

Chapter 7

BUILDING COALITIONS AND NETWORKS TO SUPPORT PLANS



Networking is most relevant in what may be called difficult planning situations — in situations we have already referred to as “wicked” or “messy.” In these cases the Prince is uncertain which way to proceed, many interest groups exert pressure in different directions, and no one really knows how to address the problems. It is not clear what the consequences of different courses of action would be.

Our first task in this chapter is to define the terms *networking* and *networks*. We will then proceed to pay close attention to seven major networking tasks. Our main concern will be to clarify how networking helps in achieving the multiplier effect. We will therefore discuss how information is obtained, how the initial image is floated, how coalitions are formed, and how the multiplier is triggered. Finally, in the last section of the chapter we will look at four networking issues: First, what are the advantages and disadvantages of secrecy? Second, what is the importance of incentives in networking? Third, how do planners identify grass-roots movements in coalition building? And, finally, how do networking and coalition building rely on the Prince for support?

As mentioned above, our discussion of networking assumes a worst-case scenario. Obviously, much planning takes place in a more conventional or institutionalized framework. In

those instances, forming coalitions or triggering the multiplier may be simpler processes because circumstances and the environment are more benign. The effective planner who understands the worst-case scenario can always function successfully in more structured, if more tedious, environments.

Networking and Networks

The term *networking*, as used here, refers to the linking of relevant stakeholders through formal or informal channels so as to bring about plan formulation and implementation. Networks are communication channels that may or may not be part of the formal organization. Networks operate at many levels. For example, a cocktail party or a dinner at an embassy is an informal channel that provides opportunities to meet and transact business. The informal and pleasant surroundings of embassy receptions greatly facilitated my work when I served in the Department of State in Washington, D.C. I found that I was even able to speak to my immediate superior when he attended these functions. Given the press of time and the constraints of office life down at Foggy Bottom, we found it easier to network at embassy parties.

Networking is using channels to reach individuals whom one might have difficulty reaching through the hierarchy. When I joined the State Department in the early days of the Kennedy administration, I was asked to chair an interagency coordinating committee. Our task was to set policies for U.S. assistance to education and science in Latin America. Interagency coordinating committees are a dime a dozen in Washington. Seidman and Gilmour (1986) call them "the crabgrass in the garden of government institutions" (p. 226). They are supposed to coordinate agency action. Therefore, any and all government agencies that had anything to do with either education or science in Latin America had a representative on my committee. In fact, at our first meeting, I had no idea what some of the initials after their names stood for, and I was amazed at the large attendance. I was surprised that so many agencies were interested in doing something bold about education and science in Latin America. But I

rapidly discovered that most of the participants on that coordinating committee were there to protect their agency's interest. They had little concern for most of what we were doing. They seemed to sleep during our meetings and only spring into action when they thought we were about to encroach on a portion of their precious turf. I had a mentor in the foreign aid agency who saw my plight. He advised me to cultivate friends wherever they might be and not worry too much about the committee. He pointed out that there were "bureaucratic engineers" everywhere in the administration. "The art of getting things done," he said, "consists in finding who they are, knowing them, and getting them to act. The rest is decoration and facade."

Some people on my committee were useful and informed. Through them, I learned who were the relevant actors and what were the important centers of power. Very soon I was visiting staff in the White House, meeting with informed undersecretaries in the Department of Defense, and attending Latin American embassy functions where all sorts of interesting people would surface. I discovered several networks of individuals working on science and education in Latin America. Some of these networks were more heavily oriented to education—they included a wide variety of individuals, ranging from charlatans who were pushing pet projects to "save" the world from whatever dire danger they thought was imminent, to thoughtful Latin American, U.S., and European educators concerned about the future of the schools in that important portion of our hemisphere. Other networks were more concerned with science. Several active science networks linked Latin American and U.S. science communities. The private foundations, such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, played an important role. Therefore, the policy debate was actually very rich and diverse—many projects were under way, many people were involved, and our little interagency coordinating committee was a small bubble on a vast sea of activity. In the course of time, our committee did come up with a U.S. position on science and education in Latin America that became a component of a plan ultimately adopted

at an international meeting of ministers of education and science (Cerych, 1965).

The first lesson about networking is that much important work takes place outside formal channels because emergent ideas and activities are not always properly recognized by and linked to the formal structure. Much of the preparatory work takes place elsewhere. In the example discussed above, informal links turned out to be as important as those provided by the formal committee. Networking took place at both formal and informal levels. It became clear that my mentor had been right. To get things done, one had to know who were the useful people and where they were located.

- *Networks exist over time.* Most informal networks have a history. Individuals who have worked together over long periods of time acquire mutual trust from this experience. They are able to bank on this trust relationship. When I served with UNESCO, I was impressed by how many informal networks remained in place long after the initial tasks that had brought them together had been completed. For example, there was a very active network of UNESCO staff members who had all worked, at one time or another, in Latin America. They kept in close touch, helped each other, and carried on many informal planning tasks that facilitated action, notwithstanding the very formidable UNESCO bureaucracy.

- *Networks are invitational.* Informal networks are affiliation groups. They include people who share, or have shared, many similar experiences and people who share convictions, work on similar problems, pursue similar goals, or have similar professional interests. One does not force oneself into a network, one gradually becomes part of it. Networks are, in a sense, like social clubs, except that they are not formalized, have no management, no visible identity, no entrance committee, and no fixed admission fees. They are invisible colleges (Crane, 1972).

- *Networks are numerous.* There usually are a large number of networks across or within organizations. Some are more important than others; some fulfill work functions, while others tend to be more oriented to play activities. But play networks

can link individuals in work functions. If there are too many networks, however, networking can easily become an end in itself. It is easy to waste time in networking, to become bogged down in unnecessary transactions, and to lose sight of what is to be accomplished.

- *Networks have a limited capacity.* Networks cannot address too many agendas or become involved in too many causes at any one time. Therefore, there is an element of timing in using networks. One has to engage them at a moment when they are available, when few pressing tasks and causes preoccupy the membership, when the channels can be used.

- *Networks are only as good as their members.* Getting things done requires people who can act, who do not feel that they must always be cautious and wait and see. The problem is that deadwood and climbers infiltrate networks. Obviously, one is looking for idea people, namely, those who are willing to take risks. But it is easy to be misled here. Individuals encountered in an informal setting may appear to be vibrant activists, and yet, when they go back to their offices, they are again transformed into cautious mice. The network is impoverished when its members do not deliver.

- *Networks depend on exchanges and incentives.* Networks persist because they are useful. Networking implies an exchange of goods and services, the ability to provide valued commodities and incentives. To get information, one may have to give some in return. This give-and-take is one *raison d'être* of the network (Cook, 1977; Benson, 1975). Since most networks are informal, motivation for participation depends on the intrinsic benefits that its members receive. Successful networks accomplish tasks because these accomplishments motivate the participants. The exchange relations between participants and networks can therefore evolve to the extent that the network becomes an important focus for their commitment and allegiance.

- *Networks tend to focus on selected issues.* Since networks are informal and voluntary, motivation is important for participation. Networks tend, therefore, to be self-selective. Their membership tends to be homogeneous and focused on selected issues. It tends to share a common baggage of assumptions

about what is important and how to act. It tends to belong to a particular school of thought. It also tends to have professional convictions and to be devoted to given agendas (Heclo, 1978). Members of networks tend to be motivated by causes, by the appeal and drama surrounding action. They like to believe that they are contributing to history.

- *Networks are channels for action.* Networks are communication channels, but they can also be used for collaborative implementation. When this happens, networks become organizations in their own right, crossing over and linking other organizations. When a network is involved in implementation, the motivation of its members depends on the importance of the tasks they are able to accomplish together. After informal networks have been actively implementing over a period of time, formalization usually takes place. Thus, an informal network linking many social agencies delivering different services to the same clients can, in time, be institutionalized into a consortium with its own management and funding.

- *Networks are a source of power.* As several authors have shown, in complex situations, power accrues to those who can link many causes, movements, or networks together (Castells, 1983; Blau and Alba, 1982). But the persistence of such linkage depends also on the rewards that those who participate obtain from their activities. Moreover, unequal exchanges within networks sooner or later result in the acquisition of more power by some members of the network (Cook, 1977; Mock, 1979).

- *Networking takes place in a symbolic context.* Symbols are important to networks. Opportunities to affirm convictions or to express the existence of a movement or new points of view maintain the commitment of the interested members. Visibility—for example, at conferences, in meetings, through publications—is important. But the greatest pleasures of networking come from knowing one is influencing policy, that one is part of the in-group close to power. Therefore, the process of networking acquires a value in its own right (March and Olsen, 1984).

- *Networking is fashionable.* Networking has become one of the fads of successful management (Mueller, 1986; Lipnack and

Stamps, 1982; Welch, 1980). This does not mean networking has become less important; it simply means that it can be overemphasized.

Seven Networking Tasks

Planning consists of seven principal networking tasks: (1) map the terrain, gather information, and identify actors; (2) identify the relevant leverage points; (3) select the tentative coalition of supporters; (4) float the initial image to symbolize the possibility of action; (5) adapt the technical argument to the requirements of support and opposition; (6) organize the coalition to trigger the multiplier; and (7) maintain and feed the coalition as the process of planning moves toward implementation.

Map the Terrain, Gather Information, and Identify Actors. Planning relies on information. Yet, much networking still takes place without anyone's being aware that it is in fact occurring. I recall interviewing a planner and asking whether he and his team had done enough networking. This individual replied that he was not familiar with my terminology. When I explained, he was quick to say that he had consulted a few people he knew here and there but had not thought about the process in any systematic fashion. He was not an untypical case. Yet a first purpose of networking is to obtain information. One cultivates networks for this purpose. The task is continuous. At first, the planner seeks to understand what the problem looks like: Who are the relevant actors? Where is learning taking place? What do the relevant stakeholders know, and how do they perceive the issues? To accomplish this, planners ask who are the relevant informants? Into what networks can they tap?

Later, as the planning process is set in motion, networking will be important to keep tabs on the perceptions and reactions of relevant groups and actors. Later still, the planners will want to keep in touch with reactions to their efforts and identify trouble spots, detours, and other traps on the way to implementation. At first networking is an unconscious activity.

In due time, however, planners become aware of its importance and systemize their use of time and resources in light of what they seek to accomplish.

Networking is an exchange process—people contribute ideas, knowledge, or energy because they are motivated by the symbols and values that are pursued. Networking is akin to a political campaign. Much interest and energy are generated by a commitment to new ways of thinking or doing. Beyond this, networking can be valued because of the prestige it provides, that is, belonging to an elite group of activists who think that they can bring about fundamental changes in an organization, in a region, or even in the entire world.

Relevant networks are not always in place. Therefore, one has to create new networks when they do not exist. This might be accomplished informally when the ideas and ideologies pursued generate a considerable amount of commitment and interest. At times, it may also be useful to make formal arrangements—for example, creating temporary task forces and temporary study groups—to begin to explore issues and obtain information. Prestige and visibility may be an important motivation for participation in such undertakings.

When I studied the process of national educational planning in Mexico, I found that the planners who had been hired by the Minister of Education had encountered difficulty in obtaining the most common statistics (Benveniste, 1970). At that time computers were not yet widely used in Mexico. Educational statistics were collected manually and recorded on forms, and the forms were then sent from all parts of the country to the ministry in Mexico City. Since the ministry was divided into large independent fiefdoms, each fiefdom collected and preciously protected its own statistics. Thus, the Department of Primary Education collected its own data, the Department of Secondary Education did the same, and so on. Each had a statistics office. There were more than a half dozen in the ministry. I visited one of these statistics offices. The precious data were wrapped in cloth bundles, and these cloth bundles were stacked in a dark storeroom. Obtaining data about enrollments, teacher-pupil ratios, drop-outs, and so on was a serious business. Some-

one with the key to the relevant storeroom had to go in, with proper authorization of course, gather the bundles, unwrap them, and go through the tedious process of adding figures. Obviously, the computer has altered all this, although mainframes and microprocessors provide as many opportunities to protect data and act secretively as do cloth bundles and Marchant calculators.

The planners I was studying did not belong to the Ministry of Education. They came from the professional staff of another government agency and were therefore not linked to the networks in the Ministry. They had to create their own networks, and this they did. They suggested that a prestigious task force be set up with responsibility for preparing the most comprehensive and accurate data possible about education in the country. The minister agreed, and the task force was given considerable publicity. The planners staffed the task force with a few outsiders, a few of their own people, and the heads of the various statistics offices. The heads of these offices were, by and large, low- to middle level civil servants who rarely enjoyed either prestige or visibility. They were not accustomed to holding press conferences and receiving much attention. The prestige and fanfare energized them. They were only too happy to open the storerooms and unwrap the bundles. The planners worked closely with them and thus obtained access to the data. They exchanged prestige and visibility for commitment and created their own data-gathering network.

Networking means exchanging favors or at least appearing to exchange favors even if one cannot deliver. For example, when I worked in Paris on a major study of future world energy needs, I attempted to obtain a report on European energy needs that had not yet been released by the research staff of the OECD. I had networked assiduously but could not obtain a copy. The report was awaiting approval of member governments, and the staff feared premature leaks to the press. The word was that it would not be made available to the public for an indefinite period of time. A colleague of mine, who had just flown in from the United States, assured me he would obtain the report in one week. A week went by and he did just that. "How did you man-

age?" I asked when he returned with the report. "Simple," he said, "very simple. I called Dr. Y [the main report author] and told him we were recruiting for an appointment in his field. Several people had recommended him to our search committee. Could we have lunch?" By the time the meal ended, Dr. Y had become interested in the job, and when my friend was about to leave him, he asked if he could have examples of recent professional studies that Dr. Y had completed to take back to the United States. After lunch, they went to his office and my friend was given the report.

Policy arenas are usually filled with ferment. A first networking task is to find good informants. Information is generally available if one takes the time to obtain it. But this requires asking questions to find out who knows what, who can describe the issues, and who can identify the innovators. Since time and resources are extremely limited for this, the problem consists in being able to gather good information rapidly—and, more important, in being able to distinguish true from bogus information. It is a fact that people in organizations like to be consulted and are usually willing to talk freely, particularly when they sense that they might have an impact on policy.

There is no theory or rule that tells us when we finally have learned enough about the local culture and have heard enough local gossip. But what planners know or do not know is not the only relevant issue; it is also important how they are perceived by the people in the field.

Experts who come, do a "quick and dirty" planning exercise, and leave after collecting their fees are unlikely to arrive at a thorough understanding of the problems or to learn much about the various interests at work. The first purpose of networking is to obtain information. A second is to make it known that the planners are concerned with the issues and committed to what is important. Networking makes it known that the planners understand that what happens in the field should receive attention. Tapping into networks increases the credibility of planners. The planner I interviewed, who was not familiar with the terminology of networking, was not particularly concerned about his own credibility. He had not thought about that aspect of his task either. But those in the know, in and out of organiza-

tions, are aware of existing networks and can judge the performance of planners on their ability to tap these networks or to create new ones.

Identify Leverage Points. Any significant change implies a multitude of simultaneous or sequential acts that have to be taken to achieve implementation of that change, and there will be many important actors who can influence implementation. Identifying leverage points consists in finding out who the important stakeholders are, that is, those who have power and can influence the outcome (Gergen, 1968). For example, suppose we wish to help peasants in a village in India change their traditional way of planting, growing, and harvesting crops. We will have to involve them in many different activities. Providing better seeds is not enough; making credit available is not enough; demonstrating uses for fertilizer is not enough; helping create marketing cooperatives is not enough. All this and more must take place simultaneously. We will, therefore, need a lot of information about the peasants—for example, how they perceive what they are doing and how they might perceive proposed changes. We will also need to know about the key operating organizations. What is the agricultural extension system doing? What rural credit institutions are in place? What about land-reform programs? What kind of agricultural strategy is the government pursuing? In due time, we might know enough to begin to answer such questions as, What decisions have to be taken? Who will influence these decisions? And when will the decisions have to be made? We will begin to learn what groups operate in the policy arena, what strategies they pursue, and what interests they promote.

As we become more sophisticated, we will learn where needed resources might come from, what agencies and staff might be involved, and what facilities are required. We will come to know what compromises and configurations might be promoted and have a chance of being accepted. We will arrive at some idea of who the bureaucratic engineers are and what they can contribute.

We will begin to describe leverage points: What actions

should we initiate? When and where are decisions made? Which actions are necessary to begin to create a credible plan? What is the minimum coalition of support needed to begin the process?

Describing leverage points is a matter of understanding the dynamics of the situation: Which individuals are involved or interested in the issues? How can they be motivated to act? Obviously, this is not a simple task, and most planners are quite happy to disregard its importance since the task obliges them to pay far more attention to implementation issues than they usually do.

But understanding leverage points clarifies the importance of keeping the plan as simple as possible. If we complicate and extend the scope of the endeavor, we soon discover that too many leverage points have to be activated. Therefore, the art of keeping projects simple, meaningful, and implementable is the art of knowing how to define the problem so that it remains manageable, so that the planning exercise can activate the relevant leverage points either directly or through the multiplier.

Select Tentative Coalitions. Coalition building requires both accommodation to political interests and symbolic action (Durning, 1987). The plan must be activated in a political environment where exchanges take place continually. But while these transactions take place, the firm, the set of organizations, or, in the case of public-sector planning, the entire political system, maintains and affirms symbolic values. We have already discussed the importance of exchanges and of the technical argument in coalition building. It is now necessary to examine the symbolic nature of the values that the plan espouses. These will tend to be the values that have proven important in the past, and they will serve to motivate the participation of citizens or of members of an organization. For example, the goals of an organization may be an important component of its symbolic values: At XYZ Company, we believe in a quality product. We manufacture the best widget in the world. Or we may be concerned with larger symbolic values. San Francisco sees itself as a cosmopolitan city oriented to foreign influences, a melting pot of various cultures with a long liberal tradition. There exist shared values

in San Francisco that are not present in cities of the same size in the Midwest or in the South of the United States.

The plan will provide an additional set of values and symbols that will motivate support. The symbols of the plan will not only have to fit with those of supporters but, more importantly, must not threaten those of opponents. Accommodation is always more easily achieved when it does not appear, symbolically, to reveal defeat or retreat. Successful planning efforts tend to be those that are visible, easily understood, and sufficiently important to motivate action. Since the symbolic nature of the plan must mesh with the prevailing symbolism of supporters and opponents, the ability of planners to resist changes and alterations will depend, in part, on the way that the relevant symbols interplay.

In the seventies, I was a consultant on the expansion of higher education in a Latin American country. The educational planners were under considerable political pressure to expand the number of universities in the country. Each province wanted its own university, and the governors of the provinces that had no institution of higher education wanted to move rapidly. They pressed for the democratization of access to higher education, but paid little attention to the obstacles to implementing this goal. Most importantly, there were simply not enough resources to create quality institutions in a short time span. One person in the know described the problem this way: "Our government supports the democratization of higher education. This has been the platform of various political parties, and most politicians of the right and left seem to be in favor of expanding access. Therefore, we cannot seem to appear to be opposed to the creation of new universities even when we know that it is not possible to move that fast. We are under considerable pressure from the governors of several provinces who do not want any delay. We point out to them that there is no faculty, no libraries, no laboratories, and that opening new universities so rapidly is bound to [create a] backlash in the long run. But the governors are under pressure. They want to be able to show results. So they keep pressuring us."

The art of coalition building consists in finding ap-

proaches that convey enough meaning to motivate stakeholders (Feldman and March, 1981; Smircich and Morgan, 1982; Dutton and Ottensmeyer, 1987). The planners in this Latin American country searched for symbolic strategies of their own: "We have argued the great importance of maintaining and developing centers of excellence. We do not attempt to delay the expansion of the new universities—we emphasize instead the prerequisites for maintaining quality. This, if attended to, will inevitably delay implementation."

The educational planners sought to organize a coalition of supporters who would support demands for more full-time faculty, but there were very real limits to their ability to avoid creating white elephants: "How can we refuse to include a new medical school at ——— in the plan? The governor of that province has moved fast. He went ahead and inaugurated the school, although it does not exist and no central authority wants one there. But the governor has committed himself, and now we [will] look silly if we do not support him. So we include the school in the plan and insist on a full-time faculty and on commitments from the state budget. We want guarantees the school will provide a first-class education. But meanwhile, I am told they began classes with half-a-dozen part-time faculty. Now you understand the pressure we operate under!"

Planning provides both a symbolic and a technical framework for organizing coalitions. The desires and passions of individuals or groups are constrained by the logic of the plan and the symbols it provides. As mentioned previously, planning does not involve politics as usual. Exchanges and transactions take place, favors are bestowed, and the plan is bent to suit interests. But the symbols and values of the plan, together or as parts of the technical argument, legitimate constraints. At some point, the planners have to draw the line and try to resist those pressures that will destroy the coherence and symbolism of the plan. If they are to have any chance of succeeding, they have to be aware of the way the symbols they select for the plan can help them resist pressures in the subsequent battles over implementation.

Float the Initial Image. The multiplier effect cannot take place as long as the plan has not been revealed because, until then, most of the networking has taken place informally and in partial secrecy. But there comes a time when the activity is made public, when the ideas are brought to the surface. The purpose of floating the initial image is to create an awareness of and belief in new ways of thinking and acting.

Floating the initial image serves several functions. First, it reassures the members of the coalition that they can survive open scrutiny. The mere assertion that new ideas or approaches are possible takes them one step closer to reality, and they begin to acquire as much importance as the conventional wisdom of the status quo. The members of the coalition are reassured that they are not out on a limb because their proposals are now being openly discussed and asserted in many quarters.

Second, floating the initial image orients action and behavior toward the next steps of implementation. The fact that the proposal has been announced and so is out in the open implies that the next step can now be taken. It is the first move of the fledgling coalition.

Third, as the image is floated, both support and opposition start to build. Those who have not yet been recruited or who have been left out realize that the coalition process is under way. Idea people and even some climbers begin to gravitate toward the coalition. But, at the same time, those who sense they will be on the losing end if the plan is put into effect begin to organize the opposition. How well the organized coalition fares in attracting support and deterring the opposition depends heavily on the strength of the supporting coalition and the determination of the opposition.

Fourth, floating the image provides legitimacy for the new proposal. As long as the coalition remains hidden, it acts as a secret society; it has no legitimacy because formal action can rarely proceed until matters are out in the open. Floating the image may not be a formal participatory or democratic process, but it nevertheless represents the first move toward open assessment and discussion of the plan.

Fifth and last, floating the image is part of the learning

process in planning. If planners circulate widely, consult stakeholders, assess the various possibilities and options, and make choices that reflect real needs, the float will survive and the planning process will continue, even if it sustains inevitable adaptations and modifications. But if the planners have not done their jobs, it is more probable that the float will stir the opposition into prompt action, and the opposition may then be able to scuttle the plan before any further moves can take place.

There are many different ways to float the initial image. Individuals in the know begin to hear from many different sources that change is in the offing. Meetings and conferences are held. Hearings are organized. Leaks are made to the mass media, and press conferences are held. In one way or another, the possibility of action is revealed and the image begins to be discussed openly. More importantly, the initial coalition starts to emerge. One learns that "so and so" has been arguing that the time has come to do something. Hence, the realization that changes are about to occur becomes widespread.

There exist two fundamental approaches to the float. Either the float is done formally, in an institutionalized setting, or it is done informally, prior to formalization. It might be preferable in some circumstances to act informally prior to formal procedures so as to mobilize external action. Thus a plan to introduce an education program on AIDS in the local public school district might be leaked prior to consideration by the school board to allow greater community participation in the days or weeks before the members of the board will have the opportunity to discuss it. Leaks to the press might be used to create widespread interest and to mobilize public opinion. The choice of strategy depends heavily on the nature of the issue, the characteristics of the leverage points, and the nature of the cultural environment in which the planning exercise will take place. To be sure, where participatory schemes are institutionalized, formal procedures may have to be followed, whether informal procedures are used or not, and the impact of leaks or other disclosures on perceptions of the legitimacy of the undertaking has to be taken into account. At the same time, however, formal consultations and discussions sometimes lose impor-

tance when the issue has already received considerable informal public scrutiny and the mobilization of stakeholders is already under way.

I have already briefly mentioned the case of airline deregulation in the late seventies (Derthick and Quirk, 1985). Networking among academic economists had been going on for a long time. In contrast to most other economic policy issues, there existed a strong consensus in the academic community about the advantages of deregulation. It was generally felt that price regulation and the awarding of routes by regulatory bodies resulted in higher interstate fares, a fact revealed by the sharp differences between those fares and intrastate ones. But what makes this case unique is that the academic community was quite alone in pushing for airline deregulation. There was very little interest elsewhere. The airline industry had absolutely no interest in deregulation, nor did the regulatory agencies. More importantly, there was no public clamor for deregulation of the industry. On the contrary, the public was generally satisfied with airline regulation, and there was certainly no organized public interest movement around this issue.

Nevertheless, by 1971, a sufficient number of advocates for change were occupying positions in relevant government departments, notably in the president's Council of Economic Advisers, the Department of Transportation, and the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department. Some of these advocates had gravitated in the direction of Congress, and were found, for example, on the staff of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Edward Kennedy.

Although Senator Kennedy was at first cool to the idea, deregulation of the airline industry had a certain populist appeal. It meant opening up the industry to stiffer competition, and the notion that greater competition could reduce inefficiencies and result in lower prices appealed to both the right and the left.

Whether this particular exercise was a success is another matter. One can easily argue that the networking process was flawed because a single intellectual discipline dominated. It

clearly demonstrates the pitfalls of having a narrow intellectual network—in this case it was economists—dominate the policy agenda. These economists did not take into account many non-economic aspects of the problem, and they even failed to perceive some of the economic issues. As a result, the consequences of deregulation were not necessarily those originally intended. This is what Gifford (1988, p. 103) calls “tyranny by expertise”—namely, the narrowing of circles of influence until a few experts are able to dominate the policy agenda. Still, this is a good illustration of the processes I have been analyzing in this book. And even if we have second thoughts about airline deregulation, we still should try to understand how this policy innovation was brought about.

The idea was floated during Senator Kennedy's 1975 hearings on the Civil Aeronautics Board. The hearings of his subcommittee received considerable attention in the press, and they had an important impact because they signified that deregulation was clearly on the agenda of Congress. President Gerald Ford had independently voiced support for such an approach. The fact that both the administration and Congress were active had an impact. The idea was floated, and from then on, the process of deregulating this major industry was under way.

Adapt the Technical Argument to a Political Configuration. If it has not already done so, the opposition will surface as soon as the idea is floated. Therefore, if the idea is floated too soon, the opposition will have considerable time to organize and oppose it. Of course, if the idea is delayed too long and not floated, the informal networks of support will begin to lose interest and move on to other topics.

Until the idea is floated, it is difficult to assess the reactions and behaviors of the opposition. As long as networking is informal and occurs outside policy leverage points, networking is not necessarily taken seriously. As mentioned previously, there exist in the policy world many networks with different agendas pushing many different ideas. Keeping tabs on them is one thing, taking them seriously is another. Therefore, it is usually

necessary to float the idea first to really be able to assess how it will be received.

In the case of airline deregulation, there were two main potential sources of opposition: the regulators and the industry. As Derthick and Quirk (1985) point out, the staffs of regulating agencies have somewhat different agendas from those of the chairpersons or committees appointed to run them. Many staff members have made a career in the regulatory field. In contrast, the chairpersons who are appointed to head regulatory agencies are as much interested in their place in history as they are in the appointment. These appointees tended to see deregulation as an emergent reform of great significance. They adroitly removed some of the dissidents in the ranks of their staffs and were able, without too much difficulty, to lend their support and that of their agencies to the reform.

The industry was not able to organize its opposition. The Air Transport Association could not coordinate the industry because the airlines had mixed feelings about regulation. They wanted route security but had divergent views about price and other regulatory issues. Some airlines wanted to compromise and find an accommodation. Others wanted to resist the emergent legislation across the line. The opposition could not agree on the strategy to adopt and, therefore, did little to alter the course of events.

This is a unique case, made unique by the fact no one really knew who might gain or lose in the final outcome. It was not clear how each airline would be affected, nor was it clear which airlines would benefit and which would rapidly wither in the competition. Nor was it clear what changes deregulation would bring about, what routes would be affected, whether it would lead to industry consolidation, whether fares for local travel would go up, and so on. It was difficult, therefore, to work out a policy of accommodation, because there was little knowledge of the probable impact of deregulation.

This is not always the case in planning or policy exercises. Some of these efforts are more complex, because the opposition's interests are more clearly defined. Fear of making errors prevails, and the ability to adapt is often not there. The dead-

wood are entrenched and resisting, climbers do not see any advantage in taking risks, and the idea people are split, unable to mobilize, and, therefore, of little help in implementing the plan.

How do planners convince enough supporters that proposed new approaches will work, that organizations, clients, and the public will benefit, that there is something in it for everyone? Much networking will be required to reach mutually acceptable solutions because a good deal of information is needed to determine who can be turned around, who are the idea people, who are the climbers, how the plan can be packaged to gather support for it, and what minimum coalition of supporters is necessary to trigger the multiplier.

Why do plans fail when a coalition is not created? Most planning failures result from (1) a lack of perception of the need to negotiate, (2) an inability to negotiate and accommodate diverse interests, (3) the lack of sufficient incentives and penalties to be used for that purpose, and (4) the lack of trust engendered by inadequate levels of networking.

Planners usually have little training in, inclination toward, and experience of negotiation, and the same may be true of the Prince they serve, as well as of others in their immediate environment. It is therefore no surprise that negotiation tends to be an unknown dimension of planning. Concepts such as assisted negotiation, mediation, facilitation, and binding arbitration are rarely part of the planner's vocabulary, yet as Suskind and Cruikshank (1987) argue, consensual approaches to resolving public disputes are far more effective than protracted conflict and therefore should be an important component of any active planning process.

It is common for the affected parties to have little contact with planners. Dogmatic stances are taken and there is no give-and-take. Blowers (1982) has documented such an episode in Marston Vale in Bedfordshire, England. Planners were attempting to have the local plant of an important brick works firm replace old equipment that produced excessive air pollution. The planners had expected understanding and cooperation but were unable to establish a working relationship with the com-

pany. Instead, there were a hardening of attitudes and a corresponding unwillingness to negotiate. The local government council took the planners' advice and decided to force the company to eliminate pollution. But their order did not have the intended impact. The company responded by threatening to close the plant and move out of the area. The council, faced with this ultimatum, caved in, and the plan was abandoned.

Both planners and the council seemed unaware of what the company might do. They must have imagined that the company would never move and relocate, yet that is a quite plausible action, at least in the United States and increasingly in Europe. Maybe it was a simple issue of power. The company held the trump card and had no intention of negotiating. Or maybe it was a case where mutual mistrust of intentions dominated: If the company gave in on this issue, would the planners press for more? Again, maybe it was a case where the planners were unable to come up with enough incentives to make the change worthwhile to the company. We will never know exactly what went wrong, but it is clear that errors of judgment were made. Either the planners or the council or both had not evaluated the situation and, more importantly, had not been able to network, to establish trust, and to discover a way to accommodate conflicting interests. In the first round, they lost all, and the planning exercise failed.

Trigger the Multiplier. As we know by now, triggering the multiplier requires a technical argument, a symbolic stance, and a visible coalition of supporters. There is also an element of timing involved since communications about ideas sooner or later are forgotten and lose their importance. Coming back to the brick works case, was the company opposed to any reduction in levels of pollution? There must have been conditions under which it might have begun to take steps to remedy the problem. One might assume that there were at least a few individuals in the brick works who did see advantage in a strategy that would place the company in a better light. Who might these individuals be? What positions did they occupy in the company? Under what conditions might serious negotiations begin?

From the planners' point of view, was it preferable to force the issue and be defeated in the end or would it have been better to begin the long process of adjustment and compromise? When conflicts dominate the planning environment, it is difficult to negotiate because relative costs are unknown. Planners appear to be intransigent because they are totally unaware of the stark realities faced by those who have to accommodate. This is why coalition building requires information and a cooperative search for solutions. The Lindblom precepts of taking small steps are not devoid of realism. But more importantly, understanding has to exist. What incentives or penalties would have decided some managers of the brick works to do something about pollution? How many of these managers were needed to trigger the multiplier? Could they do something worthwhile about pollution at a low cost? Probably not. What would happen if they bought totally new machinery? Could they finance it? Would they still be competitive? Those were the issues that required dialogue between the company and the planners and that could have led the planners to trigger a movement toward accommodation within the brick works.

But it is not easy to engage in formal dialogue in a confrontational situation. The need for secrecy and control limits such encounters. Distrust reigns. Therefore, one has to ask again whether the institutional arrangements for planning make sense. Do they increase or decrease trust? Do they facilitate negotiation?

The deregulation of the airline industry illustrates the importance of networking and engaging in dialogue as a prelude to triggering the multiplier. The coalition that carries the day has a momentum of its own. Its symbolic stance happens to be fashionable at that point in time. There is a general belief that the time has come to do something about the costs of excessive government regulation. More importantly, the entire industry cannot threaten to leave and go elsewhere. The coalition of supporters uses ideas and knowledge provided by economists and couples it to the interests of politicians in search of issues (Kingdom, 1984). Change—whether for good or for ill—is achieved.

Triggering the multiplier requires an understanding of how the multiplier operates. Too many planners know little about the process and are not attentive to its subtleties. Timing is crucial, particularly the timing of the float. The visibility of the coalition, the credibility of the technical argument, and the symbolic stance of the planners provide the basis for the trigger. But to achieve awareness of these unconventional dimensions of the planning process requires both experience and a kind of training different from that conventionally provided in the academy.

Maintain and Feed the Coalition. The last task in networking is to maintain and feed the coalition so as to avoid plan derailment, a topic discussed at greater length in Chapter Nine. This task may require further negotiations and considerable learning and adjusting. But avoiding derailment of a plan also requires maintaining momentum and moving ahead, as well as being able to identify the trouble spots and the dissident stakeholders so as to be able to accommodate or resist their pressure. A first question is, therefore, Who are the stakeholders? Put simply, the stakeholders are all those who have a stake in the implementation of the proposed changes. From the planners' point of view, the most visible stakeholders are the Prince and the other implementers who have access to the resources needed to carry out the project. Planners tend to disregard other important stakeholders—namely, clients, beneficiaries, or the general public. There exist several good reasons for this:

First, under current conventional arrangements, planners play the role of technicians. They therefore have very little time and few budget resources to devote to networking and coalition building. If they are going to do any networking and coalition building, it will be among those who are immediately involved in the next step, namely, those involved in making the next decision or enacting the next bill. Out of necessity and lack of resources, planners focus on the Prince and his lieutenants. They do not necessarily wish to disregard clients or beneficiaries, but it is often easier to take their needs for granted, to assume they have little to offer, to think that one will have time

later on to attend to them—which means never, or after it is too late.

Second, planners are not necessarily well prepared to network with clients and beneficiaries. They may not know the milieu and may be unprepared to elicit information from them. More importantly, the planners' own sense of vulnerability tends to keep them away from encounters that they do not know how to manage. It is far easier to read about the ghetto in Rainwater's (1970) account and to argue in the protected environment of a planning office about the needs of ghetto dwellers than to encounter live clients in situ and to have to deal with their problems there.

Third, clients and beneficiaries are not always easily identified and are not always organized, cohesive, and of one mind. Moreover, they—and others—may not clearly understand their needs, and their ability to communicate may not be high.

Be that as it may, the logic of a planning process based on the assumption that planning is a technical, static staff activity will inevitably pay little attention to a large and relevant group of stakeholders. It will certainly tend to downgrade these stakeholders as long as they are inactive, and it will only begin to pay attention to them when they finally organize and fight back. Hall's (1975, 1980, 1988) studies of planning failures underscore how political opposition to planned changes diverts action. Many planning failures are the consequence of events engendered by strong opposition coming from many different quarters. This opposition either ends the project or, as is more likely, results in a series of compromises and modifications that rapidly increase costs and reduce or even ruin the fundamental quality of the endeavor. In the end, few are satisfied, and the planning exercise does not achieve the high hopes intended for it. Hall describes how planning for a third London airport, for a motorway ring around London, for the rapid transit system of San Francisco, for the Concorde supersonic airplane, and for the Sydney opera house proceeded from obstacle to obstacle to a final compromise that no one in his or her right mind would have proposed in the first place.

These experiences suggest two lines of thought. First, it is

clear that planners need to be able to link up more effectively with relevant stakeholders. This is true for all forms of planning. It applies equally to city and regional planning, economic planning, policy analysis, and corporate strategic planning. Trust, as the important variable in negotiation, is an element, but in the last analysis, design matters most. Planners need to pay much more attention to the emergent aspirations and needs of all relevant stakeholders, which means that this activity must be budgeted for and recognized as an important function of the professional planning role.

Second, and concurrent with the above, planners cannot operate in a political environment without having access to a modicum of resources. As staff, they are devoid of authority and have to transact much of their business with their hands tied behind their backs. Much of the distress of planning has its source in this weakness of planners. The examples given by Hall were not complete failures since the projects were completed even if they cost much more than originally estimated and had to be modified innumerable times. But they were clearly failures in terms of resolving conflicts and being able to arrive fairly rapidly at satisfying resolutions without incurring excessively high costs. They illustrate what happens when enough money is not spent on planning, and when planners do not have enough time, resources, or authority. The projects themselves cost much more than planned and society achieves less than it might. If messy or "wicked" problems are to be solved, planners have to be able to spend the time and energy it takes, first, to identify, attract, and create a coalition that will support a project and, second, to provide the longer-term effort needed to sustain or modify this coalition as it confronts opposition. This implies making sure, from the start, that the coalition has a high chance of succeeding and that the project attempts to satisfy a very large and significant constituency, including groups that may not now be mobilized but could be in the future.

Notwithstanding all the above, participation in planning cannot be perfect. I argued in preceding chapters that participation is the Achilles' heel of planning because planners can never attempt to replicate political processes. Planners deal at a

level of decision making where cumbersome political arrangements are not effective. Therefore, they have to approximate participation in one way or another. Networking is probably the best substitute for participation, given the complexity of the decisions that have to be taken and the resources available to consult and obtain consent. But if networking is to be an effective substitute for participation, sufficient resources have to be provided for it.

Success stories in planning tend to reveal a dominant theme: The goals of the endeavor are challenging, important, well defined, and generally understood. The Prince and the planners work closely together. The planners are able to network widely and are linked with the stakeholders. More importantly, they are able to produce plans that meet everyone's needs because there are sufficient trust and resources to provide incentives to deal with the opposition and because the enterprise is managed with a firm hand (Hall, 1988; Young and Norris, 1988). In short, these planners are in an executive position, the planning body has a clear mandate, and results will follow.

Four Aspects of Networking and Coalition Building

We have discussed the seven tasks of networking going all the way from mapping the terrain and identifying leverage points to triggering the multiplier and maintaining the coalition in place. We will return to some of these topics again in later chapters, but at this point we must discuss four additional aspects of these processes.

First, we want to explore the issue of *secrecy versus openness*. To what extent do planners rely on secrecy? When is it desirable, when is it not desirable?

Second, we need to say something more about the resources that planners need to have access to, namely, *incentives or penalties*.

Third, we want to explore the characteristics of clients. *What kinds of grass-roots movements matter?* With whom should planners try to network?

Fourth, we need to discuss an important political asset for

triggering the multiplier: What is the *role of the Prince*? Is he friend or foe—or more exactly, do planners work directly with him or do they bypass him in search of an accommodation?

Secrecy Versus Openness. Maintaining a coalition is never simple. Trust is easily lost, and suspicions arise just as readily. Moreover, when extended negotiations take place, these can also suggest weakness. Once something is obtained, more can be demanded. No one knows the limits of the power of others, and thus mistakes are easily made regarding their ability to yield or compromise. Negotiations can be an important asset in planning, but successful negotiations require skills that planners often lack.

In complex policy environments, it always appears better to disguise than to reveal action. Secrecy is attractive for many reasons. As mentioned earlier, if the plan is revealed too soon, the opposition will have plenty of time to organize itself. If one attempts to consult with too many interest groups and take into account the aspirations of every faction, one will rapidly fall prey to demands that cannot be met, and the participatory effort will actually be counterproductive as the planner succeeds in making more enemies than friends. Secrecy has a function in planning, but there is a serious drawback to hidden manipulations. Hidden manipulations may work very effectively, but they ultimately result in increased dissatisfaction, alienation, and cynicism. The *fait accompli* is achieved, but the public and all those who are thwarted lose faith in the institution. The crisis of confidence is accelerated and distrust reigns (Mitchell and Scott, 1987).

Machiavellian approaches are not always indicated. Sophisticated power plays seldom resist the erosion of time. Once the image is floated, it is important to maintain open, credible contact with all relevant parties because consensual politics depends so much on maintaining trust.

Moreover, there is a learning process that is important in planning, and learning does not take place under conditions of secrecy. Planners may have to learn, but they are not the only ones. The stakeholders may also have to learn. If the image is floated and if information is shared, to the extent that the image

and the information help dispel false conceptions, negotiations and accommodations may be facilitated. For example, opposition to a new highway may be more vociferous as long as all the details of implementation are still unclear. Once the detailed plan and necessary information are provided, however, uncertainty will be sharply reduced, and both advantaged and disadvantaged stakeholders will know what is at stake.

More importantly, openness tends to favor the larger unorganized public while secrecy tends to favor the strong and organized who represent narrower interests. Those who are powerful and have the necessary resources are always able to find out what is happening. Secrets are not secrets for long when you know how to obtain the necessary information. If planning is to be effective, it cannot afford to fall prey to those who have sufficient political muscle to affect the planning process but do not represent the mainstream of the body politic. This is why secrecy can be dysfunctional. But if secrecy is dysfunctional, it does not follow that full-scale participation is desirable. What is desirable is effective communication.

Networking and ad hoc informal communications are effective means of achieving participation without incurring the heavy burdens of formal participatory arrangements. The issue is one of flexibility, not of the routinization of participation.

Some authors argue that participation is always an important component of the planning process (Burke, 1968, 1979; Barber, 1984; Susskind and Elliott, 1983). But it is not participation per se that matters. What matters is maintaining open communication and trust, being able to identify ideas and to learn, and ultimately reaching agreements that hold. Formal participatory arrangements entail issues of legitimacy and create a structure with rights and privileges that focus attention on procedural issues. When these procedural issues cannot be easily resolved to everyone's satisfaction, distrust increases, conflict erupts, and the coalition finds itself in trouble.

Networking, in contrast to participation, is an invitational affair. It permits some to be in the know while others may or may not be informed. It also allows planners to use their time judiciously and to keep information to themselves until they

become quite certain that they are on the right path or that they have found a desirable solution to the issue. In due time, they will want to come out in the open and they will float the idea. But in the meantime, the partial secrecy provided by networking may be preferable to open disclosure.

To be sure, there will be circumstances in which secrecy is unacceptable and open hearings and participation are mandated. But secrecy has its uses, even in situations where an open, credible exchange of information is important. After all, as mentioned earlier, success in human relationships depends on making fair exchanges, not on expressing unpleasant truths.

Incentives and Penalties. Incentives are important any time that a coalition has difficulty holding together. This is particularly true of large planning exercises involving many interests, organizations, and stakeholders. Once the idea is floated, the problem is to maintain course, or, if the course is to be altered, to still achieve something worthwhile. Incentives and sanctions are used to co-opt emerging opposition, maintain support, and avoid derailment or watering down of the plan.

Bardach's (1978) study of the implementation of the 1967 mental health legislation in the state of California emphasizes the role of the "fixer" in the process of implementation. The legislation, which was the subject of his study, was ambitious and reformist. It had two main aims. The first was to restore the civil liberties of persons alleged to be mentally ill, and the second was to decentralize mental care, that is, to substitute smaller, more numerous, and diversified community-based services for large central state mental institutions. Today, we know there were unforeseen consequences to this act. No one foresaw at the time that community services were inadequate, or if some individuals did, their voices were not heard. As a consequence, many of these patients later became homeless transients, which created new problems. But the implementation lesson is still valid even though the policy was flawed.

Opposition to this legislation emerged from many different quarters. The path of implementation was torturous, and Bardach's account depicts the many pitfalls encountered. The

main author and architect of the bill, a state legislator, spent considerable time, energy, and political resources to settle issues, quell opposition, and move the action along as rapidly as possible. The lesson to be distilled from this research is that someone orchestrated the process and that political resources—favors, incentives, and political gifts and threats—were essential to the success of implementation.

Bardach stresses the importance of familiarity with the policy environment. The legislator had a long legislative history in the mental health field, as well as considerable support in the mental health milieu. He was perceived by those active in mental health policy as the focal point for action on mental health issues. Information flowed to him, and he was able to use his skills and his political assets to cajole, negotiate, and settle conflicts. Moreover, he was able to rely on allies within the coalition to create a small group of fixers, "a coalition of political partners with diverse but complementary resources" who were able to move fast and could intervene effectively because they had momentum and, even more importantly, because they knew why, where, and when to intervene and had the resources to do so (pp. 277-278).

A good deal of the literature on the implementation of policies and plans has focused on failures. These are the conventional horror stories of unintended outcomes. They often depict the endless administrative ramifications that inevitably arise when numerous agencies at the federal, state, and local levels are involved (Derthick, 1972; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979). Failures and distortions are inevitable when top-down planning and the absence of networking encounter the realities of the field (Williams, 1980; Berman, 1978, 1980). This is particularly so when the planners have not made any attempt to match the content of the plan to the realities of the field, have not assessed the potential capabilities of the implementers, and, more generally, have failed to deal with field reality (Elmore, 1979-80; Wittrock and de Leon, 1986). We can link these failures directly to the planners' lack of awareness of the importance of networking, and we can therefore understand better why they were unable to design implementable policies (Linder and Peters,

1987; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983).

This literature emphasizes the importance of access to resources such as rewards and penalties (Brigham and Brown, 1980; Hanf and Toonen, 1985; Barrett and Fudge, 1981). It also links the scope of the endeavor to access to resources. Successful implementation takes place when the reform is ambitious enough to create interest and maintain the support of a coalition but not so complicated that it results in excessive resistance—resistance that planners cannot overcome with the incentives that they have at hand (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986; Sabatier, 1986). Incentives have different dimensions: Is the plan attractive? Has it generated support? Is it understandable? Does it reach numerous stakeholders? Does it provide economic and other incentives? Can implementation be carried out? Can we move quickly to implement it?

Effective planning requires both incentives to achieve flexibility and the ability to use these in negotiations. Planners cannot come to their task empty-handed. One reason planners often cannot resolve conflicts is directly attributable to their inability to offer incentives. Hall (1988) points out that the successes of the opposition are sometimes seen as triumphs of community participation. But as he points out, planning failures are just that—failures. They are wasteful and indicate rigidity. In other words, the successes of the opposition simply reveal the inadequacy of incentives.

Access to incentives varies in planning. For example, zoning power in land-use planning may be the final responsibility of a governing body advised by planners who will influence such decisions just as many other stakeholders will. Although planners are rarely delegated sufficient authority to use incentives to achieve agreements, once we recognize that planning is a de facto management activity, such delegation comes to seem both legitimate and reasonable. The planner's ability to identify, attract, and create a coalition depends on the trade-offs he or she can negotiate. As long as planners are perceived by stakeholders not to be the relevant decision makers, they will be bypassed as stakeholders decide they prefer to strike compromises with the

Prince or his lieutenants. In such situations, however, the ability of planners to float the image and trigger the multiplier will be hampered, and the potential benefits of planning in bringing about a consensus and avoiding conflict will be lost.

What Kinds of Grass-Roots Movements Matter? To initiate the multiplier, the coalition requires a group of known supporters—a group with sufficient critical mass to create a strong conviction that the plan has a chance of being implemented.

Many planning failures result because this initial coalition, while sufficiently impressive to create a belief in the implementation of the plan, does not include, or has not taken sufficient account of, potential opponents. These, in turn, are mobilized by the emergence of the coalition. As long as the plan was dormant and action did not seem imminent, the potential opposition was unable to organize or to generate much interest in the issue. It therefore lay hidden. The planners did not take it into account because no one imagined it would surface. This is part of the uncertainty involved in forming coalitions (Bardach, 1978; Friend and Hickling, 1987). Opposition to the plan materializes after the idea is floated, at a time when the multiplier is beginning to take effect and is, therefore, very fragile.

Such opposition is not limited to implementers. Implementers and other stakeholders, particularly beneficiaries, often combine because their interests and wants are not being met by the plan. This opposition can be the expression of narrow interests (for example, the objection of a few citizens who are seriously inconvenienced by proposed developments) or the expression of wider interests (for example, the objection of a large number of citizens who sense they are being treated unfairly and have mobilized around issues).

In his cross-cultural study of grass-roots movements in urban development, Castells (1983) finds that these movements can usefully be placed in three "ideal" categories:

- *Collective consumption trade unionism.* These movements are organized around narrow issues of great importance to their participants—for example, fighting for low-cost housing, pre-

serving historic buildings, increasing city services, or reducing street crime.

- *Community searches for cultural identity.* These movements are organized around the ethnic and cultural values and lifestyles of their participants—for example, gay or lesbian rights groups, ethnic minority associations.

- *Citizen movements.* These movements focus on obtaining local decentralized power and achieving self-management. They are empowering movements that seek to reduce centralization—for example, movements to legitimize neighborhood government.

In practice, of course, a given movement often combines more than one of these categories, and Castells points out that those movements that encompass many issues, recognize the cultural identity of many groups, and are concerned with empowerment tend to be the most effective and lasting.

The reason that these movements are relevant to planning is straightforward: They indicate emerging needs and approaches. If these movements persist, it is not mere theater; serious underlying causes bring them about. Planners cannot remain blind to such realities even if the Prince does and even if taking them into account requires planners to depart from conventional orthodoxy and accepted practice within the existing power structure.

Social movements also exist within the tighter authority structures of organizations. Corporate planners should not disregard them because these movements may be indicative both of new thinking and of needs that are emerging and will, in due time, become part of the accepted corporate orthodoxy. Using the ideal types identified by Castells, we find that idea people, climbers, and deadwood come together in informal affiliation groups with similar agendas:

First come the *issue groups*. Some of these groups are single-issue oriented—for example, the activists, scientists, and other individuals in government laboratories in the eighties who believed that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would never result in the building of an effective defensive shield.

Second come the *cultural or ethnic groups*, some of which

are concerned with the needs and viewpoints of groups that have not heretofore held much power in government or business—women, blacks, Hispanics, and others. These groups often use networks that cut across hierarchies, and they may be very well informed about grass-roots problems and issues. I would also add to this list groups that espouse new cultural values within organizations—for example, managers and others concerned with ethical issues or those concerned with the quality of work life.

Finally, *empowering groups* are concerned with the sharing of authority and responsibility within organizations. For example, they may be professional groups seeking to acquire a participative decision-making role in task situations where professional knowledge is important. The emergence of these groups is indicative of underlying changes in the relations between professionals and managers and the growing importance of expertise and knowledge both within government and in the private sector (Benveniste, 1987).

This typology helps us understand that issues emerge from needs and that effective planning depends not only on bringing about change but also on bringing about change that is worthwhile, that endures, that meets emerging needs. The effective planner may often find that the Prince is not well informed, not in touch with the emerging groups in the planning environment. To be sure, this is not an easy task since it requires the ability to distinguish between mere demagoguery and needs that translate into enduring demands. There is no science to provide answers to such questions, and, as a consequence, planning is always an inventive act, a design that happens to fit historical circumstances. But it is a design based on extensive networking among grass-roots groups.

What Is the Role of the Prince? Finally let us come back to the Prince. In some instances the Prince is a single individual with strong political assets. In others, he is a committee, an elected council, or an appointed planning board. As mentioned in the previous chapter, we have used the term *Prince* to describe very

different sets of actors because the term happened to be succinct and the differences did not matter to our discussion until now.

When the Prince is an elected or appointed body composed of many individuals, the relationship between the Prince and the planners is further complicated. For example, an elected or appointed planning board will often include within its own membership representatives of major pressure groups and other stakeholders. Thus the process of networking and coalition building in the field may have to parallel, or be extended by, a similar process within the governing board. For example, when the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) was established in Britain in 1961, it had an original membership that included: six representatives from industry, six from the trade unions, and two from the nationalized industries, along with the director general and three ministers (Treasury, Labour, and the Board of Trade) (Shanks, 1977). Obviously, such a council represents and includes different points of view and interests. Planners on the staff of NEDC had to recognize and attune themselves to these interests.

In contrast, a single Prince—say a corporate CEO—sits on high, as it were, and can either support or oppose the emerging coalition. In the first instance, the Prince is an aggregate of individuals who have to be treated one by one in terms of their interests and so on, while this of course does not hold for the CEO, although his board of directors may still respond to individualized attention. Or the relationship of planners to the Prince may be more complex still. For example, an urban planning staff may be directly under a planning board with delegated legislative powers while a strong executive runs the city bureaucracy. In addition, important state and federal programs may have a direct bearing on the planning activity. Our concept of the Prince is convenient because it highlights the difference between those who hire the planners and those to be served by planning. But in some instances we need to recall that many different individuals play parts in the composite role of the Prince.

In the real world of planning, the Prince, whether single or multiheaded, has power, but he never acquires infinite power.

He of course uses his planners with his own purposes in mind. As we saw in Chapter One, he may use them to legitimize decisions he has already made or he may use them as trial balloons to test various ideas and see what reactions he receives (after all, planners can always be fired if the reaction is negative). He may use them as his personal staff to take care of his correspondence, and, as we assume is the case in this book, he may use them to achieve worthwhile change.

Once we conceive of planners as active *de facto* managers, we have to reexamine their relationship with the Prince. Are they really on the staff of the Prince, or are they somehow removed, *de facto* managers with their own responsibilities and, therefore, their own agenda?

In this perspective, is the Prince a friend? Or is he distant and aloof? Even a foe? We have stressed the importance of close collaboration between planners and the Prince in whose employ they work. But there exist many reasons why the relationship is difficult. Whether we are discussing a council or any other multiheaded Prince who happens to be one of many actors in a diffuse and loosely linked political structure or a single czar who dominates a tightly organized hierarchy, the Prince does not readily support his planners. There are several explanations for this:

First, the Prince wants to keep some distance from his planners. They can be removed if they fail, whereas the Prince hopes to stay in place. The planners may be ahead of accepted dogma and conventional wisdom. They reflect emerging changes, they propose new ideas, and they send up, so to speak, the trial balloons of the Prince. If they succeed, the Prince will embrace them. If they are shot down, the Prince will replace them.

Second, the Prince is not ready to let the planners play an adjudicative role. The Prince's own power emerges, in part, from his ability to adjudicate conflict. If the planners begin to negotiate, begin to successfully resolve conflicts, if they become "fixers," they will accrue power. Everyone will rush to their office instead of to the Prince's. A weak Prince cannot afford to have strong planners. Therefore, he makes sure that everyone by

passes the planners and understands that deals must be made with the Prince himself.

Third, the Prince distrusts the political judgment of planners. He hired them as technicians and does not see them as administrators or managers in their own right. Usually, finding themselves in an unfamiliar environment, the planners proceed cautiously and play the role intended for them. The Prince is, by training, vocation, and experience, a better politician, a better manager. They defer to him and seek his counsel.

Finally, the interests of the Prince do not coincide completely with those of his planners. The Prince is centered on the present, on what can be achieved immediately. The planners are centered on the emerging future, on specific undertakings that can be carried out today to improve opportunities later on. The Prince exchanges favors in the present and acquires influence because of what he gives today. He resents future commitments because gifts made today for later delivery do not have much value since they will be enjoyed in a distant future. In addition, these gifts become liabilities when delivery time comes.

Therefore, contrary to conventional wisdom, in complex situations planners do not necessarily work closely with the Prince. They need him, and he will need them before too much time elapses. But at the very beginning, planners will be on their own. They may report to the Prince and seek his advice, but they should not be disturbed if he seems, at first, to be distant. If the planners deal with a committee, they may find some informal allies among its members while keeping their distance from others. They will maintain that distance until they are quite sure they have the support of the Prince. Once the coalition emerges, the Prince, if wise, will quickly see the advantage in identifying himself with his planners. If he is unwise and weak, he may become confused and deliberately sabotage his planners, even get rid of them.

Meanwhile, his planners cannot take him for granted. His support will have to be sought, and the advantages that will accrue to him will have to be made explicit. The planners will have to entice him to acquire his trust. They will use his name and act under his authority even when they have not yet revealed

what they are going to do for him. He will close his eyes and pretend he does not see what is going on. He will be ready to jettison the exercise whenever the heat becomes too intense. The planners will provide a shield for his mistakes. He will claim he did not know; he will take refuge in deniability and survive while they take the blame.

Conclusion

Can there remain any doubt that the task of planning is difficult? Should we be surprised if much planning is trivial or utopian? If much planning results in unintended and undesirable compromises? Should we be surprised if there exists a crisis in planning and if students of the process adopt the famous Titanic analogy: The impact of planning is akin to a "pleasant rearrangement of the deck chairs rather than [a serious attempt] to save the ship"? (Ambrose, 1986, p. 257).

The image of planning depicted here is heavily influenced by the possibility of implementation, but the possibility of implementation is determined by human purpose and action. This theory of planning is active and not static. Planning is a matter of acting in the present to prepare for the future, but it is not always clear whether the present determines the future or whether perceptions of the future determine what we do about it. Or, as Majone and Wildavsky (1978) put it, it is not always clear whether policy shapes implementation or whether implementation shapes policy.

Two points should be emphasized: First, planning is management, but it is a special type of management. It is much less concerned with formal structures than with informal networks and emergent movements and groups. Second, planning, like management, requires resources, time, and discretion. Planning often succeeds through rapid interventions, defusing problems before they explode. This means that planners require considerable delegation of authority. They also need time and facilities to carry on their work. If we accept this, the other side of the coin is that planning has to be accountable. If planners are given more authority, they also have to account for the mandate en-

trusted to them. This could be a relatively simple matter of reporting in the context of a tight hierarchical structure, or it could require the institutionalization of oversight functions in the context of public-sector planning. Moreover, if planners are managers in their own right, they had better learn the skills and language of the specialized form of management that they are to undertake. They cannot simply rely on their analytical skills. They need to learn and practice the arts of networking and coalition building, they need to become accomplished negotiators, and they need to learn to formulate problems and solutions in ways that are credible and understandable to their peers in the administration, to the stakeholders, and to the public at large.

Lastly, the Prince and the planners have to understand how their roles complement each other. One is more concerned with the present, the other with the future. One is more concerned with what is, the other with what is emergent. Planning—as de facto management—takes its point of departure from different concerns and uses different channels but in so doing makes a valued contribution to the collective task. Its main functions are to establish the importance of the future in day-to-day decision making, to rectify the short-term vision of the Prince, and to facilitate adaptation and learning.

This may seem too much to ask, but if it is, the image of the Titanic will remain accurate. The deck chairs may be in good order, but not much will be accomplished.