egyptian-garbage-pickers_ ST_U.htm. Coptic Christians, who make up about 10 percent of Egypt’s population, fear that the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated group drafting Egypt’s constitution will marginalize religious minorities.

Rothkopf, David, “The Urgency of Now Makes a Case for Short-Term Thinking,” [Saint Paul,Minn.] Pioneer Press, Dec. 16, 2012, www.twincities.com/opinion/ci_222099 31/david-rothkopf-urgency-now-makes-case-short-term. The United States must be wary of providing long-term military assistance to extremist-led governments such as Egypt’s, says the editor-at-large of Foreign Policy.

Scarborough, Rowan, “Muslim Brotherhood Inherits U.S. War Gear: Military Buildup Could Backfire,” The Wash- ington Times, Dec. 7, 2012, p. A1, www.washingtontimes. com/news/2012/dec/6/muslim-brotherhood-inherits-us-war- gear/?page=all. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government is due to receive a large supply of heavy weapons, including 200 M1A1 Abrams tanks, from the United States.

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