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Multinationalizing the Multicultural: The Commodification of ‘Ordinary Foreign Residents’ in a Japanese TV Talk Show

KOICHI IWABUCHI, Waseda University

This paper analyses the representation of foreign residents in Japan in the popular television

variety show Kokoga hen dayo nihonjin (This Is So Bizarre, You Japanese). It discusses

ways in which the increasing presence and visibility of foreign residents in the Japanese public

space enhances the commercial value of ‘ordinariness’. In this process the boundaries between

‘us’ and ‘them-within-us’ are sharply re-demarcated in an international framework and the

intensifying multicultural situation is subtly turned into a multinational media spectacle, in a

way in which the national imagined community is not fundamentally displaced.

Introduction

The acceleration of globalization processes has promoted cross-border flows and circula-

tions of capital, people and media; the number of transnational organizations and

institutions which promote such moves has proliferated. Talk of the demise of the

national has become commonplace, raising instead notions of cultural transgression

such as hybridity, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. However, while the historical

constructedness of ‘imagined communities’ is widely recognized, the national imagina-

tion paradoxically seems to become even stronger. In some cases the intensification of

trans-border flows and connections engenders reactionary nationalism and ethnic abso-

lutism that accompany the violent exercise of exclusion evident in many parts of the

world. In others, the upsurge of national feeling can take a less assertive, ‘banal’

form. 1 While transnational flows and connections become increasingly mundane, the

banality of the nation tends to become more solid and infiltrate more deeply into

people’s minds. A significant role played in this development is the media spectacle of

global events (especially sport) and international gatherings of various kinds that

render the national logo a highly marketable brand.

This paper will look at how the pleasurable commodification of national belonging

takes place by examining the representation of ‘ordinary foreigners’ (futsū no gaikokujin)

in a Japanese TV talk show, Kokoga hen dayo Nihonjin (This Is So Bizarre, You Japanese).

I will first discuss the paradigm shift in the discourse on Japanese national identity from

international(ization) to global(ization) and briefly overview how this shift is reflected in

the media representation of ‘foreigners’. I will then discuss the ways in which the increas-

ing presence and visibility of foreign national residents in the Japanese public space

enhances the commercial value of ‘ordinariness’. In this move, the intensifying multicul-

tural situation is recognized only as a multinational media spectacle.

1 Billig, Banal Nationalism.

Japanese Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, September 2005

ISSN 1037-1397 print=ISSN 1469-9338 online=05=020103-16 # 2005 Japanese Studies Association of Australia DOI: 10.1080=10371390500225987

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From ‘International’ to ‘Global’: Shifting Paradigms of Articulating

Japaneseness

The popularity of Nihonjinron literature (discourses on Japanese and Japanese culture)

that explains Japanese people and culture in essentialist terms is indicative of the

strong interest within Japan to explicate Japanese uniqueness. Studies show how

Japanese national/cultural identity has been constructed through a conscious self-

Orientalizing discourse, a narrative which at once testifies to subtle exploitation of and

deep complicity with Western Orientalist discourses. 2 Japan is represented and rep-

resents itself as culturally and racially homogeneous and uniquely particularistic by

way of a strategic binary opposition between two imaginary cultural entities, ‘Japan’

and ‘the West’. 3 In the decade after Japan became an economic superpower—a period

when a nationalist slogan of kokusaika (internationalization) became prevalent in

Japan 4 —the Japanese government and companies devoted themselves to furthering

Japan’s national interests through competition in the international arena. This process

was accompanied by a dramatic increase in opportunities for Japanese to come into

contact with foreign—predominantly Western—people and cultures both inside Japan

and abroad. Backed by the strong Japanese economy and the relative decline of American

power, the self-Orientalizing Nihonjinron literature became a popular commodity, one

through which the Japanese populace could confidently explain the distinctive character-

istics of Japanese culture and society without undermining the demarcation between ‘us’

and ‘them’. 5 This culminated in the 1980s with Japan’s accession to the position of

economically powerful nation-state. 6

The internationalist nihonjinron discourse has fallen away since the collapse of the

so-called ‘bubble economy’ and subsequent social downfall in Japan since the early

1990s. The last decade of the twentieth century, ‘the decade of loss’ (ushinawareta

jūnen), witnessed the apparent surfacing of decisive structural breakdown and change

of such Japanese institutions as the bureaucracy, corporate organization, education

system and family relationships. A prolonged economic recession, and incidents such

as the Kobe earthquake, an increasing number of brutal crimes by teenagers, and the

Aum Shinrikyō nerve gas attacks in the Tokyo subway system, further deepened the

sense of crisis and pessimism. These changes were accompanied by a rapid development

in globalization in which trans-border flows and connections of capital, people and media

accelerated at an unprecedented scale and speed. In this context, the keyword in the

discussion of ‘Japan in the world’ shifted from ‘international’ to ‘global’. 7 The usage of

‘global’ in the media discourse clearly reads as more passive and less confident, signifying

the decay and crisis of Japan. As the term ‘global standard’ exemplifies, Japanese

2 Sakai, ‘Modernity and its critique’; Iwabuchi, ‘Complicit exoticism: Japan and its Other’.

3 This is not to say that ‘Asia’ has no cultural significance in the construction of Japanese national identity.

While Japan’s construction of its national identity through the complicity between Western Orientalism

and Japan’s self-Orientalism is conspicuous, ‘Asia’ has also overtly or covertly played a constitutive

part. While ‘the West’ played the role of the modern Other to be emulated, ‘Asia’ was cast as the

image of Japan’s past, a negative picture which tells of the extent to which Japan has been successfully

modernized according to the Western standard. See Tanaka, Japan’s Orient. 4 Iwabuchi, ‘Complicit exoticism: Japan and its Other’.

5 Befu, Ideorogii to shite no Nihon Bunkaron.

6 Kondo, About Face, 84.

7 According to Asahi Shinbun’s data base, the number of articles using the word ‘international’drops from

1104 in 1990 to 436 in 2002, while ‘global’ rises from 42 to 510 in the same period.

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discourses of globalization have most notably revolved around the necessity for Japan to

readjust itself to the new US-led global economic order.

In this context, nationalistic discourses have taken various forms beyond the claim of

cultural distinctiveness and superiority that was founded on economic power. Various

attempts are made to (re)discover the merit and virtue of Japan. There is nostalgia for

past glory, as well as reactive discourses that aim to revise history textbooks to counter

the ‘self-tormenting’ view of Japan’s modern history of imperialism and colonialism in

Asia. The state has placed emphasis on teaching Japanese young children more about

Japanese traditions and instilling patriotic sentiments. Excessive celebratory attention

is given to Japanese—sports people in particular—who achieve success abroad.

Indeed, the 1990s was noted for an upsurge of neo-nationalism. 8 This is suggestive of

a common observation that even as processes of globalization erode national boundaries

they enhance the sense of belonging to a national community. Yet it should be noted that

nationalism does not necessarily take an aggressive or fervent style. As Billig argues, the

permeation of national feeling is more often than not facilitated and displayed by a

mundane practice such as casually showing the national flag in the city. 9 Such ‘banal

nationalism’ is further promoted by an increase in the encounter with people, goods

and images from many parts of the world. Rather than being perceived as a threat to

one’s national identity, such encounters are interpreted and contained within the inter-

nationalized framework of global society in a highly commercialized and spectacular

manner. Examples include the escalation of global sporting events such as the

Olympic Games and World Cup Soccer. There is a rapid development of global televised

spectacles of various kinds in which people are asked to purchase a ticket to become part

of the event and display a particular national emblem. 10

At the time of FIFA World Cup Soccer in 2002, co-hosted by Korea and Japan, some

observed the rise of ‘petit-nationalism’ in Japan. 11

A massive number of ordinary

Japanese—especially young people—cheerfully and innocently rejoiced at being Japanese

together in a public space: they waved the national flag, painted it on their faces, and sang

the national anthem praise of the Emperor’s everlasting rule. Such practices attracted

much discussion in Japan. Some saw it positively, a sign of open-minded cosmo-

nationalism, and others thought it as a dangerous emotional phenomenon that could

easily lead to an exclusive ethno-nationalism. But since a recent survey shows that

only 15% of respondents feel proud of their country, it is hard to see this is a rise of

zealous nationalism. 12

Rather, significantly underscored in this event is the entrenched

permeation of an assumption that the world is a congregation of nations. The 2002

World Cup testifies, I would suggest, to the increasing prominence of an Olympiad fra-

mework of multinationalism: a widespread perception that the nation is the local unit of

which one is asked to display one’s membership, in order to participate in the global

society. This consciousness is deeply internalized, taken-for-granted, at an individual

level. Through spectacular international encounter, exchange and competition, the

uncanny ubiquity of the global is replaced not with a threatening ‘them’ but with the

comfortable and enjoyable comradeship of ‘us’. In this process, the national flag

becomes a marketable brand logo and ‘banal nationalism’ is reinforced by the pleasurable

8 See Abe, Samayoeru Nashonarizumu.

9 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 1995.

10 Roche, Mega-events and Modernity.

11 Kayama, Puchi Nashonarizumu Shōkōgun.

12 See Asahi Shinbun, 16 March 2005.

‘Ordinary Foreign Residents’ in a Japanese TV Talk Show 105

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consumption of the sense of national belonging that ensures a (pseudo-) participation in

the global society.

Media Representation of Foreign Residents in a Global Era

The shift in the focus from international to global and the emergence of multinationalism

are also discerned in the media representation of ‘foreigners’ in Japan. The influx of

foreigners has intensified anxiety about national security. The media have long tended

to treat foreign residents as social problems and/or threats to the Japanese community.

This became especially conspicuous in the 1980s when there was a dramatic increase

in the number of temporary and permanent immigrants from Asia. There was at that

time also some concern over how and whether Japan could become a multiracial

nation. 13

But concerns for inclusion were overwhelmed by the trend towards exclusion

widely observed in many parts of the world in the 1990s and became even more conspic-

uous after 9/11. In this context, immigrants, especially those from China, attracted

public attention in relation to the increase in crime committed by foreign nationals.

Racist comments made in 2000 by Tokyo Governor Ishihara exemplify such concerns.

He attributed the rise of crime, in large part, to the rise of illegal Chinese migrants.

The Japanese media repeatedly report the increase and viciousness of crimes committed

by foreigners. While it actually constitutes an insignificant proportion of total crime,

Japanese media collude in uncritically disseminating police data stressing the increase

of crimes by foreigners. 14

News reports regularly describe suspects as foreign, or ‘of

foreign appearance’, without clear evidence to support these assertions, thereby reprodu-

cing and reinforcing the association of foreigners with crime and danger. Demonizing

foreign criminals effectively engenders and exploits the widely felt sense of social distress

and insecurity, which is generated not just by an increase in crime but also by concerns

about unemployment, terrorist attack, the breakdown of the education system and the

decline in post retirement pensions. Instead of offering a comprehensive analysis of

these globally shared social issues, news reports simplistically attribute the cause of

anxiety to palpable villains that threaten ‘our’ national communities, and should there-

fore be expelled beyond the borders. A highly romanticized longing for a safe and

caring community is evoked through exclusion. 15

Besides the news and crime reports, there has also been a strong impetus in the Japanese

media to represent foreign residents as consumable signs through which potentially

disturbing transnational encounter can be translated into a pleasurable media spectacle.

At least since the early 1960s, foreigners have appeared in the Japanese media as commen-

tators and entertainers. This intensified in the 1980s, the decade of ‘internationalization’,

when so-called gaijin-tarento (foreign celebrities) became media celebrities. They were

mostly Caucasian people from Western countries, predominantly from the USA, 16

who

were impressively fluent in Japanese. Their assigned task was, as in the narrative of Nihon-

jinron, to mark the uniqueness of Japan through entertainment. They were repeatedly

13 For example, see Bessatsu Takarajima No. 106, Nihon ga taminzoku kokka ni naru hi (1990).

14 See, for example, Utsumi et al., Sangokujin hatsugen to zainichi gaikokujin.

15 Bauman, Community.

16 There are some non-white stars like Osmond Sanko from West Africa, whose performance of ‘primi-

tiveness’ and funny ‘Africanness’ were much enjoyed by Japanese audiences. See Russel, Nihonjin no koku-

jinkan for the representation of black people in the Japanese mass media. With the exception of some

singers, persons of Asian descent rarely appeared as commentator gaijin-tarento in the 1980s. Margina-

lized groups such as resident Koreans have until recently been treated as ‘taboo’ in Japanese TV programs.

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asked to comment on Japanese culture or current affairs with a particular emphasis on the

difference between ‘Japan’ and ‘the Rest/West’. 17

For their part, gaijin-tarento played their

assigned role to satisfy the Japanese desire to be regarded as unique.

As Nihonjinron discourses declined, so did the value of gaijin-tarento. The increasing

number of foreign nationals residing in Japan who acquired Japanese cultural compe-

tence in terms of language skills and insights into Japanese culture and society also depre-

ciated the raison d’être of gaijin-tarento. What emerged as a Japanese media commodity

instead was the ‘ordinariness’ of foreign residents, such as TV programs that showed

unknown foreigners in Japanese singing contests and depicted the everyday struggle of

foreign brides in Japan. In 2002, the Japan Advertising Council ran advertisements

that featured an American woman who works successfully as a landlady in Yamagata.

In the film, she stressed the traditional virtues of Japan, which, she observed, many

Japanese people seem to have forgotten. The ‘Japanese are short of “Japan”’ (Nipponjin

niwa nihon ga tarinai). The instructive role of gaijin-tarento in highlighting Japan’s distinc-

tiveness was replaced by the gaze and body of the ‘ordinary’ foreigner. At this time a new

type of TV talk show also appeared, titled Kokoga hen dayo Nihonjin (‘KHN’, hereafter),

which features the outspoken voices of foreign residents. The show attempted to redefine

‘Japan’ through the representation of Japan in/and of a global society. What is crucial here

is that ordinary foreigners are explicit about where they are from. A multinational

spectacle is substituted for multicultural politics and the issue of their inclusion/exclusion

in a Japanese imagined community is rendered irrelevant.

‘Ordinary Foreigners’ Wanted

After a few successful trials as a special program, KHN was broadcast as a one-hour-long

weekly program (from October 1998 to March 2002.) The program gained relatively

high ratings in the 10 p.m. time slot (around 15% on average). It brought together in

a studio setting about 100 foreigners who were willing to speak out on various topics.

The show usually started with a foreigner expressing the sense of anger, frustration

and oddness they feel about Japanese socio-cultural matters, such as racial discrimi-

nation, international marriage, school bullying, and animal abuse. The Japanese side,

consisting of persons concerned and several commentators—comedians, intellectuals

and social critics and such—responded, refuting their statements, and stirring the discus-

sion by being confrontational. The show targeted an audience, according to the produ-

cer, that was ‘without a critical awareness’ of the issues involved (Asahi Shinbun, 22 May

2001, evening edition). The program did not aim to offer rational, well-structured

discussions but to present a heated quarrel through an exaggerated and simplified com-

parison between Japan and ‘the Rest’. It was deliberately provocative and sensational. 18

17 Hall, ‘The West and the Rest: power and discourse’.

18 This paper analyses KHN with a focus on the drawing of boundaries between Japan and the foreign, but

the cultural politics of KHN’s representation is by no means restricted to this. Particularly in the latter

stage, perhaps to overcome the mannerism of the content, the role of foreign participants changed and

became less centred (Hagiwara, ‘Kokoga hen dayo Nihonjin’). Most commonly, the program foregrounds

‘queer and bizarre’ Japanese such as motorcycle gangs, homosexuals, overweight people, and high-school

women involved in sexual trade (enjo-kōsai), and foreign participants play a role in taking a stand against

them. Here, comments by foreign participants are represented sensationally as a substitution for the con-

servative views assumed to be held by the majority of the Japanese audience. The program can be subtly

acquitted of the charge of showing degrading views through the safe filter of the foreigners’ gaze. For the

gender politics of KHN, see Kunihiro, Gendai Nihon no jendā hen’yō to ‘kokoga hen dayo Nihonjin’.

‘Ordinary Foreign Residents’ in a Japanese TV Talk Show 107

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KHN apparently shared much with previous media representations of foreigners in

terms of its attempt to discursively construct an exclusive Japanese imagined community,

but it also drew a clear distinction from them in some respects. In my interview at TBS on

19 January 2001, 19

the producer told me that his idea of the show was originally inspired

by Nihonjinron literature, which he had enjoyed reading as a university student. He

wanted to make a TV talk show that elucidates the distinctive traits of Japanese society

and culture in comparison with other cultures and nations. In implementing his idea,

the producer stressed the significance of featuring nameless foreigners. According to

the producer, the newness of the program lies in the reviewing of contemporary Japanese

society through the eyes of foreigners who live as ordinary residents in Japan:

I thought it was important to feature ordinary people from many parts of the

world. There are now so many foreign nationals living in Japan. The situation

is very different from before. I want to give them a space to express their views

on issues about Japanese culture and society as well as the sense of frustration

they feel while living in Japan, which is something we should not easily dismiss.

This sounds well intentioned, but representing the voices of ordinary people was

apparently commercially significant in the show’s appeal to the Japanese audience. It

was assumed that since foreign participants appearing in the show are ‘ordinary’

people, their comments are genuine, not exaggerated and contrived performances, as

was the case with gaijin-tarento. 20

Moreover, following the popularity of Nihonjinron,

the producer was quite sure that ‘Japanese people would like to listen to how foreigners

perceive their society and culture’ to confirm Japanese distinctiveness. The ‘ordinariness’

of enraged foreigners is believed to ensure the authenticity of their voices, which in turn

helps their utterance about Japan sound radical and fresh to the viewers. The talk show

format is seen as strategically appropriate to represent such voices in a way that recon-

firms the symbolic boundaries of ‘Japan’. ‘Ordinary’ foreign residents are regarded as

an attractive commodification of alterity in a televised multicultural ‘safari park’ where

Japanese audiences may safely enjoy the spectacle of an inter-cultural encounter

through the screen.

The minimum requirement for participants in KHN was sufficient fluency in spoken

Japanese to engage in discussion on various topics with their Japanese counterparts. As

far as possible the producer turned down foreign participants who had appeared often

in other Japanese media as not sufficiently ‘ordinary’. The authenticity of this ‘ordinari-

ness’ was beside the point; the producer’s concern was rather that they should appear so

to the audience. The question is, therefore, how the program attempted to represent this

‘ordinariness’ to fulfil its commercial objective.

While the talk show purports to depict spontaneous discussions, the content of KHN

was tightly controlled. The discussion topics of each program were decided by the

production team and participants were asked to report their views in advance. The pro-

ducers decided the desirable direction of the debate, who would make interesting com-

ments, and what video images would be inserted to enhance the show. The MC, Kitano

Takeshi, was told who to select for comment. The success of the KHN depended on

foreign national residents who, in the producer’s view, could make stirring comments

19 Field research was conducted in Tokyo between May 2000 and November 2001. In addition to the

interview with the producer, I observed the shooting of the program in the studio and carried out informal

interviews with the foreign participants who appeared on KHN. 20

The Television, 26 February 1999, 35–37.

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on Japan in comparison with their own countries. Participants who were able to do so

continued to appear on the program and some even became ‘amateur’ media celebrities

of KHN. Those whose presence didn’t excite soon disappeared.

Talent agency Inagawa Motoko Office (IMO) played a significant role in the recruit-

ment and management of foreign participants. IMO has predominantly handled

foreign personalities and extras for the Japanese media since its inception in 1985, and

contracted with TBS to exclusively handle KHN’s foreign participants. While this

arrangement was instigated to simplify payment and management, IMO also auditioned

for foreign talent for the program. Furthermore, some of IMO ‘talents’ who had

appeared in the media well before KHN started actually became participants too. 21

These ‘hidden talents’ played key roles in enflaming debate. An infamous example was

a US-born Japanese-American man who had worked as a DJ. He tanned his face and

caused agitation by making offensive comments from the viewpoint of an American

hardliner. While audiences might not be aware that this was a manipulated performance,

other foreign participants who had won their right to speak through audition were

sometimes extremely frustrated by the provocative comments of these planted ‘talents’

whose prominence marginalized their presence and opinions. I will return to this point

later.

Multinational Representation of the Global Society

The commodification of ordinary foreigners in KHN suggests two reasons for the end the

era of West-centred gaijin-tarento in the Japanese TV representation. Aside from the sub-

stantial increase in foreign national residents in Japan who speak fluent Japanese

language are the growing prominence of non-Western countries in the world, and an

increasing recognition of the necessity for Japanese people to refute foreigners’ views

on Japan (Hōsō Bunka, November 1996). These changes need to be seen in the

context of the paradigm shift from internationalism to globalism discussed earlier.

KHN clearly shows the shift of emphasis from the (imbalanced) internationalist binary

between ‘Japan’ and ‘the West’ to that of globalism between the Japan and the rest of

the world’s nations. After the defeat of World War II Japanese (post)colonial connections

with other Asian countries were subsumed under its cultural subordination to and rivalry

with the West. In the last decade, however, there has been a rise of non-Western players in

the global economy, politics and culture as well as the activation of intercommunication

and exchange among the non-Western countries that bypass Western countries. These

new trends urge the Japanese media to turn more attention to non-Western countries

and their perspectives. As one Japanese magazine put it, the world of gaijin-tarento in

the Japanese TV is, though belatedly, entering the era of Asia and Africa (Hōsō Bunka,

November 1996). This tendency is clearly demonstrated in KHN, in which the binary

contraposition of ‘Japan’ vs. ‘the West’ is less emphasized in favour of a model of a

global society. Many of the popular participants and performers are actually from Asia

and Africa and their ‘non-Western’ views are highlighted in the program.

To be sure, hitherto suppressed voices of Asian and African participants might offer

fresh insights on Japanese culture and society. They are more critical of Japanese racial

discrimination, for example, but the program does not simply aim to throw these insights

21 TV production companies and talent offices are playing a significant role in the picking out of ‘appeal-

ing amateurs’ for audience-participating programs. (See Nikkei Trendy, March 2003, 154–155.)

‘Ordinary Foreign Residents’ in a Japanese TV Talk Show 109

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into the limelight. Underlining these voices is necessary to depict the global society in

microcosm, the contraposition of Japan and other nations in the world. The producer

consciously includes participants from as many countries and regions as possible so

that the program can purport to represent the whole world. The program is billed as

‘featuring foreign people from more than fifty nations’ (see, for example, More, July

1999). To enforce the picture of Japan vs. the world nations, the studio set is organized

so that foreign nationals and their Japanese counterparts stand face to face. Foreign par-

ticipants are required to wear a national flag to show where they are from. Production

staff regularly ask—even compel—foreign participants to compare Japan and their own

nation. Least favoured are comments that stress the commonality and similarity

between Japan and other nations. In my observation of studio shooting, I heard some

participants complain that such a black-and-white framework of simplified national com-

parison obscures the complexity of the issues concerned. Such views tend to be edited

out even if successfully expressed in the studio and the deviant making them will soon

disappear from the program.

A map of global diversity represented in the program is thus fundamentally a

one-dimensional composition of a nationalized binarism that eliminates ambiguity and

multiplicity in the form of national belonging and ethno-cultural identity. Some partici-

pants eventually obtain dual nationality; some have lived in Japan since childhood. All,

however, are presented simply as ‘foreign national residents’. One man wearing a

Korean flag was born in Japan and had lived in the US and Korea as well as Japan. He

was nevertheless categorized simply as a representative of ‘Korea’. He was lumped

together with other Korea nationals, some of whom came to Japan rather recently, and

the national flag he wore reduced his opinions to ‘Korean’ viewpoints. He actually

insisted on his doubleness and ‘cosmopolitan identity’ and expressed it in an interview

in a magazine that is targeted to Korean residents (Senuri, 2002, No. 51). On the

program, however, he was expected to perform as unambiguously Korean.

This lack of ambiguity reflects the way in which multiculturalism is often presented.

Multiculturalism is criticized for its underlying conception of culture as a coherent

entity, which goes together with the conception of a multicultural society as a mosaic

that is constituted of clearly demarcated boundaries between ethnic cultures, with the

dominant group unmarked. More recently, the idea of multiculturalism is also blamed

for failing to take transnationalism into consideration. Its exclusive obsession with

multicultural situations ‘here’ in a national society for the purpose of socio-national inte-

gration tends to disregard immigrants’ connections with ‘over there’, and such connec-

tions may be regarded as detrimental to achieving communal harmony in the

multicultural nation. 22

It seems premature to see the same multiculturalism trap in the Japanese context, in

which even the idea of multicultural symbiosis has not been widely embraced by the gov-

ernment and the populace. The issue at stake with regard to the cultural politics of KHN

is, I suggest, multinationalism. KHN’s representation of the global society renders the

national belonging even more taken-for-granted through the pleasurable consumption

of a multinational spectacle. By suppressing the ambivalent (trans)national connections

and belongings to Japan of foreign participants, the program fixes them as foreign

national others, essentially cutting them off from ‘Japan’. It is an attempt to control

the implosion of difference within an imagined community by replacing it with a multi-

national situation that consists of the mob of temporary residents who will never ever be

22 Vetrovec, ‘Transnational challenges to the “new” multiculturalism’.

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full members of the nation. They are only allowed to express and show their difference in

public as long as they wear different national flags that ensure the demarcation between

‘us’ and ‘them’. Their differences are recognized and understood exclusively as ‘in but

not of’ in the highly commodified form of national branding.

Media Spectacle of ‘War of Words’ in a Global Era

The program format of a ‘war of words’ (zessen) between the Japanese and ordinary

foreigners makes KHN multinationalism work more effectively. This is related to the

second reason for the end of era of gaijin-tarento. In the age of internationalism, gaijin-

tarento pleasurably confirmed Japanese uniqueness. Gratefully accepting Western views

on the Japanese uniqueness is now no longer satisfactory, as uniqueness has become

associated less with the secret of Japan’s economic power than with the shortcoming

that accounts for Japan’s socio-economic decline. And as actual encounters with

foreign nationals become more common, there is more stress on the need to refute

biased views, criticism and misunderstanding of Japan uttered by foreigners. Reflecting

this trend, KHN centres not just on foreign people’s anger and criticism against Japanese

society but also on Japanese counterarguments, in most cases in a highly emotional

manner. Provocative statements about Japanese bizarreness by a foreign participant

are followed by studio discussion between other foreign participants who comment on

the statement from their own national perspectives and by Japanese who often get

excited and stir up the argument. Extremely confrontational performances from both

sides work together to excitingly demarcate ethno-cultural boundaries between Japan

and other nations.

This picture overlaps with a new type of Nihonjinron appearing in the age of globaliza-

tion. Ishii Yoneo argues, for example, the importance of acquiring a ‘global literacy’. 23

To

acquire global literacy, one must first master basic communication skills in English, the

global lingua franca. This is indispensable, but is, nevertheless, just a means. From his

own experience of promoting an international exchange scheme, Ishii points out the

limits of a one-direction exchanges, of introducing Japanese culture to the world and

vice versa. What is imperative in the age of globalization is, he argues, a real international

exchange, not just sponsoring superficial cultural exhibitions, but promoting a dialogue

which might even be highly antagonistic in some cases. In the face of an increase in the

clash of opinions, values and principles among people of different national backgrounds,

a passive attitude of defending and protecting Japanese culture or convincing oneself of

how Japan is incomprehensible to others, Ishii argues, must be discarded. Japanese

people have to learn to actively express their own opinions, to maintain Japan’s positions

and interests, and even to be prepared for serious confrontation with other nationals in

the global arena.

Conforming to this view, the Japanese media write appreciatively of KHN because of

the ‘head-on’ talkback between the Japanese to the foreigners who unreservedly assert

their sense of anger and frustration with Japanese society. Such self-assertiveness

might be criticized for being biased, but at the same time the ability of the foreign par-

ticipants to express their opinions in a foreign language and in a public space is regarded

as something Japanese people should emulate (More, July 1999, 349). No less entertain-

ing for audiences is watching how Japanese people who are supposed to be ineffectual in

23 Kawai and Ishii, The Japanese and Globalization.

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debate nevertheless hold their own. 24

By presenting the spectacle of Japanese confront-

ing and refuting ‘ill-advised’ foreigners, KHN provides a release for the pent-up

emotions, which are brought on and heightened by the stifling socio-economic situation

of Japan, and battered by the rough waves of globalization.

Non-fiction writer Hisada Megumi’s comment that the program makes her head go

round (Asahi Shinbun, 2 March 1999, evening edition) hits the mark in regard to how

the Olympics-like war of words between Japanese and foreign participants effectively dis-

torts the public visibility and discussion of multicultural issues in the Japanese context.

Watching KHN, she was overwhelmed by the diversity of nationalities of people residing

in Japan and their tremendous self-assertion, in fluent Japanese, of the sense of anger and

frustration they are made to feel in living in Japan, so much so that she could not help but

realize that Japan had indeed, without her noticing, become a multiracial society. This

suggests that the public visibility and utterance of foreign residents with competency

of Japanese language skills might urge Japanese audiences to turn their attention to

how the intensified transnational flows of people has made it untenable to believe in

the homogeneity of a Japanese imagined community. At the same time, however,

Hisada also confesses that she was surprised to find a strong nationalistic sentiment

evoked within her. She becomes annoyed by the Japan-bashing of foreigners, and irri-

tated with being unable to refute it. Here we can see how the multinational framework

of the war of words operates to contain the opportunity for public negotiation with

actually existing incommensurable cultural differences within the society. Through

TV’s aptitude for entertaining simplification, the opportunity is replaced by the represen-

tation of a controllable confrontation of national-cultural diversity. KHN reduces the

multicultural and multiracial situations to a multinational spectacle by employing the

framework of a global war of words between clearly demarcated nationalities whereby

the potentiality to deconstruct the We-dom from within is precluded and domesticated

by the fortification of exclusive international diversity. 25

Cultural Politics of Public Visibility

While multinationalism based on the distorted representation of multicultural situations

in Japan should be critically examined, the fact that KHN in any case makes the foreign

national residents visible and their hitherto suppressed voices audible in the mediated

public space cannot be entirely dismissed. This point is suggestive of the argument con-

cerning the public participation in American talk shows such as Oprah in terms of the

possibility of constructing plural public spheres. Those shows are often criticized for

the vulgar quality of debate among the studio participants but are also appreciated for

their underlining of hitherto repressed voices such as those of women, working class

people, homosexuals, and ethnic minorities. Carpignano et al., for example, think

highly of the role of talk shows in democratizing the public sphere. 26

By intensifying

the confrontation between persons concerned and studio audiences, they argue,

American talk shows make it possible for the hitherto inaudible experiences and voices

of ordinary people to gain an advantage over intellectuals’ pedagogical comments in

the public sphere. Talk shows thus break through the limitation of a Habermasian

24 See, for example, Sapio, 10 March 1999, 96–97.

25 See Bhabha, ‘The third space’.

26 Carpingnano et al., ‘Chatter in the age of electronic reproduction’.

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bourgeois public sphere that is criticized for being elitist, male-dominated and racially

exclusive in the actual operation. 27

KHN brings the concerns of previously invisible foreign residents into the public

sphere. Issues like, for example, racial discrimination that have tended to be disregarded

by Japanese TVare paid attention to on KHN, albeit in a sensational and superficial way.

The program has dealt with Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro’s above-mentioned

bigoted comments linking Chinese and Korean residents to rising crime rates, and

with the discriminatory practice of a public bath in Otaru, Hokkaido that barred

access to foreigners, from the point of view of those who are discriminated against. In

the latter case, two foreign participants flew to Otaru to cover the story in the program

of 28 February 2001. 28

Their coverage was made mostly from the viewpoint of an Amer-

ican-Japanese man who is married to a Japanese and retains Japanese nationality but is

nevertheless forbidden to enter the bath due to his ‘foreign’ appearance. He sued the

bath owner to let the Japanese public know how this kind of conduct is unacceptably dis-

criminatory and racist. 29

‘No foreigners allowed’ signs are still openly shown at the door

of some real estate agencies and bars, yet such unjustifiable discrimination is rarely con-

demned in the Japanese media. Following the journalistic principles of ‘objectivity and

nonpartisan impartiality’, the Japanese media would tend to offer a balanced coverage

of the case, presenting both sides of the story and pointing out the difficulty of multicul-

tural symbiosis in a detached manner, ending with a clichéd suggestion from the point of

view of maintaining social harmony that it is necessary for both sides to carefully discuss

the issue with each other. 30

In KHN’s coverage, nearly all foreign participants strongly

condemned the bath house for its racial discrimination. It offered an unusual opportunity

to highlight the viewpoint of the discriminated in the mainstream media and thus should

not be easily dismissed. It exposed the fact that the principle of objectivity held up by the

Japanese media is after all only of benefit to the majority Japanese population. By fore-

grounding the minority’s point of view, the myth of media objectivity and neutrality

that tends to work towards maintaining the status quo was debunked.

This should not, let me reiterate, deter us from diverting attention from the fact that talk

shows are highly stage-managed and controlled by the producers. We need to ask how

supposedly ‘spontaneous’ voices that are expressed in the show are actually shaped

under the production format of the talk show genre, and whether a highly commodified

and exaggerated debate on TV can actually be seen as a public forum. As Shattuc

argues, professional MCs are apt to dissociate the issue concerned from a wider social

context and reduce it to a personal matter, which is to be resolved at an individual

level. 31

Despite its potential for constructing an alternative public sphere, an excessive

emphasis on sensationalism and personification imposed by media gatekeepers deprives

TV talk shows of a critical edge. Such criticism against talk show is much more seriously

applied to KHN whose degree of stage-management and preclusion of the potentiality for

creating a multicultural public sphere are not comparable to American counterparts.

There is limitation in posing the Manichean question of whether TV talk shows that

foreground the hitherto unheard voices of the marginalized create a new kind of

27 See also Livingstone and Lent, Talk on Television.

28 In the latter period of the show, some participants were assigned the video coverage of the issue of the

week, which was shown in the studio for discussion. 29

For details, see Arudou, Japanizu onrii. 30

See, for example, NHK, News 11, 9 February 1999. 31

Shattuc, The Talking Cure.

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public forum or are merely a commodified TV spectacle. It would be more productive, I

argue, to analyse the multicultural politics of TV talk shows by acknowledging that both

aspects are closely—though unevenly—complementary and cannot be considered

separately. Gamson, moving between the oppositions of spectacle and forum, circus

and symposium, argues that American talk shows constantly blur lines and, at the

same time, redraw them. 32

Focusing particularly on the issue of homosexuality, he ana-

lyses how boundaries between private and public, normal and abnormal are at once

obscured and reconstructed by attending to the contradiction in the public appearance

of the marginalized people. TV talk shows highlight what he calls ‘paradoxes of visibility’,

which display:

democratization through exploitation, truths wrapped in lies, normalization

through freak show. There is in fact no choice here between manipulative spec-

tacle and democratic forum, only the puzzle of a situation in which one cannot

exist without the other, and the challenge of seeing clearly what this means for a

society at war with its own sexual diversity. 33

In exploring the paradoxes, Gamson attached particular importance to the examin-

ation of how the marginalized people actively participate in and, in some instances,

collude in this media event. While admitting the significance of the analysis of the way

in which the media production and representation ‘annihilate’ and ‘deform’ gay and

lesbian people, he nevertheless points out its limit in analysing talk shows by posing a

question of agency:

what happens to media representations of nonconforming sexualities when

lesbians and gay men are actively invited to participate, to ‘play themselves’

rather than be portrayed by others, to refute stereotypes rather than simply

watch them on the screen? That is the twist talk shows provide. 34

Gamson argues that public visibility through commercial media is something like

‘walking a tight rope’ for the marginalized people. 35

They cannot control the result of

their public visibility though media entertainment shows and there is no guarantee

that it would lead to the deconstruction of their negative stereotypes. Nevertheless,

‘the struggle for self-representation is not one in which talk shows guests are simple

victims . . . they have a strong hand in creating it’. 36

Critical analysis of how talk shows

represent and exploit the marginalized people in terms of the democratization of the

public sphere appears to take the side of the marginalized. Yet, there is a risk that it even-

tually subsumes their active practices and performances of becoming visible under a big

picture of the construction of the rational public sphere in the singularity, a risk of dis-

regarding actually existing heterogeneous and contradictory practices of the margina-

lized within and behind the public sphere.

Likewise, the active participation and performance of foreign participants in KHN

shows the complexity and ambivalence involved in the attempt to reconstruct national

boundaries through media entertainment. While its symbolic violence of boundary

demarcation cannot be overstressed, we should also look carefully at various practices

32 Gamson, Freaks Talk Back.

33 Ibid., 19.

34 Ibid., 22.

35 Ibid., 214.

36 Ibid., 215.

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of the represented at the site of production and consumption. This is not to uncritically

celebrate the autonomy and active resistance of the marginalized against the media.

Attention to those aspects, since they are not evident on the surface of the mediated

public sphere and thus cannot be grasped by representational analysis, I argue, would

lead to a many-layered understanding of cultural politics and the representational vio-

lence of KHN. A detailed field research analysis of how heterogeneous foreign partici-

pants perform in various ways in the show is indispensable, though it is beyond the

scope of this paper. To conclude, I offer some findings and considerations that are

drawn from limited field research.

Performing ‘Foreigners’ and the Burden of Representation

While it appears that foreign participants tend to assert their differences in a nationalistic

and ethnocentric manner in the program, when we meet them it often becomes apparent

that they are actually not as nationalistic as they appeared on screen. For example, a

graduate student from China strongly defended China’s position in the show, but was

critical of Chinese society and the government in an interview. As she told me, ‘I am

not quite sure why I’d be [nationalistic] in the studio discussion, but perhaps I enjoy

behaving that way. It is more enjoyable in that situation [than being a rational

thinker]. It is something like participating in the Olympics’. She follows the intention

of the producer and enjoys performing accordingly. A Japanese-Brazilian journalist

told me that while he tries not to be taken in, he nevertheless often finds himself behaving

in a manner that supports the aim of the producer, strongly defending Brazil vis-à-vis

Japan in response to the comments of the Japanese participants. In either case, the orga-

nizing format of the program, the war of words, induces foreign participants to feel

‘you have no right to say that of me and my country’ and respond nationalistically.

Multinationalism effectively works to generate the self-assertion of national belonging.

The seemingly nationalistic performance of foreign discussants is not induced simply

by their (often pleasurable) involvement in the show. Their position as marginalized citi-

zens in Japan carries with it a burden of representation. Most of the foreign participants

auditioned of their own accord; there are many practical reasons for their eagerness to

participate in KHN. For some it provided extra pocket-money. Others saw the TV

appearance enhancing their everyday lives and even job prospects. Some simply

wanted to become media celebrities and no small number of them are motivated to

contest the widely held negative stereotypes of the country with which they (fully or par-

tially) identify, because such images strongly affect their identity formation and living

conditions within Japan. People from Asia and Africa, who suffer much more severe pre-

judice and discrimination in Japan than Caucasians, are apt to work hard to improve the

image of their own countries. The Chinese participant mentioned above told me that

I’d strongly argue against any criticism of Chinese society and culture in the

show. Well, of course I know there are many bad things in China which need

to be reformed and changed. But that is another story. We do not have to

show such bad aspects of China on Japanese TV. I’d rather wipe them out.

I was also informed that some Japanese-Brazilian participants try, as far as possible, to

promote the positive aspects of Brazil, deliberately tearing down unjust images of its

backwardness. Some participants from African countries adopt an opposite strategy,

enhancing their images by representing a poor but ‘pure’ Africa. In this sense, even if

‘Ordinary Foreign Residents’ in a Japanese TV Talk Show 115

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participants appear to be behaving nationalistically, they may do so for strategic reasons

rather than because of they are ‘nationalistic’.

This kind of performance is also shaped by the expectations of expatriate commu-

nities in Japan. The Chinese participant told me, for example, that there was a

strong peer pressure on Chinese participants to make pro-China comments. Partici-

pants who do not meet this expectation may be harshly condemned by their peers.

According to her, some comments by a Chinese perceived as damaging to the image

of China and to themselves have spawned intense discussion over several months in

the readers’ column of a Chinese language newspaper which is published in Japan.

She herself has received much criticism for her failure to enhance the images of

China. ‘If I cannot respond well to the criticism made against China or cannot ade-

quately defend China’s position in the show, I am blamed for the unsatisfying perform-

ance by people around me’. The case of a participant from Iran is more serious. An

unknown Iranian man assaulted him as he entered his favourite bar in Roppongi,

where many foreign nationals gather together to drink. The person was angry at his

performance in the show and with the way in which he described Iran. He accused

him of strengthening the negative image of Iranians in Japan. This burden of represen-

tation, a burden imposed on them as the representative of an ethno-national commu-

nity to enhance the ethnic/national images in Japan, also put pressure on foreign

participants to take on the multinationalism strategy of the program.

In any case, the participants can only have control of their representation during the

off-air taping of the program. There is no guarantee that any particular scene will be

broadcast. The taping usually takes more than three hours. As the actual program,

including video coverage, runs for around 45 minutes, much of the discussion is cut in

the post-production process. It is in this regard that the presence of IMO talents in the

show is highly frustrating for other participants. Their more frequent appearance in

the program is perceived as unfair and unjustifiable not simply because they collaborate

with the producer, but more importantly because by performing their assigned roles, they

are guaranteed more frequent appearance on screen. One participant expressed his sense

of discontent toward the talents this way:

Their views of Japan are fundamentally different from ours. Their views of

Japan are actually those of insiders, as they have been mostly brought up in

Japan. I think this makes it difficult for them to see Japan ‘objectively’ from

outside. They are awkward, halfway foreigners, as it were. They just pretend

[to be foreigners].

The sense of unfairness is also expressed in terms of language skills. Talk shows demand

an instantaneous response with rhetorical sophistication, but those whose first language

is not Japanese and who have not lived in Japan for long cannot easily attain this. As the

above person told me, ‘I often feel vexed since we cannot compete with pseudo-

foreigners in terms of discussion skills’.

It is questionable whether these views about ‘pseudo-foreigners’ are qualified and

whether it is possible at all to distinguish the ‘real’ view of foreigners from a false one

in a TV talk show. It might be the case that those who are mostly brought up in Japan

and speak Japanese as natives also experience a strong sense of frustration since they

are nevertheless treated as second rate citizens. The comments above nevertheless

show that foreign participants are sensitive to the way in which the commodification of

ordinary foreigners in the TV production actually works to marginalize their presence

and visibility in the show. The negative effect of this is that the heterogeneous existence

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and experiences of people who are categorized as ‘foreign’ in Japan is expressed in terms

of an antagonistically demarcated boundary between authentic foreigners and unauthen-

tic foreigners.

The prevalence of talent participants also encourages others to behave in accordance

with the intentions of the producer.

I tried not to be a strong nationalist, but often end up being like that. It is partly

because the staff urged us to be so. You know, we do not want our comments to

be cut, so we sometimes try to utter what will interest TV producers. Yes, we are

conscious of producers’ intention, so we perform accordingly.

Their collusion in a multinational spectacle is necessary to maximize their visibility in the

show. Such performances tend to reproduce the demarcation of national-cultural bound-

aries as they highlight the image of ethnocentric foreigners who simply attack Japan.

They walk a precarious tight rope, but no matter how conscious they are of the danger

associated with such public visibility, many still want to get on the wire. This precarious-

ness is the price that foreign residents must pay and are willing to pay, for going public

through KHN.

The desire to be visible, recognized and heard in the public sphere is clearly strong and

serious for some marginalized people. In the case of KHN, I found that irrespective of

different personal motivations to join the program, most participants were keen to go

public on a nationally networked TV program to air their experiences. Participation in

the program gives them considerable pleasure in being able to share the issues and

problems they encounter in everyday life with other ‘foreigners’ in similar circumstances.

As the above participant told me:

My friends often ask me why I am participating in such a vulgar show like

KHN, demeaning myself in public . . . Well, I fully understand his comment.

I do not think that participation in the program will make it easier to rent an

apartment, to change the mind of the owner who turns us away at the door. I

am not that naı̈ve. I know I am after all a foreigner here, even if I am a

Japanese-Brazilian . . . But the studio is the only public space where we can

complain [about Japan] and be listened to. It is an exceptional occasion in

monotonous daily life. As we are always regarded as foreigners no matter

how long we live in Japan, our sense of resignation [that nothing will

improve] is very high. Yet those who participate in the show at least are not

resigning themselves to the current situation. They want a to change the

situation, to change Japanese society’.

KHN finally ended in March 2002, promising audiences that it would return soon.

A few special programs have been broadcast since then, but the series has not reap-

peared. Three and a half years is a substantial run for a weekly variety show. While

it may have exhausted its commercial potential, the potential to expand the scope

and inclusiveness of Japanese TV has not yet been satisfactorily developed. Given

that the Japanese media still repeatedly report the increase in crimes by foreigners,

we are compelled to urgently consider ways to fill the gaps between commercialism

and citizenship, pleasure and responsibility, to create a more egalitarian and demo-

cratic public media space.

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Acknowledgements

The preparation for this manuscript was financially supported by Waseda University

Grant for Special Research Projects (2004B-935).

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