

cratic Party and an early supporter of Jimmy Carter in 1976, had been an intermediary between Carter and the Serbs, and had become Milosevic's closest American advisor. (He had also run unsuccessfully for Governor of New Hampshire against John Sununu.) I was uneasy about an American in the Yugoslav delegation, but there was nothing illegal about it, and Spiro—a colorful Greek-American who liked to tell us that we “didn’t know shit about the Balkans”—did no apparent harm.

Before we sat down to a splendid dinner of lobsters that Spiro had flown in from Maine, Kati cornered Milosevic. Speaking in her capacity as the chair of a humanitarian organization, the Committee to Protect Journalists, she said that if Milosevic did not free Rohde he would face overwhelming pressure from the world’s press. Milosevic claimed he did not know where Rohde was, or anything about the case. By prearrangement, I joined the conversation and told Milosevic again that we would not make a final agreement until Rohde was freed. When Milosevic knew the game was up on an issue, he often grumbled and murmured, as if to himself. Now he did just that. “I guess I’ll have to see what I can do,” he said. I stressed the need for speed; after his visit to the prison, Andruszyn had reported that Rohde was “pretty strung out,” and urged us to get him released as quickly as possible.

The day ended with tragic news: the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, at the hands of a fanatic Israeli in Tel Aviv. He had been murdered because he had been willing to consider a compromise for peace. The reaction of the Balkan Presidents was cold-blooded and self-centered; this showed, each said separately, what personal risks *they* were taking for peace. None expressed sorrow for Rabin or the Israeli people or concern for the peace process. The only Bosnian who seemed stricken was the Ambassador to the United States, Sven Alkalaj, who was from an ancient and distinguished Sephardic Jewish family from Sarajevo. Izetbegovic let him leave immediately for Israel to represent Bosnia at the funeral. The contrast between Rabin and the Balkan leaders could not have been more evident than it was in the following days, as we watched the funeral on television and simultaneously struggled to find a way forward in the Balkans.

DAY FIVE: SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 5

We were determined not to let Sunday become a day of rest. It was time to intensify the effort. To test this proposition, we asked Izetbegovic to meet alone with Milosevic. With a notable lack of enthusiasm, he agreed. From the reports we received from both sides after the meeting, it was clear Milosevic had made an effort to persuade Izetbegovic that they had mutual interests and