Business Ethics and Social Responsibility - MGT 422

Abstract This case covers a high-profile public sector criminal case of prolonged and serious fraud by a former senior manager, Joanne Harrison, at New Zealand’s Ministry of Transport that went unchecked for five years, despite attempts by employees to draw attention to her repeated non-compliance with procurement policies. An independent inquiry later confirmed allegations by four staff who raised concerns that they were subsequently disadvantaged in various ways in their employment at the ministry. Martin Matthews, chief executive of the ministry at the time of Harrison’s offending, was subsequently appointed New Zealand’s Auditor-General, responsible for auditing all public entities in the country. Matthews asked for a parliamentary inquiry into allegations about his handling of these issues but resigned before it was concluded. This case raises questions about the adequacy of whistleblowing legislation and policies and the importance of organizational culture and leadership in creating and maintaining a cultural environment that supports ethical behavior and protects staff who try to flag what they believe is inappropriate behavior.

Case Learning Outcomes By the end of this case study, students should be able to:

x 1. Examine the factors that shape employees’ ability and willingness to identify and report inappropriate workplace behavior by colleagues.

x 2. Examine the ‘formal’ organizational-level factors that permit, encourage, and discourage such reporting, such as policies, codes of conduct, and procedures.

x 3. Examine the ‘informal’ organizational-level factors that permit, encourage, and discourage such reporting, such as power and politics, culture, group dynamics, conformity, and leadership.

x 4. Examine the wider systemic factors that permit, encourage, and discourage such reporting, such as public sector governance legislation, as well as societal and cultural understandings (such as attitudes towards appropriate responses to authority).

x 5. Consider the inter-relationship between these levels to use these insights to develop action plans for creating organizations where staff are morally attuned and empowered to speak up about inappropriate behavior at work.

Introduction It is with great regret that I have tendered my resignation as Controller and Auditor-

General. The issues and speculation about how I handled matters in relation to the fraud

committed on the Ministry of Transport during my term as CEO have made it untenable

for me to continue in this role.

…Until April 2016, when I received some concerning information, I regarded the staff

member who perpetrated this fraud as an able and high performing member of the

leadership team. I believe I acted swiftly and thoroughly to detect the fraud and bring her

to justice when I became aware of her potential wrong-doing. I wish that I had detected

her criminal activity much earlier.

The information I received caused me to re-examine decisions I had made regarding

matters previously raised with me in relation to some internal business procedures. I

thought I had dealt with those appropriately, with the knowledge and information I had at

the time. She gave me explanations that I accepted. It turns out I was wrong. I should

have been more suspicious. The subsequent enquiries and investigations I initiated

revealed she had committed a major fraud against the ministry and the taxpayer.

I deeply regret and am sorry that I did not detect earlier her fraudulent actions. I feel as

angry and aggrieved as anyone about her stealing and breaches of trust. We are fortunate

in New Zealand that this sort of behavior is not common place and certainly should not

be tolerated.

I have resigned as Auditor-General because I understand the expectations associated

with this role are high. It is important to me, and to the office, that the public has complete

confidence in the person holding the position of Auditor-General.

Martin Matthews, 3 August, 2017

This press release was the final act in an extraordinary set of events in New Zealand’s

public service. Martin Matthews, the person with overall responsibility for auditing all of

the country’s public entities and for improving public trust in the sector, was unwittingly

caught up in a major NZD 725,000 fraud at the ministry he headed prior to becoming

Auditor-General.

Matthews’ resignation, just nine months after his appointment, came ahead of the highly

anticipated release of a parliamentary report into his and the ministry’s handling of events

surrounding the fraud and whether it was appropriate for him to stay as Auditor-General.

At the time of his appointment as Auditor-General, Matthews’ handling of the fraud while

Secretary of Transport was described as ‘exemplary’ by politicians on the appointment

panel. After he took up the role, allegations emerged that whistleblowers had warned of

repeated non-compliance, that these warnings were ignored, and that the staff concerned

were subsequently made redundant. It was important that the person holding the position

of Auditor-General demonstrated sound judgement and had a reputation beyond

question. Matthews, concerned about this, and believing his actions had been sound,

asked for a review of these matters and offered to stand aside while the report was

completed, without pay (Small, 2017).

Even more intriguing, was that the fraudster, Joanne Harrison, was regarded by Matthews

and many others in the New Zealand public service as a star performer. She had led a

programme of transformational change at the ministry that had, during her term, recorded

the highest level of staff engagement of any public sector agency. Media reports also

surfaced alleging a number of ministry staff had raised concerns about Harrison’s non-

compliant behavior with Matthews and claimed he had failed to take proper action. It was

further alleged that several of those staff had been deliberately disadvantaged in their

employment at the ministry for attempting to blow the whistle regarding Harrison’s actions.

There is no suggestion Matthews was aware of these actions at the time.

Was Harrison a proverbial ‘bad apple’ who stole from the public purse? How and why did

the Ministry of Transport ignore the warning signs about her, enabling her fraud to

continue? Why were those employees who raised concerns not protected? The findings

of the parliamentary report were expected to shed light on these questions.

Harrison, the Inspirational Leader of the Ministry of Transport’s Change Journey The Ministry of Transport is the New Zealand government’s principal transport advisor,

providing policy advice and support for Ministers to improve the performance of the

country’s transport system. The government invests about NZD 4 billion in the transport

network each year; about 1.5% of New Zealand’s gross domestic product. The ministry’s

head office is located in the capital city Wellington (Ministry of Transport, 2017).

Joanne Harrison was employed by the ministry in 2011 as Manager of Change, People

and Development. Matthews was one of three people who interviewed her for the role.

During the investigations that uncovered her fraud, the ministry discovered it was her

second attempt at joining the ministry, after an unsuccessful application in 2008. Her

curriculum vitae did not mention her 2007 conviction for defrauding a previous employer,

a fact the ministry did not become aware of until April 2016. Prior to her appointment, the

ministry did not run a check for a criminal record, despite this being an established

practice in the public sector. Even had the ministry taken this precaution, it is unlikely this

charge would have come to light due to a court-ordered name suppression order and

Harrison’s conviction under the name Joanne Sharp (Moir, 2017).

In 2013, Matthews promoted Harrison onto his senior leadership team, reporting directly

to him. Her fixed term role as General Manager of Organizational Development was to

spearhead the ‘Shaping our Future programme’, the ministry’s change program. It was

anticipated that Harrison would ‘lead a “step change” in the performance and capability

of the ministry in delivering on its purpose’ (Ministry of Transport, n.d., a). Two years later,

in May 2015, the role became permanent, and Matthews had no hesitation in offering it

to Harrison.

Harrison received positive reviews during her time at the ministry, with two performance

letters characterizing her as a high performer delivering organizational change. In 2012,

a letter to Harrison from Matthews personally thanked her for her ‘impressive efforts in

designing and developing [the ministry’s] applied Policy Advisor Development (a-PAD)

programme’, which created a ‘minimum level qualification for those who practise policy in

the public sector’ (Ministry of Transport, n.d., b). In September 2014, Harrison received a

letter of thanks from Matthews for the ‘…significant contribution you have made to our

success’ (Ministry of Transport, n.d., b).

Matthews was particularly impressed that Harrison ‘brought a different level of creativity,

innovation and drive to how we think about change’. In 2013, Matthews launched a two

year plan called back to MoT’s Future, which looked at what the ministry would be like in

2015. This change responded to challenges laid down for Matthews after a Performance

Improvement Review of the Ministry in 2013. Harrison suggested to Matthews that he

adopt the alter-ego of time-travelling Marty McFly from the well-known 1989 film back to

the Future 2, which also involved travelling forward to 2015. This would involve Matthews

dressing as McFly, the creation of cardboard cut-outs of him in character, as well as

posters and animated videos. Matthews believed ‘it was quite an inspirational idea’ and

‘a major departure from usual change plans in the public sector’, although he also

acknowledged ‘some people thought I had lost my marbles’ (Hunt, 2017a).

Matthews’ and others’ high opinion of Harrison’s performance was also due to her

success in motivating staff and getting them to identify more strongly with the

organization. One of her initiatives to lift engagement was the ‘caravan of love’ poster,

featuring the iconic Kiwi vacation vehicle; it toured the ministry’s offices around the

country, adorned with notes from staff about why they loved working at the ministry.

Accompanying the caravan poster was a table and chairs and a beer fridge (Hunt, 2017b).

Staff engagement survey results showed steady improvements under Matthews, and in

2015, the ministry achieved the highest staff engagement scores in the public sector

(Hunt, 2017b). The most outstanding results were obtained by the 19 staff in Harrison’s

group. In September 2015, she received another letter of thanks and a pay increase

(Ministry of Transport, n.d. b).

Harrison, the Fraudster Despite her glowing status in the eyes of her chief executive, other senior leaders, and

staff close to her, there was growing disquiet about Harrison’s cavalier attitude towards

the ministry’s finance rules and procedures.

Questions first arose in October 2013, relating to a company Harrison had supposedly

engaged to work on the ‘Shaping our Future’ change programme. Between November

2012 and July 2014, the ministry paid NZD 227,000 to Sharp Design. All invoices had

been approved by Harrison, yet there was no contract between the ministry and the firm

(a public sector requirement) and some questioning of the services being provided

(Deloitte, 2016).

When asked by the ministry’s Principal Solicitor for an explanation, Harrison replied:

…I did not know we had to do this [set up a contract] when we sent work out to be done,

I thought that we only arranged this when folks were contracted to work inside here with

us, so my apologies if anything has been missed in the past. (Ministry of Transport, n.d.,

c)

The ministry’s Chief Legal Advisor informed Matthews of the issue in an email, including

a copy of Harrison’s response, and stated:

How can a senior person in any organization credibly claim to be unaware of the need for

a contract when getting external providers to do work? I find it astounding… If general

managers pay no regard to proper process, what kind of an example does that set for the

rest of the organization?

Matthews asked him and the Finance Manager to remind the leadership team about the

need to follow correct processes.

In July 2014, some employees at the ministry became aware Victorian State fraud

investigators were seeking information about Harrison. Matthews was informed, and he

raised the issue with Harrison and asked her to contact them. She subsequently claimed

she had and explained the inquiry related to her former executive assistant who had

misused her credit cards (Ministry of Transport, n.d., c), and Matthews was satisfied with

the explanation (Beatie, 2017).

Meanwhile, the annual compliance report prepared by the Principal Solicitor in August

2014 and presented to the leadership team noted ongoing non-compliance in Harrison’s

organizational development team around contracting and the payment of invoices.

Around this time, an employee (referred to as ‘Employee A’ in the subsequent inquiry into

the whistleblowing) made a ‘protected disclosure’ of their concerns about Harrison. Under

New Zealand’s Protected Disclosures Act 2000, employees or former employees can

make protected disclosures (sometimes called ‘whistleblowing’) about allegations of

wrong-doing in the workplace that they reasonably believe are true or likely to be true.

The legislation is designed to protect them against disciplinary action from their employer.

The concerns raised about Harrison prompted Mathews to email her. In reply, Harrison

blamed work pressures, ‘oversights’ and ‘mistakes’ and promised ‘it will not happen in

future’. On August 27, Matthews declared he was ‘satisfied that, on the basis of the

explanations given, no further enquiry or action is required in relation to this matter’.

However, five days later, he had a change of mind and directed an employee (referred to

as Employee B in the subsequent inquiry) to seek further clarification from Harrison

(Ministry of Transport, n.d., c).

In October 2014, Employee B emailed Harrison to outline the ‘ongoing problem’ that

needed to be sorted out, requesting answers and documents for the Ministry’s records

for all the questions noted above. Harrison then emailed Matthews asking him to close

down Employee B’s questioning, arguing Employee B had sufficient information already

and implying the employee’s former role as a union delegate represented a possible

conflict of interest:

I will certainly not provide her with information about the investigation as I have real

concerns around confidentiality and her PSA status/history 1; the concerns extend to the

whole legal team and not just [Employee B]. (Ministry of Transport, n.d., c)

In December 2014, Matthews emailed Employee B saying he ‘would have preferred a

higher level of transparency to remove any doubt of suspicion.’ He stated that he had

spoken with Harrison about the issues raised and ‘she has apologized for the non-

compliance, assured me of her future compliance and explained to me her reasons for

the secrecy’. Matthews then stated he had decided not to pursue the matter further,

because ‘to act without good cause…would have equally serious implications for the

perceived trust and confidence I have in one of my senior managers’ (Ministry of

Transport, n.d., c).

A year later, in December 2015, the next annual compliance report found Harrison had

not delivered on her assurances that proper process would be followed. Harrison’s

response was to send an email to the Chief Legal Advisor, stating her ‘disagree[d] with

the content and insinuation of the memo’. She blamed lack of personal training, despite

having been in a senior leadership role with budget and procurement responsibilities for

more than two years.

The non-compliance issues relating to Harrison had been discussed at senior leadership

meetings, so other General Managers were aware of many of them. Nevertheless, on at

least two occasions in 2014, Andrew Jackson – who was Acting Chief Executive at the

time – agreed to vary some contracts at Harrison’s request, while acknowledging at the

same time that it did not comply with agreed procedures. These requests related to EJW

Consulting and Mazarine Associates – two companies that subsequent fraud

investigations would reveal Harrison had begun using to perpetuate her fraud (Ministry of

Transport, n.d., c; d).

The End of the Road for Harrison Matters came to a head in April 2016, when Matthews was tipped off about Harrison

having had a different identity and a fraud conviction under that name for which she had

permanent name suppression. This caused Matthews to start making further enquiries

about Harrison, including asking Audit New Zealand that was conducting its interim audit

to look more closely and report on Harrison’s non-compliance around procurement and

contracting. As a result of that report and other inquiries following the tip off, Matthews

commissioned two independent investigations into Harrison’s conduct, by Deloitte and by

Peter Churchman QC, putting her on special leave while these were carried out. As more

allegations were uncovered, the terms of reference of the Churchman investigation were

extended twice.

Churchman found that ‘right from the point of her original application for a position, Joanne

Harrison’s conduct has been based on deception and deviousness’ (Churchman, 2016).

The work that she claimed was done by the three fictitious companies was either not

done, or done by Harrison herself as part of her salaried role, by someone on her team

or by another provider. While her offenses were described by Peter Mersi, Matthews’

replacement at the ministry, as ‘sophisticated, highly manipulative and planned over a

five-year period’ (Ministry of Transport, n.d., d), aspects were poorly executed. A search

for the companies involved showed that they were not listed in business directories. Both

Mazarine Associates and EJW Consulting had the same bank account number and postal

address and either no, or very rudimentary, websites. All of the emails from Sharp Design

to Harrison were sent in the evening or on the weekend, from Harrison’s email address

(Deloitte, 2016).

Harrison’s misconduct extended to not declaring a conflict of interest with Patrick Sharp,

her husband at the time. She was instrumental in securing three paid roles for Mr. Sharp,

in which he received ministry funds (Deloitte, 2016). In November 2016, Harrison pleaded

guilty to three charges of dishonestly using a document and was subsequently sentenced

to three and a half years in jail. The court heard some of the stolen money was used to

pay off the mortgage on her home; as she had then transferred ownership to her husband,

the home could not be used to make reparation (Radio NZ, 2017).

The Aftermath In the aftermath of Harrison’s fraud being discovered, attention focused on why it had

been possible to continue for so long. Peter Mersi commissioned two reviews into ministry

processes: one into its contracting and payment controls and the other into its

employment screening practices, but these did not relate specifically to Harrison.

In early March 2017, Opposition MP Sue Moroney pressed for an investigation of claims

that former staff, each with more than 20 years of service with the ministry, had been

made redundant as a result of their efforts to draw attention to Harrison’s non-compliance

(McCulloch, 2017). Mersi did not believe an investigation into the restructure was

warranted, but State Services Commissioner Peter Hughes, who leads the organization

responsible for providing oversight of New Zealand’s public sector, took a different view.

Hughes appointed former Deputy State Services Commissioner Sandi Beatie to

investigate. She found four staff members – three finance staff and one legal – who had

raised concerns about dubious invoices and travel by Harrison and were subsequently

disadvantaged in their employment. Only Employee A made a formal protected

disclosure, but others had raised issues in the course of their work. Beatie found

Employee A would ultimately have been made redundant when an automated invoicing

system was introduced but was exited months earlier than necessary, based on

Harrison’s recommendation. Employee B was rightfully due an additional payment that

Harrison blocked, under the pretext of following a policy that did not exist and advice from

the Chief Executive that she did not obtain (Beatie, 2017).

Learning the Lessons In light of the Harrison case, Beatie recommended processes related to employees

making protected disclosures be reviewed. While staff understood they could raise

concerns, not all were clear about how these would be treated. Some individuals

described blowing the whistle as the ‘nuclear’ option and feared the repercussions for

doing so.

After receiving Beatie’s report, Peter Hughes said ‘it is vital that public servants can raise

concerns about suspected wrong-doing safely and without fear of punishment or reprisal’.

He further noted that in terms of wrong-doing ‘it probably won’t be an agency’s senior

leaders, or the Serious Fraud Office, or the SSC, that notices it. It will be other people

within the agency who realise something isn’t adding up’. He apologized to the four

disadvantaged former staff, thanked them for their service and said they must be

compensated (Hughes, 2017).

The Officers of Parliament committee ordered a report by former high-ranking public

servant Sir Maarten Wevers into Matthews’ suitability to be Auditor-General following

allegations about his handling of the fraud. Matthews requested that the committee

commission the review. The report was delivered in June 2017, and Matthews was then

given an opportunity to comment on its findings. Before the Committee completed its

inquiry, Matthews tendered his resignation. The MP in charge, David Carter, announced

only a two-page summary would be made public (Small, 2017). PSA national secretary

Glenn Barclay was angry the full report was withheld, saying the public needed

reassurance the appointment of Matthews as Auditor-General had been sound (Small,

2017).

Around the same time as the Beatie report came out, Griffith University released

its Whistle While They Work 2 survey of protected disclosure regimes in Australia,

conducted in conjunction with New Zealand’s Ombudsman and Victoria University of

Wellington (Brown & Lawrence, 2017). It was the first survey to rank whistleblowing

processes across New Zealand and Australia. The New Zealand public sector fared

relatively poorly. Of the 10 Australian and New Zealand public sector jurisdictions that

responded, New Zealand’s public organizations – central and local – ranked near the

bottom, at eighth. Current legislation was described as ‘weak, patchy and outdated’

(Cann, 2017).

While reviewing whistleblowing legislation and its processes was an important step, the

events raised other issues that were not well canvassed in the aftermath. Did Harrison’s

role in organizational development and change give her license to flout the ministry’s

rules? Had the inability of Matthews’ and others to see through Harrison been influenced

by her promoting him as a transformational Back to the Future leader and her

performance in other areas? Or were what appear now to be obvious warning signals

only clear with the benefits of hindsight? Harrison had produced exceptional staff

engagement survey results, but was there a dark side to the apparent cult-following by

her staff?

Discussion Questions x 1. Why is the ability for employees to ‘blow the whistle’ important for the reputation

of organizations? Consider this in relation to the case.

x 2. What aspects of the ministry’s culture made it more/less likely that staff concerns

about Harrison would be taken seriously?

x 3. What actions would you take to develop a culture at the ministry that encourages

and rewards employees who speak up about inappropriate behavior?

x 4. What elements of Harrison’s leadership style characterize her as a

transformational leader? Did this influence the likelihood of her offenses being

uncovered?

x 5. Harrison sought to encourage Matthews to adopt a transformational leadership

style in implementing change at the ministry. How might this have contributed to

him not detecting her fraud earlier?

x 6. Some of the events at the ministry took place against a background of planned

change. Do you think uncertainty created by the organizational change made it

easier for Harrison to perpetuate her fraud?

Note 1. The PSA is the New Zealand Public Service Association, the union representing

public servants.

Further Reading Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership/James McGregor Burns. New York: Harper & Row. Chaleff, I. (2015). Intelligent disobedience: Doing right when what you're told to do is wrong. Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler. Christian, M. S. , Garza, A. S. , & Slaughter, J. E. (2011). Work engagement: A quantitative review and test of its relations with task and contextual performance. Personnel Psychology, 64, 89–136. Garrad, L. , & Chamorro-Prezumic, T. (2016). The dark side of employee engagement. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2016/08/the- dark-side-of-high-employee-engagement McKendall, M. (1993). The tyranny of change: Organizational development revisited. Journal of Business Ethics, 12, 93–104. Raelin, J. (2018). What are you afraid of? Collective leadership and its learning implications. Management Learning, 49(1), 59–66. Schein, E. , Schneier, I. , & Barker, C. H. (1961). Coercive persuasion. New York: Norton. Tourish, D. (2013). The dark side of transformational leadership: A critical perspective. London: Routledge. Verhezen, P. (2010). Giving voice in a culture of silence. From a culture of compliance to a culture of integrity. Journal of Business Ethics, 96(2), 187–206.

References Beatie, S. (2017). Report of investigation into whistle blower treatment within the Ministry of Transport. Retrieved from http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/Report-of- investigation-into-whistle-blower-treatment-within-the-Ministry-of-Transport.pdf. Brown, A. J. , & Lawrence, S. (2017). Strength of organizational whistleblowing processes: Analysis from Australia and New Zealand. Further results of the Whistling While They Work 2 Project. Brisbane, Griffith University. Cann, G. (2017, July 4). Kiwi whistleblowers left vulnerable by ‘weak, patchy, and out- of-date’ legislation. Retrieved from https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/94380278/kiwi- whistleblowers-left-vulnerable-by-weak-patchy-and-out-of-date-legislation Churchman, P. (2016, July 6). Report of investigation into Joanne Harrison. Retrieved from http://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/About/Documents/ee0186bf0b/Churc hman-report-28-09-17.pdf Deloitte. (2016). Ministry of Transport contracting and payments control review. Retrieved from http://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/About/Documents/422b8930ca/Repor t-of-the-Deloitte-review-into-financial-controls.pdf Hughes, P. (2017, August 2, updated 2017, September 7). The importance of speaking up. State Services Commission CE Blog. Retrieved from http://www.ssc.govt.nz/node/10551 Hunt, T. (2017a, June 19). Former MoT boss Martin Matthews dressed up as Back to the Future’s Marty McFly for staff presentation, at suggestion of fraudster Joanne Harrison. Retrieved from https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/93716470/former- ministry-of-transport-boss-martin-matthews-dressed-up-as-back-to-the-futures-marty- mcfly-for-staff-presentation-at-suggestion-of-fraudster-joanne-harrison Hunt, T (2017b, July 20). Fraudster Joanne Harrison and the Ministry of Transport’s caravan of love. Retrieved from https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/94917859 McCulloch, C. (2017, March 10). Call to investigate if fraudster forced out whistleblowers. Retrieved from http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/326267/call-to- investigate-if-fraudster-forced-out-whistleblowers Ministry of Transport. (2017). Enabling New Zealanders to flourish: Annual report 2016/17. Retrieved from https://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/About/Documents/68513e8a7d/Annu al-Report-201617.pdf Ministry of Transport (n.d., a). Documents released by Ministry of Transport under Official Information Act. Retrieved from http://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/About/Documents/824e179b56/3- Employment-by-MOT.pdf Ministry of Transport (n.d., b). Documents released by Ministry of Transport under Official Information Act. Retrieved from http://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/About/Documents/bfd8bc1602/2- Investigation-and-dismissal.pdf Ministry of Transport (n.d., c). Documents released by Ministry of Transport under Official Information Act. Retrieved from http://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/About/Documents/cc6a9700de/4- Contracts-and-compliance-issues.pdf

Ministry of Transport (n.d., d). Documents released by Ministry of Transport under Official Information Act. Retrieved from http://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/About/Documents/c5de4eb663/Harris on-case-documents.pdf Moir, J. (2017, March 9). Transport Ministry boss: Worker who stole $725k was too ‘sophisticated’ to be stopped. Retrieved from https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/90239274/transport-ministry-boss-worker- who-stole-725k-was-too-sophisticated-to-be-stopped Radio NZ. (2017, February 21). Former senior ministry official jailed for $723k fraud. Retrieved from http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/325023/former-senior-ministry- official-jailed-for-%24723k-fraud Small, V. (2017, August 4). Auditor-General resigns, saying his position is ‘untenable’. Retrieved from https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/95411616/auditorgeneral- resigns-saying-his-position-untenable