Essentially, and perhaps arguably, there has been no innovation in the social technology of organization development (OD) since appreciative inquiry originated in 1987. It is as if the creative work of OD is done. Moreover, it is as if the mission of OD—to loosen tightly coupled systems, think large bureaucracies—has largely been achieved. Decentralization, involvement, and autonomy on the job are commonplace in many organizations. There is a paradox, however. The need for expertise in organization change has never been greater, and OD has so much to contribute, yet the failure rate for organization change efforts is around 70%, and for mergers and acquisitions the failure rate is even larger. The premise of this article is that there is much work yet to be done. We who identify ourselves with the field of OD have unfinished business. As research on the Zeigarnik effect showed, we tend to remember things undone more than we remember things that have been completed. A purpose of this article is to create a Zeigarnik effect. Four domains of unfinished business in the field are identified and explored. There are no doubt many other domains, but these four definitely need attention. We need to know much more than we now know about how to (a) work with loosely coupled systems, (b) change the culture of an organization, (c) identify and deal with perceived resistance to change more effectively, and (d) get leadership development right—it is not about training.

Keywords

organization development and change, loosely coupled systems, culture change, resis- tance, leadership development

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It is as if organization development (OD), and now in some circles, for example, Academy of Management, referred to as organization development and change (ODC), practitioners believe that the bulk of the creative work for the field has been done. Arguably, there has been little or no new social technology since appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987). Some would contend that the large group interven- tion (Bunker & Alban, 1997) represents new social technology, and in some respects that is a reasonable argument, yet what is new is an expansion and improvement of a former creation—Beckhard’s (1967) confrontation meeting.

It is as if the mission of early OD has been largely achieved. Whether stated in these specific terms or not, the mission of OD has been to loosen tight, bureaucratic organiza- tions. Early work particularly in the 1960s and into the 1970s was with large corpora- tions (General Mills, Esso, TRW Systems, Union Carbide, Pillsbury, Digital Equipment Corporation, Proctor & Gamble, General Foods, Westinghouse, Kaiser Permanente, and General Motors in the United States and organizations such as Volvo and Norsk Hydro in Europe, to name a few), with the Episcopal Church, and in the 1970s with the U.S. Army, where the initiative was labeled organizational effectiveness (OE). In other words, the practice of OD was largely with huge, bureaucratic systems. Although spotty, some degrees of success were accomplished (see, e.g., French & Bell, 1995; Golembiewski, 2003; Macy & Izumi, 1993; Mirvis & Macy, 1983; Porras & Robertson, 1992; Woodman, Bingham, & Yuan, 2008).

Thus, OD emerged in the late 1950s, grew rapidly, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, and to some extent has become established with a body of literature, university and professional programs, and acceptance in many organizations in the United States (Wirtenburg, Abrams, & Ott, 2004) and a number of other countries (Fagenson-Eland, Ensher & Burke, 2004). At present, however, OD is somewhat stagnant with growth leveled and new technology sparse (Bradford & Burke, 2005). With such promise from the 1960s and 1970s and with the need for competence in the world of organization change greater than ever before, it is somewhat puzzling and paradoxical that OD is not more prolific and influential than it is. (Burke, 2008, p. 14)

The purpose of this article, then, is to address the puzzlement and paradox by argu- ing that the field of OD/ODC has considerable unfinished business. Bluma Zeigarnik, a Russian-born psychologist working with Kurt Lewin in Germany at the time, 1927, found in her research that we tend to remember better those tasks that are incomplete. Not having closure in some matter can even nag us until we do complete it, or at least, try to. Thus, a purpose for this article is to attempt to instill a Zeigarnik effect. To be more specific, innovative work is needed especially in four areas of practice: loosely coupled systems, culture change, resistance, and leadership development.

First, a case will be made that the work of OD has been to loosen tight organiza- tions, and some headway has been achieved; at least, we have some knowledge and

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experience of how to deal with tight systems. But the majority of these large systems are still too tight. Control-oriented leaders seem to like it that way.

The second case to be made is to identify where innovation is needed, that is, the four areas mentioned above, and to explore these areas in terms of clarifying what we need to know, where the unfinished business exists.

We will conclude with an admonition about lifelong learning and that without it OD/ODC will remain stagnant.

Before moving on, let me clarify one more point. Although I have cast the two labels, OD and ODC, together they should not be considered as exactly the same. Historically, of course, OD preceded ODC. Some would perhaps like to see ODC as the modern version of OD. But that would mean that the two, except for chronology, are the same and that would not be quite accurate. OD is about planned change, and there is a phased way of practice. Those who classify themselves more with the ODC rubric, and even though there is significant overlap, would nevertheless tend to be more aligned with the academic world than with practice, and they would more likely view ODC as organization change writ large, planned or unplanned. And whereas OD practitioners have typically avoided incorporating such interventions as Six Sigma, reengineering, and work out into their consultative efforts, ODC folks would be more likely to include any and all change interventions into their work.

What the Practice of OD/ODC Has Been As stated before, whether articulated specifically or not the mission of OD along with the field’s value system has been for the most part to loosen tight organizations. This loosening process has emphasized involvement and participation with the mantra being “involvement leads to commitment.” Bureaucracy was choking the life out of organizations. The beginnings of OD, circa 1959, were about “bottom-up manage- ment” with Douglas McGregor and Richard Beckhard at General Mills (Beckhard, 1997), and the use of T-Group methodology and the early stages of the Managerial Grid to “open up” Esso, Humble Oil and related companies and refineries (now Exxon- Mobil) by Herb Shepard, Robert R. Blake, and Jane S. Mouton (French & Bell, 1995).

This loosening process was also about humanizing the work place. Maslow’s (1954) self-actualization, Herzberg’s (1966) job enrichment, Hackman and Oldham’s (1980) job redesign for more meaningful work, Dyer’s (1987) teamwork, Hackman’s (1992) self-directed groups, Blake and Mouton’s (1968) 9/9 (participative) manage- ment, and Likert’s (1967) System 4-consensus management were all contributions to the movement. Also, learning about and confronting issues of authority from a psycho- analytic perspective were part of this humanizing and democratizing process (Bion, 1961; Rioch, 1970).

Putting life into organizations, then, concerned the humanizing of work and OD was essentially an all-out attack on bureaucracy. A primary general leading the attack was Warren Bennis. In fact, he declared at the time “the coming death of bureaucracy”

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(Bennis, 1966). Bureaucracy, according to Bennis, was vulnerable because of (a) its inability to cope with the growing pace of change, (b) the sheer size of most bureaucra- cies, (c) the fact that the workplace was becoming more diverse and highly special- ized, and (d) the newer philosophy promoted by OD of humanizing the workplace. Bennis was not alone. Tannenbaum and Davis (1969) were similar in their beliefs about bureaucracies and the need for changing values more toward humanistic aims.

But a few years later, Bennis (1970) was more pessimistic. His experience of trying to run two different universities caused him to doubt what he had stated earlier regard- ing the death of bureaucracy. Yet others took up the clarion call. V. E. Schein and Greiner (1977), for example, discussed “behavioral diseases” of bureaucracies such as functional myopia and suboptimization, top-down information flow and problem insensitivity, and routine jobs and dissatisfaction, and how OD served as an antidote, if not cure, for these diseases. And although not in the OD field per se, others were also on the attack regarding the inefficiencies, if not oppression, of bureaucracy—see, for example, Ackoff (1974), Freire (1970), and Thompson (1967). Later in 1980, a special issue of The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science was devoted to “Bureaucracy in the Eighties” (Littrell & Sjoberg, 1980). Littrell (1980) in the introduction pointed out that the contributors for this issue

identified four urgently important themes . . . that will benefit from addressing the changes in power relations that affect:

1. the openness of organizational structure 2. the nature of participative management 3. the responsibility of social and welfare problems, and 4. the impact of organizational relations upon economic problems. (p. 273)

Littrell went on to suggest that research and action for the coming decade would benefit from following these four themes. In my article for this special issue (Burke, 1980), I was rather pessimistic about changing bureaucracies and that “tinkering” with change would not fundamentally change anything. The organization’s culture had to be tack- led, and I recommended three types of interventions: (a) group, for example, promoting more self-directed groups; (b) participative management as a way of decentralizing power; and (c) installing flexible reward systems that were based more on intrinsic than extrinsic rewards.

In spite of pessimism, OD practitioners in the late 1970s and 1980s continued to chip away at bureaucracy, and their underlying values of openness, confronting issues instead of sweeping them under the rug, and humanistic interventions in general pro- vided direction and motivation. One way that bureaucracy was confronted was to “invent” a parallel organization. An example was the work of Howard Carlson at General Motors (Miller, 1978). He created a “time out” process whereby members of an organization would suspend for a day all rules, norms, and hierarchy of how the company normally operated. During this suspended time, open discussions with everyone having a voice would be conducted, and problems, even “sacred cows,”

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would be confronted and often solved. Interpersonal issues would also be dealt with in an open manner. The role of Carlson was to facilitate these meetings and help ensure a “safety net” for organizational members so that they could feel free to express them- selves. Stein and Kanter (1980) also experimented with such processes, and the U.S. Army’s “After Action Review” is another form of a similar process.

Innovation in the practice of OD continued with prime examples being the advent of appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987) and large group interventions (Bunker & Alban, 1997).

Coming now to the second decade of the 21st century, it is rather clear that organiza- tions, certainly in the corporate sector, are not as bureaucratic as was true in the 1960s and 1970s. Decentralization has been the bias for a number of years now. I know of at least one Fortune 100 company that has upward of 100 separate businesses with each business head operating quite autonomously. Yet with growth now stagnant and cost containment paramount, the change effort being launched is one of tightening and cen- tralizing. Assuming that this change is diligently pursued, things will be difficult, to say the least. Once autonomy has been given, taking even some of it back will cause heavy resistance and strong feelings.

Can OD/ODC practitioners help here? Loosening a tight system is one thing; tight- ening it is quite another. So new learning for the field is required. The innovative work is not done. From my perspective, the new learning is required in at least four areas, as noted above. We begin the four with loosely coupled systems.

Have We Become Too Loose? The primary premise of this section is to argue that we ODC practitioners have paid insufficient attention to the nature of loosely coupled systems by concentrating most of the practice work on attempting to loosen tightly coupled systems. First, let us consider a summary of what constitutes a loosely coupled system and then address what we as ODC practitioners need to know about how to work with these kinds of organizations.

Loosely Coupled Systems It is natural and often useful in our attempt to understand something to consider its opposite; in this case, a loosely coupled versus a tightly coupled system. Comparatively speaking, a university is a loosely coupled system—see Weick’s (1976) classic article as illustrative—and the U.S. Army is a tightly coupled system. Two concepts easily come to mind to help understand “looseness” versus “tightness”: hierarchy and inter- dependence. Both a university and the U.S. Army have hierarchies, but in a university it is rather flat and decentralized with a major constituency, the faculty, largely ignor- ing the “chain of command.” A long-standing debate has been about who is actually in charge—the faculty or the administration. In the U.S. Army, the hierarchy is steep, centralized, and extremely clear about who is in charge. The chain of command is

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sacrosanct. With respect to interdependence, the more units within the organization depend on one another for accomplishing the organization’s mission and its goals, the more tightly coupled the system is considered to be. Accomplishing the mission in the Army is a strongly interdependent process. In the university, departments rarely cross boundaries much less cooperate with one another. Interdisciplinary efforts are some- times discussed but almost never realized. Independence is much more the name of the game than interdependence.

Describing these two organizations in this bifurcated way causes us to think unidi- mensionally with loose on one end and tight on the other. But according to Orton and Weick (1990), a dialectical way of thinking about loose versus tight is a more realistic and accurate mode for considering these two concepts. In other words, a system can simultaneously be both loose and tight. It is like asking the question of whether an organization should be centralized or decentralized. The answer to this question is both. The better question to pose is which organizational functions should be central- ized, such as finance, and which ones decentralized, such as human resources.

In an effort to understand the dialectical nature or quality of loosely and tightly coupled systems, Orton and Weick (1990) considered more than 100 studies and then summarized them into five categories: (a) causation, (b) typology, (c) effects, (d) com- pensations, and (e) outcomes.

Causation. The question here is what causes loose coupling. According to Orton and Weick’s (1990) study, there are at least three factors: (a) Causal indeterminacy— unclear means–end connections; for example, improving product and service qual- ity do not appear to lead to higher customer satisfaction. (b) Fragmental external environment—increased complexity of the marketplace; for example, new competi- tors who seem to come from out of nowhere. (c) Fragmented internal environment— high differentiation of functions with little integration. The point with causation is that the more organizational elements that differentiate an organization, the more there are differentiated responses and, in turn, loose coupling.

Typology. All loose couplings are not the same. From their study of the literature, Orton and Weick (1990) identified at least eight different types—individuals, sub- units, organizations, hierarchical levels, organizational external environments, ideas, activities, and intentions and actions. With this category, Orton and Weick are simply meaning that loose coupling can take many forms ranging from among and between individuals to ideas and activities, and so on.

Direct effects. This category refers to the fact that loose coupling can be advocated by certain organizational members, that is, loosening the way we do this or that aspect of our work is a good thing. The “work-out” initiative at General Electric a number of years ago is an example: “We do not need to do this procedure anymore; it does not contribute to the overall effort.” In this example, it is more a process of “de-coupling” that usually leads to “loosening.”

Compensations. This category can be considered the opposite of direct effects, that is, loose coupling is not a good thing. “We need to tighten things.” Managerial strate- gies to tighten too much looseness include (a) enhanced leadership, (b) focused effort,

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and (c) shared values. To compensate for too much looseness, then, would be to provide a stronger and more direct leadership, by emphasizing, say, greater efficiency and cost effectiveness, that is, more control of key variables in the organization, and to focus on values that organizational members share. Orton and Weick (1990) summa- rize this category of compensation by stating that it “preserves a dialectical interpreta- tion when it builds on the premise that looseness on some dimensions should be complemented by coupling on other dimensions” (p. 213).

Organizational outcomes. This fifth and final category from Orton and Weick’s work refers to the effect that loose coupling has on organizational performance. At the orga- nizational level (as opposed to individual or subunit levels), things get more compli- cated. In other words, the causal factors on outcomes are more varied and distant; therefore, the looser the coupling, the more difficult it is to determine what causes what. Orton and Weick (1990) point to evidence (Firestone, 1985; Wilson & Corbett, 1983) in support of this statement, that is, “tightly coupled systems are more condu- cive to systemwide change than loosely coupled systems” (p. 213).

Returning to the example of the university compared with the U.S. Army and the dialectical interpretation of loose–tight, we know that the university and the Army can have both these qualities at the same time. Within the university, departments can be tightly coupled and fight to keep it that way by insisting on the larger system’s being loosely coupled. And with respect to the Army, it is well known that loosely coupled is a much more accurate description of reality during combat conditions than when soldiers are back on the post.

This loose–tight dialectic, of course, falls within other organizational forces that contribute to conflict and consternation such as freedom and constraint, autonomy and relationships, differentiation and integration. For the purpose of organization change, the loose–tight dialectic is particularly important, however. Weick (2001) has contin- ued to help us understand loosely coupled systems when he has focused on change. He has stated that when attempting to change loosely coupled systems the practitioner should

• focus more on change as a continuous process rather than episodic, • assume that change will most likely occur on a small rather than large scale, • emphasize improvisational initiatives more than planned ones, • be more accommodative than constrained, and • operate more locally than in a cosmopolitan manner.

What We Need to Know To be honest, when consulting with organizations to bring about change, I have tended to emphasize the opposite of these five admonitions from Weick (2001), that is, to focus on episodic, large-scale, planned, constrained, and to be more cosmopoli- tan than local. See Table 1 for a summary comparison of these two processes: chang- ing a loosely coupled system and changing a tightly coupled system.

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For the most part, my approach, differing from Weick’s (2001) points about working with loosely coupled systems, has not been inappropriate. My work, after all, has been more with tightly coupled systems. Recently, however, I worked with a very loosely coupled system in an attempt to bring about a significant organization change. The need was to tighten the system, and I relied on typical ODC techniques. The change effort over a span of 2 to 3 years was successful—but only temporarily. The change did not last; in fact, the organization reverted to its previous state. I realized that I have a lot to learn about how to change a loosely coupled system. The story is more com- plicated that these few statements convey—see Noumair, Winderman, and Burke (2010) for the full report—yet what was simple for me to understand was my need to learn more about loosely coupled systems.

The fact that the work of ODC practitioners since the 1960s has been more with tightly than loosely coupled systems means that we, at least speaking for myself, are deficient in our knowledge of and how to work with loosely coupled systems. Consulting (a) in a continuous manner, (b) on a small scale, (c) improvisationally, (d) accomodatively, and (e) locally all seem to demand that we move away from our comfort zones and create new approaches and techniques for changing those organiza- tions that are largely loosely coupled, such as a network, a consortium, strategic alli- ance, partnership, university, or a cooperative, to name just a few examples. Kaplan (1982) described a situation where using a large group intervention could have possi- bly helped with his work in a loosely coupled system. Also applying concepts and techniques from the field of network analysis might help our work with loosely cou- pled systems.

Whether loosely or tightly coupled, all organizations have a culture. If we are serious about changing an organization fundamentally, we must sooner or later tackle its culture—the norms, deeply held beliefs, and eventually the collective uncon- scious. We need to know more about how to address and make these kinds of changes that lie deep inside the organization. The following section considers these kinds of changes.

Table 1. A Comparison of Changing a Loosely Coupled System (LCS) With a Tightly Coupled System (TCS)

Dimension for Comparison Process for Changing an LCS Process for Changing a TCS

Focus Continuous Episodic Scale Small Large Type of initiative Improvisational Planned Consulting process Accommodative Constrained Locus of change Local Cosmopolitan

Note. Weick (2001).

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You Don’t Change Organizational Culture by Trying to Change the Culture

Suppose I ask you to rank order the following three concepts from most difficult to change to least difficult to change:

• values • attitudes • behavior

You would no doubt agree that the order in which the three are listed is the answer to my ranking request. This is not to say that behavior is easy to change. Among these three, behavior is comparatively the least difficult with values being the most difficult. Values are fundamental to culture. In trying to change organizational culture, then, why would you begin with the most difficult aspect? The point is that you would start with behavior change to have an impact—eventually—on the fundamentals of orga- nizational culture.

Not so fast you might think. Don’t you need to define what the desired culture should be? Absolutely. And this defining should be incorporated into the organiza- tional vision for the future. In the case of culture change at British Airways (BA; Burke, 2011; Goodstein & Burke, 1991), it was a matter of defining the desired culture as one that was more responsive to the marketplace and in particular to the passenger who purchased a ticket to travel in their airplanes. The intention was for the new culture to be more market driven and less operations driven, as had been true from the origination of BA, without sacrificing the importance of and attention to safety. So it is a matter of determining the right set of behaviors, in this case, for example, to manage the BA frontline employees in a more open, considerate, and participative manner so that they, in turn, would be more attentive and considerate of the customer.

But determining the right behaviors is only half of the change effort. It is also a matter of getting beneath the surface of day-to-day behavior, attempting to understand the unspoken, the deep structure (Gersick, 1991); in other words, E. H. Schein’s (2004) third level of organizational culture—basic underlying assumptions. Yet during the initial stages of an organization change effort, we do not know what these unspoken, beneath-the-surface concerns and factors are. Much if not most qualities and dimen- sions of the culture are difficult to identify and to define and therefore difficult to anticipate. They do not emerge very readily until challenged and questioned by change initiatives. Thus, reactions to these initiatives (interventions), sometimes in the form of resistance, become significant and directional, with respect to subsequent steps in the change process. Not surprisingly, Kurt Lewin told us about this reactive quality a long time ago when he said something like, “If you really want to understand (diag- nose in more depth) an organization, try to change it.” These reactions to intervening

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into the system give us clues about the unspoken, what is hard to articulate, and what may be sacred and perhaps untouchable. My favorite metaphor for this phenomenon that Lewin identified is the scene of a young child throwing a pebble into a shallow, clear pond. Instead of following the pebble to the bottom to see where it lands, it is more important to follow the ripples across the pond’s surface. These ripples are the clues about where to look deeper into the personality of the organization. In BA, it was about power and authority, and to some extent, obvious. After all, BA originated from the Royal Air Force of World War II. But in civilian clothes, the BA culture in the 1980s was more about what represented power and how authority was exercised than power and authority per se and in a traditional sense—the hierarchy, command and control, and obedience. It was more about information—who had it and how it was disseminated if shared at all. Wielding influence via information was not obvious at the outset of the BA culture change effort.

In summary, organizational culture change begins with identifying the desired cul- ture, its characteristics and relevant values, but then moving quickly to determining what the primary behaviors are that will lead to these new, desired qualities. The emphasis needs to be on these key behaviors not so much on the values and the desired culture per se. In other words, it is a movement first particularly with managers “walking” in a new direction. The focus in not on mangers’ “mental sets”; it is more about overt behavior than cognition. This process and way of initiating change is consistent with and follows the principles of the James–Lange theory rather than concentrating ini- tially on attitudes and values. Cognitive change follows behavior change—see Burke (2011) for more details on these principles of change.

The second half of organizational culture change, therefore, is a process of getting at and attempting to discern as clearly as possible underlying assumptions that organi- zational members hold about the “way things are done around here.” But these mem- bers usually are not that consciously aware of these deeply held beliefs and assumptions. Interviewing them is not likely to be all that useful but observing their reactions to change initiatives and interventions can be very diagnostic. We need new tools or the revision of old tools to help us get at the underbelly of an organization’s culture—a segue to the closing part of this section.

Innovation Needed At least 70% of organization change efforts fail, failure meaning not attaining the goals for change or accomplishing change but the attainment does not last. The fail- ure rate is even higher for mergers and acquisitions (Burke & Biggart, 1997), and I suspect the same to be true for attempts at culture change. The message is clear: This rate of failure is unacceptable. We need new or revised social technology. There are at least three categories of need here: (a) overt techniques, (b) covert tools and techniques, and (c) the same need for sustaining change efforts, that is, techniques for maintaining momentum.

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Overt. By overt I mean primarily behavior that we can see and hear. Referring earlier to the premise that culture change begins with behavior, what we need to know more about is how to translate the vision (future state), mission, and values that represent the goals for the organization culture change efforts into the behavioral practices that will lead to the desired future state. I tell our doctoral students that they must learn how to be “translators.” In essence, it is about measurement—composing behavioral state- ments that can be used as a Likert-type scale for ratings and in turn provide feedback for managers who are in key change roles.

I have found over the years when supervising students for their doctoral disserta- tion research that more often than not, the central problem for their studies is one of measurement—are we measuring what we say we are measuring? This is a validity question, of course, yet not all that apparent until the data have been collected, and then we have a difficult time understanding what the numbers mean particularly when those numerical outcomes did not support the hypotheses for the research.

Perhaps I am not addressing innovative needs as much as I am harping on the importance of devoting the time, energy, and effort to composing effective behavioral statements that will reveal the realities of an organization’s culture and how to change it. Purchasing an instrument over the Internet purporting to measure an organization’s culture is not likely to do the job. Besides, we must craft our own so that it is tailored to the organization’s change goals. Innovation and hard work in the translation thereof is the need.

Covert. By covert I mean getting beneath the surface of an organization’s culture, finding ways to go beyond what E. H. Schein (2004) refers to as the first level, cul- tural artifacts, and the second level, espoused beliefs and values, to his third level of culture—the basic underlying assumptions that organizational members hold. These basic assumptions are (a) rarely if ever discussed; (b) taken for granted, that is, assumed; and (c) based on beliefs and behaviors that have over time contributed to the success of the organization; beliefs about what to embrace and support, and beliefs about what to avoid. According to E. H. Schein (2004), these assumptions “tend to be non-confrontable and non-debatable, and hence are extremely difficult to change” (p. 31). To change ultimately the organization’s culture, we must neverthe- less get to those matters that “are extremely difficult to change” which helps explain why the change failure rate is so high.

Moreover, to change the culture means that organizational leaders and consultants must devote considerable time and energy to the effort—time spent on building open- ness and trust so that organizational members will talk and feel safe in doing so. After all, the culture change at BA took at least 5 years.

In using the terms getting at the underlying assumptions, what do we mean? We mean things such as trying to understand why organizational members interact with one another as they do day in and day out, what is ok to say openly and what is not, and why not? Also, trying to understand how the history of the organization affects today’s behavioral patterns, for example, what is cherished and held onto from the

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past—at BA it was things such as their enviable safety record that needed to remain if not strengthened and that the long-haul pilots and crew had more status than the short- haul members. The highest status of all were the pilots and crew for the former Concorde flights. These status factors were a hindrance to the changes that were desired, that is, they contributed to elitism, which in turn worked against the attempts to instill participative management and involvement processes.

We need new thinking about and development of ways to help organizational mem- bers feel safe during times of upheaval. Attempting to address basic underlying assump- tions means that emotions will be front and center, and resistance may loom large. Encouraging people to talk about their feelings of fear and resistance can be helpful in (a) understanding what’s underneath the surface and (b) moving the organization toward the change goals.

Perhaps this need for new thinking and methods should focus on techniques that are nondirect. In other words, such approaches might be more beneficial than a more direct approach of asking people to talk about the past, their feelings and fears, and so on. Role-play and simplified versions of psychodrama come to mind, or depicting the culture in art form—painting or sculpting.

The point is that innovation is needed to access culture in many ways that will surface the “undiscussables” as well as feelings and impressions that are difficult to articulate, to put into words, and to simplify.

Sustaining, maintaining momentum. Although most any attempt to change an organi- zation is difficult, it is easier to initiate a change effort than to sustain it once under- way. When change is underway and movement is occurring, the process is typically messy if not chaotic, and things do not actualize as planned. The new software that we were counting on is not working, and some people are simply not doing what they said they would do, and so on. During such times and tribulations, change recipients in particular begin to get weary and say things such as “I knew this whole thing wouldn’t work; it’s simply too much,” or “Things are a mess, nobody seems to know what to do, and the boss is no where to be found.” In other words, people begin to give up, and the change dies a slow but sure death. It is likely that the primary cause of organization change failure is the experience of having to deal with the consequences of initiatives and interventions that were unanticipated, surprising, and unpredictable. We plan change in a linear manner, Step 1 (unfreeze), Step 2 (movement), Step 3, and so on, but the implementation of change is nonlinear, and we are having to spend most of our time on dealing with unanticipated consequences not what we thought the change was going to be or look like.

To maintain momentum, there is at least one clear and extremely important action to take. When something occurs that was not anticipated, and this something, for example, software problem, creates a significant barrier to the success of the overall change effort, it is critical that the problem be tackled immediately and be solved as soon as humanly possible. Otherwise, the process, the movement toward the change goals gets bogged down, and momentum is lost, and discouragement ensues.

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Other steps and activities are needed as well to sustain the change process such as celebrating events when milestones are reached or recognizing certain individuals who have contributed to the effort significantly.

In human affairs, momentum can be rather ephemeral and not obvious. Yet in sports we can tell when one team changes the tide and begins to outperform the other team, or even a single individual against an opponent as in tennis or boxing. With respect to an organization change effort, it is probably more important to concentrate on teamwork and create supportive activities, such as appreciative inquiry, and pro- vide resources that help team members work together well. Good teamwork can be contagious for other teams and thereby contribute to momentum. In any case, the need for innovation in this category of momentum is enormous since the lack of sustain- ment may be the greatest cause of organization change failure.

Changing an organization’s culture is a long-term endeavor. Persistence is key because from time to time and at whatever stage of the change process, resistance on the part of organizational members is highly likely. For us ODC practitioners, and again, at least speaking for myself, there has been a tendency to assume that organi- zational members will either resist the change or embrace it. It is not that simple, as we shall see in the next section.

Resistance Isn’t What It Used to Be First, allow me to own up to my contribution to the problem discussed in this section. Second, the issues will be explored combined with an admonition to modernize our thinking and practice.

On occasions when I am wearing my organization change consultant hat, I have been known to advise my clients when they are planning a change effort for their orga- nization to categorize their organizational members, that is, the change recipients and eventual implementers of the change, into two groups—the champions camp, those who are likely to be supportive of the proposed change, and the resistance camp, those who are likely to be opposed to the proposed change. Then I advise my change leaders to plan their strategy and tactics accordingly. This advice stems from my training and education in the field. I grew up on Coch and French (1948), and luminaries such as Goodwin Watson (1967) and Paul Lawrence (1969), all of whom emphasized the term overcome in dealing with resistance. I tended to think in “we–they” terms. “You are either for or against us!”

But I also learned later that all resistance is not the same. O’Toole (1995) in his book Leading Change devoted an entire chapter to “Change Resisted: Thirty-Three Hypotheses Why.” Resistance can not only be forceful but can also take a variety of forms. Hambrick and Cannella (1989) boiled it down to three kinds—blind, ideological, and political. They defined each one, and then I took their distinctions a step further and suggested different ways of dealing with each of the three types (Burke, 2011). In other words, resistance is real, to be expected, and should be dealt with quite deliberately.

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Piderit’s (2000) work, however, began to turn me around. She pointed out that responses to change are “neither consistently negative nor consistently positive” (p. 783). Ambivalence may be the more dominant reaction. Thoughtful people may see the positive outcomes of change yet at the same time be wary of potentially adverse consequences. At about the same time, Dent and Goldberg (1999) challenged our thinking (certainly my thinking) about the nature of resistance, that is, the idea, or mental model, as they referred to it, that there is consistently resistance to change and leaders and managers must overcome it. These authors then showed us how manage- ment textbooks have perpetuated the mental model that resistance is a given, without defining it, and strategies must be developed for overcoming it. Dent and Goldberg (1999) also traced the emergence of the term resistance starting with Kurt Lewin. He, of course, embedded resistance within an energy field of forces, that is, the person within context. The Coch and French (1948) study exemplified Lewin’s theoretical approach. Yet in the tracing of the resistance concept, Dent and Goldberg argued that many have strayed from Lewin’s origins and made resistance more psychological, a force within the individual rather than a combination of the individual and the context. They argued further that managers have been brainwashed (my term not theirs) about resistance, that is, it is to be expected on the part of employees and managers must overcome this resistance to make organization change work. This mental model has therefore exacerbated the problem not unlike a self-fulfilling prophecy, and what must be overcome according to Dent and Goldberg is this mode of thinking not resistance per se. Moreover, they argued that resistance since Lewin’s time has been narrowed to a psychological phenomenon instead of a systemic one and located within change recipients—the “others” who have to be overcome. The implication by Dent and Goldberg (1999) was that resistance has become an inappropriate if not outmoded term.

Ford, Ford, and D’Amelio (2008) more recently picked up the banner, but moved from narrowing to broadening when they declared in the opening statement of their article that “It is time to expand our understanding of resistance to change, including its sources and its potential contribution to effective change management” (p. 362). Change agents (leaders and managers of change and their consultants whether internal or external) act as if what they perceive to be resistance actually is resistance. “There is no consideration assigned by change agents to the behaviors and communications of change recipients, or that these interpretations are either self-serving or self-fulfilling” (p. 362). Perceived resistance is rarely seen by change agents as rational, thoughtful, or reflective. The perspective of change agents concerning resistance to organization change is there- fore quite limited. Ford and his colleagues provide three ways of expanding our under- standing of resistance and in so doing they have helped us improve our practice:

Sensemaking. Borrowing terminology from Weick (1995), Ford et al. depicted the interaction between change agents and change recipients as a matter of problem solv- ing that leads to an attempt to make sense out of the change situation, or vice versa, that is, trying to make sense can lead to solving a problem. The problem for change agents is one of determining how best to implement change, and for change recipients,

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it is more personal—what does this mean for me? Instead of assuming automatic resistance and acting accordingly thereby enacting the self-fulfilling prophecy, change agents can alternatively assume that two different problems exist. One problem is theirs, and there is another problem for the recipients. Proceeding down a path of prob- lem clarification, making sense of the situation, and then problem solving is not the same as assuming resistance and then acting in such a way as to evoke it.

Change agent contributions to resistance. Ford et al. (2008) cite several studies (and we know from accounts in the media) that demonstrate how resistance can be generated from change agents’ breaking agreements and violating trust. Evidence also shows, on the other hand, that when change agents work to repair damaged relationships and restore trust resistance decreases.

Communication breakdowns can also contribute to resistance when change agents (a) fail to legitimize change, that is, not to make the case, explain the reasons, show the need adequately; (b) misrepresent the chances of success, for example, change agents attempting to make themselves look good; and (c) resist perceived resistance, that is, to ignore change recipients ideas, proposals, or counteroffers. Change agents can come across to recipients as defensive, highly stubborn, and seeing the change to be done in only one way.

Resistance as a resource. Worse than resistance is apathy. At least with resistance there is energy, and the recipients care about something. Resistance can help keep discussion going and potentially moving in a problem-solving direction. Moreover, resistance when expressed is, after all, a form of engagement and can eventually move some recipients from ambivalence to acceptance. With such movement on the part of some, others may join in albeit perhaps slowly. This is when patience on the part of change agents can be a virtue.

Ford et al. (2008) also pointed out that resistance is a form of conflict, yet as we know, when differences among people are surfaced, confronted, and debated, improved decision making can occur. In other words, the organization change effort can prog- ress just perhaps not quite in the same way as change agents may have planned or thought that the process might proceed.

These authors concluded their article with a “reconstruction” of resistance by stat- ing that it “can be more appropriately understood as a dynamic among three elements” (Ford et al., 2008, p. 370). These elements are (a) recipient action, (b) change agent sensemaking, and (c) the change agent–recipient relationship. Recipient action refers to attempts to shift private and internal feelings about organizational change to more public behaviors. The more such attempts are successful, the more change agents have actual “data” to work with rather than, say, interpreting silence and lack of affect as resistance. Change agent sensemaking means that none of the recipients’ actions and behaviors “are, in and of themselves, resistance, and they do not become resistance unless and until change agents assign the label resistance to them as part of their sen- semaking” (p. 371). Thus, some behaviors may reflect resistance and some may not. The third element, change agent–recipient relationship, constitutes the interaction

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between the two parties. This means that resistance should be considered as a two-way street—that both parties may indeed contribute to the problem.

To summarize, let me provide a brief anecdote about organization change and perceived resistance.

Several years ago in my role as director of our graduate programs in social organi- zational psychology I (read “change agent/leader”) proposed that we initiate a new MA program in addition to the two programs (MA and PhD) that we had been provid- ing for well more than 20 years. I explained (I thought patiently) the market, the need, and our capabilities of delivering such a program successfully. When I finished, there was a long silence followed finally by a faculty member’s raising questions rather than cheering me on. I perceived the questions to be resistance, and I became rather bel- ligerent and withdrawn. A rather heated debate then ensued. I later learned that my colleague was not necessarily opposed to the idea; her behavior could more accurately be labeled as ambivalent (Piderit, 2000). In fact, we as a faculty did decide to proceed with the new program. As the change agent, I came close by my own behavior to ful- filling a prophecy about my colleague who was not necessarily resistant, only ques- tioning. As the change agent, I needed to have treated these questions as important concerns, reasons to explore in more depth the rationale and potential hazards for such a program.

This short story captures and illustrates the primary points that Ford et al. (2008) make—the role and behavior of the change agent, the change recipient, and the inter- action between the two. It is this dynamic, to use Ford and his colleagues’ term, that needs to be understood in more depth and used as a framework for learning and skill development.

Innovation Needed As noted above, we practitioners in the world of OD and organization change, in general, need more skill in understanding (a) resistance when it is real, (b) how we may contribute to the problem, and (c) what to do to get beyond resistance and solve the actual problem. Moreover, as Ford et al. (2008) note,

There are few tools, for example, that help change agents (1) repair damaged trust resulting from broken agreements (Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004), (2) address and resolve issues of mistreatment or injustice (Folger & Skarlicki, 1999), (3) admit mistakes or take other actions that restore credibility (Kouzes & Posner, 1993; Reichers, Wanous, & Austin, 1997), or (4) complete and bring closure to the past (Albert, 1983; Ford, Ford, & McNamara, 2002). (p. 370)

Reading the references noted by Ford et al. (2008) can help and so can reading a popular-press book such as Difficult Conversations (Stone, Patton, & Heen, 1999). But there is no substitute for experiential learning, reminding me of T-groups and

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sensitivity training. Yet learning can occur from role-playing and getting feedback, from Gestalt methods, and from negotiation and conflict management exercises.

The final section of this article continues with the theme of learning, particularly experientially and in this case about leadership and leadership development.

Getting Leadership Development Right Is Long Overdue One of every two individuals who fills a position of leadership fails (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994)—failure being defined as a lack of goal accomplishment. We either have a selection or a development problem. Evidence would suggest that it is both.

Selection With respect to selection, at least three biases dominate: (a) Even though we have been warned about the dangers (e.g., Bennis & O’Toole, 2000; Levinson, 1974), the tendency to clone ourselves is strong. (b) The big five factors of personality are attrac- tive. We like people for leadership roles who are reasonably stable mentally and emotionally, agreeable, conscientious, more extroverted than introverted, and open to new experiences and learning. And throw in the additional factor that if the candi- date is a man who is 6 feet 2 inches tall, the choice is all but made (Schwartz, 2010). (c) And if not prone to cloning and if we know nothing about the big five factors, we nevertheless have some kind of bias regarding selection of our leaders. In a word, we carry around in our heads an “implicit theory” about what a leader should be and look like. The individual differences regarding these implicit theories are remarkable. Take, for example, the “experiment” that I have conducted many times.

When giving a presentation on leadership to a group of executives and managers, I begin by asking them to write down the five most important qualities or characteris- tics of a successful leader; just a word or two for each of the five—and not four, and not six, but five. Once everyone has completed the task, I pull cash out of my pocket and propose two bets of two dollars each. (Now with inflation, I have increased the wager to five dollars each.) The first bet is that there will not be any two people who will have the same list. And the second bet is that there will not be one characteristic that is common for all, that is, the same single quality or characteristic that is on every- one’s list, such as “effective communicator” or “visionary.” Having done this “experi- ment” with hundreds of executives and managers over many years, and I almost always have takers in my sessions for each of the two bets, I have never lost either of the two wagers. And I take their money; I don’t fool around. You can conduct my experiment too, of course, but a word of advice. If the group is more than 40 people, you increase the risk of losing the first bet—two individuals having the same list—and if the group is less than 20, you may lose the second bet. Within that range, however, you will make money.

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The point is that we all have “implicit theories” about what a successful leader looks like, and they are different from one another, idiosyncratic to the person making the list. Thus, when we are serving on a search committee for the new leader, we as a group have a difficult time of it when trying to agree on our choice.

To compound the selection problem, we may from time to time become involved in working with people responsible for talent management in their organizations. Typically, one of their primary responsibilities is to select “high potentials” for leader- ship development. To avoid the bias problems noted above, we in a consultant role may suggest criteria for selecting these “hi-pots.” In the end, however, we often find that bosses nominate hi-pots from among their array of subordinates, and the criteria that they use for nomination are not exactly objective. In working with a client not too long ago to improve their multirater feedback system, my doctoral students and I found rather serendipitously that executives who were selecting hi-pots from their ranks were choosing those who looked remarkably like themselves when comparing their self-ratings with those who were selected. Cloning appears to remain alive and well. To avoid this problem of bias, we gave them a set of 10 criteria for selection to use instead, but it has not been clear subsequently that this company’s executives have put them to use.

We do know some things about selection. One clear example is that our criteria for selection must fit the culture and the future vision for the organization. We ignore context at our peril. However, we sometimes face the problem of an organization’s vision for the future not being congruent with the current culture that needs to change. Thus, our selection criteria must be forward thinking. So, yes, we know some things but we have a long way to go with respect to selection of people for leadership. For a review about identifying potential, see Silzer and Church (2009).

Development Regardless of how effective or flawed our selection process may be, development of potential leaders is more difficult and complicated. Many more variables are involved. One thing does seem clear: We can train managers more easily than we can train leaders. It is easier, for example, to teach people about how to analyze a financial statement than it is to teach them about how to inspire followers. Leadership is so much more personal such that training, as compared with development and education, can be quite limited and problematical.

Considerable clarification about this problem of leadership development has recently been provided by McCall (2010). He points out that to the extent that leader- ship is learned, experience remains the best teacher. This declaration is no doubt obvi- ous, but some experiences are more important than others. McCall notes that many studies show that

successful managers describe similar experiences that shaped their develop- ment. These experiences can be classified roughly as early work experiences, short-term assignments, other people (almost always very good and very bad

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bosses or supervisors), hardships of various kinds, and some miscellaneous events like training programs. (p. 4)

Although debatable as to the exact proportions, the “70-20-10 rule” appears to be apropos, that is, 70% challenging assignments, 20% other people—especially good and bad bosses, good and bad mentors, and good and bad coaches—and 10% pro- grams. An important caveat about programs (mentoring, coaching, skill training) is that the more stand-alone they are, the less effective they turn out to be. Programs work best when they are directly in support of on-the-job developmental experiences. The 70%, developmental experiences, need to be “challenging—the unexpected, high stakes, complexity, pressure, novelty, and so on—is what makes it a potentially pow- erful learning experience” (McCall, 2010, p. 4). Helping these executives reflect on their experiences particularly with the assistance of a competent coach adds to the potential for the learning to stay with them and transfer to other situations.

Much of the original work that provided the basis for the 70-20-10 rule was con- ducted a number of years ago by McCall, Lombardo, and Morrison (1988) and since that time additional studies have been consistent about the significance of learned experience (e.g., Yost & Plunkett, 2009).

The process for leadership development is now clear—providing challenging job assignments from which potential leaders can learn. But what in particular should they be learning? The huge number of lessons learned as reported by executives in the stud- ies over the years by McCall and his colleagues (and reported in McCall, 2010) can be summarized in terms of the five basic demands of the leadership role:

1. Setting and communicating direction—determining purpose, vision, goals, and establishing support for these endeavors

2. Aligning critical constituencies—making sure that those who need to support these endeavors are “on board”

3. Developing an executive temperament—being able to cope with complexity, ambiguity, and the pressures of the leadership role

4. Setting and living values—clarifying what to believe in and stand for, and making sure that as leader one’s words match one’s actions

5. Growth of self and others—practicing and supporting in others’ lifelong learning, growth, and change

A way of thinking about the overall process of leadership development is to con- ceptualize it as a set of stages or phases. First, we have to select those who have high potential using appropriate criteria and avoiding cloning. Second, we need to provide opportunities for learning via challenging job assignments. Third, we must understand that having a challenging experience alone does not guarantee learning. A program of personal reflection is key. Most of us need assistance with this reflective process, someone to discuss our experience with—a mentor and a coach, preferably two dif- ferent people. Fourth, and finally, we need to establish procedures for evaluating the effectiveness of the previous three phases, that is, a set of measures (such as multirater

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feedback, job performance indicators, rate of promotion, and extent to which one is selected for additional challenging assignments) that can help us improve if not sig- nificantly change our overall program of leadership development. See Table 2 for a summary of such a phased program of leadership development.

It is one thing to conceptualize an overall phased program of leadership develop- ment and quite another to implement such an elaborate and complex process. A sig- nificant problem lies at the outset, which can be characterized as an issue of performance versus development. To what extent are top executives committed to development of leaders, which requires deliberate placement of a high potential individual into a job that is new, the person has no previous experience with such an assignment, and it is perhaps risky, as opposed to a placement decision based on tried-and-true experience already by the individual and the possibility of failure being remote. With the pres- sures that executives face in our rapidly changing world putting an inexperienced per- son, regardless of how bright and able the individual may be, into a tough, risky assignment requires a strong commitment to development, a commitment that most executives are unwilling to make. McCall (2010) addressed this issue and suggested, among other ideas, to “embed development seamlessly in the business strategy” (p. 11). In short, he argued that it is better to “join with” executives than to confront them about the development versus performance issue. Whether to fight or join, we as change consultants nevertheless have a lot to learn about how to ensure that evidence- based knowledge regarding leadership development gets used appropriately in the organizations we serve.

Table 2. A Phased Program of Leadership Development

Phase I, Selection Phase II, Job Assignments Phase III, Reflection Phase IV, Evaluation

• Based on the criteria that are grounded in the organization’s current or future, desired state

• Avoid cloning of bosses

• Emphasize diversity— heterogeneous executives outperform homogeneous executives

• Provide challenging assignments such as • Turn around, fix-it jobs

• A leap in scope, e.g., from middle manager to general manager

• Line to staff switch • Start from scratch, e.g., new business line

• Task force and project management

• Provide support for learning via • Mentoring • Coaching with emphasis on learning and introspection

• Specific skill- based training, e.g., public speaking

• Before and after assessments based on multirater systems

• Performance appraisal

• Promotion rate • Extent to which a person is selected for further challenging assignments

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Summary and Conclusions

Arguably, the field of ODC has been stagnant for at least the past two decades with respect to innovation and new social technology. The fact, however, that the field has existed for half a century and continues to the present day may mean for some that ODC is here to stay and has proved itself. The job of creation is done, and it is a mat- ter of practicing well what we know how to do. With this article, my argument, on the other hand, has been that there is considerable unfinished business at hand. Two points: First, we must face the reality that well above the majority of organization change efforts fail. To assume that we know a lot about organization change and how to manage change effectively is a matter of unwarranted hubris. Second, the strengths of ODC have been largely based on loosening tight systems. Our expertise regarding the opposite, tightening loose systems, is sparse at best.

So we must learn to work with loosely coupled and highly decentralized systems and help them operate better, that is, the work may be more about improvement not revolution. Transformational interventions are probably too powerful and overwhelm- ing for the fragile and subtle nature of a network or a highly decentralized organization. Moreover, as noted earlier, once autonomy has been authorized and become inherent to the system you cannot “go home again.” Autonomy is about freedom and liberty, precious commodities in our society and way of life, so tightening the system may generate massive resistance if not rebellion. With a loosely coupled system, a large group intervention might need to focus on how to keep the organization together rather than change it into something else that would result in tightening (see, e.g., Kaplan, 1982). Or perhaps the initiative should be on what to keep loose and what to tighten. Working in this kind of dialectical manner is where learning and innovation are needed.

At the risk of overstating the point, it is as if the work of ODC is complete. By declaring the opposite and stating that there is unfinished business, I am attempting to instill a Zeigarnik effect, and as we know, when this effect is established, we seek closure. Achieving closure, then, is to seek and conduct innovative activities and then to write about it. I have proposed four areas for such work. There are other areas, of course, but there is plenty to do just with these four.

Now, please allow me to close on a personal note. Perhaps, I have been trained too well in how the traditional ways of doing the work of organizational change occur and am therefore stuck in my ways. To be the kind of the organization change practitioner, I continue to aspire to be, I must constantly learn, get out of my comfort zone, and try new approaches, such as learning how to tighten a loosely coupled system. If I do not continue to learn and change, then I will contribute to the stagnation of the ODC field.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Debra Noumair and Bill Pasmore for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

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Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

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Bio

W. Warner Burke is the Edward L. Thorndike Professor of Psychology and Education at Teachers College, Columbia University where he serves as coordinator for the graduate pro- grams in social-organizational psychology and chair of the Department of Organization and Leadership. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Management, Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology (SIOP), and the Association for Psychological Science. Some of his awards include the Public Service Medal from NASA, the distinguished scholar-practitioner award from the Academy of Management, the distinguished professional contributions award from SIOP, and lifetime achievement awards from the OD Network and Linkage, Inc. His most recent book is the 3rd edition of Organization Change: Theory and Practice published by Sage (2011).

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