11 decision

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Three years later, in 2006, Google.com was again blocked while Google.cn, Google’s Chinese subsidiary, remained in operation. The following year, in 2007, CEO Eric Schmidt gave an upbeat assessment of Google’s out- look in China amid challenges of censorship issues and competition from Baidu.com.

More Than a BackRub: Google’s Rise to Power But how did Google come to such international promi- nence? In 1996, Stanford graduate students Larry Page and Sergey Brin began collaborating on a search engine called BackRub. This search engine got its name because Page and Brin used backlinks to measure the importance of a site.6 By using the innovation called PageRank, a new system of ranking a website’s relevance using “an objec- tive measure of its citation importance . . . according to an idealized model of user behavior,”7 Page and Brin dra- matically increased search relevance compared to other search engines like Yahoo.

A little more than a year later, BackRub’s massive bandwidth usage, which had downloaded over 30 million indexable HTML pages, made it inoperable on the Stan- ford server.8 From then on, Larry and Sergey realized the potential of BackRub, changed its name to Google, and moved their office to a colleague’s garage.9

Google’s first investor became interested in 1996 when Sun Microsystem founder Andy Bechtolsheim provided a $100,000 check, allowing Google to incorporate and become officially Google Inc. In 1999, more investors grew attracted to Page and Brin’s idea and, with an increased budget of around $1 million, Google Inc. was able to relocate to a real office in Palo Alto, where a staff of only eight answered about 500,000 queries per day.10

In mid-1999 Google received an additional $25 million in equity funding for its search engine from two venture capital firms: Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Buyers. The confidence to invest such a large amount of capital came from the previous experience these VCs had in funding high-tech companies, such as Amazon.com and Cisco Systems. Google’s engineering genius and a monthly growth rate of 50 percent fueled only by word of mouth easily proved its value to these seasoned investors.11

By the year 2000, Google became the world’s largest search engine, supporting 15 languages.12 Google’s service was nothing new considering the existing search engines

Google in China In early 2008 Guo Quan announced plans to sue Google in the United States for blocking his entire name from search results in China. But why was his name blocked from search results? Guo Quan had published an open letter in early January to his government leaders Hu Jintao and Wu Bangguo, calling “for government reform [with] multi-party democratic elections” that served the interests of the common people.1 In response to his letter, the gov- ernment labeled Guo as a dissident and a political danger. He was ultimately arrested on charges of “subversion of state power.”2

Guo Quan’s name might have forever been lost in the shadow of the then-upcoming 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, but formal and informal networks of informa- tion helped publicize his case; his harsh sentence, which will have him imprisoned until at least 2019, and the fact that he named Google in his suit have made him infa- mous. The story of Guo Quan reflects the many chal- lenges faced by Google over the course of the past decade as it has attempted to expand globally. During this period, Google’s relationship with China has undergone a series of advances and setbacks, each reflecting in some way China’s response to the challenges of the Internet and social networking as well as Google’s difficulties of trans- lating a uniquely North American business model to countries and environments with different regulatory regimes, legal environments, and fundamental values.

Rough Beginnings At the break of the new millennium, Google began to offer its search services in a Chinese-language format with the hope of furthering its mission “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”3 Disappointingly, the website was consis- tently unavailable “about 10 percent of the time . . . [and] slow and unreliable” due to “extensive filtering performed by China’s licensed Internet service provid- ers.”4 This sense of distrust persisted for another two years until the autumn of 2002, when Google first became completely unavailable in China because Google claimed to have “stood by its principles and not subject[ed] itself to Chinese laws and regulations.”5 The dysfunctional use of Google search services for main- landers continued and in December 2003, Google.com was again blocked in China.

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416 Part 3 International Strategic Management

about the close margin in market share and considered the possibility of perhaps buying out Baidu in competition. But instead, in mid-2006, Google made a fatal mistake, selling its 2.6 percent stake of more than $60 million in Baidu shares and introducing Google.cn to China.18

Nevertheless, Google.cn was launched with the prom- ise that it would agree to block certain websites in return for the opportunity to run local Chinese services.19 Google promised to notify Chinese users when their search results would be censored and also promised not to maintain any services that involved personal or confidential data, like Gmail or Blogger, on the mainland. Google.cn was a response to improve the poor service Google believed it was providing in China. As senior policy counsel Andrew McLaughlin put it, “Google users in China today struggle with a service that, to be blunt, isn’t very good . . . the website is slow, and sometimes produces results that when clicked on, stall out the user’s browser. Our Google News service is never available; Google Images is accessible only half the time . . . the level of service we’ve been able to provide in China is not something we’re proud of.”20

Fundamentally, Google’s strategic move to create a local presence with Google.cn was driven by its desire to follow its mission of creating the most organized and efficient search engine. However, while Google thought it had the flexibility to set up a better search engine in China, Baidu CEO Robin Li was already ahead of the curve. While PageRank was being developed by Page and Brin, Robin Li was simultaneously working on a similar strategy for site-ranking called RankDex. As a result, this similar search concept was brought to Baidu. In the end, Google had erroneously presumed that it could overtake Baidu by maximizing its core competen- cies within China.21

Not only did Baidu have a strong competing search engine against Google, but it also provided several innova- tive search features customized for more local tastes. It introduced community-oriented services, including information-exchanging bulletin boards and instant messag- ing. These extra services appealed strongly to Chinese Internet users and put Baidu ahead of a foreign Google that did not seem to understand the Chinese market as well.

In addition, Baidu also took an extra step that Google missed by setting up “a national network of advertising resellers in 200 Chinese cities to educate businesses about the power of online advertising.”22 By specifically target- ing the business market segment, Baidu aimed to secure the Shanghai business sector. To secure the more general student population in Beijing, Baidu also offered a search engine that provided easy access to pirated film and music downloads.23

While Baidu strategically offered services that targeted specific market segments, Google was at a loss because of its slow comprehension of the Chinese market. Among one of the failures Google made was its attempt to rebrand

at the time, like Yahoo and AOL, but it was indisputable that Google offered the best search services. The innova- tive PageRank algorithm was combined with a minimalist homepage that focused on its search tool and reminded the user of its chief focus while helping to reinforce con- fidence in its best feature. Having secured a solid foothold in America, Google continued to seek more ways to expand. Visionaries from the very beginning, Page and Brin created Google to have “simplicity in our user inter- face and the scalability in our back-end systems [that] enables us to expand very quickly.”13

By anticipating the need to be flexible in order to expand, Google was set to go global. And as Larry Page remarked: “Google’s search engine has always had strong global appeal. We attribute this success to the site’s sim- plicity of design, ease of use, and highly relevant results. By localizing our search services to new international communities, Google will open up a host of new revenue, sales, and partnership channels.”14

Unfortunately, Asian countries in general had always been more difficult to penetrate because of competition from well-established local search engines. As recently as 2015, local search engine Naver had a market share of 49.8  percent in South Korea, while Google had 36.9 per- cent.15 Furthermore, China posed the greatest roadblock with censorship and competition from Baidu. However, with a population of one billion people and Internet usage on a steady climb, Google was determined to establish a stronger foothold in China.

China’s Internet Users and Population Users Population (millions) (millions) Percent

2004 96 1,310 7.3 2005 112 1,318 8.5 2006 140 1,326 10.5 2007 213 1,334 16.0 2008 303 1,343 22.6 2009 391 1,351 28.9 2010 466 1,360 34.3 2011 524 1,368 38.3 2012 564 1,377 41.0 2013 618 1,386 44.6 2014 642 1,394 46.0

Source: “China Internet Users,” Internet Live Stats,  www.internetlivestats.com/internet- users/china/.

Google vs. Baidu China’s policies have directly influenced the competitive landscape for search firms in China. In the space of Inter- net search, Baidu is usually referred to as China’s Google. But in reality, Baidu holds a strong market share lead over Google.16 Prior to the launch of Google.cn in 2006 in China, Google held 33.3 percent of the search engine mar- ket share between Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou while Baidu held 47.9 percent.17 Google was optimistic

Brief Integrative Case 3.1 Google in China: Protecting Property and Rights 417

Secretary of State, called upon Beijing to carry out a thor- ough and transparent investigation regarding the cyber hacks of human rights activists’ e-mail accounts. Ultimately, she threw her weight behind Google’s threat to pull out of China unless Beijing permitted an “unfiltered search engine.”32

Following the conflict in January, Google formally announced in March that all Google.cn users would be directed to the uncensored Google.com.hk website instead. According to Google, the decision reflected a legal move that still allowed mainland users access to their search engine.33 The move to stop offering a local search engine and battling with China over censorship reflected a shift in Google’s attitude, giving up competing with Baidu for Internet usage. In April, Google’s share of Chinese Inter- net searches dropped from 35.6 percent to 30.9 percent and Baidu’s rose from 58.4 percent to 64 percent.34 Despite no longer providing Google.cn to China, Google still cannot escape the censorship battles and attacks on its server. In 2014, China restricted access to nearly all of Google’s auxiliary services.35  Almost instantly, Google’s market share in China dropped to less than 2 percent.

But criticisms of Google have not always been from China. On March 22, 2011, New York Judge Denny Chin rejected a settlement between Google and both the Authors Guild and the Association of American Publishers (AAP). The original settlement had included an annual payment of $125 million in royalties to the copyright owners in order for Google to continue its project of scanning and selling online access to 150 million books.36 But copyright concerns per- sisted because no one could establish ownership of the dig- itized and scanned pages. It was concluded that Google’s current pact would simply give the company an unfair advan- tage over its competitors while rewarding it for engaging in wholesale copying of copyrighted works without permission.

In October 2012, the AAP announced a new, yet contro- versial, settlement deal with Google. For each book already scanned by Google, publishers could choose to contact Google for removal. Moving forward, every digitized book catalog would first require an express opt-in from publish- ers. None of the financial terms of the deal were released. The Authors Guild, on the other hand, still remains in litiga- tion, leading a class-action lawsuit criticizing Google for its opt-out approach.37  In 2014, legal appeals were filed challenging the validity of the financial settlement.

Google’s Future: Innovation & Alphabet Inc. The challenges of censorship in China have forced Google to look beyond the appeal of China’s gargantuan search market. Instead, Google has shifted its focus to the oper- ating systems of smartphones. At the end of 2015, Google’s Android operating system enjoyed a market share of nearly 75 percent. Android is closely held by Google; so closely, in fact, that Google had been unwill- ing to share the most recent versions of code with Chinese

Google.cn to Guge, which was Chinese for Harvest Song. Six months after the launch of Guge, “72.6 percent (62.8 percent of the users whose first choice was Google) of the interviewed users still weren’t able to [recall] the Chinese name of Google.”24 The lack of brand loyalty was reflected in the insignificant number of Google users who were willing to convert from using the Chinese version of Google.com to Guge. Most users still preferred to use the original Google.com that was only censored by the People’s Republic of China.25

Google seemed to be fighting a losing battle, while Baidu continued to receive positive press coverage during its 2005 IPO on NASDAQ. Consequently, in just one year, Baidu gained 14 percent of the search engine market share while Google lost 8 percent.26

In the following year, 2007, Google fought hard to hold onto its piece of the China market, increasing its total mar- ket share from 19.2 percent to 22.8 percent while Baidu fell from 63.7 percent to 58.1 percent. Google increased its efforts by “hiring Chinese employees and . . . partnering with Chinese technology firms . . . [and establishing] two research centers, one in Beijing and one in Shanghai.”27

The small victory was short-lived as Google was soon met with conflict from both China’s and the U.S.’s governments.

The Challenge of Censorship: Google under Fire Shortly after Google.cn received its license from the Chinese government in 2007, Google proceeded to sign a set of guidelines, designed to reduce the risk that their actions would lead to human rights abuses in China and other countries.28 By promising to comply with censor- ship when the government filed a formal request, this effectively removed Google’s presence from the majority of human rights activities.

From this point forward, Google was fiercely criticized for running advertisements from nonlicensed medical websites in 2008, launching free music services, scanning books without proper copyright laws, and making porno- graphic content easily available multiple times in 2009.29 What has unfolded in the most recent years has been the climax of this drama between country and company.

On January 13, 2010, in response to an attack on the Gmail accounts of human rights activists by the Chinese government, Google released an initial statement saying that it was ready to end censorship of its search ser- vice.30 The announcement caused a stir, with speculations that Google would pull out of China completely.

Soon afterwards, however, CEO Eric Schmidt released a counterstatement stating that Google was planning to stay in China, even if it was forced to close down its local search services and just carry through with its other range of services.31 In the same month, Hillary Clinton, the U.S.

418 Part 3 International Strategic Management

a separate case related to the Safari browser, the Federal Trade Commission penalized Google $22.5 million, “the largest civil penalty ever levied.”43 Future  lawsuits are likely to follow in the U.K. following a 2015 British Court of Appeals ruling that citizens have the right to sue Google for any misuse of private information.44

Google’s extensive reach in data is only growing in size. At around the same time that Germany was bringing its charges against Google, Google cemented its Global Human Trafficking Hotline Network, committing $3 million to bring together three NGOs: Polaris Project, Liberty Asia, and La Strada International. But one question still remains, even in the face of Google’s good intentions: Can this company be trusted with sensitive information now regard- ing potentially trafficked victims? Have we gone too far by giving Google so much credit and by painting Google with a philanthropic stroke? In response to these questions, head of philanthropy at Palantir Technologies Jason Payne points out, “Just because someone’s human rights have been eviscerated, doesn’t mean that their civil liberties and electronic rights can be eviscerated.”45 Regardless of Google’s legal efforts and privacy challenges, it is still pressing on with several innovative projects.

The most imaginative of Google’s upcoming projects is a wearable beta technology device called Google Glass. The thrust of this new device is in the power of voice command for queries such as the weather, a built-in GPS, and the ability to take point-of-view photos and videos from an intimate perspective. All of this self-generated media is then directly uploaded to a user’s Google+ account in private mode by default.46

Google is also considering several other projects includ- ing Android@Home, Google’s attempt at home automa- tion, connecting light bulbs, coffee pots, and alarm clocks.47 Another project is Google Fiber, which focuses on deliver- ing Internet speeds “100 times faster than the average Inter- net connection in the United States.”48 Driverless cars are also another ambitious goal for the company, which would go nicely with its current database of road maps. Google’s strategy is clear: With billions of dollars spent on research and development, Google knows that it has a responsibility to push out products that no other company would dare to dream about, all the while pursuing high-tech inventions that integrate with our daily lives.

To better structure the company for future innovation and diversification, Google reorganized itself under a newly formed umbrella company, called Alphabet Inc., in 2015. Alphabet Inc. consists of multiple subsidiaries, each with a distinct focus. Under this new corporate structure, the Google Inc. brand continues to operate Google.com, Google Maps, and YouTube, but the tasks associated with other company goals are spread to newly created Alphabet Inc. subsidiaries. Calico, incorporated in 2013, is centered around biotech research and development, with a specific focus on disease and aging. Google Capital and GV (for- merly Google Ventures) function as the venture capital

smartphone developers. A recent example of this is when Google forced the delayed release of a smartphone manu- factured by Acer Inc., which ran an operating system called Aliyun. This operating system was allegedly cre- ated by taking Android’s software and making unapproved changes that were headed by the Chinese ecommerce organization Alibaba.38

Relationships are extremely hostile between Google and China, and the options for China are quickly disap- pearing. The only course of action left for China is to build its own Chinese mobile-OS for Chinese mobile devices.39 Mobile continues to dominate a large portion of Google’s strategy. When Google purchased Motorola Mobility in May 2012, it had hoped that the accompany- ing treasure trove of over 17,000 patents would yield innumerable benefits. But this has not been the case. After the $12.4 billion purchase, Google still has yet to win a decisive legal case with a big payoff.40 As a result, Google sold Motorola Mobility in January 2014, though it retained most of the patents as part of the deal.

Regardless of the challenges, Google still has accumu- lated a powerful tool by acquiring Motorola Mobility’s patents. Google now possesses among the best IPR for designing devices, and Google has the software to supple- ment those devices and integrate them vertically into its online systems.41  Despite selling most of the hardware business to Lenovo in 2014, this purchase was ultimately consistent with Google’s hope to reposition itself as a bigger player in the space of mobile technology.

The rate at which technology is becoming even more integrated into our lives is astounding, and Google is on the forefront of that mission. With its app for Android users, called “Google Keep,” it hopes to target early software adopters looking for another way to manage all of their sticky notes, photos, and lists. But yet again, a central com- ponent to this new advancement is trust. While some users are easily giving up more private ground in the routine of their daily lives, others are questioning whether or not the free services are worth it, especially because similar projects like Google Reader or iGoogle have been terminated.42

For Google, these privacy issues have taken off interna- tionally. In April 2013, Germany prosecuted Google for “scooping up sensitive personal information in the Street View mapping project.” The total fine added up to $189,225, which is a drop in the bucket compared to Google’s profits of $10.7 billion in 2012. Such fees are usually already fac- tored into the business expenses of large data-mining cor- porations like Google. But these fines are not uncommon. Rather, it is the opposite, and often considered regular behavior. Google has accumulated several violations over the years. In 2014, the French regulatory body CNIL forced Google to pay a large fine. Additionally, the CNIL ruled that if an individual asks for search results based on his or her name to be removed from Google’s search engine, Google must comply. In 2012, Google paid $7 million to settle with 38 states that had filed against the company. In

Brief Integrative Case 3.1 Google in China: Protecting Property and Rights 419

and human ingenuity. At the same time, Google will con- tinue to face political threats of censorship and information restriction and challenges to its privacy policies and prac- tices. But the reverberations from its new technology will continue to generate commotion in the markets and chal- lenges to governments and their information policies.

Questions for Review 1. How would you characterize China’s market for

online search and related services? 2. Why was Google initially attracted to China? What

changed its perspective? 3. Should companies like Google conform to the

Chinese government’s expectation regarding pri- vacy, censorship, and distribution of information?

4. What advantages does Baidu have over Google in the Chinese marketplace? How might Google overcome those advantages?

5. What recommendations would you make for Google in China going forward?

Source: This case was prepared by Karl Li and Pin-Pin Liao of Villanova University under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Doh as the basis for class discussion. Additional research assistance was provided by Ben Littell.  It is not intended to illus- trate either effective or ineffective managerial capability or administrative responsibility.

arms of Alphabet Inc., targeting both tech startups and growth-stage companies. Perhaps the most interesting subsidiary is Google X (known simply as “X”), which functions as the heart of innovation at Alphabet Inc. As a secret research and development lab, Google X is responsible for developing the driverless car and Google Glass. Another exciting project, called “Project Loon,” involves the deployment of atmospheric balloons to increase Internet access worldwide. 

As Google expands, and its presence permeates devel- oping markets, its opportunities are abundant. This is especially true because most of the newly connected Inter- net users are living in areas of conflict and could poten- tially experience drastic changes to their social structures as a result of interacting with Google. A company such as Google could extend its influence beyond that of a nation-state by empowering desperate citizens with the ideas or information they need to incite a revolution. New innovative Google projects, like “Project Loon,” will con- nect the developing world with access to information and communication in ways that were previously impossible.

Ultimately, Google’s international strategy will continue to align itself with its information strategy, continually leveraging the opportunities of both computational science

1. “Wife & Son of Well-Known Political Prisoner & Christian, Guo Quan Arrive in US,” ChinaAid.org, January 24, 2012, www.chinaaid.org/2012/01/wife- son-of-well-known-political.html.

2. Ibid. 3. “About Google,” Google.com, May 7, 2013. www.

google.com/about/. 4. Justine Lau, “A History of Google in China,”

Financial Times Online, July 9, 2010, HYPERLINK “http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/faf86fbc-0009-11df- 8626-00144feabdc0.html?ft_site=falcon” \l “axzz4S04lPr4a” www.ft.com/cms/s/0/faf86fbc- 0009-11df-8626-00144feabdc0.html?ft_ site=falcon#axzz4S04lPr4a.

5. Ibid. 6. John Battelle, “The Birth of Google,” Wired.com,

August 2005, www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.08/ battelle.html?tw=wn_tophead_4.

7. Lawrence Page, Sergey Brin, Rajeev Motwani, and Terry Winograd, “The PageRank Citation Ranking: Bringing Order to the Web,” Stanford Digital Library Project, September 16, 1997,  http://ilpubs. stanford.edu:8090/422/1/1999-66.pdf.

8. “BackRub,” Google Web Archives, December 4, 1997, http://web.archive.org/web/19971210065425/ backrub.stanford.edu/backrub.html.

9. “Google: Our History in Depth,” Google.com, May 7, 2013, www.google.com/about/company/history.

10. “If the Check Says ‘Google Inc.,’ We’re ‘Google Inc.,’” Wired.com, September 7, 2007, www.wired. com/science/discoveries/news/2007/09/ dayintech_0907.

11. “Google Receives $25 million in Equity Funding,” Google Web Archives, June 7, 1997,  http://web. archive.org/web/20000309205910/http://www. google.com/pressrel/pressrelease1.html.

12. “Google Goes Global with Addition of 10 Languages,” Google.com, May 9, 2000, http:// googlepress.blogspot.com/2000/05/google-goes- global-with-addition-of-10.html.

13. “Internet and Search Engine Usage by Country,” Internet World Stats, http://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg. com/images/9780789747884/supplements/ 9780789747884_appC.pdf.

14. “Google: Our History in Depth.” 15. Maureen Gleeson, “Why Google Can’t Dominate

Search in South Korea,” Oban Digital, January 30, 2015, www.obandigital.com/gb/blog/2015/01/30/ why-google-cant-dominate-search-in-south-korea/.

16. Ginny Marvin, “Google Still Dominant, but Baidu Benefitting from Google Ban in China Says eMarketer,” March 31, 2015, http://searchengineland.

ENDNOTES

420 Part 3 International Strategic Management

March 22, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/technology/ 2011/mar/23/google-online-library-plans-thwarted.

37. Julianne Pepitone, “Google Strikes Deal with Pub- lishers over Universal Library,” CNNMoney.com, October 4, 2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/04/ technology/google-books-settlement/index.html.

38. Paul Mozur, “China Criticizes Android’s Domi- nance,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324 539404578342132324098420.html.

39. J. O’Dell, “China: Google’s Too Controlling. We Should Create Our Own Damn Smartphone OS,” Venturebeat.com, March 5, 2013, http://venturebeat. com/2013/03/05/china-google-android-drama/.

40. Susan Decker and Brian Womack, “Motorola Buyout Fails to Yield Patent Jackpot for Google,” Business Report, April 30, 2013, www.iol.co.za/ business/international/motorola-buyout-fails-to- yield-patent-jackpot-for-google-1.1508190#. UYQPdrXqnoI.

41. Google, “Facts about Google’s Acquisition of Motorola,” press release, 2013, www.google.com/ press/motorola/.

42. Ezra Klein, “Google’s Trust Problem,” Washington Post, March 21, 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/21/googles-trust- problem/.

43. Claire Cain Miller, “Stern Words, and a Pea-Size Punishment, for Google,” New York Times, April 22, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/business/global/ stern-words-and-pea-size-punishment-for-google.html.

44. Kevin Cahill, “Google Appeal Ruling Should Send Shivers through US Tech Companies,” Computer Weekly, March 30, 2015, www.computerweekly. com/news/4500243342/Google-appeal-ruling-should- sent-shivers-through-US-tech-companies.

45. Liat Clark, “Google Launches Global Human Traf- ficking Helpline and Data Network,” Arstechnica, April 10, 2013,  http://arstechnica.com/tech- policy/2013/04/google-launches-global-human- trafficking-helpline-and-data-network/.

46. Lance Ulanoff, “This Is Why Google Glass Is the Future,” Mashable, April 30, 2013, http://mashable. com/2013/04/30/google-glass-future/.

47. Eric Mack, “Google Future Tech: 10 Coolest Google R&D Projects,” CIO.com, 2013, www.cio. com/article/694854/Google_Future_Tech_10_Coolest_ Google_R_D_Projects?page5 11#slideshow.

48. Chris Ciaccia, “Google’s Future: Doing the Impossible,” BGR, April 19, 2013, http://bgr. com/2013/04/19/google-earnings-analysis- q1-2013-449971/.

com/google-still-dominant-but-baidu-benefitting-from- google-ban-in-china-says-emarketer-217745.

17. “Google Losing Market Share in China,” Search Engine Journal, September 21, 2006, www. searchenginejournal.com/google-losing-market- share-in-china/3816.

18. Rebecca Fannin, “Why Google Is Quitting China,” Forbes.com, January 15, 2010, www.forbes.com/ 2010/01/15/baidu-china-search-intelligent- technology-google.html.

19. “Google: Our History in Depth.” 20. Andrew McLaughlin, “Google in China,” Google’s

Official Blog, January 27, 2006, https://googleblog. blogspot.com/2006/01/google-in-china.html.

21. Fannin, “Why Google Is Quitting China.” 22. Ibid. 23. “Google Losing Market Share in China.” 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. “Web History of China,” Timetoast.com, 2010,

www.timetoast.com/timelines/web-history-of-china. 28. Justine Lau, “A History of Google in China,”

Financial Times Online, July 9, 2010, www.ft.com/ cms/s/0/faf86fbc-0009-11df-8626-00144feabdc0. html#axzz2MmJQVW1J.

29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. “Google Aims to Stay in China Despite Censorship

Clash,” Financial Times, January 22, 2010, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/f9ff5bcc-06ce-11df-b058- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RynyO1Rd.

32. Chris McGreal and Bobbie Johnson, “Hillary Clinton Criticises Beijing over Internet Censorship,” The Guardian, January 21, 2010,  https://www. theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/21/hillary-clinton- china-internet-censorship.

33. “A New Approach to China: An Update,” Google’s Official Blog, March 22, 2010, http://googleblog. blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china- update.html.

34. Loretta Chao, “Google Loses Chinese Market Share,” The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703 465204575207833281993688.html.

35. Charles Riley, “The Great Firewall of China Is Nearly Complete,” CNN Money, December 30, 2014, http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/30/technology/ china-internet-firewall-google/.

36. Dominic Rushe, “US Judge Writes Unhappy Ending for Google’s Online Library Plans,” The Guardian,