

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/2c1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/a32e1c95-125f-4d03-8ccb-23aad8d905b5

Page Header: eBook: Organized Crime

Navigation: Quick Tour, Print, Search, Annotations, Accessibility, Bookmark

Table of Contents (Left):

- Cover
- Title
- Statement
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime
- Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Defining "Organized Crime"
- The Structure of Organized Crime
- Franchise/Credentiaing
- Criminal Networks and Brokers
- Transnational Organized Crime

Chapter 1: Introduction to Organized Crime

CHAPTER 1 WILL ENABLE THE READER TO UNDERSTAND:

- The problem of defining organized crime
- The characteristics of organized crime
- Salient features of a bureaucracy
- The concepts of franchising and credentialing
- The importance of points of convergence
- The features of a criminal network
- The role of a broker in criminal endeavors
- Transnational organized crime
- Similarities and differences between organized crime and terrorism
- The connection between organized crime and terrorism

Introduction to Organized Crime

Organized crime—it's what it is? How can we distinguish organized crime from groups of criminals who, although they may be organized, do not fit the phenomenon we are addressing in this book? So what is it? What is organized crime?

It's not terrorism; it's not street gangs—topics we will address later in this chapter. The "criminality of persons in organized crime differs from that of conventional criminals because their organization allows them to commit crimes of a different variety (labor racketeering, for example) and on a larger scale (smuggling plane-loads of cocaine, for example) than their less organized colleagues" (Moore 1987: 51). Organization permits a scope of activities unavailable to conventional criminals, while providing a vehicle for criminal interaction and coordination on a regional, national, and international level.

Copyright 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights, some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.

Page 1 / 434

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/2c1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/639e65a0-29a7-4344-893d-16ad1c397cab

Page Header: eBook: Organized Crime

Navigation: Quick Tour, Print, Search, Annotations, Accessibility, Bookmark

Table of Contents (Left):

- Cover
- Title
- Statement
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime
- Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Defining "Organized Crime"
- The Structure of Organized Crime
- Franchise/Credentiaing
- Criminal Networks and Brokers
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Organized Crime and Terrorism
- Summary of Chapter 1
- Review Questions for Chapter 1
- Ch 2: Explanations for Organized Crime
- Ch 3: United States
- Ch 4: Italy and Albania
- Ch 5: Colombia and Mexico
- Ch 6: Russia and the Former

Chapter 1: Introduction to Organized Crime

2 CHAPTER 1

DEFINING "ORGANIZED CRIME"

The criminal organizations examined in this book have historical origins that date back many decades, if not centuries. In contrast, as far as we know, the gang headed by Jose James was devoid of global connections, their crime portfolio limited to bank and train robbery, and they failed to survive Jose's death in 1882. While there is a great deal of discussion about organized crime groups and their activities, a review of the subject in law enforcement and academic literature reveals it is difficult to determine what exactly is being discussed (Lowe 2002). Indeed, the Federal Organized Crime Act of 1970 (which contains the RICO section discussed in later chapters) fails to define the subject of its concern. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines organized crime "as any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locale, region, or the country as a whole." The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Article 2(a)) states that an "organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with the Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit."

Although there is no generally accepted definition of organized crime, there are a number of characteristics identified by law enforcement agencies and researchers as indicative of the phenomenon. Offering them has a practical dimension: they provide a basis for determining if a particular group of criminals constitutes organized crime and, therefore, needs to be addressed in a way different from the way one would approach terrorists or groups of conventional criminals or a group of persons that form the immediate component of a single offense.

Organized crime:

- Is devoid of political goals
- Is hierarchical
- Has a limited or exclusive membership
- Constitutes a unique subculture
- Perpetrates itself
- Exhibits a willingness to use illegal violence
- Is monopolistic
- Is governed by explicit rules and regulations

Let us examine each of these characteristics.

1. *Absence of political goals.* The goal of an organized crime group are money and power whose procurement is not limited by legal or moral concerns. An organized crime group is not motivated by social doctrine, political beliefs, or ideological concerns. While political involvement may be part of the group's activities, the purpose is usually to gain protection or immunity for its illegal activities. This distinguishes organized crime from groups of persons who are organized and violating the law to further their political agenda, such as autonomist or terrorist groups. Organized crime members are not potential suicide bombers. Indeed, they typically find terrorism inconceivable. Why would anyone take extreme risks without the prospect of personal financial gain? Why confront authorities instead of evading or corrupting them? (Bovenkerk and Chakra 2004). But a criminal group with a political agenda may mature into organized crime.

A group whose primary goal is political or ideological may consider their mission no longer relevant and, rather than disband, become an organized crime group. A group, or simply some of its members, may find personal and pecuniary goals outweighing ideology and drift across the amorphous divide between political and organized crime, for example, groups in Northern Ireland supporting loyalist and opposing republican British rule, or Marxist guerrillas in Latin America. Like cars that can run on gas or electricity, a criminal organization may also be a hybrid that is, combine pecuniary crime with ideologically driven

Page 2 / 434

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/054ea53f-e916-4f2c-ae0f-6c0443d1d36

Page title: eBook: Organized Crime

Page content:

INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZED CRIME 3

behavior (Dishman 2005) as seen with criminal organizations originating in the Chechya region of the former Soviet Union.

2. *Hierarchical*. An organized crime group has a vertical power structure with at least three permanent ranks—not just a leader and follower—each with authority over the level beneath. The authority is inherent in the position and does not depend on who happens to be occupying it at any given time. However, as we shall see, the structure of some criminal organizations is flexible, changing with the nature of the enterprise in which they are currently engaged. In some criminal organizations, the power structure is primarily that of a traditional familial hierarchy.

3. *Limited or exclusive membership*. An organized crime group significantly limits membership. Qualifications may include ethnic background, kinship, criminal record, or similar considerations. Those who meet the basic qualifications for membership usually require a sponsor, typically a ranking member, and must also prove qualified for membership by their behavior—for example, willingness to commit criminal acts, obey rules, follow orders, and maintain secrets. There is a period of apprenticeship that may range from several months to several years. If the group is to remain viable, there must be considerably more persons who desire membership than the organized crime group is willing to accept. Exclusivity of membership serves to indicate that belonging is indeed something to be valued.

While membership can refer to being part of a specific group, such as the Genovese Family or the Hill's Angels, it can also entail a more amorphous attachment to a criminal network (and/or networks) such as that which characterizes much Russian organized crime in the United States (discussed in Chapter 6). Membership indicators include bonding rituals such as initiation ceremonies and distinctive group signs on clothing, jewelry, and tattoos. In the absence of specific indicators, the question of membership can be viewed subjectively: Does the person view himself as being part of a particular criminal organization? Do others in the criminal underworld recognize the person as part of a criminal organization?

Membership provides a basis for *solidarity*, discussed later.

In British Columbia, electronic surveillance revealed the well-established Hill's Angels (HA) expressing concern over a loosely organized criminal group called the "LNU," in its United Nations, an apparent reference to its diverse membership. The HA wanted to know if the LNU had any specific identifying markers, such as jackets or tattoos, indicating membership. If they did, in the opinion of the HA, that would make the LNU a more formidable competitor in the drug business. A LNU logo eventually appeared on clothing and jewelry of members with a motto: "Honor, Loyalty, and Respect." In 2009, the founder of the LNU was sentenced in a Seattle federal court to thirty years' imprisonment for a massive cross-border drug trafficking operation.

4. *Creates a unique subculture*. Members of organized crime frequently view themselves as distinct from conventional society, which they typically view with derision if not contempt, and therefore not subject to its rules. A group structured around values, not necessarily criminal, dynamics (e.g., military, athletic) may develop into a criminal organization when members come to realize that the application of their resources, such as instrumental violence, offers a source of considerable income.

There is a "chicken-or-the-egg, which came first" dimension. For example, during Prohibition (1920–1933), did a criminal subculture develop around bootlegging, or did members of an existing criminal subculture enter the trade? On both. In either case, a subcultural base provides the flexibility necessary for criminals to switch enterprises. For example, after repeal of Prohibition, bootleggers moved to drug trafficking and labor racketeering.

5. *Perpetual staff*. An organized crime group constitutes an ongoing conspiracy designed to persist through time that is beyond the life of the current membership. The members assume permanence, and this provides an important basis for attracting qualified persons, thus perpetuating the group's existence. The strength of this attribute often depends on the depth of the subcultural

Navigation: Previous page, Defining "Organized Crime", Next page, The Structure of Organized Crime

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/30d87033-f9c8-465b-a08a-58149c5cca8a

Page title: eBook: Organized Crime

Page content:

CHAPTER 1

orientation manifested by the group. Donald Cressey (1969: 263) states that in order for an organized crime group to survive, it must have "an institutionalized process for inducting new members and inculcating them with the values and ways of behaving of the social system." American Mafia groups in most cities ceased to be viable when they could no longer interest young males of Italian heritage to enter their ranks, while the outlaw biker subculture remains strong, providing sufficient numbers to ensure continuity.

Membership, subculture, and perpetuity are intertwined: perpetuity is strengthened when membership is accompanied by initiation rites and symbols, such as tattoos and clothing with the organization's logo, the death head of the Hill's Angels, for example.

6. *Willingness to use illegal violence*. In an organized crime group, violence is a readily available and routinely accepted resource. Access to private violence is an important dimension that allows the group to actively pursue its goals. The use of violence is not restricted by ethical considerations but counseled only by practical limitations.

7. *Monopoly*. An organized crime group exercises competition. It strives for hegemony over a particular geographic area (a metropolitan area or section of a city), a particular "industry" (legitimate or illegitimate (for example, gambling, drug trafficking), or a combination of both (for example, bootlegging in a particular area or the wholesale cocaine market in a city). A monopoly, of course, restrains "free trade" and increases profits. An organized crime monopoly is maintained by violence, by the threat of violence, or by corrupt relationships with law enforcement officials. A combination of both methods, violence and corruption, may be employed.

Although an organized crime group may strive for a monopoly, this may not be possible given the nature of competing groups or the type of industry, for example, drug trafficking. In 1995, when Maurice ("Moose") Boscher, head of Nevada's chapter of the Montreal Hill's Angels, attempted to assert control over the city's drug market, he encountered a serious impediment—Vito Rizzuto, a Bonanno

crime Family captain with his own midwestern Montreal crew. Given the danger of conflict, Boscher chose diplomacy and negotiated a deal with Rizzuto (Lamothe and Humphreys 2006). Rizzuto died of (apparently) natural causes in 2013 and his brother is serving a life sentence for ordering the murder of two correction officers.

Moreover, territoriality is more closely associated with localized rather than the broader reach of transnational criminal organizations (Reuter and Posen 1999). In Chapter 5, for example, we will examine Mexican organizations that, although associated with a particular geographic area (for instance, the "Juarez cartel"), do not expend resources defending geographic hegemony; they do use extreme violence to assert control over transshipment points—ports.

8. *Governed by rules*. Like any legitimate organization, an organized crime group has a set of rules that members are expected to obey. In organized crime, however, a rule-violating member is not fired but, more likely, fined or imprisoned.

If we were forced to limit a definition to only two characteristics, they would be nonideological and instrumental violence.

These characteristics are arrayed in a structure that enables the criminal organization to achieve its goals—money and power. A criminal group will pass through stages of development (Gottschalk 2009), and, if sufficiently stable, at some point mature into an organization with more, if not all, of these characteristics. A number of criminal organizations have many of the characteristics that have been discussed. Some are domestic, while most examined in this book are transnational in scope or have global ties. Some have links to terrorism.

THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Criminal organization can manifest a variety of structures, ranging from bureaucracy to a group sharing some combination of kinship, friendship, and ethnicity/culture, characteristics that provide

Navigation: Previous page, Next page

ways likely to attract law enforcement attention, to which they may respond by becoming informants (Varcoe 2011).

A criminal organization structured along bureaucratic lines has inherent weaknesses:

1. Communication from top management to operational-level personnel can be intercepted.
2. Generating and maintaining written records enlarges the entire organization.
3. Successful infiltration at the upper level can jeopardize the entire organization.
4. Death or incapacitation of command personnel can leave dangerous gaps in operations.
5. The absence of personal ties makes betrayal more likely. This explains why, in contrast to the bureaucratic ideal, criminal organizations generally prize loyalty over competence.

Many aspects of bureaucracy are impractical for criminal organizations because they must be concerned with the very real possibility that communications are being monitored. The use of the telephone must be limited solely to arrange for in-person meetings, and written communication is to be avoided. Information, as well as orders, money, and other goods, is more secure when transmitted on an intimate, face-to-face basis. Lengthy chains of command, a characteristic of modern bureaucracy, are impractical for criminal organizations, and the length the span of control. Randall Collins (1975) points out that control is a special problem for which bureaucracies develop to overcome. Joseph Althus (1971: 265) notes that the bureaucratic model would be a relatively easy target to move against: "All that would be necessary to destroy it would be to remove its top echelon." The need to exercise effective command and control over a far-flung criminal enterprise "is the feature that law enforcement can use against them, turning their strength into a weakness. The communications structure of international organized crime operating in the United States is, therefore, the prime target for drug law enforcement" (Marshall 1999: 5).

Compartmentalization. These deficiencies can be offset by the use of a compartmentalized form

CHAPTER 1

Central command: Located in a relatively safe haven, the central command oversees and coordinates operations through the controllers.

Controller: Responsible for overall operations of the several cells within a region, the controller reports to central command via cell phone or Internet.

Cell: Comprehension units within cells with about ten members, each operating independently—members of one cell typically do not know members of other cells. Operating within a geographic area, the head of each cell reports directly to a controller.

FIGURE 1.1 Compartmentalized Criminal Organization

of bureaucracy (see Figure 1.1), wherein persons at the operational level are organized into cells and know only other members of their cell. In some criminal organizations, cell members may not even know for whom they are working. If a cell is lost as the result of law enforcement infiltration, for example, the organization can continue to function uninterrupted and the cell is eventually replaced. Cells are handled under the direction of a controller who is not in direct contact with and may not even know the other controllers. A controller who is lost is quickly replaced by the central command operating out of an area of relative safety, such as another country.

A criminal organization can manifest a bureaucratic structure with ranks and levels of authority, while economic activities may be divorced from the formal structure. In such cases, every member of the organization represents a dot on the "company chart" while their business activities are independent, conducted solo or in partnership with members and nonmember associates, and not dependent on the formal structure. In these instances, the member is an independent entrepreneur who may have financial and other obligations to the organization—for example, aiding members in conflict with outsiders—but his income-generating activities are not under direction of the hierarchy. He enjoys a *franchise*, a grant of authority to engage in business activity under the aegis of the organization, such as the Hill's Angels or the Gambino Family. Peter Gottschalk (2009: 63) refers to this as the "dark side of entrepreneurship."

FRANCHISE/CREDENTIALING

Franchise provides a sense of entitlement and entitlement that enables the possessor to engage in criminal activity knowing that he will be supported and protected by the franchise—the criminal organization granting the franchise. He will be protected from

Navigation: New Tab | Ebooks - Webreader.io | My Account | Library Browsable | Twelfth Edition | My Home | Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/a10156c8-4f46-4269-b186-833c89e473cd

eBook: Organized Crime

- Cover
- Title
- Statement
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime
- Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Defining "Organized Crime"
- The Structure of Organized Crime
- Franchise/Credentialed
- Criminal Networks and Brokers
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Organized Crime and Terrorism
- Summary of Chapter 1
- Review Questions for Chapter 1
- Ch 2: Explanations for Organized Crime
- Ch 3: United States
- Ch 4: Italy and Albania
- Ch 5: Colombia and Mexico
- Ch 6: Russia and the Former

Jump to Page: 7 / 434

eBook: Organized Crime

INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZED CRIME 7

other criminals and have access to the network in which the organization is embedded. He will be able to traverse the criminal underworld in relative safety.

Criminals who are part of a recognizable (by other criminals) organization have the credentials necessary to negotiate transactions those without an organizational affiliation would find difficult if not impossible to accomplish. Some organizations use "trademarks" to confirm membership, such as the death head logo of the Hell's Angels, which is in fact a registered trademark. Unauthorized use of a trademark can be punishable removal of a death head tattoo or even fatal. Russian *vey* and Japanese *yakuza* use similar trademarks.

In the dangerous and anarchic world of crime, organizational affiliation provides a form of credentialed reputation, encouraging networking that facilitates cooperation between criminals that might not otherwise occur. The willingness of criminals to cooperate requires a level of trust that can explain the need for bonding ritual used by groups as diverse as the Mafia, Irish, *vey*, and online history-of-films (see Lampe and Johnson 2004). Goodwilling promotes business relationships between criminals who do not enjoy a history of interaction, locally, for example, members of outlaw motorcycle clubs and the Sicilian Mafia or globally, for example, the Mexican Mafia and Latin American drug cartels.

In the Hobbesian world inhabited by criminals, the member of an organization with sufficient martial capacity—the *rule of a bad reputation*—can offer services typically reserved for government, such as contract enforcement and adjudication of disputes. Indeed, the degree of sophistication characterizing a criminal organization can be measured by the degree to which members provide contact and

CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND BROKERS

abatement services to criminals and sometimes legitimate entrepreneurs looking for a wider, more reliable form of justice. In places where the legal system places onerous burdens on plaintiffs, such as Russia and Japan, the collection of legitimate debts is frequently contracted out to members of criminal organizations whose reputation for violence can expedite the collection process.

Credentialed also permits members of a criminal organization to enforce extrajudicial social norms ranging from restraining antisocial behavior to requiring a young man to marry the young lady he impregnated. In Chicago, when the police failed to adequately respond to complaints about reckless driving by young men in the Grand Avenue neighborhood, several residents went to see their neighbor "Judge" Jerry Joseph ("The Clown") Lombardo. The ranking member of the Chiots received the problem with a few carefully chosen words to the young men. In Bethel, Colorado, a gang of students was harassing the son of a female friend of a member of the Hell's Angels at his high school. Wearing the full regalia of the Hell's Angels, the member visited the school and explained there was a choice: the principal could do something about the matter or the Hell's Angels would. The principal saw for the gang members, whom he introduced to the Hell's Angels. The harassment quickly ended.

VALUE OF A BAD REPUTATION

Police in Vancouver, Canada, in a surveillance van watched a line of parked motorcycles outside a bar. Some bikes had the logo of the Hell's Angels and on one of those sat a fat wallet with a broken chain attached. They watched as people walked by, glanced at the bikes and the wallet, and moved on. Several hours later, when the owner of the bike appeared, the wallet was still there, undisturbed.

Navigation: Previous page | Franchise/Credentialed

Navigation: New Tab | Ebooks - Webreader.io | My Account | Library Browsable | Twelfth Edition | My Home | Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/8f082981-467c-4aa4-8b0e-92db5b19a1b1

eBook: Organized Crime

- Cover
- Title
- Statement
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime
- Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Defining "Organized Crime"
- The Structure of Organized Crime
- Franchise/Credentialed
- Criminal Networks and Brokers
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Organized Crime and Terrorism
- Summary of Chapter 1
- Review Questions for Chapter 1
- Ch 2: Explanations for Organized Crime
- Ch 3: United States
- Ch 4: Italy and Albania
- Ch 5: Colombia and Mexico
- Ch 6: Russia and the Former

Jump to Page: 8 / 434

eBook: Organized Crime

8 CHAPTER 1

of criminal groups to persons with marginal employment (e.g., bouncers at sex-oriented establishments, professional gamblers) to a variety of parts and full-time criminals with varying degrees of skill and success. There may be "knock-around" jobs who, while not routinely involved in crime, are not averse to criminal opportunity, such as trafficking in stolen property. The subcultural environment also contains persons who are ostensibly legitimate but enjoy frequenting places "on the wild side."

A criminal network has points of convergence where participants congregate. Some observers refer to these places as "ingest areas" (Anonika 2015). "Hangouts," or places that welcome their patronage—bars, restaurants, social clubs, nightclubs, gym—may be owned by or under the control of criminal entrepreneurs. Some locations may cater to a particular subculture, such as a "biker bar." While they were primarily a place for socialization, hangouts provide opportunity to advance business matters.

The subculture contains gaps between persons with complementary resources and information. They require a third party, a broker who, typically for remuneration, can fill the gap by constructing a "social bridge" and connecting otherwise isolated individuals (Sax 2008). The role of a broker is enhanced if he is properly credentialed and can thereby provide an umbrella of protection and act as a guarantor (akin to title insurance in real estate) for a transaction. Thus the New Jersey crime family captain remained outside of his house while the individual he had introduced (a thief with valuable merchandise and a businessman in a position to profitably dispose of the merchandise) negotiated. Each understood that they would be bound by whatever was agreed upon to do otherwise would raise the ire of the guarantor and likely be fatal.

"The difficulties identifying partners," notes Diego Gambetta (2009: 6), "keep much potential crime at bay. Making identification is arguably the most powerful deterrent against crime that the force of law brings about, by discouraging the countless dormant criminals who refrain from acting unduly for fear of being caught when searching or advertising." A person with information of value

Transnational Organized Crime

to professional burglars or hijackers, such as the employee of an insurance firm, a warehouse worker, or teenager with information about expensive electrical equipment, could not ordinarily make profitable use of this information. The credentialed criminal can serve as the "yellow pages," acting as a catalyst for a great deal of crime that in his absence is unlikely to occur.

Criminal network participants have ties to conventional persons, parents, siblings, other relatives, or neighbors. The criminal network strays into conventional society, linking the criminal and the legitimate, often via a broker with ties to both "worlds," as in this vignette from New York City:

He owned two factories, one modern and efficient, the other antiquated and a drain on his profits. Unable to sell the inefficient factory for a reasonable amount, he recognized that the best possible outcome would be for it to experience a fire for which he could collect insurance. But, he was a businessman, not an arsonist.

In a casual conversation with his employees' union representative, he expressed a wish for a factory fire. The rep replied that such wishes could be made to come true—was he interested? An affirmative reply set in motion a connection between the otherwise legitimate businessman and the criminal network of the union rep. He contacted a member of the Genovese crime family who through his network was able to provide a "touch," a professional arsonist. The scheme also required a professional burglar who could enable the arsonist to gain entrance into the factory without tripping an alarm. The Genovese member was able to turn up the arsonist with a professional burglar. While his imprimatur enabled the scheme, the Genovese member who made the referrals avoided direct contact with the criminal participants and left the businessman to explain their assignments. The factory burned to the ground leaving no evidence of arson, allowing its owner to collect insurance and pay an agreed upon fee to the participants, a percentage of which was given to the Genovese family boss, who played no role in the scheme.

Navigation: Previous page | Criminal Networks and Brokers

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/b14a41fc-f30b-40b8-af8a-080140beca03

Page 9: **TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME**

Transnational organized crime (TOC) refers to self-perpetuating criminal organizations operating across national boundaries. Their structure varies from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells, and may evolve into other structures. The crimes they commit also vary (National Security Council 2011).

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a pivotal historical event that intersected with the rapid expansion of global markets—money, goods and people have circulated with a regularity and facility which were once unthinkable. In both the developed and developing world, criminal organizations' scope of action and range of capabilities have undergone profound change (Violante 2000: x). Furthermore, note Roy Godson and William Owen (1995: 19), decline in political order and deteriorating economic circumstances have led to a growing underground economy that habituates people to working outside the legal framework. Easy access in arms, the massive flow of emigrants and refugees, and the normal difficulties involved in accomplishing meaningful international cooperation are working to the advantage of criminal organizations. And the "the of better-organized, internationally based criminal groups with vast financial resources is creating a new threat to the stability and security of international systems."

In the United States, Prohibition (1920–1933) acted as a catalyst for the unprecedented mobilization of criminal organizations and the cooperative ventures of syndication. The international trade in liquor altered the hierarchical scope of most criminal organizations, whetting the appetite for further innovative opportunities and forging the trade in heroin. The expanded capacity of contemporary criminal organizations derives from interconnection of goods traditionally traded by organized crime, in particular, drugs, arms, and sex workers. In each case, the country of destination is different from that of its origin. Commitments transcend national boundaries and even oceans. As in the case with legitimate trade, arrangements need to be made that involve the use of banks, finance houses, and customs formalities, and require ongoing relationships with criminal organizations of different countries. "These commercial necessities have created solid international relations between all of the most dangerous criminal organizations" (Violante 2000: xi). The new face of organized crime, notes Angela Patrigiani (2009: 65), "is increasingly similar to a transnational commercial company combining rigid hierarchies and territorial rooting with flexible structures that are easily adaptable to changing circumstances. Commercial speculation has been repudiated in favor of the simultaneous trade and supply of different categories of illegal goods and services."

Migration, legal or illegal, broadens the reach of existing criminal networks. Although most migrants, including many of those who enter their destination country illegally, are generally law abiding, among them are inevitably affiliates of a variety of criminal networks. "These people bring with them their crime-related skills and knowledge as well as their criminal contacts. Chinese, Nigerian, Italian and Mexican groups are well-known examples of network proliferation through migration" (UNODC 2016a: 34).

ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM

The globalization of organized crime created a nexus with terrorism. "In years past, TOC was largely regional in scope, hierarchically structured, and had only occasional links to terrorism. Today's criminal networks are fluid, striking new alliances with other networks around the world and engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, including cybercrime and providing support for terrorism" (National Security Council 2011: 3).

Just as there is no accepted definition of organized crime, terrorism also defies a universally accepted definition. Indeed, "many definitions of terrorism are, in fact, encoded political statements" (Combs 2003: 7). Title 22 of the United States Code section 2056(f), defines terrorism as "premeditated,

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/841dc3e3-2dc8-45ef-a3fd-451546fb732b

Page 10: **CHAPTER 1**

politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." The FBI defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

As opposed to organized crime, terrorism is inherently political, and as such it is relative to one's political view. Because the term is pejorative, terrorism is a label more likely to be attached to the violent activities of political opponents. One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. Terrorists are nonstate actors whose intention is to "intimidate an audience larger than their immediate victims, in the hope of generating widespread panic and, often, a response from the enemy so brutal that it ends up backfiring, creating sympathy for the terrorists' cause. Their targets are often ordinary civilians, and even when terrorists are trying to kill soldiers, their attacks often don't take place on the field of battle" (Jellmann 2010: 73).

There is also confusion over the terms *state* and *nonstate*. "The object of military force, for example, is to strike terror into the heart of the enemy, and systematic terror has been a basic weapon in conflicts throughout history" (White 2006: 3). While the tactics of terrorists can appear to be the same as those of military action, such as bombings and hostage taking, their targets are frequently noncombatants. Of course, the same can be said of the nuclear bombs dropped on Japanese cities in 1945. For the terrorists, injury to the innocent "is not an undesirable accident or by-product (colloquially called "collateral damage"), but the carefully sought consequence of a terrorist act" (Combs 2003: 12).

Terrorists often choose their targets at random and thus there are few if any precaution potential victims can take. They exploit noncombatant deaths as a means to advance their cause—"send a message"—and their victims typically have no strategic value. Terrorists do not expect governments to capitulate; indeed, their activities are frequently designed to elicit an overreaction that will aid in winning hearts and minds (Danner 2005). Although a number of American Mafia Families probably benefited from the building of the World Trade Center, they were not looking to advance their role or make a political statement. And with the exception of Colombia, "rarely do the large established crime organizations link with terrorist groups, because their long-term financial interests require the preservation of state structures" (Sheley et al. 2009: 1). Indeed, many traditional organized crime groups are politically quite conservative and supportive of their host governments, for example, Japanese *yakuza* (discussed in Chapter 7) and the Sicilian Mafia (discussed in Chapter 4). The infamous Medellín drug cartel in Colombia used terrorist tactics in their battle with the Marxist revolutionary group known as M-19.

However defined, the various categories of terrorism may overlap, whether they are domestic or international, left- or right-wing, separatist or religious. The Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups, self-styled militia groups, and survivalists are domestic and right-wing, while right-wing "Shahada" and Neo-Nazis are active in Europe. The Weather Underground in the United States used violence during the 1970s to express left-wing views, while the Red Army did the same in Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the separatist *Euzkadi Ta Askaniak* (ETA) uses violence against Spain in an effort to establish a Marxist independent Basque state. Al-Qaeda is the best-known example of a religious and international terrorist group whose activities often begin in one country and take place in another.

There are also terrorists that defy easy categorization, such as "concomitants" of the Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front who use violence to promote animal rights and preserve wilderness. Some observers refer to state-sponsored terrorism to describe such events as the Klaus Barbie slaughter in Cambodia during the 1970s, the Serbian militia massacres of Muslim men and rape of Muslim women in Bosnia during the 1990s, and the massacres of Tutsis by government-supported Hutu militias in Rwanda during the 1990s. But terrorism can be carried out by a single

Navigation bar: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1d533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/5431b6d-3431-4813-82f0-5e5a2ecb3ba8

Page 11: INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZED CRIME

Left sidebar: eBook Organized Crime, Cover, Title, Statement, Copyright, Contents, Preface, Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime, Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand, Defining 'Organized Crime', The Structure of Organized Crime, Franchise/Credentialed, Criminal Networks and Borders, Transnational Organized Crime, Organized Crime and Terrorism, Summary of Chapter 1, Review Questions for Chapter, Ch 2: Explanations for Organized Crime, Ch 3: United States, Ch 4: Italy and Albania, Ch 5: Colombia and Mexico, Ch 6: Russia and the Former

Main text (left column): person, such as Ted Kaczynski ("The Unabomber"), who was arrested in 1996, while organized crime by definition requires organization. In some parts of the world, such as the Balkans, breakaway areas of the former Soviet Union, and Latin America, organized crime and terrorist organizations share the same geography (usually conflict zones), and membership can overlap with individuals belonging to both terrorist and organized crime groups (Shelley et al. 2005). Criminal networks and terrorist networks may be or become intertwined, as in *Ciudad del Este*. *Ciudad del Este* (CIDE), or "City of the East," provides a microcosm of the nexus between organized crime and terrorism. This remote Paraguayan city is the center of a border area with Brazil and Argentina where border controls barely exist—a free-trade zone for contraband infested with criminals and terrorists. Originally a village, this rapidly expanding city of some 250,000 people was developed under the military dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner (1954–1989), who turned Paraguay into a haven for fugitives, including Nazi war criminals (Shelley et al. 2005). *Ciudad del Este* is an oasis for informants and spies, peddlers of contraband (largely cheap East Asian goods) and counterfeit products, traffickers in drugs, weapons, and humans (prostitutes, including women and children forced into prostitution), common criminals, mafia organizations, and undocumented Hispanic terrorists (Haskins 2010: 10). In some cases, terrorists imitate the organized criminal behavior they see around them, borrowing techniques. This can lead to more intimate connections, particularly in places of poor governance, ethnic separation, or a tradition of criminal activity, such as in failed states, war regions, prisons, and some urban neighborhoods (Shelley and Picarelli 2005). "It is not particularly uncommon for terrorist groups to recruit some of their members among criminal elements, particularly among individuals who may have special skills or common criminals who can contribute to its goals in instrumental, training, and other matters" (Difontaine and Daughan 2004: 16). "Terrorist and organized criminal groups share some attributes, in particular,

Main text (right column): organizational structure such as compartmentalization. Terrorist groups and criminal organizations often have similar requirements for moving people, money, and material across borders and often operate under a similar set of contingencies, so that symbiotic ties may form. Terrorists are increasingly turning to criminal networks to generate funding and acquire logistical support (National Security Council 2011). FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III (2011) noted the link between transnational organized crime and terrorism: "If a terrorist cannot obtain a passport, for example, he will find someone who can. Terrorists may aim to arrest crime—and, by extension, organized crime—to raise money, as did the 2001 Madrid bombers. Organized criminals have become 'service providers.' Could a Mexican group move a terrorist across the border? Could an Eastern European enterprise sell a Weapon of Mass Destruction to a terrorist (if) Likely, yes. Criminal enterprises are motivated by money, not ideology. But they have no scruples about helping those who are, for the right price." Yuri Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), points out: "Today, the criminal market spans the planet, and in many instances criminal profits support terrorist groups. Globalization has turned out to be a double-edged sword. Open borders, open markets, and increased ease of travel and communication have benefited both terrorists and criminals. Thanks to advances in technology, communication, finance and transport, loose networks of terrorists and organized criminal groups that operate internationally can easily link up with each other. By pooling their resources and expertise, they can significantly increase their capacity to do harm" (UNODC press release, March 16, 2011). Once terrorists and other criminals start to work together, they naturally begin to buy and sell services and goods from each other. It is more efficient to outsource a service (such as passport forging) to an established specialist than to try to master the necessary techniques. If these business relationships progress beyond individual transactions, in the next stage the two groups begin working together more

Page navigation: Previous page 10, Next page 12

System tray: 9:20 PM 3/8/2021

Navigation bar: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1d533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/d563b935-c535-45aa-b372-b426bd9171f1

Page 12: CHAPTER 1

Left sidebar: eBook Organized Crime, Cover, Title, Statement, Copyright, Contents, Preface, Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime, Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand, Defining 'Organized Crime', The Structure of Organized Crime, Franchise/Credentialed, Criminal Networks and Borders, Transnational Organized Crime, Organized Crime and Terrorism, Summary of Chapter 1, Review Questions for Chapter, Ch 2: Explanations for Organized Crime, Ch 3: United States, Ch 4: Italy and Albania, Ch 5: Colombia and Mexico, Ch 6: Russia and the Former

Main text (left column): regularly and begin to share each other's goals as well as working methods. A symbiotic relationship, as seen in the Russian region of Chechnya, discussed in Chapter 6, develops where there is no hard-and-fast line between Chechen organized crime and Chechen rebels fighting terrorism war against Russian sovereignty over their homeland (Shelley and Picarelli 2005). The Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the former Yugoslavia forged links with drug traffickers and international criminals, then used these connections, as well as combatants from Albanian migrant communities abroad, to fund its paramilitary campaign against Serbian authorities. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) raises funds through the extortion ("taxation") of both legal and illegal businesses—the latter includes the drug trade. Similarly, in return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange for weapons, some units protect cocaine laboratories and clandestine airseps in southern Colombia. FARC units may be independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations, and some are more directly involved in local drug trafficking activities, such as controlling cocaine base markets. At least one prominent FARC commander has served as a source of cocaine for a Brazilian trafficking organization. FARC cocaine was also shipped to the H&M's Angeln in Amsterdam via Cancun in the Dutch Antilles (Sier and Marsden 2006). Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan have been using heroin to finance their efforts. In 2005, Afghan drug lord Bar Mohammad was extradited to the United States, where he is accused of heading an organization that controlled poppy fields in Afghanistan, heroin-processing plants in Pakistan, and a trafficking network that smuggled millions of dollars' worth of drugs into the United States. In partnership with the Taliban, Mohammad told reporters they would be committing jihad by selling heroin to Americans (Zambini 2005b; McFadden 2005). A tribal warlord allied with the Taliban, Babar Noorzai, was tricked into traveling to New York where in 2005 he was arrested and, in 2008, convicted of smuggling \$50 million worth of heroin in the United States (Associated Press 2006a).

Main text (right column): In Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, there is a long-standing tradition of using heroin trafficking to support insurgents (discussed in Chapter 11). According to the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, "almost half of the State Department's list of known terrorist organizations are known to have, at one point or another, trafficked in drugs" (Walters 2003: 9). This gives rise to the term *narco-terrorism*, terrorist acts carried out by groups directly or indirectly involved in cultivating, manufacturing, transporting, or distributing illegal drugs. The links between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers can take many forms, ranging from facilitation, protection, transportation, and taxation, to direct trafficking by the terrorist organization itself in order to finance its activities. Traffickers and terrorists have similar logistical needs in terms of material and the covert movement of goods, people, and money. Relationships between drug traffickers and terrorists are mutually beneficial. Drug traffickers gain from access to terrorist military skills and weapons supply; terrorists gain a source of revenue and expertise in illicit transfer and laundering of proceeds. Both drug corrupt officials whose services provide mutual benefits, such as greater access to fraudulent documents, including passports and customs papers. Drug traffickers may also gain considerable freedom of movement when they operate in conjunction with terrorists who control large amounts of territory (Beets and Taylor 2002). Elyna Pacheco (2011: 2) points out that the fight against terrorism and that against organized crime have important parallels and overlaps. In Latin America, for example, "politically motivated groups like the FARC are increasingly taking on the characteristics of criminal gangs, while organized criminal groups, most notably Mexico's cartels, are obscuring the state and carrying out such large-scale attacks that some describe them as insurgents."

Section Header: Organized Crime and Terrorism: Similarities and Dissimilarities

Main text (right column): Like Colombian drug cartels (discussed in Chapter 5), terrorist groups are frequently organized.

Page navigation: Previous page 11, Next page 13

System tray: 9:20 PM 3/8/2021

Chapter 1: Introduction to Organized Crime

INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZED CRIME 13

along compartmentalized lines. Similar to Italian and Asian organized crime groups, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda use apprenticeships, apprenticeships, and initiation ceremonies. Like organized crime, terrorist groups have a need to launder their financial assets. The Provisional Irish Republican Army, for example, is reported to have become expert at money laundering through a portfolio of front businesses in Belfast (Christie 2005).

"Roughly speaking, politically motivated groups are interested in the substance of the crime, while criminally motivated ones have an important stake in maintaining it, so that they can keep operating" (Kobrin 2010: 12). The differences between terrorist organizations and organized crime groups rest on means and ends. While both engage in organized criminal activity to support themselves, terrorists use their funds to further political ends, to overthrow governments and impose their world-view. Organized crime instead seeks to form a parallel government while coexisting with the existing one. Organized crime groups are not motivated by an ideology, while terrorist groups try to give their activities an altruistic aura to justify their acts and to solicit people's sympathy for their cause. Frank Hogan (2006) refers to this as political crime, committed for ideological purposes. Organized crime groups prefer to carry out their activities secretly, while terrorists seek to maximize media coverage and to promote their message and publicize their goals. While organized crime groups typically place significant restrictions on membership, terrorist activity recruit and typically enjoy sympathy from a segment of the population that identifies with their goals. Thus, whether an individual is a partner or a terrorist is not a relevant issue with respect to organized crime.

Terrorist groups and drug trafficking organizations often rely on cell structures to accomplish their respective goals. This enhances security by providing a degree of separation between the leadership and the rank and file. In addition, terrorist and drug traffickers use similar means to conceal profits and fund raising. They use informal transfer systems such as *hushu* (discussed in

Chapter 12), and also rely on bulk cash smuggling, multiple accounts, and front organizations to launder money. Both make use of fraudulent documents such as passports and other identification to smuggle goods and weapons. Both fully exploit their networks of trusted contacts and contacts to conduct business. To increase communications security they use multiple cell phones and encrypted emails and are careful about what they say on the phone. The methods used for moving and laundering money for general criminal purposes are similar to those used to move money to support terrorist activities. Countries and jurisdictions with poorly regulated banking structures allow both terrorist organizations and drug trafficking groups to use online transfers and accounts that do not require disclosure of owners (Beers and Taylor 2002).

A striking dissimilarity is the suicide bomber frequently used by jihadist terrorists—unlikely (understandably) to be used by organized crime. A radical British Muslim is quoted as saying: "Even if my own family were killed by a jihadist bomb, I would say it is in the will of Allah" (Pewell 2005: 56). "Organized crime's business is business. The less attention brought to their lucrative enterprises, the better. The goal of terrorism is quite the opposite. A wide-ranging public profile is often the desired effect" (Cifalillo 2000: Internet). Organized crime groups enjoy the shadows and do not seek to publicize their activities for public consumption. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, distributed a videotape depicting their second-in-command cutting off the head of an American journalist. However, at times, organized crime groups have used high-profile terror tactics, such as those perpetrated by Pablo Escobar in Colombia and the Sicilian Mafia's attacks on the Uffizi Galleries in Florence. In those instances, the goal was to intimidate governments into changing policies antithetical to organized crime. For organized crime groups, notes Thomas Sanderson (2004: 56), terrorism may serve as a tactic, "whereas criminal activities may become a permanent necessity for terror groups lacking sufficient sources of funding."

Chapter 1: Introduction to Organized Crime

CHAPTER 1 14

In sum, terrorist organizations and organized crime groups differ on means and ends. Both engage in organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking to support themselves, but terrorists use their funds to further political ends, to overthrow governments and impose their world-view. Organized crime instead seeks to corrupt government to gain immunity for their crimes. Rather than destruction, criminal organizations frequently form a parallel government while coexisting with the existing one. While members of organized crime are not motivated by an ideology and generally identify themselves as criminals, terrorist groups try to give their activities an altruistic aura to justify their acts and to solicit people's sympathy for their cause. Organized crime groups prefer to carry out their activities secretly, while terrorists seek to maximize media coverage to promote their message and publicize their goals.

Law enforcement resources diverted to fighting terrorism dilute government efforts against organized crime. But greater surveillance of our borders to fight terrorism also benefits efforts against drug smuggling. There is a parallel between the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and the USA PATRIOT Act (both discussed in Chapter 13) enacted in the wake of the September 11, 2001, destruction of the Twin Towers. Both provide the federal government with extraordinary powers justified by "clear and present dangers," and both have been used against persons devoted to organized crime or terrorism. For example, a PATRIOT Act provision that authorizes "secret searches" that permit federal agents to search a

home without immediately notifying the target that they have been there has "been used in a wide variety of cases beyond terrorism, including child pornography, drug trafficking and organized crime" (Luchessa 2005b: 19).

As Frank Boveck (2011: 263) points out, "Terrorism can turn into organized crime." A terrorist group may abandon its political goals or the use of violence to achieve those goals. In either instance, some members no longer restrained by ideological ends may find that their skills lend themselves to achieving more personal goals—greed replaces ideology. A transformation occurs as both individual skills developed as terrorists and the advantages of organization are mobilized in the pursuit of pecuniary interests: terrorists become organized crime. There is evidence of this transformation in Northern Ireland where the Irish Republican Army has relinquished violence as an organizational level. This may be occurring in Colombia where FARC guerrillas become increasingly involved in drug trafficking and lose sight of their original ideological motivations. Glenn Curran and Tara Kavanagh (2002: 4) refer to this as "righteous turned felon." If, for example, drug trafficking proves lucrative beyond the immediate goal of paying for arms, the "purity" ideology of a terrorist group "may be diluted and some parts of the organization may 'wander off' into conventional criminal activity." Chris Dolan (2005: 237) adds that when terrorist groups use financial incentives to recruit and retain initiates, they may find that persons who join to make money "will quickly set ideological goals to the side if a profit."

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 1

- The criminality of organized crime differs from that of conventional criminals in variety and scope.
- The federal Organized Crime Act of 1970 fails to define organized crime.
- Organized crime is devoid of political goals, is hierarchical, has a limited or exclusive membership,
- constitutes a unique subculture, perpetuates itself, exhibits a willingness to use illegal violence, is monopolistic, and is governed by explicit rules and regulations.
- Bureaucracy offers an alternative to more personalistic ties.

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cenreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/d5ca7bfb-473c-4506-aa20-9422178f718c

Page Title: eBook: Organized Crime

Page Number: 15

Section: INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZED CRIME

- A bureaucracy has a complicated hierarchy; an extensive division of labor; positions assigned on the basis of competence, with responsibilities carried out in an impersonal manner; and extensive written rules and regulations, with communication from the top of the hierarchy to persons on the bottom via a chain of command.
- As a criminal organization continues to expand, at some point it needs to adopt the bureaucratic style of organizations.
- A criminal organization structured along bureaucratic lines has inherent weaknesses, in particular, communication.
- Bureaucratic deficiencies can be offset by compartmentalization.
- A criminal organization can manifest a bureaucratic structure with ranks and levels of authority, while economic activities may be divorced from the formal structure.
- Function provides a sense of entitlement and a status that are important in the underworld subculture.
- A properly credentialed criminal will be protected and have access to a criminal network.
- Criminal organization membership may be confined by specific tattoos.
- A criminal network has *points of convergence* where participants congregate.
- A properly credentialed broker can bridge the credibility gap between criminals.
- The credentialed criminal can act as a catalyst for crime that otherwise would not occur.
- Transnational organized crime (TOC) refers to self-perpetuating criminal organizations operating across national boundaries.
- Migration, legal or illegal, breaks the reach of existing criminal networks.
- There is no universally accepted definition of crime.
- The distinction between organized crime and terrorism centers on political goals.
- In some parts of the world, organized crime and terrorist organizations share the same geography and membership can overlap.
- Terrorists and members of organized crime may form a symbiotic relationship.
- Organized crime seeks to form a parallel government while coexisting with the existing one.
- While organized crime groups typically place significant restrictions on membership, terrorists actively recruit.

REVIEW QUESTIONS FOR CHAPTER 1

1. How does the criminality of organized crime differ from that of conventional criminals?
2. How does the federal Organized Crime Act of 1970 define organized crime?
3. What are the eight characteristics of organized crime?
4. What are the two most important characteristics of organized crime?
5. What type of structure is a criminal organization likely to manifest if personal ties are weak?
6. What are the six characteristics of a bureaucracy?
7. What are examples of a bureaucracy?
8. When does a criminal organization require a bureaucratic structure?
9. What are the dangers of a bureaucratic structure for a criminal organization?
10. Why do criminal organizations give loyalty over competence?
11. How does compartmentalization offset the weaknesses of a bureaucracy?
12. How can the economic activities of a criminal organization be divorced from its formal structure?
13. What benefits do criminals provide for criminals?
14. What are the trademarks that can confirm membership in a criminal organization?
15. In a criminal network, what are *points of convergence*?
16. What is the role of a broker in bridging the gap between criminals?

Navigation: Previous page, Summary of Chapter 1, Jump to Page 15 / 434

System tray: Type here to search, 9:21 PM, 3/8/2021

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cenreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/0395cbb4-e1fc-4292-8a62-a55141d2d085

Page Title: eBook: Organized Crime

Page Number: 16

Section: CHAPTER 1

17. How does a credentialed criminal act as a catalyst for crime that otherwise would not occur?
18. What is meant by transnational organized crime?
19. How has migration broadened the reach of criminal networks?
20. What is the universally accepted definition of terrorism?
21. What is the primary distinction between organized crime and terrorism?
22. Why would terrorists and members of organized crime cooperate?
23. What are the similarities between organized crime and terrorism?

Navigation: Previous page, Review Questions for Chapter 1, Jump to Page 16 / 434

System tray: Type here to search, Chapter 2 Will Enable the Reader to Understand, 9:21 PM, 3/8/2021

Chapter 2: Explanations for Organized Crime

CHAPTER 2

Explanations for Organized Crime

Although sociologists and psychologists have offered a number of theories to help explain crime and criminal behavior, save for "pathic succession" theory they have not been directed at organized crime. Nevertheless, some sociological and psychological theories of crime and deviance provide insight into organized crime, and they will be examined in this chapter. Then we will examine sociology, in particular neurology (brain science), which offers an understanding of problematic behavior associated with organized crime.

CHAPTER 2 WILL ENABLE THE READER TO UNDERSTAND:

- Organized crime in terms of the study of crime, subcultures, cultural transmission, differential opportunity, and social control theory.
- The theory of "pathic succession" or organized crime.
- The impact of Prohibition.
- The role of "Gop" in the American Mafia.
- Psychoanalytic and behavioral-psychological theory applied to organized crime.
- How brain science can explain the behavior of persons in organized crime.
- Persons in organized crime as entrepreneurs.

18 CHAPTER 2

SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Sociology refers to the study of society, social institutions—such as religion and family—human interactions, collective behavior, and the behavior of organized groups.

The Strain of Anomie

The term *anomie* as developed by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1951) refers to a state of normlessness, the result of dramatic change, an economic boom or depression, for example. Normlessness is exemplified by a breakdown in communal ties and long-established rules. In time, communal ties and rules are reestablished within the new reality.

During the Great Depression, Robert K. Merton (1936), building on Durkheim's concept of anomie, set forth a social and cultural explanation for deviant behavior in the United States. To Merton, organized crime is a normal response to pressures exerted on certain persons by the social structure—the strain between goals and means. Goals, he points out, are economic, and he argues that there is an American preoccupation with economic success—*pathological materialism*. During the 1800s, a visitor from France, Alexis de Tocqueville (1966: 386), wrote: "It is odd to watch such what feverish ardor the American pursue prosperity and how they are tormented by the shadowy suspicion that they may have not have chosen the shortest route to get it." According to Merton, in America it is the goal that is emphasized, not the means, which are at best only a secondary consideration. "These may develop a deproportionate, at times, a virtually exclusive stress upon the value of specific goals, involving relatively slight concern with the motivationally appropriate modes of attaining those goals" (1938: 673).

This being the case, the only factors limiting goal achievement are technical, not moral or legal. "Emphasis on the goals of monetary success and material property leads to dominant concerns with technological and social instruments designed to produce the desired result, inasmuch as institutional controls become of secondary importance. In such a situation, innovation, such as organized crime"

flourishes as the range of means employed is broadened" (Merton 1938: 673). Thus, in American society, "the presence of prestige-bearing success tends to eliminate the effective social constraint over means employed to this end. The end-justifies-the-means doctrine becomes a guiding tenet for action when the cultural structure steadily exerts the end and the social organization steadily limits possible recourse to approved means" (1938: 681).

The activities of earlier capitalists, the unscrupulous "Robber Barons" of the nineteenth century, exemplify the spirit that Merton refers to as innovation. Taking advantage of every (legitimate and illegitimate) opportunity, these men became the embodiments of the great American success story. However, the opportunity for economic success is not equally distributed, and the immigrants who followed these men to America found many avenues from "rags to riches" significantly limited if not already closed. Rampant—that is, uncontrolled—capitalism, a feature of nineteenth-century America, is now being replaced by the former Soviet Union and it too has spawned a class of "Robber Barons" and organized crime that we will examine in Chapter 6.

Some immigrants recognized that the cards were stacked against them, and as a result, organized crime flourished. Winning several years before Merton, Louis Robinson (1933: 16) spoke of an American credo according to which "we dare not or at least will not condemn the criminal's goal, because it is also our goal. We want to keep the goal ourselves and damn the criminal for pursuing it in the only way he knows how."

The methods which criminals use in attaining our common goal of wealth may, of course, differ from those that the non-criminal classes use. But this is to be expected. They are probably not as a position to employ our methods. We can think of a variety of reasons why a man without capital or without education or without industrial skill or without this or that advantage or handicapped by any one of several factors which anyone could easily name would be forced to seek the

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/cf5a16c-811a-412-ad9-3813375eba82

Page Title: eBook: Organized Crime

Page Number: 19

Section: EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME

Text:

common goal by means differing from those employed by another man better suited or endorsed. In other words, he would play the game differently. (1933: 15-16; emphasis added)

Anomic results when members of people are confronted by the contradiction between goals and means and "become estranged from a society that promises them in principle what they are deprived of in reality" (Merton 1964: 238). Despite numerous success stories, "we know in this same society that proclaims the right, and even the duty, of lofty aspirations for all, men do not have equal access to the opportunity structure" (1964: 218). Yet those with ready access to success ("born with a silver spoon") and those who are at a distinct disadvantage are constantly exposed to the research of "time and fortune" by the mass media. For some, particularly the disadvantaged, anomie is the result. Merton states there are five modes of individual adaptation to this phenomenon: conformity, ritualism, rebellion, retreatism, and innovation. We are concerned only with the last adaptation—innovation—which includes organized criminal activity for those who would play the game differently.

British sociologists Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jack Young (1973: 97) summarize the anomic condition in the United States: "The 'American Dream' urges all citizens to succeed while diminishing the opportunity to succeed unequally: the result of this social and moral climate, inevitably, is innovation by the citizenry—the adoption of illegitimate means to pursue and obtain success." However, "massive" pedestrian criminal acts do not lead to any significant level of economic success. Innovation, then, is the adoption of sophisticated, well-planned, skilled, organized criminality. Although anomic can help explain why some persons from disadvantaged groups become involved in organized crime, it fails to provide a satisfying explanation for the continued existence of the American Mafia. In other words, even though poverty and limited economic opportunity can certainly inure one toward innovative activities, they do not explain why middle-class youngsters become involved in

Text:

organized crime or why crimes by the wealthy and the powerful—for example, massive savings and loan industry fraud, securities fraud, insider trading, offshore agreements—continue to be a problem in the United States. Perhaps the most-often referred to as "anomic" micro-level socioeconomic boundaries. In fact, organized criminal activity on a rather outrageous scale, for example, by the predatory businessmen of the nineteenth century, without necessarily being connected to conditions of anomie, has been an important part of American history.

A question remains: why do some persons suffering from anomic turn to criminal innovation, whereas others do not? Edwin Sutherland, the "father" of American criminology, provides an answer: differential association.

Differential Association

As in most scientific, differential association argues that you are who you hang with. According to Sutherland (1973), all behavior—lawful and criminal—is learned. The principal part of learning occurs within intimate personal groups. What is learned depends on the intensity, frequency, and duration of the association. When these variables are sufficient and the association is criminal, the actor learns the techniques of committing crime and the drives, attitudes, and rationalizations that add up to a favorable preoccupation to criminal behavior. The balance between noncriminal and criminal behavior is tipped in favor of the latter.

Learning the techniques of sophisticated criminality requires the proper environment—ecological niches or enclaves where delinquent or criminal subcultures (discussed later) flourish and the education is available. In a capitalist society, socioeconomic differentials relegate some persons to an environment wherein they experience a compelling sense of strain—anomie—as well as differential association. In the environment where organized crime has traditionally thrived, strain is anomic. Conditions of severe deprivation are coupled with readily available success models and associations that are innovative, such as racketeers and drug dealers. This makes certain enclaves characterized by social disorganization and delinquent

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/cf064eb7-6646-480f-ab91-2e3fa30c82c2

Page Title: eBook: Organized Crime

Page Number: 20

Section: CHAPTER 2

Text:

or criminal subcultures spawning grounds for organized crime.

Various types of people tend to seek out others like themselves and live close together. Located within these distinctive clusters are specialized commercial enterprises and institutions that support the inhabitants' special ways of life. Each distinctive group, along with its mores and institutions, occupies a geographic area that becomes intimately associated with the group. Through this linkage, areas acquire symbolic qualities that include their place names and social histories. Each place, both as a geographic entity and as a space with social meaning, also tends to be an object of residents' attachments and an important component of their identity. For example, people living in Little Italy or Chinatown think of themselves as Italian or Chinese, but their place of residence is also a prominent part of their self-concept. . . . [The] enclave has some characteristics of a subculture, in which a group of people shares common traditions and values that are ordinarily maintained by a high rate of interaction within the group. (Abernethy 1996: 1, 3)

Instead of conforming to conventional norms, some persons, through differential association, organize their behavior according to the norms of a delinquent or criminal group to which they belong or with which they identify. This is most likely to occur in environments characterized by relative social disorganization, where familial and communal controls are ineffective in exerting a conditioning influence. In certain areas—enclaves with strong traditions of organized crime, be they in New York, Javier, Medellin, Miami, or Sicily—young persons stand a greater chance of being exposed to criminal norms. In these areas persons evaluating criminal norms are often well integrated into the community, and such areas have been the breeding ground for delinquent subcultures and prospective entrants into organized crime (Kobrin 1966).

Delinquent Subcultures

Culture refers to a source of patterning in human conduct: it is the sum of patterns of social relationships and shared meanings by which people give order, expression, and value to common experiences. The strength of a culture is determined by the degree of commitment of its members; culture is a valued heritage. A subculture implies that there are value judgments or a social value system which is apart from a larger or central value system. From the viewpoint of the larger dominant culture, the values of the subculture set the latter apart and prevent total integration, occasionally causing open or covert conflict" (Wolfgang and Ferraro 1967: 99). "Subcultures are patterns of values, norms, and behavior which have become traditional among certain groups. These groups may be of many types, including occupational and ethnic groups, social classes, occupants of 'closed institutions' [for example, prisons and mental hospitals] and various age grades." They are "important frames of reference through which individuals and groups see the world and interpret it" (Shaw 1968: 11).

Central to the issue of culture versus subculture are norms, "group-held prescriptions for or prohibitions against certain conduct" (Wolfgang and Ferraro 1967: 113). Norms are general rules about how to behave and expectations that are predictive of behavior. The vast majority of a society, which provides rewards or punishments for conformity or violation, approves these rules and expectations. "The 'delinquent subculture' is characterized principally by conduct that reflects values antithetical to the surrounding culture" (1967: 110). Subcultural theory explains criminal behavior as learned: the subcultural delinquent has learned values that are deviant—ideas about society that lead to criminal behavior. A number of studies indicate that delinquent youths hold values that differ markedly from those of nondelinquents. Indeed, they may view their criminal behavior as morally wrong, but this is not the controlling attitude. Being right or wrong in terms of the wider society is simply not a goadpost for behavior. Nonconventional behavior such as the ability to fight, to win at gambling, to

Navigation: New Tab | Ebooks - Webreader.io | My Account | Library Brytewise | Twelfth Edition | My Home | Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/2c1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/b9856e75-337a-45b3-891d-5a349aa7076b

Page: 21

Section: EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME

Text:

"bold one's liquor," is admired and, thus, reinforced (Elliott, Huizinga, and Ageton 1985). The connection between subcultural deviance and organized crime was revealed in an interview with an experienced investigator:

They saw the Outfit [Chicago organized crime] guys, and gave them deference. It's in the culture. They don't grow up to believe this is wrong; it's a pervened sense of values. Knockin' down an old lady to take her purse, killing the clerk at the store for a few bucks, that's wrong. But everything to do with organized crime is perfectly acceptable. They know it's illegal, but who cares... There's our group, for example, who we first noticed in 1994. "Hi, who call themselves the 'Boys in the Hood.'" There are about fifty or sixty of them, many of whom are now associates of the street crews. We had some as young as sixteen, but usually eighteen, nineteen, and usually from Elmwood Park, Melrose Park, the Northwest Side of Chicago [a residential area with many Italian Americans, and police officers and firefighters]. They were doing any scam that the Outfit would let them do—major burglaries, jewelry thefts, drug sales, credit card fraud. Many of them are relatives of Outfit members. Many of them now—they're in their twenties—work for the Elmwood Park crew. (Scamella 1998)

Section: Cultural Transmission

Text:

Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, sociologists at the University of Chicago, used that city as a laboratory for their study of patterns of criminality during the 1920s and 1930s.¹ They found that certain clearly identifiable neighborhoods maintained a high level of criminality over many decades despite changes in ethnic composition. Thus, although one

Text:

ethnic group replaced another, the rate of criminality remained constant. What was it about the environment of these neighborhoods that made them criminogenic?

Shaw and McKay (1972:173) described socially disorganized neighborhoods as beginning with attitudes and values conducive to delinquency and crime, particularly organized crime, which provided pathways to adult crime. Second, they observed that one generation passed on their attitudes, values, and crime techniques to the next. Engulfed in their neighborhood, children are not only the delinquency present in similarly aged youths, but also older offenders. As Shaw and McKay (1972:174) stated it: "This contact means that the traditions of delinquency can be and are transmitted down through successive generations of boys, in much the same way that language and other social forms are transmitted." Finally, Shaw and McKay believed conflict was inevitable in this mix of cultures. The values of the larger, more conventional society may hold little meaning for the youthful residents of some areas of large cities.

Shaw and McKay (1972:172) viewed the community as a source of many conflicting messages: children should obey laws even if their parents and other adults do not; crime does not pay, but sometimes it does; obey the law, unless it runs counter to what your local neighborhood expects of you. How could society expect youths living in these environs to be anything but confused when exposed to such conflicting sets of values?

According to Shaw and McKay (1972: 72), such neighborhoods are characterized by attitudes and values that are conducive to delinquency and crime, particularly organized crime.

The presence of a large number of adult criminals in certain areas means that children there are in contact with crime as a career and with the criminal way of life, symbolized by organized crime. In the type of organizations can be seen the delegation of authority, the division of labor, the specialization of functions, and all the other characteristics common to well-organized business institutions wherever found....

Footnote:

1. However, the persistence of organized crime in Chicago during the period of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era did not mean that it was wholly absent in the past. (Scamella 1998)

Navigation: Previous page | Next page

Navigation: New Tab | Ebooks - Webreader.io | My Account | Library Brytewise | Twelfth Edition | My Home | Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/2c1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/1e3097f5-9d2e-49ec-b48f-b28d72522bf3

Page: 22

Section: CHAPTER 2

Text:

The heavy concentration of delinquency in certain areas means that boys living in these areas are in contact not only with individuals who engage in proscribed activity but also with groups which sanction such behavior and exert pressure upon their members to conform to group standards. (1972: 174)

Text:

A disruption of the social order (anomie) is associated with high rates of delinquency in a community, the result of a breakdown in mechanisms of social control. In many U.S. cities around the turn of the century, the social order was disrupted by the combined negative effect of industrialization, immigration, and urbanization. Deviant traditions developed and coexisted with conventional norms; in some communities, deviant norms won out. Once established, these norms took root in areas that, according to Shaw and McKay, are characterized by attitudes and values that are conducive to delinquency and crime, thus creating a subculture of crime. The attitudes and values, as well as the techniques of organized criminality, are transmitted culturally. "Delinquent boys in these areas have contact not only with other delinquents who are their contemporaries but also with older offenders, who in turn had contact with delinquents preceding them, and so on back to the earliest history of the neighborhood."

Back in the 1920s, John Landesco (1968) found that organized crime in Chicago could be explained by the prevalence of social disorganization in the wider society (during the period of Prohibition) and by the distinct social organization of urban slums from which members of organized crime emerge. "Once a set of cultural values is created and established—either because of economic factors or accidental or moral transformations—they tend to become autonomous in their impact. From that point on, they can influence human relations independently of their original sources. And since they are, as a rule, accepted unconsciously and through the most inadvertent process of socialization, they are regarded as normal and inevitable within each cultural system" (Sney 1986: 35).

Text:

In other words, the roots and culture of particular neighborhoods explain why gangsters come from clearly delineated areas "where the gang tradition is old" (Landesco 1968: 207) and where adolescents, through differential association, can absorb the attitudes and skills necessary to enter the world of adult organized crime. Indeed, in such neighborhoods, organized crime can provide a level of social control—limiting predatory crime, for example—that would otherwise be absent. At night, in an organized crime-dominated neighborhood in Brooklyn, a young woman did not realize she was being followed as she approached the door to her home. The young man following her did not realize that he was being watched. Several large men who quickly carried him up the stairs foiled his attempt at a knife-point robbery. An observer recalls "I could make out the small roof walk on the front of the building—it was made of brick—and then I saw the guy launched right over it into the air. He hung there for just a second, flailing arms like a broken helicopter, and then he came down hard and splattered all over the street" (Pisapp 1996: 40). As an FBI agent Joe Piatone notes, "Neighborhoods that are dominated by wisegays are considered to be under the protection of these wisegays. There are far fewer robberies, rapes, or kidnappings in wisegay neighborhoods than even the safest precincts of the city" (Piatone 2004: 76).

Inadequate familial socialization prevents some persons from conforming to the conventional norms of the wider society. Through differential association, some of these persons organize their behavior according to the norms of a delinquent or criminal subculture with which they identify or to which they belong. This is most likely to occur in environments characterized by relative social disorganization, where familial and communal controls are ineffective in exerting a conforming influence. In his classic study of Chicago street gangs originally published in 1927, Frederic Thrasher (1968: 270) notes, "Espionage is a gang of the predatory type usually develops in the boy an attitude of indifference to law and order—one of the basic traits of the finished gangster." Thrasher (1968: 273) points out: "If the younger undisciplined gangs and clubs of the gang type, which serve as

Navigation: Previous page | Next page

Navigation: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/2c1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/f9eb3e6b-407d-413d-a2a7-260c2b1d01bf

Page: 22

Section: EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME

Text:

membership in such conventional institutions of their local communities as churches, fraternal and mutual benefit societies, and political parties" (Robbin 1966: 156). Fraternal and informal political, economic, and religious ties provide both legitimate and legitimate opportunities. These leaders are able to control violence and delinquent behavior in their domain—they are effective instruments of social control. "Everyone," particularly would-be immigrants, "knows" not to "mess around" in certain neighborhoods. And those who do not "know" have suffered serious consequences—willing druggs in one Chicago suburb, for example, resulted in mutilated corpses. In the Italian area of New York's Greenwich Village, "street corner boys" enforced the social order—made sure the streets were safe. And their self-appointed role was backed by the formidable reputation of the neighborhood's organized crime figures. For this protection, neighborhood residents reciprocated by providing "wiseguy" with a "safe haven" (Tranter 1984).

Nicholas Piliavin (1985: 37–38) describes a defended neighborhood in Brooklyn:

In Brownsville-East New York wiseguys were more than accepted—they were protected. Even the legitimate members of the community—the merchants, teachers, phone repairmen, garbage collectors, bus depot dispatchers, housewives, and adult-tutors strolling themselves along the Coney Island Beach—all seemed to keep an eye out to protect their local hoods. The majority of the residents, even those not directly related by birth or marriage to wiseguys, had certainly known the local rages most of their lives. They had gone to school together. A great many of them shared friends. There was the nodding familiarity of neighborhood. In the area it was impossible to betray old friends, even those old friends who had grown up to be racketeers.

The extraordinary insularity of these old-world mob-controlled sections, whether Brownsville-East New York, the

Navigation: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#/reader/2c1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/ec377890-ee04-4a7b-9a3a-848c47556d81

Page: 24

Section: CHAPTER 2

Text:

South Side of Chicago, or Federal Hill in Providence, Rhode Island, unquestionably helped to nurture the mob.

Recruitment into organized crime is made viable because "in the type of community under discussion boys may more or less realistically recognize the possibilities for personal progress in the local society through success in delinquency. In a general way, therefore, delinquent activity in these areas constitutes a training ground for the acquisition of A.D.I. in the use of violence, concealment of offense, evasion of detection and arrest, and the purchase of immunity from punishment" (Robbin 1966: 156).

Raymond Martin, a former ranking officer with the NYPD, describes why recruitment is made easy in certain Italian neighborhoods in Brooklyn (1963: 61):

On so many street corners in Bath Beach, in so many luncheonettes and candy stores in Bayside, boys see the mob-affiliated hoodies operate. They meet the young toughs, the mob enforcers. They hear the tales of glory recounted—who robbed what, who worked over whom, which shagbald shared which gangster's bed, who got his by whom, the techniques of the rackets and how easy it all is, how the money rolls in. What wonder is it that some boys look forward to being initiated into these practices with the cognomen of a college freshman hoping to be pledged by the smoothest fraternity on campus. With a little luck and guts, they feel, even they may someday belong to that slicked, high-living band, the mob.

Robert Lombardo, a former organized crime investigator and ranking Cook County, Illinois, police official, paints out the prospective members of organized crime "typically come from communities which share collective representations and moral sentiments which allow them to recognize the pursuit of a career in the underworld as a legitimate way of life" (1979: 18, 1994). Young men from these areas draw in a certain style—"gangster chic"—and congregate in social clubs and night spots where they are able to associate with the men who have already been allowed entry into organized crime. They are ready and eager to show their mettle by accepting assignments from "goatskins."

The centrality of the neighborhood for providing a pool of organized crime aspirants cannot be overemphasized. In these areas, there is a "socialization of the mob"—young "wannabes" copy the style of their notorious skills and are eager to ingratiate themselves with male goys. As one recruit, raised in the organized crime neighborhood of Brooklyn's East New York-Brownsville section, recounts, "At the age of twelve my ambition was to be a gangster. To be a wiseguy. To me being a wiseguy was better than being president of the United States. It meant power among people who had no power. It meant peeks in a working-class neighborhood that had no privileges. To be a wiseguy was to own the world. I dreamed of being a wiseguy the way other kids dreamed about being doctors or movie stars or firemen or ball players" (Piliavin 1985: 13).

Even those who have moved to suburban locations—if they accept the "wiseguy" credo—gravitate back to the "hood." In Chicago this phenomenon has been referred to as the "suburbanization of the mob"—young men who have known only middle-class living conditions becoming part of organized crime. Like the members of outlaw motorcycle clubs discussed in Chapter 9, these young men are attracted to a subcultural lifestyle, not necessarily by the potential financial rewards offered by organized crime. For example, Salvatore ("Sally D.") DeLuca (b. 1938), who was raised in the Taylor Street neighborhood in Chicago, aspired to be a "gangster"—a term he uses to describe himself—since his earliest days. But his family moved out to suburban Lake County, and Sally D. found himself cut off from his career path. Lake County lacked the critical mass of older criminals and their young, associate members. So DeLuca gradually made connections back in the old neighborhood and eventually became a

Chapter 2: Explanations for Organized Crime

member of the Chief crew in charge of Lake County. (He is serving an eighteen-year sentence for a racketeering conviction.)

In Chicago, even senior members of the Outfit who reside in suburban locations frequent the restaurants, nightspots, and social clubs back in the hood. James D. ("Jimmy D.") Antonia, ranking member of the Grand Avenue crew, resided in suburban Skokie. But until his death in 1993 from an auto accident, he operated a storefront social club in the Grand Avenue neighborhood, which sponsored a boys' baseball team for neighborhood youths (O'Brien 1993). But many "hood neighborhoods" are changing. In one of them, a southwest Brooklyn area known as Bensonhurst whose main commercial strip is Bath Avenue, it is nearly impossible to find any trace of its mob past (Fernandez 2007). The tough waterfront area of Red Hook, Brooklyn, was once home turf to members of the American Mafia, but is now home to trendy shops, cafes, and other indicators of gentrification.

According to Irving Spargel (1964), in such communities life in organized crime is considered acceptable and therefore a legitimate aspiration for young persons. Although these communities provide an appropriate learning environment for the acquisition of values and skills associated with the performance of criminal roles, integration into organized crime requires selection and tutelage in the process of acquiring recognition—and only a select few are given recognition by those who control admission. Entry into organized crime is characterized by differential opportunity.

Differential Opportunity

In agreement with Merton's Americanization of anomie, Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin (1960) noted that American preoccupation with economic success, coupled with socioeconomic stratification, relegates many persons to an environment wherein they experience intense strain: "Many lower-class male adolescents experience extreme deprivation born of the certainty that

EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME 25

their position in the economic structure is relatively fixed and immutable—a desperation made all the more poignant by their exposure to a cultural ideology in which failure to orient oneself upward is regarded as a moral defect and failure to become mobile as proof of it" (1960: 107).

Conditions of severe deprivation with extremely limited access to ladders of legitimate success result in collective adaptation in the form of delinquent subcultures. Cloward and Ohlin distinguish three types:

1. **Ritualistic subculture:** Activities in which drug usage is the primary focus; the anomic condition leads the sufferer to reject the goal of economic success in favor of a more easily obtainable one—the "high."
2. **Conflict subculture:** Gang activities devoted to violence and destructive acting out as a way of gaining status. As with ritualism, the anomic condition leads to a rejection of economic success in favor of a more easily obtainable goal.
3. **Crimeless subculture:** Gang activity devoted to utilitarian criminal pursuits, an adaptation that begins to approximate organized crime.

Anomie alone, note Cloward and Ohlin, is not sufficient to explain participation in organized crime: what is necessary is cultural transmission (Shaw and McKay) through differential association (Sutherland). However, Cloward and Ohlin point out that illegitimate opportunity for success, like legitimate opportunity, is not equally distributed throughout society (1960: 145): "Having decided that he 'can't make it legitimately,' he cannot simply choose from an array of illegitimate means, all equally available to him." In other words, access to criminal ladders of success is no more freely available than are noncriminal alternatives.

Only those neighborhoods in which crime flourishes as a stable, indigenous institution are fertile learning environments for the young. Because these environments afford inculcation of different age-levels of

CHAPTER 2

offender, selected young people are exposed to "differential association" through which tutelage is provided and criminal values and skills are acquired. To be prepared for the role may not, however, ensure that the individual will ever discharge it. One important limitation is that more youngsters are recruited into these patterns of differential association than the adult criminal structure can possibly absorb. Since there is a surplus of contenders for these elite positions, criteria and mechanisms of selection must be evolved. Hence a certain proportion of those who aspire may not be permitted to engage in the behavior for which they have prepared themselves. (Cloward and Ohlin 1960: 148)

The increasing scale and complexity of modern life has altered the social structure of urban communities. Greater social mobility has marked the end of many ethnically defined and defended neighborhoods. Racket subcultures vanish as residents become educated, find well-paying jobs, and move to the suburbs. But in some suburbs—think of where television's "Tony Soprano" lives—the tradition has moved with its adherents.

Although various types of conventional crime are open to everyone, "things are somewhat more complicated where organized crime is concerned" (Kleiman and de Poot 2008: 74). In organized crime, social relations are of greater importance, and illegal business relationships have to be built up: "Not everyone has suitable social ties and building up such relationships takes time and energy" (2008: 75). This is of particular importance in criminal activities that are transactional: smuggling drugs, arms, stolen vehicles, human trafficking for sexual exploitation, and money laundering. The very complexity of transactional organized crime may require going beyond one's own social circle. This is facilitated by the understanding discussed in Chapter 1, and acquiring credentials requires affiliation with a known and respected (at least in criminal circles) criminal organization. In some perhaps

many cases, however, persons with specific skills or occupations, such as those involving transportation and finance, may be drawn into a criminal organization through a serendipitous social relationship with an organized crime network—*social opportunity* (Kleiman and de Poot 2008). Such persons are relatively late starters who do not follow a career path from juvenile delinquency to adult crime. In neighborhoods where the organized crime tradition continues, or among persons who have access to a requisite social network, why do young people who have the opportunity choose not to become contenders for positions in organized crime? *Social control theory* offers an explanation.

Social Control Theory

Social control refers to those processes by which the community influences its members toward conformance with established norms of behavior. The primary mechanism for inculcating conventional norms and values is the family, and the strength of the parent-child bond is seen as the main determinant of delinquent behavior. Social control theorists argue that the relevant question is not, "Why do persons become involved in crime, organized or otherwise?" but rather, "Why do most persons conform to societal norms?" If a control theory generally assumes, most persons are sufficiently motivated by the potential rewards to commit criminal acts, why do only a few make crime a career? According to social control theories, "delinquent acts result when an individual's bond to society is weak or broken" (Hirschi 1969: 16). The strength of this bond is determined by external and internal restraints. In other words, external and internal restraints determine whether we move in the direction of crime or of law-abiding behavior.

External restraints include social disapproval linked to public shame and/or social ostracism and fear of punishment. In other words, people are typically deterred from criminal behavior by the possibility of being caught and the punishment that can result, ranging from public shame to imprisonment (and, in extreme cases, capital punishment). In neighborhoods or among subcultural groups with social sentiments favorable to organized crime,

Public shame/social ostracism is ineffective. Only the threat of imprisonment can offer a deterrent.

The strength of official deterrence—force of law—is measured according to two dimensions: risk versus reward. Risk involves the ability of the criminal justice system to detect, apprehend, and convict the offender. The amount of risk is weighed against the potential reward. Both risk and reward, however, are relative to one's socioeconomic situation. In other words, the less one has to lose, the greater is the willingness to engage in risk. In the words of Bob Dylan singing "Like a Rolling Stone": "When you ain't got nothin', you got nothin' to lose." And the greater the reward, the greater is the willingness to engage in risk.

This theory explains why persons in deprived economic circumstances would be more willing to engage in criminal behavior, while for college students the risk of a criminal record is generally sufficient for deterrence. However, the potential reward and a perception of relatively low risk can also explain why persons in more advantaged economic circumstances would engage in nonremunerative criminal behavior such as corporate crime.

Latent reasons include what psychoanalytic theory refers to as the superego (discussed later): an unconscious, yet powerful, conscience-like mechanism that provides a sense of guilt. According to Sigmund Freud, conscience is not something that is a part of us from the very beginning of our lives. It is a controlling mechanism that develops out of the relationship with, and influence of, our parents. In the adult who experienced "healthy" parental relationships as a child, the superego takes the place of the controlling parental function. Dysfunction during early stages of childhood development, or parental influences that are not normative, result in an adult who is devoid of prosocial internal controls; some refer to this as psycho- or sociopathy, or antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), characterized by a combination of antisocial behavior and emotional detachment (discussed later).

Ethnic Succession

Although America had organized crime before Prohibition (1920s-30s), it "was intimately associated with shabby local politics and corrupt police forces"; there was no organized crime activity "in the syndicate style" (King 1969: 23). The "Great Experiment" was a catalyst that canceled organized crime, especially violent forms, to blossom into an important force in American society. Prohibition mobilized criminal elements in an unprecedented manner. Pre-Prohibition crime, insofar as it was organized, centered on corrupt political machines, vice entrepreneurs, and, at the bottom, gangs. The competitive violence of Prohibition turned the power structure upside down. It also led to a new level of criminal organization.

In order to be profitable, the liquor business, licit or illicit, demands large-scale organization. Raw material must be purchased and shipped to manufacturing sites. This requires trucks, drivers, mechanics, warehousemen, and laborers. Manufacturing efficiency and profit are maximized by economies of scale. This requires large buildings where the whiskey, beer, or wine can be manufactured, bottled, and placed in cartons for storage and distribution to wholesale outlets or saloons and taverns. If the substances are to be smuggled—ships, boats, and their crews are required, as well as trucks, drivers, mechanics, laborers, and warehouses. And there is the obvious need to physically protect shipments through the employment of armed gangs. "As illegal entrepreneurs," notes Mark Halle (1984: 142), bootleggers "also had to learn to use legal institutions to service their illegal enterprises; they had to learn banking to handle their money, insurance to protect their ships, and the methods of incorporation to gain control of chemical and cosmetics companies from which they diverted industrial alcohol. They also dealt with varied legitimate companies to purchase trucks, boats, copper tubing, corn sugar, bottles, and blocks." Businessmen who had previously been involved in the legal liquor industry did not remain in business during Prohibition; this left the field open to opportunistic amateurs, often violent young men who had heretofore been left behind in the race for economic success. Bootlegging "was a relatively open field of endeavor and allowed ambitious young Italians and Jews (as well

as some Poles and Irishmen) to catapult to quick success" (Haller 1974: 3). It brought Jewish criminals into prominence. A study of New York's top bootleggers in the late 1920s found that about half were Jewish; 25 percent were Irish and 25 percent were Italian (Haller 2014).

With the onset of the Great Depression (1929) and the subsequent repeal of Prohibition (1933), the financial base of organized crime narrowed considerably. Many players dropped out: Some went into legitimate enterprises or employment; others drifted into conventional criminality. Bootlegging required trucks, drivers, mechanics, garages, warehouses, bookkeepers, and lawyers—all and assets that could be converted to noncriminal endeavors. For those who remained in crime, reorganization was necessary. "When prohibition ended in 1933, bootleggers were still young men—generally in their thirties—yet with wealth and autosizable contacts that had grown out of their bootlegging enterprises. In addition to their liquor interests, they already had substantial investments in restaurants, nightclubs, gambling, and other profitable businesses. In the 1930s and 1940s, then, they used their national contacts, diverse interests, and available capital to cooperate in a variety of entrepreneurial activities, legal and illegal" (Haller 1974: 5-6).

During the decades following World War II, organized crime underwent considerable change. It became increasingly clear that in the United States, organized crime was dominated mainly by Italians—the Irish, except for small pockets in New York and Boston, were no longer involved. And although the sons of Jewish immigrants played a vital role in organized crime, by the third generation, the Jews had moved out. Jackson Toby (1938: 348) explains:

Jews and Italian came to the United States in large numbers at about the same time—the turn of the century—and both settled in urban areas. There was, however, a very different attitude toward intellectual accomplishments in the two cultures. Jews from Eastern Europe regarded study as the most important activity for an adult male.

The rabbi enjoyed great prestige because he was a scholar, a teacher, a logician. He advised the community on the application of the Written and Oral Law. Life in America gave a secular emphasis to the Jewish reverence for learning. Material success is a more important motive than salvation for American youngsters, Jewish as well as Christian, and secular education is better training for business and professional careers than Talmudic exegesis. Nevertheless, intellectual achievement continued to be valued by Jews—and to have measurable effects. Second-generation Jewish students did homework diligently, got high grades, went to college in disproportionate numbers, and scored high on intelligence tests. Two thousand years of preparation lay behind them.

Immigrants from southern Italy, on the other hand, tended to regard formal education either as a fad or as a source of dangerous ideas from which the minds of the young should be protected. They remembered Sicily, where a child who attended school regularly was a rarity. There, youngsters were needed—only to help on the farm. Equally important was the fact that hard-working peasants could not understand why their children should learn classical Italian (which they would not speak at home) or geography (when they would not travel in their lifetimes more than a few miles from their birthplace). Sicilian parents suspected that education was an attempt on the part of Roman officials to subvert the authority of the family. In the United States, many southern Italian immigrants maintained the same attitudes. They restricted compulsory school attendance laws and prodded their children to go to work and become economic assets as soon as possible. They encouraged neglect of schoolwork and even truancy. They did not realize that education has more

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/3306b11d-7618-4e38-bc8f-bcaca320a10f

Page title: eBook: Organized Crime

Page number: 27

Section: EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME

Text: The Irish came first, and early in the century they dominated crime as well as big-city political machinations. As they came to control the political machinery of large cities they won wealth, power and respectability through subsequent control of construction, trucking, public utilities and the waterfront. By the 1920s and the period of prohibition and speculation in the money markets and real estate, the Irish were succeeded in organized crime by the Jews, and Arnold Rothstein, Lipke Buchalter, and Garma Shapiro dominated gambling and labor racketeering for over a decade. The Jews quickly moved into the world of business and the professions as more legitimate avenues to economic and social mobility. The Italians came next. (1974: 13-14)

Text: The pool of available candidates for membership in organized crime dwindled in Jewish communities. In Italian communities it remained adequate enough; the large-scale organizations needed to profit from Prohibition were no longer

Text: importance in an urban-industrial society than in a semi-rural one. With supportive motivation from home lacking, the second-generation Italian boys did not make the effort of Jewish contemporaries. Their teachers tried to stuff the curriculum into their heads in vain. Their lack of interest was reflected not only in low marks, tardiness, truancy, and early school leaving; it even resulted in poor scores on intelligence tests. They accepted their parents' conception of the school as worthless and thereby lost their best opportunity for social ascent.

Text: David Bell (1964) refers to crime as an American way of life. "A Queer Ladder of Social Mobility." He points out that the "jungle quality of the American business community, particularly at the turn of the century, was reflected in the mode of 'business' practiced by the coarse gangster elements, most of them from non-immigrant families, who were 'springing ahead' just as Horatio Alger had urged" (1964: 116). Francis Loun (1974) notes that this "queer ladder" had organized crime as the first rung:

Section: JEWS AND ORGANIZED CRIME

Text: Arnold Rothstein, considered the "godfather" of organized crime in America, was the wayward son of a pious Jewish businessman. "A. R." or "The Brain," as author Gordon Kuylen called him, was born in New York in 1882 and "set new and historic standards in the development of organized crime in America" (Barey 1991: 50). He "transformed criminal activity from a haphazard, often spontaneous endeavor into one whose hallmarks—specialized expertise, administrative hierarchy, and organizational procedure—correspond to the classic sociological model of a bureaucracy. Thus, Rothstein's illegal business had a definite administrative structure based on specific skills, competence and not ethnic pedigree determined one's rank and, of course, one's position in the world" (Loun 1983: 143).

Text: Rothstein's office... in the middle of the midtown business district, employed a staff comparable to that of any large (and legitimate) commercial firm, replete with secretaries, bookkeepers, and legal counsel... A decision to enter some new illegal venture tended to be based, not on personal motives of revenge or power but on strictly commercial considerations: the amount of profit to be made and the length of time it would take to make it. Finally, by investing the money he earned through illegal channels into legal enterprises such as real estate and the theater, Rothstein made it difficult to ascertain where the illegal enterprises left off and the legitimate one began. (Gowis 1983: 44)

Text: The murderous labor racketeer Louis "Lepke" Buchalter had three brothers; one earned a Ph.D., became a rabbi and college professor, the second became a pharmacist; the third a dentist. Lepke died in Sing Sing's electric chair in 1944.

Page navigation: Previous page, Next page

System tray: 9:27 PM 3/8/2021

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bryteware, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/c42b818d-ecb3-4b5c-87fe-45b81b8faffc

Page title: eBook: Organized Crime

Page number: 30

Section: CHAPTER 2

Text: necessary. In Chicago, for example, during the height of Prohibition, Al Capone is reported to have employed seven hundred gunmen for an organization that involved thousands of people. There are few if any of the signs of the Capone legacy left in contemporary Chicago.

Text: According to the ethnic succession thesis, each successive immigrant group experienced assimilation to which some members reacted by assuming in accord with a tradition that had been established by earlier predatory American entrepreneurs—the "Rothbar Business." Ethnic succession results when a group experiences success in crime, and legitimate opportunities thereby become more readily available. Strain subsides, and the group moves out of organized crime, creating an opportunity for innovation for the succeeding immigrant group. According to this thesis, persons involved in organized crime are not committed to a deviant subculture but are merely using available, albeit illegal, opportunity to achieve economic success. Letizia Polvi and Peter Reener (2008) state that blocked opportunity and the "queer ladder" may also explain participation in organized crime by members of the immigrant community in Europe.

Text: More than four decades ago, Francis Loun stated that ethnic succession is continuing, that "the Italian are leaving or being pushed out of organized crime [and] they are being replaced by the new wave of migrants to the city: blacks and Puerto Ricans" (1974: 14). Although they might not have been obvious to Loun when he was conducting his research in New York, today we would have to add, among others, Albanians, Chinese, Colombians, Mexicans, Nigerians, Russians, and certain motorcycle clubs. According to the ethnic succession thesis, involvement in organized crime is simply a rational response to economic conditions; organized crime can be understood as a rational choice for responding to economic.

Text: Other theorists reject this one-dimensional view. Organized crime, they argue, provides important psychic rewards and meaningful social structures. In the Northeast, young Italian American males from middle-class circumstances continue to be drawn by the allure of the American Mafia—a

Text: romanization of the mob kept alive in certain neighborhoods—endowed—and reinforced by media representations. Being "connected" brings prestige, and in the social environment inhabited by winery-guns, restaurants, nightclubs—a privileged status is evident. The "winoids" culture is socialized into an exciting world where he cogently adopts the attitude-behavior pattern, and even the clothing styles exemplified by winoids.

Text: An example was the rise of a notorious gang of Italian American hoodlums in the Pleasant Avenue section of Harlem. Dubbed the Purple Gang, apparently after the murderous Detroit (Jewish) mob of Prohibition days, they were used as "muscle" and executioners in many gangland murders, and their reputation for violence made them very useful to the Mafia leadership. The Purple Gang has been involved in numerous rackets, particularly drug trafficking, which is facilitated by their contacts with young men of other ethnic backgrounds who have access to important quantities of heroin and cocaine. In his study of some members of the Purple Gang, Peter Lupata (1983) found that they tend to have been born between 1946 and 1951 and to be third-generation Italian Americans who are related by blood and marriage. Even though they come from the Pleasant Avenue neighborhood, most reside in the Bronx or suburban Westchester County. "They are now, like many New York suburbanite businessmen, commuters to the old neighborhood for work, money, and voting rather than residents" (1983: 76). Many Purple Gang members have been "made"—inducted into membership in traditional New York organized crime families. Similar groups have been identified.

Text: Journalist Mike McAlay (1998) followed the exploits of a group of young Italian American known as the "Tanglewood Boys"—they used the Tanglewood Shopping Center in suburban Yonkers, New York, as a hangout. Six of the post-adolescent gangsters had fathers who were members of New York's organized crime families. The Tanglewood Boys committed armed robberies and murders, some for personal reasons, others for reasons related to business.

Page navigation: Previous page, Next page

System tray: 9:28 PM 3/8/2021

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/2c1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/ac0de66a-6186-4b3f-ac9a-e79763c0204a

Page 31: EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME

In Queens, the "Gambino crew" consisted of young men who worked for three New York City crime families—their hangout is the Cafe Gemini on Fresh Pond Road in Ridgewood. They began their criminal careers in the late 1980s as a violent street gang affiliated with an older set of men, the Ridgewood Boys, some of whom had ties to organized crime. Federal officials describe the group as a "firm team" for organized crime. In 2001, when one of the Gemini crew, age 28, pled guilty to racketeering, he described several murders as if they were trips to the dry clean-ers (Four 2001). One of the crew members, whose father is serving a life sentence for his involvement in the "Pizza Connection" heroin case (discussed later), became a made guy in the Bonanno Family (Marozzi 2004). Anthony ("Ace") Aiello was described by the Family boss as "Lusa Brasi," a reference to the hulking and maddening enforcer in the *Godfather* novel and film. In 2005, Aiello, 26, was arrested in Syracuse while a fugitive following the 2004 murder of a mob associate (Marozzi and Lerner 2005). Another Queens crew of young "wannabes," dubbed the "Young Guns," reported to a Gambino Family boss and worked in New York and Florida. In addition to armored car and bank robberies, crew members were responsible for at least four murders (McPhee 2003).

In New York, an organized crime insider explained to the writer that although older wiseguys may try to hide organized crime affiliations from their offspring, the sons and daughters discover the truth during adolescence. He noted that without any encouragement—and even with discouragement—from their fathers, some of these young men take advantage of their fathers' reputations to form crews of organized crime aspirants. What they are attracted by is the allure of organized crime—of wiseguys, chic and lifestyle.

Fifty-six organized crime, states Lapina (1981: 22), is not based on blocked opportunities, that is, on anomie or strain. Rather, it "is a rational choice, rooted in one pervasive aspect of our values, namely, that only 'suckers' work, and that in our society, one is at liberty to take 'suckers' and work

easy money." The wiseguys attitude is exemplified by Paul ("Pud") Vano, a powerful associate in the Lucchese Family. Vano associate Henry Hill (Pilliga 1985: 20) reports:

Paulie was always asking me for stolen credit cards whenever he and his wife, Phyllis, were going out for the night. Paulie called stolen credit cards "Midlows," and he always said that liquor tastes better on a Midlow. The fact that a guy like Paul Vano, a cop in the Lucchese crime family, would even consider going out on a social occasion with his wife and run the risk of getting caught using a stolen credit card might surprise some people. But if you know wiseguys you would know right away that the best part of the night for Paulie came from the fact that he was getting over on somebody.

With a great deal of might, Pilliga (1985: 30) captures the wiseguys attitude toward society: "They lived in an environment awash in crime, and those who did not partake were simply viewed as prey. To live otherwise was foolish. Anyone who stood waiting his turn on the American pay line was bound to be contemptuous." According to the view, organized crime comprises a deviant subculture to which members have a commitment that is not mitigated by the absence of strain. As one Gambino crime Family member told a reporter: "We don't want to be part of your world. We don't want to belong to country clubs" (Eckstein 1990: 181). Benjamin ("Lefty") Ruggiero of the Bonanno Family explained: "As a wiseguys you can lie, you can cheat, you can steal, you can kill people—legitimately. You can do any goddamn thing you want, and nobody can say anything about it. Who wouldn't want to be a wiseguys?" (Passaro 1987: 330). As former undercover FBI agent Joe Patrone (2004: 9) points out:

Wiseguys exist as a bizarre parallel universe, a world where justice and corruption are the norms, and where the righteous that most ordinary people hold dear—

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/2c1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/1ff641c-141a-4d0e-b306-0eb551a25260

Page 32: CHAPTER 2

working good jobs, being with family, living an honest life—are seen as the crime of the weak and the stupid. Wiseguys resemble us in many ways, but make no mistake, they might as well be from another planet, so alien and abnormal are their thoughts and habits.

Lanza (1972) describes the "Lapines," his pseudonym for the Italian organized crime family he studied, whose core members are all related by blood or marriage. In the fourth generation, "only four out of twenty-seven males are involved in the family business organization. The rest are doctors, lawyers, college teachers, or run their own businesses" (1972: 193). In New York, however, young men raised in comfortable middle-class circumstances have advanced into organized crime in a more violent way. Roy DeMeo of Brooklyn, for example, a second-generation American of Neapolitan heritage, became a lion shark while still in his teens. His uncle was a star prosecutor at the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office. But at age 32, to protect an extortion scheme run with his partner, a member of the Gambino Family, Roy committed his first murder—a solo job using a silenced-equipped pistol. He subsequently put together a crew of active criminals from the (middle-class) Canastota section of Brooklyn. Their first murder victim, a car dealer who was testifying against them before a Brooklyn grand jury, was kidnapped, stabbed repeatedly, and dismembered. The medical examiner who handled the case, Dr. Dominick DiMiano, did not know that his cousin, Roy DeMeo—his branch of the family picked the name differently—was responsible for the murder. DeMeo was initiated into the Gambino Family, and his crew eventually killed and usually dismembered an estimated two hundred people, most of the bodies were never found. In fact, contrary to mob custom, Roy DeMeo killed murder-for-hire in his employer and, against the edict of the Gambino Family boss, dealt in cocaine. One of DeMeo's leading assassins was arrested and began providing evidence against the Gambino Family. Soon afterward, in 1983, at age 42, DeMeo was the victim of a volley of shots fired into his head at close range (Mottam and Caputo 1990; Caputo 2003).

A meeting between John Gotti, boss of the Gambino Family, and Vincent ("Chin") Gigante, boss of the Genovese Family, revealed their different attitudes toward offspring following them into organized crime. Gambino underboss Sam Gravano reports: "One thing I'll never forget from that meeting, was John telling Chin in sort of a posed way that his son, John Junior, had just been made. Chin said, 'Jeez, I'm sorry to hear that.'" (Mass 1997: 239–40). A journalist quotes Colombo Family associate Salvatore ("Big Sal"—350 pounds) Mezzota: "Only a real gasser [wiseguys] wants for his kids what we got...knots and wannabes are who's attracted to this life now" (J. Goldberg 1999: 27). The thinking of Italian neighborhoods, notes Ronald Goldstock, former director of the New York State Organized Crime Task Force, "results in a lack of gangs, which means that there are no minor leagues to supply the mapan" (J. Goldberg 1999: 71).

According to the theory of ethnic succession, organized crime in the United States has been a device for achieving social mobility by disadvantaged segments of the population. With social and economic success, the formerly disadvantaged exit crime in favor of conventional lives. This has affected the American Mafia, which has difficulty attracting prospective members from traditional "mob neighborhoods" such as the Pleasant Avenue section of East Harlem and the southwest Brooklyn neighborhood of Bensonhurst.

In the summer, "Fat Tony" Salerno, boss of the Genovese Family, could often be found sitting in front of his pet shop on Pleasant Avenue, which during the Harlem riots of the 1960s was left strangely unviolated. "Fat Tony" a gasser—he died in prison in 1992—and so is the mob. The fire social clubs are no more and Pleasant Avenue, a short street, spanning just six blocks from 114th Street to 120th Street, is no longer an Italian

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/0bffe00-107b-456b-b86a-44ab49a5f1cc

Page Header: eBook: Organized Crime 32 EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME

Table of Contents (left sidebar):

- Cover
- Title
- Statement
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime
- Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Defining "Organized Crime"
- The Structure of Organized Crime
- Franchise/Organizing
- Criminal Research and Behavior
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Organized Crime and Terrorism
- Summary of Chapter 1
- Review Questions for Chapter 1
- Ch 2: Explanations for Organized Crime
- Chapter 2 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Sociology of Organized Crime
- The Psychology of Organized Crime
- History of Human

Text (left column):

enclave, but a Mack, Puerto Rican, and Mexican one (Fernandez 2010).

When I worked in Bensonhurst during the late 1960s, the well-maintained homes characteristic of the area had sidewalks that were washed down several times a week by homeowners. An attendant—and only an attendant would do this—who dropped an empty pack of cigarettes was politely asked to pick it up. Failure to comply meant an unpleasant confrontation with some of the area's law-abiding residents. Today, on Bath Avenue, Bensonhurst's main commercial strip, the stereotypical shops are gone and it is nearly impossible to find any trace of its mid past (Fernandez 2007).

Though many young men appear to enjoy playing the swaggy role—often outfitted with large puka rings, gold chains, and other symbols of gangster chic—many are neither bright nor tough. As journalist George Anastasia notes, "They value form over substance" (1998: 25). The long neighborhood-based apprenticeships through which organized crime chooses the cream of the "swaggy" are history. Those accepted into membership are often not the tough, street-smart, stand-up kids of yesteryear, but rather social failures and potential informants quick to play "I've got a secret"—turn on their closest associates to avoid incarceration.

Text (right column):

of a restrictive immigration statute that had discriminated against southern and eastern European" (PCOC 1986: 53). Any number are related to members of the American Mafia in New York. According to police sources in New York City, some of these Zips have been admitted to membership in American Mafia Families, and many more are operating in their own association independent of, but in cooperation with, traditional crime groups. They have been particularly active in drug trafficking. Using drug profits, Zips have opened strip malls containing bakeries, tobacco shops, coffee newspaper stands, and laundromat service operations. They are essentially reproducing the small-scale neighborhood life in which organized crime has traditionally felt most comfortable.

The American Mafia has a demand for criminal labor, particularly in the highly rewarding but dangerous enterprise of drug trafficking. Southern Italy has provided a vast labor market for American Mafia drug trafficking operations. "In southern Italy, night and summer groups can rely on a 'reserve army' of individuals prepared to enlarge their own—and other people's—lives in the execution of especially risky and violent tasks, because the problems of inner-city environment and youth unemployment are growing continually worse in the Mezzogiorno, so that the supply of criminal labor is continually increasing" (Mafachi 1986: 194).

Ties between the American Mafia and the Zips were highlighted during the "Pizza Connection" case concluded in 1987. Former Sicilian Mafia boss Tommaso Boscora was a prosecution witness in the trial of twenty-two defendants.¹ A Mafia group headed by Gaetano Badalamenti, then (a, an ousted associate) Gian Carlo Sudy, was found to have supplied heroin with a total value in excess of \$1.6 billion to a group headed by Salvatore ("Totò") Catalano, then (a, a captain in the Bonanno crime Family of New York, Canada) arrived in the United

Footnote 1: Tom Boscora, did face a college education. Two able "blacks," three Catholics, one of two Carlo Catalano and a graduate in the crime family, and (a) Tom, one of the United States family, an college graduate.

Footnote 2: For an exciting gangster book, see the "Pizza Connection" investigation, or the book by Tom Boscora (1987).

Footnote 3: Catalano is serving a three-year federal sentence. Badalamenti, a 60, died in 1987 while serving a life term for the same reasons.

Page Footer: Jump to Page 33 / 434

Browser tabs: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Brytewave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

Address bar: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/d535042f-836c-470f-b6c6-666a7ee8ab3b

Page Header: eBook: Organized Crime 34 CHAPTER 2

Table of Contents (left sidebar):

- Cover
- Title
- Statement
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime
- Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Defining "Organized Crime"
- The Structure of Organized Crime
- Franchise/Organizing
- Criminal Research and Behavior
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Organized Crime and Terrorism
- Summary of Chapter 1
- Review Questions for Chapter 1
- Ch 2: Explanations for Organized Crime
- Chapter 2 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Sociology of Organized Crime
- The Psychology of Organized Crime
- History of Human

Text (left column):

States from Sicily in 1961 and headed a crew of Zips in the Kenderbaker Avenue section of Brooklyn. The Sicilian defendants purchased morphine base in Turkey and processed it in Sicily. Pizza parlors in the United States owned by the defendants were used to facilitate the drug trafficking.

Two men implicated in the case were with Bonanno crime Family underboss Carmine Galante in a Brooklyn restaurant when he was shot down in 1977. Baldo Assano (born in 1932) and Cosmo Bonocore (born in 1951), both Zips and cousins of Joseph Bonanno, for whom the Family is named, helped set up Galante's murder on behalf of Family boss Phil Rando's Sicilian-born partner Gaetano Scarsia, at 65, a major heroin dealer and Bonanno Family associate in charge of a crew of Zips, was shot at close range in 1999, and his body dumped on a Bronx street (Capeci 1998). In 2006, the *New York Daily News* reported that the acting head of the Bonanno Family is Sicilian-born Sal ("The Ironworker") Montagna (Marzulli 2006). In 2011, the newspaper reported that the new head of the Gambino Family is Sicilian-born Domenico Cefalo, a low-profile ex-con who resides with his mother in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn (Marzulli 2011).

One of the important Zip drug organizations was led by several Sicilian cousins of Carlo Gambino and headquartered in Cherry Hill, New Jersey:

Although related to the late crime boss Carlo Gambino of New York, the New Jersey Gambino drug operations are independent from the New York family.

There are direct lines of communication and influence based on actual blood ties between the New Jersey Gambinos and other traditional organized crime families in New York. Gambino family members own significant interests in the pizza industry in South Jersey and parts of

Text (right column):

Pennsylvania. These businesses have been used for concealing illegal immigrants, for laundering money, and for storing drugs. They are known to have employed illegal aliens and other nonfamily members who were more experienced in drug trafficking to smuggle heroin into and transport it within the United States. (PM 1983: 134)

The Zips and their American counterparts "share similar customs, criminal philosophies and a common heritage. The prototype of the crime Family is identical in each system" (PCOC 1986: 53). In criminal and law enforcement circles, however, their "Old World" ways have earned the Zips more fear and respect than their American counterparts. Just how many Zips are in the United States is not clear, but they are believed to be concentrated in the Northeast, particularly in the New York City area. Other groups are known to be located in Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Philadelphia, Houston, and Dallas.

Successful federal prosecutions using the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute (to be discussed in Chapter 13) have thinned the ranks of the American Mafia—particularly the long, double-digit seniority typically handed down. Whether or not the Italian American community and the Zips will be able to provide sufficient replacements to keep the American Mafia viable in the Northeast in the years to come remains an open question.

Prohibition was the turning point that allowed Jews and Italians to ascend the crooked ladder provided by participation in organized crime. In the United States, culture conflict between earlier and later immigrants created a demand from the latter for goods and services outlawed by the former. This led to the creation of gambling syndicates and infamous criminal organizations of the Prohibition era. Today, alcohol and various forms of gambling are legally available in most areas of the country, but the outlawing of certain chemicals enjoyed by a large minority of the population provides continuing incentive and opportunity for criminal innovation. Though the Jews, largely in New York, were the next group to dominate organized crime, they

Footnote 1: In 2014, Assano, 83, was arrested on the same charges for the 1987 murder.

Footnote 2: In 1996, the body of Bonocore was found washed into New York's Hudson River, his wife's car.

Page Footer: Jump to Page 34 / 434

Navigation: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bystwave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/13fa9132-59ef-4831-8394-7caed6420352

eBook: Organized Crime

- Cover
- Title
- Statement
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime
- Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Defining "Organized Crime"
- The Structure of Organized Crime
- Frontlines/Criminalizing
- Criminal Research and Solvers
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Organized Crime and Terrorism
- Summary of Chapter 1
- Review Questions for Chapter 1
- Ch 2: Explanations for Organized Crime
- Chapter 2 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- The Psychology of Organized Crime
- Psychology of Human

Jump to Page: 35 / 434

eBook: Organized Crime

EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME 35

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZED CRIME

While sociology helps explain why persons in certain environments would be motivated to get involved in organized crime, most people similarly situated do not become involved. Thus, while sociological theories may help identify societal variables that motivate involvement in organized crime, they fail to explain why only a small fraction of persons exposed to such variables actually become criminals. Why do people exposed to the same milieu react differently? Psychology, a discipline that focuses on the individual, provides some answers.

The discipline of psychology consists of two parts: one is grounded, more or less, in psychoanalytic theory and may be referred to as clinical psychology; the other emerged from the experimental laboratory and may be referred to as experimental psychology or behaviorism. Behaviorism is based on learning theory and places emphasis on the objective, measurable investigation of individual action and reaction. A behaviorism textbook typically has numerous photos and drawings of small animals, mostly pigeons and rats, as well as many graphs and charts.

Clinical Psychology/Psychoanalytic Theory

Clinical psychology is based, to various extents, on psychoanalytic theory, a body of work followed by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939). Over the years the theory has undergone change, although Freud's basic contribution, his exposition of the importance of phenomena of the unconscious in human behavior, remains. Personality is strongly influenced by determinants in the unconscious that develop early in life. Simply put, this concept argues that the most important determinants of our behavior are not available as our conscious thought (Chavinger 2004). These determinants evolve during early stages of psychological development.

A delicate balance is maintained by unconscious forces as a person experiences various socio-cultural and biological aspects of existence. When the balance is upset, the psyche passes from the normal to the psychoneurotic or the psychotic (mental illness). That a fine line exists between the normal and the neurotic and between the neurotic and the psychotic is basic to psychoanalytic theory. In fact, only a difference of degree separates the "normal" from the "abnormal." The degree to which there is a malfunctioning in psychic apparatus to the degree to which a person is "abnormal" or "sick," that is, socially dysfunctional.

Control to the psychoanalytic explanation for crime is the superego, a conscience-like mechanism whose function is to control the person from antisocial behavior. According to August Aichhorn (1963: 221), "the superego takes its form and content from identifications which result from the child's effort to control the parent. It is evolved not only because the parent loves the child, but also because the child fears the parent's demands." If the superego does not attain full strength, the person is more likely to act on primitive impulses, often of a violent nature. This is exemplified by the psychopath.

The Psychopathic Personality

The psychopath does not experience the normal bipartite structure of id, ego, and superego. The

Navigation: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Bystwave, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/3590d614-b021-48e5-953d-8b96b67f3bf3

eBook: Organized Crime

- Cover
- Title
- Statement
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- Ch 1: Introduction to Organized Crime
- Chapter 1 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- Defining "Organized Crime"
- The Structure of Organized Crime
- Frontlines/Criminalizing
- Criminal Research and Solvers
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Organized Crime and Terrorism
- Summary of Chapter 1
- Review Questions for Chapter 1
- Ch 2: Explanations for Organized Crime
- Chapter 2 Will Enable the Reader to Understand
- The Psychology of Organized Crime
- Psychology of Human

Jump to Page: 36 / 434

eBook: Organized Crime

CHAPTER 2

absence of a superego is the result of "failure of internalizations that often begin with imitation of the parents' behavior, but then expand to include family, school and community norms and rules." In short, there is a failure to internalize rules. "The psychopathic adult is a valueless person" (Meky and Sliva 2007: 341). Psychopaths exhibit a lack of conscience, superficial charm, high verbal skills, and a lack of long-term interpersonal bonds. They are characterized by low arousal, a low resting heart rate, and fearlessness. There is speculation that psychopaths have been victims of child abuse who turn off their emotions to reduce the abuse impact. This coping strategy contributes to the development of a psychopath who as an adult appears as a "hardened" person with a strong, tough demeanor (Porter 1996).

Psychopaths are motivated only by the fear of punishment, which alone cannot exercise adequate control over antisocial impulses. Such persons suffer little or no guilt as a result of engaging in socially harmful behavior. They are characterized by a combination of antisocial behavior and emotional detachment (Black with Larson 1999) exemplified by a willingness to murder persons against whom they harbor no personal animosity. The modification characters portrayed by Joe Pesci in the movies *GoodFellas* and *Casino* exemplify this type of personality, as does the DiMaso faction of the Gambino Family discussed earlier. Gambino Family underboss Sammy Gravano recalls his first murder—he shot a close friend in the back of the head on orders from the Colombo Family: "Am I supposed to feel remorse? Amn't I supposed to feel something? But I felt nothing like remorse, if anything, I felt good. I felt high. Like powerful, maybe even superhuman. It's not that I was happy or proud of myself. Not

that. I'm still not happy about that feeling. It's just that killing came so easy to me" (Man 1997: 52). A member of the Mexican Mafia (discussed in Chapter 3) reports, "You start to enjoy it [murder] after the first time, to see a person plead and cry for help, literally to pray to you like a saint. And you just get hooked up, the blood and everything, it's just weird. It's a sickness" (Blackford 2016: 12). In 2014, a Camorra (discussed in Chapter 4) boss told an Italian court that he killed so many people that he cannot remember the exact number. A leader of the infamous Casalesi clan, he further revealed a psychopathic personality by violating his initiation oath never to betray the clan, becoming an informer (McKernan 2014).

The psychopathic criminal is totally without conscience, capable of unrepentant acts, and shows no external signs of psychoses or neuroses. He came to the bar for his wife: "You've got two kids at home who need dinner and we need you to get out of here." When she said she wanted to have another drink with her friends, members of the Mongols motorcycle club, they interrupted: "Fuck you then bitch, and fuck the Mongols." Daniel headed for the door but was intercepted: Mongols beat and stabbed him, and his life ended fenderless on the pavement (Queen 2007).

Gregory Scarpa, a member of the Colombo Family known as "The Green Rooster," was suspected (correctly) of being an FBI informer because of his uncanny ability to avoid arrest and prosecution. One member of his crew recalls (Connolly 1996: 56): "We all suspected something, but a few days later we were in the club with Greg and a guy he hated. We're talking and joking, and out of nowhere, Greg whip out a piece and shoots the

DEMO'S 'BUTCHER SHOP'

Killings typically took place in a Brooklyn apartment. When the victim arrived, he would be shot with a silencer-equipped gun, and a towel was wrapped around his head to stop the blood. He would then be stabbed in the heart to stop the blood from pumping.

and the body would be placed in the shower to bleed him. He was then placed on a pool liner in the living room, dismembered, and wrapped in plastic bags that were placed in cardboard boxes and taken to a nearby dump (Koppe 2003).

Navigation: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Browsable, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/6af585f8-4972-46c8-8c4a-6310512b5e2

Page: 37

Section: EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME

Text:

... in the head... The guy's brain was all over me. My car was ruing from the gunshot. Good as he can be, he told us to roll the body in the rug and get rid of it. Nobody doubted Greg after that day." Giovanni Brusca—the Sicilian mafioso who flipped the switch resulting in the death of prosecutor Giovanni Falcone and his wife (discussed in Chapter 4)—was asked by a psychiatrist how many people he had killed. Typical of mafiosi, he could not remember: "Certainly more than 100, but less than 200" (Marin 2008: 84). Sicilian mafioso, mass Lectoria Paoli, "do not usually feel any sense of guilt or remorse when they kill somebody who is not a mafia member... since they do not consider the victim to be a human being and therefore do not view him as worthy of emotional involvement" (2003: 84-85).

"Psychopathy is defined by lack of empathy, insensitivity, grandiosity, callous and manipulative interpersonal interactions, and the inability to engage in socially deviant behavior. Psychopathy has been associated with aggression, recidivism, and other behaviors harmful to others" (Berkeley, Goss, and Kurlan 2013: 628). Superficially charming, psychopaths tend to make a good first impression and appear remarkably successful. Yet, they are largely devoid of any feelings of guilt and the capacity for empathy ("an affective response that stems from the comprehension of another's emotional state and is similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel") (Euse 2009: 353). Donald Carver (2010: 112) argues, however, that the psychopath has a well-developed capacity for empathy that "he employs to understand the minds of those he seeks to manipulate for his own ends." Knowing is not caring and the psychopath exhibits a "callous and remorseless disregard for the rights and feelings of others, and a pattern of chronic antisocial behavior" (Midy 1997: 636).

Psychopaths have a weak sense of loyalty. Anthony ("Clayton") Casso recalls his first murder, committed at the behest of the Lucchese Family: "For me it was just business. I didn't know the guy. I'd never seen him before. He had to go. That's all I knew. That's all I needed to know" (Carlo 2008: 83). Casso's long prison term, Casso, a Lucchese Family underboss, became a government informant. Even a blood-kin relationship has not been sufficient to engender loyalty. Frank Calabro is a Chicago Outfit loan shark with a particularly violent reputation—responsible for at least thirteen murders that involved beatings and lynchings. His younger brother Nick and his son Frank, Jr., participated in these activities. In an effort to secure immunity, Frank, Jr. became an informant against his father, revealing incriminating conversations with Frank, Sr. who was incarcerated at the time. Subsequently, Nick became an informant against his brother and pled guilty to participating in eight

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: A BRAIN DISEASE?

There is a great deal of evidence indicating that the brains of psychopaths are abnormal (Kiehl 2014). For whatever reason, their brains seem to work differently from neurotypicals and other psychologically disordered persons. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, clinical comparative studies of brain activity revealed differences in the brains of persons diagnosed as psychopaths (Blair et al. 1995, 2005). The application of the principles and techniques of neuroscience to understand the origins of antisocial behavior "gave rise to neurocriminology" (Marin 2013: 8).

Advances in brain imaging has led to the identification of specific areas of the brain responsible for behavior control and, hence, psychopathy (de Silva, Riga, and Salekin 2012). A horseshoe-shaped band of tissue nestled in the deepest recesses of the brain (limbic system) may be the area that malfunctions in psychopaths. "It includes clinical interrelated brain regions that register feelings and other sensations and assign emotional value to experiences. These brain regions also handle decision-making, high-level reasoning, and impulse control. People with brain damage in these areas tend to develop psychopathic traits and behaviors" (Kiehl and Buckholtz 2010: 27).

Navigation: New Tab, Ebooks - Webreader.io, My Account, Library Browsable, Twelfth Edition, My Home, Ebooks - Webreader.io

URL: ebooks.cnreader.com/#!/reader/Zc1dc533-eac5-4fca-ad75-cd9288b9458c/page/6ebf28fb-390d-47b5-8c0d-a53ae9bdf816

Page: 38

Section: CHAPTER 2

Text:

murder. Frank, Sr., was sentenced to life in prison in 2009 and died in federal prison at 75. Nick received twelve years, and Frank, Jr., entered the Witness Security Program. John Francisco, Jr., son of Colombo crime family boss John ("Sonny") Frankie, became an informant and testified against his father who in 2011, at age 93, was sentenced to eight years in prison.

Behavioral Psychology/Learning Theory

John B. Watson (1878-1958) first used the term behaviorism more than one hundred years ago when he authored "Psychology as the Behaviorist Sees It" in 1913. Watson was influenced by the work of the Russian scientist and Nobel Prize winner Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936). In his most famous experiment, Pavlov sounded a bell just before presenting dogs with food, conditioning them to begin salivating every time he sounded the tone. For Watson, behavior is a physiological response to a given stimulus. In contrast to psychoanalytic theory, Watson saw no place in this process for the conscious or the unconscious. He remained, for others, but especially the American behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner, to explain the complex nature of these learning mechanisms.

Central to behavioral psychology is that all behavior is shaped by its consequences. Behavior is acquired through operant conditioning—a method of learning through positive and negative reinforcement that results from interaction with the environment. Through operant conditioning, an association is made between a behavior and a consequence for that behavior. If a person's "aggressive behavior has been rewarded, at least part of the time, no further explanation in terms of internal needs is necessary"; the person simply learns to behave aggressively (Nisbett et al. 2003: 47).

According to learning theory, antisocial behavior is the result of learning—that is, positive and negative reinforcement—directly from others (for example, peers) or the failure to learn how to discriminate between competing norms, both lawful and unlawful, because of inappropriate reinforcement. When conforming behavior is not adequately reinforced, a person can more easily be influenced by competing, albeit antisocial, sources of positive reinforcement (e.g., money and excitement from criminal behavior). The environment inhabited by organized crime is awash with reinforcement for antisocial behavior, while conventional, conforming behavior is frequently ridiculed.

NEUROLOGY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

The human body consists of cells organized into tissues. Specialized cells along the surface of the body receive information about the environment that is translated into electrochemical signals that we experience as sight, sound, smell, and touch. Information from the internal and external environment—collectively known as stimuli—is received by the central nervous system (CNS), consisting of the brain and the spinal cord, whose cells—neurons—send information to a specific processing center of the brain.

The brain, a dense mass weighing about three pounds and consisting of ten to fifty billion anatomically independent but functionally interrelated neurons ("brain cells"), is connected to the spinal cord by fibers and cells (the peripheral nervous system) that carry sensory information and muscle commands to the rest of the body. "This single organ controls all body activities, ranging from heart rate and sexual function to emotion, learning and memory" (Society for Neuroscience 2002: 5). After receiving and processing information, the brain sends commands to muscles and glands.

Neurons contain about one hundred different neurotransmitters, which are chemicals that when activated bind to receptors of an adjoining neuron in a "lock and key" action. Each neurotransmitter has a receptor site designed to receive it, triggering a particular response. Excitatory neurotransmitters such as dopamine, epinephrine, or norepinephrine trigger "fight or flight" mechanisms in response to perceived danger; endorphins produce a calming effect and aid in controlling pain and stress.

Chapter 2: Explanations for Organized Crime

39

EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME

A delicate balance of chemicals keeps information flowing to the brain, keeping humans alive and functioning.

The human brain is at great risk from biochemical imbalances, particularly as related to antisocial behavior. Those whose central nervous system quickly habituates to incoming stimuli owing to a neurotransmitter malfunction are most apt to be reinforced for engaging in antisocial behavior and less likely to learn alternative behavior patterns. Subjectively, such people regard many ordinary environments as boring and unpleasant and would therefore be more motivated than most people to seek novel and/or intense sensory stimulation. The behavior of such people includes impulsivity and risk taking (Elliott 1998).

Neurotransmitter levels are controlled by chemicals known as monoamine oxidases (MAO). Some individuals have elevated MAO, which lowers the levels of excitatory neurotransmitters, causing a state of depression. Early biographical persons may suffer from MAO overload. This condition could induce risk-taking, engaging in sports, mountain climbing, or sky-diving, for example, or crime. Low MAO activity is an apparent precursor for psychopathology and criminality. Furthermore, low-MAO persons exhibit a tendency toward aggressive outbursts, often in response to anger, fear, or frustration. Several studies report relationships between MAO deficiency and abnormal aggressive behavior in males (Stimuster et al. 1994; Ellis 1991; Sunderland 1985).

The neurotransmitter dopamine has received special attention because of its role in the regulation of mood and affect and its role in motivation and reward processes. This neurotransmitter is associated with regions of the brain that, among other important functions, produce the sensations associated with such pleasures as eating and sex. Dopamine is constantly released in small amounts in order to "keep the receiving cells in each brain region functioning at appropriate attention for current demands—neither too high or too low" (Nessler 2005: 3).

A variant of the dopamine receptor (D₂) is associated with novelty seeking; people with this genetic factor tend to be extroverted, quick-tempered, impulsive, and easily bored (Angier 1998). They possess a gene that makes them especially responsive to dopamine, and this is believed to be related to participation in dangerous, though not necessarily criminal activities, such as boxing and motorcycle racing (Rooscher 1997).

Persons with low levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin are more inclined toward aggression and violence than those with normal amounts. Because of this link, serotonin level is a rough predictor of criminal behavior. While the correlation between serotonin and crime is clear, it is unclear whether the environment influences the serotonin level. It is also possible that serotonin levels (and other biological factors) have roots in social conditions, such as extreme poverty and accompanying malnutrition.

Environmental factors can alter the expression of genes involved with the way the brain works and responds to the environment, thus influencing the behavior of the individual (Volzow 2006: 70). Thus, not all persons with genes associated with risk taking engage in violent criminal behavior, although they might be inclined toward violent behavior that is not criminal. Current members of SEAL Team 6 who killed Osama bin Laden with Boston mobster Whitey Bulger (discussed in Chapter 14), who murdered at least nineteen people.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2

- Anomie refers to a state of normlessness, the result of dramatic societal change.
- According to Robert Merton, organized crime is a response of the societal strain between goals and means.
- Differential association explains why some persons suffering from anomie turn to crime.
- Finders characterized by social disorganization and delinquent or criminal subcultures

Chapter 2: Explanations for Organized Crime

40

CHAPTER 2

are spawning grounds for organized crime.

- Subcultures are patterns of values, norms, and behavior that have become traditional among certain groups.
- Cultural transmission refers to the process by which one generation passes on their attitudes, values, and crime techniques to the next.
- Some characteristics of adolescent gang membership—a code of loyalty and a sense of "territory" (territory), a criminal record, an antisocial attitude—offer the credentials for a career in organized crime.
- The defended neighborhood refers to cohesive groupings that seal themselves off through the efforts of delinquents, restrictive covenants, and a forbidding reputation.
- According to the theory of differential opportunity, criminal opportunity is not equally distributed.
- Social control theory asks, "Why do most persons conform to societal norms?"

- The strength of social bonds determines whether we move in the direction of crime or law-abiding behavior.
- "Ethnic succession" explains how various groups used organized crime to escape into legitimate pursuits.
- Prohibition acted as a catalyst for the development of organized crime.
- The connection between the criminal organizations of southern Italy and the American Mafia are the *Zipps*, recent immigrants.
- Omicid of the Northeast, the demise of once powerful American Mafia groups is the result of a lack of interest in membership by men with an Italian heritage.
- Psychoanalytic theory is based on the work of Sigmund Freud.
- Behaviorism is based on operant conditioning.
- Psychopaths exhibit a lack of conscience.
- Persons with a neurotransmitter malfunction are most apt to be reinforced for engaging in antisocial behavior and less likely to learn alternative behavior patterns.

REVIEW QUESTIONS FOR CHAPTER 2

1. What does anomie refer to?
2. How did Robert Merton "Anomic" anomie?
3. What is the societal strain that can result in organized crime?
4. How does differential association explain why some persons suffering from anomie turn to criminal innovation, while others do not?
5. What are the characteristics of the culture from which organized crime emerges?
6. What are the characteristics of delinquent subcultures?
7. How does cultural transmission explain organized crime in certain neighborhoods?
8. What are the characteristics of adolescent gangs that prepare members for a career in organized crime?
9. What are the characteristics of a defended neighborhood?
10. What does the theory of differential opportunity explain about organized crime?
11. What is the central question asked by social control theory?
12. What does the strength of social bonds explain?
13. What does ethnic succession explain?
14. How did Prohibition act as a catalyst for the development of organized crime?
15. What is the relationship between ethnic succession and the *Zipps*?
16. What led to the demise of the American Mafia outside of the Northeast?
17. In psychology, how does psychoanalytic-based theory differ from behaviorism?
18. What is the basic characteristic of a psychopath?
19. How can antisocial behavior be explained by a neurotransmitter deficiency?