Capstone Project

Scholar: I M Student

Title: Runway Incursion Mitigation Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Degree: Master of Science in Aeronautics Year: 2020 This research is to address the hazards associated with runway incursions at all towered and non-towered US airports. In 2015 the FAA introduced the Runway Incursion Mitigation (RIM) program. However, the five-year trend between the fiscal years 2015 and 2019 indicates that there has been an upward trend in RI episodes in the US. This study will investigate RI episodes to determine if current FAA initiatives are abating RIs or need to refine their scope of operations to reduce the RI rate. The results of this research will help the FAA to continue its effort to mitigate runway incursions and provide recommendations for airports not covered by the RIM program. The identification of the main causal factors of RI occurrences is necessary for this effort and will provide another stepping stone to increase runway safety at all US airports. The research presented in this proposal will review the historical rate of RIs within the US and the leading reporting causes of RIs. The outcome of this research will support any recommendations to improve the FAA's RIM program to continue the reduction of the RIs and increase runway safety. This research will satisfy the Program Outcomes of the Graduate Capstone Project and the Specialization Outcomes associated with the Advanced Aeronautics and Aviation Aerospace Safety Systems specializations. Table of Contents Table of Contents Page Graduate Capstone Project Committee ii Abstract iii List of Tables vii Chapter Introduction 1 Significance of the Study 3 Problem Statement and Purpose 4 Hypothesis 5 Review of the Relevant Literature 5 Evolution of aviation safety 6 Review of SMS 7 Current RI mitigation strategies 9 Airport Improvement Plan 9 Runway Incursion Mitigation program 10 Problematic Taxiway Geometry 12 Facilities and Equipment Program 13 NextGen 14 Statistical modeling of RIs 15 Addressing the “people problem” 16 Current training requirements 17 Aviation safety reporting systems 18 The future of the US aviation industry 19 Methodology 20 Research Design and Procedures 20 Sources of the Data 21 Limitations on the data collected 23 Analysis Methodology 24 Results 24 Data Treatment 24 Analysis of RI types and RI causes 24 Results of the study 29 Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations 29 Discussion of Results 29 RI type and cause trends 29 Conclusions 30 Recommendations 31 Changes to RI training 31 Changes to RI reporting 31 Technology 32 Airport design 32 References 33

Page

Table

1 FAA FY 2015 – 2019 runway incursion totals 22

2 FAA Type totals for FY 2015-2019 22

3 NASA ASRS database totals for FY 2015 - 2019 22

4 ASRS RI causes for FY 2015 - 2019 22

5 ASRS ANOVA bar plot for RI causes FY 2015 - 2019 28

6 ASRS ANOVA QQ Plot for RI causes FY 2015 -2019 28

7 Mann-Whitney U test between RI causes for FY 2015 -2019 29

Chapter I Introduction

Runway Incursions (RI) are an all too common occurrence at US airports. The FAA recorded 8,341 incidents between FY15-FY19 with 134 reported in the first quarter of the FY19 alone (FAA, 2019), making runway incursion prevention a top priority at US airports. The FAA defines runway incursions as "any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for landing and takeoff of aircraft" (FAA, 2017).

The severity of a RIs was first realized during an unscheduled divert of two fully-loaded Boeing 747 aircraft at the Los Rodeos Airport on Tenerife Island in 1977. A combination of poor weather conditions, nonstandard radio calls, and limited surface movement areas set the stage for aviation's deadliest disaster to-date. This RI episode costs the lives of 583 passengers and flight crews plus, the total loss of two aircraft (Smith, 2017).

The lessons learned from the Tenerife disaster were instrumental in changing how aircraft operations today. Sweeping changes to international aviation regulations stemmed from this crash: the standardized English language phrases between pilots and air traffic controllers (ATC) (Bragg, 2020). This disaster also set the foundation for the Crew Resource Management (CRM) - now Threat and Error Management (TEM)- program today (Nova, 2006).

The global aviation community has made many strides towards reducing mishaps like the Tenerife. In the US, the FAA has continued to improve the process for flight operations as new aircraft and airport technologies emerge; however, technological advances are not the sole mitigation effort. The introduction of the Safety Management System provides a process to

( RUNWAY INCURSIONS: A PROBLEM NOT SOLVED ) ( 10 )

manage the introduction of cutting-edge equipment to ensure that all handling stations are aware of the capabilities and limitations of new flight and air traffic control systems.

Over the last 30 years, the number of aviation-related fatalities has continued to trend downward. The commercial US air carriers had zero deaths in 2015 for both scheduled and non- scheduled flights with four out of ten years (2008-2017) with zero recorded fatalities. The general aviation sector has continued to reduce fatal mishaps from over 400 per year in the early 1990s to fewer than 250 per year from 2010 to 2017 (US DOT, 2018).

The technological advances in aviation have corrected many issues by reducing ambiguous cockpit gauges, increasing aircraft systems reliability, and revolutionized the national air traffic control system (Oster Jr., Strong, & Zorn, 2013). Technology has been a cornerstone of reducing fatal aviation mishaps. However, there are signs that another Tenerife disaster is on the horizon. The 2006 Comair Flight 5191 mishap from the wrong runway serves as a recent reminder of the importance of increasing safety at the airport. The safety recommendations to the FAA from this mishap were to increase cockpit situational awareness with the introduction of moving map displays, improved airport surface marking standards, and ATC policy changes to task prioritization in the landing and takeoff areas (NTSB, 2007).

The introduction of the FAA's Runway Safety program is another advancement towards reducing the fatal mishap rate. However, since its inception in 1997, the number of mishaps has remained relatively constant (Werfelman, 2017). The leading causes of these mishaps are human-factors related and runway incursions. Since 2001, runway incursions have been on an upward trend. A most notable change was in 2008 when the FAA adopted the ICAO RI classification definitions. The new descriptions captured more data and resulted in an increase in reports; however, the rate of RIs continues to trend upward (Ison, 2020).

The challenging part of reducing RI occurrences is to determine their leading causes. A formative method of compiling data is through the modeling of runway incursion to assess the rate of incidents over time. In the years between 2002-2015, the FAA had an increase of 80% in reported RI episodes. This change resulted in a rate increase per 100,00 operations for 1.5 in 2002 to over 3.5 in 2015 (Mathew J. K., Major, Hubbard, & Bullock, 2017). The lessons learned in the Tenerife and Comair Flight 5191 are still applicable today. Both accidents were caused by pilots who lost situational awareness of the other aircraft and their position on the airport's surface. These cases serve as the basis for this research.

In the US alone, over 19,627 aviation facilities comprise private-use, public-use, and NPIAS serving 610,796 pilots, 213,050 active general aviation aircraft, and 18,203 air carrier aircraft (FAA, 2019). Currently, there are 134 current RIM locations at 76 airports. Since 2015, over 44 sites have been mitigated, 12 hot spots have been removed, and 107 mitigation projects are in the planning, design, or under construction (Vitagliano, Debban, & Healy, Runway Incursion Mitigation Fiscal Year 2019 Annual Summary Report, 2020).

The increase in air operations will also increase the demand for the entire air transportation infrastructure. Ensuring that the FAA continues to reduce the occurrence of fatal aviation mishaps, the continued study of RIs and their causes is required. The introduction of the Runway Incursion Mitigation (RIM) program in 2015 is a positive way to reduce RI occurrences at US airports. The RIM program is a 20-year improvement process that identifies airports with high circumstances of RIs, mitigate those areas at these airports that are causing the RIs and reduce the overall numbers of RIs (FAA, 2019). The RIM program utilizes a risk-based decision-

making methodology to identify the root causes of runway incursions such as unclear taxiway markings, nonstandard airport signage, and poor taxiway geometry (Hampton, 2015).

The RIM program's primary problem is the time associated with correcting the issues identified at airports with high occurrences of RIs. In 2017, the FAA presented the Call to Action (C2A) report, which identified runway incursions as the principal hazard at US airports. The C2A systematically targeted the factors leading to runway incursion: Pilot Deviations (PD), Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations (VPD), Operational Incidents (OI). It also included the need to develop strategies for early detection, reporting, and mitigation of RI episodes during the overhaul of the airport infrastructure.

The problem identified in this study is that RIs continue to threaten the safe operation of aircraft at US airports. From FY15 to FY19, RIs continued to trend upward even as flight operations decreased. Another issue identified in this study is that pilots primarily cause RIs and the most commonly cited causal factor is the loss of situational awareness. In this study, I will investigate the categories of RIs to determine which type is the highest risk of contributing to an RI episode. Once identified, I will examine the reported causal factors of RI episodes to provide a focusing effort for further mitigation and prevention of RIs.

This research is necessary to prove that pilots are the leading causes of RI episodes and determine why pilots are causing RI episodes. This research will identify current RI mitigation practices and technologies to identify new RI mitigation strategies and identify current policies, practices, or procedures requiring improvement. This research will also review ongoing RI training and awareness programs to make recommendations for future RI mitigation training and awareness programs.

Ha1: Pilot Deviations (PD) are the leading cause of runway incursion episodes. Ho1: There is no statistical difference between the PD, OI, and VPD RI episodes. Ha2: Loss of situational awareness is the most cited causal factor in RI episodes.

Ho2: There is no statistical significance between the SA, CB, CF, and OT causal factors in RIs.

Chapter II

Review of the Relevant Literature

The foundation of my research paper is to increase awareness and efficiency of aviation safety by focusing on runway safety and the reduction of RI episodes. For this research paper, I will utilize the FAA's Airport Safety website for national runway safety statistics and the ICAO website for supplemental international runway safety initiatives and information as required. For supporting documentation on runway safety initiatives, I will use the Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association, Flight Safety Foundation, and National Transportation Safety Board websites.

In the United States, the FAA has made many strides towards reducing aviation mishaps. In 2018, the FAA met its 10-year goal of reducing aviation-related accidents by 10% seven-years earlier than initially proposed (FAA, 2018). The continuing effort to minimize aviation mishaps has shifted its focus since the first flight flown at Kitty Hawk to the semi-autonomous uncrewed aircraft of today. Aviation safety is a byproduct of the increasing demand for aircraft and their integration into the worldwide transportation infrastructure. The concept of aviation safety is to reduce aviation related-mishaps through a constant improvement process of aviation procedures, policies, and practices through oversight, research, and feedback. The progression of aviation

safety is divided into three categories: the technical era from 1900-1960, the human factors era from 1970-1990, and the organizational era from the mid-1990s to the present.

The technological era focused on the complexity of aircraft systems and their reliability. During WWII, B-17 pilots experienced a large number of aircraft crashes to the tune of over 450 in 22 months (Kuang, 2019). The leading Army Air Force psychologists, Paul Fitts and his colleague Alfonse Chapanis, were summoned to determine why "pilot error" was the leading causal factor in the B-17 mishaps. Through case investigations and trend analysis, Fitts and Chapanis were able to decide on that poor system design and non-standardized instrument arrangements were confusing pilots. Their discovery and ingenuity changed aviation and is why the retractable landing gear handle and flap lever replicate the system they operate.

As aircraft grew more reliable and relatively more comfortable to fly, there was still an alarming amount of aviation mishaps occurring (Brownlee, 2013). The human factors era focused on the human interface with the aircraft and interaction of the crew members. The shift in safety focus to the man-machine interface leads to one of the essential safety initiatives in aviation, Crew Resource Management (CRM).

CRM was developed from the "Resource Management on the Flight Deck" study conducted by NASA in the 1970s in response to a series of aircraft incidents where human error was the causal factor of the accident. Shortly after this study was published, US FAR Part 121 carriers (major airlines) began implementing comprehensive CRM training into their regiments. CRM started to grow roots in 1991 when the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued the advisory circular on the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), which outlined a voluntary

program for the Part 121 carriers to implement human factors training programs (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012).

Following the cues from the human factor era, the FAA focused on the organizational barriers that precluded safe and effective use of aircraft and aircraft support equipment operation. The aviation industry saw a decrease of 83% in the commercial air travel sector between 1998 and 2008 (Duquette & Dorr, 2015). The FAA capitalized on this momentum and released the initial Safety Management System (SMS) program concept. In 2006, the FAA invited the commercial aviation sector to implement the SMS into their business model voluntarily.

The SMS is a centralized system to monitor system safety and safety management activities into daily operations. The SMS is a four-component structure that integrates safety principles into a corporation's core processes through Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. The SMS concept provides safety managers with the same level of legitimacy within the corporation's hierarchy (FAA, 2019). A valid SMS will offer both the FAA and product/service providers (certificate holders) with a means to:

1. Structure safety risk management.

2. Demonstrate safety management capability before system failure.

3. Provide safety assurance through the implementation of risk controls.

4. Interface knowledge sharing between FAA and certificate holders.

5. Support an active safety culture through safety promotion.

The primary audience for the SMS was commercial air operators. In 2007, the FAA invited the major U.S. airlines to participate in a pilot program to implement SMS into their business model voluntarily. In 2011, US Airways was one of the first major U.S. air carriers to

achieve the FAA's Level Four status of SMS implementation (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012). The success of the SMS program was realized and embraced by the FAA and commercial aviation industry. In 2015, the FAA mandated that all US air carriers implement an SMS program into their business model to reduce the US commercial fatality risk by 50% (FAA, 2015).

The FAA categorizes the SMS by aviation industry type:

1. Part 121 Operators.

2. Non-Part 121 Operators, MROs, Training Organizations.

3. Design and Manufacturing Organizations.

4. Air Traffic.

5. Airports.

The Part 121 operator category encompasses commercial and hazardous material transportation. Non-Part 121 operators, MROs, and training organizations generally cover all air operations outside of Part 121, including maintenance facilities and flight training schools. The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) and General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) developed the SMS and managed the implementation into aircraft production and systems manufacturing. The air traffic category establishes the SMS for the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), protecting the end-users (commercial, general aviation, and military operators) and the service providers (controllers, technicians, engineers, and support personnel).

The Airport category focuses on the SMS for the Nation's airports. The Airport and ATO industries require a significant amount of time, federal funding, and human resources to update the extensive, complex infrastructure of all the industry types. Comparatively, the other categories -which are mostly privately owned and operated organizations- can adopt, implement, and adapt their SMS process with little impact on their workforce, production lines, and the end-

user. Driven by profit margins and investors, the initial capital investment is relatively steep to implement the SMS. However, the long-term savings from injury lawsuits, medical compensation, and the ensuing OSHA noncompliance fines will apply an economic investment (Geng, 2018).

To address the issues in the Air Traffic and Airport industries, the DOT has introduced several initiatives to update the National Airspace System (NAS). The DOT's FY2018-22 strategic plan targets four specific areas to increase aviation safety within the NAS.

1. Safety: Reduce transportation-related fatalities and serious injuries across the transportation system;

2. Infrastructure: Invest in infrastructure to ensure mobility and accessibility and stimulate economic growth, productivity, and competitiveness for American workers and businesses;

3. Innovation: Lead in the development and deployment of innovative practices and technologies that improve the safety and performance of the Nation's transportation system;

4. Accountability: Serve the Nation with a reduced regulatory burden and higher efficiency, effectiveness, and responsibility (FAA, 2019).

A significant factor contributing to RI is the configuration of the airport. Although most US airports were built before the age of the jet aircraft, they can still accommodate the large volume of aircraft operations. As the world around the airport evolved, the airport design remained relatively unchanged and contributing to RIs (FAA, n.d).

Under the guidance of DOT's strategic vision, the FAA has funded the AIP to support its goal of reducing accidents, fatalities, and RIs. The AIP provides funding for runway and taxiway reconfiguring to increase efficiency and build new perimeter roads and movement areas for airport vehicles to prevent them from crossing the runways. The AIP also updates runway markings and signs to eliminate pilot confusion when taxiing to the runway and alert pilots when approaching the entrance to a runway (FAA, 2019).

One of the RI mitigation strategies used in place of reconfiguration is the identification of hot spots. A hot spot is an area on an airport movement area with the potential risk of collision or RI due to airport geometry and ground traffic flow. The identification of hot spots brings awareness to airport users and allows them to determine the safest approach when encountering them. Hot spots are displayed on the taxi diagram on instrument approach plates and in the airport facilities directory (FAA, 2020). Another RI mitigation strategy is the identification and restriction of converging runways. Converging runways are runways that do not intersect, but their flight paths cross within one mile of the airport. This strategy has been one of the most substantial safety improvements towards reducing the potential for collision and RIs (FAA, 2018).

The positive approach and identification of RIs are attributed to active safety culture and reporting system (Mathew J. K., Major, Hubbard, & Bullock, Statistical Modeling of Runway Incursion Occurrences in the United States, 2017). Despite the progress made in safety and reporting, there has been an upward trend in the RI occurrences over the last 18 years. To address this, the FAA introduced the RIM program in 2015 to address the increasing trend of RIs (FAA, 2015).

The RIM program is a focused approach towards reducing RI episodes through the identification and reconfiguration of areas with traditionally high occurrences of RIs. The FAA took notice that the ICAOs published a study in 2007 that determined that sophisticated or inadequate design is a significant factor that increases the chances of RI episodes. The specific areas of concern that increase confusion and decreased situational awareness were:

1. "The complexity of the airport layout including roads and taxiways adjacent to the runway;

2. Insufficient spacing between parallel runways;

3. Departure taxiways that fail to intersect active runways at right angles; and

4. No end-loop perimeter taxiways to avoid runway crossings." (Vitagliano, Garrison, & Aland, Problematic Taxiway Geometry Study Overview, 2018)

In 2007, the FAA's Airport Engineering Division initiated a study to identify any relationships linking RIs to airport configuration. The study also emphasized the safety theories and produced recommendations for future airport design. The study concluded in 2012 and identified the following considerations for the layout of future airport development, to reduce confusion when taxiing aircraft, and promote situational awareness for pilots, vehicle operators, and pedestrians:

1. Avoid vast expanses of taxi pavement entering a runway.

2. Limit runway crossings.

3. Avoid dual-purpose pavements.

4. Increase the visibility of runway holding position signs.

5. Do not design taxiways that lead directly from an apron to a runway.

This study's results pressed the FAA to identify and correct the problematic taxiway and runway geometry (PTG) characteristics that directly contribute to RIs (FAA, 2019).

Subsequently, the FAA identified 19 nonstandard features that reduce SA and increase CF due to their complex configuration and poor visual cues:

1. Y-shaped taxiways crossing a runway

2. Wrong runway events

3. Vast expanses of taxi pavements entering or along a runway

4. The convergence of numerous taxiway types entering a runway

5. High-speed exit crossing a taxiway

6. Two runway thresholds in close proximity

7. Short taxiways (stubs) between runways

8. Direct taxing access to runways from ramp areas

9. An aligned taxiway entering runway ends

10. Nonstandard markings and signage placement

11. Greater than three-node taxiway intersection

12. Taxiway connection to V-shaped runways

13. Taxiway intersects runway at other than a right angle.

14. Short taxi distance from the ramp/apron area to a runway

15. High-speed exits leading directly onto another runway

16. Taxiway coinciding with the intersection of two runways

17. Use of a runway as a taxiway

18. Unexpected holding position marking on parallel/entrance taxiway

19. Miscellaneous (i.e., non-sequential taxiway designation schemes, absence of full-length parallel taxiway, taxiway intersection along with the middle third of a runway, etc.) (Vitagliano, Debban, & Healy, Runway Incursion Mitigation Fiscal Year 2019 Annual Summary Report, 2020).

This study's success allowed the FAA to identify 119 PTG locations and has implemented measures to correct them through the RIM program. The problem with the RIM program is the time required to implement change. Another issue with RIM is that the scope of operations relegates program initiatives to 50 major U.S. airports. This limitation leaves the remaining 3271 airports in the NPIAS vulnerable to RI episodes (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2018). It does not entirely address the FAA's goal to reduce fatal aircraft accident rates.

Another program fielded by the FAA is F&E program that focuses on runway safety through the implementation of technology. The FAA incorporates several aircraft surveillance technologies for inflight position reporting and surface movement for early detection and prevention at the more substantial Part 139 airports such as Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia (FAA, 2019). The ADSE-3/AMASS system is a radar-based system that automatically tracks surface movements and provides ground controllers visual, and audio alters when a potential collision or RI is detected. This system is composed of a ground-based radar (ADSE-3) that is enhanced by the AMASS software logic and is currently installed at nine airports (FAA, 2018).

Another surface movement detection technology is the ASDE-X. This technology is an enhanced version of the ADSE-3/AMASS system and provides visual and aural alerts to ground

controllers if potential runway and taxiway conflicts arise. This system is capable of determining aircraft position within five-miles of the airport. It derives aircraft and airport vehicle information from surface movement radars, multilateral sensors, ADS-B sensors, the terminal automation system, and aircraft transponders. The ASDE-X is enhanced with AXSL software to determine if current or projected positions and movement of aircraft and vehicles will cause a collision or RI conflict (Jones, 2010). The FAA has installed or has planned ASDE-X installation projects at 35 US airports (FAA, 2018).

The FAA is currently overhauling the National Airspace System to increase aviation safety and make flight operations more efficient. To handle the demands of increased domestic and international air operations, the FAA has introduced the NextGen program to modernize the air transportation system. The NextGen initiative provides an improved surveillance and controller decision support tool that supports all aspects of flight operations. It also offers critical information for the ADSE-3/AMASS and ASDE-X systems through ADS-B (FAA, 2016).

The ADS-B is a network system consisting of aircraft avionics, GPS, and a network of ground stations to transmit aircraft position and flight path to ATC. This system enhances the capability of the early collision and RI detection systems by providing automated position broadcasts from equipped aircraft and vehicles. The precise position reporting nature of the ADS-B system offers increased situational awareness. It reduces ATC workload during periods

of high volume and concurrent runway operations at airports with closely spaced runways (FAA, 2016). The completion of the ADS-B 10-year rollout has completed and is now mandated to have an ADS-B Out transmitter installed aboard all aircraft in the NAS (FAA, 2010).

Another system utilized in the prevention of RIs is the RWSL system. This system provides visual cues to pilots when approaching runways, where the potential of an unsafe condition exists. The RWSL derives information from the ASSC and illuminates red in- pavement lights to alert pilots of a potentially hazardous situation. The RWSL system incorporates REL at taxiway/runway crossings and THL on the departure hold zone of the runway that will illuminate when another aircraft or vehicle is on the runway (FAA, 2018).

A relatively cheaper, ubiquitous option for position reporting is through the use of an electronic flight bag (EFB). This commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology capitalizes on the NextGen upgrades and consists of an approved portable electronic device (PED) or installed aircraft hardware to display aircraft position on the surface of the airport via moving map. The addition of this technology allows pilots to quickly orient themselves at the airport and aid in the reduction in RIs caused by loss of SA (FAA, 2017).

An article published in the Accident Analysis and Prevention Journal titled "Modeling Runway Incursion Severity" identified the challenges associated with the utilization of historical studies. The researchers found that the available data only focused on two factors: pilot and air traffic controllers, and omitted vehicles and ground personnel. Through the restructuring of RI risk assessment, the researchers determined that RI incidents are predominately caused by human-related factors (70% pilot, 14% ATC, and 16% V/PD) and that RIs occur: ATC 13.70 more times than pilots, and 20.41 times more likely that V/PD to high-severity RI occurrence (Wilke, Majumdar, & Ochieng, 2015).

A 2017 study published in the Journal of Air Transportation Management titled "Statistical Modeling of Runway Incursion Occurrences in the United States" determined that the

type of RI occurrence was a function of the airport design and operational capacity. The researchers found that larger airports were more likely to have OI occurrences at the major airports, and PDs were more prevalent at general aviation airports. This fact is interesting to note since both the OI and PD occurrences are human-related issues that rely on situational awareness.

The process the researchers utilized in this study provided viability to my research due to its scope and ability to categorically process data from the 3331 large airports listed in the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS). The results produced from this study provided an insight into the challenges of identifying the causal factors, determining the rate of occurrence, and the severity of each incident (Mathew J. K., Major, Hubbard, & Bullock, Statistical Modelling of Runway Incursion Occurrences in the United States, 2017). This study provides empirical data for the statistical analysis and a process to identify the causal factors and severity of RI occurrences.

In a 2000 study, the FAA identified the problems with reducing RIs due to the apparent apathy in solving the "people problem" (Knott, Gannon, & Rench, 2000). The researchers focused on the pilot informational areas such as signs, markings, and lights as areas for improvement to resolve ambiguity and reduce pilot confusion. The significance of this study and its relation to my research is the introduction of the onboard aircraft positioning aids and the international effort to adopt them as a means to specifically reduce RIs.

A follow up to this study conducted by the FAA in 2001 focused on the presentation of the runway markings providing the pilots in several different airframes and vehicles. This research intended to evaluate the runway marking design, how to enhance their recognition, and

reduce RIs. The result produced several recommendations for improved runway markings. Although this study did not provide data for analysis, it lends support to my assumption that pilots are the leading cause of the most severe RI occurrences.

The evolution of aircraft and airport safety system technology has been instrumental in the reduction in RI occurrences. A byproduct of the improved technology is the ability to capture data and reduce the time to process it. A study published in 2016 focused on the early detection of RIs through the use of the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A- SMGCS). The researchers used the abundance of data from the ICAO and FAA databases to develop an algorithm that processed ADS-B surveillance data to predict RIs (Li, Wang, Zhu, Lu, & Su, 2016). The system is still in the testing phases but foreshadows the evolution of RI mitigation and supports the human factor theme of my research.

Training is one of the essential tools in reducing RIs, however, not all training is equal. The Part 121 operators (commercial airlines) have annual training requirements with six-month proficiency reviews in aircraft or simulator. Part 91 operators (GA) are required to demonstrate their knowledge and proficiency every 24-months (FAA, 2019). The ATC receives semi-annual runway safety training and Part 139 certification of airports and conducts initial, recurrent, and remedial training for ground vehicle operators (FAA, 2018). The differences between the four- groups highlights the lack of RI awareness training amongst the Part 91 operators.

One of the leading challenges of RIs is the ability to capture all RI episodes. At non-Part 139 airports, non-fatal RI episodes are only identified through the pilots, ATC, or ground operators, who voluntarily report through the FAA's Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The FAA's ASAP initiative is a

voluntary program to resolve safety issues through corrective action without punishment or discipline. This program allows all entities to review safety data reported into the ASAP database to this, in turn, aids in the SMS safety promotion through historical events and trends (FAA, 2020).

The ASRS initiative is a more precise instrument for capturing aviation safety-related data. The ASRS is another voluntary platform that collects data for analysis but follows a protocol to capture the intricate details of an incident. The ASRS program has added "structured callbacks" at the FAA's request for all RI episodes to add to broaden the net cast and refine reports generated in ASAP. The structured callback process:

In 2019, the global commercial airlines carried over 4.5 billion passengers, delivered over

61.2 million metric tons of cargo, and provided jobs for over 65.5 million people (Marzareanu, 2020). The tourism travel sector counted for over half of the 1.4 billion international arrivals worldwide (Lock, 2019). The US alone generated over 612 billion dollars in revenue from commercial passenger travel in 2019 (Mazareanu, 2020). Over the next 20 years, the global commercial airline industry predicts a 4.2% annual growth in air passenger travel (Marzareanu, 2020).

In the US, annual domestic carrier passenger growth is predicted at 2.0% between 2020-2040. The US internal system traffic in revenue passenger miles (RPM) is predicted to increase by 2.5% while the international RPM is predicted at 3.0%. The US commercial airline system capacity -available seat miles (ASM)- is predicted to grow with the increased demand. By 2030, regional jets are expected to handle a 40% increase in seats per aircraft (FAA, 2020).

The uptick in the global air travel and cargo delivery has sent the signal demand to the commercial, general aviation and, unmanned aerial vehicle manufacturers. Boeing, a major US commercial aircraft manufacturer, is forecasting over 44,000 aircraft deliveries, with 56% new deliveries to meet market demand, over the next 20 years (Boeing, 2020). French aircraft manufacturer, Airbus, is forecasting their 2038 fleet size at over 47,000 with over 39,000 new additions to their fleet (Airbus, 2020). In 2016, 2,262 general aviation aircraft were added to the worldwide fleet of over 416,000 registered aircraft worldwide, with over half of the market share residing in the US (Business Wire, 2020). In 2021, market researchers predict the Unmanned

Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sector to generate over $12 billion in sales (Business Insider Intelligence, 2020).

Throughout the research of RIs, several reoccurring themes support my assumption that pilots are the leading cause of the most severe RI occurrences, early detection is required for the prevention of RIs, and the elimination of complicated surface movement areas is necessary to reduce RIs. The FAA's 2019 Annual Summary Report on the RIM program provides the most recent update on RI prevention and statistics for analysis. The report also provides an update of the current safety initiatives at airports within the US. The FAA's current focus is on improving the surface movement area geometry, the standardization of runway and taxiway markings, and improved signage placement throughout the aerodrome (Vitagliano, Debban, & Healy, Runway Incursion Mitigation Fiscal Year 2019 Annual Summary Report, 2020).

Chapter III Methodology

The upward trend of RIs between FY 2015 and 2019 highlights the necessity of determining why the RI occurrences have not been reduced. The extensive amount of research conducted on RIs has produced new RI mitigation strategies, corrected deficiencies in the airport design, and standardized pilot and controller procedures. However, RIs remain a threat to aviation safety. This intent of this research will attempt to identify any areas that will aid in the reduction of RI occurrences and decrease the risk of another significant aviation catastrophe.

This study will utilize a quantitative design using the FAA's RI database and NASA's ASRS database to determine variances and rate of occurrence between the types -PD, OI, and

VPD- of RI episodes and the reported causal factors – SA, CB, CF, OT- of RI between FY 2015- 2019. The test I have chosen for this study is the ANOVA one-way test for the variance. The non-parametric testing will provide depth to my research and provide detailed information to support my assumption that PD is the leading type of RIs and that SA is the leading causal factor of RIs. The results from this test will provide the basis for hypothesis testing both Ha1 and Ha2 due to the robustness and ubiquity of the ANOVA test. Due to the ordinal nature of the data, the Mann-Whitney U test was selected for trend analysis will be applied in conjunction with the ANOVA to identify RI trends during the five years. Review of statistical research procedures required for quantitative research are per the accepted, ethical practices and methods of the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative program and monitored under the cognizance of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University staff (Leedy & Ormond, 2019).

The data utilized for this study is extracted from the FAA's National Runway Incursion Totals from the Runway Safety Statistics database webpage (FAA, 2020). The FAA data is categorized by type and severity to determine the leading kind of RI. The second source of data originates from NASA's ASRS database to determine the leading cause of and rate of RIs.

( FAA Type of RIs 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 PD OI VPD )

( ASRS Cause of RIs 47 43 46 38 41 31 31 32 27 24 27 30 25 20 19 19 13 15 11 13 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Situational Awareness Communication Breakdown Confusion Other )

Data for this study is predicated on the accuracy of reported RI occurrences. Due to this, RIs tended to be reported higher from Part 121 and Part 139 sources and lesser from Part 91 sources. This limitation precludes accuracy in testing due to the non-automated environment of the non-Part 139 aviation facilities. Another barrier to this is the accuracy in reporting. RI episodes at an uncontrolled airport are required to self-report RI episodes. This issue precludes certainty in testing due since all reports are not valid unless observed and reported by a second party.

The variables analysis of the ASRS database proved to be a challenge due to the ability of the RI incident initiator to select several factors in their report entry, leaving the majority of the RI incidents with overlapping causal factors. For this study, I collated the causal factor data based on the first reported causal factor in the column. The majority of the reported RI incidents were human factors related (SA, CB, CF, OT), and further analysis is required to determine if the ASRS reporting system is accurately capturing data.

A barrier discovered in the data collection is the decrease in air operations in the second quarter of FY20. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically decreased the number of flight operations in the US and the global aviation economy (Airlines for America, 2020). The Mann-Kendall trend analysis identified a decrease in the rate of RI occurrences in FY19, and the assumption is that the frequency of occurrence will artificially be low in FY20 and FY21.

However, from the aviation safety perspective, this can be view as a positive because the workloads on pilots and controllers have decreased.

The test I have chosen for my research paper is the ANOVA to test for variance between the three types of RIs and a second, separate ANOVA on the four causes of RIs. The benefit of utilizing the ANOVA for this research project is that it uses proportionality to identify variances between groups larger than two and will determine the of each group. A Mann-Whitney trend test will aid this research is confirming the RI trends between the five years and verify the distribution of variables of the two ANOVA tests. Utilizing non-parametric testing provides an adequate platform for data analysis and will aid in hypothesis testing.

Chapter IV Results

The following are the results from the first ANOVA run on the FAA RI database. I have added the five-step process in this first test to demonstrate the testing procedure.

Step 1: Restate the question as a research hypothesis and a null hypothesis about the populations.

· Population 1: Pilot Deviations (PD)

· Population 2: Operational Incidents (OI)

· Population 3: Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations (VPD)

1. The null hypothesis is that these three groups have the same mean.

2. The research hypothesis is that the population means are not the same.

Step 2: Determine the characteristics of the comparison distribution.

· The comparison distribution is an F distribution with 2 and 12 degrees of freedom.

Step 3: Determine the cutoff sample score on the comparison distribution at which the null hypothesis should be rejected.

· This is done using the F table.

· For a .05 significance level, the cutoff F ratio is 3.89.

Step 4: Determine your sample’s score on the comparison distribution.

· Calculate S2Within

· PD

· group mean = 1304

· sum of squared deviations from mean ∑ (X – M)2 = 7598010

– S2 = 7598010 / 4 = 189950.5

· OI

· group mean = 399.25

· sum of squared deviations from mean = 2574342.74

– S2 = 2574342.74 / 4 = 643585.685

· VPD

· group mean = 357.75

· sum of squared deviations from mean = 749780.74

– S2 = 749780.74 / 4 = 187445.19

· S2Within = (189950.25 + 643585.69 + 187445.19) / 3 = 2730533.37 / 3

=1365266.69

· Calculate the between-groups variance.

· sample means are 1304, 399.25, 357.75

· sum of sample means = 2061

· GM = 2016 / 3 = 687

· deviations from grand mean (M – GM)

– 617, -287.75, -329.25

· squared deviations from grand mean (M – GM)2

– 380689, 82800.06, 108405.56

· sum of squared deviations from grand mean

– ∑(M – GM)2 = 571894.62

· variance of the distribution of means

( M Between )– S2 = ∑(M – GM)2 / df = 571894.62/ 2 = 285947.31

· variance of the population of individuals’ scores

( Between M )– S2 = S2 (n) = 285947.31 (12) = 343136.72

· Calculate the F ratio.

· F = S2Between / S2Within

· F = 343136.72/ 1365266.69 = 2.51

Step 5: Decision

The sample’s F ratio of 2.51 is less extreme than the .05 significance level cutoff of 3.89. I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the three groups come from populations with the same mean.

Analysis of Variance results:

Column statistics

ANOVA table

Tukey HSD results (95% level) PD subtracted from

OI subtracted from

The following data are the results from the second ANOVA run on the ASRS database.

The full testing procedure was applied to this data but, is not depicted. Analysis of Variance results:

Column statistics

ANOVA table

( Difference Lower Upper P-value CB -8.8 -19.481992 1.8819921 0.1264 CF -23 -33.681992 -12.318008 <0.0001 OT -21.8 -32.481992 -11.118008 0.0001 )Tukey HSD results (95% level) SA subtracted from

CB subtracted from

CF subtracted from

Mann-Whitney Test

Hypothesis test results:

m1 = median of SA m2 = median of CB m1-m2 : m1 - m2 H0 : m1-m2 = 0

HA : m1-m2 > 0

Results of this study

The test was successful in determining the variances in both tests. Both ANOVAs had normalized distribution and discovered that PD is the leading cause of RIs, and SA was the highest reported cause of RIs. The Mann-Kendall trend test confirmed the upward trend in reported RIs from FY 2015 through 2018 but identified a downward trend in FY 2019.

Chapter V

Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations

Discussion of Results RI type trends.

The analysis of the FAA's RI database provided a thorough set of data for testing. The trends in the type of occurrence identified the PD is the leading cause of RIs. The investigation into the current aviation enterprise, the policies that govern aviation, and the infrastructure that

supports aviation in the US have contributed to the rate of PD RI episodes. The concurrent trend analysis identified that the rate of RIs continued to trend upward after the inception of RIM but, there was a notable decrease in RIs, however, PD remained as the leading cause of RIs. This outcome is concurrent with a 2012 study conducted on human factors associated with runway incursions (Chang & Wong, 2012). It provides a focal point for risk mitigation at airports outside of the FAA's RIM program.

The analysis of the ASRS database proved to be complicated and challenging in developing a strategy for analysis. The procedure I used to prioritize and categorize causal factor data allowed for the review to determine the leading causal factors of RIs and to determine the five-year trend of RIs. The analysis confirmed that SA is the leading causal factor of RIs in the US. Loss of SA continues to threaten US airport safety and requires increased awareness campaigns focused on the dangers of RIs and the procedures to prevent and report RI episodes such as Comair Flight 5191 in 2006.

This study examined the trend of RIs at US airports and found conclusive evidence that pilots were the leading contributing factor to the RIs. This study also identified that human factors played a crucial part in the occurrence of RIs. This study determined that PD and SA RI episodes were the leading causes of the FAA recorded 8,341 incidents between FY 2015-2019 (FAA, 2019). The identification of this fact provides the FAA with a direction to apply focus to reduce RIs.

As the global aviation industry realized the importance of mitigating RIs after the Tenerife Island disaster and more recently in 2006, The FAA needs to continue its commitment to revolutionize the NAS and continue to seek new technologies to improve flight safety. SMS

policies and procedures need constant monitoring and overhaul. New aircraft industries emerge and continue to ensure the safety and welfare of all personnel involved in the aviation industry. Through foresight and innovation, the FAA can continue their downward trend of aviation- related fatalities and meet their goal of a 50% reduction in commercial airline fatalities.

The following recommendations are based on the analysis of data, the review of previous RI studies, and investigation of RI case studies.

To cast a broad net on RI mitigation, the FAA needs to increase its campaign for RI awareness and prevention. The most effective way to do this is through training. The FAA offers computer-based training lessons through their WINGS program on the FAASafety.gov website. Although this training method is voluntary, local flight schools and flying clubs can mandate annual training completion certificates or logbook endorsements to be maintained for flying status.

Changes in RI reporting

The importance of recording RI episodes needs to be addressed at the lowest levels and maintained with the highest standards. To aid in promoting the reporting of RIs, the FAA can develop a traveling information and training team that conducts seminars on the importance of eliminating RIs and other safety-related issues. This effort can be strengthened by sponsored support from the major airlines and aviation-related industries to attract increased participation in the safety roadshows. Another recommendation for RI awareness is non-punitive ramp checks and demonstration of proper ASAP and ASRS reporting by local FAA representatives.

There is an abundance of technology available for pilots to utilize for situational awareness and aircraft performance. However, it is expensive and increases the financial burden of owning and operating an aircraft. To reduce the financial difficulties of personally procuring EFBs, the FAA can incentivize airports, flying clubs, and flight schools to report RIs. The entities that manage and maintain an effective SMS program and produce a sufficient amount - scaled for airport size- of safety and RI reports can petition for federal grants to outfit their entities. The commercial airline and aviation-related industries can strengthen the EFB funded initiative through sponsorships.

The configuration of the airport's surface movement areas has been identified as the most significant contributing factor in RI episodes. The continued mitigation and reconfiguration of airport hot spots must be accelerated and expanded to cover the smaller airports where PTG has been identified. To bridge the gap between the FAA's reconfiguration process, the introduction of the EFB should be available to all pilots and ground personal. However, this could dissuade potential users due to the financial burden of procuring the hardware, software, and the associated subscription fees. A federally funded program to reduces the economic weight of owning an EFB could increase the number of pilots and ground personnel utilizing them and inversely decrease RIs through enhanced situational awareness.

Airbus. (2020). Airbus Forecasts Need for Over 39,000 New Aircraft in the Next 20 Years.

Blagnac, Fance: Airbus Media Relations.