

1 From Castles & Davidson (2000)
Citizenship and Migration Putnam Press

The Crisis of Citizenship

In that summer of 1914, when the rulers of human destinies drew European humanity from the playing fields of universal suffrage to the already prepared arena of universal military service, the town of Visegrad provided a small but eloquent example of the first symptoms of a contagion which would in time become European and then spread to the entire world. (Andric, 1994 [1945], p. 265)

Today we are experiencing the weakening of civic feeling and of political bonds. There is nothing to guarantee that the modern democratic nation will in future have the capability of maintaining the social bond, as it has done in the past.... It seems impossible for democracies to demand of their citizens to defend them with their lives. In democracy there is no longer any supreme sacrifice: the individuals and their interests have taken the place of the citizens and their ideals. (Schnapper, 1994, p. 11, translation by Castles)

Until a few years ago, the notion of citizenship was little discussed outside university political science courses. Being a citizen was just a matter of common sense in the fortunate minority of the world's countries that might be considered to be democracies. It was 'normal' to be a citizen, which meant having the rights to vote and to stand for political office, enjoying equality before the law and being entitled to various government services and benefits. Being a citizen also meant having the obligations to obey the laws, to pay taxes and – in extreme situations – to defend one's country. As for the rest of the world, it was a widespread aspiration to move towards the western model of citizenship. As the President of Mongolia, Punsalmaagiya Ochirbat, said when he visited Paris, the symbolic birthplace of the modern nation, 'In 1990 we embarked on a great journey to join the common course of mankind – democracy and human rights, the market economy and economic development' (*Le Monde/Guardian Weekly*, 5 May, 1996). Those were the icons of progress. The nation-state had become the

global norm for political advancement, and citizenship was seen as an integral aspect of prosperity and modernization.

There are, however, signs that citizenship has in recent years become problematic. Several countries have revised their laws and practices concerning the rights and obligations of citizens. Others have changed their rules for access to citizenship for immigrants, children of immigrants and other minorities. New countries emerging from the dissolving multiethnic states of real socialism have sought to define and establish appropriate rules of citizenship. Other new countries forged out of former colonies have dissolved into anarchy because of a failure to build an inclusive national identity and a stable state. The notion of citizenship has become the focus of political and academic discourse, with a spate of books, debates and conferences. Citizenship campaigns have sprung up, which claim that extending citizenship to certain groups, or changing the substance of certain aspects of citizenship, could help to solve major social problems. Why this sudden interest in something that seemed so obvious? Is it the result of major changes in the political and social context? Or is it that we have become sensitive to possible omissions and problems implicit in the common-sense notion of citizenship?

The answer is both. The global context of citizenship is changing dramatically, but so is the way in which we perceive it. These two trends are linked: there have always been some fundamental ambiguities in the notion of citizenship, but these did not seem to matter much as long as the political context appeared fairly coherent and stable. That context was, of course, the nation-state: the development of modern citizenship was inextricably linked with the emergence of the nation-state in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century onwards. The current crisis of citizenship is thus closely linked with the challenges facing the nation-state model at the end of the twentieth century. These affect – in specific ways – not only the classical nation-states of Western Europe, but also the nation-building societies of North America and Oceania, and the new industrial countries of Asia and Latin America.¹

Globalization and the nation-state

The essence of the nation-state is the institution of citizenship: the integration of all the inhabitants of a territory into the political community, and their political equality as citizens. Of course, relatively few nations

match this democratic ideal. How many countries have not had a violent change in government during the twentieth century? It is hard to think of more than seven! In how many states do the people really have a choice about who forms the government and what it does? Yet most heads of state claim that their country is democratic, and most politically aware people aspire to this.

The European and North American nation-states that emerged from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries were astonishingly effective, in both internal and external terms. Their political systems facilitated the integration of diverse groups into cohesive populations and provided the conditions for capitalist industrialization. They were able to dominate and colonize the rest of the world, and to impose economic relations and cultural values that were to transform all the disparate societies and bring them into a global system. These nation-states continued the work of the great centralizing monarchies: Spain, Portugal, France and England. However, they quickly transcended the absolutist model, marginalizing those countries that did not make the transition to the modern nation-state on time. Colonialism was crucial to the emerging nation-states: exploiting the natural resources and the labour power of dominated peoples made industrialization possible. When the 'late nations' such as Germany and Italy began to seek 'their place in the sun', and the colonized peoples demanded freedom, the result was the conflicts that were to lead to the most violent century in history.

This dialectic of progress and violence indicates some of the ambivalences inherent in the nation-state model. Can it work if all the societies of the world constitute themselves as nation-states and seek equality in a global system? Or is it premised on the domination of weaker countries, and the stigmatization and exclusion of the Other? It is vital to deconstruct the contradictions of the nation-state model if we are to find ways of achieving more democratic types of citizenship and more equitable and peaceful international relations. However, the project of this book is more modest: we aim to analyse just one – albeit the most important – aspect of the nation-state in the light of some of the challenges it faces in the current epoch. Our theme is citizenship and the ways in which it is being questioned and reshaped by current global transformations.

Globalization is widely seen as one of the most important determinants of the human condition in the contemporary world, so we need to characterize it here, as the context for debates on citizenship. Globalization is a term used to summarize the following trends:

- The emergence of a global economy based on the activities of transnational corporations and on international markets for capital, commodities, services and futures.
- The very rapid introduction of new information technologies that are revolutionizing communication, production and trade, and facilitating the international dissemination of cultural values.
- The formation of regional economies and markets characterized by the free movement of capital, goods and labour across national states' borders. The European Union (EU) is the most developed example, while the North American Free Trade Area and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum permit free movement in some respects but not others.
- The development of supra-national institutions and legal norms to regulate economic and political relations (the EU, the World Court, the European Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization and so on).
- The growing significance of democracy and human rights as near-universal norms of governance in the international community.
- The emergence of a global commitment to a common set of values and standards of the Good as a result of global information transfer and cross-cultural awareness.

The development of global systems of production and trade is not in itself new – it is a central aspect of modernity as embodied in the world-wide empires of the great European powers that reached their zenith in the pre-1914 era of imperialism. What is new today is the all-embracing character of global relationships, the speed of reaction through electronically networked markets and media, and the decline of central control as the role of national governments diminishes. Globalization is characterized by a lightning-quick transmission of information through new media. Television images of human disasters in Central Africa bring that world into the living-rooms of rich countries. However, the converse is also true: the idealized lifestyles of Beverly Hills are flaunted before the world's poor.

It is doubtful, however, whether the global media explosion is really breeding a global consciousness. Most of its images exist only in a fantasy realm completely divorced from the lives of 80 per cent of the globe who view them. This rupture between mental or cultural life and lived life is marked by the fact that, of some billion international trips per year, most are made by a relatively small group of privileged people from rich countries. The bulk of the world's population either

stay where they were born, or move to adjoining countries much like their own. It is important to avoid an over-facile definition of globalization based on the experience of privileged minorities, as found for example in the work of Ohmae (1995). Most people still do not have a wide experience of different cultures of that direct sort that allows them to make sense of media grabs.

Even more significant is the fact that economic, social, educational and health conditions still vary immensely. Even in the USA, income inequality grew sharply in the 1980s: the rich got richer, there were more poor people, and the middle classes were eroded (Reich, 1991, pp. 196–207). This trend applies in virtually all the older industrial countries, where the decline of welfare states has exacerbated the social polarization. Growing inequalities in wealth can also be found in newly industrializing countries. Economic development under conditions of free markets and non-interventionist states seems inevitably to lead to greater inequality. Modernization theories claim that higher living standards will 'trickle down' to disadvantaged groups, yet it is far from clear that this is happening. The most glaring inequality, however, is still that between the industrial countries (both old and new) and those areas which have not been able to achieve sustained economic development. In many areas of Africa and Asia, real income is falling. This means declines in educational opportunities, health standards and even life expectancy. Whole nations are being excluded from the new global order.

A recent text on global inequalities makes this devastatingly clear, mortality tables showing an 18:1 greater chance of dying before the age of 5 years in poor against rich countries, and a life expectancy of 54.5 years compared with 80 years. More than 90 per cent of children attend secondary school in rich countries, against fewer than 20 per cent in poor countries (Bradshaw and Wallace, 1996, Chapter 2; Streeten, 1996). Another study points out that in the 1980s, real minimum wages fell by up to 50 per cent in Africa and Latin America. In the 42 poorest countries, the expenditure on health fell over 50 per cent and that on education over 25 per cent. Resource transfer to poor countries went from a positive 43 billion dollars in 1981 to a negative 33 billion dollars in 1988. Comparative income gaps have widened, the average per capita income in an advanced country being 58 times that in the least developed countries, where over half the world's population live on 5.6 per cent of world income (Turk, 1993, pp. 17–18; Khor, 1996). Like many other texts, these sources suggest that globalization is making the discrepancy worse. There is a 'relentless growth'

in the number of the 'absolute poor' reaching 1.3 billion in 1993 (Global Commission, 1995, pp. 21-3).

Globalization is characterized by new forms of inclusion in and exclusion from societal relationships. Castells (1996, p. 3) argues that 'our societies are increasingly structured around a bipolar opposition between the Net and the Self'. He emphasizes the role of new information technologies in creating global networks of wealth, power and images. These networks can 'selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, regions and even countries' according to their relevance in fulfilling instrumental goals. This system is economically efficient but incapable of giving meaning to people's lives. To escape such abstract universalism, people increasingly seek meaning through particularistic identities based on ethnicity, religion, regionalism or nationalism. This explains why many contemporary conflicts are not concerned primarily with 'rational' economic and social interests. The defence of local or sectional interests against globalizing forces may be based on cultural symbols connected with dignity and identity. Resistance movements may appear particularistic and even backward-looking because discourses of universalism appear to have been monopolized by globalizing forces. At worst, the result is a new 'tribalism' in which populations retreat from universal to exclusive localist outlooks and a new anarchy or chaos dominates outside rich countries (Global Commission, 1995, pp. 16-17). There is a massive increase in violence, crime, war and drug addiction (UNRISD, 1995). In some places, barbarism rules: torture, rape, cannibalism and other bizarre expressions of violence become commonplace (Kaplan, 1996b; Touati, 1996; Zheng, 1996). We can thus discount any notion that globalization spells the homogenization of experience throughout the globe on the lines of that in advanced countries.

Globalization affects citizenship in many ways. This can be summarized by pointing to three main aspects, of which two are contextual and the third more direct. First, globalization questions the notion of the relative autonomy of the nation-state, upon which each separate national citizenship is based. Globalization breaks the territorial principle, the nexus between power and place. Wiewiorka (1994, p. 25) has drawn attention to the 'decomposition of national industrial societies'. The 'national industrial society', as it evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, articulated three elements - society, state and nation - in a particular form. 'Society' referred to an economic and social system based on rational (as opposed to traditional or religious) principles, within a bounded national territory. 'State' referred to a

political system based on secular (and usually democratic) principles, capable of regulating economic and political relations and change. 'Nation' referred to a 'people' defined on the basis both of belonging to the territory of the state and having a common cultural and ethnic background (Lapeyronnie *et al.*, 1990, pp. 258-62). Politics, the economy, social relations and culture were congruent in that they all took the nation-state as their main point of reference. The nation-state was seen as a discrete unit within a world of nation-states. The whole of classical sociology takes this 'national society' for granted (Lapeyronnie *et al.*, 1990, p. 259). Even the critics of capitalism based their politics on national units: social-democratic demands for economic reform and welfare policies addressed the state; communists called for world revolution but were organized nationally.

Globalization has destabilized the 'national industrial society'. The central dynamics of economic life now transcend national borders and have become uncontrollable for national governments. Deindustrialization of the older industrial nations has led to profound social changes and has eroded the membership basis of the labour movement. The nation-state is still the basic unit for welfare systems, but no government can pursue welfare policies that ignore the pressures of global markets. This alters the terms for socialist parties: even if they can get elected to power, they may have to abandon their traditional objectives and adopt economic rationalism. Capital may appear to have won the class struggle, but this leads not to Fukuyama's (1992) 'end of history' but instead to forms of social and political disorganization that threaten the security of the well-off and the stability of democratic states. What, then, does it mean to be a citizen if the autonomy of the nation-state is being eroded, and the vote that one wields cannot influence key political decisions because they are no longer made by national parliaments?

The second aspect of globalization is that it has undermined the ideology of distinct and relatively autonomous national cultures. These were always a myth because virtually every nation-state has been made up of a number of ethnic groups, with distinct languages, traditions and histories. Homogenization is at the core of the nationalist project. The internal Other has to be made into a national before he or she can become a citizen. As Renan pointed out in 1882 in his famous discourse 'What is a nation?' (Renan, 1992), forgetting the history of ethnic distinctiveness and the (often repressive) process of overcoming it is vital to national identity. Moreover, no frontier has ever been completely impervious to cultural influences: even Enver Hodja's Albania could not completely encapsulate itself against the influences

of western culture, as the rush to migrate to Italy after 1989 showed. All cultures are hybrids. Nonetheless, ideas of national cultural distinctiveness have underpinned nation-building and patriotism.

Globalization has changed all this: rapid improvements in transport and communications have led to an unprecedented degree of cultural interchange. The industrialization of media production puts enormous pressure on national and local cultures. Dominance by global cultural factories, for example Hollywood, means the diffusion of specific value systems connected with consumerism, individualism and US lifestyles. At the same time, however, we witness a re-ethnicization of culture at a subnational level. This trend appears as a form of resistance to both the nationalization and the globalization of culture. Collectivities that constitute themselves around cultural claims may be based not only on ethnicity, but also on regional location, gender, sexual preferences and lifestyles. National culture is being squeezed between the global and the local.

The third aspect is the central theme of this book: globalization means the rapidly increasing mobility of people across national borders. The period since 1945 and especially since 1980 has been marked by large-scale migrations of all kinds: temporary and permanent movements; labour migrations and refugee exoduses; individual and family flows; highly skilled specialists and manual workers (Castles and Miller, 1998). Such migrations have led to settlement in nearly all highly developed countries and in many parts of the less-developed regions. Populations have become more heterogeneous and culturally diverse. Cultural difference and social marginalization are often closely linked, creating ethnic minorities with disadvantaged and relatively isolated positions in society. In addition to long-term migration, mobility takes on other forms that may have a considerable impact on local cultures and economies: tourism, the short-term movement of business executives and experts, and the mobility of young people in search of education and training.

The mobility of people has always been an inherent part of colonialism and industrialization. Sailors, soldiers, traders, administrators and settlers were sent out to manage and exploit the colonized Others, who were constructed through racist ideologies as being inferior and threatening. As the flow of colonial profits back to the metropolises helped to provide the capital for industrialization, new mass migrations started. At first, these were movements of impoverished rural workers into the new industrial towns. As these reserves dried up, however, workers were pulled in across national borders: Irish to Britain; Poles

and Italians to Germany, France and Switzerland; and Eastern and Southern Europeans to fuel the industrial take-off of the USA. These migrants were eventually, to a large extent, absorbed into the national populations, and their children became citizens.

Two things are new about current migrations. The first is their sheer scale: they affect all regions and most countries of the world simultaneously. The speed at which new ethnic minorities have emerged has confounded policy makers and undermined laws and practices concerned with integration and citizenship. The second is the ethnocultural characteristics of many of the immigrants: they come from areas that are increasingly distant – not only in kilometres, but also in cultural terms. They often originate in former colonies or areas of military presence of the receiving countries: North and West Africans in France; Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain; Mexicans, Filipinos, Koreans and Vietnamese in the USA; and so on. Many recent migrants, however, come from areas where the linkages are based on more tenuous experiences of economic and cultural penetration: Arabs to the USA; South East and South Asians to Japan; Chinese to virtually all developed countries. The highly historical success of the western nation-states in establishing the domination of the Third World has created mechanisms that now question the nation-state; this domination has led to linkages that facilitate the movement of not only capital and commodities, but also people and ideas – in both directions.

Key questions

The colonized Other is returning to the metropolises and becoming part of their populations and societies. In every city of Western Europe and North America, ethnic heterogeneity has become an inescapable reality. This Other has no shared past with the people of the receiving society. The cultural background, as seen in the contrast between Christian and Islamic traditions, may be very different. In the case of migrants from former colonies, the culture of the Other may partially mirror that of the receiving society, yet the dialectical unity of exploiter and exploited may contain a fundamental difference in experience. This situation raises crucial questions:

- Can these Others be submitted to a process of acculturation (as were previous internal minorities), which will reduce them to nationals and thus qualify them for membership in the nation-state?

- Or is such a process unthinkable in the era of globalization, with its multiple identities and diasporic communities?
- Has the pace of intermingling of ethnic groups become so rapid that there is no time for the process of forgetting different histories, which Renan saw as being crucial to national identity?
- Does this mean that the nation-state and citizenship will have to be modified to fit the new reality of the collective presence of the irreducible Other in multiethnic societies?
- If so, what can be the characteristics of possible new forms of political belonging?
- What political action is needed to develop these new forms?

These are the central questions of this book. Before discussing them further, it is necessary to return briefly to the problems that have always been implicit in the notions of the nation-state and citizenship.

Ambiguities of citizenship

Citizenship is one of the key institutions of contemporary societies, at the very core of both democracy and national identity, yet it has always been ambiguous in various ways. First, it implies not only inclusion, but also exclusion: the citizenship of certain types of person implies the non-citizenship of others. In the Greek *polis*, slaves, foreigners and, above all, women were excluded. In the modern states that emerged in the nineteenth century, the very size of the society precluded direct democracy. Suffrage was linked to the assumption of the capability of a man to participate rationally in the public sphere and to represent the people dependent upon him (women, children, servants and employees). In a wider sense, those elected to office had to be capable of representing the social category or interest group from which they derived. Citizenship was restricted to male householders belonging to the dominant religion and ethnic group. The political movements of excluded groups (women, workers, religious minorities and indigenous peoples) have seen access to the franchise as the main instrument of their emancipation.

Today, the problem of *formal exclusion* from citizenship applies above all to immigrants. By 1995, the total foreign population of European Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries was 19.4 million, of whom only 6.7 million were EU citizens. There were 2 million North Africans, 2.6 million Turks and 1.4 million

people from former Yugoslavia (OECD, 1997, p. 30). A large number of these were actually born in their country of residence yet had not become citizens, due to the principle of *ius sanguinis* (nationality by descent). Even in North America and Australia, where naturalization is easier to obtain, there is a relatively large number of resident non-citizens. These are people who belong to society as workers, tax-payers and parents, yet are denied full political participation. Even illegal immigrants may be long-term residents but do not enjoy many basic rights. This negates the basic principle of liberal democracy that all members of society should be included as citizens.

There is, however, another dimension, that of *de facto* exclusion: in most countries, there are significant groups, usually marked by race, by ethnicity or by being indigenous peoples, who are denied full participation as citizens. They may have the right to vote, but social, economic and cultural exclusion denies them the chance of gaining political representation or of having any real say in the decisions that affect their lives. This situation is in part a reflection of the fact that the substantial meaning of citizenship itself has become extended in recent times as civil and political rights have been joined by social rights (Marshall, 1964). Put differently, a certain level of social and economic welfare is needed before people can take advantage of formal political rights. Today, it may be argued that collective cultural rights needed to be added to Marshall's triad. *De facto* exclusion presents new challenges for the politics of inclusion, leading to calls for 'differential citizenship' (Young, 1989, 1990) and 'multicultural citizenship' (Kymlicka, 1995).

A second ambiguity of citizenship concerns the relationship between *rights* and *obligations*. This is most evident in the close link between universal suffrage and universal military service (referred to in the quotation from Ivo Andrić's epic novel on Bosnia at the beginning of this chapter). Dominique Schnapper's important work on citizenship constantly emphasizes the notion of the 'warrior-citizen' (Schnapper, 1994, p. 49). This link is problematic: it excludes women, who, with a few exceptions (such as in Israel), have not been seen as being capable of defending their nation by violent means. It also implies that democratic nations can only be consolidated internally by hostility towards external groups, that is, by constructing a *Feindbild*, or by the concept of an enemy (see Hoffmann, 1994). Moreover, linking suffrage with conscription can be a means of excluding internal minorities, who may be accused of 'unclear loyalties' in the event of a conflict. A model of citizenship for a global society can hardly be based on the willingness

to indulge in inter-state warfare, although it might require willingness to support the use of force to prevent conflict or human rights abuses.

Both of the above ambiguities are the expression of a more fundamental contradiction: that between *citizenship* and *nationality*, or between the notion of the *citizen* as an individual abstracted from cultural characteristics, and that of the *national* as a member of a community with common cultural values. In liberal theory, all citizens are meant to be free and equal persons, who as citizens are homogeneous individuals (Rawls, 1985, pp. 232–4). This requires a separation between a person's political rights and obligations, and their membership of specific groups, based on ethnicity, religion, social class or regional location. The political sphere is one of universalism, which means equality and abstraction from cultural particularity and difference. Difference is to be restricted to the 'non-public identity' (Rawls, 1985, p. 241).

This, however, conflicts with the reality of nation-state formation, in which becoming a citizen has depended on membership in a community. The nation-state is the combination of a political unit that controls a bounded territory (the state) with a national community (the nation or people) that has the power to impose its political will within those boundaries. A citizen is always also a member of a nation, a *national*. Thus, citizenship is meant to be universalistic and above cultural difference, yet it exists only in the context of a nation-state, which is based on cultural specificity – on the belief in being different from other nations. Historically, this tension has been expressed in measures to incorporate minority groups into the 'national culture'. Today, it is a major issue for indigenous peoples as well as for immigrants: can they only belong to the nation if they reject their own language and traditions and conform to the dominant ones?

It is clearly vital to distinguish between the nation and the ethnic group. There are currently some 200 nation-states in the world, yet over 6000 languages (Moynihan, 1993, p. 72). Language is in most cases an indicator of a cultural community and thus frequently of an ethnic group; if even a fraction of these groups were to seek to become nations, the potential for conflict would be enormous. As Moynihan (1993, pp. 63–106) shows, there is an inherent contradiction between two basic principles of the United Nations (UN): the principle of national sovereignty and that of the self-determination of peoples.

But the difference between the nation and the ethnic group is not always obvious, especially in the Anglo-American literature. For example, Seton-Watson describes a nation as 'a community of people,

whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness' (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 1). Connor defines a nation as 'a group of people who *believe* they are ancestrally related. It is the largest grouping that shares that belief' (Connor, 1991, p. 6, emphasis in original, quoted here from Moynihan, 1993, p. 1). Ethnicity is usually defined as a sense of group belonging based on ideas of common origins, history, culture, experience and values. Ethnicity is seen as 'cultural', in contradistinction to 'biological' notions of race (see Castles and Miller, 1998, pp. 30–2).

The distinction between ethnic group and nation in Anglo-American interpretations is usually a practical one based on sovereignty: an ethnic group that controls a bounded territory becomes a nation and establishes a nation-state. Factors of shared history and culture are then complemented by a common economy and legal system. Anthony Smith sums this up as follows:

A nation can therefore be defined as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members. (Smith, 1991, p. 14)

Since, however, there are few homogeneous nation-states, the question is how the varying ethnic groups in a territory are to be moulded into one nation. This may take place through the forcible imposition of the culture of the dominant group on the others, for example through the prohibition of minority languages, schools and festivals, as in the case of present-day Kurds in Turkey. The process may be a more gradual and consensual one, in which groups grow together through economic and social interaction, and the development of a common language and shared institutions, such as schools, church and military service. There is a fine line between the nation based on repression and that based on historical consensus. Most have elements of both and are open to subsequent challenge by movements of territorial minorities, as recent European history has shown.

Continental European views on the difference between nation and ethnic group have followed a rather different line, based on the famous distinction between the *Kulturnation* (cultural nation, also known as the ethnic nation) and the *Staatsnation* (state nation, also known as the civic nation). These notions developed as ideological expressions of the struggle for dominance between Germany and France in the nineteenth century.

Germany was a backward patchwork of principalities and mini-states with absolutist rulers until the end of eighteenth century. Nation-state formation did not come through internal impulses, but as a reaction to conquest by the Napoleonic armies. As Habermas points out, national consciousness was based not on democratic civil liberties and popular sovereignty, but on 'the romantically inspired middle-class notion of a *Kulturnation*, a nation defined by its culture' (Habermas, 1994a, p. 146). Romanticism portrayed individuals as part of an organic whole; freedom meant not individual rights but the acceptance of one's role in the greater organism. The state was the embodiment of this superior meaning, which could only be interpreted by great leaders. Democracy had no place in the model (Hoffmann, 1994, pp. 108–30).

The French *Staatsnation*, on the other hand, developed through the democratic revolution of 1789. It was seen as being based not on common culture but on a common will, as expressed both in Rousseau's idea of the 'general will' and in Renan's famous expression of the nation as '*le plébiscite de tous les jours*' (the daily plebiscite). The implication is that citizens of a nation form a community because they constantly express the will to do so. The nation should therefore be understood as a political project capable of transcending the tension between universalism and particularism (Schnapper, 1994, pp. 83–114). The common will creates and maintains the political unit, whatever conflicts there are within it. This idea provides the basis for a republican form of government, which should be capable of assimilating ethnic or religious minorities.

Yet the claim of transcending culture is dubious, for the French experience was actually based on linguistic homogenization, political centralization and compulsory assimilation. Shared endeavour and suffering in war were seen as the nation-building experiences *par excellence*. 'Political nation-units are generally born in the frays of war' (Schnapper, 1994, p. 45). Even Renan emphasizes alongside the principle of consent that of common history and culture (see Schnapper, 1994, p. 168). The republican model worked well as long as the dominant group was willing to assimilate others, and the economy was able to provide a reasonable level of social integration to all. But how well has the republican model coped with globalization and the immigration of the Other? We will return to this in later chapters.

A final ambiguity to be noted is contained in the concept of 'nationalization', used in English, French and certain other European languages to refer to the administrative act whereby a foreigner is

accepted as a citizen. Naturalization implies that being a member of a certain nation-state is laid down by 'natural laws', perhaps linked to natural environment or racial descent. Foreigners can only 'become natural' to the new host country through a long process (taking between 5 and 12 years in most countries), which may be seen as an exception to the normal rule of lifelong membership.

Fehér and Heller (1994) have pointed out that becoming acceptable as a citizen has nothing to do with nature but is instead based on a process of cultural adaptation; 'culturalization' would therefore be a more appropriate term. However, naturalization can be taken to mean being assimilated into an order that is 'the only natural one' for the place concerned. Failure to assimilate would then label the immigrant as a deviant or an enemy. The confusion between nature and culture is endemic in discourses on citizenship and the nation-state. The concept of naturalization is in blatant contradiction to the idea of citizenship as culturally neutral and open to all members of a society. Curiously, the German-speaking countries, which are highly restrictive in their policies of access to citizenship, use the more neutral term of '*Einbürgerung*', which literally means 'making into a citizen'.

Dealing with globalization: some approaches

Throughout this book, we will be looking at ideas on how citizenship should be reshaped in response to globalization and cultural diversity. Here we will mention just two positions, which can perhaps be seen as the opposing poles in the debate. Between them lies a wide range of interpretations and suggestions, to be found in a growing body of literature. These two positions are:

- The idea that the substance of citizenship and the nation-state are changing anyway through the inexorable forces of globalization, so that little further action is needed.
- The belief that the nation-state, although weakened by internal and external contradictions, is still the only political unit capable of maintaining democratic citizenship.

There is also, of course, the position that nothing fundamental has changed, and that national politics can go on as before. This view is widely held by conservative commentators and politicians. It leads to isolationism and to policies that are dangerously out of touch with both

global markets and global cultural transformations. We have already advanced reasons for rejecting this position and will not discuss it further here.

The first position – that global forces of themselves bring about reforms in citizenship patterns – can be associated both with the technocratic ideas of global managerialism and with political theories that focus on the growing role of supra-national human rights norms. We will discuss the former using the work of the Japanese management expert Kenichi Ohmae, and the latter with reference to a study by Harvard sociologist Yasemin Soysal.

In his book, *The Borderless World*, Ohmae argues that a supra-national power has already emerged; he calls it the Interlinked Economy (ILE), which consists of the 'Triad' (the USA, Europe and Japan), joined by new industrial economies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.

It has become so powerful that it has swallowed most consumers and corporations, made traditional national borders almost disappear, and pushed bureaucrats, politicians and the military towards the status of declining industries. (Ohmae, 1991, p. xi)

This may come as something of a surprise to the officials of the EU or the generals of the Pentagon, and indeed – even more so – to asylum-seekers trying to cross the borders of Fortress Europe, but this is not what Ohmae is concerned with: his borderless world applies to the transnational corporations and their executives and specialists. He is talking about what he sees as an inevitable trend:

The policy objective for the ILE will be ensuring the free flow of information, money, goods and services as well as the free migration of people and corporations. Traditional governments will have to establish a new single framework of global governance. (Ohmae, 1991, p. xii–xiii)

For Ohmae, the global economy is driven by the free choices of customers, which dictate a radical opening of economies. The task of government is to end protectionism and to 'ensure that its people have a good life by ensuring stable access to the best and the cheapest goods and services from anywhere in the world' (Ohmae, 1991, p. 12). The burgeoning flow of information is turning people into 'global citizens', who are aware of all that is happening around the world – with regard to tastes and preferences, styles of clothing, sports and lifestyles (Ohmae, 1991, pp. 18–22). Thus, Ohmae reduces the philosophical notion of the

'good life' to the right to buy the most stylish and best-quality consumer goods. Global citizenship is about reducing the role of government in order to permit untrammelled play to the transnational corporations.

Yet it is not so easy to dismiss this vision. Ohmae is right to claim that much economic power has passed from states to corporations and to markets. His argument is a post-nationalist one, when he claims that power in the great companies can no longer effectively be based in one country or on one national culture. He shows that successful management requires the abandonment of 'the headquarters mentality', and a real decentralization of decision making to global networks. This is in turn only possible if corporations can free themselves of the national culture of their founders and develop their own transnational culture, that is, 'a system of values that all employees in all countries and regions unquestionably accept' (Ohmae, 1991, p. 89).

Ohmae's 'borderless world' is a comfortless place for those who believe in national autonomy. Developing countries that seek to build up their economies through protectionism are doomed to failure; in Ohmae's view, they should throw open their borders to a free transfer of commodities and capital, whatever the social costs (which he never mentions). The 'borderless world' is also bad news for anyone who believes in democracy. Governments are increasingly powerless, so the right to elect them has little meaning. There are no democratic mechanisms in the global marketplaces and transnational corporations. The theme is not even discussed in Ohmae's book – he clearly sees it as irrelevant. Ohmae's global citizen is imbued with consumerism, not democratic values.

Ohmae is an adviser to some of the world's most powerful corporations, so his views may be seen as a significant expression of the technocratic logic of advanced sectors of capital. He is pointing to real trends that contain serious threats to any notion of democratic citizenship. The analysis shows the difficulties faced by democratically elected authorities constituted at the nation-state level when they seek to influence the global economy. The answer can only lie in the development of democratically elected supra-national bodies capable of developing countervailing power to control economic interests at the global level.

A very different notion of 'post-national membership' is put forward in the book *Limits of Citizenship* by Yasemin Soysal. She argues that:

A new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the post-war era, one whose organising and legitimating principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging. (Soysal, 1994, p. 1)

Soysal criticizes political sociologists for remaining fixated on the bounded nation-state as the locus for rights. Her study finds that:

the classical formal order of the of the nation-state and its membership is not in place. The state is no longer an autonomous and independent organisation closed over a nationally defined population. Instead, we have a system of constitutionally interconnected states with a multiplicity of membership. (Soysal, 1994, pp. 163-4)

The main focus of Soysal's book is a comparative study of incorporation patterns and changes in the societal membership of immigrants in Western European countries. Soysal (1994, p. 29) argues that 'world-level pressures towards more expanded individual rights have lead to the increasing incorporation of foreigners into existing membership schemes'. At the same time, the extension of membership beyond national citizens transforms the existing models, 'making national citizenship less important'. A number of questions may be raised with regard to Soysal's analysis. Does it overstate the extent to which immigrants in Western European countries such as Germany have in fact gained most of the rights of citizenship without actual formal access to citizenship? In fact, immigrants are in many places still denied significant social and political rights, being open to deportation for a range of reasons. Does Soysal overemphasize the importance of 'world-level pressures' in securing rights for immigrants, while paying little attention to the role of political mobilization by immigrant groups themselves in gaining greater equality?

The main issue that concerns us here, however, is Soysal's conclusion that the emergence of universal personhood is rapidly eroding the territorially bounded nation-state. In her view, this type of nation-state was the dominant form for only a fairly short time: from about the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. Soysal's model of 'post-national belonging' is based on universal human rights, as laid down in conventions and declarations of supra-national bodies like the UN, which are gradually incorporated into the constitutions and laws of nation-states. Thus, universal entitlements are still basically delivered by the nation-state but are no longer limited by formal citizenship. The furthest-going expression of the trend is the transnational citizenship laid down within the EU.

This perspective does correspond with current trends and may have important consequences for citizenship in future, but Soysal seems to overstate the extent to which it has been already achieved, and may be overly optimistic about the strength of the tendency. International

human rights conventions are often not ratified: for example, the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families has only been signed by a handful of emigration countries. Moreover, they may not be implemented where they are ratified, and above all are ignored by the countries where abuses are worst. The number of countries where democracy and human rights prevail is fairly small, and there are strong trends towards exclusionary nationalism and racism in many places. The EU is an important development, but little progress has been made on extending European citizenship rights to the large minorities from outside the EU. The trend in Europe is towards the exclusion of non-EU citizens. In principle, as Soysal points out, that could be consistent with improving the rights of those who have been admitted, but it is far from clear that this is the main tendency at present (see Chapters 4 and 7 for more discussion of EU citizenship).

It thus seems misplaced to argue that 'post-national citizenship' has been or is about to be achieved. The nation-state is still the key reference point for citizenship, and is likely to remain so. Global citizenship has to be built around the reality of a world of nation-states, despite the globalization of economy and culture. Let us therefore turn now to the position that the nation-state is still the only conceivable unit for democratic citizenship, even though it is under pressure through global change. We will again contrast a mainly economic perspective – that of Robert B. Reich – with a political sociology approach – that of Dominique Schnapper.

In his book, *The Work of Nations*, Reich (who was the US Secretary for Labour in the First Clinton Administration) presents a compelling analysis of the effects of globalization:

As almost every factor of production – money, technology, factories, and equipment – moves effortlessly across border, the very idea of a national economy is becoming meaningless. (Reich, 1991, p. 8)

The question that Reich raises is whether there can be a national society in the absence of a national economy. Citing Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, Reich states, 'the idea that the citizens of a nation shared responsibility for their economic wellbeing' was closely linked to the rise of the democratic nation-state (Reich, 1991, p. 18). As long as economic affairs were organized on national lines, there was a certain degree of common interest that transcended class divisions: successful industrial economies could pass on some of their wealth to workers through higher wages, access to consumer goods and improved welfare systems. This in turn strengthened feelings of national solidarity.

Globalization and technological change shatter the basis of national solidarity. Reich argues that class structure has been transformed through the decline of manufacturing industries in countries such as the USA. Three categories of workers are emerging (Reich, 1991, pp. 171–84):

- routine production workers, the declining group of employees in manufacturing enterprises;
- in-person servers, people performing simple and repetitive tasks, such as retail sales workers, waiters and waitresses, health-care personnel and the growing army of security guards;
- 'symbolic analysts', all the problem-solving, problem-identifying and strategic-brokering activities, which require high-level skills and training.

The first two categories are oriented towards local or national labour markets, while the symbolic analysts function increasingly in global labour markets. It is irrelevant for them whether they work for a US, a Japanese or a transnational company. Moreover, the symbolic analysts have a strong grip on economic power. They can ensure that their earnings grow while the wages of the production workers and in-person servers are strictly limited. This explains the enormous growth of income inequality in the USA over the past 20 years. As real wages and working conditions worsen for most of the population, symbolic analysts have been able to reduce their own personal taxation. This explains the fiscal crisis of the welfare state. The wealthy one-fifth of the population have, according to Reich, effectively seceded from the rest (Reich, 1991, pp. 282–300). They have moved into separate towns and suburbs, protected by private police. They have ceased to contribute to public expenditure, instead financing their own privatized schools, health-care systems and leisure facilities. Above all, they dominate political power and see no reason to share it with the rest of the nation. Politics thus oscillates between the 'zero-sum nationalism' of those who want to turn the clock back, and the 'impassive cosmopolitanism' of people who, as citizens of the world, may feel no particular bond with any society (Reich, 1991, pp. 301–15).

For Reich, the only answer lies in a reassertion of national solidarity. This may be stimulated by 'the inability of symbolic analysts to protect themselves, their families and their property from the depredations of a larger and ever more desperate population outside' (Reich, 1991, p. 303). The main factor, however, must be 'a new patriotism', founded

less upon economic self-interest than upon 'loyalty to place'. This could be the starting point for 'a positive economic nationalism', in which each nation's citizens would take responsibility for ensuring that their compatriots had full and productive lives, while also cooperating with other countries for mutual advantage. This would require a sense of national purpose, based on historical and cultural connections to a common political endeavour (Reich, 1991, pp. 311–12). The problem with this conclusion is that it is completely voluntaristic: having demonstrated the powerful forces that are undermining the national bond, Reich postulates that these can be countered by an act of a collective will that, according to his own analysis, no longer exists.

Dominique Schnapper's book, *La Communauté des Citoyens*, was awarded the Prize of the French National Assembly in 1994 for its passionate defence of republican values. Schnapper's analysis combines a reassertion of Rousseau's principle of the common will as the basis of the social bond, with a critique of the contradictions of increasing rationalization of societal relationships that leans heavily on Weber. Schnapper laments the decline of the nation as a political form in the various areas where it originated: Western Europe and North America. She also mentions the 'dysfunctions' connected with the imposition of the nation-state form elsewhere in the world, but this is not her main theme. As the quotation at the beginning of this chapter indicates, Schnapper asserts that the nation-state is being seriously weakened by both external and internal factors (Schnapper, 1994, pp. 11, 185).

The external stresses are connected with globalization and the development of supra- and infra-national units. A global political order, as represented by the UN, limits national independence and sovereignty. The need for common action to achieve collective security, to combat terrorism and to stop drug smuggling also makes inter-state cooperation essential. At the economic level, international markets and the increasing importance of global regulatory bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade render autonomous national economic policies impossible. Administrative and legal decisions by European bodies restrict the power of national parliaments and governments. At the same time, the emphasis on local interests and cultures creates demands for regional autonomy or representation (Schnapper, 1994, pp. 186–8).

Internally, Schnapper argues, the nation is weakened by an inherent contradiction. Democracy is based on the principle that citizens should be genuinely capable of exercising their rights of participation. This

requires not just formal equality, but also a degree of real equality of socioeconomic conditions. Thus, the logic of democratic participation leads inevitably to a welfare state. This in turn engenders a new 'productivist-hedonist logic', which, by emphasizing the interests of the individual, undermines the basic political project of the nation. People come to see the state simply as an instrument that manages the economy and distributes social benefits. *Civisme* (civic or public feeling) gets lost. There is a trend towards depoliticization, which constitutes a constant menace for democratic nations (Schnapper, 1994, pp. 190–1).

These external and internal changes lead to a contradiction:

between the objective integration of people in a virtually global space and their social habits, that is their feeling of collective identity, as well as their political participation, which continue to be mainly expressed at the level of the nation. (Schnapper, 1994, p. 189)

The nation becomes degraded to an emotional bond, which can give a subjective meaning to people's existence. This opens the ways for a 're-ethnicization', in which people perceive themselves to be members of an emotional community based on shared history and culture, rather than political citizens who participate in a democracy. Schnapper argues this with reference to Germany's shift from *Verfassungspatriotismus* (Habermas' term for loyalty to a constitutional political community) to a more nationalistic model after the demise of the German Democratic Republic in 1989. She implies, however, that the same trend applies in France, Britain and elsewhere (Schnapper, 1994, pp. 194–6).

Peace and international cooperation appear as problems for the nation-state. 'Every war or threat of war is a factor of integration' (Schnapper, 1994, p. 197). Now that the Soviet threat has gone, Schnapper complains of trends towards pacifism and a lack of *civisme*. She observes a trend towards a decline of the great public institutions – school, army, judiciary, public services – which were intended to teach the values of the nation and democracy. The depoliticization and re-ethnicization of the nation-state undermine the republican project of the individual integration of immigrants and other minorities by means of common political values. This is replaced by separatist consciousness: national identity (for the majority), ethnic identities (for the minorities) and new forms of religious identity (sects and so on) help people to cope with feelings of

powerlessness and disenchantment caused by the increasing rationalization, anonymity and bureaucratization of large-scale societies.

Schnapper presents a powerful analysis of the crisis of democratic citizenship, yet her critique remains problematic. Although she claims to be presenting a general argument for a political concept of the nation, her picture is clearly that of the French republican model. She is one-sided in her portrayal of the nation, emphasizing its rationality and its capacity for creating a social bond between people of differing origins. She neglects past repressions needed to homogenize ethnically diverse populations, and current racism towards immigrants and minorities. She idealizes conscription and war as means of national integration, but ignores the suffering that flowed from this notion of the warrior-citizen. (In this context, the French government's decision to abolish conscription in 1996 must have appeared as a threat to civic values.) Schnapper seems oblivious to the dialectic of rationality and barbarism that bedevils the history of European nations. The development of communities of warrior-soldiers armed to the teeth against (real or imagined) external enemies led inexorably to ever-more horrific wars.

The main problem is that Schnapper suggests no way of resolving the crisis of the nation-state. She explicitly rejects the notion of a multicultural society, arguing (without giving any reasons) that multiculturalism offers merely a 'magical' or apparent solution to the contradiction between the two great values of modernity: individual *equality* inscribed in the principle of citizenship, and *authenticity* tied to a specific culture. In the same way, Schnapper argues that decentralization and local democracy are insufficient to unite citizens around a project that creates a common will (Schnapper, 1994, p. 201). In the end, she states that it seems possible that the project of the democratic nation has become exhausted, but she offers not even a glimpse of a way forwards.

From differing perspectives, all four authors discussed here provide convincing evidence that the nation-state is in serious difficulties. Ohmae argues from a rather crude economic determinism that nation-states should not control the workings of global markets. The democratic citizen does not appear in his world-view, while his notion of the 'global citizen' refers to the mobile corporate executive. Soysal's notion of 'post-national belonging' and her assertion that universal personhood is rapidly replacing citizenship in the nation-state seem optimistic in view of the continuing limitation on the rights of migrants and minorities. Reich gives an incisive critique of the polarization of

US society, but fails to provide a convincing strategy for recreating national solidarity. Schnapper presents a thorough analysis of the stresses faced by nation-states, but is unable to suggest any political solution. In the end, all four analyses lead to inaction, Ohmae and Soysal because they indicate that new modes of political integration are appearing by themselves, Reich and Schnapper because they see no option to the nation-state, even though they show that it is no longer viable in its existing form.

Conclusion

Clearly, globalization and the increasing mobility of people raise new issues for the nation-state and citizenship, and existing models no longer provide the answers. The main thesis of this book is that a theory of citizenship for a global society must be based on the separation between nation and state. Such a theory must, in other words, evacuate the nation part of the concept of the nation-state. This means a new type of state that is not constituted exclusively or mainly around the nexus of territoriality and belonging. Citizenship should therefore not be connected to nationality (that is, to the idea of being one people with common cultural characteristics); citizenship should be a political community without any claim to common cultural identity.

Yet in a world of migrants and ethnic groups, citizenship cannot be blind to cultural belonging. The political mechanisms that make people into citizens must take account both of their equal rights as individuals and their needs, interests and values as members of social and cultural collectivities. Reconciling the individual and the collective is the key problem of citizenship for a globalized society and will be discussed extensively in this volume. The traditional answer of liberal theory – that citizenship refers only to the individual abstracted from his or her sociocultural specificity – is no longer adequate.

Citizenship for a global society also requires a new notion of state borders. These cannot be abolished, as distinct states will remain the rule for the foreseeable future, but borders cannot be rigid, in view of the mobility intrinsic in modernity and globalism. A notion of *porous borders* is required, with admission rules and rights based on people's real societal membership (compare Bauböck, 1994). Such a system would break with the outmoded norm of singular membership in a nation-state and recognize the growing prevalence of dual or multiple membership. There must be a link between admission procedures (to

the state territory and to citizenship) and the contents of citizenship. This may require differentiated forms of rights, which take account of people's differing needs and values, as well as new forms of representation and participation.

It is now time to turn to a more fundamental discussion of theories of citizenship, before looking in more detail at the issues raised by the new cultural diversity.

Note

1. An earlier version of some parts of this chapter has been published in Bauböck, R. and Rundell, J. (eds) 'Globalisation and the ambiguities of national citizenship', *Blurred Boundaries* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).