Managerial Economics

profileThomas1122
BUS505PPTs-20200804.zip

Baye_9e_Chapter_01.pptx

The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics

Chapter 1

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Learning Objectives

Summarize how goals, constraints, incentives, and market rivalry affect economic decisions.

Distinguish economic versus accounting profits and costs.

Explain the role of profits in a market economy.

Apply the five forces framework to analyze the sustainability of an industry’s profits.

Apply present value analysis to make decisions and value assets.

Apply marginal analysis to determine the optimal level of a managerial control variable.

Identify and apply six principles of effective managerial decision making.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

The Manager

A person who directs resources to achieve a stated goal.

Directs the efforts of others.

Purchases inputs used in the production of the firm’s output.

Directs the product price or quality decisions.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-3

Introduction

3

Economics

The science of making decisions in the presence of scarce resources.

Resources are anything used to produce a good or service, or achieve a goal.

Decisions are important because scarcity implies trade-offs.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-4

Introduction

4

The study of how to direct scarce resources in the way that most efficiently achieves a managerial goal.

Should a firm purchase components – like disk drives and chips – from other manufacturers or produce them within the firm?

Should the firm specialize in making one type of computer or produce several different types?

How many computers should the firm produce, and at what price should you sell them?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-5

Introduction

Managerial Economics Defined

5

Basic principles comprising effective management:

Identify goals and constraints

Recognize the nature and importance of profits

Understand incentives

Understand markets

Recognize the time value of money

Use marginal analysis

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-6

Economics of Effective Management

The Economics of Effective Management

6

Identify Goals and Constraints

Well-defined goals

Firm’s overall goal is to maximize profits

Constraints make it difficult to achieve goals

Available technology

Prices of inputs used in production

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7

The Economics of Effective Management

Recognize the Nature and Importance of Profits

Accounting profit

Total amount of money taken in from sales (total revenue) minus the dollar cost of producing goods or services.

Economic profit

The difference between total revenue and cost opportunity cost.

Opportunity cost

The explicit cost of a resource plus the implicit cost of giving up its best alternative.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-8

The Economics of Effective Management

8

The role of profits

Profits are a signal to resource holders where resources are most highly valued by society.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-9

The Economics of Effective Management

Recognize the Nature and Importance of Profits

9

Five Forces and Industry Profitability

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10

The Economics of Effective Management

Understand Incentives

Changes in profits provide an incentive to how resource holders use their resources.

Within a firm, incentives impact how resources are used and how hard workers work.

One role of a manager is to construct incentives to induce maximal effort from employees.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-11

The Economics of Effective Management

11

Two sides to every market transaction: buyer and seller

Bargaining position of consumers and producers is limited by three rivalries in economic transactions:

Consumer-producer rivalry

Consumer-consumer rivalry

Producer-producer rivalry

Government and the market

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-12

The Economics of Effective Management

Understand Markets

12

Recognize the Time Value of Money

Often a gap exists between the time when costs are borne and benefits received.

Managers can use present value analysis to properly account for the timing of receipts and expenditures.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-13

The Economics of Effective Management

13

Present Value Analysis 1

Present value of a single future value

The amount that would have to be invested today at the prevailing interest rate to generate the given future value:

Present value reflects the difference between the future value and the opportunity cost of waiting:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-14

The Economics of Effective Management

14

Present Value Analysis II

Present value of a stream of future values

or,

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-15

The Economics of Effective Management

15

Consider a project that returns the following income stream:

Year 1, $10,000; Year 2, $50,000; and Year 3, $100,000.

At an annual interest rate of 3 percent, what is the present value of this income stream?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-16

The Economics of Effective Management

The Time Value of Money in Action

16

Net Present Value

The present value of the income stream generated by a project minus the current cost of the project:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-17

The Economics of Effective Management

17

Present value of decisions that indefinitely generate cash flows:

Present value of this perpetual income stream when the same cash flow is generated :

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-18

Economics of Effective Management

Present Value of Indefinitely Lived Assets

18

Profit maximization

Maximizing profits means maximizing the value of the firm, which is the present value of current and future profits.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-19

Economics of Effective Management

Present Value and Profit Maximization

19

Present Value and Estimating Values of Firms I

The value of a firm with current profits , with no dividends paid out and expected, constant profit growth rate of (assuming ) is:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-20

Economics of Effective Management

20

When dividends are immediately paid out of current profits, the present value of the firm is (at ex-dividend date):

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-21

Economics of Effective Management

Present Value and Estimating Values of Firms II

21

Short-term and long-term profits

If the growth rate in profits is less than the interest rate and both are constant, maximizing current (short-term) profits is the same as maximizing long-term profits.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-22

Economics of Effective Management

Short-Term versus Long-Term Profits

22

Given a control variable, , of a managerial objective, denote the

total benefit as .

total cost as .

Manager’s objective is to maximize net benefits:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-23

Economics of Effective Management

Use Marginal Analysis

23

How can the manager maximize net benefits?

Use marginal analysis

Marginal benefit:

The change in total benefits arising from a change in the managerial control variable, .

Marginal cost:

The change in the total costs arising from a change in the managerial control variable, .

Marginal net benefits:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-24

Economics of Effective Management

Use Marginal Analysis

24

Marginal principle

To maximize net benefits, the manager should increase the managerial control variable up to the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. This level of the managerial control variable corresponds to the level at which marginal net benefits are zero; nothing more can be gained by further changes in that variable.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-25

Economics of Effective Management

Use Marginal Analysis

25

Marginal Analysis In Action

It is estimated that the benefit and cost structure of a firm is:

Find the and functions.

What value of makes zero?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-26

Economics of Effective Management

26

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-27

Quantity

(Control Variable)

Total benefits

Total costs

0

Slope =

Slope =

Maximum total benefits

Maximum net

benefits

Economics of Effective Management

Determining the Optimal Level of a Control Variable

27

Determining the Optimal Level of a Control Variable II

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-28

Quantity

(Control Variable)

Net benefits

0

Maximum

net benefits

Slope =

Economics of Effective Management

28

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-29

Quantity

(Control Variable)

Marginal

benefits, costs

and net benefits

0

Maximum net

benefits

Economics of Effective Management

Determining the Optimal Level of a Control Variable III

29

Marginal Value Curves Are the Slopes of Total Value Curves

When the control variable is infinitely divisible, the slope of a total value curve at a given point is the marginal value at that point.

The slope of the total benefit curve at a given Q is the marginal benefit of that level of Q.

The slope of the total cost curve at a given Q is the marginal cost of that level of Q.

The slope of the net benefit curve at given Q is the marginal net benefit of that level of Q.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-30

Economics of Effective Management

30

Marginal Value Curves Are the Slopes of Total Value Curves

A calculus alternative

Slope of a continuous function is the derivative /marginal value of that function:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-31

Economics of Effective Management

31

Incremental revenues

The additional revenues that stem from a yes-or-no decision.

Incremental costs

The additional costs that stem from a yes-or-no decision.

“Thumbs up” decision

.

“Thumbs down” decision

.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-32

Economics of Effective Management

Incremental Decisions

32

Learning Managerial Economics

Practice, practice, practice …

Learn terminology

Break down complex issues into manageable components.

Helps economics practitioners communicate efficiently.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

1-33

Learning Managerial Economics

33

Baye_9e_Chapter_02.pptx

Market Forces: Demand and Supply

Chapter 2

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Learning Objectives

Explain the laws of demand and supply, and identify factors that cause demand and supply to shift.

Calculate consumer surplus and producer surplus, and describe what they mean.

Explain price determination in a competitive market, and show how equilibrium changes in response to changes in determinates of demand and supply.

Explain and illustrate how excise taxes, ad valorem taxes, price floors, and price ceilings impact the functioning of a market.

Apply supply and demand analysis as a qualitative forecasting tool to see the “big picture” in competitive markets.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Market demand curve

Illustrates the relationship between the total quantity and price per unit of a good all consumers are willing and able to purchase, holding other variables constant.

Law of demand

The quantity of a good consumers are willing and able to purchase increases (decreases) as the price falls (rises).

Price and quantity demanded are inversely related.

2-3

Copyright © 2014 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.

Demand

Demand

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3

Market Demand Curve

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-4

Quantity

(thousands per year)

Price ($)

Demand

$40

0

$30

$20

20

40

$10

60

80

Demand

Changing only price leads to changes in quantity demanded.

This type of change is graphically represented by a movement along a given demand curve, holding other factors that impact demand constant.

Changing factors other than price lead to changes in demand.

These types of changes are graphically represented by a shift of the entire demand curve.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-5

Demand

Shift in Quantity Demanded versus a Shift in Demand

Changes in Demand

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-6

Quantity

0

Price

D1

Increase

in

demand

Demand

A

B

D0

D2

Decrease

in

demand

Demand Shifters

Income

Normal good

Inferior good

Prices of related goods

Substitute goods

Complement goods

Advertising and consumer tastes

Informative advertising

Persuasive advertising

Population

Consumer expectations

Other factors

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-7

Demand

Advertising and the Demand for Clothing

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-8

Quantity of

high-style

clothing

0

$50

$40

50,000

Price of

high-style

clothing

D2

60,000

Due to an

increase in

advertising

Demand

D1

The Demand Function

The demand function for good X is a mathematical representation describing how many units will be purchased at different prices for X, the price of a related good Y, income and other factors that affect the demand for good X.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-9

Demand

The Linear Demand Function

One simple, but useful, representation of a demand function is the linear demand function:

where:

is the number of units of good X demanded;

is the price of good X;

is the price of a related good Y;

is income;

is the value of any other variable affecting demand.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-10

Demand

Understanding the Linear Demand Function

The signs and magnitude of the coefficients determine the impact of each variable on the number of units of X demanded.

For example:

by the law of demand;

if good Y is a substitute for good X;

if good X is an inferior good.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-11

Demand

The Linear Demand Function in Action

Suppose that an economic consultant for X Corp. recently provided the firm’s marketing manager with this estimate of the demand function for the firm’s product:

Question: How many of good X will consumers purchase when per unit, per unit, and ? Are goods X and Y substitutes or complements? Is good X a normal or an inferior good?

Answer:

units. Goods X and Y are substitutes. Good X is an inferior good.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-12

Demand

Inverse Demand Function

By setting and and the demand function is

the linear demand function simplifies to

Solving this for in terms of results in

which is called the inverse demand function. This function is used to construct a market demand curve.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-13

Demand

Graphing the Inverse Demand Function in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-14

Quantity

Price

$2,020

0

6,060

Demand

Marketing strategies – like value pricing and price discrimination – rely on understanding consumer value for products.

Total consumer value is the sum of the maximum amount a consumer is willing to pay at different quantities.

Total expenditure is the per-unit market price times the number of units consumed.

Consumer surplus is the extra value that consumers derive from a good but do not pay extra for.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-15

Consumer Surplus

Demand

Quantity

in liters

Price per

liter

Demand

$5

0

$3

$2

1

2

$1

4

5

Market Demand and Consumer Surplus in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-16

Total Consumer Value:

0.5($5 - $3)x2+(3-0)(2-0) = $8

Expenditures:

$(3-0) x (2-0) = $6

Consumer Surplus:

0.5($5 - $3)x(2-0) = $2

Demand

$4

3

Consumer Surplus

16

Market supply curve

A curve indicating the total quantity of a good that all producers in a competitive market would produce at each price, holding input prices, technology, and other variables affecting supply constant.

Law of supply

As the price of a good rises (falls), the quantity supplied of the good rises (falls), holding other factors affecting supply constant.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-17

Supply

Supply

Changes in Quantity Supplied versus Changes in Supply

Changing only price leads to changes in quantity supplied.

This type of change is graphically represented by a movement along a given supply curve, holding other factors that impact supply constant.

Changing factors other than price lead to changes in supply.

These types of changes are graphically represented by a shift of the entire supply curve.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-18

Supply

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-19

Changes in Supply

Quantity

Price

S2

0

Decrease

in supply

Supply

A

B

S0

S1

Increase

in supply

Input prices

Technology or government regulation

Number of firms

Entry

Exit

Substitutes in production

Taxes

Excise tax: a tax on each unit of output sold, where tax revenue is collected from the supplier

Ad valorem tax: percentage tax

Producer expectations

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-20

Supply

Supply Shifters

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-21

A Per Unit (Excise) Tax

Quantity of

gasoline per

week

Price

of

gasoline

0

t = per unit tax of 20¢

Supply

S0

S0+t

t = 20¢

$1.20

$1.00

t

Excise tax

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-22

An Ad Valorem Tax

Quantity of

backpacks per

week

Price

of

backpacks

0

Supply

S0

S1 = 1.20 x S0

$24

$10

Ad valorem tax

$12

1,100

$20

2,450

The Supply Function

The supply function for good X is a mathematical representation describing how many units will be produced at alternative prices for X, alternative input prices W, and alternative values of other variables that affect the supply for good X.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-23

Supply

The Linear Supply Function

One simple, but useful, representation of a supply function is the linear supply function:

is the number of units of good X produced;

is the price of good X;

is the price of an input;

is price of technologically related goods;

is the value of any other variable affecting supply.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-24

Supply

The signs and magnitude of the coefficients determine the impact of each variable on the number of units of X produced.

For example:

by the law of supply.

increasing input price.

technology lowers the cost of producing good X.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-25

Supply

Understanding the Linear Supply Function

Your research department estimates that the supply function for televisions sets is given by:

Question: How many televisions are produced when , per unit, and ?

Answer:

television sets.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-26

Supply

The Linear Supply Function in Action

Inverse Supply Function

By setting and in

the linear supply function simplifies to

Solving this for in terms of results in

which is called the inverse supply function. This function is used to construct a market supply curve.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-27

Supply

Producer surplus: the amount producers receive in excess of the amount necessary to induce them to produce the good.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-28

Supply

Producer Surplus

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-29

Producer Surplus in Action

Quantity

Price

Supply

$400

0

800

Supply

Producer surplus

29

Competitive Market Equilibrium

Determined by the intersection of the market demand and market supply curves.

A price and quantity such that there is no shortage or surplus in the market.

Forces that drive market demand and market supply are balanced, and there is no pressure on prices or quantities to change.

The equilibrium price is the price that equates quantity demanded with quantity supplied

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-30

Market Equilibrium

Market Equilibrium

Market Equilibrium

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-31

Quantity

Price

Supply

0

280

Demand

Surplus

Shortage

Market Equilibrium

Consider a market with demand and supply functions, respectively, as

and

A competitive market equilibrium exists at a price, , such that . That is,

and 6

units

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-32

Market Equilibrium in Action

Market Equilibrium

Price Restrictions and Market Equilibrium

In a competitive market equilibrium, price and quantity freely adjust to the forces of demand and supply.

Sometime government restricts how much prices are permitted to rise or fall.

Price ceiling

Price floor

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-33

Price Restrictions and Market Equilibrium

A Price Ceiling

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-34

Quantity

Price

Supply

0

280

Demand

Shortage

Priceceiling

Nonpecuniary price

Lost social welfare

Price Restrictions and Market Equilibrium

Price Ceiling in Action

Consider a market with demand and supply functions, respectively, as

and

Suppose a $1.50 price ceiling is imposed on the market.

units.

units.

Since a shortage of units exists.

Full economic price of unit is , or . Of this,

$1.50 is the dollar price

$1 is the nonpecuniary price

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-35

Price Restrictions and Market Equilibrium

A Price Floor

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-36

Quantity

Price

Supply

0

280

Demand

Surplus

Pricefloor

Price Restrictions and Market Equilibrium

Cost of

purchasing

excess supply

Price Floor in Action

Consider a market with demand and supply functions, respectively, as

and

Suppose a $3.50 price floor is imposed on the market.

units

units

Since a surplus of units exists

The cost to the government of purchasing the surplus is .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-37

Price Restrictions and Market Equilibrium

Comparative static analysis

The study of the movement from one equilibrium to another.

Competitive markets, operating free of price restraints, will be analyzed when:

Demand changes

Supply changes

Demand and supply simultaneously change

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-38

Comparative Statics

Comparative Statics

Increase in demand only

Increase equilibrium price

Increase equilibrium quantity

Decrease in demand only

Decrease equilibrium price

Decrease equilibrium quantity

Example of change in demand

Suppose that consumer incomes are projected to increase 2.5% and the number of individuals over 25 years of age will reach an all time high by the end of next year. What is the impact on the rental car market?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-39

Changes in Demand

Comparative Statics

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-40

Effect of a Change in Demand for Rental Cars

Quantity

(thousands

rented per day)

Price

Supply

0

$45

104

Demand1

$49

Demand0

100

Comparative Statics

108

Increase in supply only

Decrease equilibrium price

Increase equilibrium quantity

Decrease in supply only

Increase equilibrium price

Decrease equilibrium quantity

Example of change in supply

Suppose that a bill before Congress would require all employers to provide health care to their workers. What is the impact on retail markets?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-41

Changes in Supply

Comparative Statics

Effect of a Change in Supply

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-42

Quantity

Price

Supply0

0

Demand

Supply1

Comparative Statics

Simultaneous Shifts in Supply and Demand

Suppose that simultaneously the following events occur:

An earthquake hit Kobe, Japan and decreased the supply of fermented rice used to make sake wine.

The stress caused by the earthquake led many to increase their demand for sake, and other alcoholic beverages.

What is the combined impact on Japan’s sake market?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-43

Comparative Statics

Simultaneous Shifts in Supply and Demand in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-44

Quantity

Price

Supply0

0

Demand1

Supply1

Demand0

Comparative Statics

Japan’s Sake Market

Supply2

A

B

C

Baye_9e_Chapter_03.pptx

Quantitative Demand Analysis

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 3

Learning Objectives

Apply various elasticities of demand as a quantitative tool to forecast changes in revenues, prices, and/or units sold.

Illustrate the relationship between the elasticity of demand and total revenues.

Discuss three factors that influence whether the demand for a given product is relatively elastic or inelastic.

Explain the relationship between marginal revenue and the own price elasticity of demand.

Show how to determine elasticities from linear and log-linear demand functions.

Explain how regression analysis may be used to estimate demand functions, and how to interpret and use the output of a regression.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

The Elasticity Concept

Elasticity

A measure of the responsiveness of one variable to changes in another variable; the percentage change in one variable that arises due to a given percentage change in another variable.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-3

The Elasticity Concept

3

The Elasticity Concept

The elasticity between two variables, and , is mathematically expressed as:

When a functional relationship exists, like , the elasticity is:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-4

The Elasticity Concept

4

Measurement Aspects of Elasticity

Important aspects of the elasticity:

Sign of the relationship:

Positive

Negative

Absolute value of elasticity magnitude relative to unity:

is highly responsive to changes in .

is slightly responsive to changes in .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-5

The Elasticity Concept

5

Own Price Elasticity of Demand

Own price elasticity of demand

Measures the responsiveness of a percentage change in the quantity demanded of good X to a percentage change in its price.

Sign: negative by law of demand.

Magnitude of absolute value relative to unity:

: Elastic.

: Inelastic.

: Unitary elastic.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-6

Own Price Elasticity of Demand

6

Linear Demand, Elasticity, and Revenue

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-7

Quantity

Price

Demand

$40

0

$20

$10

20

30

$5

40

$15

$30

$25

$35

10

50

60

70

80

Linear Inverse Demand:

Demand:

Revenue = $

Elasticity:

Conclusion: Demand is elastic.

Revenue = $

Elasticity:

Conclusion: Demand is unitary elastic.

Revenue = $

Elasticity:

Conclusion: Demand is inelastic.

Observation: Elasticity varies along a linear (inverse) demand curve

Own Price Elasticity of Demand

7

Total Revenue Test

When demand is elastic:

A price increase (decrease) leads to a decrease (increase) in total revenue.

When demand is inelastic:

A price increase (decrease) leads to an increase (decrease) in total revenue.

When demand is unitary elastic:

Total revenue is maximized.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-8

Own Price Elasticity of Demand

8

Perfectly Elastic and Inelastic Demand

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-9

Quantity

Demand

Price

Perfectly Inelastic

Demand

Perfectly

elastic

Own Price Elasticity of Demand

9

Factors Affecting the Own Price Elasticity

Three factors can impact the own price elasticity of demand:

Availability of consumption substitutes

Time/duration of purchase horizon

Expenditure share of consumers’ budgets

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-10

Own Price Elasticity of Demand

10

Marginal Revenue and the Own Price Elasticity of Demand

The marginal revenue can be derived from a market demand curve.

Marginal revenue measures the additional revenue due to a change in output.

This link relates marginal revenue to the own price elasticity of demand as follows:

When then, .

When then, .

When then, .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-11

Own Price Elasticity of Demand

11

Demand and Marginal Revenue

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-12

Quantity

0

MR

3

Price

6

Elastic

Demand

Own Price Elasticity of Demand

1

6

Inelastic

Unitary

Marginal Revenue (MR)

Cross-Price Elasticity

Cross-price elasticity

Measures responsiveness of a percent change in demand for good X due to a percent change in the price of good Y.

If , then and are substitutes.

If , then and are complements.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-13

Cross-Price Elasticity

13

Cross-Price Elasticity in Action

Suppose it is estimated that the cross-price elasticity of demand between clothing and food is -0.18. If the price of food is projected to increase by 10 percent, by how much will demand for clothing change?

That is, demand for clothing is expected to decline by 1.8 percent when the price of food increases 10 percent.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-14

Cross-Price Elasticity

14

Cross-Price Elasticity

Cross-price elasticity is important for firms selling multiple products.

Price changes for one product impact demand for other products.

Assessing the overall change in revenue from a price change for one good when a firm sells two goods is:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-15

Cross-Price Elasticity

15

Cross-Price Elasticity in Action

Suppose a restaurant earns $4,000 per week in revenues from hamburger sales (X) and $2,000 per week from soda sales (Y).

If the own price elasticity for burgers is and the cross-price elasticity of demand between sodas and hamburgers is , what would happen to the firm’s total revenues if it reduced the price of hamburgers by 1 percent?

That is, lowering the price of hamburgers 1 percent increases total revenue by $100.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-16

Cross-Price Elasticity

16

Income Elasticity

Income elasticity

Measures responsiveness of a percent change in demand for good X due to a percent change in income.

If , then is a normal good.

If , then is an inferior good.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-17

Income Elasticity

17

Income Elasticity in Action

Suppose that the income elasticity of demand for transportation is estimated to be 1.80. If income is projected to decrease by 15 percent,

what is the impact on the demand for transportation?

Demand for transportation will decline by 27 percent.

is transportation a normal or inferior good?

Since demand decreases as income declines, transportation is a normal good.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-18

Income Elasticity

18

Other Elasticities

Own advertising elasticity of demand for good X is the ratio of the percentage change in the consumption of X to the percentage change in advertising spent on X.

Cross-advertising elasticity between goods X and Y would measure the percentage change in the consumption of X that results from a 1 percent change in advertising toward Y.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-19

Other Elasticities

Elasticities for Linear Demand Functions

From a linear demand function, we can easily compute various elasticities.

Given a linear demand function:

Own price elasticity: .

Cross price elasticity: .

Income elasticity: .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-20

Obtaining Elasticities From Demand Functions

20

Elasticities for Linear Demand Functions In Action

The daily demand for Invigorated PED shoes is estimated to be:

Suppose good X sells at $25 a pair, good Y sells at $35, the company utilizes 50 units of advertising, and average consumer income is $20,000. Calculate the own price, cross-price and income elasticities of demand.

units.

Own price elasticity: .

Cross-price elasticity: .

Income elasticity: .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-21

Obtaining Elasticities From Demand Functions

21

Elasticities for Nonlinear Demand Functions

One non-linear demand function is the log-linear demand function:

Own price elasticity: .

Cross price elasticity: .

Income elasticity: .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-22

Obtaining Elasticities From Demand Functions

22

Elasticities for Nonlinear Demand Functions In Action

An analyst for a major apparel company estimates that the demand for its raincoats is given by

where denotes the daily amount of rainfall and the level of advertising on good Y. What would be the impact on demand of a 10 percent increase in the daily amount of rainfall?

. So, .

A 10 percent increase in rainfall will lead to a 30 percent increase in the demand for raincoats.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-23

Obtaining Elasticities From Demand Functions

23

Regression Analysis

How does one obtain information on the demand function?

Published studies

Hire consultant

Statistical technique called regression analysis using data on quantity, price, income and other important variables.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-24

Regression Analysis

24

Regression Line and Least Squares Regression

True (or population) regression model

unknown population intercept parameter.

unknown population slope parameter.

random error term with mean zero and standard deviation .

Least squares regression line

least squares estimate of the unknown parameter .

least squares estimate of the unknown parameter.

The parameter estimates and , represent the values of and that result in the smallest sum of squared errors between a line and the actual data.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-25

Regression Analysis

25

Excel and Least Squares Estimates

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-26

SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.87
R Square 0.75
Adjusted R Square 0.72
Standard Error 112.22
Observations 10.00
ANOVA
  Df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 301470.89 301470.89 23.94 0.0012
Residual 8 100751.61 12593.95
Total 9 402222.50      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1631.47 243.97 6.69 0.0002 1068.87 2194.07
Price -2.60 0.53 -4.89 0.0012 -3.82 -1.37

Estimated Demand:

Regression Analysis

26

Evaluating Statistical Significance

Standard error

Measure of how much each estimated estimate varies in regressions based on the same true demand model using different data.

95 Percent Confidence interval rule of thumb

t-statistics rule of thumb

When , we are 95 percent confident the true parameter is in the regression is not zero.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-27

Regression Analysis

27

Excel and Least Squares Estimates

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-28

SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.87
R Square 0.75
Adjusted R Square 0.72
Standard Error 112.22
Observations 10.00
ANOVA
  Df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 301470.89 301470.89 23.94 0.0012
Residual 8 100751.61 12593.95
Total 9 402222.50      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1631.47 243.97 6.69 0.0002 1068.87 2194.07
Price -2.60 0.53 -4.89 0.0012 -3.82 -1.37

Regression Analysis

, the intercept is different

from zero.

, the intercept is different

from zero.

28

Evaluating the Overall Fit of the Regression Line

R-Square

Also called the coefficient of determination.

Fraction of the total variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the regression.

Ranges between 0 and 1.

Values closer to 1 indicate “better” fit.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-29

Regression Analysis

29

Evaluating the Overall Fit of the Regression Line

Adjusted R-Square

A version of the R-square that penalize researchers for having few degrees of freedom.

is total observations.

is the number of estimated coefficients.

is the degrees of freedom for the regression.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-30

Regression Analysis

30

Evaluating the Overall Fit of the Regression Line

The F- Statistic

A measure of the total variation explained by the regression relative to the total unexplained variation.

The greater the F-statistic, the better the overall regression fit.

Equivalently, the P-value is another measure of the F-statistic.

Lower P-values are associated with better overall regression fit.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-31

Regression Analysis

31

Excel and Least Squares Estimates

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-32

SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.87
R Square 0.75
Adjusted R Square 0.72
Standard Error 112.22
Observations 10.00
ANOVA
  Df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 301470.89 301470.89 23.94 0.0012
Residual 8 100751.61 12593.95
Total 9 402222.50      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1631.47 243.97 6.69 0.0002 1068.87 2194.07
Price -2.60 0.53 -4.89 0.0012 -3.82 -1.37

Regression Analysis

32

Regression for Nonlinear Functions and Multiple Regression

Regression techniques can also be applied to the following settings:

Nonlinear functional relationships:

Nonlinear regression example:

Functional relationships with multiple variables:

Multiple regression example:

or

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-33

Regression Analysis

33

Excel and Least Squares Estimates

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

3-34

SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.89
R Square 0.79
Adjusted R Square 0.69
Standard Error 9.18
Observations 10.00
ANOVA
  Df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 1920.99 640.33 7.59 0.182
Residual 6 505.91 84.32
Total 9 2426.90      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 135.15 20.65 6.54 0.0006 84.61 185.68
Price -0.14 0.06 -2.41 0.0500 -0.29 0.00
Advertising 0.54 0.64 0.85 0.4296 -1.02 2.09
Distance -5.78 1.26 -4.61 0.0037 -8.86 -2.71

Regression Analysis

34

Baye_9e_Chapter_04.pptx

The Theory of Individual Behavior

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 4

Learning Objectives

Explain four basic properties of a consumer’s preference ordering and their ramifications for a consumer’s indifference curves.

Illustrate how changes in prices and income impact an individual’s opportunities.

Illustrate a consumer’s equilibrium choice and how it changes in response to changes in prices and income.

Separate the impact of a price change into substitution and income effects.

Show how to derive an individual’s demand curve from indifference curve analysis and market demand from a group of individuals’ demands.

Illustrate how “buy one, get one-free” deals and gift certificates impact a consumer’s purchase decisions.

Apply the income-leisure choice framework to illustrate the opportunities, incentives, and choices of workers and managers.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Consumer Behavior

Consumer opportunities

Set of possible goods and services consumers can afford to consume.

Consumer preferences

Determine which set goods and services will be consumed.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-3

Consumer Behavior

3

Properties of Consumer Preferences

Property 1- Completeness: For any two bundles of goods either:

.

.

.

Property 2- More is better

If bundle has at least as much of every good as bundle and more of some good, bundle is preferred to bundle .

Property 3- Diminishing marginal rate of substitution

As a consumer obtains more of good X, the amount of good Y the individual is willing to give up to obtain another unit of good X decreases.

Property 4- Transitivity: For any three bundles, , , and , either:

If and , then .

If and , then .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-4

Consumer Behavior

4

Constraints

While any decision-making environment faces a host of constraints, the focus of managerial economics is to examine the role prices and income play in constraining consumer behavior.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-5

Constraints

5

The Budget Constraint

Budget constraint

Restriction set by prices and income that limits bundles of goods affordable to consumers.

Budget set:

Budget line:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-6

Constraints

6

The Budget Constraint In Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-7

Good

Good

0

Budget line:

Slope

Bundle G

Bundle H

Budget set:

Constraints

7

The Market Rate of Substitution

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-8

Good

Good

0

Budget line:

Market rate of substitution :

Constraints

8

Changes in Income Shrink or Expand Opportunities

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-9

Good

Good

0

Constraints

9

A Decrease in the Price of Good X

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-10

Good

Good

0

New budget line

Initial budget

line

Constraints

10

The Budget Constraint in Action

Consider the following budget line:

What is the maximum amount of X that can be consumed?

What is the maximum amount of Y that can be consumed?

What is rate at which the market trades goods X and Y?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-11

Constraints

11

The Budget Constraint in Action

Answers:

Maximum X is: units

Maximum Y is: units

Market rate of substitution:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-12

Constraints

12

Consumer Equilibrium

Consumer equilibrium

Consumption bundle that is affordable and yields the greatest satisfaction to the consumer.

Consumption bundle where the rate a consumer choses (marginal rate of substitution) to trade between goods X and Y equals the rate at which these goods are traded in the market (market rate of substitution).

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-13

Consumer Equilibrium

13

Consumer Equilibrium

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-14

Good

Good

0

Consumer equilibrium

A

B

C

I

II

III

Consumer Equilibrium

D

14

Price Changes and Consumer Behavior

Price and income changes impact a consumer’s budget set and level of satisfaction that can be achieved.

This implies that price and income changes will lead to consumer equilibrium changes.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-15

Comparative Statics

15

Price Changes and Equilibrium

Price increases (decreases) reduce (expand) a consumer’s budget set.

The new consumer equilibrium resulting from a price change depends on consumer preferences:

Goods X and Y are:

substitutes when an increase (decrease) in the price of X leads to an increase (decrease) in the consumption of Y.

complements when an increase (decrease) in the price of X leads to a decrease (increase) in the consumption of Y.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-16

Comparative Statics

16

Price Changes and Equilibrium in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-17

Good

Good

0

Point A: Initial consumer equilibrium

Price of good X decreases:

A

B

Point B: New consumer equilibrium

I

II

Since when :

Conclude that goods and are

substitutes

Comparative Statics

17

Income Changes and Consumer Behavior

Income increases (decreases) reduce (expand) a consumer’s budget set.

The new consumer equilibrium resulting from an income change depends on consumer preferences:

Good X is:

a normal good when an increase (decrease) in income leads to an increase (decrease) in the consumption of X.

an inferior good when an increase (decrease) in income leads to a decrease (increase) in the consumption of X.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-18

Comparative Statics

18

Income Changes and Consumption

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-19

Good

Good

0

A

B

II

I

Point A: Initial consumer equilibrium

Price of income increases:

Point B: New consumer equilibrium

Since more of both goods are consumed

when : Conclude that goods

and are normal goods.

Comparative Statics

19

Substitution and Income Effects

Moving from one equilibrium to another when the price of one good changes can be broken down into two effects:

Substitution effect: The movement along a given indifference curve that results from a change in the relative prices of goods, holding real income constant.

Income effect: The movement from one indifference curve to another that results from the change in real income caused by a price change.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-20

Comparative Statics

20

Substitution and Income Effects in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-21

Good

Good

0

Point A: Initial consumer equilibrium

Price of good X increases:

C

A

Point B: substitution effect

B

Point C: income effect and new

consumer equilibrium

Substitution

effect

Income

effect

Comparative Statics

I

G

H

F

J

21

Applications of Indifference Curve Analysis

Choices by consumers

Buy one, get one free

Cash gifts, in-kind gifts, and gift certificates

Choices by workers and managers

Income-leisure choice

Managers preferences

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

22

Applications of Indifference Curves Analysis

Consumer Choice with a Gift Certificate

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-23

Good X

0

Point A: Initial consumer equilibrium

Receive a $10 gift certificate for good :

A

Point B: higher utility holding

consumption at initial level

II

I

C

Point C: new consumer equilibrium

when and are normal

goods

B

Good Y

Applications of Indifference Curves

23

Labor-Leisure Choice Model

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-24

0

E

I

Leisure

(hours per day)

Income

(per day)

16 hours of leisure

8 hours of work

Worker equilibrium

Applications of Indifference Curves

II

III

24

Labor-Leisure Budget Set in Action

What is the budget set for a worker who receives $5 per hour of work and a fixed payment of $40? Let denote the worker’s total earnings and the number of leisure hours in a 24-hour day.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-25

Applications of Indifference Curves

25

Indifference and Demand Curves

Indifference curves along with price changes determine individuals’ demand curves.

Market demand is the horizontal summation of individuals’ demands.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-26

The Relationship Between Indifference Curve Analysis and Demand Curves

26

From Indifference Curves to Individual Demand

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

4-27

Good

Good

0

A

B

II

I

Good

Price of

good

Demand

The Relationship Between Indifference Curve Analysis and Demand Curves

27

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

28

Good

0

A

Good

Price of

good

Demandmkt

Price of

good

B

A

B

A+B

DemandB

DemandA

From Individual to Market Demand

The Relationship Between Indifference Curve Analysis and Demand Curves

Baye_9e_Chapter_05.pptx

The Production Process and Costs

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 5

Learning Objectives

Explain alternative ways of measuring the productivity of inputs and the role of the manager in the production process.

Calculate input demand and the cost-minimizing combination of inputs and use isoquant analysis to illustrate optimal input substitution.

Calculate a cost function from a production function and explain how economic costs differ from accounting costs.

Explain the difference between and the economic relevance of fixed costs, sunk costs, variable costs, and marginal costs.

Calculate average and marginal costs from algebraic or tabular cost data and illustrate the relationship between average and marginal costs.

Distinguish between short-run and long-run production decisions and illustrate their impact on costs and economies of scale.

Conclude whether a multiple-output production process exhibits economies of scope or cost complementarities and explain their significance for managerial decisions.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

The Production Function

Mathematical function that defines the maximum amount of output that can be produced with a given set of inputs.

is the level of output.

is the quantity of capital input.

is the quantity of labor input.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-3

The Production Function

3

Short-Run versus Long-Run Decisions: Fixed and Variable Inputs

Short-run

Period of time where some factors of production (inputs) are fixed, and constrain a manager’s decisions.

Long-run

Period of time over which all factors of production (inputs) are variable, and can be adjusted by a manager.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-4

The Production Function

4

Measures of Productivity

Total product (TP)

Maximum level of output that can be produced with a given amount of inputs.

Average product (AP)

A measure of the output produced per unit of input.

Average product of labor:

Average product of capital:

Marginal product (MP)

The change in total product (output) attributable to the last unit of an input.

Marginal product of labor:

Marginal product of capital:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-5

The Production Function

5

Measures of Productivity in Action

Consider the following production function when 5 units of labor and 10 units of capital are combined produce: .

Compute the average product of labor.

units per worker

Compute the average product of capital.

units capital unit

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-6

The Production Function

6

Increasing, Decreasing, and Negative Marginal Returns

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-7

Labor input

(holding capital constant)

0

Total product

Average product

Marginal product

Total product (TP)

Average product (APL)

Marginal product (MPL)

Increasing

marginal

returns to labor

Decreasing

marginal

returns to labor

Negative

marginal

returns to labor

The Production Function

7

The Role of the Manager in the Production Process

Produce output on the production function.

Aligning incentives to induce maximum worker effort.

Use the right mix of inputs to maximize profits.

To maximize profits when labor or capital vary in the short run, the manager will hire:

Labor until the value of the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate: , where

Capital until the value of the marginal product of capital equals the rental rate: , where

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-8

The Production Function

8

The Role of the Manager in the Production Process

Value marginal product: The value of the output produced by the last unit of an input.

Law of diminishing returns: The marginal product of an additional unit of output will at some point be lower than the marginal product of the previous unit.

Profit-Maximization input usage

To maximize profits, use input levels at which marginal benefit equals marginal cost

When the cost of each additional unit of labor is w, the manager should continue to employ labor up to the point where VMPL = w in the range of diminishing marginal product.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-9

The Production Function

9

Algebraic Forms of Production Functions

Commonly used algebraic production function forms:

Linear: Assumes a perfect linear relationship between all inputs and total output

, where and are constants.

Leontief: Assumes that inputs are used in fixed proportions

, where and are constants.

Cobb-Douglas: Assumes some degree of substitutability among inputs

, where and are constants.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-10

The Production Function

10

Algebraic Forms of Production Functions in Action

Suppose that a firm’s estimated production function is:

How much output is produced when 3 units of capital and 7 units of labor are employed?

units

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-11

The Production Function

11

Algebraic Measures of Productivity

Given the commonly used algebraic production function forms, we can compute the measures of productivity as follows:

Linear:

Marginal products: and

Average products: and

Cobb-Douglas:

Marginal products: and

Average products: and

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-12

The Production Function

12

Algebraic Measures of Productivity in Action

Suppose that a firm produces output according to the production function

Which is the fixed input?

Capital is the fixed input.

What is the marginal product of labor when 16 units of labor is hired?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-13

The Production Function

13

Isoquants and Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution

Isoquants capture the tradeoff between combinations of inputs that yield the same output in the long run, when all inputs are variable.

Marginal rate of technical substitutions (MRTS)

The rate at which a producer can substitute between two inputs and maintain the same level of output.

Absolute value of the slope of the isoquant.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-14

The Production Function

14

Isoquants and Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-15

Labor Input

0

A

B

=100 units of output

Substituting labor for capital

200 units of output

300 units of output

Increasing output

Capital Input

The Production Function

15

Diminishing Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-16

Labor Input

0

D

C

=100 units

Capital Input

B

A

3

Slope:

Slope:

The Production Function

16

Isocost and Changes in Isocost Lines

Isocost

Combination of inputs that yield cost the same cost.

or, re-arranging to the intercept-slope formulation:

Changes in isocosts

For given input prices, isocosts farther from the origin are associated with higher costs.

Changes in input prices change the slopes of isocost lines.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-17

The Production Function

17

Isocosts

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-18

Labor Input

0

Capital Input

The Production Function

18

Changes in the Isocosts

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-19

Labor Input

0

Capital Input

The Production Function

Less expensive input

bundles

More expensive input

bundles

19

Changes in the Isocost Line

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-20

Labor Input

0

Capital Input

The Production Function

Due to increase in wage rate

20

Cost Minimization and the Cost-Minimizing Input Rule

Cost minimization

Producing at the lowest possible cost.

Cost-minimizing input rule

Produce at a given level of output where the marginal product per dollar spent is equal for all input:

Equivalently, a firm should employ inputs such that the marginal rate of technical substitution equals the ratio of input prices:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-21

The Production Function

21

Cost-Minimization Input Rule in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-22

Labor Input

0

=100 units

Capital Input

The Production Function

22

Optimal Input Substitution

To minimize the cost of producing a given level of output, the firm should use less of an input and more of other inputs when that input’s price rises.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

23

The Production Function

Optimal Input Substitution in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-24

Labor Input

0

B

Capital Input

New cost-minimizing

point due to higher wage

A

Initial point of cost minimization

The Production Function

H

I

F

J

G

24

The Cost Function

Mathematical relationship that relates cost to the cost-minimizing output associated with an isoquant.

Short-run costs

Fixed costs (): do not change with changes in output; include the costs of fixed inputs used in production

Sunk costs

Variable costs []: costs that change with changes in outputs; include the costs of inputs that vary with output

Total costs:

Long-run costs

All costs are variable

No fixed costs

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-25

The Cost Function

25

Short-Run Costs

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-26

Output

0

Total costs

Variable costs

Fixed costs

The Cost Function

26

Average and Marginal Costs

Average costs

Average fixed cost:

Average variable costs:

Average total cost:

Marginal cost (MC)

The (incremental) cost of producing an additional unit of output.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-27

The Cost Function

27

The Relationship between Average and Marginal Costs

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-28

Output

0

A

ATC, AVC, AFC

and MC ($)

Minimum of ATC

Minimum of AVC

The Cost Function

28

Fixed and Sunk Costs

Fixed costs

Cost that does not change with output.

Sunk cost

Cost that is forever lost after it has been paid.

Irrelevance of Sunk Costs

A decision maker should ignore sunk costs to maximize profits or minimize loses.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-29

The Cost Function

29

Algebraic Forms of Cost Functions

The cubic cost function: costs are a cubic function of output; provides a reasonable approximation to virtually any cost function.

C(Q) – F + aQ + bQ2 + cQ3

where a, b, c, and f are constants and f represents fixed costs

Marginal cost function is:

MC(Q) = a + 2bQ + 3cQ2

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

30

The Cost Function

Long-Run Costs

In the long run, all costs are variable since a manager is free to adjust levels of all inputs.

Long-run average cost curve

A curve that defines the minimum average cost of producing alternative levels of output allowing for optimal selection of both fixed and variable factors of production.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-31

The Cost Function

31

Long-Run Average Cost

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-32

Output

0

LRAC ($)

The Cost Function

32

Economies of Scale

Economies of scale

Declining portion of the long-run average cost curve as output increase.

Diseconomies of scale

Rising portion of the long-run average cost curve as output increases.

Constant returns to scale

Portion of the long-run average cost curve that remains constant as output increases.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-33

The Cost Function

33

Economies and Diseconomies of Scale

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-34

Output

0

LRAC ($)

The Cost Function

Economies of scale

Diseconomies of scale

34

Constant Returns to Scale

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-35

Output

0

LRAC ($)

The Cost Function

35

Multiple-Output Cost Function

Economies of scope

Exist when the total cost of producing and together is less than the total cost of producing each of the type of output separately.

Cost complementarity

Exist when the marginal cost of producing one type of output decreases when the output of another good is increased.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-36

Multiple-Output Cost Function

36

Algebraic Form for a Multiproduct Cost Function

For this cost function:

MC1 = aQ2 + 2Q1

When a < 0, an increase in Q2 reduces the marginal cost of producing product 1.

If a < 0, this cost function exhibits cost complementarity

If a > 0, there are no cost complementarities

Exhibits economies of scope whenever f - > 0

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

5-37

Multiple-Output Cost Function

37

Baye_9e_Chapter_06.pptx

The Organization of the Firm

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 6

Learning Objective

Discuss the economic trade-offs associated with obtaining inputs through spot exchange, contract, or vertical integration.

Identify four types of specialized investments, and explain how each can lead to costly bargaining, underinvestment, and/or a “hold-up problem.”

Explain the optimal manner of procuring different types of inputs.

Describe the principle-agent problem as it relates to owners and managers.

Discuss three forces that owners can use to discipline managers.

Describe the principal-agent problem as it relates to managers and workers.

Discuss four tools the manager can use to mitigate incentive problems in the workplace.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Management’s Role

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-3

Output

0

Costs

($)

Minimum

cost function

10

$80

$100

A

B

Introduction

Producing at Minimum Cost

3

Methods of Procuring Inputs

Spot exchange

An informal relationship between a buyer and seller in which neither party is obligated to adhere to specific terms for exchange.

Contract

A formal relationship between a buyer and seller that obligates the buyer and seller to exchange at terms specified in a legal document.

Produce inputs internally (vertical integration)

A situation where a firm produces the inputs required to make its final product.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-4

Methods of Procuring Inputs

4

Methods of Procuring Inputs In Action

Determine whether the following transactions involve spot exchange, a contract, or vertical integration:

Clone 1 PC is legally obligated to purchase 300 computer chips each year for the next 3 years from AML. The price paid in the first year is $200 per chip, and the price rises during the second and third years by the same percentage by which the wholesale price index rises during those years.

Clone 2 PC purchased 300 computer chips from a firm that ran an advertisement in the back of a computer magazine.

Clone 3 PC manufactures its own motherboards and computer chips for its personal computers.

Answers:

Clone 1 PC is using a contract.

Clone 2 PC used the spot exchange.

Clone 3 PC uses vertical integration.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-5

Methods of Procuring Inputs

5

Transaction Costs

Cost associated with acquiring an input that is in excess of the amount paid to the input supplier.

Types of “obvious” transaction costs

Cost of searching for a supplier.

Cost of negotiating a price.

Investments and expenditures required to facilitate exchange.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-6

Transaction Costs

6

Types of “Hidden” Transaction Costs

Specialized investment

Expenditure that must be made to allow two parties to exchange but has little or no value in any alternative use.

Relationship-specific exchange

A type of exchange that occurs when the parties to a transaction have made specialized investments.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-7

Transaction Costs

7

Types of Specialized Investments

Types of specialized investments

Site specificity

Physical-asset specificity

Dedicated assets

Human capital

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-8

Transaction Costs

8

Implications of Specialized Investments

Implications of specialized investments

Costly bargaining

Underinvestment

Opportunism and the “hold-up problem”

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-9

Transaction Costs

9

Optimal Input Procurement

How should a manager acquire inputs to minimize costs?

Depends on the extent of the relationship-specific exchange.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-10

Optimal Input Procurement

10

Spot Exchange

Characteristics of the spot exchange:

No relationship-specific investment.

Absence of transaction costs, and many buyers and sellers, imply that the market price is determined by the intersection of demand and supply.

Opportunism

Underinvestment in specialized investments

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-11

Optimal Input Procurement

11

Contracts

Characteristics of contracts:

Use when inputs require a substantial specialized investment.

Typically requires substantial up-front expenditures.

Specifies prices of inputs prior to making specialized investments.

Reduces likelihood of opportunism.

Reduces likelihood to skimp on specialized investment.

Requires decision on optimal contract length.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-12

Optimal Input Procurement

12

Optimal Contract Length

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-13

Contract Length

(in years)

0

MB, MC

($)

MC

MB

Optimal Input Procurement

13

Specialized Investments and Contract Length

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-14

Contract Length

0

MB, MC

($)

MC

MB0

MB1

Longer contract

Greater need for

specialized investment

Optimal Input Procurement

14

Contracting Environment and Contract Length

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-15

Contract Length

0

MB, MC

($)

MC0

MB

Shorter contract

More complex

contracting

environment

MC1

MC2

Longer contract

Less complex

contracting

environment

Optimal Input Procurement

15

Vertical Integration

Produce inputs internally

Use when inputs require

a substantial specialized investment.

generate significant transaction cost.

complex contracting or uncertain economic environments.

Advantages:

“Skips the middleman”

Reduces opportunism

Mitigates transaction costs

Disadvantages:

Managers must create an internal regulatory mechanism

Bear the cost of setting up production facilities

No longer specialized in producing its output

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-16

Optimal Input Procurement

16

Optimal Procurement of Inputs

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-17

Optimal Input Procurement

17

Managerial Compensation and the Principal-Agent Problem

The primary obstacle is the separation of ownership and control.

Principal-agent (P-A) problem: if the owner is not present to monitor the manager, how can she get the manager to do what is in her best interest?

Owners have to incent managers since they are not present to monitor.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-18

Managerial Compensation and the Principal Agent Problem

18

Managers’ Compensation Mechanisms

Manager’s economic trade-off

Leisure.

Labor

Fixed salary

Receives wage independent of labor hours and effort.

No strong incentive to monitor other employees labor hours and effort.

Adversely impacts firm performance.

Incentive contract

Tie manager wage to firm performance (like profits).

Manager makes labor-leisure choice and is accordingly compensated.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-19

Managerial Compensation and the Principal Agent Problem

19

Incentive Contracts

A way to align owners’ interests with that of the actions of its manager.

Examples include:

Stock option

Other bonuses directly related to profits.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-20

Forces that Discipline Managers

20

External Incentives

Outside forces can provide manages with the incentive to maximize profits, and include:

Reputation

Takeover threat

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-21

Forces that Discipline Managers

21

The Manager-Worker Principal-Agent Problem

The owner-manager, principal-agent problem is not unique.

A similar problem exists between the firm’s managers and the employees he or she supervises.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-22

The Manager-Worker Principal-Agent Problem

22

Solutions to the Manager-Worker Principal-Agent Problem

Manager-worker principal-agent problem solutions:

Profit sharing

Revenue sharing

Piece rates

Time clocks and spot checks

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-23

The Manager-Worker Principal-Agent Problem

23

Conclusion

The optimal method for acquiring inputs depends on the nature of the transaction costs and specialized nature of the inputs being produced.

To overcome the owner-manager and manager-worker principal-agent problems, principals must align the agents’ interests with the principals’ interests.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

6-24

24

Baye_9e_Chapter_07.pptx

The Nature of Industry

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 7

Learning Objectives

Calculate alternative measures of industry structure, conduct, and performance, and discuss their limitations.

Describe examples of vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate mergers, and explain the economic basis for each type of merger.

Explain the relevance of Herfindahl-Hirschman index for antitrust policy under the horizontal merger guidelines.

Describe the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, the feedback critique, and their relation to the five forces framework.

Identify whether an industry is best described as perfectly competitive, a monopoly, monopolistically competitive, or an oligopoly.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Market Structure

Market structure factors that impact managerial decisions:

Number of firms competing in an industry

Relative size of firms (concentration)

Technological and cost conditions

Demand conditions

Ease of firm exit or entry

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-3

Market Structure

3

Industry Concentration

Measures the size distribution of firms within an industry.

Are there many small firms?

Are there only a few large firms?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-4

Market Structure

4

Measuring Industry Concentration

Measures of industry concentration

Four-firm concentration ratio:

Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI):

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-5

Market Structure

5

Measuring Industry Concentration in Action

Suppose an industry is composed of six firms. Four firms have sales of $10 each, and two firms haves sales of $5 each. What is the four-firm concentration ratio for this industry?

Answer:

Total industry sales are .

Sales of the four largest firms are $40.

The four-firm concentration ratio is:

The four largest firms in the industry account for 80 percent of total industry output.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-6

Market Structure

6

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-7

Market Structure

7

Limitations of Concentration Measures

Factors that impact and limit industry concentration measures include:

Global markets

National, regional and local markets

Industry definitions and product classes

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-8

Market Structure

8

Technology

Industries differ in regard to the technologies used to produce goods and services.

Labor-intensive industries

Capital-intensive industries

Within a given industry if the available technology is:

the same, firms will likely have similar cost structures.

different, one firm will likely have a cost advantage.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-9

Market Structure

9

Demand and Market Conditions

Industries with

low demand may imply few firms.

high demand may imply many firms.

Elasticity of demand varies from industry to industry.

The Rothschild index measures the sensitivity to price of a product group as a whole relative to the sensitivity of the quantity demanded of a single firm to a change in its price.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-10

Market Structure

10

Demand and Market Conditions in Action

The industry elasticity of demand for airline travel is -3, and the elasticity of demand for an individual carrier is -4. What is the Rothschild index for this industry?

Answer:

The Rothschild index is:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-11

Market Structure

11

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-12

Market Structure

12

Potential for Entry

Optimal decisions by firms in an industry will depend on the ease with which new firms can enter the market.

Several factors can create barriers to entry (or make entry difficult).

Capital requirements

Patents

Economies of scale

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-13

Market Structure

13

Conduct

Behavior of firms:

Price markup over costs

Integration and merger

Advertising expenditures

Research and development expenditures

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-14

Conduct

14

Pricing Behavior

Lerner index

A measure of the difference between price and marginal cost as a fraction of the product’s price.

rearranging this equation yields

where is the markup factor over marginal costs.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-15

Conduct

15

Pricing Behavior in Action

A firm in the airline industry has a marginal cost of $200 and charges a price of $300. What are the Lerner index and markup factor?

The Lerner index is

The markup factor is

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-16

Conduct

16

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-17

Conduct

17

Integration and Merger Activity

Integration

Uniting productive resources of firms.

Can occur during the formation of a firm.

Merger

Two or more existing firms “unite,” or merge, into a single firm.

Reasons firms merge:

Reduce transaction costs.

Reap benefits of economies of scale and scope.

Increase market power.

Gain better access to capital markets.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-18

Conduct

18

Types of Integration

Vertical integration

Various stages in the production of a single product are carried out in a single firm.

Horizontal integration

Merging two or more similar final products into a single firm.

Conglomerate mergers

Integration of two or more different product lines into a single firm.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-19

Conduct

19

Research and Development

Research and development

Expenditures made by firms to gain a technological advantage, with the aim of acquiring a patent.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-20

Company Industry R&D as Percentage of Sales
Bristol-Meyers Squibb Pharmaceuticals 19.7
Ford Motor vehicle and parts 4.1
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Rubber and plastic parts 2.0
Kellogg Food 1.5
Proctor & Gable Soaps and cosmetics 2.5

Conduct

20

Advertisement

Advertisement

Expenditures made by firms to inform or persuade consumers to purchase their products.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-21

Company Industry Advertising as Percentage of Sales
Bristol-Meyers Squibb Pharmaceuticals 4.9
Ford Motor vehicle and parts 3.2
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Rubber and plastic parts 2.5
Kellogg Food 9.2
Proctor & Gable Soaps and cosmetics 11.7

Conduct

21

Performance

Refers to the profits and social welfare that result in a given industry

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

22

Performance

Dansby-Willig Performance Index

Ranks industries according to how much social welfare would improve if the output in an industry were increased by a small amount.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-23

Industry Dansby-Willig Index
Food 0.51
Rubber 0.49
Textiles 0.38
Apparel 0.47
Paper 0.63
Chemicals 0.67
Petroleum 0.63

Performance

23

The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm

Structure:

Factors like technology, concentration and market conditions.

Conduct:

Individual firm behavior in the market. Behavior includes pricing decisions, advertising decisions and R&D decisions, among other factors.

Performance:

Resulting profit and social welfare that arise in the market.

Structure-conduct-performance paradigm

Model that views these three aspects of industry as being integrally related.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-24

The Structure- Conduct-Performance Paradigm

24

The Casual View

Market structure “causes” firms to behave in a certain way.

… this behavior, or conduct, “causes” resources to be allocated in certain ways.

… this resource allocation leads to “good” or “bad” performance.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-25

The Structure- Conduct-Performance Paradigm

25

The Feedback Critique

There is no one-way causal link among structure, conduct and performance.

Firm conduct can affect market structure;

Market performance can affect conduct and market structure.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-26

The Structure- Conduct-Performance Paradigm

26

Five Forces Framework

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-27

The Structure- Conduct-Performance Paradigm

27

Looking Ahead

Perfect competition

Many, small firms and consumers relative to market.

Firms produce very similar products.

No market power (P = MC).

Monopoly

Sole producer of good or service.

Market power (P > MC).

Monopolistic competition

Many, small firms and consumers relative to market.

Firms produce slightly different products.

Limited market power.

Oligopoly

Few, large firms tend to dominate market.

Price/marketing strategies are mutually interdependent with other firms in the industry.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

7-28

Overview of the Remainder of the Book

28

Baye_9e_Chapter_08.pptx

Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 8

Learning Objectives

Identify the conditions under which a firm operates as perfectly competitive, monopolistically competitive, or a monopoly.

Identify sources of (and strategies for obtaining) monopoly power.

Apply the marginal principle to determine the profit-maximizing price and output.

Show the relationship between the elasticity of demand for a firm’s product and its marginal revenue.

Explain how long-run adjustments impact perfectly competitive, monopoly, and monopolistically competitive firms; discuss the ramifications of each of these market structures on social welfare.

Decide whether a firm making short-run losses should continue to operate or shut down its operations.

Illustrate the relationship between marginal cost, a competitive firm’s short-run supply curve, and the competitive industry supply; explain why supply curves do not exist for firms that have market power.

Calculate the optimal output of a firm that operates two plants and the optimal level of advertising for a firm that enjoys market power.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Perfect Competition

Perfectly competitive markets are characterized by:

The interaction between many buyers and sellers that are “small” relative to the market.

Each firm in the market produces a homogeneous (identical) product.

Buyers and sellers have perfect information.

No transaction costs.

Free entry into and exit from the market.

The implications of these conditions are:

a single market price is determined by the interaction of demand and supply

firms earn zero economic profits in the long run.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-3

Perfect Competition

3

Demand at the Market and Firm Levels Under Perfect Competition

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-4

Perfect Competition

Market

output

0

Price

D

Price

Firm’s

output

S

Market

Firm

4

Short-Run Output Decisions

The short run is a period of time over which some factors of production are fixed.

To maximize short-run profits, managers must take as given the fixed inputs (and fixed costs), and determine how much output to produce by changing the variable inputs.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-5

Perfect Competition

5

Revenue, Costs, and Profits for a Perfectly Competitive Firm

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-6

Perfect Competition

Firm’s output

$

0

Revenue

A

B

Slope of

E

Costs

Slope of

Maximum

profits

6

Competitive Firm’s Demand

The demand curve for a competitive firm’s product is a horizontal line at the market price. This price is the competitive firm’s marginal revenue.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-7

Perfect Competition

7

Profit Maximization under Perfect Competition

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-8

Perfect Competition

Firm’s output

$

0

Profits

8

Competitive Output Rule

To maximize profits, a perfectly competitive firm produces the output at which price equals marginal cost in the range over which marginal cost is increasing.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-9

Perfect Competition

9

Competitive Output Rule In Action

The cost function for a firm is .

If the firm sells output in a perfectly competitive market and other firms in the industry sell output at a price of $20, what price should the manager of this firm charge? What level of output should be produced to maximize profits? How much profit will be earned?

Answer:

Charge $20.

Since marginal cost is , equating price and marginal cost yields: units.

Maximum profits are: .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-10

Perfect Competition

10

Short-Run Loss Minimization

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-11

Perfect Competition

Firm’s output

$

0

Loss

11

The Shut-Down Case

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-12

Perfect Competition

Firm’s output

$

0

Fixed Cost

Loss if produce

Loss if shut down

12

Short-Run Output Decision Under Perfect Competition

To maximize short-run profits, a perfectly competitive firm should produce in the range of increasing marginal cost where , provided that . If , the firm should shut down its plant to minimize it losses.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-13

Perfect Competition

13

Short-Run Firm Supply Curve for a Competitive Firm

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-14

Perfect Competition

Firm’s output

$

0

Short-run supply

curve for individual firm

14

The Short-Run Firm and Industry Supply Curves

The short-run supply curve for a perfectly competitive firm is its marginal cost curve above the minimum point on the curve.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-15

Perfect Competition

15

The Market Supply Curve

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-16

Perfect Competition

Market output

P

0

1

$10

$12

Market supply

curve

Individual firm’s

supply curve

500

S

16

Long-Run Decisions: Entry and Exit The Market and Firm’s Demand

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-17

Perfect Competition

Market

output

0

Price

D

Price

Firm’s

output

0

Exit

Entry

17

Long-Run Competitive Equilibrium

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-18

Perfect Competition

Firm’s output

$

0

Long-run competitive

equilibrium

18

Long-Run Competitive Equilibrium

In the long run, perfectly competitive firms produce a level of output such that

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-19

Perfect Competition

19

Monopoly and Monopoly Power

Monopoly: A market structure in which a single firm serves an entire market for a good that has no close substitutes.

Sole seller of a good in a market gives that firm greater market power than if it competed against other firms.

Implication:

market demand curve is the monopolist’s demand curve.

However, a monopolist does not have unlimited market power.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-20

Monopoly

20

The Monopolist’s Demand

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-21

Monopoly

Output

Price

0

A

B

Monopolist’s power is constrained

by the demand curve.

21

Sources of Monopoly Power

Economies of scale: exist whenever long-run average costs decline as output increases.

Diseconomies of scale: exist whenever long-run average costs increase as output increases.

Economies of scope: exist when the total cost of producing two products within the same firm is lower than when the products are produced by separate firms.

Cost complementarity: exist when the marginal cost of producing one output is reduced when the output of another product is increased.

Patents and other legal barriers

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-22

Monopoly

22

Elasticity of Demand and Total Revenues

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-23

Monopoly

Q

0

Revenue

Price

Firm’s

output

0

Unitary

Unitary

Elastic

Inelastic

Inelastic

Elastic

Maximum revenues

MR

23

Marginal Revenue and Elasticity

The monopolist’s marginal revenue function is

, where is the elasticity of demand for the monopolist’s product and is the price charged.

For

when .

when .

when .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-24

Monopoly

24

Marginal Revenue and Linear Demand

Given an linear inverse demand function

, where , the associated marginal revenue is

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-25

Monopoly

25

Marginal Revenue In Action

Suppose the inverse demand function for a monopolist’s product is given by . What is the maximum price per unit a monopolist can charge to be able to sell 3 units? What is marginal revenue when ?

Answer:

The maximum price the monopolist can charge for 3 units is: .

The marginal revenue at 3 units for this inverse linear demand is: .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-26

Monopoly

26

Monopoly Output Rule

A profit-maximizing monopolist should produce the output, , such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-27

Monopoly

27

Costs, Revenues, and Profits Under Monopoly

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-28

Monopoly

Output

$

0

Cost function

Slope of

Slope of

Revenue function

Maximum

profit

28

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC

ATC

)

Profits

Profit Maximization Under Monopoly

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-29

Monopoly

Monopoly Pricing Rule

Given the level of output, , that maximizes profits, the monopoly price is the price on the demand curve corresponding to the units produced:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-30

Monopoly

30

Monopoly In Action

Suppose the inverse demand function for a monopolist’s product is given by and the cost function is . Determine the profit-maximizing price, quantity and maximum profits.

Answer:

Profit-maximizing output is found by solving: .

The profit-maximizing price is: .

Maximum profits are: .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-31

Monopoly

31

The Absence of a Supply Curve

Recall, firms operating in perfectly competitive markets determine how much output to produce based on price ().

Thus, a supply curve exists in perfectly competitive markets.

A monopolist’s market power implies .

Thus, there is no supply curve for a monopolist, or in markets served by firms with market power.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-32

Monopoly

32

Multiplant Decisions

Often a monopolist produces output in different locations.

Implications: manager has to determine how much output to produce at each plant.

Consider a monopolist producing output at two plants:

The cost of producing units at plant 1 is , and the cost of producing at plant 2 is .

When the monopolist produces a homogeneous product, the per-unit price consumers are willing to pay for the total output produced at the two plants is , where .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-33

Monopoly

33

Multiplant Output Rule

Let be the marginal revenue of producing a total of units of output. Suppose the marginal cost of producing units of output in plant 1 is and that of producing units in plant 2 is . The profit-maximizing rule for the two-plant monopolist is to allocate output among the two plants such that:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-34

Monopoly

34

Implications of Entry Barriers

A monopolist may earn positive economic profits, which in the presence of barriers to entry prevents other firms from entering the market to reap a portion of those profits.

Implication: monopoly profits will continue over time provided the monopoly maintains its market power.

Monopoly power, however, does not guarantee positive profits.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-35

Monopoly

35

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC

ATC

A Monopolist Earning Zero Profits

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-36

Monopoly

Deadweight Loss of Monopoly

The consumer and producer surplus that is lost due to the monopolist charging a price in excess of marginal cost.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-37

Monopoly

37

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC

Deadweight Loss of Monopoly

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-38

Monopoly

Deadweight loss

Monopolistic Competition

An industry is monopolistically competitive if:

There are many buyers and sellers.

Each firm in the industry produces a differentiated product.

There is free entry into and exit from the industry.

A key difference between monopolistically competitive and perfectly competitive markets is that each firm produces a slightly differentiated product.

Implication: products are close, but not perfect, substitutes; therefore, firm’s demand curve is downward sloping under monopolistic competition.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-39

Monopolistic Competition

39

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC

ATC

Profit-Maximization under Monopolistic Competition

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-40

Monopolistic Competition

Profits

Profit-Maximization Rule for Monopolistic Competition

To maximize profits, a monopolistically competitive firm produces where its marginal revenue equals marginal cost.

The profit-maximizing price is the maximum price per unit that consumers are willing to pay for the profit-maximizing level of output.

The profit-maximizing output, , is such that and the profit-maximizing price is .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-41

Monopolistic Competition

41

Long-Run Equilibrium

If firms in monopolistically competitive markets earn short-run

profits, additional firms will enter in the long run to capture some of those profits.

losses, some firms will exit the industry in the long run.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-42

Monopolistic Competition

42

Price

Quantity of Brand X

Demand0

MR0

MC

ATC

Effect of Entry on a Monopolistically Competitive Firm’s Demand

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-43

Monopolistic Competition

Demand1

MR1

Due to entry of new

firms selling other brands

Price

Quantity of Brand X

MC

ATC

Long-Run Equilibrium under Monopolistic Competition

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-44

Monopolistic Competition

Demand1

MR1

Long-run monopolistically

competitive equilibrium

The Long-Run and Monopolistic Competition

In the long run, monopolistically competitive firms produce a level of output such that:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-45

Monopolistic Competition

45

Implications of Product Differentiation

The differentiated nature of products in monopolistically competitive markets implies that firms in these industries must continually convince consumers that their products are better than their competitors.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-46

Monopolistic Competition

46

Implications of Product Differentiation

Two strategies monopolistically competitive firms use to persuade consumers:

Comparative advertising: form of advertising where a firm attempts to increase the demand for its brand by differentiating its product from competing brands

Brand equity

Niche marketing: a marketing strategy where goods and services are tailored to meet the needs of a particular segment of the market.

Green marketing

Successful differentiation and branding strategies can make managers brand myopic, resting on the brand’s past laurels and in doing so missing opportunities to enhance its brand

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

47

Monopolistic Competition

Optimal Advertising Decisions

How much should a firm spend on advertising to maximize profits?

Depends, in part, on the nature of the industry.

The optimal amount of advertising balances the marginal benefits and marginal costs.

Profit-maximizing advertising-to-sales ratio is:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8-48

Optimal Advertising Decisions

48

Baye_9e_Chapter_09.pptx

Basic Oligopoly Models

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 9

Learning Objectives

Explain how beliefs and strategic interaction shape optimal decisions in oligopoly environments.

Identify the conditions under which a firm operates in a Sweezy, Cournot, Stackelberg, or Bertrand oligopoly, and the ramifications of each type of oligopoly for optimal pricing decisions, and firm profits.

Apply reaction (or best-response) functions to identify optimal decisions and likely competitor responses in oligopoly settings.

Identify the conditions for a contestable market, and explain the ramifications for market power and the sustainability of long-run profits.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Conditions for Oligopoly

Oligopoly market structures are characterized by only a few firms, each of which is large relative to the total industry.

Typical number of firms is between 2 and 10.

Products can be identical or differentiated.

An oligopoly market composed of two firms is called a duopoly.

Oligopoly settings tend to be the most difficult to manage since managers must consider the likely impact of his or her decisions on the decisions of other firms in the market.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-3

Conditions for Oligopoly

3

Strategic Interaction: A Firm’s Demand Depends on Actions of Rivals

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-4

Role of Beliefs and Strategic Interaction

Output

Price

0

Demand1

Demand2

C

A

B

Demand if rivals

match price changes

Demand if rivals do not

match price changes

4

Sweezy Oligopoly

Sweezy oligopoly characteristics:

There are few firms in the market serving many consumers.

The firms produce differentiated products.

Each firm believes its rivals will cut their prices in response to a price reduction but will not raise their prices in response to a price increase.

Barriers to entry exist.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-5

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

5

Sweezy Oligopoly

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-6

Output

Price

0

MR2

Demand2

(rival matches price change)

A

B

MC1

MR1

MC0

Demand1

(rival holds price constant)

F

E

C

MR

Sweezy Demand

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

6

Cournot Oligopoly

Cournot oligopoly characteristics

There are few firms in the market serving many consumers.

The firms produce either differentiated or homogeneous products.

Each firm believes rivals will hold their output constant if it changes its output.

Barriers to entry exist.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-7

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

7

Cournot Oligopoly: Reaction Functions

Consider a Cournot duopoly. Each firm makes an output decision under the belief that is rival will hold its output constant when the other changes its output level.

Implication: Each firm’s marginal revenue is impacted by the other firms output decision.

The relationship between each firm’s profit-maximizing output level is called a best-response or reaction function.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-8

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

8

Cournot Oligopoly: Reaction Functions Formula

Given a linear (inverse) demand function

and cost functions,

the reactions functions are:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-9

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

9

Cournot Reaction Functions

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-10

Quantity2

Quantity1

Firm 2’s Reaction Function

Firm 1’s Reaction Function

Cournot equilibrium

A

B

C

D

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

10

Cournot Oligopoly: Equilibrium

A situation in which neither firm has an incentive to change its output given the other firm’s output.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-11

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

11

Cournot Oligopoly: Isoprofit Curves

A function that defines the combinations of outputs produced by all firms that yield a given firm the same level of profits.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-12

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

12

Isoprofit Curves for Firm 1

Every point on a given isoprofit curve yields Firm 1 the same level of profits.

Isoprofits curves tat lie closer to Firm 1’s monopoly output are associated with higher profits for that firm.

The isoprofit curves for Firm 1 reach their peak where they intersect Firm 1’s reaction function.

The isoprofit curves do not interest one another.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Firm 1’s Best Response to Firm 2’s Output

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-14

Quantity2

Quantity1

A

B

Firm 1’s profit increases as isoprofit

curves move toward

(Firm 1’s reaction function)

C

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

14

Quantity2

Quantity1

Firm 2’s profit increases as isoprofit

curves move toward

Firm 2’s Reaction Function and Isoprofit Curves

Monopoly point for firm 2

(Firm 2’s reaction function)

Copyright © 2014 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.

9-15

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

Quantity2

Quantity1

Cournot Equilibrium

Cournot Equilibrium

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-16

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Quantity2

Quantity1

Effect of Decline in Firm 2’s Marginal Cost on Cournot Equilibrium

Due to decline in

firm 2’s marginal cost

F

E

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-17

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

Cournot Oligopoly: Collusion

Markets with only a few dominant firms can coordinate to restrict output to their benefit at the expense of consumers.

Restricted output leads to higher market prices.

Such acts by firms is known as collusion.

Collusion, however, is prone to cheating behavior.

Since both parties are aware of these incentives, reaching collusive agreements is often very difficult.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-18

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

18

Incentive to Collude in a Cournot Oligopoly

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-19

Quantity2

Quantity1

Collusion outcome

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

19

Incentive to Renege on Collusive Agreements in Cournot Oligopoly

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-20

Quantity2

Quantity1

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

20

Stackelberg Oligopoly

Stackelberg oligopoly characteristics:

There are few firms serving many consumers.

Firms produce either differentiated or homogeneous products.

A single firm (the leader) chooses an output before all other firms choose their outputs.

All other firms (the followers) take as given the output of the leader and choose outputs that maximize profits given the leader’s output.

Barriers to entry exist.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-21

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

21

Stackelberg Equilibrium

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-22

Quantity Follower

Quantity Leader

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

22

Stackelberg Oligopoly: Equilibrium Output Formulae

Given a linear (inverse) demand function

and cost functions and .

The follower sets output according to the reaction function

The leader’s output is

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-23

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

23

Stackelberg Oligopoly In Action: Problem

Suppose the inverse demand function for two firms in a homogeneous-product, Stackelberg oligopoly is given by

and their costs are $2. Firm 1 is the leader, and firm 2 is the follower.

What is firm 2’s reaction function?

What is firm 1’s output?

What is firm 2’s output?

What is the market price?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-24

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

24

Stackelberg Oligopoly In Action: Answer

The follower’s reaction function is: .

The leader’s output is: .

The follower’s output is: .

The market price is: .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-25

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

25

Bertrand Oligopoly

Bertrand oligopoly characteristics

There are few firms in the market serving many consumers.

Firms produce identical products at a constant marginal cost.

Firms engage in price competition and react optimally to prices charged by competitors.

Consumers have perfect information and there are no transaction costs.

Barriers to entry exist.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-26

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

26

Bertrand Oligopoly: Equilibrium

The conditions for a Bertrand oligopoly imply that firms in this market will undercut one another to capture the entire market leaving the rivals with no profit. All consumers will purchase at the low-price firm.

This “price war” would come to an end when the price each firm charged equaled marginal cost.

In equilibrium, .

Socially efficient level of output.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-27

Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings

27

Comparing Oligopoly Models

Consider the following inverse market demand function:

and the cost function for each firm in this market is identical, and given by

Under these condition, the different oligopoly outputs, prices and profits are examined.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-28

Comparing Oligopoly Models

28

Comparing Oligopoly: Cournot

The Cournot oligopoly reaction functions are

These reaction functions can be solved for the equilibrium output. These quantities can be used to compute price and profit.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-29

Comparing Oligopoly Models

29

Comparing Oligopoly: Stackelberg

The Stackelberg leader’s output is

The market price is:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-30

Comparing Oligopoly Models

30

Comparing Oligopoly: Bertrand

Since , .

Total output is found by:

Solving yields:

Given symmetric firms, each firm gets half the market, or 498 units.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-31

Comparing Oligopoly Models

31

Comparing Oligopoly: Collusion

Since the output associated with collusion is the same as monopoly output, the inverse market demand function implies that monopoly marginal revenue function is:

Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost yields:

Solving this: units. Each firm will produce half of these units.

Price is:

Each firm earns profits of .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-32

Comparing Oligopoly Models

32

Contestable Markets

Contestable markets involve strategic interaction among existing firms and potential entrants into a market.

A market is contestable if:

All producers have access to the same technology.

Consumers respond quickly to price changes.

Existing firms cannot respond quickly to entry by lowering price.

There are no sunk costs.

If these conditions hold, incumbent firms have no market power over consumers.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

9-33

Contestable Markets

33

Baye_9e_Chapter_10.pptx

Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 10

Learning Objectives

Apply normal form and extensive form representations of games to formulate decisions in strategic environments that include pricing, advertising, coordination, bargaining, innovation, product quality, monitoring employees, and entry.

Distinguish among dominant, secure, Nash, mixed, and subgame perfect equilibrium strategies, and identify such strategies in various games.

Identify whether cooperative (collusive) outcomes may be supported as a Nash equilibrium in a repeated game, and explain the roles of trigger strategies, the interest rate, and the presence of an indefinite or uncertain final period in achieving such outcomes.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Overview of Games and Strategic Thinking

Game theory is a general framework to aid decision making when agents’ payoffs depends on the actions taken by other players.

Games consist of the following components:

Players or agents who make decisions.

Planned actions of players, called strategies.

Payoff of players under different strategy scenarios.

A description of the order of play.

A description of the frequency of play or interaction.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-3

Overview of Games and Strategic Thinking

3

Order of Decisions in Games is Important

Simultaneous-move game

Game in which each player makes decisions without the knowledge of the other players’ decisions.

Bertrand duopoly game

Sequential-move game

Game in which one player makes a move after observing the other player’s move.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-4

Overview of Games and Strategic Thinking

4

Frequency of Interaction in Games

One-shot game

Game in which players interact to make decisions only once.

Repeated game

Game in which players interact to make decisions more than once.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-5

Overview of Games and Strategic Thinking

5

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games: Theory

Strategy

Decision rule that describes the actions a player will take at each decision point.

Normal-form game

A representation of a game indicating the players, their possible strategies, and the payoffs resulting from alternative strategies.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-6

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

6

Normal-Form Game

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-7

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

Player A Player B
Strategy Left Right
Up 10, 20 15, 8
Down -10 , 7 10, 10

Set of players

Player A’s strategies

Player B’s strategies

Player A’s possible payoffs

from strategy “down”

Player B’s

possible

payoffs

from

strategy

“right”

7

Possible Strategies

Dominant strategy

A strategy that results in the highest payoff to a player regardless of the opponent’s action.

Secure strategy

A strategy that guarantees the highest payoff given the worst possible scenario.

Nash equilibrium strategy

A condition describing a set of strategies in which no player can improve her payoff by unilaterally changing her own strategy, given the other players’ strategies.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-8

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

8

Dominant Strategy

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-9

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

Player A Player B
Strategy Left Right
Up 10, 20 15, 8
Down -10 , 7 10, 10

Player A has a dominant strategy: Up

Player B has no dominant strategy

Player A Player B
Strategy Left Right
Up 10, 20 15, 8
Down -10 , 7 10, 10

9

Secure Strategy

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-10

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

Player A Player B
Strategy Left Right
Up 10, 20 15, 8
Down -10 , 7 10, 10

Player A’s secure strategy: Up … guarantees at least a $10 payoff

Player B’s secure strategy: Right … guarantees at least an $8 payoff

Player A Player B
Strategy Left Right
Up 10, 20 15, 8
Down -10 , 7 10, 10
Player A Player B
Strategy Left Right
Up 10, 20 15, 8
Down -10 , 7 10, 10

10

Nash Equilibrium Strategy

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-11

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

Player A Player B
Strategy Left Right
Up 10, 20 15, 8
Down -10 , 7 10, 10

A Nash equilibrium results when Player A’s plays “Up”

and Player B plays “Left”

Player A Player B
Strategy Left Right
Up 10, 20 15, 8
Down -10 , 7 10, 10

11

Application of One-Shot Games: Pricing Decisions

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-12

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Low price 0, 0 50, -10
High price -10 , 50 10, 10

A Nash equilibrium results when both players charge “Low price”

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Low price 0, 0 50, -10
High price -10 , 50 10, 10

Payoffs associated with the Nash equilibrium is inferior from the

firms’ viewpoint compared to both “agreeing” to charge

“High price”: hence, a dilemma.

12

Application of One-Shot Games: Advertising and Quality Decisions

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-13

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Advertise $4, $4 $2, $1
Don’t Advertise $1 , $20 $10, $10

A Nash equilibrium results when both firms “Advertise”

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Advertise $4, $4 $20, $1
Don’t Advertise $1 , $20 $10, $10

Collusion would not work because this is a one-shot game; if you

and your rival “agreed” not to advertise each of you would have an

incentive to cheat on the agreement.

13

Application of One-Shot Games: Coordination Decisions

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-14

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy 120-Volt Outlets 90-Volt Outlets
120-Volt Outlets $100, $100 $0, $0
90-Volt Outlets $0 , $0 $100, $100

There are two Nash equilibrium outcomes associated with this game:

Equilibrium strategy 1: Both players choose 120-volt outlets

Firm A Firm B
Strategy 120-Volt Outlets 90-Volt Outlets
120-Volt Outlets $100, $100 $0, $0
90-Volt Outlets $0 , $0 $100, $100

Equilibrium strategy 2: Both players choose 90-volt outlets

Firm A Firm B
Strategy 120-Volt Outlets 90-Volt Outlets
120-Volt Outlets $100, $100 $0, $0
90-Volt Outlets $0 , $0 $100, $100

Ways to coordinate on one equilibrium:

1) permit player communication

2) government set standard

14

Application of One-Shot Games: Monitoring Employees

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-15

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

Manager Worker
Strategy Monitor Don’t Monitor
Monitor -1, 1 1, -1
Don’t Monitor 1, -1 -1, 1

There are no Nash equilibrium outcomes associated with this game.

Q: How should the agents play this type of game?

A: Play a mixed (randomized) strategy, whereby a player randomizes

over two or more available actions in order to keep rivals from

being able to predict his or her actions.

15

Application of One-Shot Games: Nash Bargaining

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-16

Simultaneous-Move, One-Shot Games

Management Union
Strategy 0 50 100
0 0, 0 0, 50 0, 100
50 50 , 0 50, 50 -1, -1
100 100, 0 -1, -1 -1, -1

There three Nash equilibrium outcomes associated with this game:

Equilibrium strategy 1: Management chooses 100, union chooses 0

Equilibrium strategy 2: Both players choose 50

Equilibrium strategy 3: Management chooses 0, Union chooses 100

16

Infinitely Repeated Games: Theory

An infinitely repeated game is a game that is played over and over again forever, and in which players receive payoffs during each play of the game.

Disconnect between current decisions and future payoffs suggest that payoffs must be appropriately discounted.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-17

Infinitely Repeated Games

17

Review of Present Value

When a firm earns the same profit, , in each period over an infinite time horizon, the present value of the firm is:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-18

Infinitely Repeated Games

18

Supporting Collusion with Trigger Strategies

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-19

Infinitely Repeated Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Low price 0, 0 50, -40
High price -40 , 50 10, 10

The Nash equilibrium to the one-shot, simultaneous-move

pricing game is: Low, Low

When this game is repeatedly played, it is possible for firms to

collude without fear of being cheated on using trigger strategies.

Trigger strategy: strategy that is contingent on the past play of a

game and in which some particular past action “triggers” a different

action by a player.

19

Supporting Collusion with Trigger Strategies

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-20

Infinitely Repeated Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Low price 0, 0 50, -40
High price -40 , 50 10, 10

Trigger strategy example: Both firms charge the high price, provided

neither of us has ever “cheated” in the past (charge low price).

If one firm cheats by charging the low price, the other player will

punish the deviator by charging the low price forever after.

When both firms adopt such a trigger strategy, there are conditions

under which neither firm has an incentive to cheat on the collusive

outcome.

20

Sustaining Cooperative Outcomes with Trigger Strategies

Suppose a one-shot game is infinitely repeated and the interest rate is . Further, suppose the “cooperative” one-shot payoff to a player is , the maximum one-shot payoff if the player cheats on the collusive outcome is , the one-shot Nash equilibrium payoff is , and .

Then the cooperative (collusive) outcome can be sustained in the infinitely repeated game with the following trigger strategy: “Cooperate provided that no player has ever cheated in the past. If any player cheats, “punish” the player by choosing the one-shot Nash equilibrium strategy forever after.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-21

Infinitely Repeated Games

21

Supporting Collusion with Trigger Strategies In Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-22

Infinitely Repeated Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Low price 0, 0 50, -40
High price -40 , 50 10, 10

Suppose firm A and B repeatedly play the game above, and the

interest rate is 40 percent. Firms agree to charge a high price in

each period, provided neither has cheated in the past.

Q: What are firm A’s profits if it cheats on the collusive agreement?

A: If firm B lives up to the collusive agreement but firm A cheats,

firm A will earn $50 today and zero forever after.

22

Supporting Collusion with Trigger Strategies in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-23

Infinitely Repeated Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Low price 0, 0 50, -40
High price -40 , 50 10, 10

Q: What are firm A’s profits if it does not cheat on the collusive

agreement?

A:

23

Supporting Collusion with Trigger Strategies in Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-24

Infinitely Repeated Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Low price 0, 0 50, -40
High price -40 , 50 10, 10

Q: Does an equilibrium result where the firms charge the high price

in each period?

A: Since , the present value of firm A’s profits are higher

if A cheats on the collusive agreement. In equilibrium both firms

will charge low price and earn zero profit each period.

24

Factors Affecting Collusion in Pricing Games

Sustaining collusion via trigger strategies is easier when firms know:

who their rivals are, so they know whom to punish, if needed.

who their rival’s customers are, so they can “steal” those customers with lower prices.

when their rivals deviate, so they know when to begin punishment.

be able to successfully punish rival.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-25

Infinitely Repeated Games

25

Factors Affecting Collusion in Pricing Games

Number of firms in the market

Firm size

History of the market

Punishment mechanisms

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-26

Infinitely Repeated Games

26

Finitely Repeated Games

Finitely repeated games are games in which a one-shot game is repeated a finite number of times.

Variations of finitely repeated games: games in which players

do not know when the game will end

know when the game will end

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-27

Finitely Repeated Games

27

Games with an Uncertain Final Period

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-28

Finitely Repeated Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Low price 0, 0 50, -40
High price -40 , 50 10, 10

Suppose the probability that the game will end after a given play is

, where .

An uncertain final period mirrors the analysis of infinitely repeated

games. Use the same trigger strategy.

No incentive to cheat on the collusive outcome associated with a

finitely repeated game with an unknown end point above, provided:

28

Repeated Games with a Known Final Period: End-of-Period Problem

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-29

Finitely Repeated Games

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low price High price
Low price 0, 0 50, -40
High price -40 , 50 10, 10

When this game is repeated some known, finite number of times

and there is only one Nash equilibrium, then collusion cannot work.

The only equilibrium is the single-shot, simultaneous-move Nash

equilibrium; in the game above, both firms charge low price.

29

Applications of the End-of-Period Problem

Resignations and Quits

The “Snake-Oil” Salesman

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

30

Finitely Repeated Games

Multistage Games: Theory

Multistage games differ from the previously examined games by examining the timing of decisions in games.

Players make sequential, rather than simultaneous, decisions.

Represented by an extensive-form game.

Extensive form game

A representation of a game that summarizes the players, the information available to them at each stage, the strategies available to them, the sequence of moves, and the payoffs resulting from alternative strategies.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-31

Multistage Games

31

Theory: Sequential-Move Game in Extension Form

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-32

Multistage Games

B

B

A

Up

Up

Up

Down

Down

Down

Decision node

denoting the

beginning of the

game

Player B’s decision nodes

Player A payoff

Player B payoff

Player A feasible strategies:

Player B feasible strategies:

Up

Down

Up, if player A plays Down and Down, if player A plays Down

Up, if player A plays Up and Down, if player A plays Up

32

Equilibrium Characterization

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-33

Multistage Games

B

B

A

Up

Up

Up

Down

Down

Down

Nash Equilibrium

Player A: Down

Player B: Down, if player A chooses Up,

and Down if Player A chooses Down

Is this Nash equilibrium reasonable?

No! Player B’s strategy involves a non-credible threat since if A plays Up,

B’s best response is Up too!

33

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

A condition describing a set of strategies that constitutes a Nash equilibrium and allows no player to improve his own payoff at any stage of the game by changing strategies.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-34

Multistage Games

34

Equilibrium Characterization

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-35

Multistage Games

B

B

A

Up

Up

Up

Down

Down

Down

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

Player A: Up

Player B: Up, if player A chooses Up,

and Down if Player A chooses Down

35

Application of Multistage Games: The Entry Game

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

10-36

Multistage Games

B

A

In

Hard

Soft

Out

Nash Equilibrium I:

Player A: Out

Player B: Hard, if player A chooses In

Non-credible, threat since if A plays

In, B’s best response is Soft

Nash Equilibrium II:

Player A: In

Player B: Soft, if player A chooses In

Credible. This is subgame perfect equilibrium.

36

Baye_9e_Chapter_11.pptx

Pricing Strategies for Firms with Market Power

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 11

Learning Objectives

Apply simple elasticity-based markup formulas to determine profit-maximizing prices in environments where a business enjoys market power, including monopoly, monopolistic competition, and Cournot oligopoly.

Formulate pricing strategies that permit firms to extract additional surplus from consumers—including price discrimination, two-part pricing, block pricing, and commodity bundling—and explain the conditions needed for each of these strategies to yield higher profits than standard pricing.

Formulate pricing strategies that enhance profits for special cost and demand structures—such as peak-load pricing, cross-subsidies, and transfer pricing—and explain the conditions needed for each strategy to work.

Explain how price-matching guarantees, brand loyalty programs, and randomized pricing strategies can be used to enhance profits in markets with intense price competition.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Review of Basic Profit Maximization

Firms with market power face a downward-sloping demand.

Implication: there is a trade-off between selling many units at a low price and selling a few units at a high price.

Managers of firms with market power balance these competing forces by selecting the quantity that equates marginal revenue and marginal cost , and charging the maximum price that consumer will pay for this level of output.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-3

Basic Pricing Strategies

3

Basic Profit Maximization In Action

Suppose the (inverse) demand for a firm’s product is given by and the cost function is . What is the profit-maximizing level of output and price for this firm?

Answer:

The marginal revenue function is: .

The marginal cost function is: .

Equating these two functions yields , so . The profit-maximizing price is .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-4

Basic Pricing Strategies

4

Simple Pricing Rule: Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition

What if estimates of the demand and cost functions are not available?

Managers have a “crude” estimate of

marginal cost; the price paid to a supplier.

the price elasticity of demand, since it is typically available for a representative firm in an industry.

With this information, the monopoly and monopolistically competitive firm’s profit-maximizing price (markup) is computed from: MC =

, where .

So, set price such that: .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-5

Basic Pricing Strategies

5

Simple Pricing Rule In Action: Problem

The manager of a convenience store competes in a monopolistically competitive market and buys cola from a supplier at a price of $1.25 per liter. The manager thinks that because there are several supermarkets nearby, the demand for cola sold at her store is slightly more elastic than the elasticity for the representative food store. Specifically, the elasticity of demand for cola sold by her store is . What price should the manager charge for a liter of cola to maximize profits?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-6

Basic Pricing Strategies

6

Simple Pricing Rule In Action: Answer

The marginal cost of cola to the firm is , or per liter, and the markup factor is .

The profit-maximizing pricing rule for a monopolistically competitive firm is:

, or about per liter.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-7

Basic Pricing Strategies

7

Simple Pricing Rule for Cournot Oligopoly

When each of the firms operating in a Cournot oligopoly has identical cost structures and produces similar products, the simple profit-maximizing price (markup) in Cournot equilibrium is:

, where is the market elasticity of demand.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-8

Basic Pricing Strategies

8

Beyond the Single-Price-Per-Unit Model

In some markets, managers can enhance profits beyond those resulting from charging all consumers a single, per-unit price.

Models that yield greater profits fall into three categories:

Pricing strategies:

that extract surplus from consumers.

for special cost and demand structures.

in markets with intense price competition.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-9

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

9

Models that Extract Surplus from Consumers

Strategies for surplus extraction:

Price discrimination (first, second and third degrees)

Two-part pricing

Block pricing

Commodity bundling

Each strategy is appropriate for firms with various cost structures and degrees of market interdependence.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-10

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

10

Surplus Extraction: First-Degree Price Discrimination

Price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices to consumers for the same good or service.

First-degree price discrimination is the practice of charging each consumer the maximum price he or she would be willing to pay for each unit of the good purchased.

Implication: the firm extracts all surplus from consumers and earns the highest possible profit.

Problem: managers rarely know each consumers’ maximum willingness to pay for each unit of the product.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-11

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

11

First-Degree Price Discrimination

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-12

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

Price

Quantity

Demand

MC

Firm profit under first-degree

price discrimination

12

Surplus Extraction: Second-Degree Price Discrimination

Second-degree price discrimination is the practice of posting a discrete schedule of declining prices for different ranges of quantity.

Implication: firm extracts some surplus from consumers without needing to know the identity of various consumers’ demand.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-13

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

13

Second-Degree Price Discrimination

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-14

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

Price

Quantity

Demand

MC

Contribution to profits under

second-degree price discrimination

14

Surplus Extraction: Third-Degree Price Discrimination

Third-degree price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices based on systematic differences in demand across demographic consumer groups.

Implication: marginal revenue will be different for each group. That is, if there are two groups, , for example.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-15

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

15

Surplus Extraction: Third-Degree Price Discrimination Rule

To maximize profits, a firm with market power produces the output at which the marginal revenue (left-hand side of the following equations) to each group equals marginal cost.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-16

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

16

Third-Degree Price Discrimination Rule In Action:

You are the manager of a pizzeria that produces at a marginal cost of $6 per pizza. The pizzeria is a local monopoly near campus. During the day, only students eat at your restaurant. In the evening, while students are studying, faculty members eat there. If students have an elasticity of demand for pizza of and faculty has an elasticity of demand of , what should your pricing policy be to maximize profits?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-17

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

17

Third-Degree Price Discrimination Rule In Action:

Assuming faculty would be unwilling to purchase cold pizzas from students, the conditions for effective third-degree price discrimination hold. It will be profitable to charge a “lunch menu” price and a “dinner menu” price. These prices are determined as follows:

Solving these equations yield, and .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-18

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

18

Surplus Extraction: Two-Part Pricing

Two-part pricing is a pricing strategy whereby a firm with market power charges a fixed fee for the right to purchase its goods, plus a per-unit charge for each unit purchased.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-19

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

19

Two-Part Pricing

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-20

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

Price

Quantity

Demand

MC = AC

Fixed fee = $32 = profits

Consumer surplus = $0

Per-unit fee = $2

20

Surplus Extraction: Block Pricing

Block pricing is a pricing strategy in which identical products are packaged together in order to enhance profits by forcing customers to make an all-or-none decision to purchase.

The profit-maximizing price on a package is the total value the consumer receives for the package.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-21

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

21

Block Pricing

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-22

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

Price

Quantity

Demand

MC = AC

Profit with block pricing = $32

Price charged for a block of 8 units = $48

22

Surplus Extraction: Commodity Bundling

Commodity bundling is the practice of bundling several different products together and selling them at a single “bundle price.”

Key assumption: Consumers differ with respect to the amounts they are willing to pay for multiple products sold by a firm.

Managers cannot observe different consumers’ valuations.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-23

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

23

Pricing Strategies for Special Cost and Demand Structures: Peak-Load Pricing

Peak-load pricing is a pricing strategy in which higher prices are charged during peak hours than during off-peak hours.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-24

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

24

Special Demand and Costs: Peak-Load Pricing

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-25

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

Price

Quantity

Demand High

MC

MR High

Demand Low

MR Low

25

Special Demand and Costs: Cross-Subsidies

Cross-subsidy is a pricing strategy in which profits gained from the sale of one product are used to subsidize sales of a related product.

Cross-Subsidization Principle:

Whenever the demands for two products produced by a firm are interrelated through costs or demand, the firm may enhance profits by cross-subsidization: selling one product at or below cost and the other product above cost.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-26

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

26

Special Demand and Costs: Transfer Pricing

Transfer pricing is a pricing strategy in which a firm optimally sets the internal price at which an upstream division sells an input to a downstream division.

Important since most division managers are provided an incentive to maximize their own division’s profits.

Transfer pricing aligns division manager’s incentives with that of the overall firm, and increases overall firm’s profit.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-27

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

27

Special Demand and Costs: Double Marginalization

Consider a large firm with two divisions:

upstream division is the sole provider of a key input.

downstream division uses the input produced by the upstream division to produce the final output.

Upstream division has market power and incentive to maximize divisional profits leads managers to produce where .

Implication: .

A similar situation exists for the downstream division; profit-maximization leads to .

Both divisions mark price up over marginal cost resulting in a phenomenon called double marginalization.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-28

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

28

Special Demand and Costs: Transfer Pricing Rule

Transfer pricing is used to overcome double marginalization.

A transfer pricing rule sets the internal price at which an upstream division sells inputs to a downstream division in order to maximize the overall firm profits.

Require the upstream division to produce such that its marginal cost, , equals the net marginal revenue to the downstream division:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-29

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

29

Intense Price Competition: Price Matching

Price matching is a strategy in which a firm advertises a price and a promise to match any lower price offered by a competitor.

Used to mitigate the stark outcome associated with firms competing in a homogeneous-product, Bertrand oligopoly.

Outcome: If all firms in the market adopt a price matching policy, all firms can set the monopoly price and earn monopoly profits; instead of the zero profits it would earn in the usual one-shot Bertrand oligopoly.

Potential issues:

Dealing with false consumer claims of low prices.

Competitor’s with lower cost structures.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-30

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

30

Intense Price Competition: Inducing Brand Loyalty

Brand loyal customers continue to buy a firm’s product even if another firm offers a (slightly) better price.

Strategy used to mitigate the tension of Bertrand competition.

Methods for inducing brand loyalty.

Advertising campaigns.

“Frequent-buyer” programs.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-31

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

31

Intense Price Competition: Randomized Pricing

Randomized pricing is a strategy in which a firm intentionally varies its price in an attempt to “hide” price information from consumers and rivals.

Benefits of randomized pricing to firms:

Consumers cannot learn from experience which firm charges the lowest price in the market.

Reduces the ability of rival firms to undercut a firm’s price.

Not always profitable.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

11-32

Strategies that Yield Even Greater Profits

32

Baye_9e_Chapter_12.pptx

The Economics of Information

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 12

Learning Objectives

Identify strategies to manage risk and uncertainty, including diversification and optimal search strategies.

Calculate the profit-maximizing output and price in an environment of uncertainty.

Explain why asymmetric information about “hidden actions” or “hidden characteristics” can lead to moral hazard and adverse selection, and identify strategies for mitigating these potential problems.

Explain how differing auction rules and information structures impact the incentives in auctions, and determine the optimal bidding strategies in a variety of auctions with independent or correlated values.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Measuring Uncertain Outcomes

A variable that measures the outcome of an uncertain event is called a random variable.

Probabilities can be attached to different values of a random variable that denote the chance that a value occurs.

Information about uncertain outcomes can be summarized by the mean (or, expected value) and variance of a random variable.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-3

The Mean and the Variance

3

Measuring Uncertain Outcomes: Mean

The mean of a random variable is the sum of the probabilities that different outcomes will occur multiplied by the resulting payoffs.

If denote the possible outcomes of the random variable and the corresponding probabilities of the outcomes, then the mean of is:

, where .

The mean does not provide information about the risk associated with the random variable.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-4

The Mean and the Variance

4

Measuring Uncertain Outcomes: Variance and Standard Deviation

The variance of a random variable is the sum of the probabilities that different outcomes will occur multiplied by the squared deviation from the mean of the resulting payoffs.

If denote the possible outcomes of the random variable, their corresponding probabilities are , and the expected value of is , then the variance of is:

The variance is a common measure of risk.

The standard deviation is the positive square root of the variance: .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-5

The Mean and the Variance

5

Risk Aversion

Attitudes toward risk differ among consumers.

A risk-averse consumer prefers a sure amount of to a risky prospect with an expected value of .

A risk-loving consumer prefers a risky prospect with an expected value of to a sure amount of .

A risk-neutral consumer is indifferent between a risky prospect with an expected value of and a sure amount of .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-6

Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior

6

Managerial Decisions with Risk-Averse Consumers: Product Quality

Risk analysis can used to examine situations where consumers are uncertain about product quality.

Consider a consumer who regularly uses Brand X. If a new product enters the market, Brand Y, under what conditions will the consumer be willing to try the new product?

Issues to overcome and consider:

Relative certainty about Brand X.

At equal prices among other things, a risk averse consumer will continue to purchase Brand X, since a risk averse consumer prefers the sure thing (Brand X) to a risky prospect (Brand Y).

Two tactics can be employed to induce a risk averse consumer to try a new product:

Lower the price of Brand Y.

Try to convince consumer the new product’s quality is higher than the old product.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-7

Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior

7

Managerial Decisions with Risk- Averse Consumers

Chain stores: may be in a firm’s best interest to become part of a chain store

Standardization, reputation, increased chance of survival

Online reviews

Insurance: the fact that consumers are risk averse implies they are willing to pay to avoid risk.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

8

Consumer Search

To identify the low-price seller from among many firms selling an identical product, consumers sometimes incur a cost, , to obtain each price quote.

After observing each price quote, a consumer faces must weigh the expected benefit from acquiring an additional price quote with the additional cost.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-9

Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior

9

Consumer Search

Suppose that three-quarters of stores in a market charge and one-quarter charge .

A consumer observing a price of should stop searching since there is no price below .

What should a risk-neutral consumer do after observing a price of , if search occurs with free recall and with replacement?

One-quarter of the time the consumer will save .

Three-quarters of the time the consumer will save nothing.

The expected benefit from an additional search is: .

A consumer should search for a lower price as long as the expected benefits for an additional search are greater than the cost of an additional search.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-10

Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior

10

Optimal Search Strategy

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-11

Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior

Price

Reservation price:

Price at which a consumer

is indifferent between

purchasing at that price and

searching for a lower price.

Expected

benefits

and costs

Acceptance Price Region

Rejection Price Region

11

Consumer’s Search Rule

The optimal search rule is such that the consumer rejects prices above the reservation price, , and accepts prices below the reservation price. Stated differently, the optimal search strategy is to search for a better price when the price charged by a firm is above the reservation price and stop searching when a price below the reservation price is found.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-12

Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior

12

Increasing Cost of Search

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-13

Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior

Price

Expected

benefits

and costs

Due to

Increase

in search

costs.

13

Manager’s Risk Attitudes

While manager must understand the impact of uncertainty on consumer behavior, uncertainty also impacts the manager’s input and output decisions.

Manager’s risk profiles:

Risk averse: a manager who prefers a risky project with a lower expected value if the risk is lower than a project with a higher expected value.

Risk loving: manager who prefers a risky project with higher expected value and higher risk to one with lower expected value and lower risk.

Risk neutral: manager interested in maximizing expected profits; the variance of profits does not impact a risk-neutral manager’s decisions.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-14

Uncertainty and the Firm

14

Risk Aversion In Action: Problem

A risk-averse manager is considering two projects. The first project involves expanding the market for bologna; the second involves expanding the market for caviar. There is a 10 percent chance of recession and a 90 percent chance of an economic boom. The following table summarizes the profits under the different scenarios. Which project should manager undertake, and why?

a

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-15

Uncertainty and the Firm

Project Boom (90%) Recession (10%) Mean Standard Deviation
Bologna -$10,000 $12,000 -$7,800 $6,600
Caviar 20,000 -8,000 17,200 8,400
Joint 10,000 4,000 9,400 1,800
Safe (T-Bill) 3,000 3,000 3,000 0

15

Risk Aversion In Action: Answer

Managers should not invest in T-Bills

The joint project is assured of making at least $4,000, which is greater than $3,000 under the T-Bill scenario.

Since the expected returns of the bologna project are negative, neither a risk-neutral nor a risk-averse manager would choose to undertake this project.

The manager should adopt either the caviar project or the joint project. Which project will depend on his or her risk preferences.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-16

Uncertainty and the Firm

Project Boom (90%) Recession (10%) Mean Standard Deviation
Bologna -$10,000 $12,000 -$7,800 $6,600
Caviar 20,000 -8,000 17,200 8,400
Joint 10,000 4,000 9,400 1,800
Safe (T-Bill) 3,000 3,000 3,000 0

16

Manager’s Risk Attitudes and Diversification

Notice from the previous problem that by investing in multiple projects, the manager may be able to reduce risk.

The process of potentially reducing risk by investing in multiple projects is called diversification.

Whether it is optimal to diversify depends on a manager’s risk preferences and the incentives provided to the manager to avoid risk.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-17

Uncertainty and the Firm

17

Producer Search

When producers are uncertain about the prices of inputs, an optimizing firm will use optimal search strategies.

These strategies mimic consumer search previously developed.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-18

Uncertainty and the Firm

18

Profit Maximization and Uncertainty

The basic principles of profit maximization can be modified to deal with uncertainty.

If demand (hence, revenue) is uncertain and the manager is risk neutral, then the manager will want to maximize expected profits by producing the output where the expected marginal revenue equals marginal cost:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-19

Uncertainty and the Firm

19

Profit Maximization and Uncertainty In Action: Problem

Appleway Industries produces apple juice and sells it in a competitive market. The firm’s manager must determine how much juice to produce before he knows what the market (competitive) price will be. Economists estimate that there is a 30 percent chance the market price will be $2 per gallon and a 70 percent chance it will be $1 per gallon when the juice hits the market. If the firm’s cost function is , how much juice should be produced to maximize expected profits? What are the expected profits of Appleway Industries?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-20

Uncertainty and the Firm

20

Profit Maximization and Uncertainty In Action: Answer

Appleway Industries’ profits are

Since price is uncertain, the firm’s revenues and profit are uncertain. To maximize expected profits, the manager equates expected price with marginal cost.

The expected price is: .

Therefore, manager should produce output where gallons.

Expected profits are $645.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-21

Uncertainty and the Firm

21

Asymmetric Information

Uncertainty can profoundly impact markets abilities to efficiently allocate resources.

Some markets are characterized by individuals who have better information than others.

Implication: Those individuals with the least information may choose not to participate in a market.

When some people have better information than others in a market, the information people have is called asymmetric information.

There are two specific manifestations related to asymmetric information in markets:

Adverse selection

Moral hazard

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-22

Uncertainty and the Market

22

Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection

Adverse selection refers to situations where individuals have hidden characteristics and in which a selection process results in a pool of individuals with undesirable characteristics.

In this context, a hidden characteristic is something that one party to a transaction knows about itself but which are unknown by the other party.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-23

Uncertainty and the Market

23

Asymmetric Information: Moral Hazard

Moral hazard refers to a situation where one party to a contract takes a hidden action that benefits his or her at the expense of another party.

In this context, a hidden action is an action taken by one party in a relationship that cannot be observed by the other party.

One way to mitigate the moral hazard problem is an incentive contract.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-24

Uncertainty and the Market

24

Signaling

Another way to mitigate the problem of moral hazard is signaling, which is an attempt by an informed party to send an observable indicator of his or her hidden characteristics to an uninformed party.

For signaling to be effective it must be:

observable by the uninformed party.

a reliable indicator of the unobservable characteristic(s) and difficult for parties with other characteristics to easily mimic.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-25

Uncertainty and the Market

25

Screening

A final way to mitigate the moral hazard problem is by screening, which is an attempt by an uninformed party to sort individuals according to their characteristics.

Screening may be achieved through a self-selection device.

A self-selection device is a mechanism in which informed parties are presented with a set of options, and the options they choose reveal their hidden characteristics to an uninformed party.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-26

Uncertainty and the Market

26

Types of Auctions

An auction is a mechanism where potential buyers compete for the right to own a good, service, or, more generally, anything of value.

Sellers participating in an auction offer an item for sale, and wish to obtain the highest price.

Buyers participating in an auction seek to obtain the item at the lowest possible price.

Bidders’ risk preferences can affect bidding strategies and the expected revenue a seller receives.

Four basic auction types:

English (ascending-bid)

First-price, sealed-bid

Second-price, sealed-bid

Dutch (descending-bid)

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-27

Auctions

27

Differences Among Auctions Types

The timing of bidder decisions (simultaneously or sequentially)

The amount the winner is required to pay.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-28

Auctions

28

English Auction

An English auction is an ascending sequential-bid auction in which bidders observe the bids of others and decide whether or not to increase the bid. The auction ends when a single bidder remains; this bidder obtains the item and pays the auctioneer the amount of the bid.

Bidders continually obtain information about one another’s bids.

Bidder who values the item the most will win.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-29

Auctions

29

First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction

A first-price, sealed-bid auction is a simultaneous-move auction in which bidders simultaneously submit bids to an auctioneer. The auctioneer awards the item to the highest bidder, who pays the amount bid.

Bidders obtain no information about one another’s bids.

Bidder who values the item the most will win.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-30

Auctions

30

Second-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction

A second-price, sealed-bid auction is a simultaneous-move auction in which bidders simultaneously submit bids to an auctioneer. The auctioneer awards the item to the highest bidder, who pays the amount bid by the second-highest bidder.

Bidders obtain no information about one another’s bids.

Bidder who values the item the most will win, but pays the second-highest bid.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-31

Auctions

31

Dutch Auction

A Dutch auction is a descending sequential-bid auction in which the auctioneer beings with a high asking price and gradually reduces the asking price until one bidder announces a willingness to pay that price for the item.

Bidders obtain no information about one another’s bids throughout the auction process.

Bidder who values the item the most will win and pay the amount of his or her bid.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-32

Auctions

32

Strategic Equivalence of Dutch and First-Price Auctions

The Dutch and first-price, sealed-bid auctions are strategically equivalent; that is, the optimal bids by participants are identical for both types of auctions.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-33

Auctions

33

Information Structures

While the four auction types differ with respect to the information bidders have about the bids of other bidders, bidders also have different information structures about the value of their own bids.

Perfect information

Independent private values

Affiliated (or correlated) value estimates

Special case: common-value auctions

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-34

Auctions

34

Optimal Bidding Strategies for Risk-Neutral Bidders

An optimal bidding strategy for risk-neutral bidders is a strategy that maximizes a bidder’s expected profit.

Optimal bids depends on the

type of auction.

information available to bidders at the time of bidding.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-35

Auctions

35

Strategies for Independent Private Value Auctions

With independent private values, bidders know his or her own values prior to the auction start.

English auction

Remain active until the price exceeds his or her own valuation of the object.

Second-price, sealed-bid auction

Bid his or her own valuation of the item. This is a dominant strategy.

First-price, sealed-bid auction (strategically equivalent to the Dutch auction)

Bid less than his or her valuation of the item. If there are bidders who all perceive valuations to be evenly (or uniformly) distributed between a lowest and highest possible valuations, and , respectively, then the optimal bid, , for a player whose own valuation is is:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-36

Auctions

36

Strategies for Independent Private Value Auctions In Action: Problem

Consider an auction where bidders have independent private values. Each bidder perceives that valuations are evenly distributed between and . Sam knows his own valuation is . Determine Sam’s optimal bidding strategy in:

A first-price, sealed-bid auction with two bidders.

A Dutch auction with three bidders.

A second-price, sealed-bid auction with 20 bidders.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-37

Auctions

37

Strategies for Independent Private Value Auctions In Action: Answer

Sam’s optimal bid in a first-price, sealed-bid auction with two bidders is .

Sam’s optimal bid in a Dutch auction with three bidders is .

Sam’s optimal bid in a second-price, sealed-bid auction with 20 bidders is to bid his true valuation, which is .

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-38

Auctions

38

Strategies for Correlated Values Auctions

Bidders do not know their own valuations for an item, nor others’ valuations.

Implication: makes bidders vulnerable to the winner’s curse, which is the “bad news” conveyed to the winner that his or her estimate of the item’s value exceeds the estimates of all other bidders.

To avoid the winner’s curve in a common-value auction, a bidder should revise downward his or her private estimate of the value to account for this fact.

The auction process may reveal information about how much the other bidders value the object.

The winner’s curse is most pronounced in sealed-bid auctions since bidders don’t learn about other player’s valuation.

English auction, in contrast, provides bidders with information. Therefore, bidders may have to revise up their initial bids.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-39

Auctions

39

Expected Revenues in Alternative Types of Auctions

Comparison of expected revenue in auctions with risk-neutral bidders

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

12-40

Auctions

Information structure Expected revenues
Independent private values English=Second-price = First-Price = Dutch
Affiliated value estimates English > Second-price > First-price = Dutch

40

Baye_9e_Chapter_13.pptx

Advanced Topics in Business Strategy

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 13

Learning Objectives

Explain the economic basis for limit pricing, and identify the conditions under which a firm can profit from such a strategy.

Explain the economic basis for predatory pricing.

Show how a manager can profitably lessen competition by raising rivals’ costs.

Identify some of the adverse legal ramifications of business strategies designed to lessen competition.

Assess whether a firm’s profits can be enhanced by changing the timing of decisions or the order of strategic moves, and whether doing so creates first- or second-mover advantages.

Identify examples of networks and network externalities, and determine the number of connections possible in a star network with n users.

Explain why networks often lead to first-mover advantages, and how to use strategies such a penetration pricing to favorably change the strategic environment.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

Successful businesses often spawn entry of new competitors into the market, and adversely affect the profits of existing firms.

Faced with that threat, a manager may consider limit pricing, which is a strategy where an incumbent maintains a price below the monopoly level in order to prevent entry.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-3

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

3

Monopoly Pricing

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-4

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC

ATC

)

Profits

4

Limit Pricing and Residual Demand

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-5

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

Price

Quantity

Demand

Entrant’s residual

demand curve

AC

5

Limit Pricing May Fail to Deter Entry

Under limit pricing, the entrant was assumed to have complete information about the incumbent’s demand and costs.

The strategy did not “hide” information about the profitability of the incumbent’s business.

The low price charged by the incumbent did not prevent entry; the entrant stayed out because it believed the incumbent would produce at least , if it entered.

A revised strategy is to set the monopoly price, , and produce the monopoly output, , and threaten to expand output to , if entry occurs.

This, however, is not a credible threat; so, a rational entrant would find it profitable to enter if the incumbent sets price,

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-6

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

6

Effective Limit Pricing

For limit pricing to effectively prevent entry by rational competitors, the preentry price must be linked to the postentry profits of potential entrants.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-7

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

7

Linking Preentry Price to Postentry Profits

Commitment mechanisms

Learning curve effects

Incomplete information

Reputation effects

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-8

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

8

Dynamic Considerations

Even if the incumbent can link preentry price to postentry profits, it may be more profitable to permit entry.

The present value of maintaining monopoly status is:

Entry from monopoly to duopoly profits, where :

Since , entry will harm the incumbent.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-9

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

9

Dynamic Considerations

Profits under effective limit pricing:

Limit pricing is profitable when:

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-10

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

Conditions for Dynamic Considerations

The conditions under which limit pricing is attractive include:

Low interest rate environments

Monopoly and limit-price profits are close

Duopoly profits are significantly lower than limit-price profits.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-11

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

11

Dynamic Considerations In Action: Problem

Baker Enterprises operates a midsized company that specializes in the production of a unique type of memory chip. It is currently the only firm in the market, and it earns million per year by charging the monopoly price of per chip.

Baker is concerned that a new firm might soon attempt to clone its product. If successful, this would reduce Baker’s profit to million per year. Estimates indicate that, if Baker increases its output to units (which would lower its price to per chip), the entrant will stay out of the market and Baker will earn profits of million per year for the indefinite future.

What must Baker do to credibly deter entry by limit pricing?

Does it make sense for Baker to limit price if the interest rate is 10 percent?

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-12

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

12

Dynamic Considerations In Action: Answer

What must Baker do to credibly deter entry by limit pricing?

Baker must “tie its hands” to prevent itself from cutting output below units if entry occurs, and this commitment must be observable to potential entrants before they make their decision to enter or not enter.

Does it make sense for Baker to limit price if the interest rate is 10 percent?

Limit pricing is profitable if .

Therefore, limit pricing is profitable.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-13

Limit Pricing to Prevent Entry

13

Predatory Pricing to Lessen Competition

Predatory pricing is a strategy where a firm temporarily prices below its marginal cost to drive existing competitors out of the market.

Involves a trade-off between current and future profits, so it is profitable only when the present value of the higher future profits offsets the losses required to drive rivals out of the market.

A firm engaging in predatory pricing must have “deeper pockets” (greater financial resources) than the prey in order to outlast it.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-14

Predatory Pricing to Lessen Competition

14

Predatory Pricing Counterstrategies

To significantly reduce the profitability of predatory pricing, the prey may:

Stop production entirely and cause the predator to lose more money each period.

Purchase the product from the predator and stockpile it to sell when predatory pricing ceases.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-15

Predatory Pricing to Lessen Competition

15

Legality of Predatory Pricing

Engaging is predatory pricing is vulnerable to prosecution under the Sherman Antitrust Act; however, it is often difficult to prove in court.

Some legitimate business practices/scenarios might be deemed “predatory” under legal definitions.

Fierce competition with substantial fixed cost may lead to the departure of the weakest firm.

Firms attempting to penetrate a market with a new product often find it advantageous to sell the product at a low price or give it away for free initially.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-16

Predatory Pricing to Lessen Competition

16

Predatory Pricing In Action: Problem

Baker Enterprises operates a midsized company that specializes in the production of a unique type of memory chip. If Baker were a monopolist, it could earn million per year for an indefinite period of time by charging the monopoly price of per chip. While Baker could have thwarted the entry of potential rivals by limit pricing, it opted against doing so, and it is now in a duopoly situation, earning annual profits of million per year for the foreseeable future.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-17

Predatory Pricing to Lessen Competition

17

Predatory Pricing In Action: Problem

If Baker drops its price to per chip and holds it there for one year, it will be able to drive the other firm out of the market and retain its monopoly position indefinitely. Over the year in which it engages in predatory pricing, however, Baker will lose million. Ignoring legal considerations, is predatory pricing a profitable strategy? Assume the interest rate is 10 percent and, for simplicity, that any current period profits or losses occur immediately (at the beginning of the year).

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-18

Predatory Pricing to Lessen Competition

Predatory Pricing In Action: Answer

If Baker does not engage in predatory pricing, the present value of its earnings (including its current million in earnings) will be

If Baker uses predatory pricing, the present value of its current and future profits will be

Profits are lower under predatory pricing.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-19

Predatory Pricing to Lessen Competition

19

Raising Rival’s Costs to Lessen Competition

Raising rivals’ costs is a strategy in which a firm gains an advantage over competitors by increasing their costs.

Strategies involving marginal cost.

Strategies involving fixed cost.

Strategies for vertically integrated firms.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-20

Raising Rivals’ Cost to Lessen Competition

20

Raising a Rival’s Marginal Cost

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-21

Raising Rivals’ Cost to Lessen Competition

Quantity2

Quantity1

A

B

21

Raising a Rival’s Fixed Cost

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-22

Raising Rivals’ Cost to Lessen Competition

E

E

I

$90 License

Enter

Enter

Don’t enter

Don’t enter

No license

22

Raising Rivals’ Costs: Vertically Integrated Firms

A vertically integrated firm with market power in the upstream (input) market may be able to exploit this power to raise rivals’ costs in downstream markets.

Vertical foreclosure

Strategy wherein a vertically integrated firm charges downstream rivals a prohibitive price for an essential input, thus forcing rivals to use more costly substitutes or go out of business.

Price-cost squeeze

Tactic used by a vertically integrated firm to squeeze the margins of its competitors.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-23

Raising Rivals’ Cost to Lessen Competition

23

Price Discrimination as a Strategic Tool

Price discrimination – the practice of charging different prices to different consumers – enhances the profitability of predatory pricing, limit pricing and raising rivals’ costs.

Price discrimination means firms only to have lower prices to targeted consumer groups and mitigates the negative aspects of limit pricing and predatory pricing.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-24

Price Discrimination as a Strategic Tool

24

First-Mover Advantages

A first-mover advantage permits a firm to earn a higher payoff by committing to a decision before its rivals get a chance to commit to their decisions.

Changing the timing of a game to move from a simultaneous-move to sequential-move game can yield one player a first-mover advantage.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-25

Changing the Timing of Decisions or the Order of Moves

25

Simultaneous-Move Production Game

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-26

Changing the Timing of Decisions or the Order of Moves

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low output High output
Low output $30, $10 $10, $15
High output $20 , $5 $1, $2

Firm A has a dominant strategy: Low output

Nash equilibrium: Firm A produces Low output, Firm B produces High output.

Firm A Firm B
Strategy Low output High output
Low output $30, $10 $10, $15
High output $20 , $5 $1, $2

26

Sequential-Move Production Game

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-27

Changing the Timing of Decisions or the Order of Moves

B

B

A

Low output

Low output

Low output

High output

High output

High output

Changing the timing of the game,

Firm A gets to move first.

Unique, subgame perfect

equilibrium is:

Firm A: produce High output

Firm B:

produce Low output, if Firm A produces High output

produce High output, if Firm A produces Low output

First-mover

advantage

permits

Firm A to

earn $20

Instead of

$10.

27

Second-Mover Advantages

A second-mover advantage can permit a firm to earn a higher payoff by free-riding on the investments made by the first mover and produce at lower costs.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-28

Changing the Timing of Decisions or the Order of Moves

28

What is a Network?

A network consists of links that connect different points (called nodes) in geographic or economic space.

One-way networks

Two-way networks

Star networks

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-29

Penetration Pricing to Overcome Network Effects

29

Two-Way, Star Network

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-30

Penetration Pricing to Overcome Network Effects

30

Direct Network Externalities

Two-way networks that link users exhibit positive externalities called direct network externalities.

The direct value enjoyed by the user of a network because others also use the network.

Principle: Direct network externalities

A two-way network linking users provides potential connection services. If one new user joins the network, all the existing users directly benefit because the new user adds potential connection services to the network.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-31

Penetration Pricing to Overcome Network Effects

31

Indirect Network Externalities

An indirect network externality is the indirect value enjoyed by the user of a network because of complementarities between the size of a network and the availability of complementary products or services.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-32

Penetration Pricing to Overcome Network Effects

32

Negative Network Externalities

Negative network externalities exist when an additional user to the network decreases the value per user of the services.

Congestion

Bottlenecks

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-33

Penetration Pricing to Overcome Network Effects

33

First-Mover Advantages Due to Consumer Lock-In

The presence of network externalities often make it difficult for new networks to replace or compete with existing networks; even a technologically superior network.

Existing network likely have an installed user base and complementary services compared to a new network.

Network externalities can create consumer lock-in: a scenario in which consumers are stuck in a situation (equilibrium) where they are using an inferior network.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-34

Penetration Pricing to Overcome Network Effects

34

Using Penetration Pricing to “Change the Game”

Consumer lock-in resulting from an existing network might be easily resolved by communication between two users; however communication is not feasible with potentially hundreds of millions of users because of transaction costs.

What hope does a firm have of establishing its new network?

One strategy, penetration pricing, involves charging a low price initially to penetrate a market and gain a critical mass of customers; useful when strong network effects are present.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

13-35

Penetration Pricing to Overcome Network Effects

35

Baye_9e_Chapter_14.pptx

A Manager’s Guide to Government in the Marketplace

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Authorized only for instructor use in the classroom. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.

Chapter 14

Learning Objectives

Identify four sources of market failure.

Explain why market power reduces social welfare, and identify two types of government policies aimed at reducing deadweight loss.

Show why externalities can lead competitive markets to provide socially inefficient quantities of goods and services; explain how government policies, such as the Clean Air Act, can improve resource allocation.

Show why competitive markets fail to provide socially efficient levels of public goods; explain how the government can mitigate these inefficiencies.

Explain why incomplete information compromises the efficiency of markets, and identify five government policies aimed at mitigating these problems.

Explain why government attempts to solve market failures can lead to additional inefficiencies because of “rent-seeking” activities.

Show how government policies in international markets, such as quotas and tariffs, impact the prices and quantities of domestic goods and services.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2

Market Power

The socially efficient quantity in a market occurs where price equals marginal cost. This quantity maximizes the sum of consumer and producer surplus.

This socially efficient price and quantity arise naturally in a perfectly competitive market.

When a firm in a market produces an output that is less than the socially efficient level because it charges a price that exceeds marginal cost, the firm has market power.

The value to society of producing another unit is greater than the cost to produce another unit.

Government may intervene in the market in attempt to increase social welfare.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-3

Market Failure

3

Welfare and Deadweight Loss Under Monopoly In Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-4

Market Failure

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC

Deadweight loss

Social welfare

4

Antitrust Policy

The purpose of antitrust policy is to eliminate the deadweight loss of monopoly by making it illegal for manager to engage in activities that foster monopoly power.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-5

Market Failure

5

Antitrust Policy: Sherman Act, Section 1

The cornerstone of U.S. antitrust policy are Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890:

Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars (one million dollars if a corporation, or, if an other person, one hundred thousand dollars) or by imprisonment not exceeding one (three) years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-6

Market Failure

6

Antitrust Policy: Sherman Act, Section 2

Section 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars (one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars) or by imprisonment not exceeding one (three) years, or both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-7

Market Failure

7

Antitrust Policy: Rule of Reason

Interpretation of antitrust policy is shaped by the courts, which rule on ambiguities in the law and previous cases.

In the Supreme Court’s ruling on Standard Oil Trust, the Court defined a new rule of reason, which effectively stipulates

that not all trade restraints are illegal; rather, only those that are “unreasonable” are prohibited.

Problems with the rule of reason:

It is difficult for managers to know in advance whether particular pricing strategies or other actions used to enhance profits are in fact violations of the law.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-8

Market Failure

8

Antitrust Policy: Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts

To make more precise what actions are deemed illegal in antitrust law the U.S. Congress passed the Clayton Act (1914) and Robinson-Patman Act (1936).

These acts make price discrimination – aimed to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the line of commerce, or injure, destroy, or prevent competition – illegal.

Price discrimination is permitted under these acts when

it arises because of cost or quality differences.

it is necessary to meet a competitor’s price in a market.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-9

Market Failure

9

Antitrust Policy: Clayton Act

Illegal actions for firms under the Clayton Act:

Hide kickbacks as commissions or brokerage fees.

Use rebates unless they are made available to all customers.

Engage in exclusive dealings with a supplier unless the supplier adds to the furnishing of the buyer and/or offers to make like terms to all other potential suppliers.

Fix prices or engage in exclusive contracts if such a practice will lead to lessening of competition or monopoly.

Acquire one or more other firms if such an acquisition will lead to a lessening of competition.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-10

Market Failure

10

Antitrust Policy: Celler-Kefavuer Act

The Celler-Kefavuer Act (1950) strengthened the Clayton Act by making it more difficult for firms to engage in mergers and acquisitions without violating the law.

Merger policy was furthered changed when new horizontal merger guidelines were written in 1982; amended in 1984, and revised in 1992, 1997, and 2010.

Guidelines based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI): , where is firm ’s market share.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-11

Market Failure

11

Antitrust Policy: Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Merger that increases HHI by less than 100 or leads to an unconcentrated market (post-merger is typically permitted.

Markets are considered moderately concentrated when the post-meger results in:

Mergers with an HHI in this range and increase the HHI by more than 100 points potentially raise antitrust concerns.

Markets are considered highly concentrated when the post-merger .

Mergers with an HHI in this range and increase the HHI between 100 and 200 points potentially raise antitrust concerns.

If a merger increases the HHI by more than 200 points and leads to a highly concentrated market, it is presumed to enhance market power.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-12

Market Failure

12

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (1976) requires that the parties to an acquisition notify both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of their intent to merge, provided that the dollar value of the transaction exceeds a certain threshold (currently about $80 million).

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-13

Market Failure

13

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act

Following this premerger notification, the parties of the merger must wait 30 days before they may complete the merger transaction.

If the DOJ and FTC determine that further examination is warranted, a second request is issued that extends the waiting period. Once the additional information is requested, the government has another 30 days to review the information and file a complaint to block the merger or permit it to move forward.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

2-14

Market Failure

Price Regulation

The presence of large scale economies may make it desirable for a single firm to service an entire market.

In these instances, government may permit a monopoly to exist, but regulate its price in effort to reduce the deadweight loss.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-15

Market Failure

15

Regulating a Monopolist’s Price at the Socially Efficient Level

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-16

Market Failure

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC

Regulated price

Effective demand

16

Regulating a Monopolist’s Price Below the Socially Efficient Level

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-17

Market Failure

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC

Regulated price

Shortage

Deadweight loss

before regulation

Deadweight loss

after regulation

17

A Case Where Drives the Monopolist Out of Business

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-18

Market Failure

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC

Regulated price

ATC

18

Externalities

Negative externalities exist when costs are borne by parties who are not involved in the production or consumption of a good or service.

The reason externalities cause a “market failure” is the absence of well-defined property rights.

The failure is often resolved when a government defines itself to be the owner of the environment, and uses its power to induce the socially efficient levels of output and pollution.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-19

Market Failure

19

The Socially Efficient Equilibrium in the Presence of External Costs

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-20

Market Failure

Output of steel

Price

of

steel

(internal costs)

0

Demand

Marginal cost to society of

producing steel

(internal and external costs)

Marginal cost of

pollution to society

(external costs)

A

B

Free market

equilibrium

C

Socially

efficient

equilibrium

20

Externalities: The Clean Air Act

To solve the externality problem caused by pollution, the U.S. Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1970 and made sweeping changes with amendments in 1990.

Firms that operate in industries that release over 10 tons per year, or 25 tons per year of a combination of pollutants, on a specified list are required to obtain a permit to emit pollution into the environment.

The Clean Air Act causes firms to internalize the cost of emitting pollutants since the permits are costly to acquire.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-21

Market Failure

21

Impact of the Clean Air Act In Action

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-22

Market Failure

Market output

Price

0

Demand

Due to reduction in

output by all firms

22

Public Goods

A public good is another type of good that leads to a market failure.

A public good is:

A good that is nonrival and nonexclusionary in nature, and therefore, benefit persons other than those who buy the goods.

Nonrival goods: the consumption of the good by one person does not preclude other people from also consuming the good.

Nonexclusionary good: once provided, no one can be excluded from consuming the good.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-23

Market Failure

23

Public Goods and Inefficiencies

Public goods leads the market to provide inefficient quantities since everyone gets to consume a public good once it is available, but individuals have little incentive to purchase the good; they prefer others to pay for it.

When a group of individuals rely on the efforts or payments of others to provide a good, we say there is a free-rider problem.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-24

Market Failure

24

Demand for a Public a Good

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-25

Market Failure

Quantity of

streetlights

Price

0

of streetlights

Individual demand for streetlights

Individual consumer surplus = $72

Total demand for streetlights

25

The Free-Rider Problem

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-26

Market Failure

Quantity

of streetlights

0

Price

Price

Quantity

of streetlights

of

streetlights

Total demand

by B and C

B’s and C’s

individual demand

A’s demand

for streetlights

A’s consumer

surplus from

free-riding

= $85.50

30

30

26

Incomplete Information

Efficiently functioning markets require participants to have reasonably good information about prices, quality, available technologies, and the risks associated with working particular jobs or consuming particular products.

Market inefficiencies result when participants have incomplete information.

One severe source of market failure is asymmetric information, where some market participants have better information than others.

Implication: buyers may refuse to purchase from sellers.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-27

Market Failure

27

Government Policies Dealing with Asymmetric Information

Rules against insider trading

Certification

Truth in lending

Truth in advertising

Enforcing contracts

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-28

Market Failure

28

Rent Seeking

Government policies can improve the allocation of resources to alleviate market failures.

These policies, however, generally benefit some parties at the expense of others.

Implications: lobbyists spend considerable sums in attempt to influence government policy; a process known as rent seeking.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-29

Rent Seeking

29

Incentives to Engage in Rent-Seeking Activities

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-30

Rent Seeking

Price

Quantity

Demand

MR

MC = AC

C

A

B

30

Quotas

A quota is a government restriction that limits the quantity of imported goods that can legally enter the country.

Implications:

Reduces competition in domestic market

Higher domestic prices

Higher profits for domestic firms

Lower consumer surplus for domestic consumers

Conclusion: Domestic producers benefit at the expense of domestic consumers and foreign producers

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-31

Government Policy and International Markets

31

The Impact of a Foreign Import Quota on the Domestic Market

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-32

Government Policy and International Markets

Price

Demand

G

E

Market supply

before quota

K

Quota

A

B

M

Market supply

after quota

Quantity in the

domestic market

32

Tariffs

A tariff is designed to limit foreign competition in the domestic market to benefit domestic producers, which accrue at the expense of domestic consumers and foreign producers.

Lump-sum tariff: fixed fee that foreign firms must pay the domestic government to be able to sell in the domestic market.

Excise (per-unit) tariff: the fee an importing firm must pay to the domestic government on each unit it brings into the country.

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-33

Government Policy and International Markets

33

Impact of a Lump-Sum Tariff on a Foreign Firm

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-34

Government Policy and International Markets

Price

Quantity of

individual

foreign firm’s

output

MC

AC2

AC1

Average cost

before

lump-sum tariff

Average cost

After lump-sum tariff

34

Impact of a Lump-Sum Tariff on Market Supply

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-35

Government Policy and International Markets

Price

Quantity in the

domestic market

A

Market supply curve

before lump-sum tariff

Market supply curve

after lump-sum tariff

35

Impact of an Excise Tariff on Market Supply

© 2017 by McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

14-36

Government Policy and International Markets

Price

Demand

E

H

A

B

C

Quantity in the

domestic market

Supply before

excise tax

Supply after

excise tax

36