Case Studies in International Relations

The North Korean Nuclear Stand-Off

On a visit to Pyongyang in October 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly pressed the North on suspicions that it was continuing to pursue a nuclear energy and missiles program, citing evidence of a secret uranium­enriching program carried out in defiance of the 1994 Agreed Framework.3 Under this deal, North Korea agreed to forsake nuclear ambitions in return for the construction of two safer light water nuclear power reactors and oil shipments from the US. Later that month, the US announced that North Korea had admitted in their talks to a secret nuclear arms program. Initially the North appeared conciliatory. Kim Jong­Il said he would allow international weapons inspectors to check that nuclear facilities are out of use.

The North­-South Korea talks in Pyongyang were undermined by the North’s nuclear program ‘admission’. US Secretary of State Colin Powell then said further US aid to North Korea was now in doubt. The same month, five Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea 25 years before were allowed a brief visit home. But they ended up staying, thereby provoking more tension in the region.

The North adopted a mercurial stance, one moment defiantly defending its right to weapons development, offering to halt nuclear programs in return for aid and the signing of a non­aggression pact with the US the next. It argued that the US had not kept to its side of the Agreed Framework, as the construction of the light water reac­tors – due to be completed in 2003 – was now years behind schedule. US President George W. Bush declared that the November oil shipments to the North would be the last if the North does not agree to put a halt to its weapons ambitions.

In December 2002, North Korean­made Scud missiles were found aboard a ship bound for Yemen, provoking American outrage. The US detained the ship, but released it, conceding that neither country has broken any law. The North threatened to reactivate nuclear facilities for energy generation, saying the Americans’ decision to halt oil shipments left it with no choice, blaming the US again for wrecking the 1994 pact.

On December 13, North Korea asked the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to remove seals and surveillance equipment from its Yongbyon power plant, then removed them itself. North­South Korea talks over reopening road and rail border links stalled. North Korea began shipping fuel rods to the Yongbyon plant which could be used to produce plutonium. The IAEA expressed concern and the two IAEA nuclear inspectors were expelled from the country. North Korea also said it was planning to reopen a reprocessing plant, which could start producing weapons-grade plutonium within months.

In January 2003, the IAEA passed a resolution demanding that North Korea readmit UN inspectors and abandon its secret nuclear weapons program. The US said it was willing to talk to North Korea about how it met its obligations, but would not provide goods to North Korea in exchange. North Korea then announced it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty. US satellites tracked movement at the Yongbyon plant throughout January.

In February 2003, North Korea said it had reactivated its nuclear facilities. The IAEA found North Korea in breach of nuclear safeguards and referred the matter to the UN Security Council. On February 24, 2003, North Korea fired a missile into the sea between South Korea and Japan, firing a second one in March. On March 2, North Korean fighter jets intercepted a US reconnaissance plane in international air space and shadowed it for 22 minutes.

On April 1, the US announced that stealth fighters sent to South Korea for train­ing would stay on. The UN Security Council expressed concern about North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea announced that it was willing to negotiate, having started to reprocess its spent fuel rods. Talks did begin in Beijing, led by the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs, James Kelly, and the deputy Direc­tor General of North Korea’s American Affairs Bureau, Li Gun. Nonetheless, in May, North Korea scrapped a 1992 agreement with the South to keep the peninsula free from nuclear weapons, its last remaining international agreement on non­-prolifera­tion.

In June 2003, officials admitted to a visiting delegation of US congressmen that the country had nuclear weapons. North Korea said that it would build a nuclear deterrent, ‘unless the US gives up its hostile policy’. In August, it agreed to six­way talks on its nuclear program – the US, Japan, China and Russia and the two Koreas. The talks failed to bridge the gap.

In October, North Korea announced that it would display its nuclear deterrent, and it also agreed to resume talks on the nuclear crisis. In December, it offered to freeze its nuclear program in return for a list of concessions from the US. It warned that if the US did not agree, it would not take part in further talks. The US declined.

In January 2004, an unofficial US team visited Yongbyon and was shown what appeared to be weapons­grade plutonium, but no evidence of a nuclear bomb. In May, the UN atomic agency investigated allegations that North Korea secretly sent uranium to Libya. In June, a third round of six­nation talks was held in Beijing, with the US making a new offer to allow North Korea fuel aid if it froze then dismantled its nuclear programs. In July, US Secretary of State Colin Powell met the North Korean Foreign Minister, Paek Nam Sun. North Korea later described US President George W. Bush as an ‘imbecile’ and a ‘tyrant that puts Hitler in the shade’; in response to comments President Bush made describing the North’s Kim Jong­Il as a ‘tyrant’. Following that sparkling moment in diplomatic history, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su­hon told the UN General Assembly that his country had turned plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods into nuclear weapons.

In January 2005, North Korea expressed willingness to restart stalled talks on its nuclear program. In February, North Korea suspended its participation in the talks over its nuclear program and repeated its assertion to have built nuclear weapons for self­defence. In April, South Korea noted that the Yongbyon reactor had been shut down, a move which could allow it to extract more fuel for nuclear weapons. On May 1, 2005, North Korea fired a short­range missile into the Sea of Japan. On May 11, it completed extraction of spent fuel rods from Yongbyon. On May 16, North and South Korea held their first talks in 10 months. The US suspended efforts to recover the remains of missing US servicemen in North Korea, saying restrictions placed on its work were too great. In June, North Korea requested more food aid from the South, and in July it said it would re-­join nuclear talks.

In July, South Korea offered the North huge amounts of electricity as an incentive to end its nuclear weapons program. The fourth round of six­nation talks in Beijing reached deadlock within two weeks, but resumed after a month. North Korea agreed to give up all its nuclear activities and re­join the nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty. The US said it had no intention of attacking. But on September 20, North Korea said it would not scrap its nuclear program until it is given a civilian nuclear reactor. In December, North Korea announced it intended to resume building nuclear reactors, because the US had pulled out of a key deal to build two new reactors.

There the matter rested until April 2006, when a two­day meeting aimed at per­suading North Korea to return to talks on its nuclear program failed. In July, Washing­ton dismissed a threat by North Korea that it would launch a nuclear strike against the US in the event of an American attack as ‘deeply hypothetical’. North Korea test fired at least six missiles. South Korea suspended food aid and the UN Security Council unanimously banned exports and imports of missile­related materials. In September, North Korea blamed the US financial sanctions for the deadlock in a speech to the UN General Assembly. It carried out a nuclear test on October 9. As a result, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose weapons and financial sanctions on North Korea. The six­nation talks resumed briefly in December in Beijing, but without progress.

In January 2007, the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, stated his country could not tolerate a nuclear­armed North Korea and called for closer international co­operation to stop such an outcome. The six-­nation nuclear talks then resumed, in Beijing.

Taken from https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110450552-008/html