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The NAFTA Tomato Wars
When the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect in December 1992
and tar-iffs on imported tomatoes were dropped, U.S. tomato producers in Florida feared
that they would lose busi-ness to lower-cost producers in Mexico. So they lobbied the
government to set a minimum floor price for toma-toes imported from Mexico. The idea
was to stop Mexican producers from cutting prices below the floor to gain share in the U.S.
market. In 1996, the United States and Mexico agreed on a basic floor price of 21.69 cents a
pound.
At the time, both sides declared themselves to be happy with the deal. As it turns out, the
deal didn’t offer much protection for U.S. tomato growers. In 1992, the year before NAFTA
was passed, Mexican producers ex-ported 800 million pounds of tomatoes to the United
States. By 2011, they were exporting 2.8 billion pounds of tomatoes, an increase of 3.5-fold.
The value of Mexican tomato exports almost tripled over the same period, to $2 billion. In
contrast, tomato production in Florida has fallen by 41 percent since NAFTA went into
effect. Flor-ida growers complained that they could not compete against low wages and lax
environmental oversight in Mexico. They also alleged that Mexican growers were dumping
tomatoes in the U.S. market at below the cost of production, with the goal of driving U.S.
producers out of business.
In 2012, Florida growers petitioned the U.S. Depart-ment of Commerce to scrap the 1996
minimum price agreement, which would then free them up to file an anti-dumping case
against Mexican producers. In September 2012, the Commerce Department announced a
prelimi-nary decision to scrap the agreement. At first glance, it looked as if the Florida
growers were going to get their way. It soon became apparent, however, that the situation
was more complex than appeared at first glance. More than 370 business and trade groups
in the United States—from small family-run importers to meat and vegetable producers and
Wal-Mart Stores—wrote or signed letters to the Commerce Department in favor of
continuing the 1996 agreement.
Among the letter writers was Kevin Ahern, the CEO of Ahern Agribusiness in San Diego. His
company sells about $20 million a year in tomato seeds and trans-plants to Mexican
farmers. In a letter sent to The New York Times, Ahern noted that “yes, Mexico produces
their tomatoes on average at a lower cost than Florida; that’s what we call competitive
advantage.” Without the agreement Ahern claimed that his business would suf-fer. Another
U.S. company, NatureSweet Ltd., grows cherry and grape tomatoes under 1,200 acres of
green-houses in Mexico for the American market. It employs 5,000 people, although all but
100 work in Mexico. The CEO, Bryant Ambelang, said that his company couldn’t survive
without NAFTA. In his view, Mexican-grown tomatoes were more competitive because of
lower labor costs, good weather, and more than a decade of invest-ment in greenhouse
technology. In a similar vein, Scott DeFife, a representative of the U.S. National Restau-rant
Association, stated, “people want tomato-based dishes all the time. . . . You plan over the
course of the year where you are going to get your supply in the win-ter, spring, fall.”
Without tomatoes from Mexico, a win-ter freeze in Florida, for example, would send prices
shooting up, he said.
Faced with a potential backlash from U.S. importers, and from U.S. producers with interests
in Mexico, the Commerce Department pulled back from its initial con-clusion that the
agreement should be scrapped. Instead, in early 2013, it reached an agreement with
Mexican grow-ers to raise the minimum floor price from 21.69 cents a pound to 31 cents a
pound. The new agreement also es-tablished even higher prices for specialty tomatoes and
tomatoes grown in controlled environments. This was clearly aimed at Mexican growers,
who have invested bil-lions to grow tomatoes in greenhouses. Florida tomatoes are largely
picked green and treated with gas to change their color.
Case Discussion Questions
1. Was the establishment of a minimum floor price for tomatoes consistent with the
free trade principles enshrined in the NAFTA agreement?
2. Why, despite the establishment of a minimum floor price, have imports from Mexico
grown over the years?
3. Who benefits from the importation of tomatoes grown in Mexico? Who suffers?
4. Do you think that Mexican producers were dumping tomatoes in the United States?
5. Was the Commerce Department right to establish a new minimum floor price rather
than scrap the agreement and file an antidumping suit? Who would have benefited
from an antidumping suit against Mexican tomato producers? Who would have
suffered?
6. What do you think will be the impact of the new higher floor price? Who benefits
from the higher floor price? Who suffers?
7. What do you think is the optimal government policy response here? Explain your
answer.