ACCT 352 question

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CaterpillarInc.v.Sudlow.docx

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Court of Appeals of Indiana

CATERPILLAR INC., Appellant–Defendant,

William SUDLOW, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 79A02–1507–CT–801.

March 3, 2016.

BAKER, Judge.

[1] Caterpillar, Inc., appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of William Sudlow. Sudlow was a Caterpillar employee who was fired after another employee observed a partially visible gun in Sudlow's vehicle in the Caterpillar parking lot. The trial court entered summary judgment in Sudlow's favor because it found that Caterpillar's policy did not prohibit the conduct for which Sudlow was fired. Finding that Sudlow is not entitled to relief under statute or common law, we reverse the summary judgment order and the damages award and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Caterpillar.

Facts

During the relevant period of time, Caterpillar had a Facility Firearms policy (the Firearms Policy) that read as follows:

In accordance with Indiana State Statute 34–28–7–2, employees or suppliers legally permitted to possess and transport a firearm are authorized to store the firearm in the licensee's private means of transportation in line with state law. Any person who chooses to transport his or her firearm under this law must abide by the regulations within the law while on Caterpillar property. Any person found to be in violation of this policy, may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination and/or criminal prosecution.

Indiana Code section 34–28–7–2(a) (“the Firearms Statute”) reads as follows:

Notwithstanding any other law and except as provided in subsection (b), a person may not adopt or enforce an *21 ordinance, a resolution, a policy, or a rule that:

(1) prohibits; or (2) has the effect of prohibiting;an employee of the person, including a contract employee, from possessing a firearm or ammunition that is locked in the trunk of the employee's vehicle, kept in the glove compartment of the employee's locked vehicle, or stored out of plain sight in the employee's locked vehicle.

On March 28, 2011, Sudlow drove to work. That day, he had a loaded Ruger .357 Magnum handgun—for which he had a permit—“stuffed down between the [center] console and the driver's seat.” Appellant's App. p. 60–61. Sudlow left the gun there when he parked and exited his vehicle and entered the building to begin his work day. Another Caterpillar employee was walking through the parking lot and walked past Sudlow's vehicle. The employee noticed what appeared to be a handgun inside the vehicle. He could see the weapon's handle, the guard over the trigger, and the holster. He then reported the issue to Caterpillar's head of security. Eventually, the head of security confirmed the presence of the weapon in the vehicle and told Sudlow that he was suspended indefinitely.

On March 30, 2011, Sudlow was fired for violating the Firearms Policy. The same day, Caterpillar posted a new firearms policy throughout the building; the new policy explicitly states that firearms in employees' vehicles must be kept “secured and out of sight.”

On July 19, 2011, Sudlow filed a complaint against Caterpillar, alleging that Caterpillar had violated the Firearms Statute when it terminated his employment for violating the Firearms Policy. On May 15, 2014, Caterpillar moved for summary judgment; on June 16, 2014, Sudlow filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court entered an interlocutory order granting summary judgment in Sudlow's favor on September 24, 2014.

I. The Firearms Statute

The plain and unambiguous language of this statute prohibits employers from enacting policies that prevent their employees from having a firearm that is locked in the trunk, kept in the glove box in a locked vehicle, or stored out of sight in the employee's locked vehicle.

Here, Caterpillar's Firearms Policy did not prohibit conduct that is protected by the Firearms Statute. Sudlow's attorney conceded as much at oral argument. Indeed, as noted by the trial court, per the Firearms Statute, Caterpillar could have enacted a more restrictive policy (and did so the day Sudlow was fired) but it chose not to do so. It is readily apparent that neither the Firearms Policy nor Caterpillar's interpretation thereof violated the Firearms Statute. As a cause of action under the Firearms Statute is authorized only when an employer violates the statute, see I.C. § 34–28–7–3, Sudlow has no right to recover on this basis.

II. Common Law

3 [12] If Sudlow does not have a cause of action under the Firearms Statute, his only recourse would be something akin to a wrongful termination claim. It is undisputed that he was an at-will employee, meaning that his employment could have been terminated by either party at will, with or without a reason. E.g., Ogden v. Robertson, 962 N.E.2d 134, 145 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). There are three exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, but the parties discuss only the public policy exception: “we have recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine if a clear statutory expression of a right or duty is contravened.” Orr v. Westminster Village N., Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 718 (Ind.1997).

The Firearms Statute is the best expression of Indiana's public policy regarding the right to transport and store firearms at work. And while this statute does confer a right to store a weapon in a trunk, glove compartment, or out of sight in a locked vehicle, it simply does not confer a right to store a weapon in a vehicle in plain sight. It is apparent, therefore, that in this case, there was no contravention of a clear statutory expression of a right. As a result, the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine does not apply, and Sudlow is not entitled to relief under the common law.

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